Deforestation in Tanzania’s East Usambaras: Sticks, Carrots and the ‘Crowding Out’ effect
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Transcript of Deforestation in Tanzania’s East Usambaras: Sticks, Carrots and the ‘Crowding Out’ effect
Deforestation in Tanzania’s East Usambaras: Sticks, Carrots and the ‘Crowding Out’ effect
David Kaczan
M.Sc Student
Brent Swallow
Professor and supervisor
Vic Adamowicz
Professor and co-supervisor
Delia Catacutan
ICRAF co-supervisor
What is the ‘Crowding Out’ effect, and why does it matter?
Framing
Self determination
Information conveyance
Endogenous preferences
(Reyes et al. 2006; Burgess et al. 2007)
The Context
•3300 km2 of sub montane and montane forest
•A Biodiversity hotspot: “...the highest ratio of endemic flora and fauna per 100 km2 of all biodiversity hotspots in the world”
•35 % of species endemic
•Other important ecosystem functions: water provision, local climate
(Reyes, et al. 2006)
Human Impact
Reyes et al. (2007)
•60 percent of forest cover lost in East Usambaras
•26 percent of remaining forest has cardamom
Hall, 2006
Conservation efforts
•Forest reserves, Amani nature reserve, Deremacorridor
•What about incentive schemes (PES)?
•If so, how would you design such a scheme for maximum effectiveness?
Intervention Points> 100 percent compensation
(- altruism / pro social)
No compensation?(Knowledge transfer,
Credit)
> 50 percent compensation (- altruism / pro social)
But: if PES is used, is there a danger that economic incentives could ‘crowd out’ pre existing altruistic/pro social incentives?
A research question
Approach 1: Experiments
Precedents, mechanisms?
Experimental design: dictator game
30 Tsh
50 Tsh
20 Tsh
40 Tsh
50 Tsh
20 Tsh
Donated to passive group
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
Period
Control PES treatment
Control (average) PES (average)
Not Significant Significant
Dictator game: stylized PES
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
Period
Control Enforcement - high
Control (average) Enforcement - high (average)
Significant Not significant
Dictator game: stylized enforcement (high)
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
Period
Control Enforcement - low (average)
Control (average) Enforcement - low
Not Significant Not significant
Dictator game: stylized enforcement (low)
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27
Period
Control PES - collective
Control (average) PES collective (average)
Significant Significant
Dictator game: stylized PES (collective)
62%
23%
11%
2.5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
No payment but provision for
village infrastructure
Individual payment of
Tsh2000
Payment of Tsh2000
transferred to village
committee
Disagree/Need additional
options
Experiment II: Which of the payment options will you prefer? (n=194)
Vardhan, 2010 (unpublished)
Vardhan, 2010 (unpublished)
97%
82% 76%74%
64%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
High individual payment (Tsh1000)
offered
No mention of payment
High social payment (Tsh 1000) offered
Payment mentioned
but not offered
Low individual
payment (Tsh 200 offered)
Experiment I: Will your neigbor participate under these payment options? (n=194)
In summary...
•Preliminary evidence suggests crowding out for rewards, less so for enforcements
• Fact of enforcement may be more important than its magnitude
•Contrary to other studies, but some similarities with Vardhan?
•Collective payment unsuccessful
“First do no harm....”
With thanks…
to supervisors B. Swallow, V. Adamowicz and D. Catacutan;
field assistants F. Njilima, V. Mkongewa, Y. Mwaikio and A. Kajiru;
administrators at ICRAF Tanzania and Kenya;
and valuable, regular advice from H. Vihemaki, S. Rantala and R. Bullock