Defending Proper Functions

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'Defending' Direct Proper Functions

Author(s): Paul Sheldon DaviesSource: Analysis, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 299-306Published by: on behalf ofOxford University Press The Analysis CommitteeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3328403Accessed: 05-06-2015 01:53 UTC

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2/9

Defending

direct

proper functions

PAUL SHELDON DAVIES

In

Davies

[2]

I

argue

that Millikan s

[5]

theory

of direct

proper

functions

fails.

Elder

[3]

attempts

a

defence of Millikan s

theory,

but his

attempt

does

not

work

and

I

propose

to

explain

why.

According

to

Millikan

[5]

natural

items

such as hearts have direct

proper

functions

only

if

collections

of

such

items constitute

a

biological

category.

Members of

biological

categories

are

classified

according

to two

general

properties.

The

objects

must

be

(a)

related to one another

genealogically

and (b) descendents of ancestral objects favoured by natural selection. So

hearts have

direct

proper

functions

only

if

they

are

genealogically

related

to

earlier

hearts favoured

by

selection. Let us focus

upon

(a).

Hearts are

genealogically

related

only

if

they belong

to

what Millikan

calls

a

higher-order

reproductively

established

family

(higher-order

REF).

Hearts

belong

to a

higher-order

REF

only

if

there exists

a

first-order

repro-

ductively

established

family

(first-order

REF)

of items

possessed

of

the

direct

proper

function of

producing

items

in

the

higher-order

REE

Millikan

assumes

that sets of

genes

constitute

a first-order REF

possessed

of the direct proper function of producing hearts.

There

exist first-order

REFs

that

produce

items

belonging

to

higher-

order

REFs

only

if

members of the

first-order REFs are

related to one

another

by

virtue of

reproduction.

In

Millikan s technical

nomenclature,

reproduction

designates

a

relation,

roughly,

of

copying.

Sets of

genes,

for

example,

constitute

a

first-order

REF

possessed

of the

direct

proper

func-

tion of

producing

hearts

only

if

sets of

genes

that

produce

hearts are

copied

across

generations.

The

relevant

bits of

Millikan s

theory,

then,

are these:

Hearts

fall

into a

biological

category

and

thus

possess

a

direct

proper

function

only

if

they

fall

into

a

higher-order

REF,

and

hence

only

if

there exist

sets of

genes

that

fall

into a

first-order

category

possessed

of

the

direct

proper

function of

producing

hearts,

and

hence

only

if

there exist

sets of

genes

that

reproduce

across

generations

and

produce

hearts

in

each

generation.

Davies

[2]

demonstrates

that,

in

sexually

reproducing

organisms,

there

are no sets

of

genes

that

satisfy

Millikan s

reproducing

relation and

also

produce

hearts

in

each

generation.

Facts

about the

genetics

of

development

and facts about the mechanisms of meiosis rule this out. So hearts do not

1

For

uller

xplication

f

the

relevant

its

of

Millikan s

heory

ee

Davies

2],

pp.

365-

68.

ANALYSIS

5.4,

October

1995,

pp.

299-306.

?

Paul Sheldon

Davies

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3/9

300

PAUL SHELDON DAVIES

belong

to

any higher-order

REF

and,

in

consequence,

cannot

possess

any

direct

proper

function. Millikan s

heory

fails

and its

failure

n

the

case

of

natural tems

such as heartscasts

doubt

upon

its

plausibility

n an

allegedly

naturalistic

heory

of mind.2

Referring

o

the

argument

n

Davies

[2],

Elder

asserts:

This

argument

s

overhasty.

t

actually

does show that heartscannot

compose

a

higher-order

REF,

and do not in their own

right

have

proper

unctions;

but it neverthelesseavesMillikanroom to maintain

that

all the

functionally

significant

raits

of

hearts

have

proper

func-

tions,

which when

added

together

sum

up

to

a function of

pumping

blood.

([3],

p.

168)

Elder

hen

explains

how,

on

his

view,

the

proper

functionsof traits of the

heart

sum

up

to

the function

of

pumping

blood.

My

response

to Elder

consists

in

three

points,

which

I

discuss

n

turn.

1.

Clarification

Elder

admits that

the

argument

n

Davies

[2]

shows that

hearts cannot

compose

a

higher-order

REF,

and

do not

in

their

own

right

have

proper

functions

.. .

([3],

p.

168)

This,

I

surmise,

s

to

concedethat

my

argument

is sound. But Elderdoes not

stop

there.He claims thereis

room,

despite

the soundness

of

my argument,

or Millikan

o manoeuvre.

But

saying

Millikan

may

manoeuvre

is

ambiguous

between

saying

Millikan s

theory

of functions is

salvageable,

on the one

hand,

and

an

alternative

theory

of

functions is

plausible,

on the other.

Having

conceded

that

my argument against

Millikan s

theory

of functions

is

sound,

it seems clear that Elder s

discussion s

best

interpreted

as an

alter-

native to Millikan s

heory.

So it is

puzzling

hat Eldershould

advertise

his

essayas a defence,as opposedto a revisionor replacement,of Millikan s

theory.

This

may appear

a

quibble,

but in

fact

it is

important.

Millikan

[6]

char-

acterizes

her

account of functions as a theoretical definition .

This

contrasts

with

the

analyses

of varioususes

of the

concept

function

offered

in

Wright

[9],

Boorse

[1],

and others. These

latter

analyses

aim

to

specify

conditions

necessary

and

sufficient for the correct

application

of the

concept

function ,

leaving

them

open

to refutation

by

counterexample,

including merely logically possible

examples.

But theoretical definitions

aredifferent.A theoreticaldefinition,according o Millikan,is the sort of

thing

Cavendish

and Lavosieroffered when

they

proposed

that water

is

2

See Davies

[2],

pp.

368-76 for the

argument

and 376-80

for

objections

to the

argument

and

replies

to the

objections.




4/9

DEFENDING

DIRECT PROPER FUNCTIONS

30I

HOH. We

cannot

refute the identificationof water with HOH

by

appeal

to

what

is

merely

logically

possible.

We must

restrict

our

inquiry

o

what

is

actually

he

case.

So

Millikan s

accountof

functions,

qua

theoretical

definition,

s

properly

tested

against

the actual facts of our

evolutionaryhistory.

This

is a

fact

about

which Millikan is

unequivocal.

But

this means

that the

details

of

Millikan s

heory

especially

he

biological

details

-

really

matter.

For

any

attempt

to

confirm or disconfirm he

theory

that

water is

HOH

depends

upon

the

specific

chemicalassertionsof that

theory.

Likewise or the

theory

of

proper

functions;

any

attempt

to confirmor disconfirm

depends

upon

the

specific

biological

assertions.To tinker with the

biological

details of

Millikan s heory,therefore, s to tinkerwith the whole theory.

The

argument

n

Davies

[2]

criticizesMillikan s

heory

precisely

on the

grounds

that

certain of its

biological

details are

incompatible

with actual

biological

facts.

So

it is no

defence

against

my

criticism o

point

out that

there

might

be some other

theory

-

one

obtained

by

tinkering

with

Millikan s

biological

assertions which

avoids

my

criticism.

My

criticism

depends,

and

must

depend,

on the

details of

Millikan s

heory.

So either

Elder has defendedMillikan s

heory

or he

hasn t.

He

hasn t,

since his

proposal

alters the

biological

detail

(see

below)

and

hence aban-

dons the

theory.

So Elder s defence sno defenceatall;it is

merely

a sketch

of

an alternative

heory.3

2.

Truth

According

o

the

argument

n

Davies

[2],

Millikan s

heory

of direct

proper

functions

fails

to

apply

to

paradigmatically

unctional traits such

as the

human

heart.

Heartscannot have

direct

proper

unctions

because he

genes

required

o

produce

a heartare

too

large

n

number

and

interactive

n

their

effects to satisfyMillikan sdefinitionof reproduction.Elder sresponse s

to

say

that this

leaves Millikan

room to maintain hat all the

functionally

significant

raits of hearts

[e.g.,

heart-size,

heart-shape,

tc.]

have

proper

functions,

which when added

together

sum

up

to a function

of

pumping

blood .

([3],

p.

168)4

There are

at least two

distinct

claims here

that

need

to be

distinguished.

3

Elder

charges

that the title of

my

paper,

Troubles For

Direct

Proper

Functions ,

is

misleading.

(Elder

[3],

p.

167, n.2)

If

my

argument

succeeds

against

direct

proper

functions, he says, it therebysucceeds againstrelationalproperfunctions, since the

latter are

derivative

from

the

former. Elder

is

correct about the

primacy

of

direct

proper

functions,

but he is

surely

mistaken in

thinking

that that makes

my

title

misleading.

There is

nothing misleading

in

attacking

a

theory

at its

foundation

while

passing

by

its

superstructure

n

silence;

once

the

foundation

gives,

the rest falls

without

a

word.




5/9

302

PAUL

SHELDON DAVIES

The

first

is

that

(A)

descending

from traits

such

as

hearts

to

simpler

traits

such as heart-size

and

heart-shape

avoids

my

criticism. Hearts

cannot

have direct

proper

functions because

the

genes required

to

produce

hearts are too

complex

to

be

reproduced

across

generations,

but

the

genes required

to

produce heart-shape

or

heart-size,

according

to

Elder,

are few

enough

to be

reproduced.

The

second

claim

is

that, (B)

having

determined

the direct

proper

functions

of these

simpler

traits,

we

may

then

sum

up

these functions and

thereby

award

the

direct

proper

function of

pumping

blood

to

the

heart.

These

claims

are

supposed by

Elder sufficient

to refute

my

argument.

But

neither claim

is

plausible.

Let

us

consider each

in

turn.

(A) The first is false for the same reasons that Millikan s original theory

is

false.

It

is

false

that traits

such

as

heart-size or

heart-shape

are

produced

by

only

a

small subset of

genes.

For heart-size

and

heart-shape

are

organ-

ismic traits that

exist

only

insofar as

a heart

exists;

but the

heart,

being

integral

to

the

entire

organism,

is

an

organismic

trait that exists

only

if

the

main structural

systems

of

the

organism

exist,

including

neural,

pulmo-

nary,

and

the

rest;

but

virtually

all of

an

organism s genes

are

required

to

produce

these main structural features

of

an

organism.5

Therefore the

genes

involved

in

the

production

of

heart-size

or

heart-shape

are

many

-

far too

many

to

satisfy

Millikan s definition of

reproduction.

(This

point

is

discussed

in

Davies

[2],

p.

372.)

This

way

of

putting

the

point may

make

it

appear

merely

quantitative,

but

quantity

is not the

only

problem.

Traits such as heart-size

and heart-

shape

are

produced

by

ensembles of

highly

interactive

genes.

This

is so

because hearts are

produced

by large

numbers

of

highly

interactive

genes

-

genes

which control

and

genes

controlled

by

the

expression

of one

another

-

and

the existence of heart

shapes

and sizes is

dependent

on

the

4

Elder s choice of heart-traits is

odd.

It is dubious that heart-size

or

heart-shape

are

functional

traits;

if

they

are,

we

should

suspect

the

relevant sense

of function of

being

rather thin.

It

is

also

doubtful that our

genome

contains

genes

which

code

for

heart-size

and

heart-shape;

size

and

shape

may

be mere

by-products

of other

traits,

where these

other

traits are

the

products

of

specific

genes.

At the

very

least

Elder

should

give

some

reason

for

thinking

that

his

conjectures

are

plausible.

For

the

sake

of

argument,

however,

we

may

set these

oddities aside.

5

There are at least three distinct

categories

of

genes

causally

necessary

for

the

produc-

tion of

organs

such as

hearts:

(i)

Those

responsible

for

embryonic

development up

to

the point at which cell differentiation begins. (ii) Those responsible for continued

development

and maintenance

of

any

organ

( housekeeping genes).

(iii)

Those

responsible

for the

production

of the

type

of tissue

unique

to the

specific

organ.

These

three

categories

constitute

a

very

rough

and

absolutely

minimal

taxonomy

of

organ-

producing

genes

and,

even

so,

they

constitute

a

significant

number

of

genes.

(My

thanks

to Cameron

Binnie

for

this

taxonomy.)




6/9

DEFENDING

DIRECT

PROPER FUNCTIONS

303

existence

of hearts.

(This

too is discussed in

[2],

pp.

377-78.)

It is

a

mistake

to conceive

of

specific

organismic

traits like

heart-size

as the

product

of

a

single gene

or

a

tidy,

small

subset

of

genes. Beanbag genetics

is

the

pejorative

name

given

to such a view and since 1959

that view has

taken

a

thorough

but

well-deserved

thrashing.

(See

Mayr [4],

pp.

306-28.)

So

heart-size and

other such traits do not

qualify

for

proper

functions.

Of

course Elder could

iterate

his

strategy.

He

could descend

still

further,

hoping

to reach traits

produced by

sets of

genes

small

enough

to

satisfy

Millikan s definition

of

reproduction.

But

this

brings

us

to another

problem.

The

genome

of

any

sexually

reproducing organism

consists

of

strands of

DNA

from

both

parents.

Roughly

one-half

of

the

genes

involved

in the production of heart-size in my father were bequeathed to me; the

same

is true of

the

genes

that

produced

heart-size

in

my

mother. This is a

banal

consequence

of

meiosis.

So

the

set

of

genes

responsible

for

the

size

of

my

heart,

being

a

combination

of

bits from

both

parental

sets,

is a

copy

of neither.

Heart-producing genes

in

me are

not Millikanian

copies

of

heart-producing genes

in

either

parent.

Other

meiotic

processes,

especially

crossing

over

and

random

assortment,

make

Millikanian

reproduction

even

more

implausible.6

This

is

true

for

virtually any

trait of

any

sexually

reproducing

organism;

the

simplicity

of the

trait is

irrelevant.7

So the

quantity

and

systemic

interactions of our

genes,

plus

the

frag-

menting

effects of

meiosis,

thwart

Elder s

alternative.

Like

Millikan s

theory,

Elder s

founders on

basic

biology.

Traits such as

heart-size

cannot

possess

direct

proper

functions.

(B)

But even if

heart-size

and other

such traits

could

possess

direct

proper

functions,

Elder s

second

claim

fails.

The claim is

that the

direct

proper

functions

of

heart-size,

heart-shape,

etc. somehow sum

up

to

the

function

of

pumping

blood.

Elder talks

of heart-size

and

heart-shape

some-

how

yielding

an

effective

blood-pumping heart and making for an

overall

design

that

enables

blood

pumpings.

([3],

p.

169)

But the

notion

of

summing

up

is

vague

and

unexplicated;

it is

unclear on

what

grounds

it should be

evaluated.

But

opacity

aside,

the

obvious

problem

is

that

Elder s

suggestion

is

fatally

ad

hoc. We

may

suppose,

with

Elder,

that

heart-size,

heart-shape,

etc.

somehow

yield

a

heart

that

pumps.

In

yielding

hearts

that

pump,

however,

these

same traits

also

yield

hearts that

thump,

hearts that

produce

vibrations on the

sternum,

hearts that emit

electrical

discharges,

6

For

fuller

explication

see Davies

[2],

pp.

370-72,

especially

the

discussion of random

assortment.

7

Possible

exceptions

include

traits

produced

by genes

linked to

the

X

chromosome and

maladies such as

sickle cell

anaemia. But

traits such

as

heart-size fall into

neither

category.

For discussion

of

maladies,

see

Davies

[2],

pp.

376-78.




7/9

304

PAUL SHELDON

DAVIES

and

so on. The

primary

task of

any theory

of functions is to

provide

prin-

cipled

means

with

which to

specify

conditions under which select

causal

effects

qualify

as

functional effects.

For

all Elder

has

told

us, however,

there

is

no

more reason to sum

up

to

pumping

than

to

thumping,

vibrating,

and

the rest.

We

should not concede that the function

of

the

heart is to

thump,

vibrate,

and the

rest,

and

hence

we should

reject

Elder s second claim that

the

proper

functions of traits such as hearts are somehow

yielded by

those

of

simpler

traits.

Therefore,

neither

(A)

nor

(B)

are

plausible.

Since the

failure of either

is

sufficient for the failure

of

Elder s

defence ,

his

attempt

surely

fails.

3. Evidential Burden

Elder

discusses two

possible

objections

to

his

defence

and

ascribes both

to me. The second

objection

is

mistakenly

attributed

to

me;

it is

concerned

with issues

I

have not

raised.8

The first

objection,

I

surmise,

is the

point

just

made

(section

(2)

above),

namely

that even

simple

traits such as heart-size

cannot

possess proper

functions. Elder s

response

is

to insist

that

this

does

not matter.

He asserts

that,

because natural selection

occurs

in

sexual

organisms,

and

because

such selection is

genetically

based,

it must be

the

case that there exist some genetic elements responsible for phenotypic

traits

which

can

in

principle get

copied

over and

over

across

genera-

tions... .

([3],

p.

170)

Elder

concedes

that

the

genetic

elements that

produce

heart-size

may

not

be

the relevant

ones,

but

that,

he

claims,

does not

matter,

for Millikan s

theory

(or

Elder s)

is

concerned

with those

genetic

elements that are

relevant,

whatever

they

might

be.

This

response

is

problematic

in

several

ways.

(i)

Elder s

use of

copied

is

ambiguous,

and

significantly

so. Either

he

intends

Millikan s definition

of

reproduction

or he intends

some other notion. Since

he

offers

no

alterna-

tive, I assume he intends Millikan s. If he intends Millikan s, then, since her

view

fails,

Elder s

defence

fails

in

the same

way.

But

if he

intends some

other notion

of

reproduction,

he

ought

to

tell us what

it is.

(ii)

Elder s main

argument

is invalid. It is true that evolution

by

natural selection

requires

some

type

of mechanism of

heredity,

but this

does not entail that

the

heritable elements must

satisfy

Millikan s

(or

Elder s)

definition of

repro-

duction. Whether

or

not

they

do is

precisely

the

question

at issue.

(iii)

Even

if

the

argument

were

valid,

the term

genetically

based

([3],

p.

170)

is

vague

and this

would make

assessing

the

argument s

soundness

difficult.

(iv)

The claim that there

must be

genetic

elements

responsible

for

pheno-

8

Elder

(in

correspondence)

has

explained

more

fully

the issues at

stake

in

the

second

objection

he discusses. It

is

clear

these

issues

are unrelated

to ones

he and

I have

debated.

My

thanks to

Elder for

his

help

in

clarifying

this.




8/9

DEFENDING

DIRECT

PROPER

FUNCTIONS

305

typic

traits

that

satisfy

Millikan s

(or

Elder s)

definition of

reproduction

seems little more than armchair

speculation

concerning

developmental

genetics.

Elder offers

no

evidence,

no

explanation,

not even

a

citation

-

despite

the

fact that

this is the

main

question

at

issue.

(v)

It is

false that

Millikan s

heory

is

concernedwith

just

those

genetic

elements

hat

satisfy

her definitionof

reproduction,

whatever

they

might

be. On the

contrary,

Millikan s

heory

s concernedwith

very

specific

elements those described

in

chapters

one and

two of

Millikan

[5]

-

and,

as

I

have

argued,precisely

those elements

some

of

them)

are

incompatible

with basic

biological

acts.

(vi)

When

faced

with a

counterexample,

t is no defence to insist that the

real

concern

of the threatened

heory

are

just

those

facts,

whatever

they

mightbe, thatmakethe theorytrue.

Finally,

rather ittle is

known about

genetic development

n

humans.

A

good

deal is known

about

development

n

a

few

relatively

simple organ-

isms,

though

mainly

the

fruitfly

Drosophila.

We

may

extrapolate

rom flies

to

humans,

of

course,

but

only

with

guarded

caution.9Hence it is no acci-

dent that Elder

provides

no evidencefor

his

theory,

for

the relevant

sorts

of evidenceare not

yet

available.10

We

do know that Millikan s

heory

of

direct

proper

functions,

as well as Elder s

alternative,

cannot work for

sexual

organisms;

our

knowledge

of

meiosis

and

earlyembryonic

develop-

mentis sufficient orthat. But future

attempts

o defend

proper

unctions

-

in

particular,

ttempts

to

define functional

naturalkinds

bottom-up

by

appeal

to

genetic

natural

kinds

-

may

well have to

wait for the sorts of

evidence

we do not

yet possess.11

College

of

Williamand

Mary

Williamsburg,

VA

23187-8795

[email protected]

References

[1]

Christopher

Boorse,

Wright

on

functions ,

Philosophical

Review

85

(1976)

70-86.

[2]

Paul

Sheldon

Davies,

Troubles for direct

proper

functions ,

Notis

28

(1994)

363-

381.

[3]

Crawford

Elder,

Proper

functions

defended ,

Analysis

54

(1994)

167-71.

[4]

Ernst

Mayr,

Evolution and

the

Diversity of

Life

(Cambridge,

MA: The

Belknap

Press of

Harvard

University

Press,

1976).

9

See

Science, 266,

Oct.

28,

1994

for recent work in

development.

Lewis

Wolpert s

[8]

overview is accessible,exciting, yet sobering.

10

The same

holds for both

[5]

and

[7].

Millikan

offers

no evidence

that

her definition

of

reproduction

s satisfied

by

the heritableelements

in sexual

(or

asexual)

organisms.

11

My

warm

thanks to Cameron

Binnie

for advice

and

tuition

in

developmental genet-

ics.




9/9

306

[5]

Ruth

Millikan,

Language, Thought,

and

Other

Biological Categories (Cambridge,

MA: MIT

Press, 1984).

[6]

Ruth

Millikan,

In

defense of

proper

functions ,

Philosophy of

Science 56

(1989)

288-302.

[7]

Ruth

Millikan,

White

Queen Psychology

and

Other

Essays for

Alice

(Cambridge,

MA: MIT

Press, 1993).

[8]

Lewis

Wolpert,

Do we

understand

development? ,

Science 266

(1994)

571-72.

[9]

Larry

Wright,

Functions ,

Philosophical

Review

82

(1973)

139-68.

TRENTON

MERRICKS

On behalf of the coherentist

TRENTON MERRICKS

In

a recent article

in

ANALYSIS,

eter

Klein and

Ted A.

Warfield

say:

...

coherence,

per

se,

is not

truth

conducive;

that

is,

we

will

argue

that

by

increasing

the

coherence of

a

set

of

beliefs,

the

new,

more coherent

set of

beliefs is often less

likely

to be true

[i.e.,

less

likely

to contain all

and

only

true

beliefs]

than the

original,

less coherent set.

([3], p. 129)

And

this,

they

add:

...

is an

important result,

if

one of the

desiderata

of a

theory

of

epis-

temic

justification

is to

reveal

the

connection between

justification

and

truth.

([3],

p.

129)

I

agree

with

Klein and Warfield that

they prove:

...

a more coherent

set

of

beliefs

resulting

from the addition of

a

belief

to a

less coherent set of

beliefs

is

less

likely

to

be true

[i.e.,

less

likely

to contain all and

only

true

beliefs]

than the less coherent set of beliefs.

([3],

p.

130)

This

conclusion is

treated

by

Klein and Warfield as

entailing

the claim that

coherence is not truth

conducive.

So

their

argument depends upon

evalu-

ating

the truth

conduciveness

of a

theory

of

justification

at

the

system

level

-

justification

is truth

conducive

only

if,

according

to

them,

the

more

justi-

fied

a set or

system

of

beliefs

is,

the more

likely

it

is that the

set or

system

contains no false beliefs.

But this a rather odd way to evaluate truth conduciveness. To see why,

note that

their

argument against

the

coherentist

turns

on the fact

that the

more

logically independent

beliefs

a

system

has,

the less

likely

it

is

to

contain

only

true

beliefs. So Klein

and Warfield

are

committed

to the claim

ANALYSIS

5.4,

October

1995,

pp.306-309.

?

Trenton Merricks

Preprinted

in

ANALYST,

Vol-1.Num-12


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