Deepa Joshi 1. Introduction - Overseas Development Institute · 2019-11-11 · Deepa Joshi 1....

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Paper presented at ESRC Seminar on Access, Poverty and Social Exclusion, March 1st 2005, Overseas Development Institute, London

Deepa Joshi 1. Introduction The recent interest and concern with poverty in international policy has broadened the understanding of poverty, beyond earlier narrow economic measures. Hence the MDG goal ‘to eradicate extreme poverty…’; the definitions of chronic and absolute poverty; the recognition of disparity by ethnicity, gender, disability, age and the specification of the need for safety nets and social security in the short and the long term. However, progress in linking these analyses to water policies and practises remain poor, exemplified by the continued weak consideration of poverty in the water goal of the MDG (MDG 7); the serious lack of attention paid to poverty-water links in the PRSPs and, as this paper illustrates in the policy and practice of current rural water supply interventions, which continue to be underpinned by a policy focus on achieving economic efficiency. The perceived failure of previous supply-led1 approaches to realise the goal of ‘water for all’ led to a global shift in water policies and the emergence of new ‘Demand Responsive Approaches’ (DRA). In principle, DRA aims to improve financial and technical sustainability and efficiency of delivery systems and places huge emphasis on user ‘communities’ to function as management and financing institutions. Designed to deliver water by demand – identified as what users need and are able to afford – DRA in policy, aims to enable a voice and choice for all, including the poorest. In practice, the implications of poverty in making a demand for and securing access to water is poorly understood and addressed in currently implemented demand-responsive approaches to water supply management. This paper draws on recent research2 focusing on the conceptual and practical challenges associated with implementing DRA and assesses the net impact of these ongoing changes for poor water users. In India, reviews pointing out poor financial and operational management of technocratic supply-driven institutions and interventions influenced the sectoral shift towards DRA, which mirrors the Government of India’s constitutional goal of decentralisation. In-depth case studies in the state of Andhra Pradesh suggest that current demand-led approaches take inadequate account of the complex linkages between water, poverty and rural livelihoods, and challenges underlying assumptions made in the policy agenda around community participation and management. Water resources, both communal and individual, remain under the control of a small but – socially, politically and economically – powerful usually the upper caste3 males in village settings. Moreover, the ability to 1 Water provided (supplied) free of charge, by virtue of the good and the service being considered a basic human need. 2 The SecureWater research project was coordinated by the Overseas Development Institute, London with support from the UK Department for International Development. 3 The laddered Hindu society is stratified into a social hierarchy of four caste groups. Brahmins, Kshatriyas and the Vaishyas in descending social order are assumedly higher and constitutionally referred to as the ‘general castes’. The general castes are distinctly distanced from the Sudras or the ‘lower caste’ group, referred to traditionally as ‘untouchable’ and officially as the ‘scheduled castes’ (SCs). India’s scheduled castes prefer to call themselves ‘Dalits’ or the ‘oppressed’.



invest in improved drinking water services varies significantly within communities and existing project cycles are insufficiently flexible to cater to different needs. The current emphasis on cost recovery over equity means that DRA, as currently practiced, mainly benefits economically better-off households. Finally, the domestic water sector policy remains narrowly focused on providing safe drinking water and does not recognise importance of productive uses of water at household level. Nor does the practice of demand-led approaches take account of the competing and conflicting demands on the resource base. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for water supply projects to guarantee access to secure water for domestic use. Institutional fragmentation in the water sector and weak capacity to regulate water use, combined with ambiguities in the definition of ‘sustainability’ (technical, financial, social, resource) in drinking water policy suggest that the mantra of integrated water management remains largely rhetorical. Analysing the evolution of DRA policy in India and from recent experiences in implementation in Andhra Pradesh, this paper suggests the urgent need to consider:

1. Heterogeneity in, and fluctuating household incomes and livelihood security, which influence

2. Differing demands for, access to and control over water resources and water delivery systems and

3. Place people, their livelihoods and the socio-economic and –political connotations of power and decision-making in resource management central to demand-responsive approaches to water planning and management.

Unless demand-responsive policies and approaches actively address the above issues and consider financial and non-financial barriers to water access, the poorest will continue to be excluded from water delivery designs. 2. Water and Poverty – the Contradictions in Development Goals 2.1 Water in the MDGs The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent the universal political commitment to eradicate extreme poverty. Goal 7 of the MDG is, ‘to halve by 2015, the proportion of people without access to safe water supply and sanitation’. The Plan of Implementation (of MDG 7) detailed in chapter 4, article 25 the World Summit on Sustainable Development report redefines the goal, ‘to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of people who are unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water’. A further distinction is made of the proportion of people without access to water, i.e. the unserved and the underserved and it is identified that differential approaches as well as substantial costs are required to achieve goal 7, given these distinctions (WSSCC, 2004). Two key issues contradict the linking of poverty and disparity in access to water. Guidelines suggested for achieving MDG targets - (as identified below by the WSSCC (2004) and elsewhere by major donors and host countries) emphasise on achieving financial sustainability:

Promote affordable technologies and



Develop innovative financing and partnership mechanisms

Achieving economic efficiency at the cost of equity is often justified by pointing out:

the relative costs – especially health and productivity incurred by the poorest of the poor, in not having access to safe water and

that higher level of service that might not necessarily be relevant to serving the poorest of the poor, i.e. low-cost technologies for the poor, which are affordable for them.

Secondly, by definition and therefore design, the goal reveals the traditionally narrow, health-only and therefore ‘safe-drinking water’ focus. This contradicts evidence (from this paper and elsewhere) of a diverse and complex water-poverty-livelihood relationship. 2.2 PRSPs and Water Initiated by the IMF and World Bank in 1999 as a new policy framework, and increasingly supported by the international development community, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) processes are potentially of enormous significance for linking debt relief to determine development strategies in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Despite the accepted importance of water-related poverty a study of the PRSP processes reveal:

An overarching focus on economic policies of liberalisation and privatisation which reflect the inherent International Financial Institution/s conditionalities on the PRSPs, which may serve to increase inequalities between the poorest and better off (Marcus et.al, )

Inadequate knowledge and information on the links between poverty and water in the PRSPs of 5 Sub-Saharan countries (ODI, 2002) and

Singular emphasis in the above PRSPs on delivering physical infrastructure i.e. boreholes, where water issues are included (ibid).

3. From Supply to Demand – the Policy Shift in Water Management These conflicting priorities in water governance principles result from a long standing policy dilemma of water being considered as a social good as well as an economic commodity. Till the late 1980s, water supply was considered the responsibility of national governments and international policy emphasis was on enhancing coverage. Several lacunae in the above supply-driven approach are pointed to have contributed to the need towards considering water as an economic good. Water supply departments were considered to be and focused on delivery of centrally planned ‘hardware-only’, resulting in unsustainable technology, poor delivery systems, and more critically, a lack of community ‘ownership’. Internationally, throughout the Water Decade (1980-90) government incapacity in operation and maintenance were identified as the primary reasons for missed targets and huge capital expenditures (Nicol, 2000). Subsequently, the Dublin Principles (1992) declared:

Water is an economic as well as a social good and that Water is best managed at the lowest appropriate level



Throughout the 1990s, World Bank led researches and policy analyses identified that charging for scarce and depleting water sources will lead to its prudent use, and that pro-privatization (now known as public-private partnerships) approaches which better consider user demand and preferences (and thus facilitate greater community participation) would achieve financial, technical and resource sustainability (Altaf et. al., 1992, Whittington et. al., 1991). Additionally, it was identified that ‘users will pay atleast 5% of their total household incomes, if services conformed to what they want’ (World Bank, 1993). However, several others identify that the policy shift towards considering water as an economic good had more entrenched roots than the above mentioned failings in sectoral functioning. The neo-liberal principles which dominate domestic water policy today are identified to be outcomes of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) initiated by the World Bank and the IMF more than 2 decades ago (WEDO, 2003). The arguments against state monopoly over water resources as well as the demand for community-based approaches, both grassroots initiatives, seem to have been tenaciously co-opted at the global level, to support the water as a socio-economic good perspective (Joshi, 2002). Historically nurtured by the World Bank, the approach to managing water as a socio-economic good is now accepted globally in the water supply sector and known as the demand responsive approach (DRA).

DRA The DRA takes into account that rich men, rich women, poor men and poor women may want different kinds of service. DRA provides information and allows user choices to guide key investment designs, thereby ensuring that services conform to what people want and are willing to pay for. In exchange for making contributions, in cash or kind, for a satisfactory service, the stakeholders have a voice and choice in technology type, service level, service provider and management/financing arrangements. Source: Dayal, Wijk and Mukherjee (2000). The demand-led approach in theory identifies:

Water supplies are scarce and the supply-driven approach is technically and economically inefficient, and especially subsidises the rich at the cost of the poor.

Water is an economic (as well as a social) commodity and water users are potential consumers; this identification will enhance community ownership of services and resources.

DRA allows consumers at the lowest level to choose the technology most appropriate to them – which they can afford to operate and maintain.

On these grounds, DRAs aim to promote economic efficiency, technological appropriateness as well equity in addressing expressed demands for water. The shift towards considering water as an economic good also required corresponding changes of institutional actors. ‘Depending on their political persuasion, scholars, policy-makers and activists either advocate privatisation…or demand that local communities gain full ownership of natural resources; state and state-managed supply-driven



approaches are monolithically blamed for the poor management and ecological degradation of natural resources’ (Rangan, 1997). The change in institutional responsibilities – NGOs and/or the private sector as implementers and a regulatory and/or facilitative role for the state, relieves the state of its welfare responsibility in basic service delivery. This meets the SAP goals, but contradicts international policy declaration of water as a human right: ‘All people have the right to access to the amount of water required to sustain life and fulfil basic needs. …With respect to the right to water, State parties have a special obligation to provide those who do not have sufficient means with necessary water and water facilities…’ (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2002). The DRA also makes some broad assumptions:

Water is a scarce resource and the scarcity is universally (by both the rich and the poor and across sectors) experienced

Managing water as an economic good will lead to its appropriate, judicious and sustainable use

Differing needs for water across and within households is determined by the ability to pay less and more and that it will be possible for water projects to cater to varying demands and/or that a consistent community demand for water will be made – despite the assumed variations

In exchange for making (different?) contributions in cash and kind, all stakeholders will have an equal voice and choice

The Private Sector, NGOs and/or local governments will effectively promote a demand responsive approach and deliver water better than earlier centralized approaches.

Sifting through these contradictions in policy, the SecureWater research had a more practical focus – to analyse the conceptual and practical challenges in the implementation of this policy shift, looking primarily at its implications on poverty. The key issues explored in this paper are:

The links between poverty and water and how this impacts upon both the need and the ability (financial, social and political) of the poor to demand and access water

How the operating institutional environment of the practice of DRA is able to or does not recognise these links and from these analyses in order to suggest

Recommendations for a pro-poor shift in DRA policy and practice.

4. Study area and methodology Field research was conducted in three locations in Andhra Pradesh, Nattiobannagaripalli and Tanda habitations in Peddamandyam block of Chittoor district and Vemula village in Addakal in Mahbubnagar district.



Except for the scales of size, all the 3 locations illustrated similar livelihood-poverty-water situations. A complex diversity primarily by caste, class and gender within the community and mutually reinforced in the network of formal and informal institutions operational in the areas, determined access to and control of the use of water as a livelihood resource and water management decision-making. The links between social and/or political capital, water access and secure livelihoods is evident. The richer families among the supposedly upper caste Reddys have historically claimed ownership of both land and water resources in all the research locales. The tribal and Dalit families lived in temporary dwellings and, traditionally as agricultural labourers, did not own land. Local social culture (note below) determined that these families were not allowed equal access to traditional sources of water (wells and tanks) and official sources4 (hand-pumps and bore-wells built by the Rural Water Supply department and/or through Gram Panchayat funds). Land redistribution policies and legislation has resulted in transfer of some land to those households who worked on a share-cropping basis. Given the several gaps in this process, several tribal and Dalit families are still structurally or functionally – landless. Canal irrigation schemes introduced in the State in the 1980s and bore-well technology coupled with access to subsidised electricity benefited those with access to land and the resources to invest in privately-owned deep bore wells. The earlier practices of rain-fed subsistence cropping was rapidly exchanged for water-intensive rice cultivation: three croppings per year by these households. Poor and marginal farmers lost through this process. Assured economic returns from rice production dramatically increased the divide between landowners and landless agricultural labourers. This is accentuated because, although economic conditions have changed, there has been little parity in daily wages of agricultural workers, especially women, which remain a pittance: Rs20/day (US$1 = around Rs50), much lower than the officially (GoI) designated labour charges.5 Intensified agriculture and depleting natural resources (water, forests and cultivable land) impact all, but especially the poorest and amongst these women. In the peak summer droughts, many landless poor and those dependent on rain-fed agriculture migrate [with their cattle] in search of fodder and water, while women struggle to collect fuelwood and water at all times. However, the disparities are not generic. Social relationships and economic trends are not static. In Tanda, benefiting from Gulf-migration a few tribal families have purchased irrigated land. In contrast, the fortunes of some not-so rich Reddys has declined given the increasing competition for water. Although both the research districts are currently considered water scarce (Mahbubnagar being declared water stressed) the water stress is relative; the entrance to Vemula village in Mahbubnagar is marked by a large rice mill. Migration, contract and bonded labour (agricultural and construction) including child labour affect only the poorest households.

4 The terms ‘traditional’ and/or ‘indigenous’ imply that the design, management and control of water delivery systems are established without any influence external to the local community (Agarwal and Narain, 1997). Systems of water delivery introduced through British colonialism and which also formed the seed of official water planning after Independence are referred to as official (Sengupta, 1985 and Shiva, 1989). 5 First fixed at Rs35, revised to Rs50 in 2002 and to Rs66 in September 2003.



In-depth fieldwork examined:

The fluctuating nature of household economy and water-dependent livelihood activities and

The extent to which these are addressed in the design and implementation of current demand-responsive approaches in domestic water delivery.

Field analysis was complemented with key informant interviews with stakeholders at national, state and district levels. 4.1 Heterogeneity in Poverty Assessing household wellbeing and livelihood security, the research differentiated four categories of households: poorest, poor, medium-rich and the rich. Given the diversity in poverty, the classification is merely for convenience. For example, if household income-expenses are meticulously plotted, , the result would be a linear progression, with blending, diffused edges between wealth categories and households. The wide differences in income-poverty across households is an outcome of differential access to and ownership of physical and capital assets, the productive value of which is assured often, by secure access to water. The fact that there is a graded access to and control of water across household wealth groups – in the face of an assumed water scarcity, indicates a complex interlinking of the social, political and economic dimensions of poverty, which influence water decision-making. A mutually reinforcing relationship between disparity and socio-political discrimination influences the fact that the poorest have not only the least access to physical and/or capital assets, but also the least opportunities to convert assets to productive resources. 4.2 Quantifying Poverty Various methods were used to record and research household income and expenses including - structured interviews with case study households (HHs) assessing weekly market days and other weekly expenses; seasonal calendars to assess household livelihood strategies etc. Recall capacities varied between the rich and poor, the latter, especially the poorest HHs not being able to recall either expenses or incomes beyond a month at the most. To triangulate and validate weak recall capacities, financial dairies (Hulme, 2003) were maintained over a three-month period – to note HH incomes and expenses in case study HHs in one research locale. This and the fluctuating expenses and incomes in the financial diaries of the poorest, were strong indicators that HH economies are unpredictable for those with insecure livelihoods. It is important to note here that, in DRA water interventions in practice, people’s ability and willingness to pay for improved water sources is recorded (if at all) as a one-off exercise, determined in the set period of the project cycle, showing little awareness and consideration of seasonal fluctuations in rural economies (for instance, harvest and lean periods). The findings below represent an extrapolation from the above mentioned analyses:



Comparative annual approximated HH incomes and expenses (Rs)

Categories Poorest Poor Medium rich Rich Sub-categories

Non-wage labour (physically disabled, elderly)

Wage-labour (physically able to work)

Sinking into poverty

The better-off poor

The average medium rich

The better-off medium rich

The average rich

The Better-off Rich

Total income

1,300 5,481 5,500 14,050 25,637 29,200 25,410 125,000

Total expenses

1,700 6,028 6,450 17,500 25,410* 22,940 22,150 72,141

* The figures were high due to one case study HH’s significant expenditure on healthcare. Deficit and flexible, disposable incomes

1.1.1 Sources of household incomes and expenses 4.3 A comparative and qualitative analysis of poverty The wide variation in household incomes and expenses is an outcome, as mentioned above, not only of the inequity in access to productive resources but also, varying social and political abilities or lack of it to convert assets to assured incomes. For the poorest, who lack basic resources and/or assets, the ability to survive hinges on the physical capability to secure labour and/or other non-income means of survival, i.e. collection of minor forest produce. Physical disability and/or old age, in such cases is ominous.

-50

-30

-10

10

30

50

Non-WageLabour

Poorest

WageLabour

Poorest

Sinkinginto

poverty

Better offPoor

Avmedium

rich

Better Off(Farmers)Medium

Rich

Av.Rich(Non-farmers)

RichFarmers

%



On the top end of the well-being ladder are the resource-rich households. These constitute large farmers dominantly dependent on irrigated agriculture and for whom water, a vital productive complement of other natural assets - is assured. The group also includes HHs with diversified livelihoods (secure permanent employment – farm and/ornon-farm). Here, livelihood-security is not a concern. These HHs are also the local leaders and decision-makers and, more importantly, livelihood opportunity providers for the poorest and poor families in the village. They are also rich from a human and social perspective. They consist usually of large, extended families with dependable political networks both within and beyond the village. Well-to-do Households Krishna Reddy’s family is indicated as the richest in Nattiobannagaripalli. The family has six acres of land irrigated by tank water and personal bore-wells. There are more rain-dependent fields. The family own two bullocks, 20 cows and 50 sheep, the latter is loaned for rearing. Krishna Reddy has never had to buy rice in the market and in a good year is able to sell up to 75 bags of 40 kilograms each, which fetches around Rs75,000. He grows several other crops for both subsistence and sale and his household income and expenses are varied. His is one of the few houses in the village where clothes for washing are collected by a washerman and clothes ironed for everyday wear. Individuals from poorer households are paid to collect firewood and water, especially for the cattle. Krishna Reddy attends and settles village land disputes and commands obligation from many in both habitations. Everyone In Vemula, agrees that Nagi Reddy’s family is the richest. His 14-member household includes four adult sons, three of whom are in secure employment (in the army, the police and as a government bus driver). All the grandchildren in the large joint family attend school. Nagi Reddy’s house is large – he spent more than Rs200,000 on the construction. They have both electricity and an individual water connection. Nagi Reddy owns a massive 52 acres of land, of which 10 acres is grazing land, 18 acres dryland and the rest irrigated through the tank system and the bore-well. He has drilled 21 wells, spending 2.5 lakh, and has five functional bore-wells. Much of the crop is sold. The family have four bullocks, four buffaloes and eight cows. The milk is both sold and consumed. He also has a tractor, bought on a bank mortgage. Nagi Reddy’s eldest granddaughter is 16 years old and wants to take the joint entrance examinations for entry to medical and/or engineering school and the family is investing a significant amount of money for this. Nagi Reddy does not hold a political position, but, little happens in Vemula without his approval. In contrast, 40 per cent of the total population in the research areas live in extreme poverty and:

Are essentially non-landowners, land where available is rarely cultivable Live in kutcha (of temporary construction), often dilapidated houses Have few or no livestock and none of productive relevance Common livelihood options include wage-labour, migration and minor forest

produce collection and sale, but only for the physically able The elderly and the disabled survive on inadequate social welfare Are credit-unworthy, hence little or no access to loans, in cash or kind.



Daily meals not assured especially in non-peak agriculture periods; usually only one nutritionally inadequate meal a day, e.g. rice and salt, no milk for young children, resort to begging for food

Mostly but not always Dalits (SCs), Scheduled Tribes and include a significant percentage of women-headed and women-alone households

Even amongst this group there is striking diversity in vulnerability by caste, gender, age, physical disabilities: In Vemula village, the Dalit couple, Harijan Chinna Bhimanna and his wife, Buchamma both in their 70s, struggle to cope with living. Both, partially blind and disabled with leg fractures walk with the help of sticks and beg, ‘Our jhole, munta and katte (bag, metal bowl and stick) are our livelihood assets.’ Bhimanna in his caste-allocated profession as a cobbler used to make leather watering bags and footwear, both tasks being long and completely replaced by improved irrigation and readymade footwear. Since the collapse of their small one-room kutcha house, they live in a pucca (brick/RCC) house of a migrated family. No rent is demanded, but there is neither money nor ability for any repairs. Electricity has been long disconnected due to non-payment of bills. Bhimanna gets an old-age pension of Rs75 (US$1.5) per month, paid in person, once every quarter year, for which he is required to travel to the block headquarters. This meagre sum, according to him, “neither allows us to live or die”. He has not thought of what will happen, when he can no longer travel to receive his pension. They have a White Ration (Public Food Distribution Card for the poorest) card, which entitles them to 8 kilograms of rice a month, at a subsidised rate. The rice lasts, sparingly eaten, for 25 days and the rest of the pension is stretched to meet the barest basic needs. “We beg throughout the month for some vegetables etc., but effectively, for 5 days a month, we need to beg to eat a meal a day.” Recent walking difficulties have made begging a problem. Last month Bhimanna was sick and bed-ridden for 15 days and the couple starved for 2 days. Poorest Households Defying caste-poverty links are 27 year old Rama Reddy who suffers from complete leg paralysis and his elderly mother Gongulamma, in Nattiobannagaripalli. Gongulamma, widowed before Rama Reddy’s birth worked as an agricultural (and non-farm) labourer. The family has a small piece of land which has remained fallow since the advent of high-power deep tubewells in neighbouring fields. Gongulamma has been precariously sick for the past one year. She mortgaged her last piece of gold ornament for her treatment for Rs 3000. Visits to doctors and medicines cost around Rs 4000, but she has still not recovered and has been unable to go for labour this season. Their sole source of income is from making mats from a jungle leaf and repairing cots. This earns them around Rs 30 - 40 a week, but involves visits to the forest to collect the leaves and water to soak the leaves before weaving. “My mother is unable to collect enough leaves, we will be begging soon,” says Rama Reddy. One wall of their house has fallen down completely, the roof leaks, but, as they are not Dalits, they are not easily entitled to a housing loan. They have no kitchen garden like most others; a scrawny hen lies tied to a pole by a string – as neither Rama nor his mother can chase after it and as their house is not fenced. Their dependence on others is high yet they have little to offer in return to those who may help. “I went to



Peddamandyam, the block headquarters as they were registering names of the physically handicapped. Let’s see if anything else follows. I need a bicycle lift to cross the 2 kms of kutcha terrain, before I reach the road head. But that is not always available and, often, I walk on my crutches. I fall so many times and it is a humiliating exercise each time. The bus, too, costs money, which makes it difficult for me to travel.” Common official and non-governmental poverty alleviation programmes like food for work, housing loans, micro-credit etc. are not applicable for such households, which demand social welfare, especially in the immediate term. As evident from the case studies above, the government does not ignore the poorest like Bhimanna but it is a case of a severe misunderstanding of their poverty. Under the housing scheme for landless Dalits, Bhimanna got some land and money for building a house, but he left the construction halfway as he was unable to complete it under the given norms and conditions, the process of which is reported to be tainted with corruption. Bhimanna was also a recipient of the Madiga Manyam scheme, under which 4 acres of land were distributed to 100 Dalit families, some 30 years ago. “But there is no water and what will we do with such land? It is completely infertile - rocky and hard.” Gongulamma does not receive the benefits allocated to the Dalits, who are the officially recognised vulnerable. It was also obvious that strategies for social welfare were not coordinated with water delivery and management interventions. The exclusion of these HHs from access to secure water or their relative loss of water over time, seemed largely instrumental to these HHs ‘remaining or sinking into poverty’. The Many Faces of Exclusion K Peddanna’s family, the lone Dalit household in Nattiobannagaripalli is marked by a physical exclusion from the main village complex. A lost profession as cobblers, Mr Peddanna’s family survives on the basis of their human and social assets. Four able adults in the family, enable access to labour opportunities as and when available. Also, as the lone Dalit in Nattiobannagaripalli, Peddanna has sole responsibility for skinning all dead cows in the village: the skin he hands over to the owners and the flesh is his to keep or sell. Peddanna draws on the long-time patronage of Nagi Reddy, the richest farmer in the village, for whom he provided the maximum services prior to improvements in irrigation techniques. Nagi Reddy gives him occasional loans in return for assured (as a form of bonded) labour, but Peddanna is assertive that he would rather have this support than fight against it. Apart from labour, there are other obligations to be met by him and his family. Peddanna’s younger son, Sidappa, 10 years old and a primary school drop out, takes Nagi Reddy’s cattle for grazing. As the lone Dalit and released from all strains of maintaining a ‘kinship show of dignity’, Peddanna is free to beg for food and does this readily with the tribals and the Reddys. Yet, his deprivation is long standing. Despite forty years of residence in the village, he lacks legal tenure of even his homestead, nor was he offered any loans for house construction, which was widely offered to his tribal neighbours. Living alone amongst a socially vulnerable tribal community – his caste plays against, rather than to his favour. Rising medical expenses are worrying. The family’s ration card has been confiscated by the PDS owner, to whose uncle, a doctor, Peddanna owed Rs 300. Peddanna now buys



all his food at full market price. Both husband and wife are the last to return home on village market days – they stat till the end to procure left-over vegetables. “I would be better off, if I had some land or some livestock. I know several others in the village have been given livestock on loan but no one is willing to give me a loan.” However, options available to Peddanna are not so for Chittamma, a young widowed tribal woman with a girl child of 4 and her widowed and aged mother. Chittamma is slightly better-off than Rama Reddy, being able to work. However, as a tribal and a woman, there are many obligations that bind and constrain her. She cannot easily migrate or take up non-farm labour opportunities; she needs to maintain her social links by contributing to funerals and marriages amongst her community. She cannot marry again and find support this way. In Chittamma’s case, as for many women, ‘kinship burns’ more than it sustains (Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1999). The economies of the poorest households are precarious and unpredictable as they lack ownership of key livelihood assets, common in rural settings, i.e. land and livestock. Where there is ownership, there isn’t the corresponding access to water - or other implements required to achieve production. For the poorest who lack access to either the ability to survive hinges on the other two assets – human and social – which determines how families cope in different situations and conditions. 4.3.1 Poor households Households belonging to this category unlike the poorest households had some productive assets or marketable skills which gave them a credit-worthy status. This single distinction from the poorest households enabled them to raise loans to meet basic needs and occasionally invest in productive outputs. However, the risks of external or human factors effecting changes in well-being and livelihood security are high, resulting in fluctuating pattern of income and livelihood security. Further, these were HHs which had not been historically poor. The sink into poverty – was largely an outcome of their lost access to productive water – experienced in the last decade. 4.3.2 Medium Rich Households While access to water is comparatively lower and less assured than for the richest HHs, there is enough water for such HHs to gain productively from land and livestock. This group also includes families whose basic livelihood security is met through diversified livelihood options including especially, investment in non-farm activities. Given their less dominant hold on the increasingly ‘scarce’ water, such HHs were seen to focus on further diversifying livelihoods. This included investment in sustained and meaningful education for children. To conclude, the fact that the poorest and poor HHs make up 62% of the total research area population, and function on deficit budgets has been aggravated by a continual drought in the area over the past two to three years. The poorest households running on a deficit income have theoretically zero capacity to invest in improved basic services. Moving beyond HH incomes and poverty, the section below analyses the links between poverty and water and how these have been addressed and/or aggravated by water delivery and management interventions.



5. Water, Poverty and Livelihood The wide economic heterogeneity within a village community mutually reinforces inequality in the distribution of water as well as water decision-making ability and authority. The graded water access and security across wealth groups affects both domestic and productive water needs – which are closely interlinked and depend on the same or competing water resources. The poorest use the least water – yet lack secure access to both domestic and productive water needs, which affects not only livelihood security, but also the ability to seek and secure other livelihood options, given the opportunity costs of not having water for basic needs. On the other hand, water use is highest amongst the richest, who given their social and political authority have continued to exploit water sources and bend formal and informal policies and practices of water management to their benefit. The close interlinking of water needs and uses signals the urgent need for DRA interventions to evolve beyond narrow sectoral plans of water management. 5.1 An Unequal Water Scarcity When the research was initiated in late 1999, Nattiobannagaripalli residents had experienced a second summer of near-drought within 3 years and over half of the Tanda inhabitants had migrated temporarily to the nearby mega-cities of Bangalore and Madras. Concerns over inappropriate and inadequate water were expressed by all, but especially by the tribals in Tanda. Traditional domestic water sources like dug wells were not in use in the 2 habitations and the domestic water delivery structures – handpumps, provided by the Rural Water Supply Department –were neither reliable nor adequate, especially in the summer. Indicating an overlap in institutional roles in supplying drinking water, in 1995, a deep bore-well for providing water for domestic and livestock use had been sanctioned [for both habitations] by the Gram Panchayat6 from Gram Panchayat funds. However, the tap and tank were located, by conscious design in Nattiobannagaripalli habitation and the Reddys, who live there, exercised an informal but distinct control and ownership of this asset. The age-old social practice of ‘untouchability’ was applied to the tribals and the lone Dalit family to restrict equal access. The experiences of water scarcity were not universal, indicating the skewed outcome of water development interventions. As elsewhere in Andhra Pradesh, over the last decade there has been a marked increase in the number of bore-wells in Nattiobannagaripalli, belonging mostly to richer HHs. Securing groundwater depends on two issues:

ownership of land, an outcome of the link between water and land rights and the ability to invest in a deep borewell, which costs on an average between Rs

20,000 to 60,000 (US$ 500-12000). The cost varies depending on the depth at which water is found; this is largely dependent on soil-conditions; the presence or absence of competing bore-wells nearby and technical advice and support. Some farmers have found good water supply at

6 The village-level unit of the 3-tiered local government of the Local Government or Panchayat Raj Institution of India



around 60 ft, whereas others have failed to source water even at 350 ft. The risks of not locating groundwater are high, especially given the lack of technical assistance. Huge losses are incurred when water is not found and thus, such options are open only for the resource secure. The ability to invest in taking these risks is the visible difference between land-owning medium-rich and poor HHs. Small and marginal farmers, primarily dependent on shallow open wells for irrigation have laid fallow their lands for the past few years. There is general consensus amongst the local population that while watershed development programmes have succeeded in increasing water access and availability for larger farmers, benefits for poorer households have been largely restricted to wage labour for infrastructure development. As reported by Kotha Reddapa Naik, a tribal pastoralist, “Under the latter programme, several tanks – Bandaru kunta, Chinnakunta, Renumakula kunta, Pedda Cheruvu and Chinnacheruvu – were de-silted in the village. But the most important tank, Tellelukunta, was not included. If Tellelukunta was de-silted, the collective benefits would be huge; however, this would have submerged two acres of water-abundant fields belonging to the richest farmer in Nattiobannagaripalli, Mr Nagi Reddy. The Sarpanch and Mandal officers collectively decided not to touch Tellelukunta.” The situation is similar in Vemula, where agriculture is the mainstay of the village economy. Land-ownership is skewed. There are 210 marginal farmers, 218 small farmers and 88 large farmers, cultivating 353.96 hectares, 112.42 hectares and 524.08 hectares of land, respectively. 25 households are landless. Of the 13 water tanks in Vemula, the largest one, Pedda Cheruvu, irrigates 194 acres of land, of which 60% belongs to the Reddys, 35% to other backward castes and 5% to SC farmers. According to the 1997 GoAP Act, the management rights of such tanks have been handed over to a Water Users Association. The 194 acres irrigated by this tank are divided into 30 acre plots to enable the election of a WUA member from each 30 acre plot. Large farmers, who own 30 acres of land, are automatically members of the WUA; 15–20 smaller farmers elect one member. By connivance or luck, head-end farmers in most tank schemes are resource-rich, upper caste males. These farmers also have an informal but distinct control of water in other smaller tanks. Adoni Kunta tank Adoni Kunta is a tank lying just adjacent to the Dalit colony. This is on government-owned land, but the water is used mostly by Sudhakar Goud – one of the bigger farmers – as his lands lie in the command area of the tank. Some Dalit farmers also have their lands here. Sudhakar has established a bore-well close to the tank and keeps that under lock and key. Although the Dalits readily access the tank for fetching water for domestic and livestock use, they have never dared to think of pumping this water for other uses. The reasons are more political than economic. Inadequate and contradictory legislation foster continued inequality in access to water. Landowners exercise a more subtle ownership and control of surface water located on private lands. Surface water on public lands is said to be communal but is essentially linked to agricultural uses and practices established over a long period of time. Thus traditional users of such sources, essentially the local elite, continue to exercise a dominant informal right over them. Source: Field research in Vemula (2003).



The Watershed Committee in Vemula is a political structure, with members selected from local leaders belonging to the prominent political parties. Despite the pro-poor policy, the programme in Vemula caters to improving the watershed structures of the richer and bigger farmers, who directly influence the committee. There is strong discontent among land-owning poor and medium-rich Households in Vemula, expressing the fact that the watershed programme has been hijacked by the richer farmers. Discontent with the watershed programme “Bunding7 activities in our small field would get the land levelled; prevent erosion; increase moisture content; and harvest rainwater where it falls. The ban on bunding (because bunds are not stable structures and it was suspected that claims were being made for work not done under the programme) is politically motivated. The large percolation tanks, now being built as watershed structures, benefit only the few rich farmers on whose land the tank is built. A few surrounding farmers may benefit but this is all. The Gram Panchayat and the Watershed Committee work hand-in-glove. Contrary to policy guidelines, beneficiary farmers are not involved strategically; the work is mostly done by a select few committee members, who act as contractors. The farmer to whom a watershed structure is allocated signs his name and is issued a cheque, which he has promptly to hand over to a committee member.” Source: Discussion with non-watershed beneficiaries in Vemula (2003). Unregulated access to and use of groundwater and poor operation and maintenance of domestic water delivery systems in the past has caused and the currently poor households to forego cultivation as shallow wells and other traditional water sources remain depleted. These and the poorest HHs also depend on larger farmers for water for domestic use in periods of water scarcity i.e. dry months, drought periods. While a certain degree of communalism8 is taken for granted, the levels of thoughtfulness exhibited by the bore-well owners fluctuates according to water-stress situations. “In the summer months, control and ownership of this water is exercised by these landowning farmers through various means. They often mixed cow-dung with the water and justify this as a way to fertilise their fields. But we know this was to restrict access. What can we do, after all they own the water in their lands” (discussion with tribal Households in Tanda, 2001). In Vemula too, an issue of dissent is the conflict between water for irrigation and water for domestic use is evident. Drinking water or Water for Irrigation ‘A couple of years ago, a geologist from the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation department identified an area below the Pedda Cheruvu tank as the site for putting a bore-well for drinking-water. Since then the dilemma has been the competing uses of this water. We have lost our (irrigation) rights to this water’ say the WUA members, even though they too use the same source for their drinking water needs. In 2002, the drinking water situation in Vemula was the worst in the decade. Irrespective of caste, wealth,

7 Building low-height earth-walls around an area of cultivable field. 8 The norms of untouchability do not apply for water used for agricultural purposes.



gender and political leanings, all families except those directly benefiting from the tank water put up a collective fight to ensure that water in the tank was not depleted by irrigation use. In retaliation, WUA members approached the village Sarpanch and asked for permission for use of the tank water for irrigation. Aayacut (land owners in the command area) farmers contested this move and approached the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) for intervention. A decision was made by the MRO to allow the release of water in small quantities, four feet of water in two instalments of two feet each. The MRO assured the villagers that this use would not affect drinking water needs. The release of water from the tank was strictly monitored by the villagers’ (group discussion in Vemula, 2003). However, despite this show of solidarity, in practice, the distribution of water for domestic use in Vemula, where a self-evolved DRA is operational, is inequitable. The case study has important implications for DRA theory and design. ‘Traditionally, we used dug wells for our domestic water needs. Two separate dug wells existed, one for the larger village community and one exclusively for the Dalits.9 There was a transition later to hand-pumps provided by the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation department. However, as water scarcity increased, the RWSS had only quick-fix answers which were not solutions. Every summer, 10 to 15 hand-pumps would be dug, most of which would not deliver water. In 1997, a site for a bore-well was identified downstream of the main village tank. A large water tank was built, pipe lines were laid and 65 community taps provided. The filling of the tank depended on the availability of the three- phase current, for agricultural bore-well’ (Focus Group discussion in Vemula, 2003). A DRA in Vemula Water available through 65 public stand-posts built (as reported) closest to the houses of the more influential in Vemula was not adequate for the 837 households. Access to water was a contentious issue, especially in the summer months from February to June. The better off in Vemula were not happy to be involved in daily conflicts over water and, in the true spirit of privatisation, affordability was used as a criterion to improve preferential access. Lobbying by richer Households led the Sarpanch to develop a system of individual connections. Demand increased incrementally (and is now said to be saturated) until 130 individual connections were made. There were few restrictions on opting for an individual connection, other than obtaining a house tax clearance statement from the Mandal Revenue Office, paying upfront a connection fee of Rs1,000 and agreeing to pay Rs15 per month as O&M charges. Those who did not want to or could not pay would continue to use the 65 community tap-stand. All of these decisions were made by the Gram Panchayat and the Sarpanch approved the request for new connections. A water caretaker was appointed for providing new connections and operating and maintaining the system. There are three major pipelines leading from the tank. One is diverted to the Dalit Colony and the other two to the main village. Water is released on alternate days to these lines,

9 Hindu social exclusion norms define that Dalits cannot use the same water sources (especially for drinking purposes) as higher caste Hindus, as the Dalits are considered polluting.



between 6.00 and 6:30 in the morning and the same time in the evening. There is much concern amongst those who use communal stand posts that Sardar favours the system has been tinkered to deliver better water supply to certain individual connections. These individual sources have greatly reduced the burden of many households, even in peak summer months especially for those, who have installed pumps to increase the water-pressure. However, the clamour for a few buckets of water continues for the poor and poorest households. Dissent During the drought period, the community stand-posts fail to deliver more than one pot of water for each HH. Bisam Reddy’s daughter, Indramma was seriously beaten up in the fight to get water, which resulted in a miscarriage. The family fetch water from a community water post a few metres away from the house of a neighbour, Madhav Reddy. An additional 8–10 households collected water from this connection. However, given that his household is closest to the tap-stand and by virtue of his better economic status, Madhav Reddy claims an informal ownership of the standpost. Any insistence by others to ‘share’ water equally results in blatant abuse. In 2003, 50 year-old Sakira, wife of Mehboob Ali, fell down and was badly hurt in a stampede to fetch water. A few days later, she fell down again while carrying water home and was bedridden for three months before she finally died. Such fights are common in Vemula for those who fetch water from community stand-posts: the days begin and end with violence. Pots are readily used to hit others; water is dropped and thrown away. These difficulties have to be tolerated every day. The poorest and poor families were never asked about, and also would not have been able to contest, the Sarpanch’s decision to make individual connections to those who could pay. Water use and need closely relates to household livelihood practices. Lacking land and livestock, the need of the poorest households is restricted to water for basic domestic purposes, like cooking, cleaning, washing, bathing etc. In dry months, most poor and poorest households make do with not more than one or two pots of water per day from the communal stand-posts. Water is recycled several times; kitchen waste water is used to wash clothes or utensils, and then used to water plants in the backyard. Households without individual connections also resort to accessing agricultural bore-wells and as in Nattiobannagaripalli, this is not readily tolerated by the bore-well owning landlords, who use these sources for irrigation and for their livestock. For people dependent on wage labour, not having adequate water is a huge problem as it affects the ability to reach work on time and secure work for the day. Most of the manual wage labourers need to reach work at 8:30 to 9:00 but often the water timings and the distance travelled to fetch water clash. Ramulamma, a Dalit woman in Vemula, who works as a wage labourer, says ‘if we are late, we are sent back. It is a choice between fetching water and a day’s wage labour. In the drought months, it is the same, there is a crowd at most of the nearby bore-wells and inevitably we are late.’



The elderly and disabled face problems of another kind in fetching water. Buchamma, Bhimanna’s wife is unable to use the standard 14 litre pot, as a result of physical disability. She uses a smaller five litre pot, which also means she gets less water than others. “I walk 300 metres every day to fetch water and need to cross a small landing over a drain. It is painful to do this, especially with the water load. I have fallen down in the drain twice and my fracture has got worse. I need to stop and rest twice, both ways. There is always a rush and crowd, with 40–50 people at one tap. Sometimes people help me, but not always. In the dry months, we greatly reduce our water use, as it is far more difficult for me to walk up to the bore-well. If I had money, I would have opted for an individual connection, but how can I afford this?” (Field research, 2003).

Similarly, lack of water affects the water-dependent trades of some poorest and poor Households. “During the drought months, we cannot weave, the heat makes the bamboo strips hard and it is difficult to cut and weave unless it is properly soaked in water. But we can barely manage to get a few pots of water for HH use. If there was adequate water, we could have worked during the summer to sell more during the harvest periods, when demands for such products are high.” Women from many of the poorest and poor families collect neem seeds from the village and forests and sell them during the summer months. They say “for removing the pulp, water is required. If we can get water and clean the seeds, we are paid 50 paisa more per kg. But this is not possible” (Field research, 2003). In contrast, in Vemula, the individual taps of the rich Households deliver at least 15–20 pots of water every day. But, this is still not enough and most rich households report paying wage labour to transport water for cattle. Poor households with livestock require more water, but in summer months a distress-sale of livestock becomes inevitable. In contrast, livestock kept by medium-rich and rich households are not sold in distress (in summer). If the individual systems fail to deliver adequate water at home for livestock, the rich households employ wage-labour to fetch it. The physical burden of ‘fetching water’ in the summer is thus highest for those medium-rich households without an individual water connection.



Figure 1: Water use (litres/day) in the four different HH wealth categories in Vemula in summer months (February to June/July) and drought periods Figure 2: Distance travelled (km) to fetch water by the four different HH wealth categories in Vemula in summer months (February to June/July) and drought periods

0

0.4

0.8

1.2

1.6

2

Drinking, cooking,washing utensils

Bathing Washing clothes,cleaning the house

Livestock

Poorest Poor Medium Poor Rich

0

50

100

150

200

250

Drinking, cooking,washing utensils

Bathing Washing clothes,cleaning the house

Livestock

Poorest Poor Medium Poor Rich



Water needs are thus diverse and vary across households. Water is a valuable asset for all in Vemula but the interests and the stakes obviously vary. There is an apparent equal access to water for all (excluding the fact that Dalits can only access their own stand-posts) at community stand-posts but wealth and social status influence ownership of supposedly communal sources. This applies to both stand-posts, which provide water for domestic use, and tanks, used for irrigation purposes. A key question therefore is how far these water-poverty-livelihood linkages are currently being addressed in water policy and planning. Detailed analysis of the recent evolution of water sector reforms and subsequent implementation guidelines suggests a general failure to recognise and address the needs of poor water users in scheme design. Furthermore the challenge of integrating WSS with wider WRM remains unresolved. 6. Evolution of the DRA Policy in India – Whither Poverty? In strictly constitutional terms, providing drinking water is a state responsibility; management of the resource and the systems is a responsibility of the local government in the districts and villages. In practice, the Central Government has remained historically responsible for macro-policy formulation, institution establishment and financial assistance, while state governments have acted as implementing agents. This centre/state institutional relationship was premised on the understanding that GoI, having initiated the process of would gradually exit from this supporting role. In practice the culture of dependence persists differently in different states. Post-Independence and till the end of the seventh Five-Year Plan (1985–90) a common set of technical guidelines, established nationally, were applied across all state government Public Health Engineering Departments (Joshi, 2002):

Complete coverage for all no-source problem villages and partially covered villages;

Water supply to be provided within the stipulated norms of 40 lpcd within a maximum distance of 1.6km or at an elevation of 100m in the hilly regions. At least one source for every 250 persons with capacity of 40 lpcd (with an additional 30 lpcd for cattle in desert and problem areas);

Priority of safe water provision where existing supply sources exhibit health- harming characteristics.

Social clauses specifying the involvement of women in decision-making, priority coverage to SC/ST habitations and engagement of NGOs in domestic water supply interventions were added post the seventh Five-Year Plans (1985–90) which coincided with the International Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade. The clause of priority coverage to Scheduled Caste and Tribal groups had been formulated in recognition of the caste-based discrimination in the allocation and distribution of drinking water. The eighth five-year plan (1992-97) incorporated changes in the guidelines, an outcome of international policy influence:



Management of water as an economic good Demand-led approaches in water provision Decentralisation, user-participation and private sector involvement in water

management and Local level management and adoption of low cost technologies of operation

and maintenance (Ghosh et al., 1995) However, policy did not translate to practice (Joshi, 2001; Iyer, 2003). Subsequent reviews – both external and internal – pointing out poor financial and operational management of technocratic supply-driven institutions and interventions continued to influence the shift towards implementing the DRA in practice. ‘The under-performance of the rural water supply sector is likely to continue unless there is a fundamental reform of the service arrangements. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Government alone will not be able to provide necessary expansion of services to a growing population’ (GoI, 1997). A bold shift towards considering water as an economic good was made in the declaration of the ‘Sector Reform Programme’ (SRP) in 67 districts across 26 states in 1999. Given GoI’s welfare state position, the new approach was ‘justified by arguing that, even though access to drinking water was a social right, rural users – while exercising this right – should access water as an economic good’ (GoI, 2002). SRP Guidelines outlined:

A demand-driven, integrated approach to rural water supply and sanitation; Partial (10%) capital cost recovery and 100% O&M financing by users; Community participation in project planning, implementation and maintenance; Stronger links to watershed development programmes; Control measures on over-extraction of groundwater.

The SRP was funded entirely by central government. 20% of the annual national budget for rural drinking water supply programmes is reserved for the implementation of these policy reforms in the identified pilot districts. To facilitate implementation of the new strategy, reform guidelines defined the following activities:

Constitution of state and district-level management committees; Involvement of NGOs, Panchayat Institutions and/or the private sector as project

implementation actors; Constitution of Village or Habitation-level Water and Sanitation and User

Management Committees; Planning, collection of user contributions, supervision of implementation, and

O&M of delivery systems by the Village Water and Sanitation Committees and User Committees (GoI, 1999).

The essential merit in the design of the SRP lies in the attempt to create a sense of ownership and control of local communities over assets created through partial cost contribution. The SRP was constitutionally a justifiable shift towards enacting the agenda of decentralised governance. However, in the SRP, the local-level institutions were the Village (or Habitation) Water and Sanitation Committee which, were not necessarily the



root Panchayat Raj Institution, the Gram Panchayat (GP). This dilemma of a locating an ‘appropriate’ local level institution continues. Programme guidelines: social inclusion and poverty reduction? Earlier guidelines recognised the need to address poverty (by enabling differential allocation of funds to states/union territories based on poverty criteria) and socio-economic backwardness (funds earmarked for caste and tribal habitations). Further, an exception was made in considering SC/ST habitations with less than 100 persons as a normal unit for eligibility for coverage (against a norm of 100 persons and above for other settlements).

The SRP is to be prioritised to assumedly homogenous ‘communities’ which are able to demonstrate demand by willingness to pay. The only attention paid to issues of social inclusion is in the statement that women, SC/STs and poor sections of the village may be given due representation in the VWSCs. There is no mention of the term ‘poverty’ in the SRP guidelines (Gupta, 2003).

7. DRA in practice: Sector Reform Programme in Tanda Although the SRP was formally launched in 1999, the programme took off only towards the end of 2001. It took time for government staff both at the central and state levels to understand and implement the major paradigm shift in water supply delivery. This section broadly analyses the implementation of the SRP in Nattiobannagaripalli. Chittoor was identified as a pilot district for the implementation of the SRP in Andhra Pradesh and the implementation of the programme in Tanda habitation, is one of the good case studies of the SRP (Joshi, 2004). Tanda was one of the 21 pilot habitations identified by a local NGO, Grama Jana Seva Samstha (GJSS), which had been implementing the watershed programme in Nattiobannagaripalli. Obviously, the inequity in water allocation and availability in Tanda and therefore the demand for secure water was evident to the GJSS team. The Chittoor Water Supply and Sanitation Committee (CWSC) constituted for implementation of the SRP, decided to implement the scheme only in Tanda habitation, based on the following observations:

The Reddys already had private bore-wells – for agriculture and for domestic use. The bore well for domestic water use was generally inaccessible to Tanda habitants.

Hand-pumps built under the earlier programme in Tanda, indicated poor performance and reliability.

Caste and group conflicts did not make it possible to plan a single scheme for the two habitations.

Policy prioritised provision of drinking water to STs. [This reflects a good mix-up of earlier guidelines, which specifies this clause, as no mention of a priority provision of water supplies to STs and/or SCs is made in the SRP]

It was reported that several sessions of discussions were conducted with tribal households to arrive at a consensus on the representatives for the nine-member Habitation Water and Sanitation Committee. Eventually, the committee was headed by Mr Narsimhulu (rich household, see above) as Chairperson, with his daughter,



Ramanamma, as Treasurer. Ramanamma’s role was to ensure that the 10% community contribution was collected and deposited in a local bank, which was opened as a joint account between her and her father. The geologist from the Mandal office of the Rural Water Supply Department identified the site for a bore-well. The DSU engineer designed the scheme – a bore-well supplying water to an overhead tank by an electric motor and 15 public stand-posts for the 64 Households in Tanda. A 15-year population projection was taken into account to determine the tank capacity (20,000 litres). No other design options were given by the engineer. The community was asked to open a bank account and deposit 10% of the total project cost, amounting to Rs35,000 before project initiation. This was calculated by the committee as a contribution of Rs500 per household (rich and poor), payable in cash or labour (at Rs45 per day for men and Rs30 per day for women). The Habitation Committee supervised households providing labour to ensure they worked to the equivalent of Rs500. The committee also determined that individual connections would be made available on payment of an additional Rs500. O&M costs were calculated at Rs15 for individual connections and Rs10 for communal use of stand-posts. The scheme was implemented under the supervision of the RWSS engineer from the Mandal office, with support from GJSS and the habitation committee (DSU Staff, 2003). 13 tribal households, all belonging to the rich and medium-rich groups, opted for individual connections. The extra money for this was collected on completion of the scheme and deposited in the bank as an O&M fund. Of this fund, only Rs700 currently remains (end 2003); the rest has been spent in repairing the pump motor. The present situation is that the Rs15 O&M charges for individual connections have been reduced to a standard Rs10 for all households. However, a few (around 10 households) are reported as not paying user fees; efforts by the caretaker (whose job it is to make these collections) to make them pay have not been fruitful. The larger community is quite lax about this and most households who pay are not unduly concerned as they have unlimited access to water for a low monthly payment of Rs10. O&M charges are collected from households which pay, by a caretaker, whose duty involves operating the pump twice daily and chlorinating the tank once a month. The 20,000 litre tank, filled twice a day and with no restrictions on use, ensures a high degree of water availability even in water-scarce months. There is high user satisfaction, especially as the system, less than one year old, functions well, with low O&M needs. 7.1 Availability In a complete reversal of the earlier situation, the tribals in Tanda are now ‘water secure’. In fact, convenience overrules caste restrictions, Reddy families (who had earlier declined to join the service and who pay nothing) living close to Tanda also collect water from these public stand-posts. This is not opposed by the tribal families, especially as there is enough water to spare. Issues of technical and financial sustainability not withstanding, the Sector Reform Programme appears hugely successful in Tanda. However, detailed analysis highlights the uneven distribution of costs and benefits associated with the scheme. Not everyone has benefited and for many there have been important livelihood trade offs associated with gaining access to an improved supply.



Mr Peddanna’s household was not included in the design of the SRP in Tanda. Several reasons are offered by others for this:

He is not a part of Tanda He begs from us, how can we ask him to pay Rs500? He can still fetch water, no one will stop him from using the communal stand-

posts

Mr Peddanna himself claims: I was never asked, never consulted I did go up to meet the CWSC team, I went three times and sat through the

meetings, but never found the courage (the space) to raise this. I would come back home and feel ashamed to tell my wife what happened

I could not have paid the costs, but I do still need the water and, because of the social restrictions, I do need an independent source.

The reasons for excluding Peddanna are not completely clear. However, what he says has a major lesson for the DRA:

“I am not allowed access from the communal stand-posts. I can only access water from the tank built to feed animals. This is not clean water, but we take water for all other uses from here and, for drinking and cooking, we hold the pot above the tank water and fill water from the tap. This is tiresome, because we need to hold the pot in our hands all the time as the water fills. Even here, we are often told that we dirty and pollute the water. I fought and gained access to this water. I said, it was built by the government, it is a government resource, not yours, and I have right to access it.”

The SRP attempted handing over ownership of schemes to an assumedly homogeneous ‘community’ but Peddanna had to fight and reverse this ownership back to an absentee ‘government’ in order to gain access to a common source. Next door, in Nattiobannagaripalli, Krishna Reddy was among those who voiced the decision that the Reddys would not participate in the water scheme ‘with the tribals’. He is confident that Panchayat funds will be provided to build communal and individual connections from the bore-well connection that exists in Nattiobannagaripalli. Domestic water requirements for rich households like his, are met by employing cheaply available labour. This illustrates the dangers of individuals like Krishna Reddy being able to make decisions on behalf of the ‘Reddy’ community, decisions that do not take into account the views and needs of the poorest and the poor among the Reddys, especially the physically disabled families like Rama Reddy’s (see above). Watershed and forestry management experiences in India, where a certain amount of decentralisation has been sought through the constitution of user groups or committees, show that the voices of the marginalised are rarely heard in decision-making. However, the understanding amongst decision-makers is that such problems do not exist or they will have to be minimised rather than designed. (Gupta, 2003 in personal communication with GoI). Since there is no mechanism and/or intent to restrict water delivery the Tanda Habitation Committee president, Narasimulu Nayak, stands to gain from the water overflow in the SRP project tank, to his tomato and chilli fields nearby. The researchers overhead his



anger when the pump caretaker shut off because pump as the water in the tank had started to overflow. Ironically, this bore-well located on government owned fallow land creates a big problem for Venkataramana Reddy, a medium-rich farmer, whose bore-well lies just 30 metres away. ‘Our bore-well used to provide adequate water to irrigate three acres but, since last year, the water enables cultivation only in a one acre field and three families (his uncles) share this produce. Last year, for the first time in my life, I migrated to Bangalore. My old parents too migrated to Chennai. Having never worked before, they were cheated and not paid for the work they did in a factory. I am trying to go to Kuwait again. I don’t think I can depend anymore on the water in our bore-well.’ The issue here is not of the loss of Venkataramana against the project’s gain., The issue is that the 20,000 litre tank in Tanda is filled twice a day and issues of integrated water resource management and water source sustainability outlined in the the SRP guidelines are difficult to implement in practice. 7.2 Access and use None of the poor or poorest tribal households are members of the Habitation Water and Sanitation Committee and only one poor household has opted for an individual connection. However, the wide network of taps and an over flow of water, twice a day - makes water available, at less than 50 metres for almost every household in Tanda. Fetching water for multiple domestic use is therefore not a huge burden and there is little discontent. Indeed, even the poor and poorest households, whose water use has not increased incrementally, report the benefits of freeing time, which translates to the convenience and ability to seek daily wage labour. However, the patterns and strategies for payment and cost were in this case imposed by project guidelines demonstrating little understanding of water-livelihood needs, fluctuating household incomes and differing abilities to pay for incremental improvements in water demands. Project cycles typically involve a narrow ‘one-off’ window of opportunity to secure scheme membership which serves to exclude those households who cannot mobilise capital contribution quickly. Devising options for flexible repayment over the longer term is important in order to ensure poorer households and latecomers are not excluded. Kotha Reddappa ‘I would have liked to take an individual connection. This would have made it easier for my wife to fetch water, especially as she is not well and it would be easier to fetch water for animals. Also I could have intensified kitchen gardening. But the money collection for this scheme took place at a time when it was just impossible for me to spare the amount. I don’t know how I can take an individual connection now [the programme has no support scheme for latecomers]. A lot of the water issues and activities affect us. But who listens to us? This also happened in the watershed programme. Because we don’t have land, people assume we don’t have any need for water.’ Source: Field research: Kotha Reddappa (2003).

All the poorest households in Tanda contributed equal capital costs for the scheme and currently, every household pays an equal O&M fee. Poorer households can substitute



cash with labour but contrary to popular perception this labour is not ‘free’. The inequity of this cost sharing is evident in the case of women-only households like Chittamma’s (see Section 5.2.1), which survive on daily wage labour of Rs20 (for women). Chittamma was asked to contribute Rs500 as the capital cost contribution, like all households in Tanda. Chittamma says ‘I worked a few days a week for the scheme and rest of the days as wage labour. It was a difficult period. But having reliable water for use at home means a lot. It enables me to reach work on time. According to her, there is also the shame of not being able to pay like others.’ This illustrates the importance attached to water access but also the livelihood trade-offs involved in scheme membership. Research suggests that both the relative costs and the relative benefits of improved access are generally greatest for the poorest households in a given community. Issues of technical and financial sustainability or scaling up demand-led approaches in a historically supply driven sector are not discussed in this paper. Economists recommend a fixed level of water at zero price for rural citizens to meet basic needs and thereafter a graded cost-recovery, if India is to achieve its MDG goals (Sachs and Bajpai, 2005). The current rural water supply policy in India, a scaled up version of the SRP defines cost-recovery from all users. 8. Conclusions The emphasis in this paper is not on debating whether or how the state should deliver its welfare roles and/or assure people’s rights to water. The focus is on demonstrating the links and gaps between policy and practice to improve ‘access to safe drinking water’ and the wider objective of poverty reduction. The analysis reveals complex linkages between water-livelihoods and poverty, which point out where and how access to secure water complements household wellbeing and livelihood security. Numerous examples illustrate that household consumption and productive use of water is closely inter-linked and that the incentive and potential ability to invest in improved water supplies is greatest, when livelihood security is assured. However, if poverty is to be addressed, redistribution of capital assets will need to go together with the provision of secure and reliable water as inequity in the distribution of water matters as much as does the combined effect of inequity in water along with other assets. For the asset-less poorest, the trade-offs of having access to secure, reliable water are indirect: for example, freeing time and energy for wage labour. However, even when secure water for domestic use is assured, the gains do not readily translate to improved household economy. Mr Peddanna aptly described, ‘What will we use the extra water for? There is no kitchen garden, no cattle, and often no energy at the end of a long working day’. Also, indirect gains through secure access to water and wage labour – do not work in lifting households out of poverty. This is because of the poor regulation of fair wages and more primarily, the fact that securing wage labour demands appropriate human and social assets. The latter applies, especially to the elderly and disabled among the poorest. Adequate and appropriate water does secure the livelihoods of the ‘few asset-owning’ poor households; however, for household security to be assured, programmes must move beyond the narrow domains of providing only safe drinking water. Productive water needs here include water for irrigating small landholdings, for livestock, for small businesses like beer brewing and for traditional livelihood activities. However, many of these families still are grave losers in the over-exploitation of available groundwater



sources by rich and medium-rich households. They perceive that meaningful gains can only be assured through an integrated and equitable water management. Kotha Reddappa’s unheard needs, whether it was his suggestion for watershed programmes for re-charging common grazing grounds or demand for an incremental user contribution – suggest that the links between water, livelihoods and poverty are not very difficult to gauge and require relatively simple adjustments in project design. What matters is that such voices are heard and that the project planning process provides a principled framework for negotiation among different water users. Water is undoubtedly a key livelihood asset for medium-rich households and partial, if not adequate, access to this water has been secured by this group. Having more or less resolved the problems of access to water for domestic use and unable to compete for productive water with the rich households, a wise decision is made here, to diversify livelihoods, using opportunities that are not water-dependent. For the traditionally landed and rich households, well-being and security revolve around adequate and reliable water. This explains the persistent focus on developing (exploiting) water, even in the face of visible water scarcity. This also explains why (male) farmers in this category demand and exert strong influence on all water initiatives in the village. Such entrenched inequities in social organisation and water access are overlooked in the current drinking water policy and practice, which assumes an altruistic and unitary user community and compartmentalised water uses and/or need. The drinking water sector will continue to grapple with raising and addressing demand, unless DRA design and implementation is revised to incorporate a poverty and livelihoods perspective. Continued lack of explicit attention to these issues will mean that intended and potential benefits of a DRA are unlikely to be realised both in terms of sustainability (scheme and finance) and poverty reduction. References: Altaf, M. A., H Jamal, and D Whittington, (1992), Willingness to Pay for Water in Rural

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V Naidu at the Water Forum 2002, World Bank, Washington, DC, 6 May, 2002. Government of India (1997), Report of the Working Group on Participatory Irrigation

Management for the Ninth Plan, Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi. Kabeer, N. and R Subrahmanian (eds) (1999), Institutions, Relations and Outcomes,

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Gupta R. (2003), SecureWater research documentation, India, 2003. Hulme, D. (2003), Thinking small and the understanding of poverty: Maymana and

Mofizul’s story. Working Paper No. 22, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, Manchester: IDPM.

Joshi, D. (2002) ‘The rhetoric and reality of gender issues in the domestic water sector: a case study from India’, PhD Thesis, University of Southampton, UK.

Joshi, D (2004). SecureWater – Whither Poverty? Livelihoods in the DRA Approaches: A Case Study of the Water Supply Programme in India. ODI Water Policy Programme and the School of Civil Engineering and the Environment, University of Southampton, UK.

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Sachs, J.D. and N Bajpai (2005), The big if: India can achieve its date with destiny by 2015 with planning, Guest Column, The WEEK, February 27, 2005, Malayala Manorama Press, Kottayam.

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