Design of RBOs Mex - Example LermaCH F

8/7/2019 Design of RBOs Mex - Example LermaCH F

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The Design of River Basin Organizations in Mexico

The Example of Lerma - Chapala

Eduardo Mestre

Consultant,

Former President of the International Network of River Basin Organizations INBO andformer Regional Manager of the Comisin Nacional de Agua, Mxico

Paper originally presented at the 5th River Basin Management Workshop

Sponsored by

The Water Resources Management Thematic Group in RDV

and

W ld B k I tit t (WBI)


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World Bank Institute (WBI)

The Water Resources Management Thematic Group in RDVand the World Bank Institute

Fifth workshop on River Basin Management Institutions.

Washington, D.C., August 28, 2001

The Design of River Basin Organizations in Mexico

The Example of Lerma - Chapala

Eduardo MestreConsultant,

Former President of the International Network of River Basin Organizations INBO and formerRegional Manager of the Comisin Nacional de Agua, Mxico

I. Summary

Lerma Chapala Basin is a complex region in Central Mexico with grave national economic and socialrelevance. By 1988, severe water scarcity and pollution claimed for integrated action, as issues andconflicts surpassed Government efforts. Chapala Lake, the largest in Mexico, and the third in

dimensions in Latin America, was experiencing low levels. In turn, more water - surface andgroundwater- had been allocated than available. A severe regional drought was affecting irrigation.Low water pricing was supporting inefficiency and low water productivity. Centralization was a critical

obstacle to improve water management. On the other hand, reduced awareness of water issues helpedkeeping low-key water users participation. Conflicts were growing among users and political entities.Public opinion, tired of scarce action, was demanding action; thus, political pressure grew steadily.

It became clear that institutional arrangements and law enforcement were critical constraints to beconsiderably improved. Furthermore, the increasing role of society in water matters, as well as the

need to raise stakeholders participation and involvement in water management, demanded longawaited reforms. Financial resources were scarce, so redefining financial instruments was badlyneeded.

To address such issues, an RBO was created by public demand and political willpower. Lerma Chapala

River Basin Council is a consultative forum, not an Authority, nor a public institution or NGO,complemented by a Federal regional agency. LCRBC is a deliberative stakeholder forum to analyzecomplaints debate and find solutions raise issues and discuss planning promote projects and actions


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amendments to legal framework, insufficient financial resources, weak water governance and lawenforcement, as well as lack of accountability and transparency.

Confidence and evidence exist in the sense that finding the right path again is possible and desirable.With proper assessment, reorientation and support, issues and conflicts may be sustainably solved, tocontribute in attaining integrated water management on a river basin scale. Rekindling action in LermaChapala Basin and thus, reviving a champion, is crucial beyond its geographic area, as its outcome

will indeed affect the possibilities of success of newly born basin organizations in Mexico. The WBmay play a relevant role to help improve present conditions, both with on-going projects that might bereoriented for such purpose, as well as by means of new projects to respond to present and expectedchallenges.

II. Foreword

Mexico's socioeconomic and cultural development has been tightly linked to water. Water is generallyscarce in Mexico, with repercussions on demographic and economic evolution patterns. Water isabundant in areas with scarce population and modest overall economic activity, whereas is scarce inareas where most Mexicans dwell and a high percentage of GNP is produced. Mexico's developmenthas influenced water use and inspired its legal framework.

In many regions, Mexico currently faces critical imbalance between water demand and availability,

primarily due to natural water scarcity. Rapid urban and industrial growth, have worsened this scenario.Water needs have raised, water uses are fiercely competing with each other and conflicts are surging. Inturn, the transboundary nature of water has ignited sectoral conflicts as well as disputes amongmunicipios and states. Water quality has deteriorated as many urban and industrial effluents are stilldischarged with no previous treatment.

Mexico covers 1.97 million km2, with a population of 100 million and an annual growth of 1.8%. Acomplex system of mountain ranges creates 310 hydrological basins with varying degrees of hydraulicdevelopment and water pollution. Among them, Lerma-Chapala stands alone as the most important.

Consequently, it is a high priority for at all government levels - federal, state and municipal. Publicawareness on water issues in Lerma-Chapala has led to active participating roles played by water users,NGOs and social institutions with a plethora of interests directly or indirectly linked to the water sector.


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Figure 1. Main river systems in Mexico

Source: SIGANet National WaterCommission


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government-run by a sole federal ministry with little interaction with water users or even with federal,state, and municipal authorities. RBECs became powerful organisms far beyond water management,

challenging existing state and regional political schemes. By 1977 all of them had been dismantled.Urban, industrial, and tertiary economic growth during 1960-1980 strongly influenced water qualitydeterioration; furthermore, water demand soared and surpassed water availability in highly developedbasins like Lerma River and the Valley of Mexico. Water imports (interbasin transfers) were triggered.Certain uses were displaced, mainly irrigated agriculture.

Mexico's development required hydraulic legislation; thus, the Federal Water Law was enacted in 1972,although its mandatory regulations were never published. Hence, law enforcement was weak.

In 1976, the Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources Secretariat (AHRS) - a new federal ministry became Federal water Authority. Water became a resource to promote agricultural activities. No policywas adopted to reduce aquifer overdrafting and solve raising surface runoff rivalries among users. Nocomprehensive water management policy was implemented, although sustainability was graduallybecoming an issue. Consequently, other competing uses such as industry and urban centers were leftbehind, triggering a fierce fight for water in many communities and watersheds. Many conflicts remainunsolved sometimes contributing to social unrest.

In 1989 the National Water Commission (NWC) was established as sole Federal water Authority,

located within AHRS. Its broad water management responsibilities comprised water allocation anddistribution among users, federal water rights revenues collection for water use and effluent discharge(a basin tariff, a pseudotax similar to the French redevance and the Spanish canon, designed to partiallyfund the water sector and simultaneously induce better water practices) as well as hydraulicinfrastructure planning, construction, and operation. Although empowered to foster better watermanagement, NWC dedicated itself mostly to mitigate the enormous gap between water supply anddemand for agricultural and domestic uses. Meanwhile, a change of paradigms from supply to demandmanagement was becoming necessary.

In December 1992 the National Water Law (NWL) was enacted, and in January 1994 its correspondingregulations. This great improvement in legal framework strengthened NWC legal status and role. Suchinstruments address with a wider scope water planning and management, although falling short inprevisions for law enforcement and centralization. Further amendments in NWL regulations havedi t t d it i i l d bj ti d k d i l t t t


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widespread even within NWC. This has directly defined the profile of the water sector in Mexico, moreoriented to infrastructure and less knowledgeable in water management.

IV. The Institutional Setting

Federal Governmentrole Is the sole water Authority. The President himself (i.e. expedition ofregulations and decrees) or through NWC2 (i.e. National Water Plan development and implementation,federal water management, law enforcement) is responsible for national water management. NWLregulations provide procedures for law enforcement that have proven insufficient. Additionally theFederal Rights Law (a fiscal law of capital importance for the water sector) entitles NWC to collectwater rights (basin tariffs) from national water users and for effluent discharges to national water bodies.

Such Law foresees an annual debate, approval and publication of precise basin tariffs for both aspects.Hence, NWC is a Federal Regulator with ample attributes; furthermore, it exceptionally plays the role ofoperator in terms of direct water supply to end users. Finally, Mexico is a Federal State, althoughhistorically very centralized and authoritarian; the repercussions in water management are still stronglycarrying on.

State and municipal governments participation Before 1992 state and municipal governments had littleparticipation in water management3. Even today, their possible participation in Basin Councils needs tobe accompanied by more robust direct involvement in water management. Legal framework has yet to

grant state and municipal governments means to enhance their direct participation in activities presentlyreserved solely to NWC. Although a priority, decentralization in water sector is weak. Efforts have beenmade, especially by the states within Lerma Chapala Basin, but centralization is still very strong. Incontrast, stakeholder participation is gradually increasing and breeding a more solid water sector.

Role of river basin councils According to NWL and its regulations, RBCs are means to coordinategovernment institutions and to negotiate with water users and social organizations, pursuing as mainobjectives to formulate and execute programs and actions to improve regional water management,support of hydraulic works development and related services, and preserve river basin resources.

River basin councils were conceived as plural, open forums where existing problems are ventilated, andactions are agreed for the benefit of river basins and their population, according to a previously acceptedwater agenda or, through an orthodox master water plan. Since 1989, Lerma Chapala River BasinCouncil has been the forerunner of this new approach toward improved regional water management.


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Figure 3. Lerma Chapala Basin. Elevations and hydrographic network

V. Lerma Chapala River Basin. A Brief Description

Lerma Chapala Basin is of paramount importance to Mexico, in economic, political and social terms. Itis also the melting pot for new ideas in many fields, and for one, it is the leader in water managementschemes, born of unfulfilled expectations from users and society.Lerma River, with a length of 750 Km, is originated in Mexicos central high plateau at an altitudebeyond 3000 meters above sea level (masl). Lerma river ends in Chapala Lake (1510 masl) , the largesttropical lake in Mexico, 77 Km long and 23 Km wide, the third largest in Latin America. Its maximumstorage capacity is 8.13 km3 with a global surface close around 110,000 hectares. Chapala is rathershallow; its average depth is 7.2 m, with a maximum of just 16 m. Lerma river basin, a tropical region

with an average temperature of 21 degrees Celsius, has an area of 54,421 Km2

- less than 3% ofMexicos entire territory - features an average rainfall of 735 mm per year, mainly concentrated duringsummer, from which a mean runoff of 5.76 km3 is derived. Chapala Lake gives birth to Santiago Riverthat flows westward downstream finally reaching the Pacific Ocean. Santiago river basin is less


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of the industrial GNP (9% of Mexicos GNP). Furthermore, 20 per cent of all national commerce andservice activities occur within this basin.

With its three economic sectors highly developed and with a superior transportation network - that waspartially financed by private investors - this is in fact one of the richest regions in Latin America.

Water stress As a result of intensive socioeconomic activity, available water per capita is very low.Although mean rainfall is similar to the national average, less than a thousand cubic meters of water areavailable per inhabitant per year - one fifth of the national average. Scarcity has been increased by asteadily growing water demand that already surpasses natural availability and sewage discharges.

Irrigated agriculture, the main water user, represents 78 per cent of all water abstractions, surface runoff

and groundwater; 14 per cent of thee regions total area is irrigated. Regionally, industry and domesticwater supply water uses are modest, but are quite relevant on a local level, exerting great pressure onground water and holding a fierce competition with agriculture for land and water.

A surface runoff regional water balance shows deficits within the Lerma river basin. Lake Chapala, thefinal natural reservoir in the basin, having its inflow gradually reduced, was unable to cope withabstractions and losses, its water levels continually declining. Water stress is critical.

Some 26,000 deep-water wells operate within the basin, with low efficiency rates, derived from highelectric consumption and little water yields. Almost 70% of all 38 aquifers in the region are

overexploited. Regional aquifer water recharge is 3,980 million m3 per year, and the demand is at least4,621 million m3 per year. Nevertheless, regional figures hide severe local and regional overdrafting.

Water users multiplied by seven from 1940 to 2000. Before 1989 little was made to reduce the steadygrowth of irrigated areas, both fostered by Federal investments and construction --reflecting a biasedsectoral approach in water management--, as by scarce control of illegal abstractions, as water rightslicenses were unnecessary; thus, it became very easy to have a water well with a provisional permit that in time proved to be definitive--. More than 80% of todays deep wells were bored in the past 30years. The reasons are clear: a mixture of negligence, lack of sustainable water management policy,

poor and biased baseline knowledge on water availability, high corruption levels and unfortunaterepercussions of having water being managed within AHRS, hence, with a heavy bias in favor ofagriculture. As always, sub-sectoral water management yields some bitter results and heavy costs thatmust be met sooner or later. Many social pressures were provisionally solved by means of reducing


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Figure 4. Lerma Chapala Basin Water Balance: Surface and Groundwater

Conflicts derived from surface runoff uses (mainly for irrigation and potable water supplies), combinedwith general discharge of untreated effluents, have originated serious regional - and local - pollutionproblems. Frequent conflicts over water quality occur in Chapala Lake. By 1989, most reaches wereeither polluted or severly polluted, with the exception of reaches close to basin boundaries. Thus, in thereach from its origins to Toluca, the river had acceptable water quality, whereas the river reaches fromToluca effluent discharge points to Alzate Dam, from Salamanca to Turbio river confluence, and fromLa Piedad to Duero river confluence were considered to be highly polluted. Some tributaries were alsoclassified as highly polluted: Queretaro river, high Turbio river, and Grande de Morelia river. As could

be expected, Chapala Lake, the final basin reservoir, received a heavy toll of pollutants discharged bothby Lerma River and the cities and villages in the vicinity of the lake. In May 1989, 90 per cent of thereservoir was classified as having unacceptable water quality for certain uses such as drinking water orfish breeding.


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Figure 5. Water quality in Lerma Basin

VI. The New Basin Institutional Arrangement. The Lerma Chapala River Basin Council is born

A wide-ranging water diagnosis and assessment existing by mid-1989, clearly portrayed four capitalproblems in the Lerma river basin: (1) scarcity, as well as unsuitable water allocation, (2) pollution, (3)low water use efficiencies, and (4) environmental deterioration with scarce on-going preventive actions.To turn the tide, it became clear that it would be insufficient and imprudentto maintain the federalgovernment as sole responsible for such severe problems as well as the only capable or entitled to solveor mitigate them. Many groups and individuals, both from public and private sectors, water users, andsociety itself, should become involved. A need for a coordinated plan and organization was beyonddiscussion. Success could bring hope to other basins with similar conditions; failure will make thingseven worse.

Social reactions to existing problems were clear and harsh, especially in Jalisco and Guanajuato. Bittercriticism to Federal weak and lukewarm actions was surmounting. Local authorities as well as State andFederal institutions were subject to pressure. Politicians were receiving a heavy load of complaints andd d f i E did f diff l i i l di h P id f


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Under such critical scenario, subject to heavy political and social pressure derived from ailing Chapala the trigger --, on April 13, 1989 the Federal government and the five River Basin State governmentssigned a historic agreement to adopt four main objectives to advance in solving the main problems:

Distribution of water among users according to a new water allocation policy a new

water deal for the basin --

Improvement of water quality by treating municipal and industrial raw effluents

Increasing water-use efficiency

Protecting and conserving the river basin system.

This was the original water agenda. When drafting the April 1989 Agreement, many other possiblebj i i h h b d d h k i i l h il d F h

Reasons that triggered action in Lerma Chapala Basin to improve water management

A. Main Issues. -

Low Chapala Lake levels

Water allocation disorder: more water allocated than available

High pollution levels: water availability was reduced

A severe regional drought: low levels in reservoirs and aquifers Low water pricing: inefficiency and low water productivity

Centralization inertia

Reduced awareness on certain water issues; Low participation of key water users;

growing sectoral conflicts for water and political disputes among municipios and states

Public opinion demanded action; Political pressure was steadily growing

B. Motivations and needs. -

A new Federal Water Authority had been recently created

Institutional arrangements and law enforcement had to be considerably improved

Increasing role of society in issues related to the environment, natural resources and

water

The need to increase stakeholders participation and involvement in water

management

Requirements to increase and diversify financial sources to support water sector

spending, and consequently, the need to redefine financial instruments


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Figure 6. Initial Objectives for Lerma Chapala Water Management Improvement

On September 1, 1989 a Consultative Council (a preliminary embryonic river basin council solelyintegrated by government officials: federal and state) was integrated to follow up and evaluate goalsand tasks derived from the water agenda and to ensure that commitments derived from April 1989Agreement be honored. The Consultative Council was integrated (1) by the President of the Republic asHonorary member, (2) by Ministers of Agriculture, Fisheries, Urban and Social Development,Environment, Health, and Federal Comptroller, (3) by CEOs of decentralized institutions dealing with

energy (Electricity CFE -- and Oil Pemex -) and (4) by the Governors of the five States in the basin.NWCs Director General becamen Council secretary responsible of its agenda. Such leadership provedto be fruitful.

Th il i d T h i l W k G (TWG) i i l h d b f


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Political and technical approaches With such arrangements, the Consultative Council met roughly ona yearly basis under a very political and financial atmosphere, with the presence of Federal Ministers,

State Governors and high-level government officials (the President of the Republic chaired severalCouncil sessions). Meanwhile the TWG became the technical and productive workhorse that madethings happen. Meeting places both for the Consultative Council and the TWG were either in largecities, small townships or in rural areas, on any of all five States. Thus, an opportunity of having localguests participating in such meetings helped raise awareness and interest among stakeholders, as well asto moderate existing criticism with regards to water management issues.

The centralization pendulum Moderate opposition to the Consultative Council existed since thebeginning, both inside NWC because it affected the establishment and its interests, clearly expressed

in shrewd attempts to recentralize attributes and actions and outside as State Governments in somecases preferred a bilateral arrangement with NWC, especially because such commission maintained atight control on water budgeting in Mexico it still does. Within NWC those in charge of watersupply and sanitation programs were especially reluctant to let the Consultative Council have a part ofany proposals or decision-making, technical or financial, especially in treatment plants. Bitter strugglesexisted and second-level central public servants, to reduce the momentum, every now and then imposedobstacles. Such area continuously criticized the Consultative Council and the Regional Agency for theresults obtained with the Water Quality Improvement Program. Those public servants working inNWCs irrigation offices had a milder reaction, because budgetary discussions and decision making in

terms of water works had little to do with the Consultative Council first phase programs.

The long road: Forging consensus By late 1989 many activities were on their way and resourcespoured in from different sources to attain goals and push forward to new challenges. It is pretty clearthat all activities were originally government-run (Federal and State governments). However, theexperience in terms of multiple coordination, political will, financial instruments, and team spirit werevery rich. Of course, many apparently insurmountable problems arose. As a preventive medicine,consensus was adopted as the sole manner to solve disputes. Fortunately, differences in opinion,technical expertise, and political views were always settled, either in-group work sessions or by means

of lobbying. In many occasions when discussions headed nowhere, sessions were suspended andbilateral and multilateral negotiations started. Such approach was of paramount importance to manysuccesses attained.

F t h diffi lt t tt i TWG t d th P t W k


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The NWL in its 13th Article6, supports the creation of river basin organizations. Perhaps a strongerposition towards RBO could have been established as in the Brazilian or Colombian Laws, inspired in

the NWL, but it was sufficient to trigger actions.In drafting such article, regional water management alternative organizations were considered withinand beyond NWC: either continue with an exclusive-government model such as the ConsultativeCouncil or by improving the basin commission model from the past or to have river basin mixedorganisms, with government and non government participants. Since the beginning, the latter option waschosen for the Mexican scenario, following basic concepts of institutional engineering. The second stepto define institutional arrangements had already been decided since NWC was born: to have regionalagencies Gerencias Regionales empowered by and subordinated to NWC. The duet Consejo de

Cuenca Gerencia Regionalresulted.According to NWL, which establishes the basis to create RBCs, the Consultative Council becameLerma-Chapala River Basin Council on January 28, 1993, the first RBC in Mexican history.

LERMACHAPALA

RIVER BASIN

COUNCIL

STATE

GOVERNMENTS

STATE

GOVERNMENTS

MUNICIPALITIESMUNICIPALITIES

FEDERALGOVERNMENT

FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT

COORDINATION

SUSTAINABLE

WATER

MANAGEMENT

ENHANCED

WATER SERVICES

INTEGRATED

WATERSHED

PROTECTION

SUSTAINABLE

WATER

MANAGEMENT

ENHANCED

WATER SERVICES

INTEGRATED

WATERSHED

PROTECTION

POLITICAL

WILL

LEGAL AND

FINANCIAL

INSTRUMENTS

POLITICAL

WILL

LEGAL AND

FINANCIAL

INSTRUMENTS

NGOWATER

CONSENSUS- BUILDING


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LCRBC was born, on one hand, blessed by a Federal Law that fostered such regional institutionalarrangements; on the other hand, LCRBC was limited to participate in crucial water management tasks

by the same Law (not expressly but rather by omission), a matter of little importance during the first twoyears of life for the new basin council, but that dramatically modified the scenario when NWLregulations were eventually amended to strengthen the NWC that was loosing its grip on many activitiesand programs and was weakened by considerable loss of proficient personnel. In doing so, nowadaysNWC is entitled to discretionally invite members to participate in the RBC. Clearly, such move has beenfavorable to centralization purposes and goes against the spirit itself of having basin councils. Hence,profound changes within the legal and institutional framework-- have to be made if river basins are tobe used as cost-effective instruments to promote reforms towards integrated and sustainable watermanagement.


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do with Federal leadership, centralization and political positions within the RBC and beyond, vis a visincreasing autonomy by State Governments. Finally, a compromise was attained where users

representatives would surge from State water users organizations within Lerma Chapala Basin, andfrom there, the General Assembly would select its representatives to LCRBC.

The Regional Water Users Assembly has a very complex structure and confronts incompatible intereststhat drive each water use. In every case, each committee elects its representatives (exceptions do exist),and in turn the general assembly elects six water users who will become official council members.

Fisheries CommitteeFisheries Committee

Lerma ChapalaLerma Chapala River Basin CouncilRiver Basin Council

Water Users AssemblyWater Users Assembly

Representatives to theRepresentatives to the

RiverRiver Basin CouncilBasin Council

Water UsersWater Users

GeneralGeneral AssemblyAssembly

IrrigationIrrigation

CommitteeCommittee

DomesticDomestic

WaterWater

UsersUsers

EnvironmentalEnvironmental

committeecommittee

IndustrialIndustrial andand

commercialcommercial

CommitteeCommittee

Committee onCommittee on

Oil and PowerOil and Power

Tourism andTourism and

RecreationalRecreational

UsersUsers

Figure 9. Lerma Chapala Water Users AssemblyIn summary, LCRBC is an organization to contribute to regional, sustainable, integrated, collectivewater management and protection, to coordinate action among government institutions and to buildconsensus with water users and other social stakeholders. LCRBC is a mixed organization, with


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A Bimodal ModelA Bimodal ModelRiver BasinRiver Basin

CouncilCouncil

River BasinRiver Basin

AgencyAgency

Both perceived as necessary conditionsBoth perceived as necessary conditions

Lerma ChapalaLerma Chapala

RBCRBC

GovernmentGovernment

StakeholdersStakeholders

Non GovernmentNon Government


RegionalRegional

AgencyAgency

NWCNWC

GovernmentGovernment


Figure 10. A bimodal approach to river basin water management

A bimodal approach to regional water management

In Mexico, regional institutional arrangements for water management are bimodal. Therefore, LCRBCis complemented by Lerma Santiago Pacfico Regional Agency --LSPRA-- (Gerencia Regional LermaSantiago Pacfico), a government organization subordinated to NWC, with a degree of autonomy(although centralization has yet to be defeated), and entitled to do regionally what NWC can donationally (with the exception of a few grave attributes explicitly reserved solely to the DirectorGeneral, the Secretary of SEMARNAT or the President) LSPRA is an executive arm for the LCRBC aswell as for the Federal Government. Is a continuous linkage with the rest of NWC and its wideresources, and helps in negotiations and technical-scientific activities that would become expensive forthe council to solve directly. Is entitled to suggesting levels of basin tariffs and establishing schemes fortheir collection among water users and is capable of using financial resources together with otherpossible sources in implementing the Basin Master Water Plan and its respective programs, both

d b th Ri B i C il It b Ri B i A th it i i ll i h f


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Regional Water Planning NWC developed the River Basin Master Plan draft, a top-down effort,eventually analyzed by the Councils TWG. Important lessons were learned from such process. Non-Federal TWG members rejected the Master Plan draft on grounds of not having participated in itspreparation and deliberations. Consequently, participatory planning and programming was adopted by

LCRBC7

Finally, after fierce debates and many amendments, Lerma Chapala River Basin HydraulicProgram was agreed upon. It defined the objectives, strategies, and action lines for improving the basin'swater sector.

Water allocation Since 1991 a surface water distribution agreement has been in force It established

Lerma Chapala River Basin CouncilObjectives and Attributes

A deliberative stakeholder forum where government officials, water users and other socialstakeholders meet to present and analyze complaints; demand, propose, debate and find

solutions; raise questions and issues; promote programs, projects and actions; and discuss

the incorporation of new users

Is a mixed organization, with government, water users and social representatives; it

coordinates with government bodies and builds consensus among water users and society, to

contribute in improving water management in an integrated, equitable and sustainable

manner.

It is a consultative body, not an Authority neither a public organism, an NGO or an

executive body.

Its legal personality is supported by NWL; presently, lacks patrimony

Approves annual water allocation (but none in water licensing to individuals), pollution

control, water efficiency schemes and basin protection

Is entitled to approve the Master Water Plan, programs

May conciliate problems via consensus without making decisions -- among users and

recommend actions to NWC; helps reduce conflicts among users, NGOs and government.

Is not capable of undertaking regulatory tasks and is not a service provider.

Is limited in basin tariffs final definition

Lerma Chapala River Basin CouncilObjectives and Attributes

Is a government organization, where the three levels of Government should participate,

Decisions and implementation of actions carried out with sufficient legal, technical and

financial capabilities;

Has a modest role in suggesting basin tariffs and establishing schemes for collectingrevenues;

Uses financial resources with other sources for Basin Master Water Plan implementation;

is simultaneously an executive arm for Government and the Basin Council

It plays the role of River Basin Authority

It is in charge of specific water rights licensing to individuals, pollution control, water

efficiency and basin protection

It is seldom heads water works construction

It is closely coordinated with LCRBC and is also coordinated with various Government

entities related to the water sector


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families of curves, solutions were provided to annually allocate water for large-scale water systems andto smaller systems on a sub-basin and state basis, for good, average and bad years in terms of annual

rainfall and runoff. A specific date to allocate surface water was agreed: Every November 1

st

of eachyear, a, moment in time that roughly coincides with the end of the rainy / runoff season.

Figure 11. Surface water allocated and used

During the first five years, benefits derived from the distribution agreement were systematicallyobserved in reservoir levels, in irrigated area, and the possibility of confronting drought periods withpeace of mind. Chapala recuperated healthy water levels. The surface water distribution agreement wasblessed by good or average years. Furthermore, strict discipline was applied to make water users honorwater distribution. Conflicts did occur and even reservoirs were every now and then high jacked byi i ti t t i t t dditi l t H NWC d d i k i t l


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As to groundwater allocation and reduction of aquifer overexploitation, by means of plural discussion,

an umbrella general regulation has been agreed upon for each state in the basin area. Specific regulationagreements for each aquifer are still technically and legally under discussion. Technical Committees onAquifers (TeCAS)9 are being created, where groundwater users participate, and actions are undertakento achieve rational and efficient water use Some TeCAS are currently producing good results some do

Inherent weaknesses in the surface water distribution agreement had become gradually evident:

(1) Surface water availability was overestimated derived from insufficient hydrological data --;(2) Groundwater and surface runoff interactions were inappropriately considered; however,

recent research and updated water balances seem to point out that an important contribution

to Lermas low basin runoff came from aquifer discharge;

(3) Many new water wells surged in the past 10 years, some clandestine, others tolerated by the

Federal Authority;

(4) Irrigated areas were subestimated in size and in water abstractions, especially small scale

areas that represent at least half of the total irrigated area in Lerma Chapala Basin --;

(5) Water efficiency was overestimated for small scale irrigated areas; furthermore, water

efficiencies had not improved given that surface water irrigation tariffs continued to be

irrelevant or non existing in small irrigated areas;

(6) The effects on runoff produced by recent dams in Guanajuato, Michoacn and Jalisco was

underestimated;

(7) Although an agreement was adopted by all five states and NWC not to incorporate newirrigated areas in the basin, Guanajuato and Michoacn moderately continued to do so;

(8) Discipline in water distribution and NWC control were weakened or abandoned in criticalareas in the basin, where experience clearly indicated that water was stolen by illegal users;

furthermore, ill-fated decisions were adopted in terms of distributing more water to irrigated

areas than was stated by the agreement;

(9) Water licensing and users census were unable or unwilling to detect clandestine water use;

(10)Overhauled reservoirs such as Alzate Dam proved that even extraordinary floods could be

caught in their reservoirs impeding water to flow downstream.


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In the water licensing process the Regional Agency had a crucial role whereas LCRBC and its nonNWC members were only marginally participating. Such unilateral water rights issuing is alreadyhaving heavy social, economic, financial and environmental repercussions. This is one of the mainreasons to trigger a deep institutional and legal reform in water management, in Lerma Chapala Basin,as well as in all Mexico.

Fighting Water Pollution Water quality and pollution regulation is a NWC responsibility, shared withstate and municipal governments. However water quality in federal water bodies is solely a NWCresponsibility. The River Basin Water Quality Program required considerable investment, time, andparticipation from all related parties, including the private sector, as well as domestic and internationalcredits. In 1989, as a first step towards lowering pollution levels in critical zones throughout the basin,the council agreed to build and operate through its members -- 48 treatment plants for municipalwastewater to treat 3,700 liters per second (l/s) overall municipal wastewater in the basin is 18,000 l/s;this program was the First Regional Water Treatment Phase. Investment was $339 million with fundingcoming from the Federal Treasury via NWC as a subsidy (although some experts interpret it as basintariff revenues returning to the basin); from State governments either via subsidy or as an investmentrepaid at a low interest rates; by water supply organisms and enterprises; by private investors, most ofthem by means of BOT schemes; and by credits, either domestic by means of Banobras (a governmentdevelopment bank) for smaller treatment facilities or by The World Bank through the Potable water andsanitation Program for Urban Areas (APAZU). Operating costs were on the long run derived from water

tariffs, which in turn would have to be readjusted. However, on the short run State subsidies wereimplemented, especially in the States of Mexico, Guanajuato and Jalisco, to keep treatment plantsworking while waiting for users to be willing to pay for sewage treatment, as a common behavior.

In 1993, a Second Regional Water Treatment Phase, bolder than the First, was agreed by LCRBC,comprising 52 new plants as well as the enlargement of five existing ones, to globally treat 10,835 l/s;this stage included large-capacity plants to appropriately address sewage discharges of metropolitanareas within the basin (as well as Guadalajara) The required investment was $722 million, provided byFederal, State, water enterprise, private, and credit funding. Private and credit funding was much more

important in this phase. Large BOTs were implemented and additional APAZU funding from WB creditoperations was required. With these two stages about 80 per cent of all municipal wastewater would betreated. Most of the First Phase is finished and was operational for awhile. The second phase is still onits way, with financial difficulties derived from political unwillingness to commit to water treatment


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timely fashion. Criticism from NWC central areas who were fighting themselves for survival mountedand the whole program was pronounced useless without supplying any alternative program to rescue orreorient regional water quality improvement guidelines. A gallant joint effort by Federal, State andMunicipal governments was largely abandoned or left dormant. With a few exceptions, it is still today.

Small townships and rural dwellings lacked sanitary conditions. A program was designed and approvedto solve both aspects, but engineering approaches and costs became a main concern. On the other hand,although steadily improving in the number and capacity of treatment facilities and zero-dischargesystems, as a result of an apparently tighter fiscal related grip on water discharges, most industries arestill discharging untreated effluents.

To some extent, during the first two phases, help was furnished by the Federal Water Rights Law,

which, in paper, stimulated implementing treatment facilities that would cost less than paying waterrights for discharging pollutants into national water bodies (rivers, streams, brooks, reservoirs,infiltration). Moderate forecasts established that, by the end of the present decade, most industrieswould be complying with maximum permissible discharge limits stated by law per industrial activity.

Beginning in 1997, in order to start business, all new industries were required to comply with suchmaximum limits. Since then, subject to economic and political pressures, NWC allowed modifyingdeadlines and also tolerated without further action, those industries whose deadlines have alreadyexpired. Although new provisions are being designed for the Water Rights Law of 2002, already today,

pollution has increased and money collected for pollutants discharged into national water bodies ismodest compared to potential collections. The bottom line is that this economic instrument, whosepurpose is to contribute in improving water quality, has been severely injured by NWC decisions.

This a specific field of paramount importance where WB could make a difference, both helping redesignand polish existing instruments and processes, as well as by helping induce cost-effective technology.

Raising water tariffs

Service-related water tariffs LCRBC had relevant influence in water tariff modifications, although

NWC role was critical. For long time irrigation tariffs had remained ridiculously low, while drinkingwater tariffs remain modest in most cases. In the first five years Consultative Council and River BasinCouncil irrigation tariffs were raised at least 1000% and several cases ten times more. Irrigationdistricts transfer to users helped as much as stiff restrictions in water distribution with LCRBC


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Figure 12. Basin Tariffs (water rights)

Basin Tariffs derived from the Ley de Derechos (Water rights tariffs) For more than a decade, basintariffs for water abstraction and sewage water discharge have been applied throughout Mexico, globalrevenues coming close to a billion dollars a year. A basin tariff (derecho de agua, in Mexicanterminology, a rather unfortunate wording in Spanish because it is easily confused by users with thosewater rights certified by concession titles that allow legal water abstractions) is a fiscal legal impositive

instrument, with a close resemblance to a tax, which is defined on a periodic basis, normally every year,and whose payment is mandatory, or else, those lagging on their payments are subject to fiscal creditsthat entitle the Authority for embargoing goods and properties, and even impose more severe penalitiessuch as imprisonment


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As pertinent information on water abstraction and discharges (in volume and quality) was scarce orweak and expensive to obtain, an indirect approach was adopted to facilitate revenues collection. Waterusers who directly abstract water from national property bodies, are forced by law to periodically self-declare their water abstractions and sewage discharges and to pay for them according to the water rightslaw for a particular fiscal year. Users must finance and install volumetric devices that can bediscretionally audited by Mexican Authorities (either NWC or the Treasury itself), in most occasions ona random basis, to verify if users are indeed making a honest declaration on water abstractions.Payments are made as deposits in specific accounts created ex-profeso by Mexican Federal Treasury inall Banks in Mexico. Bank branches carry special declaration forms for that self-declaratory purpose.

Revenues are collected by the Banking system and nourished to the Mexican Federal Treasury, which inturn, usually with a time lag, makes available such revenues and in present conditions, additionalresources, as well to NWC via its fiscal budget for such Commission to invest in hydraulic works,O&M, technical development, water management, salaries, utilities, etc. either directly or by thirdparties such as State and local Governments and water users, especially in irrigated areas. Revenues assuch are not ear-marked for the water sector, let alone be regionally ear-marked; however, globallywater sector financial needs and actual budget exceed by far basin tariffs water revenues as expected,given that in budgetary terms, basin tariffs have always been considered a complement although arelevant one -- to other financial sources to support water sector global spending.

Fi 13 Fi i l f


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Water tariffs must be raised to increase water efficiencies. Tariffs must acquire a close resemblance withreal costs, and should comprise opportunity costs (closely linked to water rights) All users must pay forwater to moderate its use and improve water productivity. In a water scarcity scenario, worsenedthrough time, there is no place for subsides on the long run. Irrigation is a great challenge.

In terms of basin tariffs revenues, perhaps no earmarking is needed or advisable, since the Water sectorruns at much higher cost. However, some thought must be made to define those cases where appropriatemechanisms have to be implemented to ensure that regions are benefited from their payments, tocontribute to make basin tariffs play a different role than taxes so that, when timely, regional actionsmay be enforced.


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about 45% of the basin total would be today financially ineligible. WB can also help stimulateappropriate water tariffs and total costs reductions.

Small irrigated areas with subsidized crops or modest yields per hectare have lagged and financialmotivations are not very clear. However, given that evidence shows that irrigated land water needs havealready surpassed water availability at least 150,000 hectare would have to be destined to otheractivities should the present status quo continued --, probably, some draconian decision-making mightbe adopted to buy the water rights of less productive irrigated areas to contribute in reducing basinwater stress. Perhaps a mixture of both solutions could be adopted. Finally, it is quite clear that waterefficiency, as in many other cases, is very much related to water economics and specifically, to watermarkets.

Water markets With water scarcity and no possibility to obtain new licenses from NWC, watermarkets have surged forcefully. Presently, most water rights transactions, fully supported by NWL, aremade in Valley of Mxico, Bravo and Lerma Chapala Basins. Irrigation is the most important userpresently selling water rights. As water rights may be sold but only within a specific geographicallocation (influence area), to avoid affecting already fragile runoff and groundwater behaviors subject toover exploitation, many transactions are heavily concentrated in the outskirts of or very close toimportant urban-industrial centers (Toluca, Quertaro, Len and Guadalajara, among others), irrigationactivities are suffering, and if present transaction patterns carry on, they might eventually disappear.

Little control exists to avoid speculatory and monopolistic movements. Most operations are oriented tosatisfy growing industrial needs. LCRBC has little to do with such activities although the potential isenormous, given the present legal framework, as well as for the need to closely consider water users andlocal authorities in water market decision-making. Presently, NWC and its regional agencies are solelyentitled to approve new works, water users and uses with no need to hold public hearings or similarmechanisms, to consider interests, reactions, fears and opposition regarding specific decisions to beadopted. Such unilateral approach is endangering water management improvement in areas strickenwith severe water scarcity and long-going mismanagement.

The water market in Lerma Chapala (and throughout Mexico) represent an attractive area and a greatchallenge for the WB to involve itself, both in helping define clear, non-discretional regulatory supportfor such market to operate efficiently as a critical instrument in modern water management, as well as inhelping develop deeper studies on water costs and prices on a regional (basin / aquifer) basis.


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agency operates the SIGANet (Geographic water information system nationally run by NWC) forLerma Chapala (and other Central-Mexico basins as well) and is readily available through Internet.

However, information is still scarce to support better knowledge, improve water culture andunacceptable to support decision-making. Paradoxically, much more valuable and costly informationalready exists and has been fed to GIS; however, it is not publicly available (such tendency to share onlylight information on water matters is closely linked to centralization phenomena and responds to groupinterests as well) Such remarks may be considered by the WB, especially regarding its on-goingPROMMA project, closely linked to information production, processing and diffusion.

LCRBC must return to the right trackWith these results, the Lerma-Chapala River Basin Councilhas become, in Mexico, a model to follow. Interest also has been awakened in other countries. In its

time, it was a successful experience, since it allowed plural participation between NWC, the users, andthe state and municipal governments. However, many aspects have to evolve and/or be retaken.Credibility and willpower must be gained again. Some amendments in the council structure andoperation have not succeeded and should be dismantled. Water allocation, as said before, is not workingproperly and dramatic modifications must be introduced on the grounds of improved information andextreme care in future decision making. Water treatment must carry on, by operating existing treatmentfacilities and implementing new projects with real financial support, in capital investment andoperational costs.

Water tariffs and water rights (basin tariffs) need to be revised. Discipline must be regained in irrigationdistricts and small scale irrigated areas. Water police is badly needed as well as stiff sanctions to alloffenders, especially for water theft, clandestine abstraction and illegal boreholes. Impunity is reallydamaging many efforts to improve water management. Corruption has to be intelligently addressedavoiding useless investigations by comptrollers and adopting more aggressive measures includingexternal prosecution. Corruption needs to be stopped.

Water efficiencies have to rise much more and in doing so realistic programs need to be adopted, wherecomplementary approaches be comprised. Water markets need improved regulation mechanisms

without preempting their evolution. But above all relevant measures, a regional water managementpolicy must be defined and implemented. Water balance must be again attained with all its inherentcosts. Water finances must return to a healthy stage adopting additional imaginative mechanisms.Institutions, especially NWC has to achieve excellence in its personnel, procedures and reliability.


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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

A. How should the Bank approach the Mexican government (i.e. NWC, Ministry of the

Environment and Natural Resources, and IMTA) in the case of LC River Basin?

Some orientations towards success

LCRBC was a champion; to regain such level, with a considerable amount of externalsupport, for the next few years LCRBC will need to:

Establish a new deal to manage and use water

Really attain success in improving water use efficiency

Finally implement a demand control and management approach in order torescue valuable volumes with reasonable water quality that can support on

going development and well-being Improve quality indexes in water bodies, continuing with wastewater treatment

programs until their full completion, but revising thoroughly technical andfinancial bases

Seek new imaginative ways to finance and achieve regional financial self-sufficiency; improve water rights revenues payment and spending

Substantially increase users awareness, participation and involvement on watermanagement tasks, together with higher participation from all governmentlevels and society; make water information available to all stakeholders

Continue supporting a watershed oriented approach via reasonably smallcatchment area and aquifer management efforts; re-engineering LCRBC mustdeeply consider watersheds as a basis for integrated and sustainable basinmanagement

Attain physical (water environment) and socioeconomic sustainability


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Fifth, by helping re-establish hydrologic and hydraulic equilibrium by means of improvingwater efficiencies, creating adequate conditions to promote water demand management

instead of water supply management; and by means of creating a new regional waterdeal through water reallocation with financial and socioeconomic support;

Sixth, by helping mitigate and at least stabilize (ideally improve) environmental conditionsin the basin (with possible GEF support by appropriate operational programs)

Seventh, by helping LCRBC be on the right track again, to regain momentum and to modifyand polish its water management instruments.

Eighth, by helping on-going efforts to adopt watersheds and social catchment areas as thebasis for integrated basin management (including CeTAS)

Ninth, by fortifying its on-going projects in Mexico, related to Lerma Chapala (directly orindirectly), particularly PROMMA and any water efficiency efforts.

B. Key Lessons and Proposals

Presently, Mexico has 25 River Basin Councils, 6 basin commissions, 2 basin committees y 38Groundwater technical committees.

Users are learning more on water management throughout its needs, challenges, drawbacks,obstacles, and regional water governance. They are gradually adopting tasks formerly in chargeof governmental entities. Users are now aware of water scarcity, pollution and over drafting, aswell as environmental impacts (wetlands, soil degradation, etc.) They are learning thataccessing the right information in timely fashion is fundamental to improve social participationand collective decision-making. They are well aware that a long road is still ahead.

Unsatisfied social needs and heterogeneous perceptions on water and natural resources roles,add up to natural hydrologic complexities. However, River Basin Councils are starting to playtheir part in hydraulic planning, complementing water management tasks and promoting changein the water vision throughout their regions.

River basin councils do respond to stakeholders need to participate and involve in regionalwater management with their will effort and resources to help increase public action and to


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River basin councils need to earn legitimacy, credibility and sustainability. NWC and itsRegional Agencies, do, too.

River basin councils are not a panacea for regional water management. They do not attempt toendeavor in activities to substitute existing authorities. Their role clearly complements thosetasks that government is unable to control or manage. RBCs support government action andpromote efficiency and savings by attaining closer and fruitful relationships with water users,NGOs, etc. and lowering transaction costs.

RBCs must continue working via consensus. It does consume time but results are more reliable,solid and last longer.

RBCs need a stronger structure together with increased management, financial and operationalautonomy to improve their performance. Water users are newcomers to regional watermanagement tasks. Additional effort should be made to improve their means of participation,access to pertinent information and communication channels between different water uses.

Within RBCs, new work teams have to be designed and implemented. NWC, the State andMunicipal governments and local organizations are not presently addressing many regionalwater management tasks. Should RBCs would want to acquire such responsibilities, enrichingRBCs financial mechanisms is mandatory.

RBCs need a stronger legal personality, to accomplish more tasks, especially to acquirefinancial resources, additional attributes, stronger objectives and a more executive role.

Baseline knowledge on water availability and uses, together with information systems have tobe improved to support raising awareness, participation and decision making processes.

RBCs contribute to decentralization, to improve institutional efficiencies and to better watermanagement, by placing decision-making processes where problems and opportunities arelocated. Watershed management must be the most important ingredient in regional (basin /

aquifer) water management. RBCs must adequate for those new challenges.

A new conception needs to be found to redesign NWC and its regional agencies. The NWLneeds very important modifications and additions to give room to present and new conditions.


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It is indispensable to strengthen institutional links among stakeholders that participate in RBC,improving capacity building and coordination / consensus as vital tools for regional watermanagement.

Finally, social participation and involvement in water matters: planning, projects, execution andoperation of key elements in water management and its protection, should be promoted by allmeans.

Balance between availability and uses must be attained. New procedures, mechanisms andstrategies have to be designed and implemented. Increasing supply should not be priority.Demand management is fundamental if Lerma Chapala is to be a sustainable basin. In doingsuch critical transition, basin economic production should remain untouched.

Capacity building has to be enhanced. WB and PROMMA can be of much help. IMTA has arole to play, too. Quarrels between NWC and IMTA must stop to give room to a new fruitfulrelationship. Mexicos water sector is at stake.

New analytical tools must be adopted. Regional water management in a basin as complex asLerma Chapala, require powerful tools to support decision-making and improve publicparticipation.

Raising water efficiencies is crucial. Many years have past, great ideas have come and laterforgotten, but water efficiencies are still the same or have been reduced. A straightforwardfinancial approach is needed to trigger actions to raise water efficiencies. Water tariffs mustacquire a close resemblance with real costs, including opportunity costs. All users must pay forwater. Financial solutions have helped turn the tide in many places around the world. Bypaying real costs moderation is nourished and best water use is generated. Needless to say, thereis very little room for subside in such a scheme, given that the most important use of all isirrigation followed by water supply. Hence, raising industrial water efficiencies, thoughadvisable, are not going to solve present acute deficits.

A large scale reordering process must take place in terms of water rights and water users. Strictcontrols, water police, realistic water tariffs, and water markets must play a relevant role to helpreinstall a suitable balance between water availability and actual uses.


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The infrastructure within a basin is indeed its patrimony. For many years, maintenance andrehabilitation works have been lagging. A very strong effort must be undertaken to avoid therisk of loosing vital infrastructure in crucial times. Water works maintenance and rehabilitationneeds to be appropriately decentralized.

Centralization must be defeated; efforts should increase in number and relevance; politicalsupport must grow and crucial external partners, such as WB, must make clear thatcentralization is indeed a formidable obstacle to attain success in integrated water management.

D. Perspectives

The tasks to improve water management are enormous; however, perseverance and courage will help

achieve a better distribution of activities and responsibilities among different actors.

River Basin Councils will become executive organisms to help develop a modern water sector and meetnew challenges in the coming century. Councils will eventually take over several tasks now under thecontrol of NWC. NWC in turn will originate a change in itself, which, without endangering its role asfederal water authority, will let it gradually become a consulting agency, once in a while a referee and,only exceptionally, a supreme judge to settle water disputes. The principle of water authority should beredefined without injuring constitutional principles.

There is a need to review from the ground up the Water State Policy, to define what Mexicans shall doas Society and as Government towards attaining integrated and sustainable water management,including ecosystem management and protection, cooperatively and with shared responsibilities as wellas with sufficient resources for the task. From those two important needs will derive a review of allwater and natural resources management instruments: legal framework, institutional framework,planning processes, technical processes, information systems, research and development, humanresources development and capacity building, financial and environmental systems.

A deep reform in the Mexican water sector is needed. There are enough elements to start the process;the WB may play a key role in such efforts.

VII. References

Consejo Consultivo de Evaluacin y Seguimiento del Programa de Ordenacin y Saneamiento de la


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Coordinacin de Consejos de Cuenca. El consejo de cuenca Lerma-Chapala 1989-1999. 10 aos detrabajo en favor de la gestin integral y manejo sustentable del agua y de los recursos naturales de lacuenca. National Water Commission; Guadalajara, Mexico. 1999

De Anda, Jos; Quiones, Sergio E.; Cisneros, French, Richard H.; Guzman, Manual Hydrologicbalance of Lake Chapala (Mexico). Journal of the American Water Resources Association. 34(6): 1319-1331. 1998

De La Lanza, Guadalupe; Garca Caldern, Jos Luis; Mestre, Eduardo et al. Lagos y Presas de Mxico.Mxico, D.F., Centro de Ecologa y Desarrollo, A.C., 1995 ISBN 968-7671-03-3

De Paul Sandoval, Francisco. Pasado y futuro del Lago Chapala. Guadalajara, Mxico: Government ofthe State of Jalisco, Mexico. 1994

Limn, Gualberto; Mestre, Eduardo; Roln, Elisa; Rodrguez, Emiliano; Prez, Hctor M. Proyecto deLineamientos Estratgicos para el Desarrollo Hidrulico de la Regin Lerma-Santiago-Pacifico.DiagnsticoRegional. Montgomery Watson GDL on behalf of National Water Commission;Guadalajara, Mexico: 199912

Mestre, Eduardo Avances en la Gestin del Agua y sus Finanzas en la Cuenca Lerma Chapala.Revista de Ingeniera, Publicacin de la Facultad de Ingeniera, UNAM, Mxico, vol. XIV num. 2, April- June 1994.-pp. 69-83.

Mestre Eduardo Integrated Approach to River Basin Management: Lerma Chapala Case Study Attributions and Experiences in Water Management in Mexico. Asit Biswas, Editor in chief. WaterInternational: International Water Resources Association (IWRA). Volume 22, No. 3, September, 1997(http://iwrn.ces.fau.edu/mestre.htm)

Mestre, Eduardo et al. Integral Approach to Water Quality Conservation in Basins. InternationalJournal of Water Resources Development. Water Resources Development in Mexico. Volume 10,Number 3, ISSN 0790-0627. Carfax Publishing Company, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom,1994

Mestre, Eduardo Los Consejos Tcnicos de Aguas. Agua Forum. Government of the State ofGuanajuato, Mxico. July-August Edition, 1998

Philippus Wester, Martin Burton, Eduardo Mestre and Ricardo Sandoval. Managing the WaterTransition in the Lerma-Chapala Basin. IWMI. Loskop Dam, South Africa. October, 200013
http://iwrn.ces.fau.edu/mestre.htmhttp://iwrn.ces.fau.edu/mestre.htm


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ANNEX 1. Brief comparison of key functions and characteristics of Lerma Chapala River Basin Council and the Lerma SantiagoRegional Agency / National Water Commission

EN TITY HIGHER AUTHORITYROLE1

TASK: POLICYAND

COORDINATION.

TASK:PLANNING

CONSTRUCTIONAND OPERATION

TASK: FINANCING

CONSTRUCTIONAND OPERATION

TASK: infrastructure

CONSTRUCTION &OPERATIONS

STAKEHOLDERSPARTICIPATE/

SUPERVIZE

AWARENESSRAISING IN BASIN

Comisin Nacional de Aguaand the Gerencia RegionalLerma Balsas 2

Authority Type FederalGovernment organizations

Yes Yes Yes Yes

Canals. Reservoirs.Pumping stations;

direct waterabstraction 3

Moderateinteraction with

State Govt.representatives

Strong; LermaChapala has

become a criticalnational issue

Consejo de Cuenca LermaChapala

River Basin Mixed

Organization Type,composed by Government,water users and societyrepresentatives

No; the council isconsultative, promotescoordination amonginstitutions and

consensus among users,other stakeholders andgovernment.

Partially, as aconsultative body

Partially;mostrelevantplanning is

of Federal orState Nature

No; however itpromotes financingfor its programsthrough its members,

mainly in the case ofgovernments

No; however itrevises and agrees onregional surfacewater allocation for

all uses on a yearlybasis

Yes

Representatives ofNational and State

Govts (nomunicipios); of

water usersorganizations and

other socialstakeholders

Becoming strongand critical again(after a dormantperiod of five or

six years)

Brief Notes:

1. The Federal Government in Mexico sets the national policy and guidelines; it is also entitled to set regional policy. The National Water Law entitlesC.N.A. to promote and establish River Basin Councils. Twenty five exist with a varying degree of success. National water planning is carried solely byC.N.A. Basin plans, if financial and executive support is needed, must meet C.N.A. requirements. Basin tariffs are applied; most payments come from

Industry; irrigation is exempt and potable water pays very little. Service tariffs are commonly paid for water supply (many times below overall watercosts including capital costs), in lesser extent by Industry; in large scale irrigated areas (Distritos de Riego) tariffs pay at least for operational costs, andare gradually paying for maintenance: Subsides are mandatory to equilibrate financial needs, particularly in heavy capital investments for infrastructuredevelopment and overhaul. C.N.A. annual overall costs are higher than global basin tariffs revenues.

2. C.N.A. is entitled by NWL to create its regional agencies to meet its objectives. Regional Agencies (i.e.Gerencia Regional Lerma Santiago) are directlysubordinated to C.N.A. central offices. However, gradual modifications allow some autonomy, although periodic drawbacks do occur.

3. The Federal Government is the main activist to foster local and sub regional cooperative arrangements, and water allocation schemes among states andcompeting users (such as Ro Verde Agreement)

Design of RBOs Mex - Example LermaCH F

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