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College of Law Pitbol University

NOVEMBER 12, 2009Espiritu vs Cipriano G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974

Filed under: Statutory Construction ryanmendez @ 2:36 pm

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974

PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,vs.

RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV,

respondents.

Concepcion, Victorino, Sanchez and Associates for petitioners.

Jose G. Ricardo for respondent Ricardo Cipriano.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private

respondent Ricardo Ciprianos motion to dismiss on the authority of Republic Act 6126, and thesecond, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order. The

question before Us involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126,

otherwise known as the Rental Law.

The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs, nowpetitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano

for the latters alleged failure to pay rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against

said respondent, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the case was docketedas Civil Case No. 338-M. In the said Court private respondent sought to amend his Answer filed

in the Municipal Court on the grounds that (1) for lack of time he was not able to disclose to his

former counsel all the material facts surrounding his case and, therefore, he was not able to fully

determine his defenses; and (2) that prior to the hearing of the case in the lower court he wanted tocause the filing of an amended answer but was not able to do so for his alleged failure to contact

his counsel. The motion to file amended answer was denied by the Court. The parties eventually

submitted a stipulation of facts, the salient provisions of which read as follows:
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1. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendant since 1954;

2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the

plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease;

3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being thenpayable at or before the end of the year;

4. The following are the rates of rentals:

(a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year

(b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year

(c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year

(d) 1962 P16.00 a year

(e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year

(f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year

5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was

increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs;

6. The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present;

7. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate;

8. A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and receivedby, defendant.

On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order

giving private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss.Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioners complaint, invoking the

prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling

Units or of Land On Which Anothers Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing

Violations Thereof.

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on August 4,

1970, which reads:

On the Authority of Republic Act 6126, this Court hereby sustains the Motion for Dismissal filed

by the defendant through counsel, dated July 13, 1970.


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A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge. Hence this

petition.

Thrust upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act 6126 may beheld applicable the case at bar. For convenience We reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in

question:

Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which anothers dwelling is located shall,

during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed uponbetween the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not

exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved June 17, 1970.

It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar iscovered by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the

increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, 1 while the law in question

took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentalshad been effected. Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no

perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly

payments of P30.00 effective January 1969, as he did not give his consent thereto. In his brief he

alleges:

Defendant (respondent) herein also begs to disagree with the contention of plaintiffs. We believe

and respectfully submit that there would be no impairment of obligation of contract if Republic

Act 6126 were to be applied to the present case. The alleged new contract of lease and subsequentincrease in the amount of rental were not effected as of January 1969 with respect to thedefendant. He did not accept the new rate of rental. The eloquent testimonies on record to show

that defendant never accepted the new rate of rental imposed upon him by the plaintiffs were the

pretrials on the case wherein defendant offered to accept the increase to the tone of 100%. Hence,the new contract of lease increasing the rental had never been agreed upon by both the plaintiffs

and the defendant because the defendant never gave his consent to the new rate of rental. In effect,

therefore, the alleged new contract of lease was not a contract at all since it did not have theconsent of the other party, the defendant.

Private respondents contention is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to

show that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was essentialto its validity. There was no more subsisting yearly contract of lease at a fixed amount. It hadalready expired when the increase and conversion into monthly payments took effect in January,

1969. The lessor was free to fix a higher amount than that previously paid by the lessee (private

respondent herein) and if the latter did not agree to the increased amount, he could have vacatedthe premises and thus rendered himself free from liability. Respondent Cipriano, therefore, cannot

invoke lack of consent on his part as basis for declaring the contract of lease ineffective.


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Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given

retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being

remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective constructionthereof is in order.Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive

effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain.

We must apply it to the facts as found. 2 The law being a temporary measure designed to meet atemporary situation, 3 it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and

unequivocal language that No lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall, during the period of one

year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lesseeprior to the approval of this Act. Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was

effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by

the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport

to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction thatExpressium facit cessare tacitum 4 and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature

ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. A

perusal of the deliberations of Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126,

as recorded its Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Lawdid not entertain for a moment that a retroactive operation would be given to this enactment. We

quote pertinent portions of the discussion:

Remarks of sponsor, Mr. Roces:

Mr. Roces Mr. Speaker, the President is still observing the effect of the newly established

floating rate. In the meantime we feel that, in line with the policy that those who have less in life

should have more in law, apartment dwellers are entitled to protection. Therefore this bill

proposes that the rentals paid today will not be increased in the next 18 months.

and on pages 66 and 72 respectively of the same Congressional Record We likewise find thefollowing:

Mr. Gonzales Will the gentleman from Manila interpret for us the phrase during the period of

6 months preceding the approval of this Act in Section 2? 5

Mr. Roces. My interpretation is that the rent being paid during that period not before will bethe one considered.

Mr. Montano The term moratorium as utilized by the gentleman from Manila at the start of

his sponsorship was applied not in its legal acceptance but generally. For purposes of the bill, the

term is construed as suspension of increasing rents in the meantime that we have not yetdetermined the real value of the currency .

Respondents tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126 represents a

last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same time escaping theobligation to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance such a situation, for to permit the

same to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity and causing injustice to the petitioner

herein. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive


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laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is

equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to

affect pending proceedings, unless such intent in expressly declared or clearly and necessarilyimplied from the language of the enactment, 6 Similarly, in the case of La Previsora Filipina,

Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Felix Ledda, 66 Phil. 573, 577, this Court said:

It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive effect unless it is

otherwise provided therein (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 43861). Act No.4118 does not state that its provisions shall have retroactive effect, wherefore, it follows, as it is

hereby declared, that it is not applicable to the contracts entered into by the parties, and, hence the

trial court erred in granting possession to the petitioner.

The petitioner contends that said law is applicable because when the property in question was sold

at public auction said law was already in force. This contention is in our opinion untenable. The

date which should be taken into account in order to determine the applicability of the law is the

date when the contracts were entered into by the parties and not the date of the public sale, .

Under the circumstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not applicable

to the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean

what it plainly says.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and setaside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285)

on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing

procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.

Costs against respondent.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 5, March 3, 1970, 24 of Rollo.

2 Cf. People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. CB, 22 SCRA 917;

Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Gracia, 30 SCRA 111.

3 Explanatory Note (RA 6126) H. No. 853 Congressional Record of the House, 1970 Vol. I, Part

I, March 5, 1970.

4 That which is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. (Sutherlands Statutory

Construction, Vol. 2. Section 4945 p. 412.)

5 Section 2. It is unlawful for any owner, administrator, agent or any person, within a period of18 months from the approval of this Act, to increase the rental of any building, part or unit thereof


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for residential purposes, or to collect any amount in excess of the rental paid for such building,

part or unit thereof during the period of six months preceding the approval of this Act. .

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18566 September 30, 1963


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IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF

ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and

ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners-appellees, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

PAREDES, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

Finding that only legal issues are involved inthe instant case, the Court of Appeals certified thesame to this Court for disposition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen,serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment

at Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married EsterMira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter

Elizabeth, by another man, also of the AmericanNavy, who left the country in 1952, and never

heard from since then. After the marriage, thecouple established residence at Intramuros, Manila,and the minor Elizabeth had always been under

their care and support of Brehm. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed aJoint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court for the adoption of the minorElizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given

their consent to the adoption, not only to promoteher best interest and well-being, but also to giveher a legitimate status. They prayed that after the

proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing


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the child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations ofobedience and maintenance with respect to her

natural father, and be, for all legal intents and

purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all therights pertinent thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

An opposition to the petition with respect to

Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of thePhilippines, it appearing that Brehm testified thathis residence in Philippines was merely temporary,

same being effective only for purposes of his tourof duty with the Navy, thus disqualifying him frommaking an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code;

Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of Court), and that being anon-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction

over him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A reply to the opposition was presented by

petitioners. They claim that Art. 335 does not applyin the case, reasoning out that it covers onlyadoptions for the purpose establishing a

relationship of paternity and filiation, where noneexisted, but not where the adopting parents are not

total strangers to said child; that there is already arelation between the child and Brehm, created by

affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil code,expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child bya step-father, in which category petitioner Brehmfalls. Petitioners contend that the records show

their residence is Manila, for while Brehm works at


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Subic, he always goes home to Manila, duringweek-ends and manifested that he intends to reside

in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of

duty with the U.S. Naval Forces.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courtrendered judgment, the Pertinent portions of which

read -

... Since residence is principally a matter ofintention, the Court is of the opinion that

notwithstanding the nature of Petitioner Gilbert R.Brehm's coming to the Philippines, his subsequent

acts, coupled with his declared intention ofpermanently residing herein, have cured the legaldefect on the point of residence. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Finally, we must consider the status of the

minor Elizabeth Mira whose welfare deservesparamount consideration. Being a natural child ofthe petitioning wife, it cannot be in conscience be

expected that when petitioners married, the motherwould reduce her responsibility and her affectiontoward her child....chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, finding that the principalallegations of the petitioners are true, it is hereby

adjudged that henceforth the minor Elizabeth isfreed from all obligations of obedience andmaintenance with respect to her natural father, and

is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the


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petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm,said minor's surname being change from "Mira" to

"Mira Brehm".

The Solicitor General took exception from

the judgment, claiming that it was error for theCourt in adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the

adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm. Theappeal, however, did not assail the right ofpetitioner Ester Mira Brehm, the natural mother of

the minor, to adopt her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual lawlibrary

There is no question that petitioner Gilbert

R. Brehm is a non-resident alien. By his owntestimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of hisstatus here, and no amount of reasoning will

overcome the same. For this reason, he is notqualified to adopt. On this very point, We have

recently declared:

The only issue in this appeal is whether, not

being permanent residents in the Philippines,petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Provides

that - chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The following cannot adopt

x x x x x x x x x chanrobles virtual law library

(4) Non-resident aliens;


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x x x x x x x x x chanrobles virtual law library

This legal provision is too clear to requireinterpretation. No matter how much we maysympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with

the good intentions of petitioners herein, the lawleaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms,

which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power toadopt anybody in the Philippines (Ellis & Ellis v.Republic, L-16922, Apr. 30, 1963).

Prior to the above decision, We have alsodenied petitions to adopt by persons similarly

situated as petitioner Brehm. Thus, in the case ofCaraballo v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15080, April 25,1962, giving some reason why non-resident aliens

are disqualified to adopt, We said -

... Looking after the welfare of a minor to beadopted the law has surrounded him withsafeguards to achieve and insure such welfare. It

cannot be gain said that an adopted minor may beremoved from the country by the adopter, who isnot a resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond

the reach and protection of the country of his birth.

(See also S/Sgt. Katancik, v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15472, June 20, 1962).

This notwithstanding, petitioners press theargument that Brehm being now the step-father of

the minor, he is qualified to adopt, in view of the


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provisions of par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, whichstates -

The following may be adopted:

(1) The natural child by the natural father chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

(2) Other legitimate children, by the father ormother chanrobles virtual law library

(3)A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.

We should construe, however, Article 338 inconnection with article 335. Art. 335 clearly statesthat "The following cannotadopt: ... (4). Non-

resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory,because it contains words of positive prohibition

and is couched in the negative terms importing thatthe act required shall not be done otherwise than

designated (50 Am. Jur. 51). On the other hand,Art. 338, Provides "the following maybe adopted:(3) astep-child, by the step-father or step-mother",

which is merely directory, and which can only begiven operation if the same does not conflict with

the mandatory provisions of Art. 335. Moreover, as

heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that confersjurisdiction to the court over the case, and before

Article; 338 may or can be availed of, suchjurisdiction must first be established. We ruled out

the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, when


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the latter has a legitimate child of his own (Ball v.Rep., 50 O.G. 145; and McGee v. Rep., L-5387,

April 29, 1959). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual lawlibrary

IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed

from, in so far as it affects the petitioner Gilbert R.Brehm, is hereby reversed, and his Petition to

adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Withoutcosts.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17915 January 31, 1967

TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant,vs.

AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner ofCivil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA asSecretary of Finance,MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO,respondents and appellants.

Ramon C. Aquino, Teodoro M. Castro, Leandro C.Sevilla and Antonio M. Castro for petitioner andappellant.Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and E. M. Fernandofor respondent and appellant Toledo.


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Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot andSolicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for respondents andappellants Secretary of Finance, et al.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorariandmandamus originally filed in the Court of FirstInstance of Manila. The controverted position isthat of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II,

Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959,upon the promotion of its occupant, AlfredoJimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo wasappointed in his place, and it is this appointmentthat is being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M.Castro in this proceeding. The court a quo

annulled Toledo's appointment, but did not grantCastro's prayer that respondent officials beordered to appoint him.

Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance,upon recommendation of the Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, was made on November 24,

1959, effective as of October 1, 1959. When hewas appointed Toledo's position was that of ChiefRevenue Inspector, or Chief Revenue Examiner,stationed in Manila. The appointment wasprotested by Castro in a letter he wrote the


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Commissioner of Internal Revenue on January 19,1960, wherein he alleged that in accordance withthe provisions of Section 23 of Republic Act No.

2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of1959, he was the one who should have beenconsidered for the position. Copy of the letter-protest was furnished the Secretary of Finance.On February 8, 1960 the Commissioner of InternalRevenue, in a first indorsement, informed Castro

that "the position of Assistant Revenue RegionalDirector II, R-53, at P6,000.00 adjusted toP6,597.60 per annum, is for Regional District No.3, Manila, and the appointment thereto had to beissued to the person actually performing thefunctions of the position," namely, respondentToledo, who was then acting as AssistantRevenue Regional Officer II, Manila.

On March 8, 1960 Castro appealed to theCommissioner of Civil Service, who indorsed thematter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenuewith a request for a statement of the comparative

qualifications of Toledo and Castro. After settingforth the qualifications as requested, theCommissioner explained that the next twoAssistant Revenue Regional Directors in line forthe protested position, as reported for purposes of


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Administrative Order No. 171, were TeodoroLucero, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I(Regional District No. 4), with a salary of P6,900

per annum; and Lauro Abraham, AssistantRevenue Regional Director I (Regional District No.6), with a salary of P6,000 per annum, but thatsince the protested position was for RegionalDistrict No. 3, Manila, where Toledo was next inrank, and since he was actually performing the

functions of the controverted office, there was noneed to make a comparison between hisqualifications and those of Castro.

On July 1, 1960 the Commissioner of Civil Servicerendered his decision dismissing Castro's proteston the ground that the contested position belonged

properly to Regional District No. 3, where Toledowas the next ranking employee, while Castro wasin Regional District No. 5, San Pablo City. Hence,Castro filed the present petition asking thatToledo's appointment be annulled and that he bedeclared entitled to the position. As already stated,

the trial court rejected Castro's claim, but at thesame time annulled Toledo's appointment thislast on the ground that his previous appointmentas Chief Revenue Examiner was illegal.


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Both sides appealed from the decision.Respondents claim that the lower court should nothave nullified Toledo's appointment. They contend

(1) that the question as to the legality of hisprevious appointment as Chief Revenue Examinerwas neither raised in the pleadings nor proven atthe trial with the consent of the parties; (2) thatpetitioner was precluded by laches fromquestioning said appointment; and (3) that the

same was not contrary to the RevisedAdministrative Code.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lowercourt should have ordered respondentsCommissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretaryof Finance to appoint him to the controverted

position because (1) he was senior in rank toToledo and was the competent and qualifiedemployee next in line for the position; and (2) theeight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors Ihad waived their rights to the position.

Castro entered the government service in 1931 asa messenger in the Bureau of Forestry. Hebecame a clerk in the Bureau of Internal Revenueon February 1, 1937. Then he becamesuccessively law clerk, income tax examiner, Chief


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of Tax Audit Branch and eventually, on July 1,1957, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I.

On the other hand , Toledo first worked in theMetropolitan Water District on July 16, 1948. Hebecame employed in the Bureau of InternalRevenue on December 4, 1952, when he wasappointed distillery agent. At the time he left theBureau on January 15, 1958 his position was thatof income tax examiner with a salary of P3,300 perannum. On said date he became a TechnicalAssistant to the Executive Secretary of thePresident of the Philippines at P7,200 per annum.On July 1, 1958, when he returned to the Bureauhe was appointed Chief Revenue Inspector (a newposition created under the Appropriation Act of

1958-1959, which look effect on July 1, 1958) atP6,787 per annum.

This case is principally a special civil action in quowarranto. A quo warranto proceeding is one todetermine the right to the use or exercise of afranchise or office and to oust the holder from itsenjoyment, if his claim is not well founded, or if hehas forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.1 Theaction may be commenced for the Government bythe Solicitor General or by a fiscal;2 or a person


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claiming to be entitled to a public office or positionusurped or unlawfully held or exercised by anothermay bring an action in his own name.3 Where a

private person files the action, he must prove thathe is entitled to the controverted position,otherwise respondent has a right to theundisturbed possession of his office.4

Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23,paragraph 3, Republic Act 2260, which provides:

Whenever a vacancy occurs in anycompetitive or classified position in thegovernment or in any government-ownedor controlled corporation or entity, theofficer or employee next in rank who is

competent and qualified to hold theposition and who possesses anappropriate civil service eligibility shall bepromoted thereto: Provided, That shouldthere be two or more persons under equalcircumstances, seniority shall be givenpreference:And provided, however, Thatshould there be any special reason orreasons why such officer or employeeshould not be promoted, such specialreason or reasons shall be stated in writing


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by the appointing official and the officer oremployee concerned shall be informedthereof and be given opportunity to be

heard by the Commissioner of CivilService, whose decision in such case shallbe final. If the vacancy is not filled bypromotion as provided herein, then thesame shall be filled by transfer of presentemployees in the government service, by

reinstatement, by reemployment ofpersons separated through reduction inforce, or by certification from appropriateregisters of eligibles in accordance withrules promulgated in pursuance of this Act.

It appears that for internal revenue tax purposes

the Philippines is divided into ten regional districts,with Manila as District No. 3. Each district has aRevenue Regional Director and an AssistantRevenue Regional Director. The RevenueRegional Director for the Manila District outranksthe nine other Revenue Regional Directors, while

the Assistant Revenue Regional Director forManila outranks the nine other Assistant RevenueRegional Directors. These nine Assistant RevenueRegional Directors therefore usually aspire to bepromoted either to the position of Revenue


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Regional Director or to that of Assistant RevenueRegional Director for Manila.

At the time the controverted petition becamevacant Toledo was occupying the position of ChiefRevenue Inspector, (or Examiner) while thepositions of Assistant Revenue Regional Directoroutside the Manila District were occupied by thefollowing:

Name Salary

1. TeodoroLucero . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P6900

2. Lauro D.Abraham . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

3. Ricardo A. Rivera . . . . . . . . .. . .

6000

4. Gaspar L. Angeles . . . . . . . .. . .

5100

5. JaimeAraneta . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

6. Policronio Blanco . . . . . . . . .. . .

6000

7. Francisco Tantuico . . . . . . . .. .

6266.40


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8. Pedro D.Uy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6000

9. Teodoro M. Castro . . . . . . . .. . . 6000

According to the Commissioner of InternalRevenue, the next two in line for the position inquestion were Lucero and Abraham. Obviously theposition of Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner)

was considered to be of the same rank as theposition of Assistant Revenue Regional Directorfor regions other than Manila. And Toledo, whowas then Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner),was chosen because in the opinion of theCommissioner of Internal Revenue he was already

in the region where the vacancy occurred andtherefore was more familiar with the work there,and both his salary range and efficiency rating5were higher than Castro's aside from the fact thathe was already performing the functions of theoffice.

Even on the assumption that Castro possessed,as he claims, better qualifications and a higherefficiency rating than Toledo, it would avail himnothing because he has failed to prove that hisposition was the one next in rank to the vacant


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office. He was not even the most senior among thedifferent Assistant Revenue Regional Directorsoutside the Manila District. However, he insists

that the eight other Assistant Revenue RegionalDirectors waived their rights to the position by theirfailure to complain against Toledo's appointment.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a knownright. The silence of the eight other AssistantRevenue Regional Directors does not amount to awaiver on their part. Waiver must be predicated onmore concrete grounds. The evidence must besufficient and clear to warrant a finding that theintent to waive is unmistakable.

Castro himself, when he testified, could not

categorically state that the eight others were notinterested in the position.6 Not having shown eitherseniority in rank among the nine AssistantRevenue Regional Directors outside the ManilaDistrict or waiver on the part of those who weresenior to him Castro has failed to establish a clearright to the office which would entitle him to oustrespondent Toledo.

Upon the other hand, the supposed illegality ofToledo's appointment as Chief Revenue Officer ofthe Manila District cannot be a ground for the


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annulment of his appointment to the controvertedposition.7 The legality of that earlier appointmentmay not be questioned except in a quo warranto

proceeding brought by the proper person at theproper time. To be sure, as heretofore stated thisis principally such a proceeding, but only insofaras the position of Assistant Revenue RegionalDistrict II is concerned. It is true there is anallegation in Castro's petition that the earlier

appointment of Toledo as Chief Revenue officerwas illegal.8 But Castro does not claim to beentitled to that other position and consequently thelegality of Toledo's appointment thereto is notproperly in issue. Besides, even if Castro were theproper party to raise that issue, he did so beyondthe time limit prescribed by law.9 Toledo wasappointed to said position on July 1, 1958. Castrohad one year from that date to assail the legality ofthe appointment. The petition here was filed onlyon August 6, 1960, or beyond the one-year period.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is

modified by eliminating therefrom that portionannulling respondent Toledo's appointment to theposition in dispute, and is affirmed in otherrespects. Costs against petitioner.


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Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,concur.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25245 December 11, 1967

FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.MAURICIO ALILLANA and WORKMEN'SCOMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

Paulino Manongdo for petitioner.Paciano C. Villavieja and M.E. Lanzona, Jr. forrespondents.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines, a domesticcorporation engaged in producing copra, on July19, 1947 took Mauricio Alillana into employment,as truck loader. In 1956 he was assigned as

washer. Four months later, he became shellcollector therein, performing duties of this nature:To pick up unshelled coconuts from a movingconveyor; place them in a "caritilla" and hand themto the shellers; four times during the 8-hour work,


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he and some assistants had to personally rotatethe pulley to keep the conveyor running when itgets stuck up by coconut shells.

On April 21, 1958, Alillana suffered from pains atthe ribs he was found with bronchitis and went onleave. On May 9, 1958, however, he was allowedby the company to resume his work.

Starting May 31, 1958, he from time to time

complained of cough, with chest and back pains,for which he was treated. Referred for physicaland X-ray examinations, on July 6, 1958, hiscondition was found to be as follows: "Faradvanced pulmonary tuberculosis at the left lung,associated with bronchitis." The next day, on July

7, 1958, he retired from the company. FranklinBaker Co. paid him P188.16 under its non-occupational sickness and disability benefit planfor the period from July 7, 1958 to October 29,1958; and P669.12 as retirements benefits.

Alillana subsequently filed a claim for disability

compensation under the Workmen'sCompensation Act. On February 28, 1963, theRegional Office hearing officer awarded disabilitybenefits. Franklin Baker Co. elevated the case tothe Workmen's Compensation Commission.


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The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, onOctober 11, 1963, affirmed the award, slightlyreducing the amount to P3,015.06. Section 14 was

applied, on temporary total disability, i.e., 60% ofhis average weekly wage of P27.01, times themaximum of 208 weeks less a brief period whenhe had "odd-lot" or sporadic employment.

On July 25, 1964, Franklin Baker Co. paid saidaward of P3,015.06. Satisfaction thereof wasacknowledge by Alillana in writing (Annex "C" toPetition).

Thereafter, on August 10, 1964, allegingcontinuing disability from his ailment, Alillana fileda motion in the same case for additional

compensation. The Workmen's CompensationCommission, on September 16, 1964, ordered aphysical examination of Alillana. And onSeptember 7, 1965, after said physicalexamination by one of the Commission's doctors,finding Alillana still suffering from temporary totaldisability due to his ailment, the Workmen'sCompensation Commission issued an order foradditional compensation of P984.94, thus raisingthe total award to the then statutory maximum ofP4,000.


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Franklin Baker Co. moved for reconsideration. OnOctober 13, 1965, the Workmen's CompensationCommission en bancdenied the motion, stating

that the period of disability can be extendedbeyond 208 weeks under Sec. 18 of the Act.

Hence, this petition was filed by the Franklin BakerCo., to raise on appeal from the Workmen'sCompensation Commission's orders the issue:Does the Workmen's Compensation Commissionhave power under Sec. 18 to extend the period ofdisability under Sec. 14 of the Act?

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Total disability. In case theinjury or sickness causes total disability for

labor, the employer, during such disabilitybut exclusive of the first three days shallpay to the injured employee a weeklycompensation equivalent to sixty percentum of his average weekly wages; butnot more than thirty-five pesos nor less

than ten pesos per week, except in thecase provided for in the next followingparagraph. Such weekly payments shall inno case continue after disability hasceased, nor shall they extend over more


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than two hundred and eight weeks, norshall the aggregate sum paid ascompensation exceed in any case four

thousand pesos. But no award ofpermanent disability shall take effect untilafter two weeks have elapsed from thedate of injury.

InAvecilla Building Corporation vs. Workmen'sCompensation Commission, L-10668, September26, 1957, this Court already ruled that saidmaximum period of 208 weeks can be extendedunder Section 18, as amended by Republic Act772:

Speaking of this right of the Workmen's

Compensation Commissioner to reopen acase already decided by him, it is aninnovation introduced by Rep. Act 772,particularly, Sec. 13 thereof, amendingSection 18 (last par.) of the originalWorkmen's Compensation Law, namely,Act 3428. Before amendment, the lastparagraph of Section 18 read thus:

"The total compensation prescribed inthis and the next preceding section andthe total compensation prescribed in


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sections fourteen and fifteen of this Actshall, together, not exceed the sum ofthree thousand pesos."

As amended, the said last paragraph nowreads as follows:

"The total compensation prescribed inthis and the next preceding section andthe total compensation prescribed in

sections fourteen and fifteen of thisAct, shall, together, not exceed thesum of four thousand pesos: Provided,however, that after the payment hasbeen made for the period specified bythe Act in each case, the Workmen's

Compensation Commissioner mayfrom time to time cause theexamination of the condition of thedisabled laborer, with a view toextending, if necessary, the period ofcompensation which shall not,however, exceed the said amount offour thousand pesos."

One change introduced is the increasefrom P3,000 to P4,000 of the totalcompensation provided in the original


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provision. The more important change,however, is that contained in the proviso,which is the last part of the paragraph. This

legal provision empowering Workmen'sCompensation Boards or Commissionersto reopen a case is contained in theWorkmen's Compensation Acts of many ofthe States of the American union, includingthe Territory of Hawaii. 1awphil.net The reason for this

legal provision is explained by ArthurLarson in his authoritative work entitled.The Law of Workmen's Compensation,Vol. 2, as page 330, as follows:

"In almost all states, some kind ofprovision is made for reopening and

modifying awards. This provision is arecognition of the obvious fact that, nomatter how competent a commission'sdiagnosis of claimant's condition andearning prospects at the time ofhearing may be, that condition may

later change markedly for the worse, ormay improve, or may even clear upaltogether. Under the typical award inthe form of periodic payments during aspecified maximum period or during


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disability, the objectives of thelegislation are best accomplished if thecommission can increase, decrease,

revive or terminate payments tocorrespond to claimant's changedcondition. Theoretically, then,commissions ought to exerciseperpetual and unlimited jurisdiction toreopen cases as often as necessary to

make benefits meet current conditions.But the administrative problem lies inthe necessity of preserving the fullcase records of all claimants that haveever received any kind of award,against the possibility of a futurereopening.1awphil.net Moreover, any attempt toreopen a case based on an injury tenor fifteen years old must necessarilyencounter awkward problems of proof,because of the long delay and thedifficulty of determining the relationshipbetween some ancient injury and a

present aggravated disability. Anotherargument is that insurance carrierswould never know that kind of futureliabilities they might incur, and would


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have difficulty in computing appropriatereserves."

It will be noticed, however, that while in theseveral states of the union, the reopeningis intended for the benefit of both employerand employee in the sense that, in case ofaggravation or deterioration of the disabilityof the employee, the period ofcompensation should be extended up to acertain limit, or in case the condition of theemployee improves or the disabilitydisappears altogether, the period ofcompensation is shortened orcompensation stopped, our law, underSection 18, is a little one-sided and is all

for the benefit of the employee, for thereason that as may be gathered from theproviso, the Commissioner may from timeto time cause examination of the conditionof the disabled laborer, with a view toextending, if necessary, the period of

compensation. In this respect there is roomfor improvement of the law as to make itmore equitable to both parties, labor andmanagement. Furthermore, while in theseveral states of the American Union, the


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time within which the Commissioner orBoard may reopen a case is limitedanywhere from one year to several years,

our law contained in the proviso inquestion, sets no time limit. Thedisadvantage of making this period withinwhich the case may be reopened, too long,or as in our law, with no limit at all, istouched upon by Larson in the latter part of

his commentary, as above-reproduced,namely, that in case such a period is toolong, there may be difficulty in completingand preserving the record of the injury, ordetermining the relationship, if any,between the aggravation or deterioration ofthe employee's disability and some ancientinjury, to say nothing of the fact thatinsurance companies which are interestedin similar cases, by having insuredemployees of companies against injuries,may find difficulty in adjusting theirfinances, such as putting up reserve funds

to take care of future liabilities.

But there is no question that under Section18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,as amended, the Commissioner was


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authorized to reopen the case of Carpesoand to direct that the compensation to himby petitioner be increased or continued.

The claim of petitioner that it had not beengiven an opportunity to traverse the claimthat Carpeso's condition had deteriorated,is not supported by the record.1awphil.net

Clearly, therefore, the Workmen's CompensationCommission did not incur in any error in extendingto cover beyond 208 weeks the period of Alillana'sdisability compensation, up to a total of not morethan P4,000.

Alillana's having signed a satisfaction receipt cannot result in waiver; the law does not consider as

valid any agreement to receive less compensationthan what the worker is entitled to recover underthe Act (Sec. 29).

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of theWorkmen's Compensation Commission are herebyaffirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal,Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,JJ., concur


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965

ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners,vs.HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.

Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:


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On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and CornAdministration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to therecommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of1964.

On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and onDecember 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the Presidentdesignated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake theimportation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for saidimportation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.

Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the governmentfrom importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palayand Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer,filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity asChairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bidscheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the

contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, theSecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.

Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.

Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though theyadduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of theimportation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.

It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government evenif there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supplyof rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibitedby Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only leftto private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn

Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.

It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively toprivate parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any othergovernment agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits thegovernment to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in ouropinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Actwherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in thelocal supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the

National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru anygovernment agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National EconomicCouncil has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes anational emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, afterconsulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediatelyundertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore,no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.


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The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenablein the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic

Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with theprovisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked:what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because itfails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory

Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal uponthe condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case,the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding impliedrepeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that,if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F(2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E.876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal anyexisting law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilableinconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no suchinconsistency.

To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicableto different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as providedfor in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the

Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period ofsufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress thelocal price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price supportprogram and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another stepadopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimateobjective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a totalban of rice importation and theother by a partialban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period.

There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of thetime underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 coversthree different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption;

(2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute anational emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as toconstitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether bythe government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizesimportation, by the government.

Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere insaid law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of suchgravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importationduring normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute anational emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are notinconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.

Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered bya consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which waspresented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to importrice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and

Almendras:


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SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10thereof "that the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is herebyprohibited from importing rice and corn."

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and cornis left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, theposition of the Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).

Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the Presidentauthority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interestand, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in anyprivate warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Actalso bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is

predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that the sectionrefers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the apparent hoardingundertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage ofthe commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, becausethe situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could have intended undersuch a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation.Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines.Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot producethe rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the privatewarehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which casewe have to turn to Republic Act 2207.

The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of itspolicy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty ofthis Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order toeffect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to theprior existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix HotelCo., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, StatutoryConstruction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (CompaiaGeneral de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms andprovisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be sucha positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot bemade to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearestcase possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano v.McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.

Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar YearNineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifyingvalue, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this

Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice fromabroad." The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its titlereads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is nowfunctus officio at least on the matter of importation.


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Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pendingprosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely asafeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated withthe enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call forlesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given

retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.

To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedlyrepealed by Republic Act3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during thediscussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill waspresented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case ofemergency in view of the uncertaintyof the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was stronglyasserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic

Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved bythe Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not binding,are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.

SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in thecase of emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under theprovisions of R.A. No. 2207?

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph(c), Section 2, page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we arereferring to R.A. No. 2207.

x x x x x x x x x

SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of theamendment by substitution reads:

Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme andunder the provisions of existing law.

I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and RepublicAct No. 3452. Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize thecontinued existence of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic

Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out thestand-by power on the part of the President to import rice.

x x x x x x x x x

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because ofthe existing law that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 that isthe reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by power of the President to importrice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power,inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the Presidentcan designate any government agency to import rice?


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SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of theSupreme Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija,Senator Liwag, informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.

SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make thatclear ... .

SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and cornis left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, theposition of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.

SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.

SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.

x x x x x x x x x

SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed onwhether Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. Oneview sustains the theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 byRepublic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is concerned. The other view is thatthere is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. I

take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .

Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are nottotally repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except oncertain points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency certified by theNational Economic Council permissible? By reading the two provisos together I wouldsay yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to anational emergency.

Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finallyapproved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No.

2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. Thisattitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to futureimportations.

Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation inquestion, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation isauthorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives.We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and toencumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and


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Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrowmoney under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance theimportation in question.

WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is herebydissolved. Costs against petitioners.

Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the Government's power to import rice, under Section 2 ofRepublic Act 2207, the majority opinion seems to have overlooked that the repeal of statutes isprimarily a matter of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act No. 3452 was plainly

intended to supersede the prior law, Republic Act No. 2207.

The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary emergency power to import rice and corn,granted to the President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting atpresent, notwithstanding the terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic Act No. 3452.

For convenience, we present in parallel columns the specific provisions of the respective acts:

REP. ACT NO. 2207(1959)

REP. ACT NO. 3452(1962)

SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall beunlawful for any person, association,corporation or government agency toimport rice and corn into any point inthe Philippines: Provided, however,That should there be an existing orimminent shortage in the localsupply of the abovementionedcommodities of such gravity as toconstitute a national emergency,upon certification to this effect by theNational Economic Council, basedon the studies of the Office of

Statistical Coordination of said body,the Presidentof the Philippines mayauthorize the importation of thecommodities, through anygovernment agencythat he maydesignate in such quantities as theNational Economic Council maydetermine necessary to cover the

SEC. 10. ... Provided, that the Riceand Corn Administration oranyother government agency is hereby

prohibited from importing rice andcorn: Provided, further, That theimportation of rice and corn is left to

private parties upon payment of thecorresponding taxes. (EmphasisSupplied)


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shortage, subject to the taxes, dutiesand/or special charges as nowprovided by law: Provided, further,That contracts for such importationshall be only on straightsales basis,and awarded only after a publicbidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasissupplied)

It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other. First, in policy; because underRepublic Act No. 2207, the general rule is that no person or entity, public or private, shall import riceand corn; while under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation of rice and corn is left to

private parties, with no restriction other than the payment of tax. Second, in procedure; underRepublic Act 2207, the President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in quantitiescertified by the National Economic Council as necessary, through any government agencythat hemay designate; while by Act 3452 any government agencyis prohibited from importing rice and corn,said prohibition being express, absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only this, but violation of the

prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and imprisonmentfor not more than 5 years (sec. 15, Act3452).

We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend that the presidential power to make importationsof rice and corn still subsists, in view of the unqualified terms of Republic Act 3452. Ifanygovernmentagency is prohibited from importing rice and corn by the later law, and the violation of the prohibitionis penalized by fine and imprisonment, in what manner can the President make the importation? Hecannot do so directly, since Act 2207 specifically requires that it be done "through any governmentagency". How, then, may he import?

It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to realize why this must be so. Suffice it to notethat the Administration's power to import rice in certified emergencies under Act 2207 was but a merecorollary to the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and the existence of such

exceptional import power necessarily depended on the continuation of that total prohibition. 1wph1.t

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was this dependence between theemergency importing authority granted to the government and the maintenance of the normal non-import policy.

SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation orgovernment agencyto import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines,provided,however, that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supplyofthe above-mentioned commodities, of such gravity as to constitute a nationalemergency, upon certification to this effect by the National Economic Council, basedon the studies of the Office of Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of

the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities, through anygovernment agency that he may designate, in such quantities as the NationalEconomic Council may determine necessary to cover the shortage, subject to taxes,duties and/or special charges as now provided by law; provided, further, that contractsfor such importation shall be only on straight sales basis, and awarded only after apublic bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)

So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import power that the latter was not even setapart in a section. Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening portion


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of the section quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the emergency power to import riceand corn established by the later part of the same legal provision. Where the basic rule disappears,the exception thereto must necessarily cease to operate, since the exception becomes automaticallyfunctus officio for lack of basis.

The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant that whenever the domestic crop

became insufficient to satisfy the demand for rice and corn, the latter had to be brought from outsideto fill the gap; and the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be done through governmentalagencies. But under Republic Act 3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared, and private partieswere authorized to bring in the cereals at any time; hence, the exceptional importing power of theGovernment lost all reason for its existence, because the private imports allowed by Act 3452 werecontemplated and intended to make up for the difference between demand and supply, withoutnecessity of government intervention. In truth, the expression in Section 10 of Act 3452

SEC. 10. ... Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration or any other governmentagency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That theimportation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of thecorresponding taxes. (Emphasis supplied)

can only mean that the Administration must desist from importing, and leave to private parties the taskof bringing such cereals from without in order to make up for whatever shortages in production shouldoccur.

That only private parties, and not the government, can import the cereals finds confirmation in thelegislative journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing thetranscript of the Senate debates on the bill that later became Republic Act No. 3452, the followingappears:

CUENCO AMENDMENT

Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the period (.) to colon and addthe following: PROVIDED, THAT THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANYOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM IMPORTINGRICE AND CORN: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT THE IMPORTATION OF RICE

AND CORN IS LEFT TO PRIVATE PARTIES UPON PAYMENT OF THECORRESPONDING TAXES.

Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.

Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The chair does not hear any.The amendment is approved. (Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p.1360)

The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the following illuminating remarks:

SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then, Your Honor, that we couldproceed with the discussion.


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Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated, specifically provides thatappointment of personnel should be in accordance with the Civil Service Law as wellas with the WAPCO. It seems to me that this provision is very laudable and very, veryreasonable. The second important feature in this proposed measure is that itprohibitsimportation by the government. I think this should be clarified in the sense that, at thesame time, it allows importation by private parties but with the payment of the

corresponding duties. Or rather, under House Bill No. 339, the general policy which isbeing set in the proposed measure is that the government should not resort toimportation but that importation of the cereal is open at all times to any citizen of thiscountry so long as he pays the corresponding duties and other taxes which areimposed by our government. (Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962)

It is thus clear that if section 16 of Republic Act 3452 providing that

All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are herebyrepealed or modified accordingly",.

intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must have referred to Republic Act No. 2207.

Hence, the Presidential power to import no longer exists.

In arguing in favor of the Government's power to import even now, the majority opinion avers thatRepublic Act No. 3452 is designed to apply only to normal times and conditions. This is plainlyabsurd, for in normal times, when production equals consumption, no importation need be authorized,for none will be required.

The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms.Granting arguendo that this were true, despite the express prohibition of government imports insection 10 of the later Act, yet it does not elucidate why the legislature found it necessary, orexpedient, to enact an entirely different law, instead of merely providing for the amendment of theprior statute (R.A. 2207). If both laws were designed to attain the same end, rice and corn sufficiencyfor our country, and only a change of method was intended, why enact two statutes not onlyunconnected with each other, but actually contradictory?

That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person orentity, public or private, could import rice or corn, since under Section 2 thereof "it shall be unlawful forany person, association, corporation or government entity to import rice and corn"; while under Act3452, on the contrary, "importation of rice and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time, withno other restriction than the payment of taxes. How can it be said that the two laws, with sodiametrically opposite philosophies, were intended to co-exist?

Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible with each other (since privateimportation of rice and corn cannot, at the same time, be unlawfulunder Act 2207 and lawfulunder

Act 3452), it is inescapable to conclude that the later statute (3452) is, and must have been, intended

to revise, supersede, and replace the former law (Act 2207).The established rule in this jurisdiction insuch a case is that

While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is notfavored, yet if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearlyintended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act (Posadasvs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 351) (quoted andapplied in In re Guzman, 73 Phil. 52).


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pines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded isdiscarded and repealed(In re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1

It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certainsubject-matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be toframe a new scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a revision of the

whole subject, that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and thatwhatever is excluded is discarded". (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 75 N.E.841.)

And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed atdifferent dates, and it is plain from the frame-work and substance of the last that it wasintended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system orprovision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever isembraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed."

Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 10 A. L. R. 910, at page 915:

6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute for one revised, operatesas a repeal of the latter without any express words to that effect; and so any distinctprovision of the old law, not incorporated into the later one, is to be, deemed to havebeen intentionally annulled. Smith, Stat. Constr. sec. 784; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass.537, 7 Am. Dec. 99:

This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court, utterly destroys the contention of themajority opinion that because the Government's power under Republic Act 2207, to make imports ofrice and corn in case of certified emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed by Republic Act 3452,such power must be still deemed to exist. No such power can now exist for the reason that the Actconferring it was totally and unconditionally superseded and repealed by Act 3452. The contradictoryphilosophies of both Acts testify to that effect.

The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does not contemplate situations where theshortage in local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. It also asserts that

Act 3452 refers only to artificialshortages through hoarding, and does not cover natural shortageswhere the rice and corn crops do not suffice to meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately, theopposite of these assertions is precisely true. Thus,

Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: The Government shall engage in the purchase ofthese basic foods from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in thePhilippines ... and whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural orartificial, should so require, (the Government) shall sell and dispose of thesecommodities to the consumers ... .

Section 3 of Act 3452 With a view to regulating the level of supply of rice and cornthroughout the country, the Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as anational reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet anycontingencies. ...

Section 12, Act 3452 "The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized todeclare a rice and corn emergency any time he deemsnecessary in the publicinterest. During the emergency period, the Rice and Corn Administration, upon thedirection of the President, shall, subject to constitutional limitation, conduct raids,


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seizures, and confiscation of rice and con hoardedin any private warehouse orbodega: Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration shall pay such confiscatedrice and corn at the prevailing consumer's price of the Rice and Corn Administration.(Emphasis supplied)

Certainly the words used by the statute, "any cause, naturalorartificial", "any contingencies", "rice

and corn emergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural deficiency due toinsufficient production, as well as artificial shortages due to hoarding. The terms employed exempt thelegislature from the accusation that it still has left some emergency unprovided for. What it did denythe Government was the power to import rice and corn whenever it so chooses; instead, the lawexpressly prescribed "that the Rice and Corp. Administration or any government agencyis hereby

prohibited from importing rice and corn"(sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a command that, as previouslyobserved, squarely contradicts and vacates that permission to import previously granted underRepublic Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not now bring in rice and corn from abroad,unless special legislative authorization is first obtained, as was done for 1964 by Republic Act No.3848.

The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the Legislature permission to import

300,000 metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use of thatpermission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its former power under Republic Act No. 2207no longer existed after the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the Administrationin estoppel to assert the contrary. Why should it seek authority to make importation during 1964 if itstill possessed that granted by Republic Act 2207?

Note that, in consenting the Government's importing 300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislatureonce more re-affirmed the prohibition of further government imports in section 6 of the enabling law,Republic Act No. 3848:

SEC. 6 Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of theGovernment shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad."(Emphasis supplied)

which is a virtual repetition of the restraint imposed by Republic Act 3452. In addition, the lawimposed the further condition that the importation be made only upon two-thirds vote of the NationalEconomic Council, where Republic Act 2207 specified no particular majority.

The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these reiterated prohibitions by claiming that saidsection 6 was intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 wasabsolutely unnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848 was a limitation in itself, as it onlypermitted the importation of 300,000 metric tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant, anyexcess beyond the quantity fixed, and any import after 1964, were automatically forbidden. Theenactment of section 6 of Act 3848, therefore, was an actual reassertion of the policy of outlawingGovernment imports, as declared in Republic Act 3452. If anything, it meant that to import rice now,the Executive must first obtain an enabling law.

Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign purchase of rice would violate theConstitutional restraint against paying money out of the Treasury, "except in pursuance of anappropriation made by law" (Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has beenenacted. Under the Revised Administrative Code, sections 606 and 607, no contract involving theexpenditure of public funds can be made without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the

Auditor General. Nor can these inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of causing a Government agency toborrow the funds required for the purpose, considering that any and all government agencies are flatly


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forbidden to import rice (Republic Act 3452, sec. 10), and the borrowing of funds to financeimportation is essential for the execution thereof.

Finally, we see no point in the quotations from statements made in the Senate during thedeliberations on House Bill No. 11511. That bill never became law, and is not before the Court. Thestatements quoted are not binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of construing the

legislative enactments.

The effect in the majority decision is, after the Legislature had expressly prohibited governmentagencies to import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill No.11511) granting the Executive a stand-by authority to import, a decision of this Court now reversesthis clear policy of the Legislature, and hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the laws haveexpressly forbidden.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.


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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965

ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE, Y.FELICIANO, ET AL.,Respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and CornAdministration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the

recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of1964.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and onDecember 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importat

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