Delivering the internal market in electricity and making ... · Delivering the internal market in...
Transcript of Delivering the internal market in electricity and making ... · Delivering the internal market in...
Delivering the internal market in electricity and making the most of public interventions
Inge Bernaerts – Head of Unit DG Energy Unit B2 Wholesale markets : electricity and gas Brussels, November 28th, 2013
2
Communication on
public intervention
Capacity
mechanisms
Demand
response
RES support
schemes
Cooperation
mechanisms
The Package:
Principles for efficient public interventions
1. Let markets work!
2. Identifying a specific problem and its cause
3. Assessing potential interplay with other policy objectives – holistic approach
4. Evaluating alternative instruments promoting market based solutions, including European options
5. Encourage changes in consumer behaviour
6. Minimising impacts on operating of electricity systems
7. Keeping costs low (competition of technologies and of suppliers, potential of other Member States)
8. Considering the impact on costs of consumers
9. Monitoring, evaluation and phasing out
Capacity mechanisms
• On 22 May 2013 the European Council called for guidance on capacity mechanisms.
• Guidance in the Communication and elaborated in this Staff Working Document
• Aim to help ensure that capacity mechanisms
• meet aims of EU energy policy aims (IEM)
• comply with the common competition rules BUT detailed treatment of capacity mechanism and State aid in forthcoming
Energy and Env. SA guidelines
Context for today's discussion
• Ensuring generation adequacy is also one of the main challenges as the Union moves towards a low carbon energy system.
• SAME time as completion of IEM Mutual interdependence of MS for SoS
SHORT TERM (operational) and LONG TERM….
• SAME time as major technological change SMART GRIDS, Demand side participation in market etc.
• SAME time as economic crisis shows overinvestment in past – impact on incumbents
analyse objectively generation adequacy concern
• Recognize the reality of coupled markets: cross-border assessment is needed
• Maximize interconnection capacity
• Include the potential of demand response in generation adequacy assessment
• Distinguish generation adequacy concerns from profitability concerns (take into account overcapacity and economic crisis)
Identify the causes of the concern
• Regulated wholesale and retail prices:
• as a general rule further public interventions not proportionate if price caps reduce investment
• Existing support schemes:
• are RES support schemes in line with best practices?
• Support for fossil and nuclear generation?
• Do effective intraday and balancing markets exist?
• Can the demand side participate in these markets?
Costs, benefits and alternatives
• The cost of capacity remuneration schemes can be very high (over 10% of wholesale electricity costs)
• Promote (local) generation or increase interconnection capacity?
• Promote generation or promote demand response?
• Impact on electricity bills? Is the cost of intervention not higher than the value of lost load?
• Impact on CO2 and RES targets: how to avoid lock-in effects?
Design of public intervention
• A strategic reserve is normally less distortionary, less costly and easier to implement; BUT not suitable for every problem
• One-off tendering could be less distortionary and easier to implement when there is a clearly identified and temporary investment gap – must be credibly one off
• Where market wide capacity remuneration schemes are considered, capacity payments are less desirable and capacity markets are to be preferred
Design features
Technological neutrality
old + new production, demand participates on equal basis
Transitional with an exit strategy
allow price to fall to zero, address market and regulatory failures
Regional schemes least cross-border participation
RECOGNISE practical difficulties
BUT vital to account for benefits of IEM
Minimizing distortions of competition and trade
no adverse effect on market coupling; no export restrictions)
Financing – beneficaries of SoS should pay
Guidance for MS Choices
• Intervention after:
• careful and objective assessment of needs
• Addressing regulatory and market failures cost/benefit analysis compared to other solutions and value of lost load
• Recommendations:
• chose the right instrument to address the problem identified
• Design the measure to minimize distortions
• Ensure mechanism is reviewed as underlying concern addressed
Market integration: support schemes & market rules
Feed-in tariff Premium Quota
Phase in market exposure: Competitive
allocation mechanisms
Mechanism to reflect maturity of technology
Competition among RES – technology development
Minimise impact on production decision
Phase in equal treatment: Balancing
obligations Bearing of grid
costs
Dispatching rules
Different degrees of harmonisation for all users
Cost control
Avoidance of over-compensation: Competitive
allocation mechanisms
Objective cost and
revenue calculations (LCOE)
Automatic digression
Limited time frame
bubble
Benefits and Potential
• Individual energy savings/reductions: 2-4%
• Partial shift to cheaper periods: ca. 10% (HH), 20%+ (I)
• (Lower system costs)
Reduced Consumer Bills
• Reduced peak generation: up to 60 GW (controllable load) • Reduced grid needs
System Efficiency
• More RES possible on the grid • Environment/CO2 reductions
• Consumer engagement/empowerment
Vicarious benefits
Demand Response: What is Needed?
• Dynamic pricing and reward structures
• Data protection and security
Market-based & transparent incentives
• Equal footing with supply
• Contractual/technical rules, e.g. network codes
Opening up the market to DR
• Smart meters
• Smart appliances
Bringing technologies into the retail segment
Thank you for attention
More information available under:
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/