Demet Kurtoglu - Bergson Conception of Time: Its Effects on a Possible Philosophy of Life

7/31/2019 Demet Kurtoglu - Bergson Conception of Time: Its Effects on a Possible Philosophy of Life

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BERGSONS CONCEPTION OF TIME: ITS EFFECTS ON A POSSIBLE

PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TOTHE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

OFMIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DEMET KURTOLU TADELEN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

July 2003


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ABSTRACT

BERGSONS CONCEPTION OF TIME: ITS EFFECTS ON A POSSIBLE

PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

Kurtolu, Tadelen, Demet

PhD., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Grnberg

July 2003, 215 pages

The aim of this study is to show how a possible philosophy of life can

arise from Bergsons conception of time. In realizing this aim, I appeal to

Hadots description of the paradox of the human condition. I claim that in order

to understand how a Bergsonian philosophy of life through Bergsons

conception of time would arise we need to understand the paradox of the human

condition. The reason for this is that there are a lot of dualities in Bergsons

philosophy all of which, I claim, are based on this fundamental duality

concerning the human condition. I believe that when this paradox and its

possible resolution are restated in Bergsonian notions, a Bergsonian philosophy

of life that consists of a life sub specie durationis, that is a life under the aspect

of duration, would arise.

Hadot considered the paradox within the context of phenomenology

alone. This made me proceed by searching for other approaches to the paradox


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within Bergsons philosophy. I realized that the attempts in finding out possible

solutions to this problem cannot be found in the context of phenomenology

alone and that the vitalist and the existentialist aspects have to be considered in

order to remain faithful to Bergsons philosophy as well as in order to construct

a Bergsonian philosophy of life. The phenomenological aspect of the paradox

arises around Bergsons notion of displacement of attention and when the

notion of dure relle is considered with consciousness in the light of the notion

of intensity. The vitalist aspect enters into our discussion when we analyze

Bergsons notion of lan vital around the consideration of true evolution. I

believe that the existentialist aspect of the paradox of the human condition

comes from Bergsons notion of freedom around the discussion of the

superficial and the fundamental self. It emerges if the individual asks himself

how to deal with this paradox that in turn defines his struggle to transform the

tension the paradox involves and that tells him to bring his own attitude towards

it.

Keywords: Paradox of the Human Condition, habits of mind, dure relle, lan

vital, superficial self, fundamental self, life under the aspect of matter, life sub

specie durationis, paradox of life

Z


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BERGSONUN ZAMAN ANLAYII: OLANAKLI BR YAAMFELSEFES ZERNE ETKLER

Kurtolu Tadelen, Demet

Doktora, Felsefe Blm

Tez Yneticisi: Do. Dr. David Grnberg

Temmuz 2003, 215 sayfa

Bu almann amac Bergsonun zaman anlayndan nasl bir

olanakl yaam felsefesinin kabileceini gstermektir. Bu amac

gerekletirmek iin, Hadotnun insan durumu paradoksu betimlemesine

bavuruyorum. Bergsonun zaman anlayndan nasl Bergsoncu bir yaam

felsefesi kacan anlayabilmek iin insan durumu paradoksunu anlamamz

gerektiini iddia ediyorum. Bunun sebebi, Bergsonun felsefesinde bir ok

ikilik bulunmas ve iddiama gre bu ikiliklerin hepsinin insan durumunu

ilgilendiren temel ikilik zerinde temellenmi olmalardr. nanyorum ki bu

paradoks ve bunun olanakl bir zm Bergsoncu kavramlarla yeniden ifade

edilirse, sub specie durationis bir yaam, yani srenin grn altnda bir

yaam, oluturan Bergsoncu bir yaam felsefesi ortaya kacaktr.

Hadot, paradoksu yalnzca fenomenoloji balam ierisinde ele

almtr. Bu beni Bergson felsefesi ierisinde paradoksa farkl yaklamlar

bulmaya yneltmitir. Farkettim ki bu sorunsala olanakl zmler bulma

giriimleri yalnzca fenomenoloji balamnda bulunamaz ve gerek

Bergsonun felsefesine sadk kalabilmek iin, gerek Bergsoncu bir yaam


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felsefesi kurabilmek iin, paradoksun dirimsel ve varoluu ynleri ele

alnmak durumundadr. Paradoksun fenomenolojik yn, Bergsonun

dikkatin yer deitirmesi kavramyla birlikte ve dure relle kavramnn,

younluk kavram nda bilinle birlikte ele alnmasyla ortaya

kmaktadr. Dirimsel yn, Bergsonun gerek evrim anlayn lan vital

kavram temelinde incelediimiz zaman tartmamza dahil olmaktadr.

nanyorum ki insan durumu paradoksunun varoluu yn Bergsonun

zgrlk kavramnn yzeysel ben ve esas ben tartmasndan gelir. Birey

kendisine bu paradoksla nasl baetmesi gerektiini sorduunda ortaya kar

ve bu onun paradoksun ierdii gerilimi dntrme mcadelesini

belirleyerek paradoks karsnda kendi tavrn ortaya koymasn syler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: nsan Durumu Paradoksu, Zihnin Alkanlklar, Dure

Relle, Elan Vital, Yzeysel Ben, Temel Ben, Madde Grn Altnda

Yaam, Sub Specie Durationis Yaam, Yaam Paradoksu


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In Memory of Suvar Kseraif


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Chapter One

Chapter Two ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. David Grnberg,

for his careful guidance and friendly support during the preparation of this

dissertation and his invaluable contributions.

I would also like to thank to Prof. Dr. Ahmet nam, Prof. Dr. Sabri

Bykdvenci and Dr. Ayhan Sol for their helpful comments and criticisms.

I express my sincere appreciation to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Medar Atc for

her supplement of reading materials as well as the benefit I gained from my

discussions with her in Galatasaray University.

I express my gratitude to all my family for the support and care they

have given me throughout my life.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my philosopher husband

skender Tadelen to whom I feel deep respect and love. Without his support,

encouragement and his invaluable contributions, this dissertation could not have

been written.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................iii

Z.....................................................................................................................v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.............................................................................viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................ix

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................1

2. BERGSON AND THE PARADOXOF THE HUMAN CONDITION.........................................23

3. BERGSONS PHILOSOPHY OFTIME..............................43

3.1 The Immediate Data of Consciousness.........................43

3.2 Consciousness as Intellectand Intuition................................................................48

3.2.1 The Habits of Mind..........................................503.2.2 Theory of Image..............................................54

3.2.3 The Point of View of Action VersusThe Point of View of Knowledge.....................63

3.3 Consciousness as Memory...........................................69

3.4 Consciousness as Duration...........................................83

3.4.1 The Intensity of The States ofConsciousness andThe Extensity of Space.....................................86

3.4.2 Homogeneous Time andConcrete Duration............................................99

3.5 The Theory of True Evolution...................................107

3.6 The Ontological Status of Duration............................116

3.7 The Superficial and


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The Fundamental Self................................................125

3.8 Causality and Concrete Duration................................136

4. TO LIVE SUB SPECIE DURATIONIS

A BERGSONIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.....................149

4.1 To Live in Society.....................................................152

4.2 The Call of The Great Mystics,The Effort of The Individuals andThe Role of The Philosophers....................................155

4.3 The Experience of the Intuition of Time.....................164

4.4 The Paradox of the Human ConditionReflecting a Philosophy of Life..................................175

5. CONCLUSION...................................................................184

REFERENCES.............................................................................................197

APPENDIX A. TURKISH SUMMARY......................................................200

VITA.............................................................................................................215


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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to show how a possible philosophy of life1 can

arise from Bergsons notion of time. In realizing this aim, I appeal to Hadots

description of the paradox of the human condition. I claim that in order to

understand how a Bergsonian philosophy of life through Bergsons notion of

time would arise we need to understand the paradox of the human condition.

The reason for this is that there are a lot of dualities in Bergsons philosophy all

of which, I claim, are based on this fundamental duality concerning the human

condition. In other words, in order to understand why there are dual notions in

Bergsons philosophy, we need to grasp the paradox of the human condition. I

believe that when this paradox and its possible resolution are restated in

Bergsonian notions, a Bergsonian philosophy of life that consists of a life sub

specie durationis, that is a life under the aspect of duration, would arise.

The term human condition is not in fact a new term. It is found in

Ancient Greek philosophical texts, in Christianity, in contemporary philosophy,

in Nietzsche, and especially in Sartre and Camus. However, in each case it is

used in a different sense. With Antigone, for instance, it expressed a revolt

against the law, in Christianity it acquired a religious sense that man was born

with his sins, with Nietzsche it expressed a revolt against God that arose from

1 As the title of this dissertation indicates, this is an attempt to derive a possible philosophy oflife. Therefore, my attempt is not to find a place for Bergsons philosophy of life along withother philosophies that could be equally placed within the philosophy of life.


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the notion of eternal recurrence, with Sartre and Camus the term expressed that

which characterized all human beings, that is, human nature and the revolt

against it gave way to the notion of absurdity as well as to a kind of nihilistic

philosophy. Although used in different senses, the term always involved the

sense of a deadlock of human beings and a metaphysical revolt against it. So far

it seems that the problem of the human condition has only an existential sense.

In fact, it would not be wrong to claim that this problem is mainly an existential

problem. However, it also has a phenomenological as well as a vitalist aspect. I

believe that with Bergsons philosophy we are able to see the problem of the

human condition in the light of these other aspects as well.

Pierre Hadot introduced this problem of the human condition as a

paradox. Therefore, in the second chapter, I aim at putting forward how Hadot

presents this paradox and try to determine how this paradox arises in Bergsons

philosophy. Hadot expresses this paradox by saying that we must separate

ourselves from the world qua world in order to live our daily life, but we must

separate ourselves from the everyday world in order to rediscover the world

qua world (1995: 258). Similarly, the paradox in Bergsons philosophy arises

because of the tension existing between our habits of mind that we need in order

to live our everyday lives and the dismissal of these habits in order to

philosophize and so grasp reality as it is. We will see that in order to dismiss the

habits of mind, a displacement of attention is needed and that the notion of

concrete duration has to be considered with consciousness in the light of the

notion of intensity. I claim that these constitute the phenomenological aspect of

the paradox of the human condition. The vitalist aspect of the paradox comes


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from Bergsons notion of life as a vital process to which human existence is

integrated. Lastly, the existentialist aspect of the paradox emerges if the

individual asks himself how to deal with this paradox that in turn would define

his struggle to transform the tension the paradox involves and that tells him to

bring his own attitude towards it. I will mainly deal with this latter aspect in the

last chapter of this study. In fact, in all these three aspects, there is a related

philosophy of life that are phenomenological, vitalist and existentialist.

Moreover, I believe that the paradox of the human condition already presents us

a philosophy of life because it manifests two levels of life which are everyday

life and a life that can be carried on by turning the attention to the world as it is;

a life lived through the habits of mind and a life lived through the effort of

getting rid of these habits.

I should say that the phenomenological, vitalist and existentialist

aspects of the paradox of the human condition constitute at the same time the

different possible readings of Bergsons philosophy. However, I do agree with

Mullarkey that neither of these possible readings can be a proper reading by

itself because Bergson never stuck to one philosophy at all. However, it is my

claim that, considered within the context of the paradox of the human condition,

these different aspects or readings acquire a sense together, which is different

from each considered separately. In other words, the paradox of the human

condition gives us a way that brings these different aspects together and

therefore, enable us to remain true to Bergsons use of different philosophies. In

fact, Hadot, in his bookPhilosophy as a Way of Life, read Bergson within the

context of phenomenology alone. He compares Bergsons position with that of


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Husserl and especially Merleau-Ponty. He says that both in Husserls and

Pontys philosophies there is an opposition between the world of science and

the world of everyday perception and that these two philosophers want us to

return to the world of lived perception in order for us to become aware of it.

Therefore, according to their view, philosophy becomes a process in which we

try to relearn to see the world. Accordingly, Hadot claims that we find a

similar distinction in Bergsons philosophy concerning the habitual and

philosophical perception and that Bergsons displacement of attention in this

sense is similar to Pontys phenomenological reduction. However, Hadots

putting forward the paradox of the human condition only in the context of

phenomenology make me proceed by searching for other approaches to the

paradox within Bergsons philosophy. I believe that the attempts in finding out

possible solutions to this problem cannot be found in the context of

phenomenology alone. Now let me continue to resume this study by sections.

In section 3.1, I aim at finding out the reason why we should accept

unreservedly as true and real the ultimate data supplied by consciousness. It is

Bergsons claim that all philosophy is obliged to start from the immediate data

of consciousness due to the fact that only these data are admissible in the

beginning. By immediate data Bergson means the direct feeling of anything

given to consciousness. However, since immediate data implies the direct

feeling, they can differ according to individuals and I claim that Bergson should

accept as true and real every individuals immediate data. Thus, we see that

there is a relation between the immediate data of consciousness and Bergsons

intention to make philosophy universal. A philosophy that everybody can agree


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upon has to start from these data but proceed by the effort of the philosophers to

complete, correct and improve one another. Such an effort is needed in order for

reality to be grasped as it is. By reality Bergson understands the oscillation of

the opposites which also implies that there are intermediate zones in reality. The

intellect, according to Bergson, speculates from the standpoint of one of the two

opposites which then puts them as thesis and antithesis. Intuition, on the other

hand, enables one both to understand why the opposing views are considered as

opposing and to awaken to the fact that there are intermediate zones. As such,

reality is no longer distorted.

I begin the section 3.2 by giving a brief explanation of what Bergson

means by consciousness. Consciousness corresponds to the living beings power

of choice and it is synonymous with invention and freedom. Consciousness

awakens when there is the least free action and becomes dormant when there is

no free action. Only man is able to break the chain of automatism that implies

routine or habitual acts. However, man is not free all the time. His

consciousness becomes dormant because of getting trapped in routines found in

daily life. In this respect, it can be said that Bergson gives us the means of

waking up consciousness of its inactivity, the means of becoming free.

Consciousness consists of both the intellect and intuition. Intuition goes in the

direction of life whereas intellect goes in the direction of matter. If these two

forms of conscious activity had attained their full development, a complete and

perfect humanity would have been realized. However, the evolution of man is

such that his consciousness is formed on the intellect and not on intuition. This

caused intuition to be sacrificed to the intellect.


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I reserve the explanation concerning the function of the intellect for the

section 3.2.1. According to Bergson, human intellect represents the powers of

conceptual thought and it is constituted of perception, conception and

understanding. The functions of all these three show that the intellect attaches

itself to what is stable and regular. Mans consciousness is formed on the

intellect because nature has destined man to master and utilize matter that

implies tending toward fabrication. In this sense the intellect evolves with ease

only in space. Intellect is described by Bergson as the attention mind gives to

matter whereas intuition is described as the attention mind gives to itself. The

attention mind gives to matter causes man to think in order to act, in other

words, it is the function of the intellect to aim at practical utility. The intellect is

turned towards the act to be performed and the reaction to follow. This

constitutes at the same time mans habitual acts. Mans habitual way of thinking

and acting proceeds through resemblance and contiguity.2 When we think, we

put side by side the ideas that resemble one another concerning certain

situations and act as our thought requires. This is the meaning of minds

attention turning towards matter.

Since there is a close relation between the intellect and matter, I make

a section on what Bergson understands by matter. Thus, 3.2.2 puts forward

2 Although when Bergson talks about resemblance and contiguity, he does not mention Humesname, we can nevertheless say that these two notions were already inherent in Humesphilosophy. InAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume talks about the principleof human nature that refers to the association of ideas that is engendered by custom or habit.We are accustomed to expect one idea from the appearance of another when, for instance, weassociate heat and flame. In this sense, it can be said that there is a similarity between Bergsonsdescription of mans habitual way of thinking and Humes description of the principle of humannature.


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Bergsons conception of matter which centers around the disputes of idealism

and realism. Bergson criticizes idealism in reducing matter to the perception we

have of it and realism in making matter a thing which able to produce in us

perceptions and comes up with his own notion of matter which is an aggregate

of images placed between the thing and the representation. Matter is a self-

existing image. By defining matter as such, Bergson claims to have ended the

distinction philosophers made between the appearance and the existence of an

object and ipso facto the dispute concerning the reality or ideality of the

external world. Bergson says that idealism cannot pass from perception to

reality and realism fails to pass from reality to immediate consciousness which

we have of it. As a result, the point of contact between matter and mind is lost.

This is due to the failure of distinguishing between the point of view of action

and the point of view of knowledge. Both idealism and realism including the

Kantian realism3 consider the matter-mind issue from the standpoint of pure

knowledge instead of action. In Kantian realism, we find no common

measure between the thing-in-itself, the real, and the sensuous manifold

from which we construct our knowledge. Bergsons theory of matter implies

many kind of images. However, our body which is among them is one image

that we know both from without and from within. Our body is a center of action

and therefore can in no way be considered as a center that engenders the

external world. This dispute about the ideality or reality of the external world

arises due to the consideration of mind and matter from the standpoint of

knowledge. Bergsons consideration of mind and matter is built upon the notion

3 By describing Kantian philosophy as a kind of realism instead of transcendental idealism,Bergson wants to emphasize the reality of the thing-in-itself in Kants philosophy in order topoint out to the gap between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. By so doing, Bergson


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of body which is a center of action. By this Bergson explains that there is an

interaction between external images influencing our body through transmitting

movement to it and our body influencing external images by giving back

movement to them. That is the reason why our intellect, and our perception in

particular, is turned towards action. And since it is turned towards action, it

would be a mistake to consider it from the standpoint of pure knowledge.

Section 3.2.3 discusses the true character of perception. All images are

bound up with all other images. Thus, when we perceive a material object, we

do not only have its representation by itself, but rather, we have it together with

what precedes and follows that representation. It seems to us that each image is

individual because we take perception to be a kind of photographic view of

things, taken from a fixed point by that special apparatus which is called an

organ of perception. In this lies the difference between considering the subject

of matter and mind from the standpoint of pure knowledge and from the

standpoint of action. When we take up the first position, perception becomes a

kind of photographic view and it is this conception of perception that we then

put at the center of getting pure knowledge. In the second one, on the other

hand, we no longer take perception to be a photographic view and as something

to give us pure knowledge. Instead, we look at things from the point of view of

action. Perception then becomes that which makes our body act. So the aim is

no longer to get at pure knowledge. We are trying to grasp everything in the

way we live. That is the reason why this is a life philosophy. When by

perception we mean getting at pure knowledge, we attribute to it a purely

aims at describing Kantian philosophy as a philosophy that fails in establishing the relation


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speculative end and therefore we isolate it from action. We take perception to be

that which acts no longer. However, the true character of perception is activity.

Considered as such, reality of things then becomes that which is touched,

penetrated and lived. According to this true character of perception, our

successive perceptions are not the real moments of things but rather are the

moments of our consciousness.

In section 3.3, I attempt to show Bergsons conception of

consciousness understood as memory. In order to explain the survival of

images, Bergson introduces three processes which are pure memory, memory-

image and perception. Perception is considered this time in its relation with

memory. Pure memory refers to the whole of our past without any attachment to

the present that is possible only in theory. Memory-image refers to the memory

actualized in an image. Our past remains in the state of pure memory until it

becomes an image in the present. Memory actualized in an image consists of the

prolongation of the past into the present. None of these three processes occurs

apart from the others. Pure memory, for example, although independent in

theory, shows itself only in images; memory-image always partakes of the pure

memory and perception is always saturated with memory-images that complete

it. Memory generally is defined by Bergson as the intersection of mind and

matter. Mind is pure memory and matter is pure perception. Between memory

and perception there is a difference in kind because perception is turned towards

action whereas memory is a spiritual manifestation. Pure perception, which is

matter, is the domain of the law of necessity whereas memory, which refers to

between mind and matter from the standpoint of action.


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spirit, is the domain of freedom. Memory is synonymous with consciousness

with respect to duration. That is the reason why our successive perceptions are

the moments of our consciousness and not the moments of things.

Hence in section 3.4, I aim at demonstrating Bergsons notion of

consciousness understood as duration. Duration as consciousness is considered

together with the states of consciousness. More precisely, the idea of duration is

considered as the multiplicity of conscious states. According to Bergson,

duration (dure) is inner experience and inner life that is grasped in intuition. It

expresses the real time we experience in our own conscious life. Bergsons

assumption is that if time is inner experience then it must be related with the life

of the consciousness. His claim is that our intellect understands time by means

of space, and since space is measurable, time understood by means of space

becomes measurable as well. By space, Bergson understands all that can be

reduced to measurement. To grasp time by means of space is the habit of our

intellect and the real sense of time implies the dismissal of this habit.

In section 3.4.1, I consider this habit of the intellect with the treatment

of the psychic states. I try to clarify Bergsons claim that psychic phenomena

like sensations, feelings and passions are thought to possess a measurable

magnitude which cause psychological life to be in parallel with matter. In order

to explain this claim, I make use of Bergsons notion of the container and the

contained. Psychic states do not contain one another, they are of a comparable

intensity which is characteristic of qualitative change. The intensity of the

psychic states is not measurable and therefore refer to minds spiritual realm.


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Our habit of understanding psychic states through magnitude comes from the

intellect which delights in clear cut distinctions. However, all our psychic states

co-exist. They are not to be separated from one another but permeate one

another. When our consciousness recalls its former states, it rather makes them

permeate with its actual states. All conscious states, according to Bergson, are

in a succession without a distinction which implies that every conscious state

represents the whole conscious life.

In section 3.4.2, I try to show the difference between the notion of time

based on measurement, which is homogeneous time, and the notion of time as

experienced, lived, which is concrete duration or dure relle. According to

Bergson, we have to learn to distinguish between duration as quality and time

that has become quantity by being set out in space. The question that made

Bergson delve into the domain of the inner life is the question how would it

appear to a consciousness which desired only to see duration without measuring

it? This search for the inner life made Bergson find out that consciousness

could grasp duration without stopping it only by means of consciousness

turning towards itself. This duration can be grasped in intuition. Homogeneous

time, according to Bergson, is the symbolical image of real duration which our

intellect is accustomed to think of. However, it implies an illegitimate

translation of the unextended into the extended and of quality into quantity. The

difference between homogeneous time and concrete duration is explained by

Bergson by means of two kinds of multiplicity that are qualitative multiplicity

or qualitative heterogeneity and quantitative multiplicity or discrete

multiplicity. What is homogeneous is space alone and every discrete


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multiplicity is got by a process of unfolding in space. I conclude this section by

saying that if there were no consciousness, the external world would be nothing

but pure homogeneity or pure space. On the other hand, if there were no

external world, there would only be pure heterogeneity, pure duration, states of

consciousness without any admixture of extensity. This is not a logical

impossibility. In fact, real space and real duration exist. However, the fact that

we are beings with consciousness, life forces us to meet in the intersection of

real space and real duration which is simultaneity, that is, the symbolical

representation of duration.

In section 3.5, I aim at explaining Bergsons notion of true evolution

which is closely connected with the notion of duration because the idea that

something evolves already gives us the notion of duration. The evolution of the

organisms and the evolution of consciousness resemble each other because life

is creative evolution itself which is true continuity, real mobility and reciprocal

penetration. The history of life, in this sense, is nothing other than the creative

evolution itself. Science in general seeks for that which repeats itself whereas it

should be the function of philosophy to show the continuity of life which

implies irreducibility and irreversibility. There are no ready-made forms in life.

On the contrary, life creates its forms continuously in accordance with changing

circumstances. Life is a tendency that consists of creating divergent directions.

It preserves all the different tendencies and creates with them diverging series of

species that will evolve separately. This is the characteristic of the general

movement of life that Bergson calls lan vital, that is vital impetus. The

direction of this vital impetus towards the intellect is only the one among the


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different lines of evolution and therefore gives us a partial view of life. Since

our psychical life is the existence of which we are most assured and which we

know best, it is this internal life that will guide us in our search for life in

general. Evolution, according to Bergson, is the very essence of life that takes

place in real duration. In this sense, to endure is not only peculiar to

consciousness but also to life and to universe. In other words, duration is

immanent to the whole of the universe.

In section 3.6, I claim that Bergsons conception of duration is

ontological. And I also attempt to show certain pragmatic and nominalist traits

of Bergsons philosophy. Now, Bergsons notion of duration is ontological

because duration is the foundation of our being that enables us to see all things

sub specie durationis, that is, under the aspect of duration, as against sub specie

aeternitatis which implies that the universe implies eternity. Bergsons notions

of quality and quantity, intensity and extensity, succession and simultaneity all

enable us to understand the nature of time and therefore are all ontological

notions. Indeed time has a purpose which is to act like a substance. It is the very

stuff of reality. However, since Bergsons philosophy allows only for processes

or events, his notion of substance is different from the Aristotelian, the Lockean

as well as Cartesian one. In this section I also reconsider the ontological notions

of quality and quantity in having an equal status in Bergsons philosophy with

respect to the principle of qualitative multiplicity. This is the principle of true

evolution in which both materiality and spirituality reside. Because reality is

duplicitous, the principle of qualitative multiplicity enables us to see this double

side as complementing one another. To accept reality to be duplicitous implies


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at the same time to accept the functions both of the intellect and intuition as

necessary for life. Our everyday lives, for example, require certain orders and

repetitions without which we could not but live in isolation from society. Since

the individual is obliged to adapt himself to his environment 4otherwise he

cannot live in societyI ask the question of how it would then be possible to

act freely?

Thus, in section 3.7, I attempt to find out the answer to this question. It

is possible to act freely when our acts spring from our whole personality which

means that when we feel the uniqueness of our self and act with this feeling in

us, our acts become free. According to Bergson, this is what characterizes our

fundamental self. The superficial self and the fundamental self are the two

aspects of conscious life, the first arising from the notion of homogeneous time

whereas the latter arising from the notion of concrete duration. The superficial

self has a static and conformist character that is peculiar to practical life, to

language and to communication; it belongs more to society than to us. From

these two selves, two ways of grasping reality arise: reality grasped with the

superficial self gives us a picture of the world as static, noncontinuous and

fragmentary whereas the one grasped with the fundamental self gives us a world

in which we feel we are the agents, in which we feel we are really living.

Bergson rejects psychological determinism which can briefly be explained as

4 It must be noted that the individuals adaptation to his environment, to society, is to beunderstood in relation to the spatialized thinking rather than to ethical norms. As we will see inour study, the individuals minimum adaptation to his environment does not imply doingviolence in society or to revolt against the norms of his society he lives in. Adaptation toenvironment means to grasp reality in accordance with the natural bent of our intellect. In otherwords, it means to grasp reality only by means of symbols, the language and the clock basedconception of time we use in our everyday life. Therefore, when an individual thinks and livesspatially, he fully manifests his sociability.


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the view that every conscious state is followed by another in a succession of

causes and effects. Reality grasped with the superficial self gives us a picture of

the world in which the law of causality operates while the reality grasped with

the fundamental self gives us a world in which the causal relation between

states are confused because there are no repetitions of causes and so of effects.

A world in which the law of causality operates can have but homogeneous

conception of duration since it is only in such a view of time that one can talk

about repetitions. We generally live with our superficial self. However, one can

always get back into pure duration and therefore these two levels of life become

a choice for the individual. Each of our conscious states can be conceived only

within the whole they are continuously and confusingly being added into. This

Bergson explains by using the term dynamic series and claims that the act will

be so much freer the more the dynamic series which it is connected tends to be

the fundamental self. From this claim we understand that freedom admits of

degrees. I end this section by presenting Bergsons criticism against the view of

the determinists and the libertarians which he thinks that both are based on a

geometrical representation of free will and that this is due to their mistake to

focus on the time which has passed instead of the time which is passing. Since

the subject of freedom generally involves the discussion of causality, I make a

section on how Bergson approaches this issue.

In section 3.8, I therefore aim at showing Bergsons view of two kinds

of causality: causality in nature and causality in consciousness. In the first one

we find regularity as well as repetition in such a way that causes are followed by

their effects. I claim that for those who live with their superficial self, there is


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also a kind of regularity found in consciousness and that we usually behave as if

there really is regularity in our states of consciousness. We think that the notion

of causality found in physical phenomena is, in a similar way, found in

consciousness because of our ability to predict some of our actions. To predict

an action beforehand means, according to Bergson, to know completely the

conditions of that action, which in fact implies to perform it. Since we have got

used to anticipate, for example, astronomical phenomena, says Bergson, we

think that we can also anticipate voluntary actions. In the second kind of

causality in fact there is no regularity and repetition. Here anticipation is

impossible because no two conscious states are identical and therefore the cause

of an inner state produces its effect once for all and will never reproduce it.

According to Bergson, when we talk about regularity, we mean a regularity

turned towards the past. In this sense, he does not differentiate between

regularity and repetition. Repetition implies the old forms coming to the scene

over and over again, in other words, the past being recomposed continuously,

using the same elements but with different combinations. Each of these

combinations corresponds to a regularity involved in the fact, event, or

phenomena. So what repeats is the same or identical conditions applied to a fact,

to an event or to a phenomenon and the fact that identical conditions are applied

in this way constitute or refer to the past. What is regular, on the other hand, is

the production of combinations.

I begin the fourth chapter by saying that in Bergsons philosophy, one

chooses to be free or not as well as the extent of his freedom only when he is

awakened to the existence both of his superficial and the fundamental self. The


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problem is, because we are human beings, we have to live according to our

practical needs even if we want to choose to live with our fundamental self. This

problem is due to the human condition of sociability. Therefore, on the one

hand, I claim that to live in accordance with our superficial and fundamental self

is a choice, on the other hand, that we are the real obstacle to ourselves.

In section 4.1, I argue that the nature of human beings is such that it

both involves a pressure-making tendency and a sense of freedom. The former

essentially appears in what Bergson calls closed morality and static religion

while the latter appears in open morality and dynamic religion. In open

morality, individuals try to break away from the rigid rule-following. This is the

sign of life itself in human beings that they are not bound by repetitious routines.

However, because closed morality is inherent in open morality, it is easy for the

individual to get stuck in routines. I ask, in the next section, what can the role of

the great mystics, of individuals and especially of the philosophers be

concerning the break from the repetitious routines.

Section 4.2 therefore, discusses the call of the great mystics, the effort

of the individuals and the role of the philosophers in relation to the paradox of

the human condition. Bergson claims that the great mystics try to propagate the

feeling of a flow that goes from their soul to God and from God to all humanity.

What they bring humanity is a new temperament of the soul. Bergson also

thinks that due to these mystics as well as the effort of the individuals, mankind

started to progress towards a more and more advanced society. The mystics had

their own special language and their own life which did not involve the


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characteristics peculiar to human life. By their nature, their lives are not based

on the intellect, rather they are those who already placed themselves in duration.

Therefore, the dismissal of the habits of mind concerns only human beings and

not the mystics. What is needed in order for the individuals to get rid of the

habits of mind is to change the direction of their reasoning that goes from

intellect to intuition to the direction that goes from intuition to intellect.

However, according to Bergson, since we are the vital current already loaded

with matter itself, the prolongation of intuition beyond a few instants becomes

very difficult and that there always is an oscillation between nature and mind.

Due to this reason, the greatest dismissal of the habits of mind becomes a

problem for the individuals. Since we are the vital current already loaded with

matter, the philosopher knows that true metaphysics requires to move between

two extreme limits that are materiality or pure repetition on the one hand, and

concrete flowing of duration on the other hand. This also implies the philosopher

to move between intuition and concepts and it is his role to try to prolong

intuition as much as he can. The reason for this, says Bergson, is that if such

knowledge is generalized, both speculation and everyday life would profit and

get illuminated by it. Philosophy is not a discipline that belongs only to

philosophers because it means to see all thingssub specie durationis that can be

accomplished by every individual to the extent that he gets accustomed to see

everything as such, just like he is already accustomed to see all things under the

aspect of matter.

In section 4.3, I claim that to grasp everything sub specie durationis

means to grasp ourselves in a present which is thick and elastic as well as to


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awaken our perception to mobility, to the flow of things. A thick present,

according to Bergson, is a present that evolves, a present that changes

continuously, which is open to creation and novelty and which involves both the

past and the future. In this section, I consider Mc Taggarts A-theory of time and

B-theory of time in order to determine Bergsons position. For this aim, I make

use of the article of Clifford Williams, A Bergsonian Approach to A- and B-

Time. Williams claim is that we cannot differentiate between the two theories

of time when we consider them from the context of Bergsonian intuition and that

if we cannot differentiate it as such, there is no means of distinguishing between

the two theories of time. In order to find out whether there are any differences

between the two theories, Williams considers the possible differences with

respect to the experiences of both theories and finds that there are no

experiential differences and therefore claims that there is no intuitional

difference between the two theories of time. Using this reasoning, I claim that

there is no intuitional difference between Bergsons notion of present that is

thick and elastic and a present that is instantaneous. The reason for this is that

there is only one real sense of time with only different conceptions. Hence the

scientific conception of time, for instance, is the notion of time stripped from the

experienceable level and brought instead to the level of analysis. From these

considerations, I claim that there can be no intuitional difference between living

sub specie durationis and living under the aspect of matter. The latter implies to

have forgotten the intuition of time and to grasp everything by means of our

intellect alone. I think that is the reason why Bergson recommends us to try to

get rid of the habits of mind and so remember that we have a faculty of intuition.

The intuition of time makes us a part of reality that goes on before our eyes.


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When this is the case, we express the notion of present as thick and elastic, and

instantaneous when this is not the case. These two expressions of the notion of

present are images. Images, according to Bergson, direct consciousness to the

point where there is an intuition to seize on and thus help us in grasping duration

indirectly. The direct presentation of duration is possible only in intuition and so

it is inexpressible. Moreover, all the conceptual representations of duration such

as indivisibility, continuity, multiplicity, and even the term duration itself, kill

the notion of time. However, this is not a problem concerning Bergsons method

of philosophy. It rather refers to the human situation Bergson himself aimed at

showing us: since our intellect is made to think matter and our concepts are

formed according to the model of the solids, our intellect is incapable of

presenting the true nature of life, the full meaning of the evolutionary

movement.

In the concluding section 4.4, I try to consider the paradox of the

human condition as reflecting a philosophy of life. I claim that Bergson gives us

a metaphysical standing in order for people to be more joyful and stronger by

making them awakened to their true self which is the fundamental self. We think

that true freedom, according to Bergson, is a state of consciousness in which one

is participating in creation and in which one feels the creative evolution he is a

part of. Therefore, I claim that Bergson has to distinguish between the joy and

strength found in practical daily life and the same found in placing oneself in

duration: the former is ephemeral because of its dependency upon outer

circumstances while the latter is not because it arises from mind turning its


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attention to itself and it represents the coincidence of human consciousness

with the living principle whence it emanates.

I also claim that both a life sub specie durationis and a life under the

aspect of matter arise from the same vital impetus and point out to two different

directions. Due to the very nature of life, vital impetus will leap from one to the

other. Therefore, I will conclude that the paradox of the human condition in fact

expresses the evolution of life itself in that, the obstacle of the individuals to

perceive the world qua world comes from the double movement of evolution.

One direction of the vital impetus enable the individuals to adapt to their

surrounding conditions whereas the other direction makes possible to dismiss the

habits of mind. The former direction turns towards materiality and intellect

whereas the latter turns toward life, intuition and spirituality in general. I claim

that Bergsons philosophy, thus requires that these habits of mind are

continuously dismissed and regained due to vital impetus. Only the great

mystics are able to be one with the vital impetus. That is the reason why, I claim,

the paradox concerns the human condition. Our existence consists of the tension

between the existence made of a present devoid of concrete duration and the one

in concrete duration. I claim that this metaphysical standing itself is the

Bergsonian philosophy of life.

I will end the section by restating the paradox of the human condition

in Bergsonian notions by means of two arguments. Focusing on the conclusions,

it will be seen that the conclusions of both arguments do not lead to a formal

contradiction and so we do not have a paradox in a strictly logical sense.


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Nevertheless, I will claim that an individual who is bound to accept the

legitimacy of both arguments and thus to accept both conclusions will find

himself in a deep confusion. I will then explain this confusion and claim that the

paradox of the human condition expresses a paradox of life in the sense of

existential contradiction.


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CHAPTER 2

BERGSON AND THE PARADOX OF THE HUMAN CONDITION

One of the issues philosophy has to consider is the paradox of the

human condition Pierre Hadot mentions in his workPhilosophy as a Way of

Life (1995: 258). I will first put down Hadots expression concerning this

paradox and then try to determine the place this paradox has in Bergsons

philosophy. However, since this attempt will continue throughout this study, the

present chapter should be regarded as a preliminary.

Hadot explains the paradox of the human condition in terms of an

inescapable fact. He says,

man lives in the world withoutperceivingthe world...Theobstacle to perceiving the world is not to be found inmodernity, but within man himself. We must separateourselves from the world qua world in order to live ourdaily life, but we must separate ourselves from theeveryday world in order to rediscover the world qua

world (1995: 258).

The human condition Hadot talks about is that, be it ancients or moderns,

there is not a change in our way of looking at the world: we look at the world in

order to humanize it, that is, we transform it, especially, by action and

perception according to our needs. This fact is not changed with respect to our


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familiarity with the developments in science and technology. Our world looks

like an aggregate of things useful for living. Hadot says, thus, we fabricate

the objects of our worry, quarrels, social rituals, and conventional values and

as a result, we no longer see the world qua world (1995: 258). The claim here

is that there is such a thing as the world qua world and also a world outside

our needs. However, that there exists a world qua world does not imply the

world minus the world outside our needs. There are not actually two different

worlds in themselves: the difference lies only in the mind of the people, that is,

either the attention is turned towards everyday life or towards the world as the

world. This situation exhibits mutually exclusive aspects because it is not

possible to have our attention turned towards everyday life and towards the

world qua world at the same time. The reason for this is that the attention

turned towards everyday life is such that we perceive things under their aspect

of usefulness for life whereas the attention turned towards the world qua world

is such that we perceive things under the aspect removed from their usefulness

for life. Therefore, we can talk about not the world minus the world outside

our needs but rather perceiving things under the aspect of usefulness on the

one hand and perceiving things removed from the aspect of usefulness on the

other. As can be understood, it is by showing that these two aspects are

mutually exclusive that Hadot tries to put forward the paradox of the human

condition.

Existentialists dealt intensively on the issue of the conception of

human existence and they saw it as a tension between two different aspects of

our being: the aspect according to which we are creatures with specific needs


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and drives on the one hand and the aspect according to which, since we are

capable of self-awareness, we are able to reflect on our own desires and as such

we transcend our own being as mere things. Phenomenologists, on the other

hand, opposed the world of science and the world of everyday perception and

attempted to return to the world of lived perception in order to make us aware

of the fact that we are perceiving the world. Philosophy, according to them,

is nothing other than this process by means of which we try to relearn to see

the world and therefore reach to the perception of the world as a world

(Hadot, 1995: 253).

Bergsons way of considering the human existence is based on

displacement of attention or the dismissal of the habits of mind that, in fact,

implies learning the world by a different kind of awareness. The paradox of the

human condition implicitly involves two ways of learning the world: by living

out our daily lives, and, by philosophizing. In what sense(s) then these two ways

of learning can lead to a paradox? Hadot does not fully analyse the paradox and

therefore leaves us with the intuition of the paradox of the human condition and

claims that Bergson is aware of this paradox. This constitutes the beginning of

this study. I attempt to delve into Bergsons philosophy in order to search for

the source of this paradox as well as for its possible resolution, if it resolves at

all.

Bergsons basic notions can be claimed to be real time (dure relle)

and related with this, movement. However, in order to understand these basic


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notions, we have to dismiss our mental habits. Kolakowski expresses the reason

why, according to Bergson, we have to do this:

Once we place ourselves in the position of a disinterestedobserver and dismiss the natural habits of mind, we see

easily that movement and time are the reality we deal withdirectly, in the simplicity of unmediated contact (1985:27).

If we do not dismiss our mental habits, it is not possible to grasp time and

movement in terms of being immediately given us and as a consequence, it is

not possible to grasp the world qua world. On the contrary, one will grasp the

world through mediation. There then seems to be a tension between learning the

world with the habits of mind and learning it after they are being dismissed. We

will see in due course that the attempt to overcome this tension is actually the

inherent drive of every part of Bergsons philosophy. Although this tension

might not be overcome absolutely, the effort in trying to overcome it gives rise

to true philosophy.

Bergson tries to clarify certain of our common believes. He attempts to

show the erroneous or illusory conclusions that arise with a certain way of

thinkingthat constitute the habits of our mind. He says:

Before philosophizing one must live; and life requires thatwe put on blinders; we must not look to the right, to theleft, or behind, but straight ahead, in the direction in whichwe are supposed to walk. In order to live, we must be

selective in our knowledge and our memories, and retainonly that which may contribute to our action upon things(PC: 137).

In order to live we have to put on blinders. The attention here is turned towards

the daily lifes requirements. Our perception captures only that which interests

us practically. At first there may be nothing wrong with this kind of attention.


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However, the tension seems to arise when the individual tries to isolate himself

from his daily requirements and start philosophizing. The self seems then to be

broken because in order to live, it has to put on blinders, since life requires so,

and from this we may infer that in order to philosophize, to understand the

world qua world, the individual then has to remove the blinders. This putting on

and removal of the blinders causes tension because of they being excluding one

another.

However, in the case when one is not aware of the blinders and

philosophizes, I do not think we can talk about a tension. Being unaware of the

fact that ones perception in general concentrates on ones daily interests, the

individual brings the same perception while philosophizing. In other words, not

being aware of the habits of mind implies to necessarily bring these mental

habits to the realm of philosophy and Bergson claims that it is due to this that

we create fictitious problems in philosophy. On the other hand, the self is

not broken because the individual remains in the same realm of practical

necessities even while philosophizing. So in a sense, the individual by not being

aware of this human condition, does not create a tension for he places himself in

the realm where the attention is on the daily requirements. However, it is

because of not being aware of the tension that certain philosophical problems

such as the problem of free will arise. In this sense it can be claimed that this

tension is in fact necessary to philosophize. Bergson says:

in psychological analysis we must never forget theutilitarian character of our mental functions, which areessentially turned toward action...the habits formed inaction find their way up to the sphere of speculation,where they create fictitious problems, and that


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metaphysics must begin by dispersing this artificialobscurity (MM: 16).

In psychological analysis, we have to be aware of and in a sense emphasize this

utilitarian aspect of our mental life which is reflected in our actions. However, if

we do philosophize, it is the duty of philosophy or metaphysics to dispel the

illusory problems formed out of our attention turned towards action. The

paradox of the human condition reflects then at the same time a tension between

psychology and metaphysics as well as between action and the act of turning

away from it.

As to the distinction between psychology and metaphysics Bergson

says, psychology has for its object the study of the human mind working for

practical utility and to describe metaphysics he says, metaphysics is but this

same mind striving to transcend the conditions of useful action and to come

back to itself as to a pure creative energy (MM: 15). It can be said that the

tension between psychology and metaphysics is tantamount to the tension

between practical utility and pure creative energy. It can also be said that the

condition of understanding the world qua world is our mind coming back to a

pure creative energy. In other words, we have to understand that our mind in

itself is in fact pure creative energy. This constitutes the vitalist aspect of the

paradox of the human condition. I will clarify it when we talk about Bergsons

famous concept lan vitalor vital impulse.

Bergson also introduces us other tensions such as the tension between

real time and physical or mechanical time, the one between superficial self and


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fundamental self, one between spirit and matter, and one between intuition and

analysis or intellect. All these tensions, as Kolakowski remarks, share the same

fate: at the outset they seem clear-cut and deprived of all intermediate zones,

yet in the final analysis we see that each side carries within it a shadow of the

other (Kolakowski, 1985, p. 23).

Bergson, coming from the Cartesian tradition, saw a meaning in

dualism. However, he is in no way a dualist philosopher. He is in fact concerned

with the dualistic approaches in order to overcome the difficulties the dualism

had fallen into. It is in this way that he tried to show, in Matter and Memory

especially, the problems both Descartes and Berkeley had fallen into. He argues

that if, for instance, we affirm the reality only of matter and understand by this

the extended or if we affirm the reality only of consciousness and understand

by it the inextensive, we will have difficulties in finding something common

between body and mind. He says,

If we imagine on the one hand the extended really dividedinto corpuscles, for example, and, on the other hand, aconsciousness with sensations, in themselves inextensive,which come to project themselves into space, we shallevidently find nothing common in such matter and such aconsciousness to body and mind. But this opposition

between perception and matter is the artificial work of anunderstanding which decomposes and recomposesaccording to its habits or its laws: it is not given inimmediate intuition. What is given are not inextensive

sensations: how should they find their way back to space,choose a locality within it, and coordinate themselvesthere so as to build up an experience that is common to allmen? And what is real is not extension, divided intoindependent parts: how, being deprived of all possiblerelationship to our consciousness, could it unfold a seriesof changes of which the relations and the order exactlycorrespond to the relations and the order of ourrepresentations? That which is given, that which is real, is


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something intermediate [my italics] between dividedextension and pure inextension (MM: 244-245).

For the moment I will not go into detail of what Bergson understands by

consciousness and matter. I leave this for the next chapter of this study. For my

present purpose it suffices to note that, as can be understood from this matter-

consciousness opposition, the tension concerning dualities are mitigated as to

open up intermediate zones. Where there are no intermediate zones, oppositions

have to remain as oppositions. Bergson gives an example for how we deal with

oppositions:

our understanding, of which the function is to set uplogical distinctions, and, consequently, clean-cutoppositions, throws itself into each of these ways in turnand follows each to the end. It thus sets up, at oneextremity, an infinitely divisible extension and at theother, sensations which are absolutely inextensive. And itcreates thereby the opposition which it afterwardscontemplates amazed (MM: 245).

We saw that Bergsons way of putting down dualities can in no way be

considered as a Cartesian dualism. Can this be characterized as a kind of a

dialectical method then? There are some who sees a resemblance between the

Hegelian and the Bergsonian dialectic. One resemblance, for example, is that

Hegel too criticized the understanding because of its producing clean-cut

distinctions. As understood from the English abstract of the Spanish article of

Maria Elosegui, one should read Bergson again from a dialectical perspective

because according to this author, Bergson sees the reality of a vital self, made


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up of dialectic and contradiction, caused by the stress between desires and this

being the case human existence is a dialectical process.5

On the other hand, with respect to the relation between quality and

quantity, which I will also deal with later on in this study, Jean Theau claims

that despite certain resemblance, Hegel and Bergson differ in their consideration

of the negative process concerning, for example, the opposition of quality and

quantity: in Hegel, this negative process is an Aufhebung that can be

conceived by a logical dialectic. In contrast, in Bergsonian philosophy, the

negative process is in fact a reversal, a turning backwards and has to be studied

empirically.6

The same idea is reflected in the title of Moores book on Bergson:

Bergson, Thinking Backwards (1996). Lastly, when explaining the law of

dichotomy Bergson talks about in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion as

well as the constant dichotomisation inherent in Bergsonian philosophy,

Mullarkey mentions that in this act of dichotomisation we cannot talk about the

Hegelian mediation (1999: 181). Therefore, I think that if one insists on

using the term dialectic in order to describe Bergsons philosophy, one should

be very careful as not to use it in the same sense with that of Hegels; he should

redefine it and make clear the reason why he is insisting on using this term.

5 Elosegui, Maria (1989) La dialectica del deseo como realizacion de la identidad en HenriBergson, Themata, pp. 45-50.6 Theau, Jean (1975) Le Rapport Quantit-Qualit Chez Hegel et Chez Bergson,

Philosophiques: 2, pp. 3-21.


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In fact, on rare occasions, Bergson himself used the term dialectic. In

Creative Evolution, for example, he describes dialectic as a relaxation of

intuition, and says dialectic is necessary to put intuition to the proof,

necessary also in order that intuition should break itself up into concepts and so

be propagated to other men.7 And he also claims that though there is one truth

only, together with dialectic different agreements are possible (CE: 238). It

can be said that on the one hand, Bergson does not totally separate dialectic

from intuition, and on the other hand, he emphasizes the speculative or maybe

argumentative side of dialectic. Therefore, it can be said that dialectic,

according to Bergson, is a conceptual method the intellect makes use of. Since

dialectic is a relaxation of intuition, we then have to say that this conceptual

method is based on intuition and not vice versa. In other words, dialectic

becomes the means of expressing our intuition. If this is so, we have to admit

that dialectic has a very important role in Bergsonian philosophy. However, in

this study, I will not use the term dialectic. This is because the term is mostly

associated with Hegels philosophy and also because Bergson himself did not

use it often. Therefore, instead of using the term dialectic, I prefer to use the

terms dichotomisation and thinking backwards.

It would be worthwhile to say in advance that whatever dichotomy

would be in question, the distinctions would be mitigated and open up

intermediate zones. Moreover, as I mentioned before, I claim that Bergsons

attempt to overcome the existing tension between the habits of mind and their

dismissal is actually the inherent drive of every part of his philosophy and thus

7 We will talk about the propagation of intuition in the fourth chapter.


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lead all the others. The effort in trying to overcome this tension gives way to

intermediate zones that Bergson expresses it by using the terms diversity and

degree. He says:

There are then, in short, divers tones of mental life, or, inother words, our psychic life may be lived at differentheights, now nearer to action, now further removed fromit, according to the degree of our attention to life (MM:14).

Above I have said that the paradox of the human condition arises when one

philosophizes by knowing his mental habits and that only then we can talk

about a tension existing, for instance, between the fundamental and the

superficial self. However, knowing the minds habits does not lead to their

ultimate dismissal. That is the reason why it gives way to intermediate zones. In

other words, the tension arises when one philosophizes by trying to remove his

minds habits. Because he then sees that this awareness of the mental habits is

not sufficient in the ultimate dismissal of the habits and that it rather ends up by

an effort to overcome it through intermediate zones. Thus it can be claimed that

this awareness of the tension gives way to intermediate zones and that although

the paradox of the human condition is not resolvable, it is nevertheless

transformable into intermediate zones.

Guy LaFrance claimed that ultimately in the action which is really

free, there no longer is a separation between the superficial self and the

fundamental self (1991: 133). However, according to Bergson, it is also true

that this real freedom is not permanent. This implies that the separation between

the two selves becomes unavoidable. Moreover, I claim that this separation of

the two selves is a problem only for the one who is aware of the habits of mind.


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One who tries to philosophize by an attempt to dismiss the habits of

mind is aware both of the paradox of the human condition and the fact that we

can talk about two selves: the fundamental and the superficial. However, it is

this same individual who awakens to the fact that if the opposition of the two

selves are to be overcome, his self will no longer be broken into two. At the

beginning, the paradox seemed to appear in the form of a choice before the

individual: either one has to adapt to the requirements of social life or he has to

understand reality as it is (the world qua world); either he has to live with his

fundamental self or according to his superficial self. However, this cannot be a

real choice and this is just what makes the situation paradoxical. We will see in

detail the reason why this is not a real choice and is rather an inescapable fact

when we will attempt to understand the vitalist aspect of the paradox of the

human condition.

We live inevitably in a world of continuously satisfying our practical

needs. If this is so, it also seems that we gradually lose sight of our fundamental

self by adapting ourselves to the necessities of social life. Bergson says, that

which is commonly called a fact is not reality as it appears to immediate

intuition, but an adaptation of the real to the interests of practice and to the

exigencies of social life (MM: 183). What I think is that Bergson tries to show

that if we adapt to social life the least we can, this will enable us merely to

perceive the world qua world, it will not make us capable people in our

everyday life. On the other hand, if we live only according to our everyday

needs and interests, which means adapting ourselves to social life abundantly,


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we will be incapable to perceive the world qua world. I claim that this is one of

the ways we can express the paradox of the human condition in Bergsons

philosophy.

Bergson attempts to bring in a possible resolution for the paradox of

the human condition by an appeal to unite his main concepts dureand

(philosophical) intuition together with the act of philosophizing. The concepts

dure and intuition gathered with the act of philosophizing can be explained

in such a way as to engender a kind of a philosophy of life. Therefore, it will be

one of my main aim to show the relation between Bergsons expression of the

paradox of the human condition and his concepts dure and intuition

gathered with the act of philosophizing. When this is established, I believe, a

Bergsonian philosophy of life will arise.

It seems that Bergsons conception of true philosophyas Bergson

also says, true metaphysics or true empiricismin general can give rise to a

philosophy of life in such a way that the perspective one gains through the effort

in trying to overcome the habits of mind no longer remains in the realm of

speculation but spreads over everyday life. It provides us with an intuition

according to which our habitual way of perceiving things will be replaced by

seeing all things sub specie durationis and as such it will give us joy and

strength because we shall feel we are participating, creators of ourselves, in the

great work of creation which is the origin of all things and which goes on before

our eyes (PR: 105). In order to explain what sub specie durationis means

Bergson says, immediately in our galvanized perception what is taut becomes


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relaxed, what is dormant awakens, what is dead comes to life again (PI: 129).

As a consequence, it is through true philosophy that the paradox of living in

the world and grasping the world as it is will be transformed. Hadot says,

Bergson correctly grasped the reason for this situation [that is, for the

emergence of the paradox], when he distinguished between habitual, utilitarian

perception, necessary for life, and the detached, disinterested perception of the

artist or philosopher (1995: 258). I will show that Bergsonian philosophy of

life I am going to talk about would begin when the paradox of the human

condition is embraced as an unavoidable existential fact and that the human

existence consists of a continuous tension between the fundamental self and the

superficial self. In other words, my claim would be that the paradox of the

human condition plays the role of giving way to a philosophy of life. And in

order for this paradox to give way to a philosophy of life, we will have to grasp

the concepts dure and intuition gathered with the act of philosophizing.

There is something that is called philosophical perception or

philosophical intuition in Bergsons philosophy. It refers to the philosophers

way of seeing the world qua world. In explaining this, Bergson uses the artists

way of creating a work of art as an analogy. The artist goes outside the fixity

and monotony of his senses while creating because abandoning the realm of

habitual actions and daily needs, he perceives for the sake of perceiving.

Hadot explains this situation very well when he says,

The utilitarian perception we have of the world, ineveryday life, in fact hides from us the world qua world.Aesthetic and philosophical perceptions of the world areonly possible by means of a complete transformation ofour relationship to the world: we have to perceive it foritself, and no longerfor ourselves (1995: 254).


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Bergson says that artists and philosophers have this ability of perceiving the

world for itself. In his bookLaughter, Bergson describes art as follows:

So art, whether it be painting or sculpture, poetry or

music, has no other object than to brush aside theutilitarian symbols, the conventional and socially acceptedgeneralities, in short, everything that veils reality from us,in order to bring us face to face with reality itself (1911:157).

Bergson thinks that artists create works of art in such a way to reveal nature to

us. He contrasts our normal way of experiencing things with the experience we

have when we are in immediate contact with things as well as with ourselves.

The former kind of experience refers to the labels we affix to things according

to which we consider them as members of classes whereas the latter kind of

experience is an experience artists live due to their detachment from life and in

which they are in perfect accord with nature. If all of our experiences were of

this latter kind, then, according to Bergson, either art would be useless or we

will all become artists (Beardsley, 1966: 325-326).

However, he also mentions the difference between the philosopher and

the artist: whereas few of us can have the privilege of being an artistand that

the artist has the satisfaction upon rare occasionsand therefore few of us

has the satisfaction in creating, all of us, at all times, can have the satisfaction

that philosophy can give us (PI: 129).

Perceiving the world for itself means perceiving pure dure and we

perceive pure dure when we concentrate on our internal experience only,

leaving aside the world of things among which we live, abandoning the


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practical orientation of the mind, and taking instead an attitude of disinterested

contemplation (Kolakowski, 1985: 16). To concentrate on our internal

experience means to concentrate on our consciousness. It is only by

concentrating on our consciousness that we understand that the world is in flux.

As Kolakowski remarks, consciousness maintains the continuity of the world

(1985: 17).

Our intellect is very good at the spatialization of the world. Bergson

says, it is natural to our intellect, whose function is essentially practical, made

to present to us things and states rather than changes and acts. But things and

states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming (CE: 248). Perceiving

the world for itself means to understand it in its becoming. The world is this

becoming itself and the only means to understand this is the attention turned

towards our consciousness. Bergson says that the philosopher "seeks to

sympathize8 with things (PI: 126). The way that leads to the experience of

dure relle comes from this sympathy. It is only through this sympathy and

therefore through the experience ofdure relle that it is possible to understand

life as a whole and as processes. Therefore, it would be correct to say that

duration is that which enables us to perceive the moving world of phenomena

without stopping it and breaking it into pieces; it frees us of perceiving it by

means of separation. In this sense, when Bergson mentions the concept

8 il cherche sympathiser (LIntuition Philosophique inLa Pense et le Mouvant, Essais etConfrences, 1939: 158. Paris: Librairie Flix Alcan). This phrase is translated into English asseeks to be at one with nature. Since I think that this translation is misleading, I retranslated itas seeks to sympathize. This translation is much more faithful to Bergsons philosophybecause in his philosophy the concept sympathy is important. In order to define intuition, forinstance, Bergson uses the notion of sympathy and says that intuition is the sympathy by whichone is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what there is unique


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displacement of attention, he means the shift from this fragmentary perception

of life or of the world to the indivisible, continuous and immeasurable view. We

perceive the moving world of phenomena in the same way as we listen to a

melody. Although the notes of the melody succeed one another, we perceive

them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being

whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so

closely connected (TFW: 100).

The tension between intuition and the intellect present in Bergsons

philosophy is criticized a lot due to the misconception that Bergson tried to do

away with the intellect. However, Bergson did not intend to do so. His ultimate

aim was twofold: to emphasize the importance of intuition in true philosophy

and related with this, to change the direction of reasoning. The habitual

direction of the intellect, Bergson claimed, prevented philosophers to see

things in duration (sub specie durationis) because any reasoning starting from

the intellect is ready to understand what happens in the world through making

separations. This can be characterized as perceiving the world for ourselves.

This habit actually goes back to Plato. Platos method which was

dialogue consisted in fact of this act of separating. The aim of dialogue was to

put forth the existing relation between concepts brought to discussion. However,

while trying to demonstrate this relation, concepts were acquiring their place

through their difference from other concepts. As a result, movement was lost for

the sake of analysis. This is what Bergson calls the habitual way of thinking. He

and consequently inexpressible in it (IM, in Creative Mind, p. 161). Monroe Beardsley


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describes it by saying that there is more in the immutable than in the moving,

and one passes from the stable to the unstable by a simple diminution (IM: 193).

Kolakowski explains the same idea by

Demet Kurtoglu - Bergson Conception of Time: Its Effects on a Possible Philosophy of Life

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