125

De/Reconstructing

Utopianism:

Towards A World-Historical Typology

M.H. (Behrooz) Tamdgidi

UMass Boston

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––We often find ourselves debunking

utopianism because of the historical short-comings of Marxism, despite realizing thatMarxism itself, in its classical writings atleast, never claimed to be a utopian doc-trine in the first place. For the founders of“scientific socialism,” in fact, being bothscientific (as Marxism claimed to be) andutopian was a contradiction in terms. Ifanything, it would be more logical to ex-plore the problems of Marxism with re-gards to its claimed scienticity than itsalleged utopianism—if we intend to pursuea dialectical critique of the inner consisten-cy of the doctrine, that is. For the contem-porary critics of Marxism and utopianism,however, one seems to have been a failurebecause it has been the other.

Underlying the above controversy overwhether Marxism was scientific or utopian(with the former implying a positive at-tribute, and the latter a negative one—re-gardless of whether sympathetic or criticalstands are taken vis-à-vis Marxism) is thecommonly assumed typological dualism ofscience vs. utopianism itself. Frederick En-

gels, of course, famously immortalized thistypological dualism in his 1880 work,

So-cialism: Utopian and Scientific

, in order to le-gitimize the newly arisen doctrine as a“scientific” enterprise in contrast to its“utopian” precursors. Consequently, westill have a hard time treating Marxism asbeing both utopian and “scientific,” whichof course would make the attribution of itsfailures to the two aspects that much hard-er. It has to be one

or

the other—an instanceof either/or formal logical dualism whichseems to run counter, in fact, to the dialecti-cal logic Marxism prided itself to have ma-terialistically reinvented. The long-inherited binary structures of our knowl-edges seem again to pose a difficulty here.

Is it possible that the real problem iswith the way the problem itself has beenposed—that the boundaries of science andutopianism are fuzzier than they appear tobe? To be sure, those who are still interestedin making efforts towards a just global soci-ety have found the identification of utopia-nism with Marxism to be an obstacle, to saythe least. It may therefore be useful to makean effort at deconstructing our taken-for-granted positions on the matter and revisitthe plethora of definitional and conceptualfuzziness and inconsistencies surroundingutopianism in the hopes of making a clearerstand on the subject.

1

My aim in this paper is to deconstructutopianism as a world-historical socialmovement, and reconstruct a typology ofutopianism that allows the interpretation ofthe historical debunking of utopianism byMarxism (or vice versa) as an expressionpartly of internal rifts among various typesof utopianism, partly of gradual departureof Marxism from utopianism in its classicallifetime, and partly of the “false” con-

1.This paper is a revised version of an ex-cerpt from the second chapter of my previouswork, “Mysticism and Utopia: Towards the So-ciology of Self-Knowledge and Human Archi-tecture (A Study in Marx, Gurdjieff, andMannheim)” (2002).

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sciousness of the movement about its owndual identity vis-à-vis utopianism and sci-ence due to ideological-political exigencies.Using the proposed typology of utopia-nism, in other words, I will argue thatMarxism’s efforts to distinguish itself fromutopianism (and vice versa) had as much todo with ideological rhetoric as with sub-stance and lack thereof. What explains theideological aspects of the controversy hasto do with self-promotion in light of theperceived failures of the other types. Butthis does not mean Marxism was not utopi-an in a certain sense; it was a specific typeof it in contrast to others (as will be ex-plained later). But it gradually lost its uto-pian message as it “matured,” whichshould legitimately raise the questionwhether its failures were due to its specificform of utopianism and/or its gradual de-parture from utopianism altogether.

I will argue below that Marxism failedits own ends both because of the limits of itsspecific approach to utopianism, and be-cause of its gradual abandoning of utopia-nism altogether,

1

eventually embracing anon-utopian, “realpolitik,” antisystemicmode preoccupied more with shattering (orrunning) the existing social institutionsthan with creatively building alternativeones in their midst, a way proven more ef-fective in previous successful historical“transitions.” The failures of the practicaltypes of utopianism or departures from theutopian mode altogether have also beenmet, on the opposite end of the contrast, by

the self-limiting of the contemporary utopi-an tradition to its literary and science-fic-tion types, which has had the opposite, butsimilar, effect of abandoning the appliedutopian pursuits of a just global society.One way or another, the above develop-ments have served the ideological-politicalfunction of preserving the status quo in mi-cro and macro social spacetimes—a func-tion or interest to which the Mannheimiansociology of knowledge may trace the ori-gins of the typological confusions sur-rounding utopianism in the first place. Thehistorical result has been the gradualthrowing away of the baby of utopianismin general with the bath-waters of failuresof specific types of it.

Marxism represented a new, “scientif-ic,” type of utopian movement in contrast,on one hand, to the philosophical and reli-gious varieties preceding it, and on the oth-er hand the briefly revived humanist type(as somewhat represented by utopian so-cialists) which was soon frozen in embryoby Marxism’s own ideological-politicalrhetoric and ascendance in the world-wideopposition to capitalism. What I intend topoint out is a need to go beyond the polem-ics and the rhetoric of these movements inorder to develop a typological frameworkof utopianism which accounts for the his-torical failures of Marxism due in part tothe shortcomings emanating from its spe-cific utopian type and partly due to itsgradual departure from the utopian typolo-gy altogether. The point is to redeem thevalue of utopianism as a specific strategyfor social change in contrast to the antisys-temic mode characterizing the dominantform of opposition movements to capital-ism during at least the past two centuries.

M

ARXISM

AND

U

TOPIANISM

Historically, there has been a curiousattitude on the part of both Marxist andutopian currents to deny their common lot.

1.Consideration of the distinction betweenthe young and old Marx, and multiplicities ofMarxisms is important in this regard. It is thisdual nature of Marxism as a utopian and an an-tisystemic movement that explains Karl Man-nheim’s classification of Marxism as both anideology and a utopia in his classic

Ideology andUtopia

(1936). In other words, the dual position-ing of the movement did not have to exist if itwas not due to the intrinsic duality which themovement came gradually to develop in thetransition from the young to old variants ofMarx’s thought. For further details on this, seeTamdgidi 2002, 2003.

127

The case of Marxism’s efforts to disso-ciate itself from utopianism is well knownand does not need much elaboration. Con-sidering itself a “scientific socialist” doc-trine, Marxism from its very beginningsbuilt its self-identity on a clear polemicalprogram of dissociating itself from utopia-nism in general, and “utopian socialism” inparticular.

1

But the other side of the equa-tion, often overlooked, seems to be as per-plexing as the other.

Five bibliographers in English lan-guage on the utopian literature (Haschak1994; Negley 1978; Beauchamp 1977; Lewis1984; Sargent 1979, 1988) hardly mention orinclude Marxism (some not even the “uto-pian socialist” literature) in their commen-taries and resource lists on utopianism. Theproblem, judging from the standpoint ofthese bibliographers’ own explicitly statedcriteria, seems to be more than a matter ofimpracticality of listing the enormousamount of literature on Marxism. Nor doesthis seem to be due to the limitations ema-

nating from the boundaries imposed by thebibliographers on their own subject matter.The very definition of utopianism offeredby these compilers, which basically seemsto limit utopianism to the so-called “utopi-an literature” or at best to sources on isolat-ed experimental “utopian societies orcommunities,” defies inclusion of Marxistliterature in their works. Consider, for ex-ample, this statement by Glen Negley, amajor bibliographer of the utopian litera-ture:

The Declaration of Independenceor the Communist Manifesto maybe said to be an expression of pro-found political and philosophicalideals, but neither is a utopia. (Ne-gley 1978:xii-xiii)

The attitudes on both sides cited above,nevertheless, are in sharp contrast to ap-proaches employed in other encyclopedicentries (e.g., Kateb’s entry in

Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences

, 1968, 16:267-70,

2

or hisentry in

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy

1972,8:212-215), or in major scholarly works onthe subject (Manuel and Manuel 1979;

3

Mumford 1941;

4

Mannheim 1936;

5

Kateb1972; Kumar 1991

6

) in which Marxism istreated as an integral part of utopianism ingeneral. The more recent

Encyclopedia ofUtopian Literature

(Snodgrass 1995), also,

1.Marx and Engels wrote in the

Manifesto ofthe Communist Party

([1848] 1978:498-499): “Thesignificance of Critical-Utopian Socialism andCommunism bears an inverse relation to histor-ical development. In proportion as the modernclass struggle develops and takes definite shape,this fantastic standing apart from the contest,these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical val-ue and all theoretical justification. Therefore, al-though the originators of these systems were, inmany respects, revolutionary, their discipleshave, in every case, formed mere reactionarysects. They hold fast by the original views oftheir masters, in opposition to the progressivehistorical development of the proletariat. They,therefore, endeavor, and that consistently, todeaden the class struggle and to reconcile theclass antagonisms. They still dream of experi-mental realization of their social Utopias, offounding isolated “

phalansteres,”

of establishing“Home Colonies,” of setting up a “Little Icar-ia”—duodecimo editions of the New Jerusa-lem—and to realize all these castles in the air,they are compelled to appeal to the feelings andpurses of the bourgeois. By degrees they sinkinto the category of the reactionary conservativeSocialists depicted above, differing from theseonly by more systematic pedantry, and by theirfanatical and superstitious belief in the miracu-lous effects of their social science.”

2.“Perhaps Marxism is the only utopian, orquasi-utopian, body of thought that large num-bers of men have actually tried to translate intopractice. But Marxism is not the only version ofutopianism that has worked to generate the feel-ing that the real world is profoundly imperfectand that some sort of change, even small, andnot even in a utopian direction, is a pressing ne-cessity” (Kateb 1968:269).

3.“Despite the persistence with which theybelabored some contemporary utopians, essen-tial parts of the

Critique of the Gotha Program

werein fact the answer to a utopian inquiry that Marxhimself had initiated ... A hundred years after itwas written, the

Critique of the Gotha Program

canbe most effectively illuminated if it is restored tothe utopian landscape in which it was originallyplanted” (Manuel and Manuel 1979:699).

128

includes entries on “Marx,” “Engels,” and“The Communist Manifesto.” Kateb’s com-mentary in his 1972 piece in

The Encyclope-dia of Philosophy

(1972) regarding the needto view Marxism as a part of the westernutopian tradition hardly needs furtherelaboration:

Those philosophies of historywhich culminate in a vision ofachieved perfection are a third typeof utopia. These are the theories ofinevitable progress created by menlike Condorcet, Hegel, Spencer,and Marx. Hegel and Marx espe-cially would have fought againstinclusion in the utopian tradition ...For all that, their writings havebeen taken by others as utopian.No list of the major sources of uto-pian literature would be acceptablewithout them and the other theo-rists of inevitable progress. (Kateb1972:213)

Even if the shared terrain occupied byutopianism and Marxism are acknowl-

edged, however, the estrangement betweenthe two movements must itself be account-ed for. Why do Marxists and utopists denytheir common lot?

An immediate explanation that comesto mind may perhaps be found in the per-ceptions by adherents in each current of thefailing and/or discredited nature of thetheories and/or practices affiliated with theother current. Marx and Engels explicitlycriticized their utopian predecessors interms of the speculative nature of their doc-trines and/or of the isolated scope of thecommunal experiments they carried out inthe context of the reality of a globally ex-panding capitalist mode of production. Inorder to advance their own political and or-ganizational agenda in the interests of theworking class to create a world communistsociety, in other words, founders of scientif-ic socialism had to clearly dissociate them-selves from the failed movements whichhad actually prefigured and nourishedtheir own past.

The reverse process of estrangement,that of the traditional utopians’ dissociat-ing themselves from Marxism, of coursesurfaced later. The reality of increasing fail-ure of the Marxist movement to abide by itsown principles, let alone of setting an ex-ample for an alternative communist society,soon led traditional utopian writers, com-munal experimenters, or simply those in-terested in utopianism as a literary genreonly, to either dissociate their own utopianinterests from the failing experiments of theworld communist movement, or to attackthe existing order and/or Marxist social ex-periments by developing a specifically newgenre of utopian literature. The emergingdystopianism in the twentieth century, a lit-

4.“In his Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,Frederick Engels made a plea for a realisticmethod of thought, which limited itself to a hereand now, as against what he derided as the uto-pian method, the attempt on the part of a singlethinker to give a detailed picture of the society ofthe future. Yet at the present time it is easy to seethat if the utopian socialism of Owen has beenineffective, the realistic socialism of Marx hasbeen equally ineffective; for while Owen’s kindof socialism has been partly fulfilled in the co-operative movement, the dictatorship of theproletariat rests upon very shaky foundations,and such success as it has had is what it wouldbe like as to anything else” (Mumford 1941:242-43).

5.“Even the socialist-communist mode ofthought and experience which, as regards its or-igins, may be treated as a unity, is best under-stood in its utopian structure by observing it asit is attacked from three sides ... It represents notmerely a compromise but also a new creationbased upon an inner synthesis of the variousforms of utopia which have arisen hitherto andwhich have struggled against one another in so-ciety” (Mannheim 1936:239-240).

6.“Marx and Engels, it is true, went out oftheir way to deny that the future socialist orcommunist society would be a closed or com-pleted system. So much could be admitted,however, without necessarily affecting the per-ception of the basically utopian quality of theirvision of the future socialist society” (Kumar1991:60).

129

erary movement focusing on the evils ofmodern society, used the medium of utopi-an literary style to criticize not only the ex-isting capitalist order but also thedehumanizing nature of social realitiesemerging from the realpolitik conduct ofMarxist, socialist, and communist move-ments across the globe. As Kumar haspointed out,

[a]ll the major anti-utopias of thetwentieth century have been so de-pendent on actual contemporarysocieties as sometimes to run thedanger of merely seeming descrip-tions of them. Zamyatin’s

We

andKoestler’s

Darkness at Noon

re-hearsed and projected the formsand thought structures of the newSoviet society. George Orwell’s

An-imal Farm

and

Nineteen Eighty-Four

similarly drew on the theory andpractice of the Soviet Union... (Ku-mar 1991:66)

The above discussion is meant to high-light the debated nature of the relationshipbetween Marxism and utopianism, ques-tioning taken-for-granted assumptions thatgeneral consensus exists regarding theiridentity and/or difference. To explore thedebate further, however, we need to delvemore carefully into the definitional land-scape surrounding the utopian thoughtand movement.

U

TOPIA

AND

U

TOPIANISM

What exactly is utopianism? “Utopia,” which is derived from the

word “topos” (place) in Greek and phonet-ically plays on the Greek words “eu”(good) and “ou” (no), has the double-meaning of a good place that does not (yet)exist

1

(Sargent 1988; Kumar 1991; Kateb1976). Of course the term, invented by St.Thomas More in 1516 in his classic satirical

novel by the same name, inherited a preex-isting tradition that goes back in the west,from a literary standpoint, to Plato’s

Repub-lic

at least, and in the East to the earliest re-ligious and mythological beliefs and texts.Therefore, from a general point of view thesearch for a good place that does not (yet)exist can be regarded as an aspiration of allhumanity across all times and places. Thefact that the term “utopia” was coined inthe west in relatively recent times shouldtherefore not distract us from recognizingthat the reality which the concept denotes ismuch older and much wider in origin, andthe concept itself embodies or signifies thehuman desire to move beyond the existingsocial status quo and to live an ideal life.

1.In his

Ideology and Utopia

(1936), KarlMannheim presented a typology of modern uto-pian mentalities that included the OrgiasticChiliasm of the Anabaptists, the liberal-human-itarian idea, the conservative idea, and the so-cialist-communist idea. The conservative notionof utopia, Mannheim suggested, is that of utopiaalready achieved in the sense that the social sta-tus quo represents the perfect or ideal societyachieveable from the point of view and interestsof dominant social forces. This is in contrast tothe other three forms which involve seeking analternate social reality in the here-and-now(Chiliastic), as a result of socio-political progressand state action (liberal-humanitarian), or socio-economic revolution (socialist/communist). Ac-knowledging the usefulness of the typology, Ithink Mannheim’s attribution of a utopian sta-tus to the conservative perspective as reiteratedabove obfuscates the consistency of the defini-tion of “utopianism” as a search for ever new so-cial conditions that do not (yet) exist. In otherwords, the notion of utopianism by definitioninvolves transcendence of the social status quoand is by nature a critical outlook (which to besure can be of both reactionary or progressivekinds, i.e., can be conservative for its regressiveseeking of social conditions lost in the past, orprogressive for its seeking of social conditionsnot yet achieved). The point here is that a refer-ence to existing social conditions as achievedutopias, is a contradictory statement that dimin-ishes the definitional value of the concept as de-noting a desire and/or action for socialtransformation beyond the status quo—whatev-er that may be. This is a good example of how inthe course of both ideological and scholarly de-bates the conceptual distinctiveness of utopia-nism has been diluted.

130

There was, however, a specific mean-ing attached to “utopia” as More practicedit, and that was the belief in the good life’sbeing realizable on this earth through theinitiative of ordinary human beings. It wasthis creative humanist bent in the Moreanversion that may explain why his particularname, term, and attitude became in timethe standard bearer of what modern worldunderstands by utopianism. In fact, it wasthis earthly scope of Morean utopianism ef-fected through the action of ordinary hu-man beings creatively building andrunning a new communal arrangement,that distinguished it both from the earlierreligious and philosophical (Platonic)forms, and what gave impetus to the laterscientific variety which found its classicform in Marxism.

Therefore, qualifying the utopian na-ture of various movements merely basedon their practical orientation or the spa-tiotemporal scope of their experimentationis misleading. The imagined/practical atti-tudes or the spatiotemporal scope of envi-sioning/implementation of themovement’s project may provide a sub-classificatory scheme for types of utopia-nism as a whole, but they should not enterinto the determination and definition ofwhether a movement is utopian or not. Forinstance, utopianism has sometimes beenenvisioned and/or practiced in a limitedspatiotemporal scope—say an inner experi-ence, an interpersonal relationship, a com-munal organization, a particular societal oreven civilizational project—rather thangeneralized as a global, transhistoricalmovement encompassing the whole hu-manity. Certainly, this was one sense inwhich Marx debunked his utopian prede-cessors or contemporaries. For him, thegood life could only be a global reality.However, this does not make the local ex-perimentations any less real—perhaps lesseffective, but not less

real

. Likewise, simplya proclamation, or a theoretical clause, inthe most militant of antisystemic manifes-

tos asserting the global nature of the eman-cipation project does not make themovement espousing that viewpoint anyless utopian. So the distinction between autopian and non-utopian movement can-not really be a matter of the spatiotemporalscope of social experimentation and/orprojected transformation. We need to lookelsewhere to define what utopianism actu-ally introduced into the discourse on themeans and the ends of achieving the goodlife.

How is utopianism distinguishablefrom the “antisystemic” modes of socialmovement behavior? After all, all move-ments struggle for a “nowhere,” or an as-pired goal that has not yet been realized orfulfilled—how can it be otherwise? Nor canthe distinguishing feature of utopianism bethat it merely deals with speculative andmental constructions of an ideal life, ratherthan making efforts at practical realizationof those goals. There have been many prac-tical utopian movements and communalexperimentations often using scientifictools and knowledges in their endeavors.And conversely there have been many “an-tisystemic movements” that have not gonebeyond mere declarations and manifestosof protest against their adversaries. More-over, just because utopian efforts havefailed, or been identified with “unrealistic”social aspirations, cannot be a distinguish-ing feature of utopianism. Obviously, many“antisystemic movements” (let alone,mainstream political mobilizations) havealso failed in bringing about the good life.Failure per se, in other words, cannot enterour efforts at defining and understandingwhat is distinctive about utopianism as asocial movement. So what is it that actuallydistinguishes the utopian movement fromall others?

Utopianism can be most generally de-fined as a movement in human thoughtand/or action to bring about an ideal life

beginning in the here and now.

In the antisys-temic mode, the attention is on fighting the

131

adversary, building a self-identity aroundthat fight, while the goals for which thefight is waged are relegated to the back-ground and projected into a future to becreated once the fight is won. There is an in-herent gap and alienation between meansand ends in the antisystemic mode ofbringing about social change. In contrast, inthe utopian mode, building the alternativevision in the thought and/or realities of thehere-and-now is the primary focus of themovement. The utopian movement chang-es the world by the examples of its alterna-tive imaginations, visions,experimentations, and self-constitutions ofwhat the world can or should be, not bypromises and decrees declared in the midstof antisystemic fervor.

To begin with, the spatiotemporal andsocial

relativism

of the utopian aspirationmust be taken into account. The standardsfor a desired “perfect” life have of coursebeen always geographically and historical-ly relative and changing. A utopian desireor demand raised at a particular historicalconjuncture may become, once and if real-ized, the status quo with respect to newutopian demands and aspirations. Like-wise, a utopian desire in one place may notbe shared by others in other places. Besides,socially, the utopian demands raised by aparticular class or strata, seeking goals orchanges that best suits its own interests (of-ten wrapped in the universalistic languageof “for the good of all”), may in fact be con-sidered reactionary, regressive and simplyundesirable from the standpoint of othersocial classes or strata. Obviously, “utopia”as a universal term must always be histori-cally contextualized. Utopianism alwaysinvolves a search for a good life by and rel-ative to the interests and visions of a specif-ic historical agency at a particular place andtime.

Utopianism may be further qualified asa movement that is concerned with the de-sign and construction of alternative histori-cal realities beginning in the

here and now

.

Whether such a concern becomes limited inone or another utopian movement to thespeculative and mental domain, whethersuch a concern is not actually intended tobe practically implemented by the utopianmovement, or whether such ideal construc-tions are actually implemented but in prac-tice fail, are secondary as far as the generaldefinition above is concerned. In contrast toreactive modes of antisystemic behaviorthat concentrate on building a movementthat instrumentally focuses on the destruc-tion of the old order in order to reach agood life projected into the future (be thatfuture distant or near, illusively or “realisti-cally” conceived), the utopian attitude in-volves making efforts, whatever theirscope, towards imagining, theorizing and/or practically realizing that future goal inthe here and now.

If this is what makes a utopian projectutopian, then how can Marxism be utopi-an? After all, Marx, while being convincedof the necessity and the possibility of a fu-ture ideal society, refused to provide a blue-print of it (except for brief philosophicaland/or political tracts), and instead direct-ed workers’ attention to the struggleagainst capitalism as personified in thebourgeoisie. Should we not then agree withthe founders of scientific socialism thatwhat they were advancing was not utopi-an, but scientific?

In what follows, by introducing a ty-pology of utopian movements as a whole, Iwill argue that the difference betweenMarxism and other forms of utopianism ispartly a matter of typological differentia-tion within utopianism and partly a resultof departure of the Marxism from that ty-pology in its development during Marx’lifetime. Marx and Engels, despite their re-jections of utopianism, and reluctance todraw up blueprints for the future society,nevertheless to an extent practiced in a dif-ferent form what utopian movements (ac-cording to the above definition) engagein—namely, seeking the utopian society be-

132

ginning in the here and now by building acommunist party and movement adheringto certain principles of communal livingprojected to become universal in at least theearly developmental stages of communistsociety. Marx and Engels’s repeated calls tosee communism not as a blueprint for a “fu-ture society” but as an actual movementtaking place in the midst of the present “un-der our own eyes” merely represented the

modus operandi

of a different, a “scientific”type, of utopianism which legitimated itself“scientifically” based on assumptions ofwhat were thought to be inevitable “objec-tive” movement of class society towards aclassless state. In Marx’s view the incessantparticipation, in the here and now, of theproletarian-communist movement in anobjectively given and inevitable building ofworkers’ unions, of proletarian communistparties, of an international association ofproletarian parties, of proletarian states,etc., towards achieving the immediate goalof a world-wide communist revolutionwere simply historically necessitated stagesof progress towards attaining a utopian so-ciety.

However, at the same time, built intoMarx and Engels’s doctrine, was a self-im-posed denial of the utopian nature of theirmovement, ideologically serving the func-tion of dispelling doubts about the scientif-ic nature of their views and misassociationswith what was perceived to be failing uto-pian efforts in the recent or distant past.Therefore, while Marxism drew powerfulinspirations from utopianism (hence En-gels’s regarding, say, French socialism, asone of its sources) it also sought to distanceitself from it for the purpose of self-promo-tion. This attitude which lies at the root ofthe antisystemic form of the movement, incontrast to its utopian content, served thepurpose of postponing not only the blue-prints, but also the practice, of the utopianimaginations which initially inspired themovement. This antisystemic strategy be-came in time framed by the doctrine of

class struggle which came to be regarded asthe means towards the idealized classlesssociety under communism. The central the-sis guiding this non-utopian, antisystemic,movement strategy towards utopian endswas based on the revolutionary nature ofthe proletariat as an oppressed class whoseemancipation will, as the theory claimed,would bring about the self-abolition of it-self as a ruling class in the postrevolution-ary period and the emancipation of thesociety as a whole. To end all classes, inshort, a class-based antisystemic strategyhad to be pursued.

For further clarification of this point, letme proceed with introducing a typology ofutopianism.

T

YPES

OF

U

TOPANISM

A general typology of utopian move-ments can be developed based on three ba-sic criteria: 1-The perceived

agency

that isconsidered to be the primary determinantfor the realization of the utopian project (or-dinary humans, distinguished elites, super-natural forces, objective natural/historicallaws); 2-The

attitude

adopted for the pur-suit of the utopian project (reflective, liter-ary, experimental, transformative); and 3-The

scope

of imagination and/or realiza-tion of the utopian vision (intrapersonal, in-terpersonal, communal, societal,environmental, or cosmic).

Figure 1 (next page) shows the way inwhich the general typology of utopianmovements may be conceptualized alongthe three criteria listed above. Notice thatthe combination of five agencies (consider-ing the two subtypes of scientific utopia-nism as separate categories), four attitudes,and six agendas provide a total of at least120 different ideal-types (in terms of vari-ous tracks along the agency, attitude, andagenda criteria). Of course, our numericalsuggestion here is only illustrative, and byno means do I mean to rigidify the three

133

SOCIETY

ORDINARY HUMANS

NATURE

SUPERNATURE / GOD (?)

Supernatural Determination

“Objective”Determination

Natural

Social

Ordinary Human Determination

RELIGIOUS UTOPIANISM

SCIENTIFICUTOPIANISM

HUMANIST UTOPIANISM

C.

D.

A.

Figure 2: Typology of Utopianism Considered in Terms of Part-Whole Schema

Note: The spheres must be considered as overlapping, not mutually exclusive,domains, outer circles encompassing the inner ones within. The addition ofthe “supernature/god” sphere is solely for the purpose of conceptualorganization.

Elitist DeterminationPHILOSOPHICAL UTOPIANISM

B.

The beginning and the end of solid line arrows indicate primary determination.

ELITES

Figure 1: Types of Utopian Movements

C. Religious Utopianism

D. Scientific Utopianism

A. Humanist Utopianism

3. Communal Agenda

4. Societal Agenda

5. Environmental Agenda

6. Cosmic Agenda(1) Technological (2) Social Scientific

2. Interpersonal Agenda

AGENCY SCOPE

1. Intrapersonal Agenda

ATTITUDE

b. Literaryc. Experimental

a. Reflective

d. Transformative

B. Philosophical Utopianism

134

major criteria and their sub-classificationsinto arbitrary numerical formulations.What I would like to convey here is that theclassificatory scheme suggested here al-lows us to consider the rich totality of thevarieties of forms utopian movements maytake in historical context. It must also benoted that an actual historical utopianmovement may display a multiplicity oftypes and trends in itself, with one perhapsbeing predominant at a time. Whether apredominant type can be identified in eachhistorical case of utopianism cannot ofcourse be ascertained in an a priori manner,for one or any combination of the ideal(agency/attitude/scope) types may devel-op (and thus be discovered) in one or morephases or stages of any given utopianmovement. In fact, actual historical move-ments may evolve from one type or sub-type to another while sublimating rem-nants of the older varieties.

Type A utopian movements are thosein which ordinary humans determine theutopian project. In this type, the arts andthe creative impulses drive the efforts tobuild the good life. The other three typesmay be considered alienated forms of hu-manist utopianism, in that the determiningfactor in the realization of the project inthese other forms shifts away from ordi-nary humans themselves and becomes as-sociated with outside forces, be they agroup of elites, supernatural forces beyond,and/or objectively pre-ordained natural/historical laws.

Type B utopian movements are those inwhich one or more “distinguished” indi-viduals, elites, wise men, “philosopherkings,” geniuses, etc., are seen as determi-nants of the utopian project. Type C utopi-an movements are those in which theprimary determinant of the origins, devel-opment, and/or realization of the utopianproject is perceived to be supernatural forc-es. The determination may not be alwayspositive and supportive of the utopianproject, though; God may be perceived, for

example, to have created this world for suf-fering and trial, the actual utopia being re-alizable not in this world but in thepromised hereafter. Type D utopian move-ments are those in which the primary deter-minants of the utopian project areperceived to be the “objective forces” oper-ating in nature in general and/or in historyin particular. In these movements the objec-tive “laws of motion” of nature and history,and not supernatural forces such as God, orordinary or distinguished humans, enableor retard progress towards an ideal life.

The difference between the humanistand elitist (A and B) on one hand and the“social scientific” type (B2) on the otherhand, can be considered in terms of the dis-tinction between agencies. Humanist andelitist movements, despite their differences,emphasize the role played by the humanagency, creativity or knowledge/will, tobring about the good life, whereas the so-cial scientific utopists emphasize the inher-ent laws of motion objectively operative insociety as determining factors, which thenallow human actors to play (or not) theirhistorical roles as catalyzers (or fetters). Inscientific utopianism, the role of human orelite agencies is downplayed and subordi-nated to the dictates of the limits and/oropportunities posed by objective naturaland/or historical conditions. In Marx’swords, expressing the scientific utopianmodel, men do make their own history butnot under conditions of their own choos-ing, but through aligning their actions withthe objective laws governing society.

With regards to the four broad agencytypes, it is important to consider their rela-tionship in a dynamic, rather than rigid andmutually exclusive, manner. A particulartype A may not negate the role played byelite, god, or nature/history agencies in theutopian project, but consider that their in-fluences are, or are meant to be, processedthrough the will and creativity of ordinaryhuman agencies. Perceiving ordinary hu-mans as being equally invested with the ex-

135

traordinary powers of the elite, of god(s), orof natural/historical progress, is an exam-ple. Type A, B, or D movement may also be“religious” in the sense that they may notdeny the existence of God, but for variousreasons consider divine intervention notprimary for the realization of the utopianproject—they may in fact adopt the argu-ment that it was divine intent to leave it tothe ordinary humans, to distinguished in-dividuals or prophets, or natural or histori-cal evolution to guide humanity towardsthe good life. The same may be consideredfor type A or B movements that may notdeny the relevance and effect of objectivenatural, social, or divine forces, but main-tain the significance of human volition andaction—as

natural

and/or

historical

forcesthemselves—in the pursuit and success ofthe utopian project.

In general, the typology of utopianmovements presented above may best beconceived in terms of a part-whole modali-ty rather than conceptualized in the patternof mutually exclusive movement types (seeFigure 2, previous page). In other words,each type does not exist apart from do-mains singled out by other types. The total-ity is operative for each type; however, ineach a particular sphere of reality is per-ceived to be more important and determi-nant than the other. From the standpoint ofhumanist utopianism, to say that ordinaryhumans are masters of their own destinydoes not necessarily contradict the notionthat history, nature, or even supernaturalforces are at work, if human powers areperceived to be also those of society, nature,and divine spirits. The power of the elitemay also be considered to be an alienatedform of ordinary human powers. So are thepowers attributed to nature, history, oreven the supernature, which can be inter-preted as alienated forms of ordinary hu-man powers. Only when these alienatedpowers are divested from their human ori-gins and projected as “other” forces beyondthe power of human understanding, will,

and action, do distinct forms of utopianismbecome clearly distinguishable.

To proceed with the second criteria ofsubclassification of each of the above majortypes, we may consider subtypes a, b, c,and d as being based on what

attitude

theutopian movement takes with regards tothe realization of the utopian vision. In typea, the utopian project is a reflective experi-ence, individually or collectively, in sensa-tion, feelings and imagination, not evencommunicated to others perhaps, or atmost existing in oral forms of expression—not yet finding its way into literary or prac-tical realms. By acknowledging type a, weare basically recognizing that just because autopian vision is not written down, ex-pressed in objective form, or realized in his-torical context, does not mean that it doesnot exist. Utopian visions are often reflec-tive at first, and only in subsequent devel-opment become expressed in literary orpractical forms.

In type b, the utopian project is ex-pressed or systematized in literary or artforms, making it possible to be communi-cated to others via objectified writings andartifacts. This is a crucial step, for it allowsthe utopian project to be communicatedacross time and space regardless of the in-tentions of its originators. The literary uto-pias may themselves take various forms, ofcourse, ranging from the most fantastic andfictional to the most precisely formulated,constitutional, and programmatic tracts in-tended for implementation.

Type c attitude involves experimenta-tion, in practical terms, with the utopianideas, visions, or theories in every day life.But this is only “experimental” in nature,that is, the primary purpose is not to com-mit oneself to transforming reality as anend in itself, but changing reality is pur-sued only to further develop and elaborateon the utopian idea, vision, or theory.

In type d attitude (“transformative”),finally, the aim is to make persistent andcontinuing efforts towards the realization

136

of the utopian project in reality. Again in the above attitude typology,

the various tracks must not be conceived inisolation from one another. Often, especial-ly in the later types, all the elements of the(preceding) types may be present, but onemay be predominant at any given time andplace. Moreover, the attitude typologymust be considered in its multiple varia-tions with respect to the agency typology.Each of the agency typologies may adoptone or more of the utopian attitudes.

The

scope

typology sub-differentiatesutopian movements based on which do-main the utopian movement primarily fo-cuses on for bringing about change. Type 1is intrapersonal, and denotes the inner lifeof the individual. Note here, for example,that based on the attitude typology, this in-ner personal utopianism may take reflec-tive, literary, experimental, ortransformative forms. For instance, an indi-vidual may not only envision a utopian ide-al for and by her/himself, but proceed withwriting down or expressing in various artforms specific plans of realizing that visionin her/his individual life, and actually pro-ceed to do so.

For Type 2 (interpersonal) utopianismthe primary focus of utopian reflection,writing/expression, experimentation,and/or transformation is the interpersonalspace, of specific relationships with anotherperson. Type 3 (communal) utopianism ac-quires a strong organizational dimensionconsidering that individuals are influencedby the type of social organization in whichthey live. In other words, type 3 introduceselements of social externalization andstructuration of the utopian project beyondthe immediate dyadic intentions of inter-personal actors. In this case, conscious andpersistent effort is spent on the develop-ment of alternative objective social struc-tures and organizations alongside fosteringof new behavioral patterns.

Type 4 (societal) is concerned not justwith the affairs of the narrow utopian com-

mune, but the latter is used as a means oran example for a wider societal (ethno-na-tional, civilizational, or global) utopianproject for which the utopian vision is de-veloped. Type 5 focuses on the environ-mental context within which the utopianproject is to be realized. It is one thing toconceive of the utopian project in terms ofhuman species, another to consider the lat-ter as part of the biosphere as a whole, in-cluding consideration of all other lifeforms. Type 6 involves primary concernswith the cosmic dimension and implica-tions of the utopian vision.

Notice here that in the scope typology,there is not an assumption of a particularintellectual and/or practical

attitude

to-wards the utopian project. A utopian vi-sion, for instance, may involve cosmicpreoccupations without necessarily involv-ing any practical steps to realize it, one wayor another—most science fictions of outerspace variety are in this category. In the lat-ter case, though, one may also find a cosmicutopianism which involves practical steps,regardless of how strange they may be(mass suicide to spiritually link up with apassing comet!). That is why I have separat-ed the attitude typology from the scope ty-pology to allow more flexible intermixingof various subtypes within and across themajor agency typologies. In each of the lat-ter, the concern with the particular domainof utopian vision may be reflective, literary,experimental, or transformative at a givetime or place for a given utopian move-ment. Any utopian movement may experi-ence one or another of the various agency,attitude, or scope typologies in the courseof its life cycle. For the purpose of clarifica-tion, the possible alternative tracks of theutopian movement can be considered us-ing arrow tracks in Figure 1 (above).

I

MPLICATIONS

OF

THE

T

YPOLOGY

The inclusive model of utopianism as

137

explicated above moves beyond a classifi-catory system that is based solely on whatcan be readily “observed” as a utopianmovement. The literary utopias or utopiancommunities investigated by scholars arethen treated as only a fraction of the world-historical utopian movement as a whole. Inthe new typology, the “silent utopias” ineveryday lives of ordinary people whichnever find expression in any tangible liter-ary or communal forms are treated as beingas much a part of the unfolding global storyof utopianism as the more visible and “clas-sical” forms.

What Wallerstein has called (1998)“utopistics” or “efficacious” utopianism, adistinction also made somewhat similarlyby Mannheim (1936) in terms of utopiasthat aim to “shatter existing society,” maybe considered as the specific type involvingsocial scientific agency and experimental/transformative attitudes in the scheme con-sidered above. But these, as in the case ofMarxism, also display tendencies for post-poning creative efforts in building the fu-ture society in the here-and-nows of thepresent. The projection of utopia to a futureapart from making efforts, no matter howsmall, in building it by example in themidst of the present, would be seen as a de-parture from the utopian mode of bringingabout social change and as proximity to theantisystemic social movement variety. An-tisystemic social movements, as notedabove, may be defined as those more preoc-cupied with shattering the present as themeans of the movement, at the expense ofmaking greater efforts at building the endsof the movement in the here-and-now.

For the purpose of this investigation,the determination of whose utopia is more“efficacious” and “shattering” than othersis considered to be a subjective matter, de-pending on which historical agency pro-claims or judges the case. Any utopist mayclaim her or his approach to be the most ef-fective from the particular vantage point ofher or his own interests and purposes in

pursuing the project. Likewise, a non-effi-cacious or non-shattering utopia may notnecessarily be of any lesser value or signifi-cance than those espoused to be more real-istic. Many of the more efficaciousutopianisms of the modern times had theirbeginnings in fictive utopian literature (St.Thomas More’s

Utopia

is the best example),and many of the dystopian literature oftwentieth century have had significant im-pact on the critical historical and social con-sciousness of a large international audience(George Orwell’s

Nineteen Eighty Four

is agood example). It may thus be more fruitfulto treat all forms of utopianism as diverseexercises in utopianism, and relegate judg-ments regarding their efficaciousness andsubstantive realism to the investigation ofsuch theories and/or practices, rather thandismissing one or another utopian projecton an a priori basis.

My proposed typology incorporatesexisting classifications of utopianism, butgoes beyond them in providing a more in-clusive picture of human efforts on a globalscale in search of the good life. This typolo-gy treats utopianism broadly as a world-historical movement, of which only a par-ticular branch may be attributable to thewestern tradition, while regarding the sci-entific variety as a western artifact, or a“western” concept and movement (Kumar1991) by pointing out the notion of utopiaas a naturally and/or historically pre-or-dained goal towards which humanity ismaking “progress” in an “evolutionary”process. The typology incorporates reli-gious “precursors” of utopianism as beingthemselves a particular type of utopianism.What is useful in the suggested typology isthe distinction made between humanistand philosophical/elitist utopianism onone hand, and the religious and scientifictypes on the other. To elaborate on this letme turn to the question with which I beganthis paper.

Besides what I consider to be the origi-nal historical type of utopianism, namely

138

humanist utopianism, which relied on cre-ativity and artfulness of ordinary humansto bring about a good life, there have beenthree major types of utopianism in world-history, adopting, respectively philosophy,religion, and science as the paradigms fromwhich to derive their utopian visions and/or practices. The splitting of humanist uto-pianism into its three alienated forms maybe seen as corresponding to the splitting ofancient civilizations into diverse forms ofclassical political, medieval religious, andmore recent modern economic empires.

Philosophical utopianism is best repre-sented by the Platonic search for the goodsociety as formed and guided by the philos-opher kings. Although religious sentimentand vision may be considered to have exist-ed in all early utopias, including humanistand philosophical ones, it is with the rise ofcultural/religious empires that religiousutopianism gains its classic form. Giventhat most of the earliest civilizations andclassical political empires had developed inthe non-western regions of the world(Egypt, India, Persia, Mesopotamia), it isnot surprising to see that religious utopia-nism is predominantly and classically east-ern in origin (“east” is used here in itsbroadest meaning of what is non-west).

1

Jewish, Christian, and Islamic forms of reli-

gious utopianism and mysticism took theirclassical shape during the long medievalperiod. Scientific utopianism of both tech-nological-bourgeois and socialist types,originating in the west in the course of theso-called Renaissance, Reformation, En-lightenment, and the Industrial Revolution,were of course best represented by varioustypes of bourgeois utopianism and Marx-ism. More’s

Utopia

or Omar Khayyam’s

Rubaiyat

, may be considered heretical uto-pian movements in thought that do not eas-ily fit in philosophical, religious, orscientific utopianisms, and have muchmore affinity with the humanist varietythat emphasizes the value of ordinary hu-man agency in bringing about the condi-tions for the good life. When they emerged,these heretical utopianisms heralded a re-turn to humanist utopianism in reaction tothe failure of orthodox religious efforts;however, despite their openness to skepti-cism and secularism, they may not easily beclassifiable also under the scientific varietythat emerged later. Omar Khayyam in par-ticular was skeptical as much about theclaims of science as about the claims of or-thodox religion and philosophy—despitebeing himself publicly a scientist/astrono-mer, a religious man, and a free-thinkingphilosopher. Works by More (who was be-headed by religious orthodoxy), or easternutopists such as Omar Khayyam, and cer-tain other utopian literature and communalexperiments emphasize, along with theiracknowledgment of religious moralityand/or use of scientific imagination andknowledge, the role of creative and willfulaction by ordinary humans in favor of uto-pian landscapes. As such they may be con-sidered precursors of a humanist utopianrenaissance that does not shy away from in-corporating the contributions of philosoph-ical, religious, and scientific utopianismwithin the framework of a new humanistutopianism. Humanist utopianism maytherefore be considered both eastern andwestern in origin.

1.For similar use of the East-West distinc-tion see Abdel-Malek (1981a/b): “For studies inthe human and social sciences in the contempo-rary Orient--tentatively defined here as Asia andNorth Africa, but which also encompasses thewhole North African continent as well as otherareas in the central and southern-eastern part ofthe Western hemisphere—must address them-selves primarily to this very transformationwhich the Orient is undergoing in a changingworld” (1981b:192); “The structuralist-function-alist networks in the human and social scienceswere busily elaborating their 'neo-Marxist' theo-ries of 'center' and 'periphery', where the 'center'was, of course, the West, and the 'periphery',needless to say, the sphere of the nations of theThree Continents--in a word, the Orient”(1981b:193); “... the emergence of the Orient, theaccess and emergence on to the contemporaryscene of the Three Continents of Asia, Africa andLatin America” (1981a:177).

139

By pointing out the spatial origins ofvarious types of utopianism, I do not meanto suggest that each type has been confinedto its original birth-place. On the contrary,all types of utopianism in time have oftenbecome global in scope. The global scope ofeach type, however, should not necessarilyprevent us from ignoring their spatialpoints of origin. Christianity, for example,which is claimed often to be a “western” re-ligion, is obviously an eastern religion (tak-ing the eastern shores of the Mediterraneansea as a cut off point) which only laterspread throughout the west and world as awhole. Most world religions are eastern inorigin, despite the fact that most have nowinstitutionalized themselves globally. Incontrast, Marxism which is a global social-ist ideology and movement, clearly origi-nated in the west and built itself primarilyon the economic, political, and philosophi-cal sources that were European in origin. Itsglobal expansion to the east (such as China,for example) should not prevent us fromrecognizing its western origin.

The break with religion in the paradig-matic structure of scientific utopianism isclear. The bourgeois ideology of “separa-tion of church from state,” to which Marx-ism also adhered, provides a historicaldemonstration of this defining feature ofwestern utopianism. Western utopianismin the form of the bourgeois ideology of“progress” is the dominant type of utopia-nism today. Even Marxism adhered to andoperated within the utopian ideology ofprogress which is the cultural

raison detre

ofthe modern capitalist world-system as well.The emphasis in western utopianism on ex-periment and practice on one hand and thepredominance in modern times of this typeof utopianism on the other hand are thetwo mutually reinforcing aspects of itscharacter.

The policy of downplaying the otherthree major philosophical, religious, andhumanist forms of utopianism, shared byboth the bourgeois and socialist forms of

western utopianism, emanates from theirperceived and claimed hegemonic status inthe global political arena. Although as awestern doctrine Marxism has itself beenregarded as the latest, the farthest advanc-ing, and failing, global experiment in utopi-anism, the “success” of bourgeoisutopianism characterized by the ideologyof progress can hardly be sustained todayeven according to the data generated byglobal financial institutions (such as theWorld Bank and the IMF). The deepeninggap between the rich and the poor acrossthe globe and within nation-states, theworsening problems of hunger, housing,and environmental degradation, the out-break of modern plagues and diseases suchas AIDS, etc., and the inability of the systemto eradicate them, are more than mere sta-tistical data, but facts of everyday life for amajority of the world’s population.

U

TOPIANISM

B

EYOND

M

ARXISM

While the typology presented aboveclarifies in what sense Marxism may be re-garded as a utopian doctrine (i.e, as a scien-tific variety of it based on thepredetermined action of natural/historicalobjective laws), it also points to the extentto which Marxism also departed from uto-pianism as a whole by embracing an anti-systemic mode preoccupied more withfighting a class enemy than with buildingthe alternative cultural, political, and eco-nomic structures in the midst of the existingsociety. In his comparative study of severalurban social movements (1983), Castellshas stressed the degree to which the successof social movements historically has de-pended on their efforts in articulating thecultural, political, and economic dimen-sions of their aspired communal life in theexisting reality than in declarations and de-mands to be made from the State. Buildingthe alternative social arrangement, even ina minor scale, in the here and now, in other

140

words, is a much more powerful strategyfor social change than promises made in themost militant manifestos and declarations.

The danger of drawing the wrong les-sons from the experience of Marxism, how-ever, is to associate its wrongs withutopianism as a whole—a mistake that ob-viously pleases the conservative trends inthe social and political establishment. Crit-ical theorists and activists have foundmuch inspiration in Marxism to the extentthat they have been able to decipher theutopian message found in the early writ-ings of the young Marx. Some of the self-critical reflections of Marx may have foundits way to Engels’s correspondence (Marxand Engels 1975), but perhaps not suffi-ciently to transcend the economistic struc-ture of mature Marxism and a dialecticalreturn to the utopian spirit in Marx’s earlywritings in which neither idealism, nor ma-terialism, but humanism was declared to bethe riddle of human history resolved.

The typology presented above is only apreliminary effort at clarifying the meaningand forms of utopianism as a world-histor-ical social movement. By distinguishingvarious types of utopianism from one an-other, the typology allows us to refrainfrom doing away with a social movementsimply because of the failures of particularapproaches to it in world-history—espe-cially so, if such failures actually emanatefrom ideas or practices not belonging to thetypology altogether. In essence, utopianismhas been about desiring and/or making ef-forts towards optimally better worlds thatdo not (yet) exist—and doing so beginningin the here and now, by the example of howwe think, feel, imagine, and act while con-ducting our everyday lives.

The debunking of utopianism as awhole has been a significant ideologicaland political feat for the guardians of thestatus quo across world-historical time andspace—paved in modern times with thegood intentions of antisystemic move-ments who have internalized the ideology

in their movement rhetoric and agenda.How could the desires and/or movementsfor radical social change in favor of opti-mally better human conditions be more ef-fectively extinguished, other than throughdeclaring any efforts made towards suchends altogether fantastic, unrealistic, andimpractical:

Where the critics of the utopianmethod were, I believe, wrong wasin holding that the business of pro-jecting prouder worlds was a futileand footling pastime. These anti-utopian critics overlooked the factthat one of the main factors thatcondition any future are the atti-tudes and beliefs which peoplehave in relation to that future.”(Mumford, 1922: 298)

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