Decision

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPIINESMUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES

BRANCH 9ILOILO CITY

ILOILO TOWN CENTER, herein CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30Represented by LUIS TINSAY, JR.

Plaintiff,

-versus- F O R

JOSEPHINE TAÑO, FELIPE PERALTA EJECTMENTJOSEPHINE MADRIGAL, TERESITANOLASCO, EDDIE NOLASCO theirspouse, relatives, privies and all thoseacting for and in their behalf.

Defendants.x---------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

This is an action for Ejectment tried under the Summary Rule.

The plaintiff, a duly organized corporation, with principal office at

Iloilo City and herein represented by Luis C. Tinsay, Jr1., in the verified

complaint allege that it is the registered owner of the property situated

at Iloilo City known as Lot No. 6 of the consolidation-subdivision plan

LRC-Pcs-11215 with an area of Two Thousand Nine Hundred Nineteen

(2,919) square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-1525742 the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City

and particularly described as follows:

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-152574

“A parcel of land (Lot 6 of the

consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-

11215, being a portion of consolidation of Lots

90, 633, Iloilo Cadastre and Lot 1090-D, (LRC)

Psd-25567, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 9739) situated in

the City of Iloilo, Island of Panay. xxx

1 Secretary’s Certificate Annex “A”2 Annex “B”

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al.MAY 7, 2010 of 19x----------------------------------------------------x

Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND NINE

HUNDRED NINETEEN (2,919) SQUARE METERS

more or less.xxx

The defendants, their spouses, their agents and representatives,

and such other persons acting for and in their behalf, are occupying

the subject property through the plaintiff’s tolerance. Defendants are

not paying any rentals on the subject property, neither do they have

any agreement with the plaintiff Corporation relative to their

occupation of the subject property.

Plaintiff corporation acquired the subject property from its

previous owner, Luis M. Tinsay Sr., in February 2005 and the title to

the subject property was transferred and registered to plaintiff

Corporation in July 2005 as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 152574.

Immediately after its acquisition, plaintiff corporation through Luis C.

Tinsay Jr., informed the defendants of its intention to use the property

and demanded that the defendants vacate the premises.

On January 15, 2009 plaintiff, through counsel, sent notice of

eviction3 to defendants through registered mail giving them fifteen

(15) days from receipt to vacate the subject lots.

As per information from the post office, most of the defendants

refused to receive the letter and sign the return card. Another copy of

the same demand letter to vacate was sent to the defendants and

were personally delivered to them by plaintiff’s personnel on February

5, 2009. Notwithstanding the demand to vacate, defendants continue

to illegally occupy the subject property, thereby causing damage and

prejudice to the Plaintiff Corporation.

3 Annexes “C” to “G” and “C-1” to “G-1”.


Their unjustified refusal to vacate the premises owned by the

plaintiff corporation and occupied by them, the defendants, their

spouse, household members, agents and representatives, and all

persons acting for and in their behalf have unlawfully deprived the

plaintiff corporation of the possession of the subject lot.

Plaintiff prays that the defendants vacate the premises of the

subject property and pay a reasonable rent in the amount of

PhP1,000.00/month per defendant to be paid from the time of the

demand to vacate until they actually vacate the subject lot.

Defendants Felipe Peralta and Teresita Nolasco in their Answer

with Compulsory Counterclaim deny that they are occupants of Lot No.

6, Iloilo Cadastre, when in fact their residential house is situated within

Lot 115-D as per Relocation Survey/Plan4 prepared on July 26, 2000 by

Geodetic Engineer Jose M. Mañosa Jr. In the aforesaid relocation

survey/plan for the identification of residential houses on Lot 115-D,

131, 90 and 89, defendant Eddie Nolasco’s house was identified as

House No. 26 which was then listed in the name of his brother, Rodrigo

Peralta.

Defendants further stress that recorded in TCT No. T-152574 is

an annotation of a Notice of lis Pendens under entry No. 372437 in

connection with Civil Case No. 05-28498 filed by the defendant Felipe

Peralta and his other co-defendants against Luis M. Tinsay Sr., for

Quieting of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Certificates of Title and

Damages before the Regional Trial Court Branch 35, Iloilo City. The

defendants question the means by which the ownership of said

property was acquired from Luis M. Tinsay Sr. Trial of the said case is

4 Annex “A” for the Defendant

still ongoing with the defendants having already presented their

evidence.


Defendants stress that their houses are standing inside Lot 115-

D, the same area occupied by their parents and family even way back

in 1945 in the concept of an owner. They further deny that their

occupation of their premises is through tolerance of the plaintiff

corporation, firstly because they occupy a parcel of land known as Lot

115-D and not Lot 6, and secondly plaintiff corporation became the

alleged registered owner of Lot 6 only after Luis M. Tinsay Sr.,

transferred its alleged ownership of said Lot 6 despite the fact that a

case for Quieting of Title was already file before the Regional Trial

Court Branch 35, Iloilo City.

Defendants further aver that plaintiff corporation has no cause of

action against them as their house and other improvements built by

them are situated within Lot 115-D and not Lot 6. TCT No. 152574

shows that Lot 6 is a consolidation of Lots 990, 633, Iloilo Cadastre and

Lot 1090-D, (LRC) Psd-25567, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 9739). Lot 115-D was

not shown to be included nor was consolidated with the other nearby

parcels of land to form Lot 6 described in the title of the complainant-

corporation. Moreover, Lot 6 covered by TCT No. 152574 is “situated

in the City of Iloilo, Island of Panay” which does not describe with

particularity its exact location.

In their affirmative defense defendants point out that plaintiff

corporation is claiming ownership over a parcel of land known as Lot

No. 6 which emanates from the consolidated lots of 1090-D, 633 and

90 as described in TCT No. T-152574. However, a certification issued

by the Registry of Deeds shows that no title was issued covering Lot

No. 1090 or 1090-D5.

5 Annex “E” for the Defendants.

Lot No. 115-D is considered land of public domain being formerly

a foreshore lot as shown by a Verification6 dated June 08, 2005 issued

by the Office of Land Evaluation Party Coordinator, Department of

Natural Resources stating that Lot No. 115-D situated in Brgy. Flores,

Iloilo City is within Project 8, alienable and disposable block.


Defendants stress that they have been in open, public and

continuous possession of a portion of Lot 115-D since time immemorial

and such occupation has ripened into ownership7.

The dismissal of the case is prayed for by the defendants on the

grounds that

Due to the filing of the unfounded and groundless case,

defendants were forced to secure the services of counsel and to

defend their interests from plaintiff’s action and incur expenses in the

amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (PhP60,000.00) as Attorney’s Fees

and the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance

fee whenever the case would be called for hearing, defendants pray for

their reimbursement.

The malicious and oppressive filing of this case by the plaintiff

has caused the defendants mental anguish, serious anxiety, sleepless

nights, embarrassment and has besmirched their reputation for which

they should be compensated by way of moral damages which should

not be less than Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for each

defendant. Defendants also pray that the reckless and wanton attitude

of plaintiff in bringing the present action against defendants should be

penalized by way of exemplary damages, the amount of which is left to

the sound discretion of the Court.

6 Annex “F” for the Defendants.7 Annex “G” Certification of Punong Barangay and Affidavit of the Defendants.

Defendant Taño submitted a separate Answer but also

containing the same averments and prayer as that of her other co-

defendants.


Facts Which Remain Uncontroverted:

1. That Plaintiff Iloilo Town Center is a corporation duly

established and existing under Philippine laws with

principal office at Iloilo City;

2. That Luis C. Tinsay, Jr., is authorized to file and

institute the instant case and to represent the

corporation;

3. That a notice of Lis Pendens (Entry No. 372437) was

annotated at the back of TCT No. 152574;

4. That there was no prior physical possession on the

part of the plaintiff corporation and/or its

predecessor-in-interest over the parcel of land

subject matter of this case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the defendant may be ejected from the property

subject of this case;

2. Whether or not the defendants are liable of damages;

3. Whether or not there was tolerance in defendant’s possession.

EVALUATION AND FINDINGS:

From the parties’ pleadings, position papers, affidavits and

evidences are the actual facts as follows.

Plaintiff corporation acquired the property covered by TCT No. T-

152574 herein particularly described:


Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-

152574)

A parcel of land (Lot 6 of the

consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psc 11215

it being a portion of Lots 90, 633, Iloilo

Cadastre and Lot 1090-D, island of

Panay..Containing an area of Two Thousand

Nine Hundred Nineteen (2,919) square meters,

more or less.

On March 1, 2005 Luis M. Tinsay Sr., executed a Deed of

Assignment in favor of the plaintiff corporation Iloilo Town Center.

Months after its acquisition

and the title to the subject property was transferred to the plaintiff

corporation, its authorized representative Luis C. Tinsay, Jr., informed

the defendants of its intention to use the property and demanded that

the defendants vacate the premises.

Notices of Eviction was sent to the defendants on January 15,

20098 through registered mail giving them fifteen (15) days from

8 Exhibits “D” to “D-2”; “E” to “E-2”; “F” to “F-2”; “G” to “G-2” and “H” to “H-2”.

receipt to vacate the subject lot. All of the defendants, except Eddie

Nolasco, refused to receive the said demand letters.

ON WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION

OVER THE ACTION/ SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE?

Jurisdiction over Ejectment is governed by the allegations of the

complaint and conferred by law. Exclusive original jurisdiction over

cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer is lodged with the first

level courts. This is provided in


Sec. 1 Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and in Sec. 33

of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise referred to as the Judiciary Act

of 1980.

Sec. 33(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 provides:

"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal

Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan

Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over

cases of forcible entry and unlawful

detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases,

the defendant raises the questions of

ownership in his pleadings and the question of

possession cannot be resolved without

deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of

ownership shall be resolved only to determine

the issue of possession; xxx

As a general rule, it is essential that plaintiff’s prior possession

should have been actual, peaceable, exclusive, adverse and

continuous in ejectment cases.

However, while in forcible entry the complaint must be

predicated upon the plaintiff’s prior physical possession of which he

was deprived by the defendant by means of force, intimidation, stealth

or strategy; in unlawful detainer9, the plaintiff need not have been in

prior physical possession, as the defendant therein unlawfully withheld

possession of the property after the


expiration of his right thereto under any contract express or implied,

hence prior possession is not required10.

Plaintiff corporation does not need to have prior physical

possession of the property so long as she can prove that she is entitled

thereto. The existence of the Certificate of Title in its name is

sufficient proof of its title to the property, such that as owner, plaintiff

corporation is entitled to its physical possession and is vested with

legal personality to file the instant case against the defendant.

The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to confer to this

Court jurisdiction over the said case. The transfer of ownership of the

property subject of this case from original owner Luis C. Tinsay, Sr.., to

the plaintiff corporation

has not been ruled invalid by any decree or order of the court. This

Court then could not rely on the mere allegations of ownership made

9 Aguilar vs. Cabrera 74 Phil 6610 Barbara vs. CA 428 Phil 598, 607-608. 2002. Maddamu vs. Judge of Municipal Trial Court of Manila, 74 Phil 230 (1943); Fideldia vs. Mulato, G.R. 149189, September 3, 2008.

by the defendants to deprive the plaintiff corporation of its rights over

the property.

Furthermore the defendants were served with notices of demand

to vacate by the plaintiff and this case was filed within one year from

date of last demand.

Under the rules, if the addressee refuses to accept delivery,

service by registered mail is deemed complete if the addressee fails to

claim the mail from the postal office after five days from the date of

first notice of the postmaster.11

In Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court,12 the Supreme

Court held that "[t]he Court cannot countenance an unfair situation

where the plaintiff in an eviction case suffers further injustice by the

unwarranted delay resulting


from the obstinate refusal of the defendant to acknowledge the

existence of a valid demand."

ON WHETHER LIS PENDENS WILL SUSPEND

THE PROCEEDINGS OF THIS COURT

The Court is guided by law and jurisprudence in appreciating the

weight of the Notice of Lis Pendens in the present case.

Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

11 Rules of Court, Rule 13, Section 10.12 Co Keng Kian v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75676, August 29, 1990, 189 SCRA 112, 116.

"SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens — In

an action affecting the title or the right of

possession of real property, the plaintiff and

the defendant, when affirmative relief is

claimed in his answer, may record in the office

of the registry of deeds of the province in

which the property is situated a notice of the

pendency of the action. Said notice shall

contain the names of the parties and the object

of the action or defense, and a description of

the property in that province affected thereby.

Only from the time of filing of such notice for

record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of

the property affected thereby, be deemed to

have constructive notice of the pendency of

the action, and only of its pendency against the

parties designated by their real names.


The notice of lis pendens hereinabove

mentioned may be cancelled only upon order

of the court, after proper showing that the

notice is for the purpose of molesting the

adverse party, or that it is not necessary to

protect the rights of the party who caused it to

be recorded. (Emphasis ours)13

In several cases decided by the Supreme Court, it has held that:

13 Lim vs. Lim G.R. No. 143646, April 4, 2001.

For purposes of annotating a notice of lis

pendens, there is nothing in the rules which

requires the party seeking annotation to show

that the land belongs to him. In fact, there is

no requirement that the party applying for the

annotation of the notice must prove his right or

interest over the property sought to be

annotated.14 Hence, even on the basis of an

unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis

pendens may be annotated on the title. And

such annotation can not be considered as a

collateral attack against the certificate of title.

This is based on the principle that the

registration of a notice of lis pendens does not

produce a legal effect similar to a lien. It does

not create a right or lien. It only means that a

person purchases or contracts on the property


in dispute subject to the result of the pending

litigation.15

Also indispensable is the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case

of Samonte vs Century Savings Bank16:

As a general rule, an ejectment suit

cannot be abated or suspended by the mere

filing of another action raising ownership of the

14 Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 298 (1997).15 Somes vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 62 Phil. 432 (1935-1936).16 G.R. No. 176413,November 25, 2009.

property as an issue.17 The Court has, in fact,

affirmed this rule in the following precedents:

1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC

by defendants in ejectment actions in the

municipal trial courts or other courts of the first

level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966])

do not abate the latter; and neither do

proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si

v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v.

Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).

2. An "accion publiciana" does not

suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff

in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187

[1981]).

3. A "writ of possession case" where

ownership is concededly the principal issue

before the Regional Trial Court does not

preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment

in an unlawful detainer suit where the only

issue involved is the material possession or

possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F.


Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518

[1988]).

4. An action for quieting of title to

property is not a bar to an ejectment suit

involving the same property (Quimpo v. de la

Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]).

5. Suits for specific performance with

damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g.,

17 Amagan v. Marayag, 383 Phil. 486, 489 (2000).

to compel renewal of a lease contract)

(Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184

[1966]; Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987];

Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264

[1988]).

6. An action for reformation of instrument

(e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of sale

with pacto de retro) does not suspend an

ejectment suit between the same parties

(Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975]).

7. An action for reconveyance of property

or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on

ejectment suits regarding the same property

(Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963];

Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v.

C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon v. Gaurana,

149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v. Malaya, 153

SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine Feeds Milling Co.,

Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174

SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment

of sale and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604

[1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608

[1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al., [annulment

of sale and reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818,

Aug. 2, 1991).


8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale,

or title, or document affecting property operate

to abate ejectment actions respecting the

same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment

of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage

and/or to declare the same an equitable

mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v.

RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA

153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of

title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison

[annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA

517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

[annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288

[1989]).18

Only in rare instances is suspension

allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil

action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño,19 and

Amagan v. Marayag,20 we ordered the

suspension of the ejectment proceedings on

considerations of equity. We explained that the

ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a

demolition of their house and would create

confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and

expense.21 Needlessly, the court would be

wasting much time and effort by proceeding to

a stage wherein the outcome would at best be

temporary but the result of enforcement would

be permanent, unjust and probably

irreparable.22


The Notice of Lis Pendens does not operate to deprive the

plaintiff corporation, or one who is entitled to rightful ownership, of its

18 Palattao v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil. 438, 447-448 (2002).19 G.R. No. L-40437, September 27, 1977, 79 SCRA 135.20 Supra Note 13.21 Amagan v. Marayag, id., at 499.22 Id.

right over the subject property. A notice of lis pendens is a mere

notice of pending litigation, that serves as warning to third persons

that the anyone who buys it, buys it at his own risk. It does not even

serve as lien on the subject property.

The defendants have not shown enough cause or evidence to

allow this Court to apply the exception rather than the general rule.

The plaintiff corporation has clearly shown through its evidence that it

is entitled to possession of the subject property having been issued

title to it.

The Relocation Survey23 submitted by the defendants was

prepared on June 16, 2000 when the said property was indeed not in

the name of the plaintiff corporation. This evidence, which was only a

photostatic copy, could hardly defeat the evidence of the plaintiff

corporation, a most recent survey24 and also the original.

WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANTS CAN BE

EJECTED FROM THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND

The Court is constrained to rule in the Affirmative.

While possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes

illegal upon demand to vacate made by the owner and the possessor by

tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.25


The case of Calubayan vs Pascual26 finds application in this case:

23 Exhibit “1” for the defendants.24 Exhibit “E” for the Plaintiff.25 De Prieto vs Reyes 14 SCRA 432.

26 21 SCRA 146

“A person who occupies the land of another

at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any

contract between them, is necessarily bound by an

implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,

failing which a summary action for ejectment is the

proper remedy against them. The status of

defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant

whose term of lease has expired but whose

occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In

such a case, the unlawful deprivation or

withholding of possession is to be counted from the

date of the demand to vacate.”

The plaintiff corporation was aware of the occupation by the said

defendants of the subject property after the same was surveyed and

inspected prior its conveyance. After the subject property has been

transferred in the name of the plaintiff-corporation demand letters to

vacate were sent to the defendants although the same refused receipt

thereof.

As registered owner, respondent had the right to the possession

of the property; which is one of the attributes of his ownership thereof.

Defendants’ argument that plaintiff-corporation is not the true owner

of the land is a collateral attack on its title, which is not allowed.

Plaintiff-corporation’s title can only be challenged in a direct action, for

it is well settled that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral

attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct

proceeding in accordance with law. Having obtained a valid title


over the subject lot, plaintiff-corporation is entitled to protection

against indirect attacks against its title.27

The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Sps. Refugia vs CA28

finds application in this case:

“Where the question of who has the prior

possession hinges on the question of who the real

owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court

may resolve the issue of ownership and make a

declaration as to who among the contending

parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where

the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on

a determination of the validity and interpretation of

the document of title or any other contract on

which the claim of possession is premised, the

inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues.

This is because, and it must be so understood, that

any such pronouncement made affecting ownership

of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely

as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an

action between the same parties involving title to

the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules

of Court expressly provides that the judgment

rendered

in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer

shall be effective with respect to the possession

only and in no wise bind the title or affect the

ownership of the land or building.”


27 Tan v. Philippine Banking Corp., G.R. No. 137739, 26 March 2001.28 327 Phil. 982 (1996)

In conclusion, the Court finds the ruling in the case of Parran v. Court

of First Instance of Sorsogon, 10th Judicial District29 and Dio vs Concepcion30

relevant:

“There is no legal obstacle for the owner of

the land to allow another person to remain in her

property one month, one year, several years or

even decades. Only when that consent is

withdrawn and the owner demands of that person

to leave the property is the owner’s right of

possession asserted and the person’s refusal or

failure to move out makes his possession unlawful

because it is violative of the owner’s preferential

right of possession, hence UNLAWFUL DETAINER is

proper when a person who occupies the land of

another at the latter’s tolerance or permission

without any contract between them, fails to vacate

the premises upon the owner’s DEMAND.”

It is however reiterated that the judgment rendered in unlawful

detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise

bind the title or affect ownership of the land and in the building. Any

controversy over ownership rights could and should be settled after the

party having a better right of possession is returned to the property31.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of plaintiff-corporation and against defendants JOSEPHINE TAÑO, FELIPE

PERALTA, JOSEPHINE MADRIGAL, TERESITA NOLASCO and EDDIE NOLASCO.

DECISION-CIVIL CASE NO. 09-30ILOILO TOWN CENTER vs TAÑO et.al.MAY 7, 2010 of 19

29 125 SCRA 78 (1983)30 296 SCRA 579 [1998]31 Fuentes vs Justice of the Peace of Pilar Laguna, 67 Phil 364.

x----------------------------------------------------x

The defendants, their agents, successors-in-interest, privies and

assigns are hereby ordered, to wit:

1. Vacate Lot 6 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-

152574 located along de Leon St., Iloilo City and peacefully

turn over the same to the plaintiff corporation or its

authorized representative;

2. Pay plaintiff the sum of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (PhP1,000.00) a

month as rental from the time of the filing of the case until

defendants shall have fully turned over possession of Lot 6 to

plaintiff;

No pronouncement as to cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Iloilo City, Philippines. May 7, 2010.

EVELYN P. RONDAELJ u d g e

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