PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 9, 147-157 (1989)

Democratic decentralization or political consolidation: the case of local government reform in Karnataka

RICHARD SLATER AND JOHN WATSON

University of Birmingham

SUMMARY

In 1987 the Indian State of Karnataka implemented panchayat reform legislation. The ideological orientation of the Janata Government’s reforms is considered, together with the question of whether stronger local government in India increases the state’s autonomy within the federation. The Karnataka reforms are expected to be significantly different from the reforms enacted in other states. Participation by marginalized groups may assist the Janata party in incorporating them into its network of patronage. Local level planning has been made more effective. The legislation gives the zilla parishad control over the line departments of the State Government. Administrative power is likely to experience increased local political direction. However the financial independence of the zilla parishad is by no means assured. The final outcome will also depend upon the attitude towards the reform of the Congress Party, anxious about its power base in the Karnataka countryside.

INTRODUCTION

The transfer of power from state governments to the panchayats has been an active issue in Indian political debate since the publication of the Ashoka Mehta report (Government of India, 1978). On the 1st April 1987, Karnataka became one of the first states to make a wholehearted commitment to Ashoka Mehta by implementing its panchayat reform legislation, Act 20 of 1985. It is not surprising perhaps to find the Janata government of former Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde pursuing administrative reforms that, conceptually at least, appear more radical than those enacted in other states. Hegde has earned a reputation as an opponent of central government; and indeed, from his victory over Congress in 1983, until his resignation last year, Hegde sought to strengthen the local power base of his party and government.

In this context, Hegde’s comments upon the Left Democratic Front (LDF) victory in Kerala are interesting. According to Hegde (Frontline, 1987) the LDF victory signifies a general movement in the country towards political polarization and away from the petty communalism he takes to be characteristic of Congress. He sees no contradiction in Janata’s role as part of the left coalition in Kerala, while in opposition to the left in West Bengal. The failure of Janata and the CPI(M) to come to terms in Bengal has more to do with the distribution of seats (Hegde

The authors are members of the Development Administration Group at the University of Birmingham, PO Box 363, Birmingham B15 2lT, U.K.

0271-2075/89/020147-11$05.50 0 1989 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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argues) than any fundamental difference in ideology. This is a strange characteriza- tion perhaps for a party whose political culture is often seen as indistinguishable from Congress.

Two questions arise from Hegde’s comments. Firstly, what is the ideological orientation of the Karnataka reforms? India’s experience of the Janata govern- ment, at least at the centre, provides no ready answer. Secondly, does the decentralization of power within a state contribute, in any way, to a state’s political autonomy within the Union? Constitutionally, there is no change. But, it is arguable that Hegde believes that a significant transfer of power to local governments will consolidate the Janata power base in the state, and this in turn will strengthen its hand in dealing with Delhi.

If so, Janata must also be confident of continuing electoral support. It will take time to get the new system working in a way that brings political benefit. However, the success experienced by Congress in the 1987 elections, which enabled it to gain 44 per cent of zilla parishad seats, may undermine this objective. The consolidation of political power at district level depends upon Janata’s ability to maintain a dominant position within the zilla parishad structure. What will happen in those districts in which Janata begins to lose support to Congress remains to be seen. Much will depend upon the degree to which the Government is prepared to devolve power in the final instance. In this context, sceptics may be forgiven for drawing attention to the host of residual powers that will remain firmly in the hands of the State Government; not least, its ability to dissolve an ‘incompetent’ zilla parishad.

THE 1985 REFORMS

The reforms embodied in the 1985 Act are designed to re-organize the district machinery by transferring the developmental responsibilities of the district administration to a newly established local government structure. The old, three- tier panchayat system of zilla development board, taluk development board and village panchayat has gone. In its place is a four-tier structure of zilla parishad (district), taluk panchayat samithi (block), mandal panchayat (village group) and gram sabha (village).

The framework of this initiative resembles administrative reorganization in states such as West Bengal, Gujarat and Maharashtra. In Karnataka, however, there is a widely held view that the current reforms will be qualitatively and quantitatively different from those enacted in other states. Firstly, Karnataka had further to go in transforming nominated advisory committees (the old ZDB and TDB) into real councils. The second point of difference centres on the powers invested in the electoral process itself. In Karnataka there has been a fundamental transfer of power and particularly to the apex body at district level, the zilla parishad. This, it is argued, will bring about rural democracy. As a means of establishing its commitment to this idea, the State has reinforced the powers of local bodies by granting the president of the zilla parishad the status and authority of a state government minister, and the deputy president that of a deputy minister. All of the twenty-six line departments concerned with development in the district will now be directly responsible to the zilla parishad, and will only report to their departmental line heads on inter-district or trans-district matters.

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The gram sabha

At the base of the new structure is the gram sabha, the council of all those on the electoral roll of a village. The main functions of the gram sabha, which should meet at least twice a year, relate to the reviewing of all mandal panchayat programmes undertaken in the locality and the preparation of specific village development plans. The gram sabha will assist with the implementation of local development schemes through the formation of a ‘land army’ of able-bodied volunteers and the collection of local contributions.

The mandal panchayat

At the next level, the mandal panchayat encompasses a group of villages with a population of between eight and twelve thousand or, in remote areas, all who live within eight kilometres of a selected village. Each mandal will have roughly thirty members, one for every four to five hundred population, representing a constituency of between ten to fifteen thousand population. Any individual who is on the list of voters drawn from the electoral roll of the zilla parishad for a particular mandal constituency may be elected as a member; providing that the individual does not meet any of the disqualification rulings governing membership.

The composition of the membership encourages participation by groups commonly excluded from the process of local decision making. The significance of this is arguably Janata’s need to incorporate marginalized groups into its patronage network. Only in this way can it hope to challenge the Congress machine. Twenty- five per cent of total seats are reserved for women, at least one of whom must belong to a scheduled caste or tribe. A minimum of eighteen per cent of seats should be reserved for scheduled groups, who may be represented in direct proportion to their overall distribution in the mandal population. If no backward class group materializes, the legislation obliges the zilla parishad to nominate members. The normal term of office is five years. If for any reason a mandal panchayat should fail to be elected, or if less than half the required membership is returned to office, the deputy commissioner may appoint a temporary administra- tor or an administrative committee for up to one year.

The officers elected as the pradhana and upa pradhana (chairman and vice- chairman) are empowered to convene meetings and supervise officers and employees. This extension of responsibility broadens the scope of the mandal panchayat beyond the supervision of public services such as water supply and sanitation, and key utilities such as roads and street lighting. It is now charged with a range of development activities including the preparation of an agricutlural production plan covering input delivery, seed production, extension, storage and the improvement of animal husbandry. Other development functions include the formulation of plans for fishery, forestry, soil conservation and the promotion of cottage and village industries. Sectoral officers such as the assistant director agriculture may contribute to plan preparation and supervise implementation.

It is intended that the reorganized line reporting structure within the implement- ing departments, which obliges departmental directors to report directly to the zilla parishad, will enhance managerial co-operation between the development authority and the implementing agencies at sub-district level. In order to facilitate proper

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functioning, elected committees are to be established, vested with certain powers to oversee all mandal activities relating to production, social amenities and the administration of justice.

Officially, the finances of the mandal panchayat will derive from a special fund which wil be partially serviced by the State Government. Additional contributions to the fund will be made up from a variety of local sales and tax proceeds, loans, subsidies and grants from village industries boards and the Government, and the rents of panchayat property. Taxes and fees may be levied upon buildings, certain entertainments, non-motorized vehicles, bus stands, markets, water supplies and upon the transfer of immovable property. All income and expenditure will be detailed in the annual budget, which must provide for twenty per cent to be spent upon the welfare of scheduled castes and tribes. It is a comprehensive list; however, Ray (1987, p. 262) has speculated that no mandal panchayat can hope to obtain more than Rs 5 to 6 lakhs (US$25,00&30,000) per annum. In consequence, the real impact of the mandals in a state known for its low level of grass-roots co-ordination has been questioned (Natraj, 1987).

The taluk panchayat samithi

Between the mandal and the zilla parishad lies the taluk panchayat sarnithi. It is essentially an advisory and regulatory body, designed to assist the mandal in the efficient execution of its duties. It is also responsible for reviewing the performance of the mandal on behalf of the zilla parishad whilst directly managing any schemes undertaken by the zilla parishad in the taluk. Membership is restricted to those members of the legislative assembly and zilla parishad whose constituencies lie partly or wholly within the taluk: pradhanas of the mandal panchayats, presidents of the taluk’s agricultural marketing society and primary land development bank, together with members from scheduled groups, backward classes and women. It has been suggested that it will be a ‘toothless wonder’. Without real purpose, its existence is seen as having more to do with satisfying Congress than with facilitating devolution (Natraj, 1987).

The zilla parishad

The zilla parishad is the apex council, with authority over the entire district, excluding municipalities. It is also the key to the Karnataka administrative reforms. It has a wide-ranging development role coupled to a revised management structure. This brings line department officers into the panchayats through a fundamental change in the structure of communication and control. In order to assess the full potential of these reforms, designed to increase participation in decision making, it will be useful to highlight some of the more important constitutional aspects of the zilla parishad.

The exact number of elected members will be determined on the basis of the population of each taluk (according to the census current at the time), with one member for roughly thirty-five thousand of population. Special requirements for the composition of the zilla parishad are similar to those governing the mandal, with at least 25 per cent reservation for women and 18 per cent for scheduled castes and tribes. All prospective members are governed by standard electoral disqualifi-

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cation rulings. Members of the Legislative Assembly, the Legislative Council and Parliament (with a constituency which includes some part of the district within the zilla parishad’s jurisdiction) are entitled to take part in and vote at all meetings. The chairman of the district central co-operative bank is a non-voting associate member. The term of office is five years.

The executive head of the zilla parishad will be the president or adhyahha, supported by the deputy president or upadhyaksha, each elected by the members of the zilla parishad. The authority of presiding officers has been considerably increased, with the president receiving salary and allowances equal to those of a state minister, and the deputy president those of a state deputy minister. Other members are entitled to receive daily allowances equal to those of group ‘A’ officers of the state government when engaged in official work.

In addition to elected members, the Government of Karnataka will appoint a number of senior officers to serve each zilla parishad. An officer of the rank of deputy commissioner or above will be appointed as chief secretary, with operational responsibility for all development schemes, works and staff. This will include control of financial transactions. A deputy secretary will be responsible for assisting the chief secretary, while a chief accounts officer will provide advice on financial policy, prepare annual accounts and budgets, and supervise all accounting practices and expenditures.

There will be a standing committee for each main area of activity. Each standing committee will consist of six members including an elected chairman, none of whom may serve on more than two such committees. The president and chief secretary will act as ex-officio members of the various standing committees.

The recent legislation has brought a number of important activities within the jurisdiction of the zilla parishad. Perhaps the most critical is that of the planning, management and integration of all development schemes in the district, reflected in responsibility for formulating and implementing the district plan. In the agricultural field, the zilla parishad is responsible for extension, including the operation of agricultural training schools, commercial farms and seed farms. Animal husbandry, including the operation of breed improvement schemes, dairy development , disease control and the management of veterinary hospitals all fall within its brief.

The development of irrigation and small-scale industry is a further responsibility. The zilla parishad will have charge of the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of minor to medium irrigation works, timely and equitable water distribution and the development of groundwater resources. In the field of rural industry, it will be concerned with the promotion of small-scale and cottage industry through the establishment of training and production centres and the provision of marketing facilities. Other responsibilities include the extension of the activities of co-operatives (including the acquisition of shares in them where appropriate) and the development of fish farming.

In addition, the zilla parishad will be responsible for health, welfare and public works throughout the district. This will include the construction and management of hospitals, dispensaries, schools, community groups, literacy campaigns, the provision of services and protection to scheduled castes, tribes and backward classes (including all development schemes designed for such groups), the establishment and maintenance of all roads in the district, other than highways and mandal panchayat roads, and the construction of zilla parishad buildings.

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A zilla parishad fund has been established to finance all its activities. The fund is made up of appropriations from the state consolidated fund plus specific grants or loans from the Government plus all revenues generated by the zilla parishad itself. Such revenues derive from a combination of fees, penalties, rents from land property and proceeds from land, property and security sales. Ray (1987) estimates that the total receipts of the zilla parishad are likely to range between Rs 30 and Rs 40 crores annually (US $15-20m).

The zilla parishad will have specific powers over the day to day operations of the mandal panchayat. This will allow the zilla parishad to intervene in the implementation of mandal programmes by issuing advice or directives with regard to improved practices or changed priorities. It may also supervise taxation and income generation procedures and suspend any activities regarded as unlawful or improper. In extreme cases it may dissolve the mandal panchayat altogether, particularly if it is considered to be ineffective or incompetent.

Equally, there is provision for a measure of control over the zilla parishad. Powers to dissolve the zilla parishad are vested in the State Government and may be exercised if the zilla parishad is considered to be incapable of carrying out its duties.

LOCAL LEVEL PLANNING

What now remains to be seen is the extent to which the new panchayat system can be made to work. The Karnataka reforms have been described by the press as ‘democratic decentralisation with teeth, giving enormous powers to the zilla parishads and the mandal panchayats, besides backing them up with the statutory transfer of resources up to about Rs 1000 crores (US$SOOm) a year’ (Frontline, 1987, p. 30). Certainly, with their new statutory responsibilities and control over substantial resources for both plan and non-plan expenditure, the zilla parishads will become the most important source of development planning and financing in the district.

This has several implications. Firstly, it could be argued that Karnataka has at last created the right environment for effective local level planning. Much of the discussion about planning in recent decades has turned upon the conditions in which local (that is, at district or lower levels) planning should function. That local- level planning is desirable seems generally accepted; the question that has engaged the Government in recent years has been the environment, and perhaps particularly the administrative structure, within which it should take place. Major proposals have been advanced from time to time (for example the Hanumantha Rao report: Government of India, 1984) without, at least as yet, attracting all-India sqpport. The States, constitutionally with great independence in these matters, continue with a wide variety of local administrative structures, planning respons- ibilities and procedures; some admittedly highly developed (Maharashtra and Gujarat are frequently cited), others perhaps less so.

Within the debate, two arguments are clear. Firstly, local level planning requires the existence of a locally constituted authority with clear allocative responsibilities. This was recognized by the Minhas report (Government of India, 1973), and indeed led to the establishment of the District Rural Development Authorities, or DRDAs. Secondly, responsibilities presume resources; local-level planning depends upon local control of significant financial and physical resources. Again,

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there are precedents: the district discretionary budget of Gujarat is a case in point. These themes are intrinsic to the Karnataka legislation. The Act envisages that the district will plan. The zilla parishad will be the district planning authority, subsuming the functions of the old District Rural Development Society (as the DRDA is termed in Karnataka) and possibly other committees as well. It will prepare a district plan and implement it through its control over the expenditure of the line departments-agriculture, rural industries and so on. The new reporting structure will, it is assumed, actively encourage line staff to adhere to the objectives that spring from the local political process.

What is new here is neither the plan nor planning responsibilities, but the legislation’s intent to give the zilla parishad effective control over the line departments. The problems that stem from the ‘rock of departmentalism’, as Minhas termed it, are well known and indeed have led to a vocabulary all of their own: ‘top-down planning’, ‘red tapeism’ and so on. They turn on the seeming inability of district authorities (panchayats, DRDA’s and so on), however constituted, to exercise more than limited control over the spending departments within their jurisdiction. In the past, district departments have looked upwards as much as sideways; working within policies determined at national or State level, working on programmes decided at State level, and responsible to State level officers for their ultimate performance. The theory is that this will change; effective local control will make it easier to match local investment to local resources and make a significant improvement in the performance of development programmes in general.

In practice, the effect of the legislation may be limited. It is difficult, for instance, to see a change in what is planned. Most public investment, whether in public works or in, say, the poverty programmes, is subject to national or state-level policy decisions translated into norms and targets. How much investment is planned depends upon the procedure employed for inter-district financial allocation; procedures themselves can be changed, but it is difficult to see how decisions can be made elsewhere other than in the State capital. The main area for manoeuvre is where the investment is planned-which village or block is to benefit-and it is arguable that this has always been subject to local control, either through the political process or through statutory authorities: the D R D A s and so on.

Furthermore, the improvement of spatial planning is going to make considerable calls on the skills available. As Ray (1987) points out, in spite of Karnataka’s initiative to appoint district planning cells, there is still a serious deficiency, at the district level in planning skills. It will take time to remedy this; and it may be that zilla parishads need to concentrate in the first instance on developing the skills needed to produce co-ordinated expenditure estimates and monitor programme performance. This could usefully be complemented at a later date by training in a selected range of techniques.

Better planning then is one possible objective of the legislation; but it is not inconceivable that the motivation for reform lies elsewhere. In a State where the Congress party has long dominated the political arena it would be surprising if Janata were not actively seeking ways of building their own systematic patronage machine. Zilla parishad reform could well serve this purpose as new channels of political mediation replace former administrative controls over a significant portion of district affairs.

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THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER?

District government in India is the product of a long history; a complex set of checks and balances has developed, which enables state and central authority to be exercised jointly, which places certain limits upon local political power and which gives departmental officers a degree of professional autonomy in the performance of their duties. No small part of these checks and balances has been the dual structure of communication and control: the collector, responsible through his chief secretary to his chief minister for the conduct of affairs in his district, but aware too of his ultimate duty to the central government; the department officer, accounting for what he does to the collector and indeed to collective authority, the DRDA or district planning board, but answering for the professional performance of his duties to his superior at state level.

The removal or dilution (it is difficult to be sure which) of such dual control over departmental staff, and the effective reduction in the authority of the collector will increasingly subordinate administrative power to local political direction. Much of the routine activity of departmental staff can now be monitored by a political body at district level. Under these circumstances it should be relatively easy for the zilla parishad to secure departmental co-operation through its links with state politicians. Ultimate control over departmental staff tends to be exercised by State ministers who determine transfers, promotions and leave entitlements. The possibility of a ‘loopline’ posting (i.e. into a siding) to a remote station can be guaranteed to instil caution and hence co-operation into the heart of any recalcitrant officer. Whilst these links will serve to strength the party structure in a Janata district, they may also ensure that a Congress zilla parishad receives minimal cooperation.

The concentration of powers at the zilla parishad level however, must place considerable strain, not only upon administrative practice but also the long established culture of government at the local level. Senior administrative staff attached to the zilla parishad may experience considerable frustration in having to work with newly elected local politicians rather than the more seasoned actors in the state capital.

A further worry for Janata arises from the results of the elections held in January, 1987. The outcome is that (far from consolidating the position of the Janata party over the development process) Congress has considerably more power in a number of districts. It is true that, despite winning a majority in four districts, the inclusion of ex-officio members (MLAs, MLCs and MPs) will limit actual Congress control to no more than two of the State’s nineteen districts. But, the significance of this result rests in the fact that a powerful opposition has now been established in almost all districts, with the exception of Dakshina Kannada and Uttara Kannada (Hegde’s own constituency) where Congress (I) and Janata dominate their respective parishads.

Ray’s analysis of voting behaviour in the recent panchayat elections demonstrates that support for the Janata party stemmed from the less developed or ‘backward’ districts in both academic and educational terms (Ray, 1987, p. 263). If Janata is to maintain its local power base it will have to be seen to deliver to the poorer groups. Just how feasible a proposition this is depends largely upon the behaviour of the vokkuliga and Einguyut legislators in the State Assembly. As representatives of the

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two numerically strong and politically dominant juti (subcaste) groups, they have been able to cultivate power with surprising ease. Manor (1984) shows how vokkaliga and lingayat MLAs have succeeded in getting members of their own groups inserted into numerous administrative posts in their constituencies at taluk and block level. ‘Given the precarious margin by which Janata controls the assembly, the chief minister and his colleagues have been compelled to acquiesce in a large number of such cases, despite public assurances to the contrary’ (1984, p. 1629). Yet, Hedge has been well aware of the dangers of dominant caste control and has been eager to incorporate greater backward class participation in the political process, partly to balance the vokkuliga and fingayat lobby.

As Manor demonstrates, Janata’s heterogeneous composition and socio- economic base can be partly attributed to political developments in Karnataka since 1980, when the former chief minister, Gundu Rao, split with his predecessor Devaraj Urs to form the Congress (I) faction. The ensuing defections led to the creation of a ‘very motley legislative delegation’ (Manor, 1984, p. 1624) loyal to Rao, and the emergence of a politically incompetent regime which succeeded in alienating important elements of the electorate including the farm lobby. This clearly worked in Janata’s favour at the 1983 state elections, the result of which surprised even the Janata-Kranti Ranga leadership, where the earlier blurring of traditional party allegiances in the State served to open up a much broader constituency for Janata (see Manor, 1984). Despite efforts to preserve former Congress inspired ‘protective discrimination’, and extend the vote to previously excluded groups such as women, Hegde’s ruling that 90 per cent of the State’s population is now to be classified as ‘backward’ smacks of outright populism and an overriding desire to please all.

The fact that there now exists a more viable opposition in the district may also reinforce the need for Janata to do more than simply pay lip service to the poor. Hence the ambiguity inherent in the reforms. Should Janata fail to win the necessary support in any district, it may come to regard the zilla parishad as a rather serious annoyance.

Recent analysis of the leadership structure of the zilla parishads shows that the government has been unable to break the power of the dominant landed groups. In examining the social background of the zilla parishad presidents, Ray and Kumpatla emphasize that the two dominant jati groups had ten out of eighteen (or 56 per cent) of zilla parishad-far in excess of their proportion in the total population (Ray and Kumpatla, 1987, p. 1826). As Ray and Kumpatla point out, with its lack of specific ideological commitment, Janata is unlikely to ‘imperil the entrenched interests of the propertied classes as a whole’ (Ray and Kumpatla, 1987, p. 1830). In this context, how strong a party base can be consolidated at district level, in the absence of a radical political and economic programme?

CONCLUSION

The reform of panchayati raj is not new in India; and to many the system remains thoroughly discredited. It is by no means uncommon to hear complaints of election rigging and irregularities being levied at panchayats. In a detailed village survey conducted by Saradamoni (1981) in Kerala, where levels of literacy and political

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awareness are often thought to minimize extra-legal activity and encourage a more responsive political system, the majority of informants dismissed the panchayat as being of ‘no use’. Villagers claimed that members were unfamiliar with their wards, had been in office too long, used their position for their own benefit, engaged in irregular housing allocation and pension recommendations, and misused tax revenues. Whether or not the reforms in Karnataka will make any difference will depend upon the development of local political machinery. If the newly empowered zilla parishads and mandal panchayats are to do more than act as newly constituted channels of patronage, they may have to be encouraged to establish a strong grass-roots party structure backed up by a substantial development programme at district level.

Since the exact degree of financial independence of the zilla parishad still remains in the balance, it is by no means clear just how autonomous the newly instituted structure will become. The legislation provides for a Finance Commission to determine the principles which should govern grants-in-aid from Government, and the overall pattern of assistance. Political streamlining has been instituted at district level but whether this materializes into anything more may ultimately depend on the Janata party’s own performance in the districts. If political losses begin to outweigh gains, then the radical language of the reforms may vanish into obscurity.

Ultimately, the character of these reforms will depend upon the criteria by which the party judges their performance. Strong electoral representation and the smooth passage of legislation can only be guaranteed as long as Janata can establish a systematic means of rewarding and penalizing its hierarchy of support. Central to this objective is the need to control a civil service, which has enjoyed a much eroded perhaps but still real degree of independence from political control. These reforms have major implications for one cornerstone of the service, the collector. Appleby has described the collector as ‘responsible to everybody for everything, though with varying degrees of clarity’ (see Maheshwari, 1974, p. 42). In fact the collector, partly for historical reasons, partly through the prestige of his service, partly through his position at the centre of decision-making at district level, has always been able, if he chose, to exercise significant influence upon the course of district government. Increasingly, development in the broadest sense has become a major objective of such government and taken increasing amounts of his time. This has gone. Major powers remain with the collector, and notably his historical responsibilities for civil order, disaster relief and revenue administration. The ‘residual power’ of the primary representative of government in the district (see Khera, 1964, pp. 54-56) will no doubt also continue. Nevertheless, it is a paradox that the modernization of the collector’s office, through the growth of his statutory responsibility for development, should have been set back by legislation that is itself seen as part of the business of modernization. Whether the zilla parishad secretary can play a similar role in the absence of the collector’s unqiue position and powers has yet to be seen.

A final question turns on the attitude the central government will adopt towards the growing tendency for state chief ministers to legislate for a more permanent opposition. The danger of a consolidation of opposition forces, brought about through the increased political involvement of a new Clite at district and state level, may become all too apparent to a Congress government which has traditionally

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monopolized control at the local level. Undoubtedly in the current political climate this tendency will ensure that decentralization will remain a contentious issue for some years to come; for example, the recent Calcutta debate among non-Congress Chief ministers about central-state relations.

REFERENCES

Frontline, (1987). A Significant Turn in History, Interview with Ramakrishna Hegde, April 4-17 issue, pp. 29-30.

Government of India, (1973). Report by the Task Force on Integrated Rural Development, Planning Commission, New Delhi.

Government of India, (1978). Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj Institutions (Ashoka Mehta Committee), Department of Rural Development, New Delhi.

Government of India, (1984). Report of the Working Group on District Planning (Hanumantha Rao Report), Planning Commission, New Delhi.

Government of Karnataka, Dept. of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, (1983). The Karnataka Zilla Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats and Nyaya Panchayats Act, Government Press, Bangalore.

Khera, S. S. (1964). District Administration in India, Asia Publishing House, London. Maheshwari, I. (1974). ‘Changes in the structure of Indian administration since Independence’.

In: Pai Pandikar, V. A. Development Administration in India. Macmillan, New Delhi. Manor, J. (1984). ‘Blurring the line between parties and social bases. Gundu Rao and

emergence of a Janata Government in Karnataka’, Economic and Political Weekly, (Special article, September) 1623-1632.

Natraj, V. K. (1987). Zilla Parishad Reform in Karnataka. Unpublished seminar paper, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex.

Rajput, R. S. and Meghe, D. R. (1984). Panchayati Raj in India, Deep and Deep, New Delhi.

Ray, A. (1987). ‘New panchayati system in Karnataka; elections and after’, Economic and Political Weekly, 22(7), 262-264.

Ray A. and Kumpatla, J. (1987). ‘Zilla parishad presidents in Karnataka’, Economic and Political Weekly 22(4243), 1825-1830.

Saradamoni, K. (1981). Divided Poor. Delhi, Ajanta Publications.