Descarte Versus Radical Scepticism_CharlesBrand

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Do you think Descartes’ philosophy offers a solution to radical scepticism? Introduction One feature that characterised the beginning of the modern philosophical period was the rejectionof the medieval reliance on qualitative descriptions in philosophical discourse. As Descartes

developed the method with which he would investigate the nature of his existence, he wasresolute in his belief that a proper understanding of the universe must be formulated in

quantitative terms. He was in the company of other great thinkers of his era such as Galileo who

expressed a similar conviction in 1623 when assessing the requirements for examining the naturalworld:

Philosophy is written in this grand book [that is nature], the universe, which stands continually opento our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the languageand read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics and itscharacters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is humanly impossibleto understand a single word of it. (Stillman: 1957,238)

German mathematician Johannes Kepler and British natural philosophers Robert Hooke and

Francis Bacon all held similar opinions regarding the necessity for a mathematical model to formthe basis for an investigation into the true nature of the world around them (De

Grazia:1980,320). This new rationalist challenge to the authority of an ecclesiastical or classicalphilosophical interpretation of the world would eventually lead Descartes to cultivate a hypothesis

regarding the certainty of our knowledge. The following essay will determine whether or not Descartes' theory of the nature of his

existence, and the process of using reason to acquire higher forms of knowledge are adequate torebut arguments posited by radical scepticism. The remainder of the essay consists of three main

parts: beginning with an outline of Descartes' philosophy and examination of the components and

overall structure of the argument, as detailed in his Discourse on Method that lead him to assert “...I think, hence I am...” . Next, in order to succinctly address the main question it will be

necessary to more fully understand how philosophical scepticism differs from ordinary incredulityand in these terms discover what kind of argument radical scepticism makes. Finally, the

definition of “clarity and distinctness” as Descartes considered it will be juxtaposed with the coreargument of radical scepticism in order to determine whether Descartes is successful in his

attempt to make his philosophy successfully refute the radical sceptic argument. Being René Descartes

Descartes seems to have begun his epistemic pursuit with a realisation; which was even

though he had spent years being schooled in the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato, mathematics,Latin and Greek grammar and other subjects, he was dissatisfied with what he had been taught.

As he writes during the opening pages of the Discourse on Method “For I found myself involved inso many doubts and errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my attempts at

learning, than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance” (Descartes:1989,12). LaterDescartes begins to suggest in a more specific manner what the issues might be with respect to

the philosophical teachings of the classic philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, “...there is not a

single matter within its sphere which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is abovedoubt...”(Descartes:1989,14) . The reference to “doubt” here is significant as it is doubt and the

process of doubting which is very much a supporting construct within Descartes' overall method

and will be returned to later. In order to overcome the limitations of the teachings that Descartesconsidered to be built on “...foundations so infirm...” (Descartes:1989,15), a new approach was

required and he thought this new approach could be based within a mathematical framework. Geometry provided Descartes with a rigidity of argument through reasoning that he

required to clarify his logic, and most importantly also gave him access to a mode of coherently

sequencing his ideas. Descartes thought that geometrical axioms and principles would provide himwith the language he needed to formulate his ideas, “I was especially delighted with mathematics,

on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasonings...” (Descartes:1989,14). We areprovided here with another central tenet of Descartes' philosophy: that the components of his

logic must be self-evidential. The requirement for Descartes' method to consist of self-evident

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/#3.1

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/#3.1



truths is related to the fact that, as he believed it, the ancient stoic wisdom and philosophy gave

no adequate verification of the principles that underpinned its arguments. In a direct comparisonto the clarity and solidness of the geometrical processes Descartes judges the assumptions made

by classical philosophy as: ...the disquisitions of the ancient moralists to very towering andmagnificent places with no better foundations than sand and mud: they

laud the virtues very highly, and exhibit them as estimable far above

anything on earth: but they gave us no adequate criterion of virtue...(Descartes:1989,14).

During the second Discourse Descartes elaborates on the aforementioned concepts of

logical progression and self-evident truths as well as delineating the wider concept of his method.

The four points he makes can be summarised as such: 1. Only to accept things as true once they were “...presented to my mind so clearly and

distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt”. 2. “to divide each (difficulty) into as many parts as...possible”. 3. “to conduct my thoughts in an orderly way...”. 4. “to make such...general reviews that I would be sure to have omitted nothing”.

Here Descartes reaffirms his intention to utilise the self evident nature of geometrical rules and in

doing so distil the nature of claimed knowledge down to undeniable clarity. As he believes, if claims to knowledge are divided “...into as many parts as possible”..and subjected to scrutiny “...in an orderly way...” the application of geometrical principles has the ability to “...exclude all

ground of doubt” from the resulting truthfulness of those claims. The first point contains a notionthat is central to Descartes' method but one which also raises criticisms to be discussed later; the

idea that true knowledge must be known with clarity and distinctness.

Thus far the main instruments and desired outcome of Descartes method, as he describes

them have been extracted from Discourse on Method i.e. the attainment of undeniable and self

evident truths by the processing of ideas and knowledge by means of geometric principles. Thereis however, one more distinction about Descartes' methodology which categorises it as firmly

within the rationalist camp of philosophical thought. As Lawn (2008:14-4) identifies, Descartessupports an understanding of knowledge held by Plato that rationalist argument can successfully

attain knowledge that is not accessible by that which is built upon experience through the senses

alone. The main stem to this rationalist approach is the belief that the fallibility of senseperception is responsible for inaccurate and false claims to fact. Descartes is unambiguous in thisassertion and shortly into the fourth Discourse says:

Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that thereexisted nothing really such as they presented to us...(Descartes:1987,30).

This clarifies his position as a rationalist thinker who believes that higher forms of knowledge can

be gained through internal contemplation and deduction using a theoretical framework of geometry-based logic as opposed to building knowledge through experience alone. This is the

philosophical background to the statement “I think, hence I am” otherwise known as The Cogito. Descartes places the ultimate importance on the formation of and principles contained

within the Cogito, so much so that he makes it the cornerstone of his entire philosophy. As hebegins to contemplate the consequences of the Cogito he says:

...I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, howeverextravagant, could be alleged by the skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, withoutscruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.(Descartes:1987,30)

It is at this point that the use of doubt will be returned to and examined in more detail. Descartesemploys doubting not as a form of Pyrrhonism or other tool of radical scepticism, but rather he

employs doubt in a systematic way in order to complement the other aspects of his method.Descartes defines his knowledge by the absence of doubt, if he can demonstrate an absence of

the possibility of doubting the truth of his statement, he eliminates all except complete certainty.The rational behind and resulting indubitability through systematic doubting is outlined by

Descartes during the fourth Discourse:



...I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least groundfor doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was whollyindubitable (Descartes:1987,30).

Descartes, having thus far established how his method will accomplish the task of attaining truth,next implements the method to examine the nature of his own existence. During the beginning of

the fourth Discourse Descartes compares his waking and non-waking thoughts in terms of theirrelationship to the possibility of falseness and concludes that they are equally susceptible to being

false. ...when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awakemay also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, Isupposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, hadin them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams (Descartes:1987,30).

It is in the next sentences of the fourth Discourse that Descartes reveals the nub of his argumentsummarised as such: since I can doubt the evidence of my senses (as previously established), I

can doubt all that my senses tell me i.e. that the world and its constituent parts including my

body exist. What I cannot doubt however, is that I am in the process of thinking that I amdoubting. I cannot remove or separate the process of doubting from the process of thinking and

vice versa. Therefore I am thinking and if I am thinking I cannot doubt that I exist, because indoing so, I would only confirm that I am thinking.

I think, therefore I am. This demonstrates the self evident nature of the Cogito and how the rationalist approach attempts

to argue towards higher knowledge that is unattainable through sensory experience. The Cogitodemonstrates that no experience or sensory interaction with the world is necessary in order to

draw its conclusion, it can be deduced from from the knowledge already held by Descartes. This

process of deduction from inherently held knowledge involves and propagates many aspects of philosophical procedure including; the epistemic closure principle, the intuition/deduction thesis

and a priori knowledge and its utilisation from a rationalist perspective. These elements of philosophy, though constituents of the Cogito, cannot be fully expanded upon during the course of

this essay, but what can be said is that they are all criticised in equal measure by radicalscepticism. What can be expressed now is that a priori knowledge relies upon a priori justification

which according to (Russell, 2007) “...is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense,independent of experience”. But a priori knowledge is considered unattainable by radical

scepticism, this will be discussed later as it is now appropriate to differentiate between normal

incredulity and philosophical scepticism. I Think, therefore I am Sceptical?

To be sceptical of a persons' claim to a particular piece of knowledge in an everyday

sense does not mean that it falls into the same category as philosophical scepticism. Ordinary

incredulity uses techniques which remove the grounds for doubt in a particular statement. For

example, Bob might say that the colour of a distant wall is yellow. I may doubt this to be so forthe following reasons: we are standing in evening light making identification of colour from a

distance difficult plus I believe that Bob has mentioned to me in the past that he is colour blind.The reason that my doubting can be categorised as ordinary incredulity are that, in principle there

are two ways of removing this doubt: 1. Bob could show that the alleged grounds for doubt are false; or 2. Bob could show that the grounds for doubt, though true, can be neutralized

(Klein:2005). To refute my initial claim Bob could produce a colour chart and demonstrate that even in the

evening light according to the standardised chart the colour of the wall is indeed yellow. Thiswould render my first claim to doubt as false. In order to neutralise my second reason for

doubting Bobs' claim he could prove that even though he does suffer from red/green colourblindness his ability to correctly identify the colour yellow is unaffected by this condition. Although

my ground for doubting Bobs' claim in relation to his colour blindness is true, he has neutralisedthe ground for doubt.



Philosophical scepticism however does not attempt to inject doubt into statements or

propositions, but instead attacks the underlying foundations of the claims to knowledge whichform the the propositions themselves. As Klein (2005) states “...philosophical skepticism attempts

to render doubtful every member of a class of propositions that we think falls within our ken.” Radical scepticism then, attempts to undermine the very belief that what we interpret as reality is

true. That our ability to verify even the most basic claims to knowledge of any kind is inherentlyimpossible or as Pritchard (2002: 2) states “...the view that I lack knowledge of much of what I

believe”. Descartes' philosophy is concerned with the attainment of knowledge and establishing itstruthfulness, while radical scepticism attempts to undermine Descartes' claim to establish truth of any kind in what he claims to know. With respect to the Cogito, is seems an untenable position to

argue that Descartes' a priori knowledge (with regard to the nature of his existence) acquiredthrough a process of deduction and which arrives at a truth that is self evident can be false. How

and why this is false will now be elaborated upon. Something from Nothing

Descartes' understanding of “clear and distinct” when referring to the nature of his self

evident truths is derived from a combination of intuition and deduction and is based on Descartesassertion that knowledge gained through reason is superior to that which is gained through the

senses. As Markie (2008) states with regard to the Intuition/Deduction Thesis “Some propositions

in a particular subject area, [...], are knowable by us by intuition alone; still others are knowableby being deduced from intuited propositions”. As Descartes demonstrates through his reasoning of

the Cogito, it is deduced from a non sensory position based on propositions constructed in thesame manner. There may also be some reliance by Descartes on the Innate Knowledge Thesisthat posits we have certain knowledge which is part of our being, whether that knowledge has

been placed there by God, an earlier existence or through the process of natural selection(Markie:2008) is irrelevant for the purposes our current argument. What is relevant is that the

knowledge exists and radical scepticism will attempt to render this knowledge as unverifiable. Interms of the sceptical argument, it is now time to frame The Cogito within this position and

examine whether or not the Cogito can hold its argument intact. It has been established that Descartes' was mainly concerned with the definition of and

acquirement of knowledge. This is commonly known as Epistemology and the Cogito could be

referred to as an epistemologically interesting (EI) proposition. Klein (2005) proposes that whenconsidering any proposition and whether or not to assent to it (i.e. agree or disagree with its

validity as a proposition) there are 3 stances which can be taken: 1. Assent that we can have knowledge of EI-type propositions. 2. Assent that we cannot have knowledge of EI-type propositions. 3. Withhold assent to both that we can and that we cannot have knowledge of EI-type

propositions. Since it is agreed that the Cogito embodies an explanation for the nature of our existence, for thepurposes of the current discussion these propositions can be rephrased as such:

1. Assent that we can have knowledge of [the nature of our existence]. 2. Assent that we cannot have knowledge of [the nature of our existence]. 3. Withhold assent to both that we can and that we cannot have knowledge of [the

nature of our existence]. Radical scepticism will assent to the view that we cannot have knowledge of [the nature of our

existence]. The form of scepticism which most resembles the radical kind in current philosophical

terms could be said to be that practised by the ancient Pyrrhonian sceptics. Pyrrhonian scepticism

withheld assent to all propositions which were not evident, or those which it was possible to



genuinely dispute and these included EI-type propositions (Klein:2005). It is at this point that

Descartes' understanding of what constituted an idea or proposition that is presented so “...clearlyand distinctly...” that it is perceived to be true must be re-examined since the definition of clarity

and distinctness could be seen as a disputable point. More than just a disputable point, some of

Descartes contemporaries including Antoine Arnauld argued that the reasoning Descartes'employs to determine his ideas are presented “...clearly and distinctly...” was flawed and this

potential error has come to be known as the Cartesian Circle.

During the third Meditation Descartes argues from a position of clear and distinct thinkingfor the existence of a benevolent god. This is in response to his sceptical argument from the first

Meditation that god might be a deceptive one. Descartes then argues from the premise that abenevolent god exists to the conclusion (in the fourth Meditation) that what is clearly and

distinctly perceived is true and here lies the circularity of the argument; Descartes presupposesthe existence of a non-deceiving god to give clarity and distinctness to his thoughts in order to

prove the existence of a non-deceiving god. As Arnauld (2006: 72) argues during the “Fourth Setof Objections” to the Meditations:

you are not yet certain of the existence of God, and you say that you arenot certain of anything, and cannot know anything clearly and distinctly

until you have achieved clear and certain knowledge of the existence of God. It follows from this that you do not yet clearly and distinctly know that

you are a thinking thing, since, on your own admission, that knowledgedepends on the clear knowledge of an existing God; and this you have not

proved in the passage where you draw the conclusion that you clearly knowwhat you are.

Descartes has defended this reasoning however through what has become known as the Memoryresponse. Van Cleve (1979:56) outlines the Memory response this way “...God is called upon to

guarantee not the truth of clear and distinct perceptions, but the accuracy of our memories”. SoDescartes argues that if he can remember clearly and distinctly perceiving something in the past

which he cannot clearly and distinctly perceive now, he can be certain of it only if a benevolentgod exists and this fact has been, as far as Descartes is concerned, established beyond doubt.

This is the rebuttal provided by Descartes and it must deal with the accusation of circularityregarding clarity and distinctness since it is one of the main supporting constructs of the Cogito.

It seems that by displacing the question of circularity regarding Descartes' reasoning withmemory and its relationship to clarity and distinctness the emphasis changes to that of determining whether or not our memories are valid and reliable sources of information. Returning

to the proposition that we cannot have knowledge of [the nature of our existence] as a radicalsceptic would; to be absolute in its negative stance does not appear credible as memory and its

reliability are far from explained or understood. The same logic can be applied to the firstproposition to assent that we can have knowledge of [the nature of our existence]. Therefore the

only option remaining is to withhold assent to both that we can and that we cannot haveknowledge of [the nature of our existence]. Conclusion

The Cartesian circle has generated huge amounts of philosophical discourse because itpertains to and involves so many elements of philosophical interest. As Gewirth (1970:669)observes

These issues of the Cartesian circle are of more than antiquarian interest. They bear on perenniallyimportant problems of certainty, and they underlie much of the history of twentieth-centuryphilosophy which consists in a series of reactions to Descartes's metaphysics.

As previously mentioned the Pyrrhonian sceptics withheld assent to all non-evident propositions

and as illustrated radical scepticism also must hold a similar position regarding the issue of Descartes' philosophy specifically with respect to the Cogito. Descartes' method of logical

deduction leads him into propositions that he perceives to be inherently clear and distinct in their



truthfulness and therefore without doubt; so it is essentially the validity of Descartes' deductive

reasoning that is under attack from the radical sceptical perspective.

As mentioned, Descartes seems to employ the Memory response as a method of

displacing the sceptics' argument regarding the circularity of his deductive reasoning. According toKekes (1975:35) however the central target of a sceptics attack is the process, not the noun

which results from the process: The sceptic attacks the possibility of knowledge, certainty, or justified belief only indirectly. Hisprimary target is the process-reasoning-which allegedly yields the reliable conclusion. If reasoning is

successfully challenged, then the rationality of any of its products becomes ipso facto dubious. So it must be asked if this deflective measure is successfully employed by Descartes? For a

sceptic to successfully undermine an EI-type proposition they must uphold the second of theirthree options, in this case that is:

Assent that we cannot have knowledge of [the nature of our existence]. However, it has already been here established that the sceptic is left with only one position with

respect to this EI-type propositions, that position is to: Withhold assent to both that we can and that we cannot have knowledge of

[the nature of our existence]. Since this is the third, rather than the second option available to a sceptic, we must

conclude that radical scepticism does not succeed in undermining the Cogito andDescartes' philosophy.

This does not mean, however, that the Cogito and Descartes' philosophy haveprovided a solution to radical scepticism, instead, both philosophies are locked in the

third option. It remains to be seen if at any stage in the future of philosophy it can bedemonstrated conclusively whether assent in the case of option 1 or option 2 can be

garnered. Only then will it be known whether the Cogito offers a solution.

Book References: Descartes, R. (2006) René Descartes Meditations, Objections and Replies Eds Ariew, R., Cress, D.Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing Company Inc. Descartes, R. (1989) Discourse on Method and the Meditations Trans. John Veitch N.Y.:Prometheus Books Stillman, D. (1957) The Assayer, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co Journal References: De Grazia, M. (1980) The Secularization of Language in the Seventeenth Century: Journal of the

History of Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 319-329 Pennsylvania:University of Pennsylvania Press Gewirth, A. (1970) The Cartesian Circle Reconsidered The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. 67, No. 19,

pp. 668-685 N.Y.:Journal of Philosophy Kekes, J. (1975) The Case for Scepticism The Philosophical Quarterly , Vol. 25, No. 98, pp. 28-39 Oxford:Blackwell Publishing Lawn, C. (2008) Oscail Course Notes Philosophy 1 Foundation Dublin:Oscail Pritchard, D. (2002) Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and Closure Theoria, Vol.68, No. 2, pp. 129-161 University of Stirling:Stiftelsen Theoria



Van Cleve, J. (1979) Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle ThePhilosophical Review , Vol. 88, No. 1, pp. 55-91 North Carolina:Duke University Press Web References: Klein, P. (2005) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/#1 Markie, P. (2008) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ Russell, B. (2007) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/#1

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism/#1

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/

Descarte Versus Radical Scepticism_CharlesBrand

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