Defendant Response to Motion to Remand

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

DEBORAH L. TOOMEY, et al.

Plaintiffs,

vs. No. 2:12-cv-01100-SMV-LAM

CITY OF TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES,

a municipal corporation,

Defendant.

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF DEBORAH L. TOOMEY’S

MOTION TO REMAND AND TO 64 PLAINTIFFS’ JOINDER IN

MOTION TO REMAND [Doc.8]

COMES NOW Defendant, the City of Truth or Consequences, by and through its counsel

Coppler Law Firm, P.C. (Gerald A. Coppler and John L. Appel) and for its Response to the

“Motion to Remand and Memorandum of Law in Support” [Doc. 8] (hereinafter, the “Motion to

Remand”) filed herein by Plaintiff Deborah L. Toomey on November 7, 2012 and to the “64

Plaintiffs’ Joinder in Motion for Remand” [Doc. 10] (hereinafter, the “Joinder”) filed on

November 9, 2012, states as follows.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case was originally filed in the Seventh Judicial District Court for Sierra County,

New Mexico. Defendant, the City of Truth or Consequences (the “City”), removed it to the

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico because Plaintiffs’ First Claim for

Case 2:12-cv-01100-SMV-LAM Document 40 Filed 11/20/12 of 18

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Relief alleges a violation of United States Land Office Patent No. 1191929. Complaint for

Declaratory Relief and Injunction [Doc. 1-1 (Ex. “A”)] (hereinafter, the “Complaint”), filed

herein on October 15, 2012, ¶¶ 77 – 79, page 30 of 49 and ¶ A, page 34 of 49. In addition,

Plaintiffs allege that the City has violated their constitutional rights to due process, without

specifying any limitation as to whether their claim rests on constitutional rights guaranteed by

the United States Constitution, or only those provided by the Constitution of the State of New

Mexico (the “State”). Complaint [Doc. 1-1 (Ex. “A”)] at 28. Plaintiffs’ First and Third Claims

for Relief therefore present questions requiring determination under the Constitution and laws of

the United States. Plaintiffs’ other claims for relief appear to rely primarily, if not entirely, on

State law.

Plaintiffs now seek to remand this matter to the State court. As to the Plaintiffs’ First

Cause of Action, Plaintiff Toomey now asserts that the Plaintiffs do not really want a judicial

determination on the alleged violation of U.S. Patent No. 1191929 after all (despite their prayer

for precisely that, set forth in Paragraph 78 of the Complaint), and she presents an argument to

the effect that the Court should not even consider that matter because it is res judicata, having

allegedly been decided by an officer of the New Mexico Economic Development Department

(“NMEDD”) in the context of a procurement decision by that Department. Ms. Toomey and the

other sixty-four Plaintiffs, in the Motion to Remand and the Joinder, now assert that,

notwithstanding language to the contrary in the Complaint, they intended only to assert claims

relying “only upon City of Truth or Consequences local ordinances, State of New Mexico


3

statutes, State of New Mexico administrative rules and decisions, and rely upon the New Mexico

Constitution.” Joinder [Doc. 10] at 1 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiffs have not moved to amend their Complaint to conform to the newly modified

scope of their claimed causes of action, as now set forth in the Motion to Remand and the

Joinder.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

The federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Except as otherwise

expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant

or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing

the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Whenever a separate and

independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction conferred by [28 U.S.C. § 1331] is

joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may

be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may

remand all matters in which State law predominates.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).

Where a plaintiff seeks to prove that the grantee under a federal land patent used the land

unlawfully, the plaintiff “must establish that the [grant of] right-of-way prohibited the use to

which it was put.” Nicodemus v. Union Pacific Corp., 440 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2006).

Thus, where such a claim is made, “[t]he federal issue . . . arises in Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, not


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by way of defense.” Id. Notwithstanding the presence of the federal issue, a case may be

dismissed for want of a substantial federal question if “the federal issue is (1) wholly

insubstantial or obviously frivolous, (2) foreclosed by prior cases which have settled the issue

one way or another, or (3) so patently without merit as to require no meaningful consideration.”

Nicodemus, 440 F.3d at 1236, quoting Wiley v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 612 F.2d 473,

477 (10th Cir. 1979).

III. ARGUMENT

Plaintiff Toomey (subsequently joined by the other sixty-four Plaintiffs) now asserts that

this Court should not even consider Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief, because there has already

been an administrative determination of that issue. In their First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs

state: “Plaintiffs seek a judicial determination Defendant violates the reservations and

restrictions of United States Patent No. 1191929 by utilizing the patented land for purposes other

than recreational and by zoning the patented land as M-1 and T-1.” Complaint [Doc. 1, Ex.

“A”], ¶ 78. Now, Plaintiffs allege that their own claim for relief as set forth in the Complaint is

frivolous or, at the least, entirely unnecessary: “There is no need to request a judicial

determination as to whether the subject land remains encumbered for recreational use only, as

the State of New Mexico made that final determination on September 7, 2012, through the

administrative appeal process.” Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], at 9. Similarly, Plaintiffs now seek

to modify their original Third Claim for Relief, alleging violations of constitutional due process,


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by adding a restriction not found in the original Complaint; they now claim that they meant only

a violation of due process under the State constitution.

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ chameleon-like effort to change their allegations to suit the

backdrop, the simple fact remains that the Complaint, as filed, invokes federal question

jurisdiction and was properly removed to this Court. The Complaint has not been amended.

A. The Complaint asserts a claim alleging improper use of land granted to the City of

Truth or Consequences under a federal patent, which invokes federal jurisdiction.

At the very heart of this litigation is Plaintiffs’ claim that the City, by erecting a recycling

center and a solid waste collection center on land original granted to the City by federal patent,

has violated the terms of the patent. The patent at issue (U.S. Patent No. 1191929) is specifically

cited or mentioned in Paragraphs 2, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 29, 78, and 79 of the

Complaint [Doc. 1-1 (Ex. “A”)]. Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief bears the heading “Violation

of U.S. Patent No. 1191929.” Complaint [Doc. 1-1 (Ex. “A”)] at 27. “Plaintiffs seek a judicial

determination Defendant violates the reservations and restrictions of United States Patent No.

1191929 by utilizing the patented land for purposes other than recreational and by zoning the

patented land as M-1 and T-1.” Complaint [Doc. 1-1 (Ex. “A”)], ¶ 78.

On its face, the Complaint therefore presents a question that can only be resolved as a

matter of federal law, and more specifically interpretation of the patent in light of the legislation

under which it was authorized to be issued, the Recreation and Public Purposes Act, codified at

43 U.S.C. § 869 et seq. This is not merely a dispute regarding the ownership or use of land, the

title to which happens to be traceable to a patent from the federal government. See, e.g.,


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Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1974) (no federal jurisdiction where

the complaint did not allege, directly or indirectly, a violation of any law of the United States).

On the contrary, the Complaint directly alleges a violation by the City of the terms under which

Patent No. 1191929 was granted. Binding precedent in the Tenth Circuit establishes that such a

claim presents a substantial federal issue that is justiciable in the United States district court.

Nicodemus, 440 F.3d at 1236.

While Defendant believes and states that Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to the patent are

incorrect as a matter of law and policy, Plaintiffs present a question that is, at least, not wholly

frivolous. Plaintiffs’ claims, if they are correct (which the City denies) would impose severe

restrictions on the use of its lands originally acquired by patent from the United States over 75

years ago. This is a matter of some importance to the City and its residents, since the limitations

the Plaintiffs seek to enforce would substantially limit the economic and use value of the lands in

question. At least as to these specific lands, no prior cases have settled the question presented,

although the resolution of at least one prior case suggests that Plaintiffs lack standing or even a

cause of action to pursue their claims alleging violation of the patent. Raypath, Inc. v. City of

Anchorage, 544 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1976).

Consequently, under Nicodemus and the applicable statutes governing federal

jurisdiction, this case presents a question arising under the laws of the United States that should

be addressed by this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and which was properly removed to this

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Court should deny the Motion to Remand and

proceed to hear at least the questions raised by Plaintiffs in their First Claim for Relief.


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B. Nothing in the prior proceedings before the New Mexico Economic Development

Department binds this Court by way of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.

Having discovered that presenting a federal claim in the Complaint results in jurisdiction

of the federal courts, and not being pleased with that result, Ms. Toomey (subsequently joined by

the other 64 plaintiffs) has now decided that she didn’t really mean it after all. Instead, she says

that all the Plaintiffs ever really wanted (never mind the plain language of the Complaint) was

for “the court to declare that ‘solid waste collection’ and ‘recycling’ are not ‘recreational’ . . .

and . . . Defendant is in violation of a recent and existing State of New Mexico administrative

decision that the land remains encumbered for recreational use only.” Motion to Remand [Doc.

8], at 10. Apparently, Plaintiffs now argue that the Court should not even rule on the question

presented by their First Claim for Relief. As Ms. Toomey states it: “There is no need to request

a judicial determination as to whether the subject land remains encumbered for recreational use

only, as the State of New Mexico made that final determination on September 7, 2012, through

the administrative appeal process.” Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], at 9. It is unclear whether

Plaintiffs are simply abandoning the cause of action set forth in their First Claim for Relief, but

at the least Plaintiffs’ position appears to have somehow become transformed into an assertion

that their own claim for relief is non-justiciable on grounds of collateral estoppel.

Since Plaintiffs in their Complaint make much of the proceedings on a public

procurement matter before the New Mexico Economic Development Department (“NMEDD”),

and now apparently assert it as grounds for collateral estoppel, the City will here briefly address

the collateral estoppel argument.


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Principles of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) may apply to the fact-finding of

administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity. University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S.

788, 797 (1986), citing U.S. v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). In

determining whether a state court decision or a state agency administrative decision should be

given preclusive effect, the federal Court will look to the law of the state. Sierra Club v. Two

Elk Generation Partners, L.P., 646 F.3d 1258, 1264 (10th Cir. 2011). “[W]hen a state agency

acting in a judicial capacity resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties

have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts must give the agency’s fact-finding

the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State’s courts.” Elliott, 478 U.S.

at 799, citing Utah Constr. & Mining, 384 U.S. at 422 (internal punctuation, ellipses and

citation omitted).

In New Mexico, “[c]ollateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, prevents a party from

re-litigating ‘ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.’” Hartnett

v. Papa John’s Pizza USA, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1286 (D.N.M. 2011), quoting Ullrich v.

Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19, 142 N.M. 835, 839, 171 P.3d 774, 778 and Deflon v.

Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 13, 139 N.M. 637, 642, 137 P.3d 577, 582. “Before collateral

estoppel is applied to preclude litigation of an issue, . . . the moving party must demonstrate that

(1) the party to be estopped was a party to the prior proceeding, (2) the cause of action in the

case presently before the court is different from the cause of action in the prior adjudication, (3)

the issue was actually litigated in the prior adjudication, and (4) the issue was necessarily

determined in the prior litigation. Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc. 115 N.M. 293,


9

297, 850 P.2d 996, 1000 (1993), citing Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 474-76, 745 P.2d 380, 382-

84 (1987); Hartnett, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. “Whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel

should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion.” Hartnett, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 1286;

Shovelin, 115 N.M. at 299, 850 P.2d at 1002. Shovelin involved an appeal from an

administrative decision of the New Mexico Economic Security Department (“ESD”), adverse to

the plaintiff. The ESD proceeding was an informal two and one-half hour telephonic hearing

with minimal opportunity for discovery and no indication that its results would be deemed

preclusive in subsequent court proceedings. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court held

that the plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before the ESD, and

affirmed the trial court’s refusal to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude re-

litigation of the issue in subsequent court proceedings. Shovelin, 115 N.M. at 301-02, 850 P.2d

at 1004-05.

Here, the Plaintiffs apparently seek to apply collateral estoppel where the connection

between administrative proceedings and the present case is even more tenuous, and where the

issue now raised by Plaintiffs was not, and could not be, determined in the administrative

proceedings. The NMEDD was not acting in a judicial capacity, the question relating to

interpretation of the United States land patent was not properly before it, and the City did not

have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the question in those proceedings. Thus, none of the

Elliott criteria that would permit this Court to give preclusive effect to its administrative decision

apply. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799.


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First, NMEDD is simply not an administrative adjudicatory body with authority to render

rulings on land use matters. NMEDD was created, and its powers and duties are defined, by the

Economic Development Department Act, Sections 9-15-1 through 9-15-15, NMSA 1978.

Additional powers and duties were authorized by subsequent legislation, codified at Sections

9-15-16 through 9-15-56, NMSA 1978. Nowhere in any of that legislation is there any grant of

authority for NMEDD to adjudicate land-use disputes or make binding determinations as to the

status of lands granted to any person or entity by federal patent. Nor did Mr. Jackson,

NMEDD’s general counsel who was appointed to conduct the proceedings cited by Plaintiffs,

make any claim that he could adjudicate land use disputes. As he clearly stated in his letter

decisions, he was “designated by the central purchasing office responsible for the referenced

procurement as the person with authority to resolve and issue determinations regarding bid

protests on its behalf.” Letter decisions dated August 21, 2012 and September 7, 2012, attached

as Exhibits B and A, respectively, to Plaintiff Toomey’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc.

1-3 (Ex. “C”)] (emphasis added).

That is all Mr. Jackson was authorized to determine—the resolution of bid protests

related to a proposed purchase of land under a request for proposals issued by NMEDD. The

determination of bid protests is governed by Sections 13-1-172 through 13-1-176, NMSA 1978

(part of the New Mexico Procurement Code), and by Sections 1.4.1.80 through 1.4.1.93 of the

New Mexico Administrative Code. Again, nothing in the Procurement Code or the regulations

adopted under it authorizes NMEDD to make a determination regarding ownership and use of

real property. In the course of making his determination that the procurement protest should be


11

granted and that NMEDD should reject the City’s offer to sell land to NMEDD, Mr. Jackson

stated by way of explanation his opinions and concerns regarding the status of the City’s lands

acquired under Patent No. 1191929, but the fact is that his statements are no more than that—his

opinions and concerns. His only determination was “that the City’s proposal was non-

responsive to RFP No. 12-495-00-00340.” Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Doc. 1-3 (Ex.

“C”)], page 10 of 24, under heading “Conclusion.”

The City did not appeal that determination because the City had no significant economic

or other interest in doing so. The facility in question would be built and the economic benefit of

its presence would accrue to the City in any event, regardless of who provided the land on which

it would be built. And the hearing officer’s analysis, even if flawed and based on an inadequate

record, has no bearing on anything other than the determination of the procurement protest.

Consequently, there was no incentive, occasion or opportunity for the City to litigate the land use

dispute in the context of the NMEDD administrative proceeding.

In short, the issue of whether the City can use its land for the present recycling center and

the proposed collection center was never even addressed in the NMEDD administrative

proceedings, could not have been determined in those proceedings, and was not determined in

those proceedings. The City, while a participant in those proceedings, did not have a full

opportunity to address the land use issues because they were not even presented for decision,

they were not actually litigated in the NMEDD proceedings, and they were not determined in the

NMEDD proceedings.

Plaintiffs’ collateral estoppel argument must be rejected in its entirety.


12

C. The Complaint, by its terms, alleges violations of constitutional due process under

either the federal or State constitution, or both, thus invoking federal jurisdiction.

The Complaint, on its face, alleges repeatedly that the City has violated the Plaintiffs’

constitutionally protected rights of due process, and seeks “a judicial determination Defendant

violates the constitutionally and statutorily protected right of due process... .” Complaint [Doc.

1-1 (Ex. “A”)], ¶ 84. However, nowhere does the Complaint state whether the Plaintiffs’ claims

are alleged under the federal or State constitution, or both. Now, in the Motion to Remand [Doc.

8] at 11-13 and in the Joinder [Doc. 10] (at bottom of first page), the Plaintiffs apparently seek to

amend their Complaint to state their constitutional claims only under the New Mexico

constitution. Ms. Toomey devotes some three pages to an argument that the City should have

understood that Plaintiffs intended only the State constitution, because their due process claims

relate to actions taken under State law. Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], at 11-13. Ms. Toomey

apparently neglects the long-standing doctrine that a great many substantive provisions of the

United States constitution are applicable to the states and their political subdivisions by action of

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, so if the City were actually to violate a right guaranteed

by the United States constitution it could be subject to an adverse decision on that basis.

In any event, as Ms. Toomey herself notes, federal court jurisdiction is based on the

allegations of the Complaint at the time of removal, not on subsequent efforts to restrict or alter

the Complaint to change the designation of the law on which the Plaintiffs chose to rely. As Ms.

Toomey observes, “the plaintiffs are the master of their claim, and they may avoid federal

jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Motion to Remand [Doc. 8], at 9. But Plaintiffs


13

here did not choose to rely only on state law. The simple fact is that the Complaint, by its own

terms, invokes both federal and state constitutional claims.

Consequently, even if federal jurisdiction was not invoked by Plaintiffs’ First Claim for

Relief, it is necessarily invoked by the constitutional due process claims under their Third Claim

for Relief. Here, too, Plaintiffs are bound by the terms of their Complaint and, having presented

federal claims for adjudication, should not be permitted to now evade federal Court jurisdiction

by attempting to selectively modify their Complaint (without actually moving to amend the

Complaint as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15) in subsequent filings.

D. Even if the Court determines that this cause should be remanded to the State court,

in whole or in part, Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover costs, attorney fees, or

sanctions for alleged “fraud upon the court.”

Finally, the City notes that, even if the Court should eventually choose to remand this

case, in whole or in part, to the Seventh Judicial District Court for Sierra County, New Mexico, it

does not follow that Plaintiffs should recover costs or attorney fees. As shown above, the

Complaint, while not particularly well drafted, cannot reasonably be construed as not presenting

federal claims in Plaintiffs’ First and Third Claims for Relief. It was therefore properly removed

to the United States District Court. As Ms. Toomey notes, Plaintiffs are not represented by

counsel, and therefore have no right to recover attorney fees in any event.

As for Ms. Toomey’s allegations of fraud on the court and demand for sanctions, we note

that the greater part of pages 14 and 15 of the Motion to Remand [Doc. 8] consists merely of a

series of wild and unsupported allegations phrased as rhetorical questions. The City states, for


14

the record, that the Notice of Removal [Doc. 1] and all other pleadings and documents filed by

the City herein speak for themselves, and are absolutely devoid of any indication that the City or

its counsel has committed “fraud” as alleged by Ms. Toomey. The City categorically denies that

its Notice of Removal was predicated on the nefarious intentions hypothesized by Ms. Toomey.

The simple fact is that the Plaintiffs chose to file a Complaint seeking judicial determination of

matters clearly arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. They should not be

heard to complain that they now find it inconvenient to litigate in the appropriate forum for their

claims to be heard.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ Complaint [Doc. 1-1 (Ex. “A”)] clearly sets forth a federal cause of action over

which this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and this cause is therefore removable

to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Plaintiffs have not filed a motion for approval to

amend their Complaint. Rather, in the Motion to Remand [Doc. 8] and the Joinder [Doc. 10],

they now seek to evade the jurisdictional consequences of their original Complaint by denying

that they ever meant what is clearly set forth in the Complaint. Plaintiffs should not be permitted

to evade Federal Court jurisdiction by denying the allegations of their own Complaint through

subsequent motions and other filings with this Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Remand should be denied, and the Court should

proceed to consider Plaintiffs’ allegations, as set forth in their Complaint, on the merits thereof.


15

Coppler Law Firm, P.C.

645 Don Gaspar Avenue

Santa Fe, New Mexico 87505

(505) 988-5656

(505) 988-5704 fax

/s/ Gerald A. Coppler

Gerald A. Coppler

John L. Appel

Attorneys for Defendant

Certificate of Service

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th

day of November, 2012, I filed the foregoing

electronically through the CM/ECF system, which caused all counsel of record and Plaintiff

Deborah L. Toomey to be served by electronic mail, fax, or USPS, as more fully reflected in the

Notice of Electronic Filing. In addition, I caused a true copy of the foregoing to be delivered to

the below-listed plaintiffs by First Class Mail, postage prepaid:

Ron Fenn

316 N. Foch Street

Truth or Consequences, NM

87901

Barbara Salasin

211 W. Riverside Drive


87901

Kathe Bachtel

590 Mims #5


87901

Bethann Fenn

316 N. Foch Street


87901

Patricia Sistrunk

506 S. Pershing Street, Apt. 1


87901

Glenn M. Allen

P.O. Box 413

Williamsburg, NM 87942

Gerald Trumbull

905 Pine Street


87901

Joan Conway

316 E. 3rd

Avenue


87901

John E. Rayburn

P.O. Box 715

Williamsburg, New Mexico

87942

Rebecca Otero

558 Mims


87901

John Pape

212 Austin Avenue


87901

Lynn Lara

P.O. Box 715


87942


16

Yarrow Dankert

819 Ivy Street


87901

Alison Rashedi

214 Oak Street


87901

Benjamin A. Sanchez

P.O. Box 432


87942

Felicitas Rodriguez

6 Mud Canyon Road


87901

Robert Hanseck

316 Broadway Avenue


87901

Bonnie Sue Sanchez

P.O. Box 432


87942

Debra George

822 N. Pershing Street


87901

William Charles Bennett Jr.

P.O. Box 3


87901

Maryann Walter

P.O. Box 403


87942

James C. Mallen

600 N. Foch Street


87901

Gordon Mishler

P.O. Box 684


87942

Thomas P. Barto

P.O. Box 83


87942

Patrick Finley

417 Charles Street


87901

Monica Mishler

P.O. Box 684


87942

Gretchen M. Barto

P.O. Box 83


87942

Linda Scott

508 S. Pershing Street


87901

Augusta Mishler

P.O. Box 684


87942

Arthur Levine

P.O. Box 37


87942

Robert R. Munnerlyn

P.O. Box 3028


87901

Joseph Mishler

P.O. Box 684


87942

Ramona Levine

P.O. Box 37


87942

Dianne Fox

P.O. Box 92


87942

Mildred I Reed

P.O. Box 201


87942

Edna Coble

P.O. Box 906


87942


17

Earl Fox

P.O. Box 92


87942

Michael W. Reed

P.O. Box 201


87942

Bruce Thompson

P.O. Box 906


87942

Louie Palacios

P.O. Box 37


87942

Cheryl Hollingsworth

P.O. Box 73


87942

Kenneth Hughes Smiley

408 N. Magnolia


87901

James Palacios

P.O. Box 37


87942

Don Childers

P.O. Box 104


87942

Ann B. Smiley

408 N. Magnolia


87901

Michelle Cambroto

P.O. Box 901


87942

Shirley M. Childers

P.O. Box 104


87942

Michal Schartz

605 S. Pershing


87901

Phyllis Madison

P.O. Box 901


87942

Betty Durham

P.O. Box 855


87942

Maria Baca

201 W. Riverside


87901

David Madison

P.O. Box 901


87942

Mary Rose

P.O. Box 6


87942

Alfredo Baca

201 W. Riverside


87901

William Mata

P.O. Box 85


87942

Carol Naranjo

P.O. Box 752


87942

Joseph Jaramillo

1208 Aluminum


87901

Amanda Bailey

P.O. Box 964


87942

Lucy Farrester

P.O. Box 909


87942

Marcus Jaramillo

1208 Aluminum


87901


18

Dana Villines

P.O. Box 92


87942

John B. Gillem

P.O. Box 909


87942

Michelle Ellinger

427 Van Patten


87901

Daronda Fox

P.O. Box 1763

Elephant Butte, New Mexico

87942

on this 20th

day of November, 2012.

/s/ Gerald A. Coppler

T:\GAC\PLEADING\4130.2012-11-20 40 Response to Mtn to Remand


Defendant Response to Motion to Remand

Documents

Transcript of Defendant Response to Motion to Remand