JfeJ. C o l l ^ ^ p V t e O t

23 June ISS?!

StMttHT OP PO 13-MUCH. 1350.

TMJS paper is an outline plan drawn iç> as a basis m which ta detennine the mtnHmmi forces required.

Fpligy In peacetime "to convince the USSR that m r äces not Pasttt Should m r oacur "to ansa» a successful defense of tha Mixrth Atlantic area,* lfain principals far carrying out the above policy is the following statement tthich foreehadoire Uie i m a l Revis*. "Hie development of planned military force«, hearing in mind the «oncxcical situation of each ration."

After estimating for planning purposes that the USSR vouXd attack the HWO naticms, ana attest to reaoh -Qw Atlantlo seaboard, the Mediterranean and the middle rest, during "which "all types of -weapons, nithout eiceptiom, night be uned "by either Bidolt the plein &ttes£ts to forecast the probable allgroent of warring countries. With the Sowjet Union: Poland, Bad; Ceranny1 CBoahoclavakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Allxinlaj North Korea and outer Mongolia. Iafjv--IjiHntftTfrw the European Satelites and two Asiatic states en the Russian periphery. Commniat China wilT'âeny the Soirlet ltaim say frontiers or resources. The Military Committee WM not pure about Yugoslavia. "It is at present ii^osslhle to forecast the aligrment of Yugoslavia in -Uie event of aggreesion", tout thinks that the Sevlets nUl hare to use force against Tito,

Aflaimtt the Soriot Union: The HtTO Naticaist Australia, IJew Zealand, South AfMcftt Ceylcai and. Jordan. IhUa and Bkkistan probably nsutml* Greece, Ttaritnyf Iran, the South Anezdaan Republics, Japan and the Rdllipinas probably favourably disposed towards Hie Allies and some actively with them.

Stgatefiio Conaeptft fem to destroy by a strategic bombing offensive -Sie- ÄL1 and capabilities of the USSB and her Satelitea to u&ge mr. Ih the far Zaatt the strategic policy would be defensive. Hie plan only considers qpemtions during what It oalls Phase 1, defined as ttPn Day to the BtatAizing of the initial Soviet offenniw. the Taafr given to the régions were as follows :-

Testern Europe - hold the etwnr aa far to the east In Gexwnf as possible

S1JS European Jfe Western Mad. — hold the euaitf aa far to the east and

north aa passible Horthesn Buropoan - bold the eamqy outside a defensible area..

Flan operations in the Baltic. Xhe plan attenpts to analyse the Ininatrial production of the Soviet BIocJct and concludes that although their overall production is less than that of the ITeateni Powers, their present military production la far greater. TSiey are invincible to bloofcode and self sufficient in food stuffs.

Suwnary of Soviet IBlltary Sta-gpffth An Axnp- of about four neUUonj a fltrong tantica 1 air army a small 3urfaoe Oeet and a streng submarine fleet. Ey 1¾¾ the USSB mill have a long range air force

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capable of "äeliverine weapons of Pbsa destruction." Tbo satelites were -weak in 1950 but it m a eapocted that by 1 9 ¾ they would make scno military contribution, l M M n g of the Soviet forces, the plan says; nTbase forons, In oomtnet to the combined force s of the Westmi Pcnwrs, « 9 cmtrollod by unified coinmnrt and single staff SyBteraw" Xhls n s in Jfepril 1950, two months before the out-break of the Esrean Mirt five months before the IttTO Oauncil decided to organize an Integrated Eurqpeaa form adequate for the defense of Tfestern Surcpea Tet the recoamendation is illicit in this text,

TftTlfifPaf the Soviet intentions, the plan says "the campaign ag&inst Weatem Europe will remain their primary objective»" At the same tine the Soviets w r e oredited with being capable Of attacking allied interests in all parts of -sorld. Their activities, according to the plan, could include:— fa) Aarlal baribardmant against -Uie British Isles* IbJ Canpaign in the Maar and Viddle Bast. (a) Oanpaign against Tugoalavia aud Italy, (d) Attacka agftinst targets in Owada, United States

and Alsftka (e) Caepaigns against Scandinavia.

Wcatp™ European Gaapaign Soviet eperatiens in Vtastesn Europe would involve siaiuatanaous attacks against Western Geraony, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Detmark1 and air action against the TIhited. Kingdom and its aea approaches, "It is considered, therefore, that only one oour-jA is open to the Soviet Union with regard to the direction of her attack; to advance to the Bhlne between tj» ooast anâ the Swiss frontier, and after forcing a crossing, to continue to the Channel, the Atlantic ooast and the Pyra»ese. This would be combined with the Invasion of Denim rk."

Southern Eiyope - Wärtern Mediterranean Refiicm The moat IiJoeIy threat is' fro« Ncrtham Yugoslavia «ttîï the intention of occupying the PD valley as mpidly as possible» Then south alone "both ooastal routes, down the length of the Pemaiinsularc

KortIieCT Sagion The direction of Soviet attack would dopend to seme «stent -whether Sweden. Is neutral or not. It is difficult to forecast what -AouM happen. Would the Soviet attack Sweden? Qr would Seeden resist the encirclement -rehich. -would ensue if the Soviet attacked Northern Norway and Dennaric sirailtaneously? If Sweden TOx-e lüwtral, there would be a land attack against Jutland fro® Gexnanyf and air and sea attacks against Zeeloiid, Iformgr would probably be attacked simultaneously, A secondary attack from Uurannslc towards Ibrvilc oould be mounted by sea.

JVIYI U1-nThe opening of the Westwn Eurcpean Begion IQT the eneny Ttould represent a major and decisive viatory, "^(Requiremesito to m e t 1 9 ¾ Defense Plan Appendix A 2DClj) ^

Land^Forc e^ 90 Divisions (16 Armoured) Air gorges .dpproxiiie-tely 9,000 (exact figure 8 ,676 aircraft)

Mote« Qiese figures were not broken down by Regions for Seourity reasons

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C' •

Xhia papier is tha first rfaleh has attenpted to eatisata requirements. Those requirement o are only es tine.ted as an overall figure; tfaoy are not broken dowt by Regions nor by nationalities. Xhere is no consideration of whether the MtTO nations ware capable of supplying these requirements and there nas no detailed plan saying •nhftt eaoh country should provide each year. The befcwaen fd&t fprcoa o^doted in 1950 and. what were required 1¾¾. was not only a gap in forceoj but in planning too. An enormous amount of work bad to be done before the SC 12 requirements could be translated into force or t n n could be evaluated as pos sibilitLe a.

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: - BOSMiC TÛPSECRET Short Resume or Document DC 1?

I. XK TJRQDO.C Tl OW

1. Document OC 13¾

(a) is the overall medium term plan (1 July 195^J

fco bo used as a Uaaia for the development of military pre-

paredness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It lias

bofln approved by the Military Committee and by the Defense

Comraittee as an InAtlil working basis for a ttWjwrAn build-up

of iîorth Atlantic Defense forces.

(b) considers only the Phase 1 operations, i.e.: D-Day

to the stabilization or irltial Soviet ofrensive, to include the

initiation of the Allied Air offenaive/n Ti 30

(c) has been issued before the Korean -warï it has been

issued on 28 Karoh 1950.

(d) is divided in the following three parts:

Part I: Defense policy and concept of operation.

Part IX: "Estimate of enemy capabilities stiä possible

courses of action.

Part III: Consolidated HegiOtial Estimates.

II. DEFENSE POLICY AMP OOMCEPT OF DFERftTICM — — — — — — — — — — — t.j*^,

trolley; To convince the ITSSB that war does not pay, and, should war occur, to insure, by Combined and coordinated action, a successful defence of NAT peoples, territories, and war-Baking capacities against all forms of enemy attack. Special emphasis is placed on the defence of Europe» since its loss might

,.. well be fatal to the defence of the NA territories as a whole.

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B B Rf'fn 3. PrlnoipleB for the Irnplemantatjort of that Policy:

(a) To develop à balanced military force.

(U) no compensate for the numerical inferiority by

establishing and maintaining technical superiority,

by developing and using modern combat methods, and

by achieving: close coordination of effort»

Ij.. Overall Strategic Concept;

Offensive: in IVeatern Eureaia..

Defensive; In the Par Easb.

5. Tasks connon to all refilona

(a) Hold base areas essential for counter offensive

operations and for air offensive operations.

(h) Initiate developments of armed forces for such

later operations as raay he neoess<wy for the achieve-

ment of the objectives of the W A Ï nations.

(cJ Provide essential aid to other regions.

(d) Plan guerrilla operations on the rear of the enemy.

(e) E x p l o t i weaknesses of USSR and satillitea by

coordinated psychological operations.

(f) Coordinate plans with other regions.

6. Specific Taaka to Hefflona

(a) Western European Région.

Hold the enemy as far to the east in Oeraiany as

possible.

(b) Southern Suropean - WeajerTi Mediterranean Region

(1) Hold the enemy as far to the east and north

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•COSMIC TOP M N ELS possible.

(2) Organise the Western Mediterranean lines of

communications.

(c) Northern European Region.

(1) hold the eneniy outside a defensible area.

{2) plan operations in the Baltic.

(d) Canada - US Region»

(1) Defence security.

(2) Support of strategic air offensive.

(3) Reinforcement of other regions,

(e) North Atlantic Ocean Region.

(1) Control trans-Atlantic L of C

{£) Defence of Portugal, Archipelay®a of Uadeira

and -Azores, Greenland, Iceland, Spitzbergen,

The Faeroes.

III. ESTIMATE OF EgEMÏ CAPABILITIES AJUI^ POSSIBLE 00UHSE3 OF ACTXOff

. Outbreak of War

M and D-day should, for planning purposes, be considered

the a am©.

8. .political factors

ta> Political.alignment

All the nations in the world are divided in:

- nations in the i^oviet bloc

- nations in the YT0Stern bloc

- nations initially neutral

it is stated that it is at present impossible to forecast

the alignment of Jugoslavia in the event of w a x .

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Gûoùffi TOP iSECREJ

9-

(b) Job of So\iet leadersî Ôemongtrafce Vo Russian

people tbat\war is impari stlc aggression

against Sovieft^Patherland,

(c) JoV of Western Fewer s î Demonstrate to Rtlbtsian \ \ \ \

peoplve that war is agaiftst communist

totalitarian and not\againat Ensslin people themae Ive - ^

Economic Factors* The Industrial and agricultural capacity of the Soviet

Union will, in 195^, still be weak in certain commodities and

her transportation system will be inadequate for her economy.

If Soviet Union wished to go to war between I95I and I95I1.,

economic considerations would not in themselves be enough to

prevent her from doing so if she felt competent of attaining

her primary objectives within a reasonably ahort space of time.

However, it is emphasized that Soviets will depend for some

years principally on the railroads, which lack in reserve. In

fact the railroad capacity is barely adequate to aieefc present

industrial needs. The problem is aggravated:

(a) by the shift of Soviet Industry eastward*

(b) by transshipment required by gauge differences

between the soviet Union and the Satellite countries.

tft. M lilt arg; Factors

(a) Soviet military strengths

(1) Unified command and single staff system

(S) important ground forces supported by a

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lb) Political aims apd obJectiWft ^^

, The Soviet Union may be ejected to further, by fill the

measures implied, in the term "cold war":

(1; Its ultimate political objective, i.e. oonmunist world

under faoviet domination.

Iiij its immediate political objectiMks, i.e. Subject Surope

and the wear and middle isast and explôit their resources

to ) Attitude and lforale of Soviet union and ^atlllite states

It appears that:

(ij subversives influences already present in soviet bnion

and popular dissatisfaction with the raglH&wlll m&gnify

and perhaps taJte an acti*tt> pert in ihterfering with the

Soviet wer effort only efter the eerly stages of the war

aûd especially if soviet military reverses become known.

(iij ihe attitude of Satellite states, although a potentiel source of weakness to the Boviet bloc, would not give

rise to effective resistance to the Soviet w effort

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C O « TOP SECRET (3) Strong submarine arm (4) Communiât parties in each Western countries -

fifth column* (b) Soviet Military Weaknesses

(1) Small surface fleet (2) Long range air force with little combat

experience. (3) Mobility of Soviet military forces particularly

dependent upon rail transportation. (4) Resistance movements in countries controlled

by Soviet Onion. (c) Satellites^

(1)

(2>

(3)

{5>

Bulgarian Armyi improved but not a formidable fighting machine. Rumanian Army )

) expanded and strengthened but Hungarian A n y ) neither will be effective for

combat vi thin next few years. CaeChoslovaltlan Army) Polish Army

general disorganization, ) law morale and InaffL-) clenCy. However, may ba

by 1954 sufficient combat divisions to make a contrl button to the Soviet offenelve power.

«Maybe this paragraph has to be revised in the light of the experience of the Korean War.

11. Strategic Intentions of the flqvlet Union. r . The Immediate objective of Soviet Union will be to complote the domina-*'

. jtioo of Europe In order toe (I)deny to the Allies à base in Western Surope which 'if retained,would permit the eventual «exploitation of the long-term «af potential of the Ifeetexn Powarsj (Ä)ejqiloit its economic atd industrial resources.

¢- Tbe Soviet plan In 1964 would probably Include Uie

•following operations for which the Soviet Union would have suffi-

cient armed force S r ^ d still have a<3

f i b

ad foi

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(a) (1) SubversIira activity and sabotage against

allied Interests in all parts of the world*

(3) A sea and air offensive against allied sea

communications,

(5) A campaign against Western Surope1 which will

remain their primary land objective*

(4) An aerial bombardment against the British

Isles.

X-IjcriscxtattJrtiL =Uu SBonro oat ciGrtiiTrg txt tnxix'trj.'car* (d) Air attacks against allied bases.

DC 13 examines In detail the Soviet capability to execute

the above listed campaigns, without taking into consideration

opposition by any forces in position and operational*

IV. C OWSQUDATEp KEG-IOJJAXi ESTIMATES

1¾. ReRional Estimates of the Situation,

Of each Region, the. Document DC 13 examine the following

factors :

- strategic importance of the Region.

- factors affecting the strategy.

- the strategic concept and objectives for the Region,

4 s far as the three European regions are concerned, it appears

that :

(a) The strategic importance of the Vfestern European

Region is far more greater thanrthe other two;

in fact the conquest of the Western European Region

by the enemy would represent a major and perhaps a

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a.

(b ) The defence of the We stern European Region will M

be assisted by the successful defence of Norway

and Demiark, and especially of Italy.

(c) The defence of the Italo-Austrian Alps area

will give to the Southern European Region the

possibility of a future offensive against the left

flank of the Soviet forces engaged in central

Europe,

Outline Plan for the Defence of WAJ Area.

The three European Regions constitute the "Couverture,"

facing ©ast" of the UAT 'Area, < • "

Through the oxploitatin of all possible gaograflcal and other advantages which might offset numerical superiority of Soviet D-Day fore eg? and Mklng full use of mobility* the three Iaropaan Regions iwtst:

(a Jarreat the enençr advance as & r to the east as possible. Ma-ximum initial effort will be made for the defence of Conti-mut&l Europe In order to acliiave suffieiabb tige delay for reinforcement* and for the strategic air offensive to fee take effect;

(b) defend those areas and linos of cannunicat ions essential to the deployment and supporj. of reinforcements from other regional areas and to the support of their own forces.

I I '

Força requirements Attached a» Appendix A to the Doeuuenb DC Ï3 Is the consolidated glonal estimates of major forces considered necessary to the iwlementa— tion of their plans.

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nrtyiP JOF JîoncT 1 J R . S J O H C L V S I O M 3

l T Document DC-13 is the over-all kediutn xerm .plan (1 July 1954)

to be used as a basis for the development of military of

the MATO•

4)6 It is a document prepared before the Korean war by—diplema1>-

S I Ä W B 1 . lit was Issued on 28 ttarch 1950)

i ï Jjocuœent DO 13 emphasized the following essential relative

characteristics of Soviet bloc; la) Great numerical superiority of ground forces.

(bj Atomic « i —

(c) Industrial srttçc&bc&j!*?

Id) Control of Communist parties in the Western countries,

(e) Weakness in the transportetion system.

Ii. Jrom the above reletive cherscteristies arise whet follow

I S P B A C B U ' I I A S .

(a ) Volley of the Soviet bloo;

(i) to maintain the numerical superiority of their a m y .

(ii) to diminish the atomic inferiority,

liilj stockpiling

(iv j to sxploit the communist parties in the W s s t e m

countries by all the measures implied in the

term "cold war",

(bj Western bloc policy

(i) to compensate for the numerical inferiority by

establishing and maintaining technical superiority,

" ' T1 i" d e v e l o P l j l S and. nß^ftJrQitätt methods.

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{ii) to oiaintain atomic superiority

(iii) to check the activities of coiwaunist parties.

OF HiHHt (a) Immediate objective of jSovlet bloc: ITo complete the

domination of Europe irï order to:

(1) deny to the Allies a base in .«estera Europe which ! if retained, would permit the eventual exploitation I of the superior long-^erm war potential of the Western Powers*

(2) Exploit its economic ?nd industrial resources, (b) Immediate objective of the gestern bloo

IOES of Europe might well be fatel to the defence of

MlA territories ea s whole. Ths three Européen Regions

are the flOOuverture" facing east. Their imnedlete

objectives are;

(i)galxi tine for reinforcements froû other regional areas to arrive, in Europe and for cumulative effect of the strategic air offenaiw-to be felt; ^ P h

(ii) defend those areas and lines of communications

essential to the deployment and support of the

above reinforcements and to the suppait of their

OVlTi forces.

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