Demo: Rubber Quack Quack.

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Transcript of Demo: Rubber Quack Quack.

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Hackers (Not) Halted: About issues that are (not) obvious to managePaula JanuszkiewiczMVP: Enterprise Security, MCTCQURE: CEO, Penetration Tester | [email protected] IDesign: Security Architect | [email protected]

ATC-B307-R

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Agenda

Idea of (NOT)

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Session goal

Become more familiar hard to manage issuesKnow why situations can happen

Know the mitigation plan

Think through the points of entry They may be based on relationships with people

Major conclusion: Operating system is just a piece of code, number of possible targets is almost over

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Offline access

Can be used to solve problems

… but it should be never treated as the problem solving methodIs a perfect starting point for the attack

Deserves to be in the security planning process

Is very often overlooked

While offline injection, even on the client machine can be dangerous

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Demo: Offline Access

Service and remote control

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Why this was possible?

The mitigation plan: BitLocker / TrueCrypt etc.

Booting from USB / CD / DVD was allowed User took laptop homeOffline encryption was not implementedHTTP monitoring was not in place (hard)Antimalware signatures were not installed (so?!)

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BitLocker

Available since Windows VistaManaged using GPO + MBAM

Keys are assigned to machine not to user

Fully invisible for the user

Protects from offline access

But does not prevents all other online hacks

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Demo: Rubber Quack Quack

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Why this was possible?

The mitigation plan: Security Awareness + USB Management

User was a Domain User and Local AdminUSB management was weakAttacker had physical access to the machineLaptop owner trusted 3rd party pen drive

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Agenda

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Denial of Service: Kind of oldschool

Can happen because they are easy and effective

Unfortunately their popularity is rising, we need to take steps to prepareTarget availability not confidentialityBut sometimes availability costs more

They are hard to avoid

But there are several mitigation plans available

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Demo: DoS Concepts

… and DoS mitigation

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Why this was possible?

The mitigation plan: Know the expensive queries for your app

nec Hercules contra plures

Website performance was not properly managedThere was defence implemented

For example: reverse proxy, load balancer

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Unpatched System and ApplicationsTerminal Servers, Domain

ControllersThe most important servers unconsistently patchedExploits are immediately

availableMetasploit etc.

Reverse engineering of patchesBest known points of attackJava, Adobe

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Demo: Holly Grail

Holy Local System

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Why this was possible?

The mitigation plan: Manage the update process for all boxes

Server was not patchedUser is used to bed security practices Security hole was just a point of entry, rootkit works like shown by designDKOM driver requires high privileges to install

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Unproperly Managed Access ControlRepositories are never over

FTP Servers, File Shares for the common good

The problem exists in peopleExisting solutions are not efficient, comfortable

Digital signatures are ignored, we are used to that!

Portable AppsEnterprise approved apps are not enugh

Warning: Portable Apps sometimes require high privileges

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Demo: Infecting Repositories

To do if you are in the bad mood

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Agenda

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Summary: Hackers (Not) Halted

Because people tend to take shortcuts

Because we prefer habits over good practices

Because hard problems are easy to ignore

Because acting is easier than planning

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Trustworthy Computing ResourcesTrustworthy Computing (TwC) is a long-term, collaborative effort to deliver more secure, private, and reliable computing experiences for everyone. Learn more at:http://microsoft.com/twc

Cloud Security Readiness ToolPass the Hash GuidanceData, Insights and Guidance (Security Intelligence Report, volume 14)

and more…

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msdn

Resources for Developers

http://microsoft.com/msdn

Learning

Microsoft Certification & Training Resources

www.microsoft.com/learning

TechNet

Resources

Sessions on Demand

http://channel9.msdn.com/Events/TechEd

Resources for IT Professionals

http://microsoft.com/technet

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© 2013 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Microsoft, Windows and other product names are or may be registered trademarks and/or trademarks in the U.S. and/or other countries.The information herein is for informational purposes only and represents the current view of Microsoft Corporation as of the date of this presentation. Because Microsoft must respond to changing market conditions, it should not be interpreted to be a commitment on the part of Microsoft, and Microsoft cannot guarantee the accuracy of any information provided after the date of this presentation. MICROSOFT MAKES NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, AS TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PRESENTATION.