Defense Transformation: To What, For What?

8/6/2019 Defense Transformation: To What, For What?

1/84

DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION:TO WHAT, FOR WHAT?

Kevin Reynolds

November 2006

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as dened inTitle 17, United States Code, section 101. As such, it is in the publicdomain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code,Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

Visit our website for other free publication downloadshttp://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/

To rate this publication click here.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=733http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=733http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/


2/84

ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authorand do not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. This report is cleared for public release; distributionis unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are availableon the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copiesof this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSIshomepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on theresearch of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, andupcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletteralso provides a strategic commentary by one of our researchanalysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, pleasesubscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-249-7


3/84

iii

FOREWORD

The transformation of Americas armed forces anddefense establishment has been one of the key over-arching objectives of President George W. Bushsadministration. Measuring the value of high-technologyweapons systems and their demonstrated effectivenessin the opening stages of both Operations ENDURINGFREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld has increased the pace ofdefense transformation. But beyond enhancing thelethality of U.S. forces on the conventional battleeld,where is defense transformation headed?

In this monograph, Colonel Kevin Reynolds asksthe question, What form is transformation takingand what end(s) are the armed forces transforming

to obtain? He argues that U.S. foreign and nationalsecurity policies should drive the pace and direction ofdefense transformation, but nds that all too often themilitarys weapons systems preferences determine theshape and form of the armed services transformationand their future capability sets. Due to the lengthyResearch, Development, Testing, and Evaluation(RDT&E) time to acquire technologically advancedweapons systems, up to and beyond 20 years in manyinstances, future administrations will inherit weaponssystems and force structures that, although recentlyelded, were imagined several administrationspreviously and whose capability to support currentpolicy may now be limited. Colonel Reynolds concludesby arguing that the military should acquire a broad

range of technologies now in order to present as yetunknown future political leaders with a broader range


4/84

iv

of military capabilities with which to pursue futureU.S. policy preferences.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


5/84

v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

KEVIN P. REYNOLDS is currently assigned to theDepartment of Distance Education (DDE), U.S. ArmyWar College as a professor and course author. Priorto his present assignment, he served as the Directorof First Year Studies within DDE. Commissioned asan Infantry Ofcer in 1973 from Ofcer CandidateSchool, Fort Benning, Georgia, Colonel Reynolds hascommanded infantry units from platoon throughbattalion. Additionally, he has served as an operationsofcer at the battalion, division, corps, and army levelsto include serving as the Chief of Plans, Third U.S. ArmyForward Command Post during Operations DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM; and has served as anObserver Controller at the National Training Center

and in the Battle Command Training Program. ColonelReynolds is a graduate of the U.S. Army Commandand General Staff College and the U.S. Army WarCollege. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science fromTemple University, an MA in International Relationsfrom St. Marys University-San Antonio, and a BA inPhilosophy from the University of Illinois-Chicago.


6/84


7/84

vii

SUMMARY

The U.S. armed forces are transforming at a rapid ratewhile simultaneously ghting a Global War on Terror(GWOT). Changing tactics, techniques, procedures,and even organizations when faced with a dangerousand adaptive enemy is nothing unusual. Almost allsuccessful armed forces have had to master changein the face of adversity. However, the changes thatU.S. armed forces are adopting began long before theevents of September 11, 2001. To begin to understandthe scope of defense transformation and its impact onthe future policy of the United States, the GWOT andthe operations that dene it must be viewed from thewider context of U.S. foreign and national securitypolicy. Policymakers must recognize that the defense

transformation decisions they make now are the oneswith which as yet unidentied future political leaderswill have to live.

Ideally, policy should drive the direction andform of defense transformation. However, defensetransformation is not necessarily proceeding in thisfashion. Rather, the military is pursuing a transforma-tion plan based on its weapons systems technologicalpreferences. Although when developed and eldedthese weapons systems preferences almost assuredlywill provide U.S. supremacy in state-centric warfare,their utility for lesser conicts is suspect. Due to thelong lead times associated with weapons systemdevelopment, future political leaders may have theirpolicy options constrained by a force structure that,

although recently elded, was imagined over 15 to 20years previously for a reality that may no longer existwhen the weapons become operational. The potential


8/84

viii

to have a military force inadequately equipped andstructured to support future policy has occurred

largely because of three factors: rst, the military, notpolicymakers, are the primary determinants of whichweapons systems to acquire and develop; second,policy formulation planning horizons are muchshorter than those of weapons systems acquisition;last, the military, at the urging of the civilian leadershipwithin the Department of Defense (DoD) is pursuing atransformation plan based primarily on the somewhatnarrow theoretical constructs of Network CentricWarfare (NCW).

The military, in determining what weapons systemsare available to choose from, heavily inuences thechoices of the decisionmakers within DoD. De jurethe Secretary of Defense decides what weapons willbe funded for development; however, de facto the

uniformed military steers the course of weaponssystems procurement. Although the armed serviceswould not be willing to relinquish this position, it isnot a role they created, either. Rather, the exponentialgrowth of technology in general and weapons systemstechnology in particular, coupled with the increasingcomplexity of warfare since World War II, havecompelled the nations civilian leadership to defer tothe militarys expertise in determining which weaponsand force structures to acquire. Simply stated, neitherthe executive nor the legislative branches of governmenthave the time or the inclination to master the arcaneconcepts, processes, and dialect of weapons systemsdevelopment. Seldom do members of the executivebranch or Congress challenge the militarys weapons

systems preferences, and when they do, it is in theaggregate, i.e., does the military really need that numberof systems vice do they need the system at all. In rare


9/84

ix

instances, the Secretary of Defense or the Congress willcancel a particular weapons development program,

but this normally occurs only after the program hasbeen in development for 15-20 years, its developmentalcosts have far exceeded its projected funding, andother weapons systems with similar capabilities haveobviated the need for it. Congress is more concernedwith the militarys stewardship of its budget and notwhether the future military capabilities the armedforces are developing will be those that future politicalleaders will need to promote U.S. policy.

The transformation decisionmaking conundrumis compounded by foreign and national securitypolicy development lagging behind weapons systemsprocurement and force structure development. Thisphenomenon, referred to in this monograph as policylag, results from the differences in the planning

horizons, budgeting cycles, and predictability forecastsbetween foreign policy/national security strategydevelopment on the one hand and weapons systems/force structure development on the other. Foreignand national security policy planning rarely extendsmore than 4 to 5 years, whereas weapons systemplanning is seldom shorter than 12 years, with thenorm being closer to 15 years. Additionally, policy ismuch harder to budget for since it depends on factorsin the humanitarian world that are not quantiableor measured easily. Conversely, weapons systemprocurement is easy to quantify, measure, and hencebudget for. Weapons are material objects and subjectto laws of science, while human beings, leaders,populations, and nation-states are not. Moreover,

the congressional committees that authorize andappropriate funds for the development of weaponssystems are discrete defense committees within


10/84

x

Congress that are dedicated to military issues. Therest of government must navigate through nondepart-

ment specic authorization and appropriationscommittees. Last, the results of foreign and nationalsecurity policy planning are much harder to predicteven in the short term (4 to 6 years), let alone in thelong term. However, the development of weaponssystems is very systematic and foreseeable. Althoughnot all inclusive, the differences in planning horizons,budgeting cycles, and predictability are the chief factorsthat account for policy development lagging behindweapons systems development. Policy lag almostalways results in the military acquiring tomorrow theweapons systems and force structure it needs today.

Last, the military and civilian leaderships withinDoD are pursing a transformation plan that is basedon a unitary theoretical operational construct: NCW.

Combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq in2001 and 2003, respectively, appeared to have justiedNCWs proponents belief in this form of warfare.But subsequent operations in both countries againstinsurgents, along with other low intensity combatundertakings, have called into question the utilityof NCW as a panacea for Americas future militaryoperations. Wholesale adoption of the weapons systemsand the force structure required to execute NCW couldleave the United States prepared to ght the mostdangerous but least likely threats and unprepared toght the lest dangerous but most likely threats.

To mitigate the effects that the factors enumeratedabove have on defense transformation, the seniorcivilian and military leadership should: ensure that

the congressional committees coordinate their actionsso as to synchronize foreign/national security policyobjectives with weapons systems/force structure


11/84

xi

decisions; reform the Defense Acquisition Systemsbureaucratic structure and procedures in order to

reduce acquisition timelines signicantly; acquire abroader range of technologies that will expand theU.S. militarys future capability sets; develop a morediversied force structure capable of responding tothe full range of the most likely challenges the UnitedStates will face; and, apportion the service budgetsin accordance with the relative share of the missionsthey will receive in the future so they may acquire thetechnologies and force structure they need to obtainand promote the nations interests.


12/84


13/84

1

DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION:TO WHAT, FOR WHAT?

The military is one of several tools Americaselected leadership has to promote, further, or obtainthe nations interests. In order not to constrain thepolicy options open to the civilian leadership, themilitary should possess a capability set that willenhance or enable the pursuit of a broad range offoreign policy and national security strategy scenarios.As a result, defense transformation should occurwith the requirements of national security policy andstrategy in mind. However, defense transformation isnot proceeding in this fashion. Rather, the military ispursuing a transformation plan based on a group ofweapons systems technologies which will ensure its

supremacy in state-centric warfare, but whose utilityoutside of major force-on-force conict is questionableat best. The militarys weapons systems technologicalpreferences, not policy, are driving the pace and formof the militarys transformation and hence the futuremilitary capabilities that will be available to the nationsleadership. Due to the long lead times associated withweapon systems development, future political leadersmay have their policy options constrained by a forcestructure that, although recently elded, was imagined15 to 20 years previously for a reality that may neverhave eventuated.

The potential to have a military force inadequatelyequipped and structured to support future policy hasoccurred largely because of three factors. First, the

military, not policymakers, primarily determines notonly which weapon systems technologies to develop,but also which ones will even be considered for


14/84

2

development. Second, foreign and national securitypolicy development lags behind weapon systems

procurement and force structure development, insteadof driving them. This phenomenon, referred to hereas policy lag, results from the differences in theplanning horizons, budgeting cycles, and predictabilityforecasts between foreign policy/national securitystrategy development on the one hand and weaponssystems/force structure development on the other.Policy lag usually results in the military acquiringtomorrow the weapons systems and force structure itneeds today.1 Last, enamored with its recent successduring the conventional combat phases of OperationsENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM (OEFand OIF, respectively) the military, at the urging ofthe civilian leadership within the DoD, is pursuing atransformation plan based primarily on the concepts

and weapons systems required to implement networkcentric warfare (NCW).2 Pursing a discrete set ofweapons systems technologies may hinder the mili-tarys ability to respond to other than state-on-statewarfare scenarios, thus limiting the civilian leadershipspolicy options. As a result, the military may becomeself-limiting by acquiring primarily those technologiesit needs to defeat a similarly equipped threat and neglectthe possibilities offered by alternative technologies.The current transformation approach could leave theUnited States preparing to ght the least likely butmost dangerous conicts vice prepared for the mostlikely but least dangerous conicts that it will face.

This monograph explores each of these factors thatcontribute to the incongruence between the transforma-

tional capabilities that the military is acquiring andtheir potential inability to support future policy optionsadequately when they are elded. The monograph


15/84

3

closes by arguing that, since the future is extremelydifcult to predict, the military should pursue a broad

range of technologies that will both enhance andexpand its future capability prole in order to betterserve policy.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS DECISIONMAKING

In principle, the selection of major weapons systemsshould be the result of a decisionmaking process atthe national level that begins with the identication ofU.S. national interests, goals, and objectives in both thenear and the long term. Next, planners should developthe national military strategy or military policy thatcombines with other elements of national power(economic, political, and sociological/informational)to form the nations grand strategy. Nested within the

grand strategy should be decisions on force structureand doctrine, and the identication and acquisition ofthe means or resources to implement the strategy. In hisbook Weapons Dont Make War, Dr. Colin Gray states: Ifit is policy to deter attack upon distant friends, strategymust specify what is to be deterred, and how and withwhat instruments deterrence is to be achieved. If themeans for deterrence will not be available for severalyears, then policymakers must decide whether to riska bluff or redene policy.3 But the process describedabove, though desirable in theory, is a practice not near-ly so orderly, coherent, and fully realized as depic-ted. It is much more amorphous, with numerous dyadicrelationships that allow for multipartite negotiationsat various levels. The process is more circular and

iterative than it is linear and progressive.4 Thissection will explore who makes the weapons systemsand transformation decisions and why. Next, it will


16/84

4

examine how those decisions result in military forcestructure and the constraint(s) these acquired military

capabilities may have on future foreign policy. Itconcludes with a case study involving the acquisitionof the B-1 bomber that illustrates how past weaponssystems decisions affect future policy options.

All too often, especially since the beginnings ofexponential technological development during WorldWar II, weapons systems decisions have inuencedheavily both the national military strategy and themilitarys force structure. Thus, in part, weaponssystems decisions determine what the nationspolitical leadership should do (the strategy its civilianleaders should pursue) and what they cannot do (thecapabilities and limitations of the force structure themilitary adopts to optimize the technology).5 In fact,given that most weapons systems have a 12-15 year

development period, current weapons systems andforce structure decisions often limit the policy optionsof future administrations that inherit a structure whosecapability may not meet future policy needs.6 In 1986,Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, contributing authorsto the original and subsequent editions of Makersof Modern Strategy, expressed essentially the sameconcern:

The actions that will be taken in future crises promise,indeed, to be predetermined and automatic in nature.One can argue plausibly that the autonomy of thepolitical leadership begins to shrink from the momentthat it authorizes the expenditure of national resources onthis or that kind of weapons research or the productionof this or that kind of bomber, missile, or submarine.

Because of the lead time required for the realizationof such projects, the decision made today inevitablydetermines or circumscribes policy at a later date, thuspre-judging situations that have not been foreseen and


17/84

5

limiting ones capabilities for contingencies that havenot yet arisen.7

Weapon system decisions and the force structure theydrive are fundamentally political decisions, giventhe impact they have on near and short-term policy.Leaving these decisions to the military represents a defacto abdication of important aspects of foreign policyformulation to the military.

Congress and the President often play the

services off against one another in the battle overfunds and programs, but they support the militarystechnologically-driven weapons systems preferences.The militarys weapons systems selections are almostnever challenged. Judith Reppy and Franklin A. Long,in the introduction to their anthology, The Genesis ofNew Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D, quote

Edwin Deagle as saying:The central political feature of the weapon systemacquisition process is that its control inevitably residesmainly in the hands of the services. No one else in thesystem had the information and the nancial and staffresources, . . . Moreover, no one can match the uniqueclaim to control of the military requirement process thatthe wearing of a uniform conveys. Thus, the struggle

for civilian inuence over the acquisition processwill always be uphill. And, given the differences andpurposes among the various political constituencies,which surround the Pentagon, civilian involvement willinevitably be diffuse, fragmented, and pluralistic.8

Both the executive and legislative branches ofgovernment have hesitated to challenge the militarys

weapons systems and force structure preferences.Given the scope and breadth of the nations needs,neither the President nor any member of Congress


18/84

6

has the time or inclination to master the technologicaland operational complexity of modern military

operations. Instead, the U.S. civilian leadership relieson the militarys expertise to determine what weaponsystems to develop and procure; hence, the pattern andshape of defense transformation and, by extension,the militarys capabilities in support of future foreignand nation security policy. Although this trend beganduring the lead-up to World War II, it was the onset ofthe Cold War that tightened the militarys grip on theacquisition and transformation process.

During the Cold War, there was a constant tensionbetween spending for defense and spending for socialprograms. For most of the Cold War, presidents stroveto keep the defense budget within limits. With thedomestic agenda holding primacy, in the absenceof a crisis, foreign aid and defense desiderata were

not always fully funded. Additionally, the programtimelines seldom extended beyond the near term, i.e.,to the end of the presidents elected term.9 Moreover,most presidents lacked the expertise and the timeto delve into the arcane world of threat estimates,weapons technology, military budgets, force structure,and operational employment of military forces; hence,they relied on the military for that expertise.10 Evena military professional turned politician like GeneralDwight D. Eisenhower considered the development ofthe nations conventional force capability a secondaryissue. Focused on the domestic agenda, Eisenhowerchose to rely on nuclear weapons and budget ceilingsto shape R&D, weapons acquisition, strategy, and forcestructure.11

Congress labored under similar constraints. Itseldom had the expertise to challenge military acquisi-tions, force structure, or strategy recommendations.12


19/84

7

Instead, Congress focused on ensuring that themilitary followed prescribed contracting procedures;

avoided waste, fraud, or abuse; and distributed majordefense contracts to as many districts as possible.13Congressmen did not, nor could they, review militaryweapons acquisition decisions, strategy, and forcestructure within an overarching strategic context.14 InThe Decisionmaking Role of Congress, Reppy and Longwrote:

Just as important, the military utility of new [weapon]systems should be balanced against the effect they mayhave on international stability and future security in aworld where other countries can and do react to U.S.technological initiatives. Unfortunately, Congress doesnot analyze these larger issues. . . . Relying, as theydo, mainly on Pentagon witnesses, the armed servicescommittees rarely hear a rounded analysis of the UnitedStates international position, strengths, and weaknesses,and the members tend to lose sight of the broader contextof national security.15

Likewise, Congresss committee structure virtuallyprecludes a systematic, coordinated, and thoroughreview of weapons acquisition.

The various committees and subcommittees of

Congress that dealt with the armed forces, foreignpolicy, and technology focused on specic issues. Theyapproached each issue narrowly and in a fragmentedmanner.16 For example, among the Senate ArmedServices Committees several subcommittees wasone dealing with research, development, testing, andevaluation (RDT&E), and another that dealt withappropriations.17 However, they did not necessarily

coordinate their approach.18 Hence, a weapon systemcould be approved for testing and development, onlyto have its procurement dollars undercut. Moreover,


20/84


21/84

9

they are placed into an organizational architecturedesigned to maximize their capabilities and within a

doctrinal context that governs their employment. Theresultant force structure has inherent capabilities andlimitations.

The weapons-systems decisions the militarymakes now affect future foreign and national securitypolicies when those weapons systems are elded insome 15 years. Contributing to the inuence of currentacquisition decisions on future policy is what could becalled policy lag. Other than in very broad terms,rarely does Americas elected leadership outline acomprehensive foreign policy that extends beyondthe incumbents term.24 A number of factors accountfor this: the pluralism inherent to the political system,the primacy of the domestic agenda, the power ofthe bureaucracy, the presidential life cycle and his

approval rating, the inuence of the news media andother political actors, the sharing of powers withina federal system, and the tendency of ad hoc crisismanagement to supplant long-term strategy.25 Eventhough presidents are the chief agents for the conductof American foreign and national security policy, theirpower is constrained by the factors just mentioned.Thus U.S. foreign policy tends to be disjointed andcharacterized by a series of political compromises.26

The military, on the other hand, does not laborunder any such constraints. For example, the Air Forcedoes not have to sell the nation on what bomber orghter to procure. They may have to lobby Congressfor money to get the numbers of a particular weaponsystem they need; still, the decision to acquire it

remains de facto internal to the Air Force.27 Due tothe nature of the development and acquisition cycle,military R&D and acquisition planning almost always


22/84

10

extends 15 to 20 years, while foreign policy planningrarely extends beyond the administrations current

term. As mentioned previously, the militarys expertiseand autonomy in the weapons systems developmentprocess during the Cold War rarely was challenged.Consequently, political leaders saw their policyoptions circumscribed by the decisions the militaryhad made during previous administrations.28 As theCold War illustrates, future presidents can changeforce structure; however, the political price of doingso is normally prohibitive.29 With regard to the B-2bomber, for example, over a 7-year period the sunkcosts were $8.5 billion in R&D and $16.4 billion inprocurement, producing a total of nearly $25 billionspent on the rst 15 aircraft alone.30 With such a hugeprevious investment, future presidents will think twiceabout abandoning the weapon.

Discarding one weapons system for another affectsthe readiness of the force, because it normally requirestraining and restructuring. Still another cost is that amajor reorganization of the armed forces normallyinvolves winners and losers within the political process.Benet redistribution is fraught with political liabilityand jeopardizes the presidents agenda.31 Each newpresident inherits a military force structure that, withminor exceptions, was created several administrationspreviously. This phenomenon was previously identiedas policy lag.32 While presidents often tinker withmilitary force structure by adding to or taking from itincrementally, for the most part they tend to make dowith the force structure they inherit.33

The development of the B-1 illustrates how problem-

atic it is to expect the militarys current weaponssystems decisions for acquisitions 20 years in thefuture to actually support the foreign and national


23/84

11

security policies of the nations future political leaders.When the B-1 bomber nally was elded, policy had

changed and the weapon system was obsolete. Theconceptual development of the B-1 bomber began in1961, with the B-70 bomber as part of the Air ForcesAdvanced Manned Strategic Aircraft program(AMSA). This program was designed to meet theperceived need by the Air Force to acquire a bombercapable of penetrating Soviet air space undetected atlow or high level. Begun under the John F. Kennedyadministration, the B-1s development continuedthrough the Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, JimmyCarter, and Ronald Reagan administrations.34 The B-1 nally entered the Air Forces inventory in 1986.35Over the course of the B-1s development, Americasforeign policy orientation changed four times. Flexibleresponse gave way to Nixons policy of dtente, then

Carters accommodation under a theory of complexinterdependency, and, nally, Reagans policy ofglobal confrontation with the Soviet Union.36 In fact, in1977 the Carter administration cancelled the B-1 afterover $22.9 billion had been spent on its research anddevelopment.37 But, like the mythical phoenix, the B-1rose from its own ashes during the early years of theReagan presidency, and by the mid-1980s, it enteredthe Air Forces inventory.

When Reagan became president, the United Statesbegan a massive rearmament. The Air Force revivedthe B-1 program, although 4 years had been lost onits development, and by 1982-83, 3 years before the B-1s elding, its utility was questioned in light of theB-2 stealth bomber, which the Air Force had been

developing in secret and concurrently with the B-1.38Moreover, by the time the Air Force began eldingthe B-1, the Cold War had begun to thaw as Soviet


24/84

12

Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced a policy ofglasnost (openness) andperestroika (restructuring), and

the Reagan administration began to cooperate withthe Soviet Union on further limiting strategic weaponsand promoting nuclear disarmament.39 By the timethe last B-1 bomber wing was operational, the ColdWar had ended and the B-2 bomber had replaced iton grounds of technological superiority. The story ofits acquisition is as much a testament to the militarysacknowledged expertise, autonomy, and the strengthof its political alliances as it is an indictment of the lackof coordination between weapon system developmentand national security strategy formulation.40 Theimportance of organizational preferences was strikingespecially in the case of the B-1 program. The AirForces commitment to the B-1 triumphed over RobertMcNamaras outright opposition to it, David Packards

attempt to shape it, and, ultimately, Jimmy Carterseffort to cancel it.41

The 100 B-1s procured by the Air Force cost thetaxpayer over 28 billion dollars after 1981, with morethan 78 percent of the programs cost appropriatedbefore the rst prototype was own successfully.42The Air Force certied that the B-1 would be built forno more than $28.3 billion as a condition for gettingcongressional approval for its resurrection. As anadditional measure for quelling political opposition,the Air Force improvised a new mission for the plane:At the beginning of 1981, the Air Force plans called forB-1s to be converted to carry cruise missiles once theStealths were ready; thus creating a synergistic effect.Air Force ofcers admitted privately that the new

synergism had more to do with politically justifyingthe B-1B than with attacking the Soviet Union.43 As itturned out, the entire eet of B-1s had to be retrotted


25/84

13

at an additional cost of $3 billion. Given the $22.9 billionR&D cost prior to its cancellation in 1977, its post-1980

cost of $28.3 billion, and the additional $3 billion morefor retrot, the total cost of the program over 27 yearswas $54.2 billion. Critics of the program called the B-1 a ying Edsel and a dismal failure. They couldrightly ask what other programs the Air Force couldhave better spent the money on.44

In 1988, Nick Kotz wrote: The B-1s developmenthas been marred by political indecisiveness, bureau-cratic obsessions, Air Force overreaching, parochialism,partisan demagoguery, and an utter lack of consensuson defense priorities and procurement strategies.45By 1994, DoD no longer considered the B-1B astrategic weapon, which had been the sole purposefor its creation. It was now classied as a conventionalweapon, having been replaced by the B-2 and the

venerable B-52H.46

While it is unfair to blame either the military orAmericas political leadership for not anticipatingthe end of the Cold War, it is fair to question theirpursuit of a weapons program that by 1981 wasredundant, if not irrelevant, as a strategic deterrent.Americas strategic deterrent resided primarily in itsarray of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs),Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs),Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), cruisemissile technology, and only secondarily in its mannedbomber force.47 Moreover, because the military steadilyupgraded the capabilities of its B-52 force over theyears, it could have continued to bridge (as it doestoday) the perceived technological gap produced by

the lengthy development of the B-1 bomber. The endof the Cold War was unknowable, but the productionand elding of the bomber was predictable, as was the


26/84

14

cost benet analysis of producing the B-1 in light ofexisting bombers and missiles, future bombers (the B-

2), and the strategic deterrent capability called for bythe national security strategy.

The B-1 remains in the Air Forces active inventoryas part of the Cold Wars legacy force.48 It has beenconverted to accomplish missions that it was notdesigned for and for which a less costly alternativewould have sufced.49 The Reagan, George H. W. Bush,Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush administrationsinherited this weapon system and the force structurebuilt to employ it. The aircrafts life expectancy is 50-to-70 years, so the B-1 could be around for another 40plus years.50 The B-1 is currently congured as a cruisemissile and smart bomb platform, which can operate atextended standoff distances.51 Its acquisition cost, basedon post-1980 gures, was $280 million per plane. The

older B-52 can fulll the same mission, with slightlyless payload. Its acquisition cost in 1998 constantdollars was $32 million per plane. Given the hugebudget outlays to procure the B-1 and the additionalcosts to maintain, man, and y (in September 1987, itcost $21,000 an hour to operate one B-1); the Air Forceis unlikely to risk further censure by abandoning it.52Instead, the B-1 promises to be an aircraft in search ofa mission. Moreover, it will continue to affect policyoptions if only because its development and operatingcost have consumed money, and will continue to do so,that could otherwise be applied to the development andacquisition of more advanced technologies. Similarly,strategies that call for the use of military force, especiallyairpower, may be constrained by the presence of this

weapon system in the inventory: it may not be suitedto the policy and military strategy the administrationwould like to execute, but it is available.


27/84

15

The decision to develop and acquire the B-1represented a choice that the military (Air Force) made

from among other alternatives (for example, upgradingthe B-52, developing advanced ghters, procuring ofmore B-2s, or acquiring additional strategic lift such asthe C-5A, C-141, and C-17) predicated on a worldviewno longer valid when the plane became operational 27years later.53 Moreover, the military made the weaponssystems choices that affected future foreign policy,not the elected civilian leadership.54 As a result of thisasynchrony between policy and weapons systemsdevelopment, or what is referred to here as policy lag,the B-1 essentially became obsolete in the nal stagesof its elding.55

Proponents of the B-1 maintain that its developmentplayed a useful role in the SALT and later STARTnegotiations with the Soviet Union as a bargaining

chip to encourage the Soviets to reduce their strategicweapons. Three factors undermine this claim. First,the preponderance of Americas strategic nuclearweapons capability resided in its ICBMs, IRBMs,and SLBMs. These strategic systems, constituting themain threat to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR) existence, were the ones the Soviets wantedreduced. Second, the oft-vaunted ability of the B-1 topenetrate the sophisticated Soviet air defenses wasalways theoretical and problematic. Once an enemylearns of a capability, the technological advantage ofthe weapon system lasts only as long as it takes theenemy to develop a countermeasure. Last, given theprodigious nancial and political resources the AirForce expended to procure the B-1, it is difcult to

imagine it willingly relinquishing the weapon systemabsent quid pro quo in its other weapons programs. AirForce prestige and identity were bound up intimatelywith the B-1 bomber.


28/84

16

B-1 adherents also played up the versatility of thebomber. Even as the B-1s strategic role diminished,

it could still perform conventional missions basedon its considerable standoff capability, or so it wasclaimed. This argument also is awed. First, the B-1was developed and sold to Congress and the Americanpeople as a strategic weapon, one that would providethe United States with a signicant military advantage.The United States had plenty of less costly alternatives,like the B-52, for conventional missions. Moreover,the threats America faced in the post-Cold War eradid not require the capabilities of the technologicallyadvanced B-1 to defeat these threats because they werenot associated with sophisticated air defense systems.Last, claiming that the standoff capability of the B-1minimizes risk to the crews is equally contentious. Thestandoff capability of the B-1 has nothing to do with

the aircraft itself; rather, it results from sophisticatedweapons munitions on board it. Those missiles andbombs can be launched with equal effectiveness andstandoff distance from a dirigible, and for a fraction ofthe cost.

As the case of the B-1 illustrates, the foreign policyoptions of Americas leadership are constrained (nan-cially and operationally) by the militarys decision toacquire specic Cold War weapons systems. In someinstances, it is not the weapons systems themselvesthat are in question as much as the number of suchsystems in the inventory and the force structure builtaround them. For example, does the United States inthe post-Cold War era need almost 1,200 (including464 in the National Guard) AH-64 Apache Longbow

attack helicopters, weapons systems that weredesigned in the early 1970s to destroy massed Sovietarmored formations that no longer exist?56 Does thenation need 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and


29/84

17

their associated battle groups when the sea lanes arenot threatened?57 What weapon system technologies

should the military develop and what force structureshould the military have, given the threats the nationfaces, or the capabilities it feels it needs, and the policyit wants to implement both at home and abroad? Thesequestions are not new; they have been raised beforeand undoubtedly will surface again. Part of the answerlies in an examination of the apparent disconnectsbetween weapons development and force structuredecisions, on the one hand, and foreign policy andnational security strategy decisions, on the other.

While linking weapon system development,acquisition, and future force structure to policy wasdifcult during the Cold War, it became even more of achallenge in the post-Cold War era when there is not aclearly dened threat on which to focus. Since 1989 and

the end of the Cold War, there have been four changes innational security strategy.58 With respect to Americasbasic foreign policy stance, the United States shed itsprevious one and adopted a new one in 1990, 1993,1996, 2000, and 2002 (see Figure 1 below). The tenorof these foreign policy changes has in part dependedon and been conditioned by the weapons systemsand force structure the political leadership inheritedfrom the Cold War. Even though the armed forces arepresently changing/transforming, the decisions madeon what capabilities to acquire and how to organizeand employ those capabilities remain primarily withthe military.59 Moreover, due to the nature of RDT&Eand acquisition system, these decisions drive thedevelopment of military capabilities that are largely

independent of policy.60Figure 1 illustrates the potential disconnect

between weapons systems development and force


30/84

18

structure on the one hand, and foreign policy on theother. It compares changes in foreign policy to the force

structure at the national leaderships disposal shouldpolicy decisions call for the use of force.

Weapons systems and their encapsulating forcestructure do not remain static. Changing technologydictates that part of the militarys force structure willbe in almost constant transition. Presently, the militaryhas three force structures (although it acknowledgesonly two, the current and the future force). The rst isthe current force. The current force is a residual ColdWar-era force designed to defeat a Soviet-based threat.It constitutes most of the militarys present forcestructure. The second category, the transition force,consists of a percentage of the force that is modernizingwith prototypes of future force equipment, but whichis not fully trained or ready. The transition force is a

bridge between the current force and the force structurethat the military is building toward, called the futureforce.61 Emerging technology drives the future forcesdevelopment.

While the terminology used in this gurecurrent,transition, and future forceis most germane to theArmy, it describes the process that all the services use.The Air Force, for example, had the B-52 (current), theB-1 (transition), and the B-2 (future) operational at thesame time. But the most important insight to derive fromthe gure is the relationship among weapons systemsdecisions, the type of force in place or projected to bein place, and the potential unsuitability of that forcewith respect to shifts in foreign policy. For example,the Cold War current force that was developed and

acquired to defeat the Soviet threat in central Europeis still in existence today and is projected to remain inthe active components until 2015, longer in the reservecomponents.


31/84

19

1970

1980

19

90

1993

1996

20

00

2002

2020

20

30+

Fo

reign

DtenteBipolar

UnipolarMultilateral

Engagement

UnilateralUnilateral--?--?--?--?

Policy

ConfrontRegionalEngagement

U.S.-

LedSelectedPreemptive

BalanceEnlargement

CoalitionEngage

CurrentRDT&E*---20%------80%-------95%-----------80%-------------------40%----Reserve

Fo

rce

Tr

ansition

RDT&E*-----5%-----------20%

-----------------------50%----80

%-----25%>

Fo

rce

Fu

ture

RDT&E*-----------------10%--------20%----75%

Fo

rce

*Indicatesdecisionpointstodeveloptechnology,weaponssystems,andforcestruc

tureforfutureelding.

Sources:T

heWhiteHouse,NationalSecurityStrategyoftheUnited

Statesfortheyears1988thr

ough2000;The1998Annua

lReport

onTheArmyAfterNextProject,KnowledgeandSpeed:BattleFor

ceandtheU.S.Armyof2025;DepartmentoftheArmy

:United

StatesArm

yTransformationCampaignPlan,datedApril2001;DepartmentoftheAirForce,GlobalEngagement:AVisionforthe21st

CenturyAirForce.

Fi

gure1.ForeignPolicyandWeaponsAcquisition/ForceStructureDevelopment.


32/84

20

As of this writing, the nation is involved in theGWOT that involves military action in a host of

countries. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ispressuring the services to transform, to think aboutpossible futures, and to acquire military technologythat will give the nation a decisive advantage acrossthe full spectrum of warfare.62 As the current war onterror illustrates, the Cold War legacy force does notprovide the right t, but it is available and the Bushadministration has had to adjust its policy optionsaccordingly.63 There have been signicant increasesin the defense budget to acquire the technology andcapabilities the military needs today. However, asFigure 1 illustrates, the technology and force structurethe military has on the drawing boards today will nottranslate into actual capabilities in any meaningful wayuntil 2020 and beyond. Will the current foreign and

national security policies in force today still be valid15 to 20 years into the future? If recent history is anyguide, the answer is no. The military is researching anddeveloping weapons technologies that it needs now,but which, when elded, may not have the right mixof capabilities that as yet unanticipated future policyoptions may require. Put differently, the military isdeveloping and acquiring the futures legacy force.

ACCOUNTING FOR POLICY LAG

While a number of factors contribute to policy lag,three are particularly important; namely, the planninghorizon involved and the number of players in thetwo processes; the budget process they operate within;

and the predictability of the outcomes of each process.Understanding how weapons systems decisionsprecede foreign policy decisions by lengthy intervals


33/84

21

is important to understanding the role that militarytransformation plays in shaping the nations future

foreign policy and national security strategy.

Planning Horizons.

Foreign policy and national security strategy tendto have short planning horizons when compared toweapon system and force structure development. First,policy decisions are governed by the structure of thefederal government and its political process, whereasweapon system and force structure decisions tend tobe relatively isolated from this process. Second, foreignpolicy and national security strategy formulation tend tobe White House-centered, while their implementationis decentralized. Weapon system and force structureplanning and execution decisions revolve around the

militarys preferences. Last, foreign policy and nationalsecurity decisions are visible and subject to censure bythe electorate, while weapons systems decisions areseldom subjected to public scrutiny. The discussionthat follows elaborates on these distinctions.

The structure of Americas political system worksagainst the development of long-range foreign andnational security policy. Policymakers themselvesare subject to wholesale change every 6 to 8 years.Congressional elections occur every 2 years, presidentialelections every 4 years, and senatorial elections every6 years. Although the chances are slim that the entireelected leadership of the country would change in anygiven 8-year period, leadership changes do occur quitefrequently, and with them changes in foreign policy.64

Figure 1 reects a 13-year post-Cold War periodinvolving three presidents and six nuanced orientationsin national security policy. Responsibility for theformulation and execution of foreign and national


34/84

22

security policy is shared among the various branchesof government, but rests especially the executive and

legislative branches. For example, while the presidentcan initiate a treaty, the Senate has to ratify it before it isformally binding on the nation. Likewise, the presidentcan lead the nation into a war, but he cannot declarewarthat requires an act of Congress.65 The individualstates play a minor role in the development of foreignpolicy. They offer tax incentives to lure major foreigninvestment, and they exchange trade delegationswith other nations.66 Within the states, major citiessuch as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Bostonnegotiate with foreign nations and establish bilateraltrade and cultural events. The nature of the politicalprocess that governs the development of foreign andnational security policy is even more complicating.67Commenting on the impact of the federal bureaucracy

on foreign policy, Henry Kissinger wrote:

The American foreign policy bureaucracy is for themost part staffed by individuals who have dedicatedthemselves to what is, in American society, a ratherunorthodox career so that they may promulgate andimplement their views of a better world. Their opinions,moreover, are honed by a system in which policyemerges from bureaucratic struggles, which, as Secretary

of State George Shultz later pointed out, are never nallysettled. Segmented into a series of individual, and at timeisolated, initiatives geared to highly specic problems,American foreign policy is rarely approached from thepoint of view of an overall concept.Ad hoc departmentalapproaches have moreand more passionatespokesmen than does an overall strategy, which oftenhas no spokesman at all.68

Other writers have commented on the short-term orientation of American foreign policy, as well.Bruce Russett states that foreign policy measures are


35/84

23

governed largely by domestic policy, because theygratify friends and disarm adversaries at home, not

because they necessarily seem sensible in some abstractprinciple of the national interests abroad. Furthermore,the political horizon shaping those decisions istypically a short one, not a vision for the long haul.69Additionally, changes in foreign and national securitypolicy tend to be incremental and thus support a short-term vision. As Herbert Simon stated in 1957, politicaldecisionmaking is not truly rational, since it is impossibleto know and process all the information and variablesthat impact on a given issue. Thus, in Simons view,political decisionmaking occurs in an environment ofbounded rationality, with decisionmaking based onthe best but partial information available at the time.Simon referred to this decisionmaking as satiscing;that is, picking the course of action that will meet the

requirements. Expanding on Simons concept, CharlesLindblom postulated that policy decisions are made bymarginal analysis in which policies are compared toone another and agreement is made on means ratherthan on ends. This muddling through phenomenon,according to Lindblom, largely accounts for theincremental nature of policy changes, as only smalldepartures from existing policies are acceptable in theface of uncertainties and unclear goals.70

Though numerous actors participate in the foreignpolicy process, the process remains White House-centered.71 But, as explained above, the president isconstrained in the initiation of foreign and nationalsecurity policy by the structure of the government andthe nature of its operation. Even within the executive

branch, the presidents ability to conduct long-termplanning is constrained by the agencies he has to workwith. In the post-Cold War era, the State Department


36/84

24

has proven largely unproductive in developing long-range plans and viable policy. This is due in part to its

structure as well as to the culture of the organization.72

Most of the State Departments efforts are spent onputting out res.73 The National Security Council (NSC)staff does not focus on long-term planning, either. TheNSC staff is small compared to other governmentalorganizations and incredibly overworked. The staffresponds to the needs of the national security advisorand the president who are primarily preoccupiedwith responding to immediate events and day-to-daygoverning. Consequently, there is little time, interest,or reward involved in long-term planning.74

Additionally, a presidents foreign policy agenda isgoverned by what scholars refer to as the presidentiallife cycle, or that period of time when congressionallines have not hardened, and the president can work

foreign policy, national security, and domestic agendaissues in a more bipartisan manner. This period canlast for as little as 3 to 4 months or, in exceptional cases,extend for as long as a year.75 Given the short durationof the bipartisan phase of the presidential life cycle,a president seeking reelection will feel pressed toimplement those policies that will have a positive effecton his chances at the polls. Long-term policies whoseeffects are difcult to measure do little to promote apresidents reelection or his partys political agenda.Bruce Russett made the case in 1990 that presidentsoften implement foreign policy measures for purelypartisan purposes:

A president may impose a grain embargo less to inuence

the Soviet Union than to impress voters at home with histoughness against a militarily active foreign adversary;a subsequent president may repeal the embargo far lessbecause it has achieved its stated foreign policy purpose


37/84

25

than because he needs the domestic political support ofgrowers and shippers of grain, and of the members ofCongress from their states.76

Russett goes on to claim that presidents use the armedforces in much the same manner. A show of force, if usedproperly, can rally public opinion and the Congress tothe side of the president during a crisis and assist himin furthering his domestic agenda in its aftermath.77Moreover, a presidents policies, both foreign and

domestic, are opened to scrutiny by Congress, thenews media, and the public.78 Additionally, his partyschances at the polls are affected by his policies andtheir approval by the public. Collectively, these factorscontribute to the short-term focus of American foreignpolicy.

The weapon systems and force structure develop-ment process does not labor under the same constraintsthat the foreign policy process does. First, the numberof actors in the process is comparatively limited.They consist of the president; the White House staffincluding the NSC and the Ofce of Science andTechnology; Ofce of the Secretary of Defense;Defense Science Board; Joints Chiefs of Staff; thethree military departments (technically the Marine

Corps is subordinate to the Department of the Navy);the Combatant Commanders (formerly known asCommanders-in-Chiefs [CINCs]); defense contractors;the research and development community consistingof government, private, and government-sponsoreduniversity researchers; and select members of Congressserving on committees dealing with weapons systemsRDT&E and acquisition.79 Although the number ofactors may seem large at rst glance, it is small comparedto the numbers who play in the foreign policy process.


38/84

26

Moreover, with the exception of the few elected orappointed actors such as members of Congress and

the Secretary of Defense, most of the participants inthe weapons systems and force structure developmentprocess are immune from electoral politics. Not havingto answer to the electorate, they can focus on the long-term aspects of weapons systems development and thebona de merits or demerits of the systems proposed.

The weapons community mentioned above, oftenreferred to as the military-industrial complex, isfocused on relatively narrow issues such as the designand development of new weapons systems.80 Thiscircumscribed approach facilitates long-term planning,as the actors involved do not have to worry about theinterests of those external to the process. The details ofweapons systems R&D tend to be highly technical andarcane, which means players outside of the issue area

seldom question them. Based on the recommendationsof the military services, Congress annually appropriatesfunds for R&D, which, in turn, are applied to specicweapon programs development. Over the systemsdevelopmental life span (10-15 years depending on thesystem), the cost sunk in R&D and prototype testingcan become substantial, so much so that these costsoften argue against canceling the system, even whenits utility is in doubt. The development of the B-1 andthe B-2 are cases in point. Additionally, individualmembers of Congress are quick to recognize the joband growth benets that prolonged weapons systemsdevelopment and acquisition bring to their districts:It is not uncommon to nd the Congress insisting thatthe nation needs a particular weapons system that

the president, the secretary of defense, and the head ofthe armed services that would use the system all insistthey do not need or want.81


39/84

27

Furthermore, the militarys RDT&E, acquisition,and force structure planning process is Pentagon-

centered and not subject to the same public scrutiny thatthe foreign policy process is. The military determineswhat weapon system technologies to develop and thenrecommends from among them which ones DoD shouldacquire, with relatively little or no outside interfer-ence.82 This is not to say that Congress and the newsmedia give the military a free ride. Former SenatorWilliam Proxmire initiated the Golden Fleece Awardto highlight waste, fraud, and abuse on the part ofthe government to the public and to the media. Yet,uncovering 600 dollar hammers and 1,200 dollar toiletseats, while sensational and indicative of over-billing bydefense contractors on the one hand and poor contractsupervision by the military on the other, does little toreconcile national security strategy development with

weapon systems development.83

Moreover, it doesnot affect the militarys RDT&E, acquisition, or forcestructure development process in any substantiveway. The decisions on what weapons systems todevelop, and acquire, and how to structure Americasarmed forces to use them remain with the military.84In the United States, weapons are not purchased bythe secretary of defense for all the armed services, butby the individual services themselves.85

Taken together, the relatively small number of actors(admittedly all actors are not equal), their insulationfrom the electoral process, the technical and arcanenature of weapon system development, the distributionof research funds and accumulation of sunk costs overa period of years, the economic benets of long-term

development to congressmen from recipient districts,and the closed nature of the decisionmaking process,all lend themselves to a long-term planning horizon inthe weapons systems development process.


40/84

28

Another factor contributing to the difference in thenature of the planning process between foreign policy

and weapons system policy is the nature of the budgetcycle they operate on, a subject for the next section.

Budgeting Process.

Most government agencies, the State Departmentincluded, operate on a budget cycle that covers 3years. In the current year they are executing onebudget, presenting next years budget to the presidentand Congress for approval and appropriations, andformulating the budget for the year after that. Mostgovernmental agencies have to navigate their waythrough the congressional budgetary system in orderto secure the monies they need for their programs.This involves an authorization process in which

they justify to one congressional committee the needfor the program; and to a different congressionalcommittee as part of an appropriations process inwhich they justify the cost of the programs theywant to implement.86 Often, the authorization andappropriations processes overlap. The congressionalcommittees seldom coordinate with one another, andit is not unusual to have members of Congress on theauthorization committee approve a program, onlyto have members on the appropriations committee,due to partisan issues, refuse to fund it. At any pointin this process, the program is subject to bargaining,compromise, and the necessity for coalition-building.87While agencies may plan for programs beyond 3years, the earliest they can get them authorized is 2

years in advance. Anything beyond that is subject tothe winds of political change and the impact of interestgroups clamoring for inclusion among those receiving


41/84

29

the benets. Consequently, the budget cycle and thepolitical factors that affect it do not reward long-term

planning within most government agencies.88

Within DoD, however, the budget planning system

is much more systematic and long-term oriented.89 Theservices plan for the far term (25 years), the mid-term(16 years), and the near term (6 years).90 The servicesgo through the same congressional authorization andappropriations committees process, except that theircommittees are dedicated to defense and the armedservices. Like the committees that deal with the rest ofgovernment, those that deal with defense have the samecoordination and synchronization problems. However,the military has three advantages in the budgetingprocess which facilitate long-term planning for RDT&E,acquisition, and force structure decisions. First, themilitarys expertise is seldom challenged. Congress may

quibble over how many of a certain type of weapon themilitary wants, but not on whether the military needsit. Recent decisions on procurement of a new nuclearcarrier for the Navy, a new armed reconnaissancehelicopter for the Army, and a new advance ghterfor the Air Force indicate the services unchallengeddiscretion in the weapon systems development process,given that the threat these three systems were designedto defeat no longer exists.91 Second, the participants inthe weapon systems authorization and appropriationsprocess are relatively closed groups that share the sameinterests. Consequently, dissent rarely occurs amongthose called to testify before Congress. Moreover, thechairmen of the various armed services committees, ifnot all the members, are from districts and states that

have been favorably blessed by defense spending.Finally, the jargon the weapon systems/force structureadvocates speak and the process (Program Planning


42/84

30

Budgeting System, or PPBS) they use to identify, justify, and acquire their preferred weapons systems

are complicated, tedious, and arcane. Taken together,these three advantages of the military services facilitatetheir weapon system RDT&E, acquisition, and forcestructure long-term planning.

The services present their budget plans to Congressspecifying what weapons systems they intend to de-velop and the long-term plan to research, test, andacquire them. Along with this plan, the militarysubmits the estimated cost of the system amortizedover the length of the RDT&E, acquisition, and eldingperiod. Unlike civilian governmental agencies whoseappropriations cover 1 year, military appropriationshabitually cover 2 years.92 It is not unusual for Congressto fund most of the life-cycle R&D costs in the rst severalyears of a weapons development. In the case of the B-

1 mentioned earlier, Congress approved 78 percent ofits costs before the rst aircraft was own.93 Similarly,between 1984 and 2002, Congress appropriated/funded over $5.9 billion for R&D on a new Comanchearmed scout helicopter for the Army.94 Eighteen yearsin the making, the program was cancelled in 2004 beforethe military received its rst operational model. TheB-1s acquisition and that of the Comanche helicopterare just two of many cases illustrating the strength ofthe military services in realizing their weapon systemspreferences in the budgetary process and the abilityof the military to sustain long-term planning forRDT&E, acquisition, and force structure development.However, this drawn-out process has certain benets.Defense spending brings with it economic benets to

the legislators and their districts.While the benets that members of Congress accrue

for their constituents from foreign policy often are


43/84

31

intangible and impossible to measure, those derivedfrom weapon systems and force structure development

are more concrete. Employment is one of the key benetsa congressional leader can bring to his district or state.Defense spending plays a major role in employmentwithin the United States. Every $1 billion in defenseexpenditures creates between 25,000 and 55,000 jobs,depending on whether the calculation includes indirectemployment effects.95 In 1990, DoD spent over $300billion per year; employed over four million people(60 percent of all full-time government employees);accounted for 30 percent of all Federal expenditures;and had over 900 bases, facilities, and properties.96 Inthe year 2000, the personnel gures were lower, but thedollar amount was not. DoD employed just fewer thanthree million personnel (2,952,000) and had a budget of$291 billion, of which $163.7 billion, or more than half,

were spent on RDT&E and procurement, which can beequated directly to jobs.97 There is a strong correlationbetween the defense payroll or weapons spendingin a state and congressional voting practices. Somemembers of Congress, expecting their district or stateto receive substantial contract awards, request that thecontract award announcement be timed to coincideas closely as possible to the congressmans campaignschedule.98 Although not every congressman courtsthe military and defense contracts, those who sit on thevarious armed service committees tend to come fromdistricts/states that have a concentration of defensecontractors.99

The magnitude of defense spending in the UnitedStates and its very tangible benets provide legislators

with strong incentives to support weapons systemsdevelopment, especially if the development andacquisition will occur over an extended period. This


44/84

32

benet is magnied if the weapons system will becomepart of a force structure that is based in the legislators

state/district. Besides direct compensation to the vari-ous states for salaries and wages, DoD provides defensegrants to state and local governments, retired militarypay, and procurement and research grants. All told,defense spending in 2002 accounted for 16.2 percentof all federal spending. Excluding programs mandatedby law, the discretionary budget, defense expendituresin 2002 accounted for almost 61 percent of the federalbudget.100 Given the amount of dollars that ow outof DoD for weapons systems and forces structure, itis not surprising to nd strong legislative support forweapons systems with extended development andelding times, those systems that will remain in theinventory for some time.

Predictability.

The nal factor contributing to the lag of foreignand national security policy behind the militaryslong-term weapons systems development, acquisition,and force structure programs deals with programsthat are tangible and predictable as opposed to thosethat are not. Foreign policy often addresses issues inthe humanitarian world. It is more difcult for theforeign policy community to articulate and justify thecommitment of resources to a particular humanitarianprogram when its outcomes in the near term, let alonethe far term, are uncertain and difcult to predict andmeasure. For example, U.S. intervention in Bosnia toprevent ethnic cleansing, establish peace, and promote

democracy continues to be a drain on the nationseconomic and military resources (albeit to a lesser extentnow). While public and congressional support for the


45/84

33

Bosnian intervention still exists, it becomes increasinglydifcult to justify in terms of national interests and to

the electorate as the years go by. Will ethnic tensionserupt when the U.S.-led coalition departs? How do weknow that it will not, and what measurement tool do weuse? When will democracy take hold in Bosnia? If so,what type of democracy? What aspects of civil societymust be in place for democracy to prosper? No one cananswer these questions with any certainty; there aretoo many murky variables to predict an outcome.

Foreign policy deals with states and nations,composed of human beings representing variouscultures and civilizations. A policy directed toward astate affects its people and, unlike inanimate objects,people often respond in unpredictable ways. Considerthe pre-September 11, 2001 (9/11) policy toward NorthKorea. U.S. policy had been aimed at encouraging

North Korea to forsake a nuclear program capableof producing weapons-grade plutonium in favorof a nuclear energy program under the auspices ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency. In returnfor participating in this program, the United Statesencouraged its allies to open a trade dialogue withthe recalcitrant communist state in order to promoteregional stability.101 This policy, initiated by PresidentBill Clinton in 1994, changed almost overnight whenPresident George W. Bush denounced North Koreaas a member of the Axis of Evil in the immediateaftermath of 9/11. North Korea reacted to thisaccusation in a belligerent manner. Now, insteadof limiting nuclear weapons, North Korea is moreactive and open in pursuing its own nuclear weapons

program along with the capability to target the UnitedStates and its allies.102 Also, the North Koreans mightexport the nuclear weapons technology they acquire,


46/84

34

if not the weapons themselves, to rogue states andterrorist groups.103 Consequently, a U.S. policy based

on deterring nuclear proliferation has changed to onebased on preempting nuclear proliferation through theuse of force if necessary and recently has reverted tomultiparty negotiations. These policy swings applybeyond Korea to a growing number of potentiallyhostile states capable of acquiring these weapons andtheir delivery systems.104

What the Bosnia and North Korea examplesillustrate is how often foreign policy can change eitherwith the advent of a new administration having adifferent world view or with a single seismic event.The number of independent variables a foreign policyplanner has to deal with is daunting, and many aredifcult to assess. Moreover, the legislative branch,with its narrower focus, contributes to the constant ux

in U.S. foreign and national security policy. Becausethese factors involve human beings who react in oftenunpredictable ways, they argue for a short-term focusin the foreign and national security planning process.The weapon systems and force structure developmentprocess is less turbulent and more predictable sinceit deals in the realm of the science, where objects aremore tractable.105

Weapon systems and force structure developmentoperate in the realm of science, physics, and mathemat-ics. A weapon system may have people in the loop whenit is operating, but the system proper, whether it is arie, missile, aircraft, or ship, is composed of elementssubject to physically engineered controls. Even thosesystems that feature articial intelligence, the so-

called smart and brilliant weapons systems, arecomposed of man-made material with a programmedrange of responses.106 In brief, the development


47/84

35

process uses the scientic method. Weapon developerscan control the environment and the independent

variables associated with the systems operation, andthe procedures and test results are reproducible,given the variables they control. Moreover, weaponsystem development follows a formalized procedureconsisting of several xed steps: identifying theoperational requirement; validating its need; full-scaledevelopment; performance testing; operational testing;and elding and operations.107

Additionally, the military has institutionalizedthe same procedure in its organizational structure.In an effort to obtain economy and weapon systeminteroperability across the services, the Joint Staffestablished the Joint Requirements Oversight Council(JROC) and the Joint Capabilities Integration andDevelopment System (JCIDS) program. These two

measures enabled the Joint Staff to accomplish therst two steps in the weapon development procedure,namely, the identication of a requirement andits validation.108 Weapons systems identied andvalidated through this process are funded for furtherdevelopment and worked into future force structurerequirements. Though not perfect, the process,methods, and organization allow the military toacquire weapons systems and develop force structurein a systematic, cost-justiable, and deliberate manner.Moreover, the weapon system capabilities vis--visthe threat they are designed to defeat are predictable,a big advantage in the policy struggle at the nationallevel. Taken together, the factors described aboveallow the military to forecast its weapon system and

force structure development well into the future with ahigh degree of probability that it will come to fruition.In addition to the military having almost exclusive


48/84

36

jurisdiction over weapons systems decisions and thedifferences in planning horizons between national

security strategy/foreign policy and weapons systemsprocurement, a third factor that is skewing U.S. defensetransformation is the militarys and DoDs almostexclusive focus on network centric warfare.

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE AND THEFUTURE OF DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION

Enamored with the potentially decisive advantagethat information dominance and precision munitionsoffered in conventional warfare, the military usedthe 1990s to develop the material underpinnings ofwhat would become network centric warfare (NCW).Throughout the rst decade of the post-Cold War era,the military maintained its major weapons systems

preferences. The Navy continued to procure newaircraft carriers; the Air Force, new bombers and ghter-bombers; and the Army, new attack helicopters. Whileresembling their Cold War counterparts in appearance,these weapons systems had signicantly enhancedcapabilities. Many of these systems featured radar-defeating technology (stealth) and carried a new andadvanced family of precision munitions. Additionally,they were linked to an array of overhead intelligence/target gathering platforms that were interconnectedby secure computers, which provided various usersat different command levels a common view of thebattlespace.109 American superiority in emerginginformation/intelligence gathering and precision striketechnology allowed Americas leaders to detect threats,

identify targets, and quickly strike them. If attacked,the accuracy and power of the munitions virtuallyensured the targets destruction. The military codied


49/84

37

this type of warfare in the term NCW.110 According toNCWs authors:

We dene NCW as an information superiority-enabledconcept of operations that generates increased combatpower by networking sensors, decisionmakers, andshooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speedof command, higher tempo of operations, greaterlethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization. In essence, NCW translates informationsuperiority into combat power by effectively linking

knowledgeable entities in the battlespace.111

NCW encapsulates four capabilities that themilitary has pursued for over 25 years, and whoserecent development technology has accelerated. Therst is information dominance. All militaries seek togain intelligence on their potential enemies in orderto determine their size, equipment, capabilities, andintentions. Simultaneously, they have attempted todeny the enemy information on themselves. Knowledgeis power, and its acquisition or lack thereof vis--vis theenemy often determines victory or defeat in combat.Americas dominance in space-based and aerial high-resolution intelligence systems provides it with anunmatched information acquisition capability. Second,

the military continuously has sought to increase theaccuracy of the weapons systems it employs. Oneroundone hitone kill is a goal the military hassought for some time.112 Precision munitions not onlyensure enemy targets are destroyed, but also theyminimize collateral damage (the damage done tononcombatants).113 In theory, precision munitions aremore economical and efcient, thus freeing weaponssystems to strike multiple enemy targets simultane-ously, and reducing the overall number of weapons


50/84

38

systems in the force structure. For example, duringOperation DESERT STORM, only 9 percent of the

munitions used were smart or precision munitions.114

Consequently, the Air Force allocated 10 or more aircraftto each target. Twelve years later during OperationIRAQI FREEDOM, precision munitions accounted forover 70 percent of the bombs dropped, and the AirForce was able to allocate just two aircraft per target.115Although the militarys overall force structure shrankduring the rst decade of the post-Cold War era dueto the advent of enhanced precisions weapons, themilitarys overall capability, lethality, and effectivenessincreased.

Third, the military emphasized speed in theconduct of its operations. Besides being able to move,shoot, and communicate faster than the enemy, thearmed forces had to think and decide faster than their

opponents, too. During the Cold War, the militaryinvested in weapons systems that were faster, moremaneuverable, more mechanically reliable, and moresurvivable than anything the Soviet Union couldeld. However, the drive for technological superioritydid not stop with the end of the Cold War. Instead,scientic advances in computer and space-basedsystems propelled weapon system developmentforward. Speed of operations encompasses more thanfast equipment, it describes how the United Statesplans to pursue its military campaigns. The militaryintends to use the enhanced capabilities of its weapons,intelligence, and command and control systems toconduct operations simultaneously and continuouslyagainst an enemys political, economic, military, and

social-psychological-informational centers of power.116Information dominance and the ability to share it inreal time at all levels from the White House to the


51/84

39

battalion level provide leaders with a common viewof the battlespace. This capability allows leaders to

employ their weapons systems to achieve synergism intime, space, purpose, and effect.117 Together, enhancedweapons systems combined with precision munitions,information dominance, and the ability to decide andact rapidly provide the United States with a decisiveedge over any potential enemy attempting to challengeit symmetrically.118

Additionally, the military has continued toemphasize the importance of air-and-space-basedweapons systems in its strategic and operationalapproach to warfare. Airpower has several attractivefeatures. First, it can self-deploy to a theater of operationsand operate from nearby bases in the region, or in thecase of naval aviation, operate from an aircraft carrier.B-2 bombers, with aerial refueling en-route and return,

can launch their attacks from the continental UnitedStates, thus obviating the need for overseas bases.Second, air power can be used almost immediatelyafter political leaders decide that a military response isnecessary. Third, air power, supported by space-and-ground-based intelligence systems capable of providingdigitally transmitted target data to aircraft weaponssystems in real time, provides political leaders andsenior military commanders with a much-enhancedtarget discriminating capability.119 Instead of levelingan entire section of a residential or industrial area todestroy a target, the aircraft equipped with Joint DirectAttack Munitions (JDAMS) can land a bomb withinfeet of the aim point. Additionally, formerly difculttargets are now vulnerable. Consequently, air powers

precision capabilities minimize civilian casualtiesand suffering.120 Last, extended-range precisionmunitions allow aircraft to deliver their attack outside


52/84

40

of an enemys air defense capability. Add to this astealth capability, and the Air Force has the ability

to remain undetected as well. The cumulative effectsof long-range precision munitions, high-resolutionoverhead target acquisition, and radar defeatingtechnologies provide the Air Force with a stand offadvantage (the ability to hit the enemy without beinghit in return), and minimize the probability of U.S.casualties.121 During the Clinton administration, airpower and cruise missiles (launched from ships andplanes) were the primary response to terrorist threatsand attacks against U.S. interests.122 When the terroristattacks occurred on 9/11, the military lacked a specicplan for operations in Afghanistan. However, thecapabilities inherent in the militarys technology andforce structure enabled President Bush to commencecombat operations in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001,

less than a month later.Within days of the commencement of military

operations, American airpower employing a variety ofair- and sea-launched precision munitions eliminatedthe Talibans air force, air defense system, and keycommunications systems.123 Simultaneously, Afghanopposition forces supported by U.S. special operationsforce (SOF) teams and close air support launched aground offensive against the Taliban and al-Qaidaforces. The military used air power and precisionsmunitions to isolate the enemy on the battleeld,prevent him from reinforcing his positions, deny himinformation on U.S. and allied forces, and ultimately todestroy him.124 In December 2001, with the battleeldisolated and the Northern alliance pressing the Taliban

and al-Qaida ghters, the United States began deploy-ing U.S. Marines (later Army forces) from the carrierbattle groups located in the Indian Ocean to secure


53/84

41

key airheads and lodgment areas in Afghanistan.125 Inaddition to direct combat operations, the United States

distributed thousands of tons of medical and foodsupplies to the Afghan people. These humanitarianoperations were part of a psychological operationscampaign to convince the people that U.S. combatoperations were targeted against the Taliban and al-Qaida forces, and not them.126 The military conductedits operations with dazzling speed. American aircraftoperated around the clock. In the space of 2 years,the targeting cycle for Tomahawk land attack missiles(TLAMs or cruise missiles) had been reduced from 101minutes during operations in Kosovo to 19 minutes inOperation ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan).127U.S forces moved about the country by air to closerapidly with identied enemy forces. In less than 6months, the Taliban had been removed from power,

and the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan had beenlargely destroyed.128

The militarys success in Afghanistan demonstratedits technological superiority and the inuence it had onthe nations foreign policy. The campaign was foughtdifferently than previous conicts. Operations featuredsurrogate ground forces, U.S. airpower, informationdominance, and precision munitions.129 The uniquemix and synchronization of these elements duringthe ghting encouraged some observers to categorizethe Afghan operations as a New American Way ofWar.130 President Bush clearly was impressed by themilitarys weapons systems and operational prowess.In a December 2001 speech at the Citadel, PresidentBush declared,

Afghanistan has been a proving ground for this newapproach. These past 2 months have shown that aninnovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape


54/84

42

and then dominate an unconventional conict. . . . Theconict in Afghanistan has taught us more about thefuture of our military than a decade of blue ribbonpanels and think-tank symposiums. . . . When all ofour military can continuously locate and track movingtargetswith surveillance from spacewarfare will betruly revolutionized.131

Critics of the Bush administrations conduct of thewar in Afghanistan argue that the President andhis team have relied too heavily on the militarys

high-tech capabilities to attain political objectivesthat might have been better served by otherinstruments of power.132 Frederick Kagan in Warand Aftermath claims that President Bushs visionof war

. . . focuses on destroying the enemys armed forcesand his ability to command them and control them. Itdoes not focus on the problem of achieving politicalobjectives. The advocates of a New American Way ofWar, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Bushchief among them, have attempted to simplify war intoa targeting drill. They see the enemy as a target set andbelieve that when all or most of the targets have been hit,he [the enemy] will inevitably surrender and Americangoals will be achieved.133

What type of war did America enter into inAfghanistan and what political objectives governedU.S. military action? Answering this question is anessential step to establishing a sound strategy andidentifying the means (resources)

Defense Transformation: To What, For What?

Documents

Transcript of Defense Transformation: To What, For What?