Deep Cuts: What the Age of Austerity Means for Global Public Goods

8/7/2019 Deep Cuts: What the Age of Austerity Means for Global Public Goods

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Summary: The provision of global public goods — for thecommon defense, the economicdevelopment of the world’spoorest societies, and themitigation of and adaptationto climate change — is at riskas governments in Europeand the United States try torein in their spending to copewith the mounting publicdebts incurred during theGreat Recession. Such scalausterity threatens the long-term security, humanitarian,and environmental interestsof nations on both sides of theAtlantic. Looming austerity willrequire defense cooperationheretofore not seen in peace

time. Greater cooperation inresearch and development,production, and procurement of defense technologies would bea logical move for cash-strappedNATO allies. Foreign aid islikely to be another casualty of

scal belt-tightening. A pooling of American and Europeanaid funding at the country orregional level may be necessaryto cope with limited resources.Climate nance needed foradaptation to and mitigationof climate change is similarlyat risk. New and innovativesources of nancing aredesperately needed. It is time fora transatlantic dialogue on theimplications of scal austerity forglobal public goods.

Te provision o global publicgoods — or the common de ense,the economic development o theworld’s poorest societies, the mitiga-tion o and adaptation to climatechange — is at risk as govern-ments in Europe and the UnitedStates try to rein in their spendingto cope with the mounting publicdebts incurred during the GreatRecession. Such scal austerity, aseconomically justi ed as it may be,threatens the long-term security,humanitarian, and environmentalinterests o nations on both sides o the Atlantic.

Te United States is expected to cutits scal de cit by 3.4 percentagepoints o GDP between 2010 and2012, according to estimates by the

International Monetary Fund. TeUnited Kingdom plans to reduceits de cit by 4.2 percentage pointsand Germany by 1.7 points. Givenprospects o slow growth in Europeand possibly even in the UnitedStates over that time period, mucho this de cit reduction will have tobe achieved through a contractionin government spending. 1

But even currently planned belt-tightening may not prove su cient.

1 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/pdf/tables.pdf

Deep Cuts: What the Age of Austerity Means for Global Public Goodsby Bruce Stokes

1744 R Street NW

Washington, DC 20009T 1 202 683 2650F 1 202 265 1662E in o@gm us.org

Net public debt as a portion o theeconomy is expected to grow in theUnited States by 18.9 percentagepoints o GDP by 2015, by 7.2points in the United Kingdom,and by 3 percentage points inGermany. Deeper budget cuts may be unavoidable to slow this rise indebt levels, especially in the UnitedStates.

o date, the austerity already imposed has largely consisted o cosmetic, one-o measures thattrim at rom bloated governmentspending. Over the next ew years,the budget scalpel will need to cutmuscle and bone. With domesticconstituencies not yet recovered

rom the economic downturn, themost vulnerable budget lines may

prove to be those that provide orinternational public goods.

Tis day o reckoning or suchspending was inevitable. Asde ense analysts Gordon Adamsand Matthew Leatherman arguedrecently in Foreign Afairs , “TeU.S. government’s ambitions nowoutstrip its capacities at home.”While they were speci cally discussing prospects or the Penta-gon’s budget, their comments may apply equally to the political willing-

March 2011

Paper Series



2

ness and budgetary headroom to provide oreign aid andclimate nance. 2

Complicating matters, European and U.S. governmentsand their publics di er in their belt-tightening priori-ties. Washington intends to continue to increase de ensespending, backed by a majority o the public, whileLondon and Berlin are cutting back on military outlays.Te British government wants to increase oreign aid,despite public opposition to such giving, but the U.S.House o Representatives, backed by American publicopinion, wants to cut development spending.

Moreover, global public goods are clearly in the eye o the beholder. As Sam Perlo-Freeman, a senior researcherat the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI), has noted, “From an American governmentperspective, U.S. military spending is a global publicgood. But i you ask the Chinese, they would say no.”3

So a lack o consensus on international priorities andjust who should bear those burdens complicate needed

coordination o national budget cutting that would helpminimize the impact o scal austerity on the provisiono global public goods.

Looming government budget cuts pose a crippling threatto de ense spending, oreign aid, and climate nance.Nevertheless, mounting public debts make such cutbacksalmost inevitable, despite the potential long-term adverseconsequences o shortchanging the uture. Tis sharedchallenge underscores the urgency o a transatlanticdialogue on budget cutting. Moreover, it highlights theneed or governments in Europe and the United States

2 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67145/gordon-adams-and-matthew-leatherman/a-leaner-and-meaner-defense

3 phone interview February 2011

to better coordinate military roles, de ense procurement,development assistance activities, and climate spending.

Defense Spending

Provision o the common de ense has long been a sharedtransatlantic challenge. Allied nations have long investedsigni cant national treasure in their militaries. Tatspending is now likely to be signi cantly curtailed. Andthe apportionment o the de ense burden, which wasnever equal, is likely to become even more uneven in theyears ahead.

In 2008, the last year or which comparable data is avail-able rom SIPRI, the United States devoted 4.3 percento its GDP to de ense. Te United Kingdom spent 2.5percent and Germany 1.3 percent. Current budget-cutting plans suggest this discrepancy in allied military budgets may grow as austerity begins to bite. 4

Te Obama administration has recently announced plansto curtail de ense spending by $78 billion over the next

ve years. But such cuts will still allow the roughly $720billion Pentagon budget to continue to keep pace within ation. U.S. Secretary o De ense Robert Gates hasresisted pressure or urther cutbacks in outlays, arguingthat “when it comes to the de cit, the Department o De ense is not the problem.”5

“In the near uture,” concludes Perlo-Freeman, “wecannot expect any reduction in U.S. military spending. Itmight, however, stop increasing at the breakneck speed ithad been increasing.” 6

While Washington is attempting to hold the line on

de ense spending, London is already aggressively trim-ming it. Te government o Prime Minister DavidCameron plans to curtail de ense spending in real termsby 7.5 percent over the next our years by phasing outBritain’s troop deployment in Germany, scrappingthe Nimrod reconnaissance aircraf, mothballing oneplanned aircraf carrier and leaving the other with noplanes to land on it or several years.7

4

ibid5 http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4720

6 http://milexdata.sipri.org

7 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11569160

Fiscal austerity threatens the

long-term security, humanitarian,

and environmental interests

of nations on both sides of the

Atlantic.



3

So ar, the British navy plans to continue with a $30billion modernization o its our nuclear submarines.But a nal decision on this matter is not expected until2016. Te Cameron government’s coalition partner, theLiberal Democrats, campaigned on a pledge to eliminatethis deterrent, suggesting it, too, could one day be on thechopping block.

Te German government o Chancellor Angela Merkelhas similarly announced plans to trim €8.4 billion romthe €31.5 billion annual de ense budget over the nextthree years. Personnel in the German armed orces willbe reduced rom 250,000 to 185,000. Conscription will besuspended. Te Lufwa e will curtail its planned acquisi-tion o Euro ghters and reduce its contingent o ornadoaircraf. And the air orce’s eet o military transportaircraf will be reduced, giving Germany less heavy airlifpotential and expeditionary capability. 8

Te disconnect between American and European mili-tary spending plans mirrors transatlantic di erencesin public opinion about the uture o de ense outlays.But whereas Americans support Washington’s go-slowapproach to trimming the Pentagon’s budget, the British

question London’s cutbacks.

Less than a third (30 percent) o Americans want todecrease military spending (31 percent want an increase),according to a February 2011 survey by the Pew ResearchCenter. Tat compares with 43 percent who wanted toslash the de ense budget in August 1990 at the end o theCold War. 9,10

In contrast, the British public is uncertain aboutimpending de ense belt-tightening. A poll by YouGov.

8 ww.iiss.org/members-login/?ReturnUrl=/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-16-2010/december/german-armed-forces-face-big-changes/

9 http://people-press.org/report/702/

10 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm

com in October 2010, at the time the U.K. de ense cutswere announced, ound that a solid majority (59 percent)o those surveyed thought it unacceptable that a lack o carrier-based jet ghters and the reduction in the sizeo the navy eet would leave the Royal Navy weakerthan that o some other European NA O allies. Anda plurality (48 percent) o the public thought that theplanned reduction in troop numbers was too large.

Nevertheless, while the Obama administration’s proposedde ense budget continues to grow and Republicans in theU.S. Congress seem to have no stomach or trimming

military outlays, there is a consensus among Americanbudget policy experts that Pentagon spending shouldnot be exempt rom scal discipline. De ense budget cutshave been proposed by the National Commission onFiscal Responsibility and Re orm, which was appointedby President Obama, by the centrist Bipartisan Policy Center, and by think tanks on both the lef and the right.I and when Washington gets serious about reining inspending, their suggestions are a roadmap or utureausterity. 11

From a European perspective, these proposed cuts couldhave ar-reaching implications. Already, proponents o a leaner American de ense budget rom both the lef —Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) — and the right — Rep. RonPaul (R-KY) — have revived talk not heard since theCold War about greater Allied “burden-sharing.”

As U.S. de ense analyst Gordon Adams has noted: “TeAmerican argument seems to be that the U.S. de nes the‘burden’ and everybody else should share it. We do notask our allies what they think the ‘burden’ is.” 12

11 http://milexdata.sipri.org

12 http://thewillandthewallet.org/2011/02/14/the-defense-budget-time-to-end-the-mantra-of-fear

Whereas Americans supportWashington’s go-slow approach

to trimming the Pentagon’s

budget, the British question

London’s cutbacks.

We cannot expect any reduction

in U.S. military spending. It

might, however, stop increasing

at breakneck speed.



4

Nevertheless, the Congressmen’s concerns have somebasis in act. A decade ago, Pentagon spending accounted

or a little less than hal o all NA O de ense outlays.oday, it is close to three-quarters and growing. In the

last two decades, British military spending has decreased1.6 percentage points o GDP and German spending hassimilarly contracted 1.6 points. American outlays havedeclined only 1.4 points, widening the burden sharinggap.

Rebalancing that de ense burden, while imposing scaldiscipline, will require hard choices. Te U.S. National

Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Re orm hassuggested decreasing rom our to two the U.S. combatbrigades now stationed in Europe, reducing U.S. military personnel there by 33,000. 13 Te U.S. Bipartisan Policy Center would cut American orce levels in Europe evenmore. 14 In addition, the National Commission has called

or cutbacks in the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, which issupported by a number o European governments.

Given the limited likelihood o a European war, the

suggested troop drawdown is unlikely to impair Euro-pean security. But shorter production runs or military hardware could lead to higher per-unit costs or Euro-pean governments that are committed to buying the F35,

rustrating Europeans’ plans to contain de ense spending.

Moreover, as NA O Secretary General Anders FoghRasmussen has warned, in the con rontation betweenlooming scal austerity needs and ongoing security requirements, Europe and the United States risk drifingapart. Te transatlantic alliance could include a weaker,

13 http://www. scalcommission.gov/sites/ scalcommission.gov/ les/documents/Illustrative_List_11.10.2010.pdf

14 http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/ les/BPC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20FOR%20PRINTER%2002%2028%2011.pdf

divided Europe, with only a ew European powersproviding the bulk o security, undermining the prin-ciples o collective de ense and allied solidarity.

Greater cooperation in research and development,production, and procurement o de ense technologies,what Rasmussen calls “Smart De ense,” would be a logicalmove or cash-strapped NA O allies. But experienceteaches just how di cult such coordination can be. obolster domestic employment in response to taxpayerconcerns and to satis y domestic de ense industry stake-holders, national governments have long demanded that

they get a slice o the military spending pie. For example,80 percent o European de ense research and devel-opment is still spent on national programs. Tis “ airreturn principle” has meant that the Euro ghter requiresassembly lines in several European countries, hardly ane cient way to build an expensive airplane.

Anglo-French cooperation e orts — on nuclear warheadresearch, on the next generation o unmanned surveil-lance drones, a shared maintenance contract on the newA400M military transport aircraf, and joint procure-ment o missiles — go urther than any military spendingcoordination hitherto attempted, suggesting that nationalprerogatives may nally be breaking down underbudgetary pressures. But the test will come when produc-tion acilities are closed in one nation, but not another, orwhen, with British and French aircraf sharing the sameaircraf carrier, their governments disagree on wherethat carrier is deployed and how it is used. Te Penta-gon’s recent award o a $35 billion aerial tanker contractto Boeing, not to its competitor, the European company EADS, suggests that budgetary pressures may lead tomore nationalism in de ense spending, not more interna-

tional cooperation.

Fiscal problems have yet to signi cantly constrain theU.S. military, but their e ects are already being elt by thearmed orces in Germany and in the United Kingdom. I American budget hawks prevail, the Pentagon may alsosoon eel the budget-cutting kni e. Di erences in timingand degree o belt-tightening are likely to reopen oldwounds about burden sharing. Provision or the commonde ense in a time o austerity will require de ense coop-eration hereto ore not seen in peace time.

In the confrontation between

looming scal austerityneeds and ongoing security

requirements, Europe and the

United States risk drifting apart.



5

Foreign Aid

Te economic development o the world’s poorest soci-eties is clearly in the economic and security sel -interesto both Europe and the United States, an obvious human-itarian imperative, and has long been a shared transat-lantic commitment.

In 2009, the United States was the leading oreignaid donor in dollar terms, contributing $28.8 billion,according to data rom the Organization or EconomicCooperation and Development. Germany provided $12.1billion and the United Kingdom $11.5 billion. 15

But when measured as a portion o the economy andassessed by recent spending per ormance, a quitedi erent picture existed. In 2009, London provided .52percent o its gross national income or oreign aid, up14.5 percent in dollar terms rom 2008. Berlin gave .35percent o its GNI, an increase o 11.3 percent. Wash-ington donated only .21 percent, up 6.1 percent.

Te proposed 2012 Obama budget would increase U.S.development assistance by 15.8 percent and bolster globalhealth and child survival spending by 11.3 percent. Butthe 2010 spending measure passed by the U.S. House o Representatives in mid-February would cut Americandevelopment assistance by 29.6 percent and global

15 http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/0,3381,en_2649_34447_1_119656_1_1_1,00.html

health and child survival spending by 10.1 percent. 16 TeU.S. Senate is unlikely to go along with all the House’sausterity measures. But any House-Senate compromisecould lead to less not more oreign aid.

Te Cameron government in the United Kingdom iseven more ambitious about oreign aid than the Obamaadministration. Despite draconian domestic budget cuts,it plans to increase development assistance by 37 percentin real terms over the next our years. Foreign aid is oneo only two areas o spending, along with national healthcare, to be spared the U.K. budget kni e. It is Cameron’s

goal or British overseas aid to reach the internationaltarget o 0.7 percent o GDP by 2013. And given hisparliamentary majority, he may be able to sail against theausterity winds. 17

But neither Obama nor Cameron enjoy public supportor their oreign aid spending plans. Development

assistance has never been popular with Americans. And,in the wake o the Great Recession, support has erodedeven urther. A plurality (45 percent) o Americanswants to decrease global poverty assistance, according toa February 2011 survey by the Pew Research Center. In2009, only 34 percent o the public wanted to cut oreignaid.18

Foreign aid is also a partisan issue in the United States.Seventy percent o Republicans, and 75 percent o thepublic that identi es with the ea Party, would slashglobal anti-poverty unding, compared with only 28percent o Democrats. It is little wonder that the Repub-lican-controlled House o Representatives voted toreduce oreign aid.

British voters agree with their American cousins, notwith their own government, when it comes to develop-ment assistance. In an October, 2010 YouGov.com survey,a plurality (47 percent) o Britons thought internationaldevelopment unding should be subject to bigger cutsthan other areas o the budget.

Given scal pressures and the lack o public support ororeign aid, American and European governments need

16 http://blogs.cgdev.org/mca-monitor/2011/02/h-r-1-–-cuts-like-a-knife.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+cgdev%2Fmca-monitor+%28Rethinking+U.S.+Foreign+Assistance+Blog%29

17 http://www.npr.org/2011/02/22/133958620/the-new-republic-real-conserva-tives-dont-slash-aid

18 http://people-press.org/report/702/

American and European

governments need to nd

new ways to stretch their

development assistance budgets

and to maximize the impact

of what promises to be limited

future increases in spending.



6

to nd new ways to stretch their development assistancebudgets and to maximize the impact o what promises tobe limited uture increases in spending.

A lack o coordination, subsequent duplication, redun-dancy, and resultant high costs have long plagued oreignaid programs. Budgetary constraints or the oreseeable

uture now make transatlantic development assistancecoordination a higher priority than ever.

A 2009 German Marshall Fund study recommendedpooling American and European aid unding at the

country or regional level.19

It also proposed commonprocurement standards that would minimize complexity and improve e ciency. In addition, Europeans andAmericans could agree to end tied-aid practices thatrequire aid recipients to buy goods and services rom

rms in the donor countries. Such requirements aredesigned to bene t the rich while driving up costs orthe poor. Te looming era o budget austerity makesit imperative to spend limited development assistanceresources more wisely.

Climate FinanceClimate change poses harsh challenges or much o the world’s population. Rising sea levels imperil tens o millions o people who live in low-lying coastal areas.Changing rain all patterns threaten harvests and raise thespecter o periodic amines in parts o A rica and Asia.Mitigating these e ects and adapting endangered soci-eties to the unavoidable consequences o global warmingis both a humanitarian imperative and a strategic neces-sity or both Europe and the United States.

Te potential cost o such mitigation and adaptationis staggering. In 2009, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change estimated the cost to beat least $93 billion per year. Te World Bank has put agreater price tag on it — at least $159 billion per year (in2005 dollars) by 2030.20

In December 2009, at the Copenhagen climate summit,rich nations promised to provide poor countries with $30billion in “new and additional” resources by 2012 to copewith climate change. Tis sum would be a down paymenton a pledge to provide $100 billion annually in climate

19 http://www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/TransatlanticTask-forceonDevelopment_KolbeCarlsson.pdf

20 http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/gcf10.pdf

nance by 2020. In December 2010, at the Cancunclimate meeting, donor nations agreed to establish aGreen Climate Fund to manage these resources. Butgovernments ailed to agree on how to und such climate

nance.

Much may depend on their de nition o “new andadditional.” In 2008, according to the Organization orEconomic Cooperation and Development, developednations provided $8.5 billion in bilateral assistance tohelp developing countries reduce their greenhouse gasemissions and to integrate climate change concerns

into their development e orts. Tis represented about 8percent o total oreign aid that year. A literal interpreta-tion o “new and additional” would suggest such annualaid has to double just to meet the 2012 commitment. 21

Moreover, o cially reported climate nance may overes-timate donors’ current contribution toward meeting theirCopenhagen pledge. Government climate aid data ofencounts the total cost o a renewable energy project, say the building o a wind arm, rather than only counting as“new and additional” the increased cost o such a projectcompared with the price tag or a conventional power

plant that would been built anyway. But, by whateverde nition, American and European climate nance may all short o the need.

Te Obama administration’s 2012 budget proposalincludes $1.3 billion to help developing countries to copewith global warming, deploy clean energy technologies,and reverse de orestation. But the 2011 budget passed by the U.S. House o Representatives in mid-February wouldeliminate at least $650 million in climate nance romthe administration’s 2010 request, including zeroing outall contributions to climate nance e orts by the WorldBank and other multilateral institutions. In addition, itwould prohibit the use o any U.S. unds or the United21 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/60/45906157.pdf

The United States must be seen

to take the lead in the struggle

against global warming or suffer

the fate of being blamed for it.



7

Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.“Tis would gut U.S. international climate assistance,”said Jake Schmidt, international climate policy director o the U.S. Natural Resources De ense Council. “Te UnitedStates would go rom being in the game to basically sitting on the sidelines.” 22

Opposition to climate nance in the U.S. House o Representatives is hardly surprising given the Americanpublic’s attitudes about global warming. Less than hal o Americans (37 percent) think climate change is a very serious problem, according to the Pew Global Attitudes

survey.23

And such concern has dropped considerably inthe last ew years. Moreover, a large number o the Housemembers newly elected in 2010 do not believe that globalwarming is actually occurring.

Neither the Obama 2012 budget nor the House 2011budget is likely to pass the Senate without signi cantchanges. And there may be no U.S. budget at all or thenext two years, merely an extension o current spendingat somewhat reduced levels. Whatever happens, it is clearthat the austerity-minded political environment in Wash-ington will make it quite di cult or the United States tomeet its Copenhagen climate nance pledge.

Tere will be a cost or this ailure. As Robert Kaplan hasargued in his recent book Monsoon, “Because it is theworld’s greatest power, the United States must be seen totake the lead in the struggle against global warming orsu er the ate o being blamed or it.”24

Climate nance prospects are better on the other side o the Atlantic. Germany has historically been one o thelargest donors o aid or climate change-related activities.

Te government o Chancellor Angela Merkel earmarkedapproximately €1.26 billion in the 2010 ederal budgetor spending on climate protection and adaptation in

developing countries. About €350 million can be countedtoward the ast start nance commitment made inCopenhagen, according to a study by Brot ur die Welt. 25

With more than hal (52 percent) o the German publicvery concerned about global warming, there is morepolitical support or climate nance in Germany than in

22 phone interview February 2011

23 http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/9/#chapter-8-environmental-issues

24 http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl/9781400067466.html

25 http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/gcf10.pdf

the United States, enhancing the Merkel government’sability to actually deliver on its Copenhagen pledge. 26 Butit will take more than the good intentions o the Germangovernment to meet the Copenhagen nancing goals.

In November 2010, the UN High Level Group on ClimateChange Financing concluded that “it is challengingbut easible” to mobilize $100 billion a year by 2020 orclimate mitigation and adaptation e orts in developingcountries. 27 But their assumptions underscore how very di cult that task will be.

Te Group assumes there will be an international carboncap and trade system in place, none now exists. And thatdeveloped countries will impose carbon taxes on emis-sions. It expects the price or traded carbon emissioncerti cates to be at least $20 per ton o CO2 equivalent.And that up to 10 percent o total revenues generatedby such trading will allocated or international climateaction. Tese are heroic assumptions.

In an era o scal austerity, new and innovative sourceso nancing are desperately needed. Tis might includesome orm o small tax on nancial transactions or somesimilar activity and greater incentives to entice privateinvestors into nancing climate projects. Without suche orts, and with donor budgets constrained, any hope o meeting climate nance needs may prove impossible.

26 http://pewglobal.org/2010/06/17/obama-more-popular-abroad-than-at-home/9/#chapter-8-environmental-issues

27 http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF_re-ports/AGF%20Report.pdf

Differences in national priorities,

domestic public opinion andgovernmental majorities threaten

to divide rather than unify

transatlantic efforts to meet

these challenges.



8

The Challenge to Global Public Goods

In the wake o the Great Recession and the subsequentrun-up in government debt on both sides o the Atlantic,a prolonged period o scal austerity was inevitable inboth Europe and the United States. But this governmentbelt-tightening poses major challenges or the commonde ense, or e orts to lif hundreds o millions o peopleout o poverty, and or the imperative to slow globalwarming.

As domestic battles in Europe and the United States overbudget cuts heat up, the unding o global public goodsare at risk. Moreover, di erences in national priorities,domestic public opinion, and governmental majoritiesthreaten to divide rather than uni y transatlantic e ortsto meet these challenges. New burden sharing rictionsmay be inevitable.

It is time or a transatlantic dialogue on the implicationso scal austerity or global public goods. Hereto ore,budget cutting was solely a domestic issue, a nationalsovereign concern. Tat is a 20 th century luxury thatEurope, the United States, and the world cannot a ord inthe 21st century.

It is time for a transatlantic

dialogue on the implications of

scal austerity for global public

goods.

About the Author

Bruce Stokes is the senior transatlantic ellow or economics atthe German Marshall Fund. He is a contributing editor or theNational Journal .

About Brussels Forum

Brussels Forum is an annual high-level meeting o the mostin uential North American and European political, corporate, andintellectual leaders to address pressing challenges currently acingboth sides o the Atlantic. Participants include heads o state, senioro fcials rom the European Union institutions and the memberstates, U.S. Cabinet o fcials, Congressional representatives, Parlia-mentarians, academics, and media.

Leaders on both sides o the Atlantic continue to deepen trans-atlantic cooperation on a vast array o distinctly new and globalchallenges rom the international fnancial crisis to climate changeand energy security to the retention o high-skilled workers, yetthere is no single transatlantic orum ocused on this broad andincreasingly complex global agenda. Brussels Forum provides avenue or the transatlantic community to address these pressing is-

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Deep Cuts: What the Age of Austerity Means for Global Public Goods

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