2 DefenceTODAY magazine

NCWNCW

Dr Carlo Kopp

Tanker broadcasts fuel state and locationTanker relays Link 16 over the radio horizon

Combat Air Patrol

Wedgetail AEW&C

Strike Package

TankerLink 16 Relay Platform

RAAF Strike / Offensive Counter Air NCW Example

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Wedgetail transmitstarget status andcommandsto Combat Air Patrol

Strike package usesWedgetail threat tracksto evade fighters and bypass SAM sites

“NCW provides amechanism toaccelerate targetingand engagementcycles, but withoutthe IntelligenceSurveillance andReconnaissanceassets plus persistentfirepower deliveryassets to exploit theengagement cycleimprovements itsutility is of dubiousvalue in itself.”

Dr Carlo Kopp

A ‘Wedgetail’ AEW&C aircraft relays ISR data and commands to a tanker and multiple fighter CAPs. The RAFfirst introduced the use of JTIDS on tankers, providing both a relay capability to extend the coverage footprint,but also permitting tankers to advertise their fuel status information to fighters. The model has now beenadopted by the US Air Force in the ‘SMART tanker’ scheme where KC-135R and KC-767 tankers will beequipped with palletised JTIDS and other communications relay nodes. Benefits seen in Defensive Counter Airtranslate directly into Offensive Counter Air and Strike operations. Strike aircraft equipped with JTIDS/Link-16can be provided with a continuously updated wide area picture of air defence threats, particularly fighters andhostile radar emitters. This facilitates evasion of these threats, improving survivability.

buzzwords, bytes and the battlespace

NCW in AirDefenceOperationsAir warfare is the first area in which wehave seen the widespread use of early NCWtechniques, both in air defence roles and instrike warfare. The results achieved to date,even with relatively rudimentarycapabilities, have been the impetus behindthe drive to introduce NCW capabilities onmore platforms and also to develop moreadvanced technology for this role.Air defence operations were the first to seebroader introduction of networked datacapabilities, when the Joint TacticalInformation Distribution System(JTIDS)/Link-16 time division multiplexsystem was adopted. Until then interceptorswere mostly controlled by voice, but by the1970s this became unusable for theexpected air battles over the NATO-WarPacFEBA in Central Europe due to the intensejamming environment and sheer density oftraffic. With the expectation that both sideswould put hundreds of fighters upconcurrently, voice control of interceptorswould be untenable.The jam resistant JTIDS and its Link 16messaging format thus became the first‘networking’ scheme adopted for airdefence operations, as earlier systems wereessentially point-to-point uplinks allowingground control to vector interceptors.JTIDS entered development in the early1980s.An AWACS would typically control a Link16 network, with time slots in themessaging scheme allocated to flights orindividual aircraft equipped with onboardterminals. A first generation Link-16installation would use a dedicated cockpitdisplay which would graphically present themessage broadcast by either the AWACS ora ground station. Messages could vary fromtext strings to Plan Position Indicator (PPI)diagrams showing the locations and statesof friendly and hostile fighter aircraft. ManyJTIDS terminals fitted to fighters are‘receive only’, enabling fighters to listenpassively for messages but not send any. The transition from voice control to JTIDShas produced notable advances in tactics:fighters can operate in radio and radarsilence listening for AWACS commands viaJTIDS or monitoring the tactical situationvia JTIDS. Radars light up only once thefighter is ready to shoot to provide a missilesolution and midcourse guidance updates tothe missile once it is launched. Manyanecdotal tales exist describing exercises inwhich fighters and AWACS equipped withJTIDS wiped out their exercise opponentsusing fighters and AWACS not yet fittedwith JTIDS. First generation JTIDS systems present animportant advance over voice basedcommunications in terms of jam resistance,unambiguous and complete messagetransmission, and speed of transmission.

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OK

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Bomber Delivers JDAMs

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(c) 2001, CaJDAM Moving Target Engagement CONOPS (AMSTE)

Surveillance UAV

Datalink Aimpoint Updates

GMTI Radar Track

JSTARS/MC2A

Overcast

GMTI Radar Track

Above: Artist impression of a RAAF AEW&C‘Wedgetail’ aircraft destined to play a pivotal role inany future ADF networked force.

Right: Naval ships would not only receive situationalawareness information and tactical data from othersources but could also collect, process anddisseminate such data across the battlespace. Shipscould also provide command & control and otherhigher level battlespace management functions.

Below: The US Air Force envisages ultimately anNCW environment with digital connectivity throughthe whole ISR and striking chain, down to the smartweapon. The recent AMSTE trials saw an F-16C dropmodified JDAM bombs fitted with JTIDS receivers,against moving ground vehicles. The bombs wereguided to impact using JTIDS target position updatestransmitted by a remote JSTARS, in effect relegatingthe F-16 to a UCAV-like ‘dumb’ delivery role.

However, many installations are not tightlyintegrated with the aircraft’s weaponsystem. A pilot or weapons officer mustread the JTIDS display, interpret it, and thenfly the intercept based on the interpretationof the display. Even if the aircrews are freeof error in processing the information, theywill have to commit concentration andseconds of time to reading the display.A second generation JTIDS installation istightly integrated with the aircraft’s missioncomputers running the navigation anddisplay control software. This permits defacto data fusion by presenting the JTIDSinformation concurrently with informationproduced by onboard systems such as radaror radar warning equipment – all on thesame display. A tactical situation displaylayout presented on a cockpit display mightoverlay a moving map, radar tracks oftargets and RWR tracks of hostile emitters,and JTIDS data such as messages and PPIpresentations of AWACS tracks with

friendly and hostile aircraft positions.The most recent fighters, such as the US AirForce F/A-22A and F-35 Joint StrikeFighter (JSF) will have such capabilitiesembedded.While passive ‘receive only’ JTIDSterminals provide valuable capabilities inpermitting rapid and wide area distributionof tactical situation data to fighters they arelimited in terms of exploiting data gatheredby fighters. JTIDS terminals with an activetransmit capability provide the ability torelay target tracks produced by the fighterback to the AWACS. One of the current roles envisaged for theF/A-22A is the use of its low probability ofintercept (LPI) APG-77 radar and ESMreceiver package as a ‘horizon extender’ forthe AWACS, relaying the gathered data overJTIDS. With a 250+ NMI ESM horizon and200 NMI radar detection range againstlarger targets, a small number of F/A-22ACombat Air Patrols can largely expand thefootprint surveilled by an AWACS. The JSFhas nominally such a capability, but is muchless effective due to less capable sensorscompared to the F/A-22A.

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NCW

Left: Cockpit multi-function displays in the Gripenfighter cockpit display real-time targeting andsituational awareness information to the pilot fromwhich to make decisions about offensive and defensivecounter air tactics and weapons employment, or theconduct of attacks against ground targets.

One of the current roles envisaged for the F/A-22A is the use of its low probability of intercept (LPI) APG-77radar and ESM receiver package as a ‘horizon extender’ for the AWACS, relaying the gathered data over JTIDS.The F/A-22A also carries a covert fighter-to-fighter datalink, but will also now acquire a JTIDS transmitcapability to support this role.

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Once fighters are equipped with activetransmit capability in JTIDS, the terminalcan then double up as a jam resistant andhard-to-intercept supplement orreplacement for military secondary radar orIFF equipment. While an IFF code could bespoofed by an opponent, the encryptionfacilities in JTIDS make it much harder tobreak into.In practical terms, widespread introductionof integrated and active transmit capableJTIDS/Link-16 terminal capabilities infighter fleets will produce a majorimprovement in air defence capabilities, asthe wide area situation picture can bedistributed accurately and quickly to allaircraft in an operating area. This willpermit significantly greater autonomy byflight commanders or individual CombatAir Patrols.Other capabilities also accrue. One is thatair refueling tankers can be equipped withactive transmit capable JTIDS terminals andcan broadcast securely their orbit locationsand available fuel state. A fighter CAP canquickly determine which tanker in itsneighbourhood is the best prospect for a topup. The RAF were the first to introduce thismodel.Although a scarce commodity in Australia,tankers are ubiquitous in the real world andthis led to RAF proposals during the 1990sto use them as JTIDS relays – effectively‘horizon extenders’ for the JTIDS footprintof the nearest AWACS. More recently, theUS Air Force has opted to emulate thismodel with the ‘Smart Tanker’ schemeusing the ROBE equipment package, whichis more ambitious in its aims compared tothe RAF scheme.The paradigm produced by a JTIDS net isalso valuable for strike aircraft. If equippedeven with a basic ‘receive only’ JTIDSterminal, they can use the situational pictureto evade opposing fighters.

With a ‘Gods eye’ view of friendly andenemy fighter positions, the safest ingressand egress routes can be rapidly chosen.The downside of JTIDS operations hasproven to be a propensity to saturateindividual JTIDS nets with traffic. Whilethis is often a result of poor planning, it alsoreflects the reality that a significant depth oftraining is required to support JTIDSoperations.The success of JTIDS has also motivatedthe adoption of dedicated fighter-to-fighterdatalinks - also termed “inter-flight” and“intra-flight” datalinks. While this was firstused on the F-14A based on a TADIL CUHF link, the most recent incarnations aremuch more sophisticated. The F/A-22Auses a Low Probability of Intercept digitaldatalink to permit F/A-22As to sharesituation data; target and threat emittertracks from one aircraft can be relayed toothers. A similar capability is now alsoplanned for the JSF.JTIDS was designed for distributing asituation picture, and coordinating thedeployment of assets, especially in complexair defence environments. It is a product ofthe high-density air land sea battleenvironment of the Cold War era where‘friendlies’ and hostiles were often easy todistinguish, and hundreds of aerial andsurface based assets needed to becoordinated. Its limitations in this role lie inthroughput and total capacity, as it isdesigned to best operate with large numbersof short compact messages.In naval Anti Air Warfare (AAW) or navalair defence JTIDS is no less valuable as itprovides a shared channel through whichthe aerial situation picture can be relayedbetween missile armed surface warships,effectively permitting all combatants in aSurface Action Group (SAG) to share acommon view of the surroundingenvironment.

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Above: An F-111 releases flares as a countermeasureagainst surface-to-air missile attack. During the1980s the RAAF’s 82 Wing trialled the ‘Precision AirSupport’ model in which F-111s would orbit at higheraltitudes over an area of interest and pick off targetsusing laser guided bombs, directed by a groundobserver. This tactic was embryonic to the ‘PersistentStrike’ techniques used so successfully in Iraq.

Left: A powerful facility in the JTIDS protocol is thecapacity to electronically multiplex more than oneJTIDS net in a given area. This diagram illustratesthe allocation of seven separate JTIDS nets withinone operational area.

NCW

As with the previous environment in airdefence, combatants can passively receive asituation picture from other warships andthus remain radar and radio silent if need beto delay detection.A major advantage does accrue when JTIDSis used to connect an AWACS and fighterpackage with a naval SAG. Surfacewarships suffer an inevitable and basichandicap as a result of a limited radarhorizon. Depending on the radar antennaelevation above sea level, and the sea state,this can be between 15 and 25 NMItypically. Low-flying strike aircraft andcruise missiles are effectively invisible towarships until they ‘pop-up’ over thehorizon.Crossing the ‘joint’ boundary, an AWACSorbiting overhead with a JTIDS capabilitypermits its ‘Gods eye’ view to be relayeddown to the warship, giving the ship evasivemanoeuvre options (circumstancespermitting) but also early raid warning of animpending attack. In practical terms a singleAWACS can provide a surveillancefootprint, especially against low flyingthreats, vastly superior to even the largestshipboard radars. Physics cannot be beatenhere.The advantages seen in naval AAWresulting from the use of JTIDS are alsorepeated in land based air defenceoperations. Radars, missile and anti-aircraftartillery batteries or fire units can be nettedtogether. Again, crossing the ‘joint’boundary and netting into a situation picturefeed from an AWACS provides likeadvantages to land based air defenders.JTIDS is 1970s technology and as such hasimplicit limitations, especially in flexibilityand throughput. Nevertheless, it has provento be a very effective first generationtechnology for network centric air warfare,be it in single service or joint serviceoperations. Future technologies such as theUS Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) areexpected to be far more flexible.

NCW in StrikeWarfareNCW technology and technique is muchless evolved in strike warfare, comparedwith air defence environments. This reflectsboth technological pressures and historicaloperational pressures.The digital datalink channel of choice todayfor NCW oriented strike operations is theImproved Data Modem (IDM) modulationand protocol, running over the Have QuickII jam resistant HF/UHF radio channelmodulation. The nearest analogy to the IDMis the conventional voice-band modemrunning over a telephone line.The IDM lacks much of the sophisticationof the JTIDS scheme and was adopted as aquick gap-filling measure after experiencein early Balkans conflicts demonstrated aneed to rapidly deliver targeting coordinatesfrom Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance (ISR) systems such as theE-8 JSTARS and RC-135V/W Rivet Joint toF-16C fighters tasked with interdiction anddefence suppression tasks.In air defence operations only targetingcoordinates and target attributes need to bedistributed, and in a timely and repetitivemanner. In strike warfare the nature of thetargets is quite different, be they emittingradars and SAM/AAA systems, or hostileground forces. Frequently, much moreinformation needs to be distributed to theaircraft tasked with killing the target. Forinstance, a hostile radar needs to beidentified by type and, frequently, qualifiedwith other information on specific operatingfrequencies and search patterns beingemitted, to permit the attacking aircraft toacquire it faster. No differently, an enemyground unit or camouflagedsite/vehicle/position may require a bitmapimage (eg JPEG) to permit the striker tounambiguously separate the target fromcivilian facilities nearby.A key challenge in strike warfare is thustransmitting what might be a complexpackage of information required to identifya target without ambiguity. Collateraldamage is used by opponents as a weapon inInformation Warfare operations; therefore,precision and unambiguous targeting isessential, and not respecting this realityprovides an enemy with ammunition.The earliest implementations of the IDMmodel were based on the same ‘centralisedISR platform plus distributed shooter’scheme seen in air defence operations usingJTIDS based technology. As the technologyhas become more widely used and mature,we have seen other sources of targetinginformation such as UAVs and distantground based analysis centres introducedinto the system.This reflects the changing nature of strikewarfare. A decade ago most targets attackedby strike aircraft were static or ‘semimobile’, regardless of whether they werestrategic or battlefield targets. Aircraft

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Ship-launched Harpoon Block II missile from theUSS Decatur of the type Boeing will supply toAustralia. Networking of warships with airborneISR assets offers important gains in situationalawareness and survivability.(US Navy image)

would be launched with crews prebriefed onwhat they were to kill and where it wassituated. Since the 2001 Enduring Freedom aircampaign in Afghanistan this has allchanged. Evolution in action has seenopponents of the West rapidly shift tomobility to protect their ground force assets.The time it takes to prepare a sortie and flya strike aircraft into position to prosecute anattack is typically much greater than thetime it takes to rapidly relocate a smallerground force element and conceal it. Theresult has been a revolution in strike warfareover the last three years as targeting modelsbuilt around predominantly static and semi-mobile targets are replaced with oneassuming targets to be highly mobile. This has been reflected in a shift to‘persistent strike’ techniques: ISR platformsmaintain 24/7 continuous surveillance ofareas of interest, with Combat Air Patrolsflying ‘killbox interdiction’ sorties (loadedwith smart bombs) maintained on stationcontinuously, waiting to pounce on targetsas soon as the ISR machinery canunambiguously identify a target to be killed.The earliest attempts at ‘persistent strike’involved mostly US Air Force B-52H and B-1B bombers, supplemented by US NavyF/A-18Cs and F-14B/Ds over Afghanistan,with targeting data transmitted by voiceover radio channels and crews punching theGPS coordinates into the missionmanagement system using the cockpitkeypad. Despite this slow and error pronetechnological limitation, the technique oftenresulted in targets being killed withinminutes of the striker being tasked to attack.What digital links like the IDM provide is amechanism to avoid the double handling oftargeting coordinates as is the case withvoice channels. Targeting data generatedtypically by a complex and often distant ISRsystem is transmitted directly into themission management computer system ofthe striking aircraft.

Current US Air Force thinking, articulatedrecently in public by Chief of Air Staff JohnP. Jumper is ‘compressing the kill chain’with the ultimate aim of providing unbrokendigital connectivity between the ISR systemwhich finds the targets, through to the strikeaircraft which delivers the weapon, evendown to the weapon that kills the target. Adoption of this model will provide amechanism to minimise the time between atarget being detected and killed, with anerror free transmission path between theISR system and the weapon itself.This model not only reflects the changingnature of opposing target sets but also thedeep changes in targeting philosophy. TheCold War era involved opponents on knowngeographical boundaries, with much knownfixed infrastructure and enormous landarmies. The military paradigm was one ofbreaking the opponent’s warfightingcapability by large-scale attrition using airattack.

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1. Detect & Track2. Classify / Identify3. Intercept4. Escort / Engage

AAW CONNECTIVITY Link - 16

Battle GroupCentre

OAB Limit

CAP - Combat Air Patrol

CAP - Combat AirPatrol

WeapnsRelease Ring

VOICE

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The US Navy have a well developed and tightlyintegrated scheme for Anti Air Warfare (AAW), whichuses a combination of JTIDS/Link-16, Link-11 andVoice comms links. F-14D and F/A-18C-F fightersnetwork with the E-2C Hawkeye AEW&C system andshipboard radars to provide a comprehensive layeredmaritime Integrated Air Defence System. The OuterAir Battle (OAB) zone is primarily covered by fightersand picket warships, the inner zone defences arecovered by SAM systems on Aegis cruisers anddestroyer escorts. This model evolved from late ColdWar pressures to defend against Russian Backfires,Bears and submarines firing supersonic cruisemissiles.

Above: A Boeing CH-47F ‘Chinook’ helicopter, whichmay be offered to Australia under Air 9000 would be animportant troop-lift asset on the networked battlefield.Survivability of helicopters is an ongoing issue, andJTIDS can be used to broadcast threat location data toaid evasion of mobile SAM and AAA systems andhostile helciopters.

Left: Smaller fighters such as the F/A-18A requireintensive aerial refuelling support to provide thepersistence required for NCW-enabled striketechniques. With only 4 or 5 tankers planned the F/A-18A and JSF will have difficulty exploiting the targetingcycle improvements from networking.

NCW

The current model is much more refined,and involves faster and more concentratedattrition of the opposing nation state’sapparatus of power: government leadership,military leadership, command and controlfacilities, propaganda apparatus, internalsecurity forces, and the most loyal andresilient military and paramilitary combatforces. While this target set isgeographically distributed across thebreadth and depth of the opposing nationstate, it is also mobile and concealed, oftenexceptionally so.Historical origins of the ‘persistent strike’model lie in Australia . During the 1980s theRAAF’s Strike Reconnaissance Forcethrough 82 Wing trialled the ‘Precision AirSupport’ model in which F-111s would orbitat higher altitudes over an area of interestand pick off targets using laser guidedbombs, directed by a ground observer. It islittle known that a video datalink wastrialled to downlink imagery from the F-111to the ground controller on site. While thescheme did not achieve prominence inAustralian military thought, it did migrate tothe US via exchange officer postings andultimately evolved over time into thetechnique we observed in Afghanistan, withB-52H bombers flying circular orbits overTaliban positions.Afghanistan also demonstrated the inherentjoint warfare potential of this targetingmodel, as a large proportion of targetinginformation was generated by special forcesunits on the ground who identified thetargets and then assessed the effect of theattack. This was repeated over Iraq last year.To extract the full potential of this model,however, requires that digital connectivityexists to link together ground forceelements and airborne ISR and strikeelements. This remains a weakness in theUS force structure and an even greater onefor Australia. For instance, the IDM is anoption on US Army AH-64D ApacheLongbow reconnaissance/attackhelicopters, permitting the helicopter to

accept targeting information on ‘over thehorizon’ targets from airborne ISRplatforms and fighters, and vice versa. Thisis the correct model but it needs to beimplemented across a much greater range ofland force elements such as tanks andarmoured recce vehicles – and infantry unitswill ultimately require such two-wayconnectivity.

The FutureThere are two fundamental issues thatdefine the future in the NCW game. Thetechnological element is straightforward inconcept even if complex in implementation.The first concerns universal high speeddigital connectivity between platforms, laterincluding weapons. The second relates tohigh levels of seamless integration of theconnectivity paths with the embeddedweapon systems software of platforms. Inthe US we are seeing this reflected in thesoftware and systems architectures of theF/A-22A and JSF aircraft, the MC2Areplacement for the E-8 JSTARS, RC-135V/W and E-3 AWACS, as well inincreasing levels of digital integration innaval air defence systems and some Armyplatforms. The doctrinal and thought element isreflected in a shifting emphasis in targetingphilosophies and in personnel training tosupport this regime of combat. The USexperience has shown that most progresshas been achieved in single Serviceenvironments, with the joint paradigmlagging quite severely. The well developedand growing intra-Service NCWcapabilities of the US Air Force and USNavy reflect this fact: cross-Servicedoctrine and technique, as well as digitalconnectivity, lag severely.In Australia, rhetoric is far more potent thanimplementation. Many recent decisionsindicate that there is little understanding ofthe deeper relationships between NCW and

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The DoD's preferred fighter solution is theF-35 Joint Strike Fighter, designed primarilyfor battlefield air interdiction and close airsupport. The JSF will carry a comprehensivesuite of digital datalinks and software topermit it to accept targeting data from a widerange of ISR assets and other JSFs.

platform/force structure capabilities. Thereseems to be a deeply entrenched belief thatNCW capabilities, especially connectivity,are a replacement for raw firepower, ISRcapability and battlespace persistence. Thisis a dangerous delusion, insofar as NCWprovides a mechanism to acceleratetargeting and engagement cycles butwithout the ISR assets and persistentfirepower delivery assets to exploit theengagement cycle improvements its utilityis of dubious value in itself.Three examples of such broken thoughtprocesses are evident. A belief seems toexist that the provision of a JTIDScapability can wholly reverse theperformance and missile engagement rangedisadvantages of the F/A-18A HUG andJSF operated with Wedgetail AEW&Cagainst Russian Su-30 fighters and A-50AWACS now being acquired across theregion. Were parity to exist between fighterand AWACS capabilities then the NCWcapability of the ADF system could indeedbe the decider in a confrontation. But in asituation where the fighters are clearlychallenged to outperform opposing aircraftit is unclear how the NCW capability wouldprovide this advantage. If the opponent canshoot much earlier and aerodynamicallyclose or open engagement distances morereadily, knowing they are doing this will notprevent them from doing so. The potentialfor developmental Russian counter-ISRweapons such as the 200 NMI range KS-172 missile to be deployed within the regionlater this decade raises some very goodquestions about ISR platform survivability.AEW&C platforms are not throwawayassets.Another prime example of a broken thoughtprocess is the drive for early F-111retirement and the expectation that four orfive medium sized tankers and standoffmissiles will offset a de facto 50% reductionin force structure firepower. NCW in strikewarfare permits rapid engagement cyclesagainst mobile ground targets, but suchengagement cycles can only be executed ifstrike assets can persist over the target areawith large precision bomb payloads. In theabsence of plans for two dozen tanker

aircraft, the F-111 is the only ADF assetwith the on-station persistence and smartbomb payload to effectively make use of anadvanced NCW capability - yet it is to bekilled off in 2010. The much promotedNCW software and datalink capabilities ofthe JSF will be of no value if the JSFs arenot orbiting the target area since they haverun out of gas and smart bombs and have togo home. On balance, the extra NCWprocessing and bandwidth in a JSF againstan IDM and JTIDS retrofitted F-111 is ofless value than the inherent persistence andbomb load of the F-111, carrying almosttwice the internal fuel of the JSF.The third example of a broken thoughtprocess is the budgetary balance betweenthe RAAF operated Wedgetail AEW&Cfleet and the RAN’s intended Air WarfareDestroyers. Both have long-range radars butthe Wedgetail can acquire and track targetsat all altitudes while the destroyers are blindto low altitude targets beyond a very shortradar horizon. In effect, the destroyer canonly defend a large area footprint properlyagainst representative imported regionalthreats of Russian design if a Wedgetail isorbiting overhead and datalinkingcoordinates down to permit missileengagements at maximum range -preferably with the warship radar silent todeny targeting data to the opponent. On

balance it makes more sense to invest inmore Wedgetails rather than large expensivelong-range shipboard radars that drive upthe size and cost of the warshipssignificantly. The cost of putting a navalSAM seeker compatible X-band illuminatorradar on the belly of a Wedgetail to permit itto provide terminal phase SAM guidanceover the radar horizon of warships, andbuying more Wedgetails, is cheaper thanoverinvesting in larger and vastly moreexpensive warships of dubious survivability.An issue in its own right is supporting thetechnological capability in Australia. Thepolicy, not always followed, on ADFElectronic Warfare systems being suppliedwith software source code and developmentsystems should be extended to encompassall NCW systems, such as datalinks andmission computer integration software. Theissues behind this are no different for NCWsystems as for EW systems.In summary, NCW offers enormouspotential for the ADF, but it is not asubstitute for proper force structureplanning. Until this is recognised, rhetoricabout NCW will achieve nothing ofsignificant value, and often providesexcuses for dubious force structureplanning.

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Above: Australia seems certain to buy the RQ-4A‘Global Hawk’ UAV seen here landing at RAAF BaseEdinburgh. Long-range UAV platforms such as‘Global Hawk’ would be an important IntelligenceSurveillance and Reconnaissance asset. A GlobalHawk role seldom discussed in Australia is the‘pseudolite’ role in which a Global Hawk carries acommunications relay and networking payload ratherthan ISR sensors, providing persistent airborne‘satellite like’ wireless network coverage in areaswhere proper satellite coverage is absent.

Left: The Australian Army is close to making adecision on a replacement Main Battle Tank (MBT)for its ‘Leopard’ fleet. With its inherent firepower andmobility the MBT would gain great advantage fromtarget and tactical information plus command &control within an NCW environment.