Democratic Backsliding and Compliance with International ... · Democratic Backsliding and...

DemocraticBackslidingandCompliancewithInternationalHumanRightsLaw

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VictoriaUniversityofWellington,NewZealand

Draft.Pleasedonotciteorcirculatewithoutpermission.PresentedattheannualconferenceoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,2017

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1.IntroductionPactasuntservanda–theideathattreatiesaretobeobeyed–isabedrockprinciple

ofinternationallaw(Henkin1979).Withoutit,states,internationalinstitutions,and

non-governmentalorganizationswouldnotdedicatethetimeandresourcestheydoto

bargainingoverandcraftinginternationalagreements.Nor,withoutageneral

expectationthattreatycommitmentscarryforward,wouldindividualgovernments

botherinvestingeffortandpoliticalcapitalinratifyingandimplementinginternational

accords.Unlessotherwisespecified,treatiesareexpectedtostandthetestoftime–and

itisforthisreasonthatcourtshavegenerallyembracedanarrowapplicationof

doctrinesthatwouldeasilynullifyexistinglegalcommitments(Binder2013).Changes

inacountry’sleadership,politicalleanings,orinstitutionsarerarelyseenassufficient

groundsfornegatingprevioustreatyobligations.

Yet,evenacasualobserverwillnotethatcompliance1isnotagiven:althoughlegal

commitmentsaremeanttocarryforward,inreality,thepracticeismuchmorecomplex.

Particularlyinthehumanrights(HR)arena,avastliteraturehasshownthatdespite

theirmassiveexpansion,HRlegalinstrumentshaveimpactsonlyunderspecial

conditions(Hafner-Burton2014)–whichremaincontested.Here,thedebatehas

centeredchieflyontheroleofdomesticinstitutions,particularlythosetypically

associatedwith(liberal)democracy.2Whilethereissomeevidencethatdemocratic

institutionscanhelptogivetheseagreements‘bite’becausetheyprovideamechanism

forholdingleaderstoaccount,findingsareverymixed.Results,moreover,varyagreat

dealfromtreatytotreaty,andfromonecompliancemetrictoanother.

1Throughout,Idefine‘compliance’asthedegreetowhichacountry’spracticealignswithwhatatreatyprescribesorproscribes.Therearemanywaystoproblematizethisdefinition,butintheinterestofspace,Isetthemaside.C.f.,Kingsbury1998.2Thisliteratureisratherlarge.SeeforexampleConrad2014;ConradandRitter2013;Lupu2013a,2014b;Simmons2009;andvonStein2016.

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Inrecentyears,anotherphenomenonhasattractedtheattentionofpolicymakers

andscholarsalike.Ineveryregionoftheworld,atleastonecountryhasexperienced

‘democraticbacksliding’–the“state-leddebilitationoreliminationofanyofthepolitical

institutionsthatsustaindemocracy”(Bermeo2016:5).Fromatreatycompliance

perspective,thisphenomenonisinterestingforseveralreasons.Manycurrent

backslidersbecamepartiesduringperiodsoftransition–towarddemocracy(Hafner-

Burtonetal.2015),towardmarketeconomies(Smith-Cannoy2012),andsoon.Now,

conditionshavechanged.Thesecasesareimportantfromatheoreticalstandpoint

becauseoneofthemostcrucialfunctionsofinternationalhumanrightslawisto

enshrineagoalandtoensurethatitstandsthetestoftime(andchange).Does

internationallawcompelthesegovernmentstobehavebetterthantheyotherwise

wouldhave?(Andifso,underwhatconditions?).

Thesecasesareanalyticallyinterestingbecausetheyoffercausalinferenceleverage

onseveraldimensions.First,asisnowwell-understoodintheliterature,selectionand

endogeneityproblemsmakegaugingtreatyimpactschallenging(vonStein2005;Lupu

2013a).Backslidingcasesofferleveragepreciselybecausetheyinvolvesituationsin

whichtheconditionsthatledcountriestojoin,andthosenowpresent,arelikely

substantiallydifferent.3Second,assessingHRAeffectsisparticularlychallenging

becauseformanyoftheseagreements,theconditionsneededforcomplianceand

enforcementareverysimilar(vonStein2016).Forinstance,doesNorwayabidebyits

obligationsundertheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)

becauseitvaluestheseentitlementsanyhow,orbecausedomesticinstitutionsand

practiceshelptoensuretheenforcementofthesepromises?

3Griecoetal.(2009)offerasimilarapproachintheirexplorationofpartisanshiftsandIMFtreatycompliance.

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Third,incountrieswithextensive,robust,‘democratic’institutionsandpractices,itis

difficulttopinpointwhichinstitutionand/orpracticeisdoingthelegworkinthestory

ofHRAcompliance.Forinstance,doesNorwaytakeitsobligationsundertheDisabilities

Conventionseriouslybecausecitizenswillpunishleaderselectorallyforbreaking

promises4,becausecivilsocietyensuresthatbreacheswillbepublicizedandcriticized,

becauseitscourtswillenforcetheseduties,orbecauselegislativeandadministrative

checksandbalancesmakeitapriority?Itisdifficulttosaybecauseinmostentrenched

democracies,theseinstitutionsgohand-in-hand.Incontrast,asdetailedlater,

backslidingcountriesareoftenmorediverse.Thisopensuppotentialopportunitiesto

bettergaugewhichinstitutionsarehavingcausalimpact.

2.DemocraticBacksliding

Whatisdemocraticbacksliding?Theanswerdepends,tosomeextent,onone’s

definitionofdemocracy(Diamond2015).Aminimalistunderstandingwouldfocuson

electoralprocedures:notonlydovoteshavetotranslateintocandidate/partychoice

(i.e.,ballotsmustbecountedandactioned),buttheremustalsobeawidespreadrightto

participationandgenuine,frequent,competitionforoffice(LustandWaldner2015).

Butmanywouldarguethatfreeandfairelectionsareonlymeaningfulifother

conditionsarefulfilled.First,asDahl(1971)argues,citizensmustenjoyequalciviland

politicalliberties,particularlyfreedomofspeechandassociation,sotherecanbeafree

exchangeofideasandinformation,includingcriticismofofficials.

Second,theremustbeaccountabilitymechanism(s),toensurethatgovernments

justifytheiractions,andtopunishleaderswhobreachcodesofconductand/orlaws

4Severalstudiesacknowledgethatthisispossiblytheweakestlinkinthechain.SeeforexampleConrad2014;Conradetal.2017;andvonStein2016.

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(LustandWaldner2015).Thereisdebateaboutwhat,exactly,thosemechanisms

shouldlooklike.Constraintsonexecutivepower(e.g.,checksandbalances,suchas

legislativevetoplayers)areonesuchmechanism,butthesecanvarynotablyeveninthe

highlydemocraticworld.Courtsarealsoimportant.Whensufficientlyindependent,

theyenablecitizenstochallengetheirgovernments,andhavetheabilitytodetermine

whethergovernment(in)actionisconsistentwithexistinglegislation.Additionally,

thesemechanismscanplayacrucialroleinensuringthatthewillofthemajority

(embodied,particularly,inelections)doesnottrammelupontherightsoftheminority

(Madison1788).Inthehumanrightsarena,thiscanbetremendouslyimportant.

Atitscore,then,democracyentails(1)freeandfairelections.Butmaking(1)

meaningful,andensuringthatthissystemofleaderchoiceendures,requires(2)basic

civilliberties,aswellas(3)accountabilitymechanisms.Forthisreason,(1),(2),and(3)

aretightlylinked,andunlikelytoexistinisolationforlong.FollowingLustandWaldner

(2015:4),Iunderstanddemocraticbackslidingtomeanadegradationincompetitive

elections,civilliberties,and/oraccountability.Inassessingbacksliding,wewantto

avoidfalsenegatives:itneedn’tnecessarilyinvolveafull-scaledemocraticbreakdown

andregimechange.Wealsowanttoavoidfalsepositives:thedeteriorationshouldbe

fairlysubstantial–notsimplypartofthenormalback-and-forthstruggleofpolitical

change(LustandWaldner2015).Ireturntothisquestionintheempiricalanalyses.

Isdemocraticbackslidingactuallyhappening?Theanswerdependsonatleastthree

things:(1)whatmetriconeemploys;(2)whatamountofchangequalifiesas

‘backsliding’’;and(3)whichcountriesoneincludesinthecomparison.FreedomHouse

(2017)certainlybelievesbackslidingisunderway:arecentreportdeclares“2016

markedthe11thconsecutiveyearofdeclineinglobalfreedom.”Diamond(2015:144),

relyingonthebroaderFreedomHousedatatime-period(since1972),echoesthepoint

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that“theworldhasbeeninamildbutprotracteddemocraticrecessionsinceabout

2006.”LevitskyandWay(2015:46)disagree,describingthatdecreaseas“extremely

modest,”andshowthatothermetricsdemonstratenodeteriorationorevennetgains

fordemocracy.Furthermore,theyargue,somecountriesthatnowappeartobe

backslidingneverreallyqualifiedasdemocracies;metricssuchasFreedomHousemay

welloverstatehowdemocraticthoseregimeswereattheirapogée.(Instead,theylabel

thoseregimes‘competitiveauthoritarians’[LevitskyandWay2002]).

Whethertheworldhas,overall,experiencedademocraticdeclineinrecentyears

remainsdebated.So,too,doesthequestionofwhethercountriessuchasRussiawere

everreallydemocracies.Whatisclearisthatanumberofcountrieshaveundergone

substantialdeteriorationinelectoralcompetitiveness,civicspacefordissentand

opposition,and/oraccountabilityinrecentyears.Often,thesechangeshaveresulted

fromexecutives’effortstoconcentratetheirownpowerandtoentrenchtheruling

party’scontrol(Diamond2015:147;seealsoBermeo2016andKendall-Taylorand

Frantz2016).Butthatisnottheonlypath.Insomecases,efforts(first)focusmore

heavilyonstrippingthecourtsofauthority,forinstance.Insomecases,suchasEgypt,

thecourtshavetriedtofightbackandtomaintainsomeautonomy,evenasopposition

voicesarequashedandthehopeofelectionsthattrulyenshrinedemocratic

accountabilitybecomesmoredistant.

Adecadeago,scholarsusedgeneralmetricsof‘democracy’totrytounderstandthis

complexinteractionbetweeninternationallaw,domesticinstitutions/politics,and

humanrightsoutcomes.Theresultsweretremendouslymixed,andgaugedthe

underlyingmechanism(s)poorly(c.f.,Hathaway2007).Now,wehavemuchbetterdata.

Togetatthesequestionsempirically,Iexplorebackslidingpatternsacrossthefour

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components,usingfourmetricsthatarenowcommoninthecomparativepoliticsand

IRliterature.

Forelectoralbacksliding,IuseV-Dem’selectoralcomponentindex,whichgaugesthe

extenttowhich“suffrageisextensive;politicalandcivilsocietyorganizationscan

operatefreely;electionsarecleanandnotmarredbyfraudorsystematicirregularities;

andthechiefexecutiveofacountryisselected(directlyorindirectly)throughelections”

(Coppedgeetal.2016:51).Togaugecivillibertiesbacksliding,IuseV’Dem’scivil

libertiesindex,whichindicateswhethergovernmentagentsexertphysicalviolence,and

whetherthegovernmentplacesconstraintsonprivateand/orpoliticalliberties

(Coppedgeetal.2016:70).

Asdiscussedearlier,accountabilityhas(atleast)twodimensions.Forjudicial

independence,IuseV-Dem’shighcourtindependenceindex,whichassessestheextent

towhichthejudicialdecisionmakingisautonomous,adoptingitssincereviewofthe

record,asopposedtosimplyadoptingthegovernment’spositionregardlessofthe

case’smerits(Coppedgeetal.2016:202).Forexecutiveconstraints,Ifocusonthe

legislature’srole,usingV’Dem’smeasure,whichindicatestheextenttowhichthe

legislatureorgovernmentagencieshavethecapacitytoinvestigate,question,andexert

authorityovertheexecutive(Coppedgeetal.56).

Foreachofthefourmeasures,Icalculate(1)thehighest(i.e.,most‘democratic’)

valueachievedbetween1990and2016;(2)thelowestvalueachievedinrecentyears

(2015and2016).Ithensubtract(2)from(1)andmapthevaluesontothemapsin

Figure1.Thegoalofthisapproachistoprovidearecentsnapshotofhowfaracountry

hasfalleninitsexperienceofdemocracyoverthepastquarter-century.Itissuperiorto

thenot-uncommonpracticeofcomparingearly1990slevelswithrecentlevelsbecause

anumberofcountrieswheredemocraticinstitutionsarenowunderseriousthreat

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achievedtheirmostrobustphasesatlaterpoints(e.g.,Thailand,Fiji,andBelarus,

dependingonthecomponentofdemocracyonefocuseson).

Figure1demonstratesclearlythatmanyofthecountrieshavingexperienced

backslidinginthepastquarter-centuryhavedonesoonalldimensions.Venezuelaisa

primeexample,rankingthirdforelectoralbacksliding,seventhforcivilliberties

backsliding,firstforexecutiveconstraintsbacksliding,andsecondforjudicial

backsliding.Thiswillcomeasnosurprisetothosefamiliarwithpoliticsinthe

BolivarianRepublic,particularlysince2004.PresidentChávezharassedcritics

(includingtheopposition),capturedthecourts,andconcentratedhisownpower–

legally.Althoughcompetitiveandgenerallyonschedule,electionsbecamelessandless

freeandfairunderChávez.

ThissituationhasdeterioratedunderMaduro(starting2013),but2015electionsput

theoppositioninpower,restrictingthePresident’sabilitytopasslegislation.However,

theresulthasbeenfurtherbacksliding:MadurorespondedbydeclaringtheNational

Assemblydevoidoflegalityandplacingthecourts(nowstackedwithloyalists)in

charge,postponinggubernatorialelections,andmakingotherchangesdesignto

disempowertheopposition(Corrales2016).Figure2,slide1,presentsdataonthefour

metricsforVenezuelasince2004.Inormalizethevariablesbetween0and1sotheycan

bevisualizedonthesamegraph.ItisevidentthatVenezuela’sbackslidinghas

negativelyaffectedallareasof‘democracy,’firstthroughconstraintsontheexecutive,

thenbydramaticreductionsinthecourts’independence,andlaterthroughharmful

limitationsondemocraticelectionsandcivilliberties.Thesolenotableexceptionsare

executiveconstraints,whichtightenedsomewhatin2011(followingthe2010

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Figure1.DemocraticBackslidingAroundtheWorld

Electoral Backsliding Civil Liberties Backsliding

Executive Constraints Backsliding Judicial Independence Backsliding

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Figure2:DemocraticChangeinTwoCountries

Toenhancevisualrepresentation,eachmetricisnormalizedbetween0and1.

parliamentaryelections,whichsawgainsfortheopposition)andnotablyin2016

(followingthe2015parliamentaryelections,whichgavepowertotheopposition).5

5GiventheSupremeCourt’stakeoveroftheNationalAssembly,thisexecutive-constraintstrajectorywilllookdifferentinV-Demin2017.SeeCorrales2017.

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Venezuela

electoralcivillibertiesexecutiveconstraintsjudicial

0.000

0.200

0.400

0.600

0.800

1.000

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Egypt

electoral

civilliberties

executiveconstraints

judicial

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Yet,backslidingisoftenmessier,movinginfitsandstartsandaffectingdifferent

dimensionsofpoliticallifeindifferentways.ConsiderEgypt,alsodisplayedinFigure2

(since2004,toprovidetemporalcomparisonwithVenezuela,althoughlittlehappened

priorto2011).InthewakeoftheArabSpring,popularuprisingsledtoPresident

Mubarek’sresignationandahugeopening-upofthepoliticalspace,withpresidential

electionsandgreatertoleranceofprotestandfreespeechin2012.Theseelections,of

course,enabledtheMuslimBrotherhoodtotakeover,whichthenattemptedtopassan

IslamistconstitutiongivingPresidentMorsisubstantialpowers.Themilitary’s2013

coupsubsequentlyreversedmostdemocraticgains,but–notably–thecourtshavenot

followedthistrajectory.Instead,theEgyptianjudiciaryhasassertedsomedegreeof

autonomyinthewakeoftheArabSpring,dissolvingone-thirdoftheparliamentafter

findingthatthepreviousyear’selectionhadbeenunconstitutional,findingthatthe

panelcreatedtodraftanewconstitutionhadbeenformedunconstitutionally,and

rejectinglegislationoutlawingMubarek-erarankingofficialsfromsubsequently

runningforoffice(Daragahi2012).

Thecourtshavecontinuedtoattempttoasserttheirindependencesincethecoup

thatputAlSisiinpoweraswell;severalcaseshaveruledagainstthegovernment.6To

beclear:Egyptiancourtsfacegenuinethreatstotheirindependence;theydonotenjoy

theautonomyseeninthecourtsofmostadvancedindustrializeddemocracies.

However,theimportantpointhereisthattheyarefightingtomaintain(somedegreeof)

autonomy.WhereasPresidentAlSisihasbannedprotests,severelycurtailedthe

activitiesofNGOs,andshutdowncriticalmediaoutlets,thecourtsarefightingfor

independencewithsomesuccess.However,recentlegislationallowingthepresidentto

6BBC.EgyptcourtvoidsrulinghaltingtransferofislandstoSaudiArabia.April2,2017.

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appointthemostseniormembersofthejudiciaryplacesthesystemundersignificant

threat(AmnestyInternational2017).

3.Democracy,Backsliding,andHumanRightsTreatyCompliance

Many(though–importantly–notall)countriesthatarenowstrugglingwith

democracyratifiedvariousHRAsduringthewaveofpoliticalandeconomicchangethat

swepttheglobeintheearly1990s.Whetherthesegovernmentshadsincereintentions

ofentrenchingreformor,rather,weremoremotivatedbyadesiretoappealtomarkets

andtoWesterndonorgovernmentsisaquestionofdebate(Smith-Cannoy2012).

Whethertheirmotivationsweresincereornot,whatisnowclearisthatdomestic

institutionalconditionshavechanged.Itisundeniablethatthesetreatyobligations

carryforwardinalegalsense.Butdotheycarryforwardinpractice?Dotheyimpose

realconstraintsongovernments’treatmentofcitizens,evenwhendomesticconditions

havechanged?

ConsiderArmenia.In1993,soonafterindependence,itaccededtoahostofmajorUN

HRAs,includingtheConventionAgainstTorture(CAT)(althoughithasyettoallow

individualstolodgecomplaints),theCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)

(includingitsoptionalprotocolallowingindividualcitizenstolodgecomplaints),and

theCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights(ICESCR).7Thistookplaceamidst

abackdropofgreathopeforthecountry,whichmanyperceived(atthetime)asan

exemplarofdemocraticandeconomictransitionintheregion(Bravo2007).Although

imperfect,civillibertiesinArmeniahavegenerallyremainedstableorimprovedsince

independence.Itsfirstelections,in1991,weregenerallyunderstoodtobefreeandfair,

7www.humanrightstreaties.org.

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andtherepealofSoviet-eralegislationandthedraftingofaConstitutionwithextensive

humanrightsprotectionssignaledthatchangewasunderway.

Yet,by1994,Armenianelectoralprocedureswereunderseriousquestion,andby

1998,thePresidentwasforcedtoresigninabloodlesscouporganizedbythemilitary

andbymembersofhisadministration.Since,theintegrityofArmenianelections(ballot

stuffing,countingflaws,intimidationandviolence,andsoon)hasdeterioratedfurther

(Bravo2007).Furthermore,the1995Constitutionwasdeeplyproblematicbecauseall

judgesareappointedbythePresident(withtherecommendationoftheJudicial

Council).Thisandotherlimitationsonthejudiciary’sindependencecametoaheadin

thedisputedpresidentialelectionsof2003.Althoughitrefusedtooverturntheelection

result,theConstitutionalCourtdidfindthatsignificantelection-relationviolations

occurred,andrecognizedthat(forced)administrativedetentionofmanycandidates

harmedthePresidentialoppositioncandidate’schances(HumanRightsWatch2003).

Consequently,theCourtrecommendedareferendumofconfidenceinthePresident

withinayear.Althoughthiswasanimportantmomentof(relative)independencefor

theArmenianjudiciary,thegovernment’sdecisiontoignorethelatterrecommendation

demonstratedasubstantialinabilitytoprovidetimelyorrealremediestodocumented

violations(Bravo2007).TheArmenianjudiciaryhasslumpedfurtherintosubservience

totheexecutive.

TheArmeniancaseisintriguingbecausethecountrytookonseveraltreaty

obligationsatatimewhenitappearedthatdomesticpoliticalinstitutionswouldbe

conducivetoenforcementoftheseobligations.Overtime,(aspectsof)thoseinstitutions

havefrayedorbeendismantled;conditionshavechanged.Thisisausefultestof

whetherandhowinternationalhumanrightslaw‘works.’Debatesaboutwhether

treaties‘matter’havehingedinpartontheperennialproblemofselectionbiasand

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endogeneitythatarewellknown(Downsetal.1996).Yet,theArmeniancaseisnotof

thisilk:conditionshavechanged,inwaysthatmaynothavebeenanticipatedatthetime

ofratification.Armeniaisnotunique,forseveralcountrieshavetakenontreaty

obligationsandsubsequentlyexperiencedsignificantdemocraticbacksliding.

Here,itisusefultooutlinepreciselyhowdemocraticinstitutionsarethoughttoaffect

compliancewithinternationalhumanrightslaw.Scholarshaveemphasizedfourmain

waysinwhichdemocraticinstitutionscanserveasHRAenforcementmechanisms.

First,becausefreeandfairelectionsmakeiteasierforcitizenstopunishleaders,

leadersoperatingindemocraticelectoralsystemshavestrongerincentivestokeeptheir

promises.Citizensmightpunishleadersbecausetheyareopposedtotheparticular

rightsabuse,and/orbecausetheydisapproveofrule-breakinginparticular.Hence,the

electoralmechanismmightengagetwodifferentaudiences(pro-rights,pro-treaty-

abiding),butinbothcases,theideaisthatHRAsareaneasiertoolforcitizensto

activateiftheyhaveaccesstoafreeandfairballotbox.

Therearetwomainchallengestotheargumentthatelectionsenhancehumanrights

treatycompliance.First,electoralcontestationisamajoritarianinstitution.Ifthe

majorityprefersrightsviolations,thenweshouldinfactexpectelectionstoexacerbate

compliance.Itmaybehardtobelievethatcitizenswouldactuallywantleaderstoabuse

rights,butthisoverlooksanimportantpoint:themajorityissometimeswillingto

tolerateorevensupportabusewhentargetedataminority,particularlyiftheformer

derivessomebenefit,suchasaheightenedsenseofsecurity(Conradetal.2017b).

Second,amongallthethingsthatvoterscareabout,itseemshardtobelieveadherence

tohumanrightslawwouldbetowardthetopofthelist.Tomz(2008)andWallace

(2013)havedemonstratedinsurvey/experimentalsettingsthatcitizenscareabout

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adherencetointernationalrules,butwhetherthesepreferencesturnintoelectoral

rewardsorpunishmentsismuchhardertoestablish.

Civilsocietyhaslongbeenunderstoodasamechanismforgivinginternational

humanrightslawmeaningandforce.Citizengroupsoftenmakeappealstohuman

rightsnorms(includinginternationallaw)regardlessofthecountry’sratificationstatus,

butsomearguethatratificationupstheante(Simmons2009).Civicgroupscanuse

treatiesasrhetoricalandmobilizationtools(KeckandSikkink1998),anditisharder

foragovernmenttoclaimnodedicationtotheprinciple(s)atreatyenshrinesifithas

gonetothetroubleofratifying.SomethinkofHRAsas‘focalpoints’aroundwhichcivil

actors–betheypro-humanrights,pro-internationallaw,orboth–coalesce(Simmons

2009).

Acritiquesimilartothatoftheelectoralcomponentcanberaisedinthecontextof

thecivilsocietymechanism.Ifthemajorityofcitizens,orthosewillingtomobilize,are

opposedtotherightinquestion,thiscouldworkagainstcompliance.Hence,itishasty

tobelievethatprovidingatighteralignmentbetweenpolicymakersandcitizenswill

alwayspushtowardcompliance;thisdependscruciallyonwhatcitizenswant.A

differentcriticismacknowledgesthatcivilsocietycanplayanimportantrolein

advancinghumanrightscauses,butquestionswhetheraratifiedtreatyaddsanything

totheequation.Afterall,citizengroupsoftenmakeappealstohumanrightsnorms

(includinginternationallaw)regardlessofthecountry’sratificationstatus;forinstance,

mostwebsitesdedicatedtoSyrianwarcrimesandgenocidemakenoreferenceto

internationallegalobligations.Conversely,thosewishingtomakelegalappealsdonot

necessarilyneedtreaties,forsomeofthemostfundamentalrightsarecoveredbyjus

cogens.

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Othersemphasizetheroleofaccountabilitymechanisms.Lupu(2013a),forinstance,

arguesthatalthoughlegislativevetoplayersmakeratificationlesslikelytobeginwith,

theyalsomakeHRAsmoreeffectivebymakingithardertoreversepolicies.Once

ratifiedandincorporatedintolaw,treatiesaremuchhardertoviolateiflegislative

actorshavetosignoffonsuchdecisions.Legislativeopponentscandenysupportto

executiveswantingtoalterthestatusquobyrefusingtosupportlegislationthatcuts

againstcompliance,byholdingtightlyontopurse-strings,and/orbybringing

contentioustreatyviolationsintothepublicview.

Thebiggestchallengetotheveto-players-as-treaty-enforcementargumentisthatit

hingesonthestatusquobeingarights-friendlyone.If,incontrast,thestatusquoisone

ofrightsviolations,theprevalenceofvetoplayersmightfrustrateattemptstorectify

thesituation,bymakingitmoredifficulttopassimplementinglegislationortochange

problematicexistinglaw,etc.Anadditionalconsiderationisthatofscope.Legislative

vetoplayersarelikelyto‘matter’inrightsareasinwhichtheexecutivetendstomeddle;

areasoverwhichexecutivesandlegislativesstruggleforauthority.

Othersunderscoretheroleofthejudiciary.Slaughter(1995)wasperhapsthefirstto

pointoutthatdomesticcourtscanplayacrucialroleintheenforcementofinternational

law.Thiscanbeparticularlypowerfulinthehumanrightscontext,as(well-

functioning)courtshavetheauthoritytoreviewwhethergovernment(in)action

adherestoexistinglaw,includingratifiedtreaties;8theyarealsochargedwith

guaranteeingindividualrightsandenablingcitizenstochallengetheirgovernmentif

necessary.Somestudieshaveshownthattreatiescanhaverealbitewhenthejudiciary

issufficientlyindependent(Lupu2013b;vonStein2013).

8Butseebelowforcaveats.

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However,theprospectofjudicialenforcementcanbeadouble-edgedsword.Indeed,

somestudieshavefoundthatcountrieswithindependentcourtsoftenoptnottojoin

theseagreements,particularlywhencomingintocompliancewouldbehard(vonStein

2016)orwhenthereisnotintensepressurefromoppositiongroupstoparticipate

(Conrad2014).Additionally,domesticcourtshavecomplexdoctrinessurrounding

wheninternationalagreementscanbeinvoked–hence,theymaychooseorberequired

nottoorderotherdomesticpartiestoadheretorules.Inanothervein,Lupu(2013b)

pointsoutthatforsomerightsviolations,itisdifficulttoobtainevidence,andthe

standardsofproofarehigh.Inthesecases,itishardevenforindependentcourtsto

restraingovernmentsbecausetheformerhavealimitedabilitytoactuallyprosecute

violations.Afinalpointisthatdomesticcourtsdonotoperateinavacuum.Eventhe

mostindependentjudiciariesoperateingivensocialcontexts;(aperceptionof)too

muchjudicialactivismcanleadtobacklashonthepartofcitizensand/orleaders.

Asdiscussedearlier,countriessuchasArmeniaareofinteresttothestudyofHRA

compliancebecausetheyinvolvesituationswheretheconditionsinplaceatthetimeof

ratificationhavechangednotably.Casessuchasthesearealsonotablebecausethey

potentiallyprovideanopportunitytobettergaugewhichdomesticinstitutionisdoing

thelegworkinthecausalstoryoftreatycompliance.Previousstudieshavestruggledto

parseoutthedifferences,eitherbecauseofpoordataavailability(forinstance,

Hathaway[2007]ischieflyinterestedindomesticlegalenforcement,butmeasuresthis

usingthePolitydata)and/orbecausecountrieswithfreeandfairelectionsalsotendto

protectcivilliberties,andtypicallyhaveaccountabilitymechanismsaswell(vonStein

2016).

Betterdata(Coppedgeetal.2016)provideafixforthefirstproblem.And,while

acknowledgingthatsomecountriesregressonmostorevenalldimensions,the

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diversityofbacksliders’experienceprovidesapossiblesolutiontothesecondproblem.

Inotherwords,becausetheirbackslidinghasnotbeenuniform,countrieslikeArmenia

and/orEgyptmightgiveusleverageinunderstandingwhichdomesticinstitution(s)

matters(most)intheenforcementofinternationalhumanrightslaw.

4.APreliminaryLookatSomeDataThepurposeofthissectionistodosomepreliminarydataanalysisofthe

relationship(s)betweenratificationofHRAs,democraticbacksliding,andthehuman

rightspracticespre/proscribedbytheparticulartreatyinquestion.Therearedozensof

HRAsfromwhichtochoose(vonStein2017),butIfocushereontwoaccords(along

withtheirrelevantoptionalarticles/protocols).ThefirstistheCAT,createdin1984;its

optionalarticle22isofparticularinterestbecauseitenablesgovernmentsthatso

desiretodelegateauthoritytotheCommitteeAgainstTorturetoreceivecomplaints

fromindividualswhoallegethattheirgovernmenthasfailedthem.TheCAT’s2002

optionalprotocolfurtherdelegatesauthoritytotheCommittee,allowingthe

SubcommitteeonthePreventionofTorturetoconductvisitstomonitorcountries’

adherencetotheagreement.Thisagreementhasbeenthesubjectofmanystudies,soI

donotdiscussitfurtherhere(c.f.,Conrad2014;ConradandRitter2013;Simmons

2009).Forinformationalpurposes,Figure3showseachcountry’sratificationstatusvis-

à-vistheCAT.

TheimportantpointtotakeawayfromFigure3isthatwithinthe‘backslidingworld,’

thereisgreatdiversityininternationallegalcommitmentstoeradicatetheuseof

torture.KazakhstanhasacceptedeveryaspectoftheCAT:themainconvention,article

22(allowingindividualstolodgecomplaintswiththeCommittee),andtheoptional

protocolallowingforvisitsfromtheSubcommitteeonPrevention.Armeniaratifiedthe

18

noratification CATonly CAT+optprotoc CAT+art22 CAT+optprotoc+art22

CATwithintwoyearsofindependence;ithasyettoacceptarticle22,butwasamong

theearliestratifiersoftheoptionalprotocol.Incontrast,Russia–alreadyapartytothe

CATsince1987–acceptedarticle22justastheSovietUnionwasdisintegrating.Hence,

itscitizenscan–andhave–lodgedcomplaintsagainsttheirgovernmentforfailingto

abidebytheConvention(Smith-Cannoy2012).Yet,Moscowhasrefusedtoallow

monitoringvisits.Oneneednotlooktremendouslyfartofindabacksliderthathas

largelyeschewedtheCATregime:Uzbekistan,forinstance,hasonlybecomeapartyto

theCAT,butdoesnotacceptthemoreinvasivecomponents.Tofindabonafide

backslider(IranandSyriadonotreallyqualify,asneitherhaseverbeensufficiently

democratic)withnoCATobligationswhatsoever,onemustlookfurtherEast,for

exampletoBurma/Myanmar.

Does(thedegreeand/ordurationof)acountry’scommitmenttotheinternational

anti-tortureregimeaffectitsabilitytocomplywiththisagreement?Anumberofstudies

haveexploredthisquestion,sothepurposeofthissectionisnottorehashthose

debates(c.f.,Conrad204,ConradandRitter2013,andSimmons2009,amongothers).

Figure (. Degree of Participation in the Convention Against Torture

19

Rather,Iaminterestedinassessingwhetherandhowdemocraticbackslidingaffects

compliance,ifatall.

Asdiscussedearlier,identifying‘backsliders’canbechallenging.Wehavealready

establishedtheconceptsofinterest–free/fairelections,civilsocietyprotections,and

twoaccountabilitymechanisms.Butmustacountryhavereachedacertainlevelof

democraticembeddednesstobeconsideredabackslider?Andhowsevereshouldthe

regressionbetoqualifyasbacksliding?Onbothquestions,Iavoidimposingdecisions

onthedata.Substantialinstitutionaldeteriorationinacountrythatneverreally

achievedentrencheddemocracy(perhapsGhanainthe1980s)isconsidered

backslidinginthesamewayasdoessubstantialdeteriorationwheremostthought

democracytobethe“onlygameintown”(perhapsChilein1973).Inthatsamespirit,I

useacountry’sdegreeofdeteriorationtoindicatetheseverity,ratherthanimposinga

dichotomyof‘backsliders’and‘non-backsliders.’Bothdecisionsmaycallfor

reassessmentinasubsequentdraft.

Usingeachoftheinstitutionalmeasuresdescribedearlier,Icreatefourseparate

variablesindicatingthedegreeofbacksliding.Ifacountryexperiencednoinstitutional

changeoranimprovementtowardgreaterelectoralintegrity(respectforcivilliberties,

etc.),itsvalueiszero.Thisallowsustofocusourattentiononbacksliding.Chilesuffered

thelargestsingle-yearbackslideinelectoralintegrity(inthedata)in1973,asaresultof

themilitarycoupthatoustedPresidentAllendeandputGeneralPinochetinpowerfora

quarterofacentury.Onlyayearandahalflater,Cambodiaexperiencedthelargest

single-yeardeteriorationincivilliberties(inthedata),whentheKhmerRougetook

power.Czechoslovakiaunderwentthelargestsingle-yearjudicialindependenceslipin

1948,whentheSoviet-ledCommunistcoupevisceratedacourtsystemthatwasabout

asindependentascurrent-dayJapan’s.Finally,thelargestone-yeardropinlegislative

20

constraintsontheexecutiveinvolvedThailandin2013-2014,whicheventuallyresulted

inPrimeMinisterShinawatraousterandthemilitaryjunta’stakeover.

Inthispreliminarysetofanalyses,Iexploretwokeyquestions:

• Doratifiersbehavedifferentlyfromnon-ratifiers?

• Doesbackslidingaffectratifiersdifferentlyfromnon-ratifiers?

Istartwithseparateanalysesofhumanrightsbacksliding,usingeachofthefour

institutionalbackslidingvariablesdescribedabove.IusetheCIRIdata,whichgauge

governmentrespectfortherightnottobetortured,summarilyexecuted,disappeared,

orimprisonedforpoliticalbeliefs(Cingranelli,Richards,andClay2014).Becausethere

isnoagreementonhowbesttomeasuregovernmentrespectforhumanrights,Ilater

usethePTSdata.Thedependentvariableisthechangeinhumanrightspractices

(laggedoneyear);larger(positive)valuesindicatemoreseriousbacksliding.An

exampleofsubstantialhumanrightsbackslidingincludesFiji,whose1987coups

jettisonedthecountryintoaperiodinwhichtorture,imprisonmentofthoseof

opposingpoliticalviews,andotherviolationswerecommon.

IuseaGLSrandomeffectsmodelwithalaggeddependentvariableandrobust

clusteredstandarderrors.Ialsoincludethecountry’sbaselinePTSscore,asbacksliding

mightdependonhowseverethehumanrightssituationalreadyis.Ialsoinclude

variablesthatotherstudieshavefoundtoaffecthumanrightspractices:whetheracivil

warisunderway,GDPpercapita,andtheyearoftheobservation.BecausetheCAT

regimehasmanyoptions,Igaugethreecomponents:whetheracountryhasratified(1)

themainagreement;(2)theoptionalprovisionallowingforindividualcitizenstolodge

complaints;and/or(3)theoptionalprovisionempoweringtheSubcommitteeto

performmonitoringvisits.Figure4presentsthebasemodels,whichdonotlookatany

interactiverelationships.

21

ThemainupshotsofFigure4are:(1)the‘standard’variables(civilwarandwealth)

predictbackslidingasonewouldexpect,whichisencouraging;and(2)onlycivil

libertiesbackslidinglinkstightlywithhumanrightsbacksliding(thethreeother

variableshavenoobviousrelationtoit);and(3)ratificationstatusdoesnotbearany

relationtohumanrightsbacksliding.

Theseinitialnon-resultsfor(2)and(3)arenotaltogethersurprising.Alarge

literaturehasdocumentedtheCAT’sstrangerelationtophysicalintegrityrights

practices.9Furthermore,ifwebelievethattreatiesaffectcompliancethroughdomestic

institutionalchannels,thentheeffectsareinteractive.Totestthatargument,Iaddto

theanalysesaninteractionoftherelevant‘democraticbacksliding’variableandthe

relevanttreatyratificationvariable.

Figure4.BaseModelsofPhysicalIntegrityRightsBacksliding

9Amongavastliterature,seeConrad2014;ConradandRitter2013;andSimmons2009.

Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year

Electoral Backsliding

Ratified CAT

Ratified CAT Ind Complaint

Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)

-.2 -.1 0 .1(Less) HR Backsliding (More)

Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year

Civil Liberties Backsliding

Ratified CAT



-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8(Less) HR Backsliding (More)

Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year

Judicial Backsliding

Ratified CAT



-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2(Less) HR Backsliding (More)

Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year

Exec Constraints Backsliding

Ratified CAT




Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year


Ratified CAT



-.2 -.1 0 .1(Less) HR Backsliding (More)

Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year

Civil Liberties Backsliding

Ratified CAT



-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8(Less) HR Backsliding (More)

Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year

Judicial Backsliding

Ratified CAT




Civil War

GDP per Capita

Year

Exec Constraints Backsliding

Ratified CAT




22

Figure5.InteractiveModelsofPhysicalIntegrityRightsBacksliding

Figure5showsthattherearesomeinterestinginteractiveeffectsworthnoting.

Referringbacktothefirstquestion–“doratifiersbehavedifferentlyfromnon-

ratifiers?”–theansweristhatitverymuchdependsonthenatureoftheinternational

legalcommitment.FortheCAT(maintreaty),Ifindnoevidencethatratifiers’human

rightsbackslidingdiffersfromthatofnon-ratifiers.Theonlypotentialexceptionisin

thecontextofcivillibertiesbacksliding,wherethereissomeevidencethatasthecivil

Civil WarGDP per Capita

YearElec Backsliding

Ratified CATElec Backsliding # Ratified CAT

Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintElec Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind Complaint

Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)Elec Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)

-1 -.5 0 .5


YearCivil Lib Backsliding

Ratified CATCivil Lib Backsliding # Ratified CAT

Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintCivil Lib Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind Complaint

Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)Civil Lib Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)

-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1Civil War

GDP per CapitaYear

Judic BackslidingRatified CAT

Judic Backsliding # Ratified CATRatified CAT Ind Complaint

Judic Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintRatified Op-CAT (Visits)

Judic Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)-1 -.5 0 .5 1


YearExec Constraints Backsliding

Ratified CATExec Constraints Backsliding # Ratified CAT

Ratified CAT Ind ComplaintExec Constraints Backsliding # Ratified CAT Ind Complaint

Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)Exec Constraints Backsliding # Ratified Op-CAT (Visits)

-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6

23

libertiessituationdeteriorates,ratifiersaremorepronetosufferphysicalintegrity

rightsviolations(Figure6,slidea).Thismaynotbesurprising,giventheextraordinarily

mixedfindingsforthisagreementinthebroaderliterature.However,thisfindingfalls

shortofstandardstatisticalsignificance.FortheCAT’sindividualcomplaintsprocedure,

thereissomeindicationthatcountriesexperiencingnoorverylittledemocratic

backsliding,ratifiersfacelessphysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding.Again,however,this

resultfallsshortofstandardthresholdsofsignificance(thoughitdoesoftencome

close).

ThemostnotablefindingsariseinthecontextoftheCAT’soptionalmonitoring

(visits)procedure.ReturningtoFigure5,itisevidentfromtheinteractiontermthat

electoralbackslidingaffectspartiestothisagreementdifferentlythanitdoesnon-

parties.Thesamecanbesaidofcivillibertiesbacksliders,althoughthisfindingfalls

shortofstandardthresholds.Tobettergaugethesedifferentialeffects,Figure6,slidesb.

andc.graphthepredictedphysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding,asafunctionofelectoral

andcivillibertiesbacksliding,respectively.Theresultsarestrongestfortheelectoral

component:countriesthathaveratifiedthisoptionalprotocolaresignificantlyless

pronetobackslideintheirphysicalintegritypractices,ascomparedtonon-ratifiers

(question1).Thelargertheelectoralbacksliding,thestrongertheOp-CAT’seffect.

Additionally,electoralbackslidingaffectsthetwogroupsdifferently(question2):

whereithasnodiscernableimpactonnon-ratifiers(p=.554),itappearstodecrease

physicalintegrityrightsbackslidingamongratifiers(p<.001).Thisissomewhat

surprisinginthefollowingregard.WhileitissensiblethatOp-CATratificationalters

governments’incentivestocoupleelectoraldegradationwithheightenedphysical

integrityrightsviolations,itishardtounderstandwhyratifierswouldbecompelledto

behaveincreasingly‘nicely’onthephysicalintegrityfrontastheirelectoralsituation

24

Figure6.SelectedMarginalEffects

a. CAT

b. CATOptionalProtocolonMonitoring(Visits)

c. CATOptionalProtocolonMonitoring(Visits)

0.2

.4.6

.81

(Sm

alle

r) Ef

fect

on

Phys

ical

Inte

grity

Rig

hts

Back

slid

ing

(Lar

ger)

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8(Less) Civil Liberties Backsliding (More)

Has not ratified CAT Has ratified CAT-1

.5-1

-.50

.5(S

mal

ler)

Effe

ct o

n Ph

ysica

l Int

egrit

y Ri

ghts

Bac

kslid

ing

(La

rger

)

0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4


Has not ratified Op-CAT Has ratified Op-CAT

(Less) Electoral Backsliding (More)

-.20

.2.4

.6(L

ess)

E

ffect

of P

hysic

al In

tegr

ity R

ight

s Ba

cksli

ding

(M

ore)

0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8(Less) Civil Liberties Backsliding (More)

Has not ratified Op-CAT Has ratified Op-CAT

25

deteriorates.Ifanything,Iwouldhaveexpectedratificationtomakethelineflat,

whereasnon-partiestotheOp-CATwouldtypicallycoupleelectoralbackslidingwith

physicalintegritybacksliding.Ostensibly,thatisnotthecase.Thisdeservesfurther

consideration.

Turningnowtohowcivillibertiesbackslidingaffectsphysicalintegrityrightsin

combinationwithtreatystatus,onestrongfindingisthatamongcountriesthathavenot

ratifiedtheCAToranyoptionalprovisions,deterioratingcivillibertiessituationsare

stronglylinkedtoaworseninginphysicalintegrityrightspractices(Figure5).Neither

CATratificationnorparticipationintheindividualcomplaintsproceduremediatesthat

relationship.However,asintheaboveparagraph,participationinOp-CATdoesmediate

thatrelationship.Indeed,amongnon-partiestothatProtocol,civillibertiesbacksliding

clearlyleadstophysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding(p<.001).Incontrast,among

parties,thatrelationshipwashesout(stillslightlypositive,butsmallandhighly

insignificantatp=.717).AsFigure6,slidec.,shows,thedifferencesbetweenratifiers

andnon-ratifiersarefairlylargeandasonemightexpect(withthenon-ratifiers

backslidinginresponsetobacksliding),butthisfindingfallsslightlyshortofstandard

statisticalsignificance.Overall,thereislittleevidencethatchangesinjudicial

independenceorthedegreeoflegislativeinterferenceintheexecutive’spolicymaking

affectphysicalintegrityrightsbacksliding.

Themostconsistentfindingsinthisstudypertaintotheoptionalprotocolon

monitoring/visits,electoralbacksliding,andtoaslightlylesserdegree,civilliberties

backsliding.ThesefindingsheldquiteconsistentlyusingthePTSdatainstead.

SchnackenbergandFariss’s(2014)latentmeanvariableisanotheroption,butits

calculationmayincludesomeofthedemocraticbackslidingvariablesusedherein,

26

whichmayposeproblems.10Ofcourse,themodelingtechniqueheredonotcontrolfor

thepotentialendogeneityandselectioneffectsthatarewell-knownintheliterature.As

aresult,onehastobecarefulaboutinferringmuchabout‘effects.’Anextstepinthis

projectistoidentifythebestmodelingapproachandtoconducttheanalyseswithit.

5.Conclusion

Treatiesaretobeobeyed.Thisisoneofthemostfundamentalprinciplesof

internationallaw.Thefactthatcountriesenter(relatively)freelyintothemcanhavea

frustratingimplication:oftentimes,governmentsdonotjoinonuntiltheyarefairlysure

theycancomply(vonStein2016).Yet,governmentsandregimescananddochange.

Whatismore,governmentssometimestakeoninternationallegalobligationsduring

periodsoftumult.Perhapstheirleadersweresincere,wantingtoentrenchprohibitions

onsomeoftheverybehaviorstowhichtheyweresubjectedasdissidents.Or,perhaps

theywerenotsincere,butperceivedtreatyparticipationasawaytoattractforeign

investmentordevelopmentaid.Whateverthemotivations,thepointisthis:times

change,butpactasuntservanda–intheory,anyhow.

Thisarticlehasexploredthisrealityinthecontextofdemocraticbacksliding,a

prominentphenomenonthatmany(thoughcertainlynotall)scholarsbelievehas

becomeparticularlyprevalentinrecentyears.Thisfocusallowsusto(attemptto)hone

inonthemechanismsatplayintheideathatdemocraticinstitutionsformthebasisof

HRAenforcement.Insomeways,theresultswillbedisappointingtochampionsofthe

internationalanti-tortureregime.ParticipationintheCATand/ortheindividual

complaintsmechanismdoesnotappeartopreventphysicalintegritybacksliding,in

combinationwithorindependentofdemocraticbacksliding.Itmay,assomeother

10Awaitingclarificationonthispoint.

27

studieshavealsofound(e.g.,HollyerandRosendorff2011),makethesituationworse–

althoughthefindingshereinshouldberegardedaspreliminaryatbest.

However,thereisanimportantareawherethefindingsprovidesomepreliminary

evidencethattreatiesalterleaders’incentives.ThefactthatparticipantsintheCAT’s

optionalmonitoringprovisionresponddifferentlyfromnon-participants–inthefaceof

substantialelectoraland/orcivillibertiesbacksliding–isimportant.Although

preliminary,thisfindingsuggeststhat(certaintypesof)pactaareindeedservanda.Itis

nocoincidencethatthiscomponentoftheanti-tortureregimeinvolvesrealmonitoring

andadegreeofsovereigntycost.Governmentsthattakeonthisparticularobligation

willfinditdifficultto‘hide’physicalintegritybackslidingortoshakeitoffasrumor,or

necessaryforthesakeofstatesecurity.

Lookingforward,thisresearchcanbefurtherdevelopedinatleastthreeways.First,

asalreadynoted,amoresophisticatedmodelthataccountsforselectionand

endogeneityisneeded.Second,furtherresearchonwhyandhowgovernmentsbecame

partiestotheCAT’soptionalprotocolwouldbeusefulasawayofexploringtheidea

thattimeschangebuttreatiescarryforward.Finally,itwouldbeworthwhiletoexplore

additionalhumanrightstreatiestodeterminewhetherandhowdemocraticbacksliding

affectscountries’abilitytoabidebytheseagreementsmorebroadly.

28

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