TANO V SOCRATESG.R. No. 110249DAVIDE, JR; August 21, 1997

FACTS:-Dec 15, 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 w/c took effect on 1 Jan 1993, banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 1 Jan 1993 to 1 Jan 1998 and providing penalties for violation therefor-Jan 22, 1993: To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23 authorizing the conduct of necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port w/in the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft. The purpose of inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter. Said order further provides that any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated therein must be held for proper disposition.-Feb 19, 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Resn No. 33 prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period 5yrs in and coming from Palawan waters; and enacted Ordinance No. 2 for the purpose.-Tano, et al argue that implementing said ordinances meant depriving all the fishermen of the province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and petitioner marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade. A number of the petitioners were even charged criminally for violating said ordinances. -Without seeking redress from the concerned LGUs, prosecutor's office and courts, petitioners directly invoked SCs original jurisdiction by filing this petition which they caption as one for "Certiorari, Injunction with Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, w/ Prayer for TRO." They pray that SC declare as unconstitutional the said issuances; enjoin the enforcement thereof; and restrain respondent prosecutors and judges from assuming jurisdiction over & hearing cases concerning violation of said issuances.[SC: More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.]-Petitioners argue that said issuances violate due process of law, the equal protection clause, the non-delegation doctrine, the non-impairment clause, as well as Sec 2, Art XII and Secs 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Consti.-Respondents argue that the said issuances are a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. They likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. -Upon motion of petitioners, SC issued a TRO directing Judge Miclat to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-trial of the petitioners impleaded in the criminal cases pending before his sala. -OSG was excused from filing a comment, considering that respondents were already represented by counsel. SC thereafter resolved to consider the comment on the petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. -22 April 1997: SC ordered impleaded as party respondents the Dept of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required the OSG to comment on their behalf. But in light of the latter's motion for an extension of time to file the comment which would only result in further delay, SC dispensed with said comment and deliberated on the pleadings filed.

PRELIMINARIES: There are two sets of petitioners in this case.1. Individuals who were criminally charged with violating said issuances seek to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved.2. The rest of the petitioners [76 fishermen and the Airline Shippers Association of Palawan (private association of several marine merchants)] claim that they would be adversely affected by the ordinances.

ISSUE: WON the writs of certiorari and prohibition should issue

HELD:As to the first set of petitioners, NO. This special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. -There is no showing that said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have filed motions to quash [MTQ] the informations therein & that the same were denied. Even if petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a COA under Rule 65, ROC. -Where MTQ is denied, remedy therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial w/o prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if, after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. And, even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for certiorari, MFR must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances. Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. As to the second set of petitioners, NO. The instant petition is obviously one for declaratory relief; as such, their petition must likewise fail. SC is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved; SC merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a COA ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be allowed. While SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTCs and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.-People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed w/ the RTC, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.-Santiago v. Vasquez: the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We reiterated "the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdictionNotwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles, SC opted to resolve the case on its merits considering that life-time of the challenged issuances is about to end[footnoteRef:1] and that the ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment [issues are novel and of paramount importance]. [1: Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years.]

-Laws (including ordinances enacted by LGUs) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Consti, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. Conflict with the Consti must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.-After scrutiny of the challenged ordinances and the provisions of Consti petitioners claim to have been violated, SC finds petitioners' contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.-There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman[footnoteRef:2] protected by Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution. Petitioner Airline Shippers Association of Palawan is self-described as "a private association composed of Marine Merchants;" petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as "merchants;" while the rest of the petitioners claim to be "fishermen," without any qualification, however, as to their status. [2: SC cited and applied Webster definitions: A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.]

-Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. The ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. -LGC provisions invoked by respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. Sec 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community."-In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs under the General Welfare Clause, and under the other sections, which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Parenthetically, these Ordinances find full support under the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act (RA 7611).-It is clear to the Court that the Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters. The realization of the second clearly falls w/in both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculean task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.Disposition Petition dismissed for lack of merit. [Note: Please see full case for the separate opinions of Justices Mendoza and Bellosillo. I opted not to include them here since their discussions did not touch upon the CivPro topic under consideration: certiorari.]

Velarde v SJS (2004)Doctrine: Decision, more specifically a decision not conforming tothe formand substance required by the Constitution is void and deemed legally inexistent (Panganiban)Mike Velarde, Petitioner vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.Date promulgated: April 28, 2004Ponente: J. Panganiban

Facts:-On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his co-respondents Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.-SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.-The petitioner filed a Motion to dismiss before the trial court owing to the fact that alleged that the questioned SJS Petition did not state acause of actionand that there was no justiciable controversy.-The trial courts junked the Velarde petitions under certain reasons:1. It said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to anypublicoffice is a clear violation of the separation clause."-The trial courtsessaydid not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, however. Due to thisaberration, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration before the trial court owing to these facts.-The lower court denied these Motions. Hence, this petition for review.On April 13, 2004, the Court enbancconducted an Oral Argument.14-In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the courta quowas proper and valid;2. Whether or not there exists justiciable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief;3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination;5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,6. Whether or not the courta quohas jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.

Issues:In its oral argument, the Supreme Court condensed Velardes issues and divided it into 2 groups:A. Procedural Issues1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?2. Did it state acause of action?3.Did respondent have any legal standing tofilethe Petition for Declaratory Relief?B. Substantive Issues1. Did the RTC Decision conform tothe formand substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?2.May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates forpublicoffice? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates? (Not answered in the affirmative)

Decision:Petition for Review GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE. The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state acause of action.

Holding:Procedural Issues:1.NO. A justiciable controversy toan existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should containa plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim.

The SJS Petition fell short of therequirementsto constitutue a jusiciable controversy. Why?a. It stated no ultimate facts. The petition simplytheorizedthat the people elected who were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter.b.It did not sufficiently state a declaration ofits rights and duties, what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution,c.The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights (duh, wala ngang rights na sinabi eh). It merely sought an opinion of the trial court. However, courts are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion. (tantamount to making laws, remember the questionability of justice panganibansguidelinesfor article 36 of the family code)

It must also be considered that even the religious leaders were puzzled as to the breach of rights they were claimed to have committed. As pointed out by Soriano, what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? Jaime Cardinal Sin adds that the election season had not even started at the time SJS filed its Petition and that he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. The Petition does not even allege anyindication or manifest intenton the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

2.NO. Acause of actionis an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals,170 SCRA 800)Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

The court held that the complaints failure to state acause of actionbecame a ground for its outright dismissal. Why?

The Court found nothing in the SJS Petition to suggest that an explicit allegation of fact that SJShad a legal right to protect. (trigger for thecause of action)

In special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept ofcause of actionunder ordinary civil actions does not strictlyapply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Nevertheless,a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

The justices could only infer that the interest from its allegation was its mention of its (SJS) thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested. Aside from the fact that this general averment did not constitute a legal right or interest, the courts inferred interest too vague and speculative in character.Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument.

Tobolsterits point, the SJS cited theCorpus Juris Secundumand submitted that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against the defendant, but sought a judicial declaration of the rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding their future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action isthat no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action,although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. (???)

During the Oral Argument, Velarde and co-respondents strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents.

Even if the SJS petition asserted a legal right, there was neverthelessno certaintythat such right would be invaded by the said respondents.

3.NO. Legal standing orlocus standihas been defined as apersonal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.

Interest means amaterial interestin issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

SJS has nolegal interest in the controversyand has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must demonstrate thatthey have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

If the petition were to be valid, it should satisfy:

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation, particularly that of Congress' taxing power.Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents.Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.In not a few cases, the Court hasliberalized thelocus standirequirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or importance to the people(IBP v Zamora). The Court deemed the constitutional issue raised to be both transcendental in importance and novel in nature. Nevertheless, the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court would prevent the resolution of the transcendental issue.

Substantive Issues

1.NO.The Constitution commands thatno decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.

Consistent with this are Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 1. which states that :

A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decisionshall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.

The SC has reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section `4, Art VIII of the contsitution. This was evinced inYao v. Court of Appealswhere Davide, CJ said that faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably aparamount component of due process and fair play.

InPeople v. Bugarin,the court held that the requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he canpoint out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees.

The assailed Decision contains no statement of facts(much less an assessment or analysis thereof) or of the courts findings as to the probable facts.The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented.Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve.Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked.The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state.Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.

A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning.

It was truly obvious that the RTCs Decision did not adhere to the Bugarin precedent because of its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as aprecedent(how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?).

Respondent SJS insisted that the dispositive portion can be found in the body (p. 10) of the assailed Decision.Stating Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.

The Court held that the statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

The standard for a dispositive was set inManalang v. Tuason de Rickardswhere the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is theinvestitive orcontrollingfactorthatdetermines and settles the rights of the parties and thequestions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing.

InMagdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag: The rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that thedispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing.

The statement quoted by SJS does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition.Neither does it grant proper relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is agrave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down asvoid.

2.It is not legally possible to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (So no answer)

Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Industries,Inc.Facts:In May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc. (lessee) entered into a contract of lease with petitioners (lessors). Provisions of the contract of lease include:

6th - Lessee shall pay an increased rent if there is any new tax imposed on the property

7th - In case of supervening extraordinaryinflationordevaluationof the PHP, the value of PHP at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment

Petitioners later demanded payment of VAT and 73% adjusted rentals pursuant to the foregoing provisions. Respondent refused and filed an action for declaratory relief. Petitioners filed an action for ejectment.

Issue:Whether or not declaratory relief is proper.

Held:YES. Petitionersinsistthat respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed, thus, respondent is barred from filing an action for declaratory relief. However, after petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.

Petitioners further claim that theinstantpetition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum.

As a rule, the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissedin viewof the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. In this case, however, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.