Desastre en Canada Por Explosion de Recipientes a Presion

the pressure equipment safety authority

Hub Oil Accident12th Annual IPEIA Conference, Banff, AlbertaFebruary 5 7, 2008

Mike PoehlmannManager of Inspections


IncidentInvestigationLegal proceedingsLessons learned


Background

Two men killed in explosion and fire August 9, 1999

28 firefighters took more than 10 hours to extinguish the fire

Approximately 1500 people evacuated from nearby residential area


Hub Oil Com pany

Commenced operations at the South East Calgary plant around 1958.Refiner - recycler of used oil.Feedstock was waste oil collected from various sources: major industries, small garages, local residents.Waste oil contained varying amounts of contaminants (water, glycol, gasoline, diesel fuel, paint, etc.)Oil was processed to remove contaminates.Product storage capacity at time of incident over 7,000,000 litres.Hub Oil had been the subject of local controversy because it was located within city limits with residential neighborhood and commercial area nearby.


(Source: maps.google.com)


I nvest igat ion

Investigation was managed by Calgary Joint Forces Arson Unit (Police and Fire)Alberta Environment, Alberta Workplace Health & Safety, and ABSA supported investigationInitially 3 ABSA Safety Codes OfficersHundreds of hours on initial investigation and over the following 7 years


ABSA I nvest igat ion

Purpose is to identify the cause of an accident to help prevent similar accidents in the future. Information gathered may be analyzed for use in:

issuing Alerts, Notifications or Directives recommending changes to regulations recommending changes to codes and standards



Monday 9 AugustNotified of explosion and fire by staff family memberDecided we would investigate because we knew of pressure equipment operating at Hub Oil

Tuesday 10 AugustContacted WH&S, arranged site meeting at fire department mobile commandMet district fire chief and Hub Oil company representativeInformed them of ABSA jurisdiction



Wednesday 11 August Morning

Contacted by Joint Forces Arson Team, requested our help, invited to meeting in afternoonAsked us to bring along any inspection records for plant equipmentInformed us of site hazards and necessary PPE

AfternoonAttended meeting 1300Visited site 1500 1900


Vessel

Known as Unit # 2Fabricated in 1963

84 i.d. x 30 long90 p.s.i. @ 720oFA-285-C-FBXShell 0.5625 , Heads 0.5

Reported not in use , and deregistered in 1971It was later determined by other investigators

Hub Oil obtained the vessel from a scrap dealer for $1500 in 1985Put into service as Unit # 2 in 1990


The Process


Explosion

Plant was processing first batch following a maintenance shutdown.Pressure vessel ruptured releasing approximately 5,000 gallons of oil at a temperature approximately 650oF.Released oil ignited in a massive explosion.


Failure Rupture and Explosion

Vessel ruptured due to overpressure as a result of sudden rapid boiling of water left in the system following shut down maintenance work.Failure analysis estimated vessel failed at approximately 201 p.s.i.


Direct Cause of Explosion


Legal Proceedings

Prosecution on criminal chargesPublic Fatality Inquiry


Cr im inal Tr ia l

Prosecuted by Alberta Environment Special Prosecutions.Hub Oil ultimately charged under the Criminal Code of Canada with 8 charges of causing a common nuisance .ABSA was contacted by prosecutor fall 2000.Provided technical advice to prosecutors and served as expert witness.


Outcom e of Tr ia l

Hub Oil changed its plea to guilty midway through the trial in June 2005.Company (bankrupt) fined $200,000 and required to establish

Two $50,000 bursaries for petroleum engineering students at SAIT.Four $25,000 education trust funds for the children of Eckhard and Silver.


Public Fatality I nquiry

Medical Examiner notified Fatality Review Board of deaths and circumstance in 1999.Decision made then to conduct inquiry.Fatality Inquiry could not begin until all criminal matters settled.Purpose of public fatality inquiry is to make recommendations to prevent recurrence, not lay blame or settle damages.Served notice as interested party November 2005.


Outcom e of I nquiry

Judge Kirkpatrick concluded modifications and reconfiguring the equipment contributed to the explosion

Recommendationthat oil refineries be prohibited from ut ilizing pre-used oil refinery equipment in any configurat ion other that that in which the equipm ent was originally designed to be operated by the m anufacturer. Any other use requir ing a substant ial change to the equipm ent or the way in which it is intended to be deployed should be approved by the appropriate municipal or provincial bodies prior to the act ivat ion of the equipm ent on site. The appropriate authorit ies would have to determ ine what types of equipm ent would require such approvals.

Kirkpatrick report to Minister of Justice, October 27,2006www.justice.gov.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.aspx?id=47282

http://www.justice.gov.ab.ca/downloads/documentloader.aspx?id=47282


Lessons Learned

Cause of ExplosionExcessive pressure in vessel caused initial explosion.

Contr ibut ing FactorsExcessive water in system.Vented to atmosphere indirectly through series of process equipment.No safety valve.Indirect control of pressure of pressure by manual operation of burner fuel supply valve to change heat input to the system.Intended for low pressure operation (not in regulated pressure equipment service).


Lessons Learned

Root Cause of ExplosionFailure to fully understand hazards resulted in

inadequacies:Management of changeSafeguards, controls and instrumentation

No safety valveOperating proceduresOperator trainingMaintenance procedures


Lessons Learned

For InspectorsDue diligence - facility inspectionsGap in regulatory scheme

Desastre en Canada Por Explosion de Recipientes a Presion

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