REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYAN

Quezon City

Seventh Division

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. SB-16-A/R-0004

Present:

- versus - Gomez-Estoesta, J., ChairpersonTrespeses, J. andJacinto, J.

ALELIABELLA-SERRANO,Accused-Appellant.

X-

Promulgated:

-X

DECISION

GOMEZ-ESTOESTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Judgment dated August 25, 2015^ of theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 226 ["trial court"], findingBarangay Treasurer Aleli Abella-Serrano ["accused-appellant"] guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Malversation throughFalsification of Commercial Document, which dispositive portion states, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution havingproved the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, finds theaccused Aleli Abella-Serrano GUILTY and is hereby CONVICTED of thecomplex crime of Attempted Malversation of Public Funds throughFalsification of Commercial Document defined and penalized under Article217 in relation to Articles 171, 48 and 51 of the Revised Penal Code.Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminatepenalty of imprisonment of Eleven (11) years. Four (4) months and One

1 Records, Volume 1, pp. 171-178I

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(1) Day as MINIMUM to Twelve (12) years as MAXIMUM of PrisionMayor in its maximum period and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.2

Accused-appellant challenged her judgment of conviction by filing aNotice of AppeaP on September 7, 2015. The trial court, however,erroneously elevated the records to the Court of Appeals instead of theSandiganbayan in its Order dated September 15,2015.

Necessarily, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Endorse Case to theSandiganbayan (with Motion for Suspension of Period to File Brief for theAccused-Appellant) before the Court of Appeals to correct the proceduralerror. In the Resolution dated March 3, 2016"^ of the Fifth Division^ of theCourt of Appeals, the motion was granted and the Judicial Records Divisionwas directed to forward the case to this Court, citing Cariaga v. People.^

Hence, the present appeal.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The facts are imdisputed, save for the defense raised by the accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant, a resident of 16 T. Alonzo Street, Project 4, QuezonCity, was appointed Barangay Treasurer of Barangay Marilag, Quezon Cityon August 15, 2002. She took her Oath of Office on the same date beforeBarangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo ["Abundo"].'' On the premise thatshe would be an administrative support personnel of the newly electedBarangay Chairperson who enjoyed his trust and confidence, accused-appellant's appointment was approved by the Sangguniang Barangay ofBarangay Marilag per Resolution No. 002 Series of 2002.® Abundo was thePunong Barangay of Barangay Marilag from August 15, 2002 to November30,2007.9

Four (4) years later, a different scenario befell the accused-appellant.An investigation was promptly initiated against her for neglect of dutyresulting from her failure to submit financial reports, leaving the barangay inthe dark as to its financial status for purposes of fund allocation and budgetappropriation. Considering the duties of the accused-appellant as BarangayTreasurer who has custody of funds, many unauthorized check encashments

2 Penned by Presiding Judge Manuel B. Sta. Cruz^ Records, Volume i, p. 243; Records, Volume 2, p. 13 which bears receipt by the Sandiganbayn Records Division^ Records, Volume 2, pp. 38-445 Composed of Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. as Chairperson with Justice Stephen C. Cruz and Justice Ramon Paul LHernando as Members

6 G.R. No. 180010, July 30,2010' Records, Volume 1, p. 146; Exhibit "A-1"8 ibid.. Exhibit "A"® TSN dated July 30,2008, p. 4

People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 3 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004DECISION ON APPEAL

were discovered and these encashments were not even the subject of barangayappropriation.^®

Resolution No. 012-S-06 dated August 10, 2006^^ was thus issued bythe Sangguniang Barangay imposing indefinite suspension upon accused-appellant "for breach of trust and loss of confidence effective August 11,2006." The Resolution authorized Abimdo to implement the indefinitesuspension and make the necessary legal action against the accused-appellant.

On August 11,2006, Abundo wrote the manager of Landbank - CubaoBranch, Quezon City, not to honor any barangay transaction presented by theaccused. His letter^^ read, thus:

August 11,2006

ATTY. ROSEMARIE J. RONILLO

MANAGER

LANDBANK

Cubao Branch

Aurora Blvd., Quezon City

Dear Atty. Ronillo:

This is to request your office to refrain from dealing bank transactions with the BarangayTreasurer of Barangay Marilag, Ms. Aleli A. Serrano with regards [sic] to the account ofBarangay Marilag effective upon the receipt of this letter. The undersigned wishes to informyou that the above named person is under investigation due to her involvement in someirregularities related to her work.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

HON. ADREW S. ABUNDO

Punong Barangay

It was under such circumstances that at around 10:00 in the morning ofAugust 28, 2006, the office of Barangay Marilag received a telephone callfirom the bank manager, Atty. Ronillo, informing them that accused-appellantwas about to encash a check worth P35,000.00 at the Landbank. Abundoimmediately called up Kagawad Yvette V. Luna, the Chairperson of theCommittee on Appropriation, to verify if an appropriation for P35,000.00 wasmade. When Kagawad Luna replied in the negative, Abundo rushed toLandbank.

Abundo lost no time in approaching the accused-appellant to ask herwhat she was encashing. Accused-appellant could not utter a reply. Abundotook his chance to seize the check fi*om her and demanded why she was doing

V.^ TSN dated July 30,2008, pp. 20-24 ^ ^" Records, Volume 1, p. 140; Exhibit "B;" TSN dated July 30,2008, p. 5 ff" Records., p. 144; Exhibit "D;" TSN dated July 30,2008, pp. 24-2613 TSN dated July 30,2008, pp. 26-28; TSN dated February 20,2014, p. 4; Exhibit "E"

People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 4 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

DECISION ON APPEAL

it. It was then that the accused-appellant answered, "Kap, pangbaon tsakapang-gastos ng mga bata^^^

The check seized from the accused-appellant was marked as Exhibit"F," as follows:

'fCCpUNTtM. ' «c6uicn«^;/fqgi$g2^i03r^7 BARANOAYMAmLAQ

£ \ 9Cwm\n ^ ^60d64(«7i80#] 7^. « ,

1^..ORDER ■ . 1 ^ ""***—* //

TAyV^ F/Vc Thmsand nPESOS

mLANDBANK'ISttBAO BRANCH

AURORA BLVD..

D>0Q00lii 7fiO?tPO 10 3 S»0 l&^ifOOi

upon closer examination of Landbank Check No. 0000467807 datedAugust 28, 2006^^ which was made payable to the order of the accused-appellant, Abundo discovered that his signature appearing on said check wasnot his, gauged from the downward curve of the "A" when his regular strokewas upward. Abundo had known that accused-appellant had encashed checksin the past by forging his signature. When he reported the matter to the CityMayor, he was instructed to solve the problem on his own. While appropriateaction was being taken in the past, the barangay officials could not recoverthe checks for evidence since accused-appellant burned them to escapepunishment.

This time around, after accused-appellant was caught red-handed,Abundo called his staff to ask for police assistance. It was BarangaySecretary Silverio Purificacion who personally alerted the desk officer of theQuezon City Police District (QCPD) of the commission of the crime of estafaand falsification of a commercial document then being committed. SP03 JoelSioson ["SP03 Sioson"] responded to the call. After having been briefed ofthe complaint, SP03 Sioson proceeded to Landbank-Cubao Branch.

At Landbank-Cubao Branch, Abundo pointed to the accused-appellantas the person who just committed the crime. After reading her Miranda rights,accused-appellant was apprehended and brought to PS-7 for investigation anddisposition.^^

y." ibid., p. 28« Exhibit "F" (y16 TSN dated July 30,2008, pp. 28-30 ' ^" ibid., p. 32; The testimony of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo was terminated with no cross examinationmade per Order dated November 16,2009; Records, Voiume 1, p. 7216 TSN dated December 2, 2010, pp. 3-4,616 ibid., pp. 4-5; See also Affidavit executed by P03 Joei Sioson marked as Exhibit "H"

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In her defense, accused-appellant submitted her Judicial Affidavit,which when conjoined with her testimony in court, has been summarized bythe trial court, as follows:

The defense presented only one witness, the accused herself AleliAbella-Serrano who testified on her direct examination based on her

Judicial Affidavit dated May 7,2015, that: she denied forging the signatureof Barangay Captain Andrew S. Abundo in Land Bank Check no.0000467807; she admitted, however, that she attempted to encash the saidcheck; the signature appearing on the subject check is similar to otherdocuments bearing the signature of the said Barangay Captain; she isfamiliar with the signature of Brgy. Captain Abundo; she tried to encash thesubject upon the instruction of Brgy. Captain Abundo purportedly to payfor some obligations of the latter and that of the barangay council; on ayearly basis she had been audited by the COA and there were no instancesthat there were missing fimds; while waiting for the verification of the checkshe was surprised when the police arrested her at the bank; the policeofficers told her nothing on the way to the police station; she was not awarethat she has been suspended by the barangay council and the said suspensionwas only effected after she had been charged; she had been the one signingthe check, payrolls, vouchers and liquidation from August 11, 2006 untilthe time she was arrested on August 28,2006; when she tried to encash thesubject check it was not supported by any Resolution, Request forAllocation (ROA), and Voucher because it [was] the usual practice in thebarangay that in cases of emergency expenses, the requirements aredispensed with and the said documents are only prepared thereafter; she isbeing charged because she knows a lot of irregularities in the barangay andshe already opted to resign in 2004 but was prevailed upon to stay; Brgy.Captain Abimdo wanted to run again in 2007 and in his efforts to appear"clean" to the electorate she was implicated in the instant case.

In her cross examination, the accused admitted that: she startedworking as Barangay Treasurer of Barangay Marilag on August 16, 2002;in the disbursement of funds in the barangay, she first makes a request forappropriation or allotment, which is done by the Punong Barangay; thesame request is approved by the Chairman of the Commission of Accountsas to the availability of funds; thereafter the Chairman of Appropriationscertifies to the existence of the appropriations; she in turn certifies theavailability of funds for the obligations; when she attempted to encash LandBank check no. 0000467807 there was no request for appropriation;likewise there is no approval by the Chairman of Commission on Accountsregarding the availability of allotment; also there is no Certification firomthe Chairman of Appropriations that there was an existence ofappropriations; finally as a Barangay Treasurer, she has no Certification ofany availability of funds amoimting to P35,000.00.

On redirect-examination by Atty. Jonathan Magallanes of the PublicAttomeys' Office, the same accused averred that: the procedure in thewithdrawal of the use of funds of the barangay was not followed in theirbarangay; it was the practice in their barangay that encashment of the checkis done first before making the request for allocation (ROA); the same waspursuant to the directive of the barangay captain.

//■

People V. Aleli Abeila-Serrano 6 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-C004

DECISION ON APPEAL

On recross-examination, accused Serrano admitted that: despite thealleged irregularities in the disbursement of funds in the barangay she didnot take any action to file a complaint pertaining thereto; she neversubmitted any resignation letter despite her intentions to resign in 2004.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

The lone assignment of error presented by accused-appellant wasphrased, thus:

[THE TRIAL COURT] ERRED AND COMMITTEDPALPABLE MISTAKE WHEN IT CONVICTED THE

ACCUSED[-APPELLANT] OF THE OFFENSE CHARGEDDESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE

GUILT OF THE ACCUSED [-APPELLANT] BEYONDRESONABLE DOUBT

Accused-appellant harps on her judgment of conviction on thefollowing grounds:

1. No testimony of a handwriting expert was presented to arrive at aconclusion that the signature of Barangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo onsubject check was indeed forged;

2. Evidence needed to be re-calibrated or re-evaluated to show the

inconsistencies and incredulity in the testimony given by BarangayChairperson Andrew S. Abundo, following the personal observations made inopen court by then Presiding Judge Leah S. Domingo Regala;

3. The testimony of Barangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo was notcorroborated on substantial points by prosecution witnesses SP03 Joel Siosonand Yvette V. Luna who only offered hearsay evidence on the fact in issue, asthe person who could have given a firsthand account of the incident was thebank manager of Landbank but who was not presented as a witness.

4. No proof was given whether accused-appellant was made aware ornotified of her preventive suspension firom office.

THE PROSECUTION'S REFUTATION

The Prosecution debunks the lone assignment of error, thus:

1. A handwriting expert is not indispensable to prove that thesignature of Barangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo in subject check wasforged as the judge can conduct an independent examination of the questionedsignature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity;

People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 7 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

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2. Accused-appellant failed to point out the inconsistencies andconflicting declarations purportedly made by Barangay Chairperson AndrewS. Abundo. On the other hand, prosecution witness SP03 Joel Sioson testifiedon the basis of his own personal knowledge insofar as it covered theapprehension of the accused-appellant or the fact that he was shown thedocuments in connection with die complaint charged against the accused-appellant; in the same way, prosecution witness Yvette Luna testified on thebasis of her own personal knowledge when she confirmed that there was noallocation made by the Committee on Appropriations of the SangguniangBarangay on the amount of P35,000.00 covered by the check. The testimonyof LBP Manager, Atty. Rosemarie J. Romillo, was not necessary as it wouldhave been merely corroborative.

3. There was no need to show whether accused-appellant receivedthe order or resolution of the Sangguniang Barangay on her preventivesuspension since this was immaterial to her criminal act of attempting toencash a check bearing the forged signature of Barangay Chairperson AndrewS. Abundo.

4. This Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as judgmentof conviction has already become final. The appeal was erroneously elevatedto the Court of Appeals by the trial court but it took the accused-appellantmore than the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days to move for theendorsement of her case to the proper forum; hence, she has lost her right toappeal.

OVERTURE ON THIS COURTIS JURISDICTION

The appellate jurisdiction of this Court has been challenged at theoutset, brought about by the Prosecution's observation that the accused-appellant took time to file a motion before the Court of Appeals to necessarilytransmit the records of this case to this jurisdiction. It cited Section 2, Rule50 of the Revised Rules of Court in asseverating that "[a]n appealerroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not he transferred to theappropriate court hut shall he dismissed outright. "

We cannot subscribe to such proposition, as it fails to sensiblyunderstand the concept when an appeal is perfected in a criminal case.

The period for perfecting an appeal in a criminal case is found underSection 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz:

Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken withinfifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice ofthe final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shallbe suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is fileduntil notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the

1 i

People V. Aieli Abella-Serrano 8 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

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accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.[Emphasis supplied]

As afore-quoted, the period for perfecting an appeal from the judgmentrendered by the Regional Trial Court is fifteen (15) days from thepromulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from. It is true that theperfection of an appeal in the manner and within the reglementary period laiddown by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect anappeal as legally required has the effect of rendering final and executory thejudgment of the court below and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction toentertain the appeal.^®

In this case, promulgation of judgment was made on September 7,2015, with the accused-appellant and her counsel de officio present.^^ On thesame day, records reveal that accused-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal andserved a copy of the same, by personal service, to Asst. City ProsecutorRaymund Oliver S. Almonte, in compliance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 122.^^There can be no doubt, at this instance, that the appeal was filed within thereglementary period and that accused-appellant has substantially compliedwith the requirements of the law for perfecting an appeal. Even JudgeManuel B. Sta. Cruz, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch226, ruled that the appeal was "seasonably filed" in his Order datedSeptember 15, 2015.^^ The elevation of the records of an appealed case,therefore, became a plain and ministerial duty on the part of the aforesaid courtover which the accused-appellant has no intervention whatsoever.^"^

The trial court, however, erroneously elevated the records of the appealto the Court of Appeals. Later, the Court of Appeals corrected the proceduralerror and, citing Cariaga v. Peoplef^ endorsed the records of the appeal tothis Court. It reiterated that the trial court was duty bound to forward therecords of the case to the proper forum since the judge was expected to knowand should have known the law and the rules of procedure, especially in casessuch as this where a person's liberty was at stake. Such disposition is anexercise of judicial discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals and, whetherdone judiciously or not, is not a remedial matter that is within the jurisdictionof this Court to take cognizance of.

Inevitably, the elevation of the appeal to the wrong forum, or theinitiatives made by the accused-appellant on whether to endorse her appeal tothe proper court, are variables that are not considered in the computation ofthe perfection of the appeal. For certain, however, it is the Sandiganbayan

2° Retoni V. Court ofAppeals, et al., G.R. No. 96776, February 5,1993Vide: Order dated September 7,2015; Records, Volume 1, p. 180

22 Sec. 3. How appeal taken. - (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided bythe Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with thecourt which rendered the Judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.22 Attached to Records, Volume 1

2^/V/turov. Co/oyco, eto/., G.R. No. L-S3465, November 2,198225 G.R. No. 180010, July 30,2010 I ̂ * /

/ 7

People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 9 I P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

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which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutionsor orders of regional trial courts, whether in the exercise of their own originaljurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to P.D. No. 1606, asamended by R.A. 8249. To echo Cariaga v. People:

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of aperson being deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates againstthe Court's dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioner's plea for arelaxation of the Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate theattainment of justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof whichresults in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must alwaysbe avoided.

It is in this essence that the process of the appeal should be allowed torun its full course.

We cannot, however, overlook the procedural lapse patent in the appealfor its non-compliance with Section 7, Rule 124^^ of the Revised Rules ofCriminal Procedure in conjunction with Section 13, Rule 44^^ of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellant's Brief did not contain the requisitesubject index and table of cited cases; worst, the Statement of Facts andAntecedent Proceedings had no page references to the record. Unlike theappeal procedure in the Court of Appeals which could have dismissed suchappeal outright under Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Courtis not accorded the same provision under its Revised Internal Rules. Thecriminal nature of the case is of primordial concern as what is at stake here isthe liberty of the accused. These procedural lapses are not fatal and hence,can be disregarded for the nonce.^^

THE COURTIS RULING

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Accused-appellant does not even deny that on August 28, 2006, at thetime alleged in the Information, she was about to encash LBP Check No.

2® Section 7. Contents of brief. — The briefs In criminal cases shall have the same contents as provided in sections 13and 14 of Rule 44. A certified true copy of the decision or final order appealed from shall be appended to the brief ofappellant. (7a)

^ Section 13. Contents of appellant's brief. — The appellant's brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, thefollowing:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of casesalphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited; x x x.

✓

28 People V. Dela Concha, 6.R. No. 140205, September 3,2002

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0000467807 in the amount of P35,000.00 at Landbank-Aurora Branch,Cubao, Quezon City. Only, she averred that she was only doing so upon theinstruction of Barangay Chairperson Abundo and that the signature appearingtherein was that of Abundo, having signed it in her presence. She maintainsthat there was no truth to the allegation that she forged the signature on thecheck.^^

At the heart of the appeal, therefore, is the trial court's finding that thecheck was a forged instrument to make the accused-appellant liable for thecrime charged.

The trial court's own independentassessment that the signatureappearing on subject check wasforged,, without resorting to expertevidence, is sufficient in itself.

Accused's insistence that she did not forge subject check was debunkedby the trial court in this wise:

XXX this Court is morally convinced that accused is guilty ofcommitting falsification of commercial document by counterfeiting orimitating the handwriting/signature of Barangay Captain Andrew S.Abundo of Barangay Marilag, Project 4, Quezon City. A close perusal ofthe subject chebk Land Bank of the Philippines Check No. 0000467807(Exhibit ("F") and the defense's own evidence. Certification dated February15, 2005 (Exhibit "2") would certainly show marked differences on theirrespective strokes and style of writing. Apparently, there is clear evidenceof an effort to counterfeit or imitate the signature of Barangay CaptainAbundo. x x x.

No reversible error can be ascribed at this instance.

The observations made by the trial court on the disparity in thehandwriting strokes and style of the signature were validly assumed. Theexpert opinion of a handwriting expert need not be resorted to. As pronouncedin G& MPhilippines v. CuamhoV?^

X X X the opinions of handwriting experts, althoughhelpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technicalprocedure involved in the analysis, are not binding upon the courts. Assuch, resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to theexamination or the comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgerydoes not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, becausethe judge must conduct an independent examination of the questionedsignature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to itsauthenticity. No less than Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtexplicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the

Vide: Judicial Affidavit of Alell Serrano y Abella, Q3 & A3 to 09 & A9

• $3® 6.R. No. 162308, November 22,2006 Y

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disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or treated as genuine by theparty against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to thesatisfaction of the judge." Indeed, the authenticity of signatures is not a

• highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g.,quantum physics or topology, or molecular biology, would constitutematters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert onthe genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly much less compellingupon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technicalissue. [Emphasis supplied]

Accused-appellant cannot, therefore, insist that the opinion of ahandwriting expert should have been consulted first to show proof of forgery.Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable inexamining or comparing handwriting.^^ To reiterate, the authenticity of asignature though often the subject of proffered expert testimony, is a matterthat is not so highly technical as to preclude a judge firom examining thesignature himself and ruling upon the question of whether the signature on adocument is forged or not. A finding of forgery does not depend exclusivelyon the testimonies of expert witnesses as judges can and must use their ownjudgment, through an independent examination of the questioned signature,in determining the authenticity of the handwriting. This was what the trialcourt did, and this will not be disturbed on appeal.^^

Besides, the trial court was not hard-pressed to find any other basis onrecord to establish forgery.^^ Prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo himselfdisputed the authenticity of his signature on subject check, as follows:

COURT:

Q: Could you show us your regular signature and one that isauthentic?

A: Here, Your Honor, my letter to Atty. Ronillo.^"^

FISCAL ALMONTE

Q: In this letter dated August 11, 2006, there is a signature ofAndrew S. Abundo, can you tell us the difference in your genuine signatureas to the signature appearing in the Landbank check which [you] denysigning the same?

A: The second letter "A" is slightly curved downward while myregular stroke is upward, sir.^^

China Banking Corp. v. Lagan, 6.R. No. 160843,11 July 2006 ^ «32 Belgica v. Belgica, G.R. NO. 149738, August 28,2007 «33 Spouses Alfaro v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 162864, March 28,2007 w ^ *34 See Exhibit "D" / ^35TSNdatedJulv30,2008,p.29 J

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The trial court may not have specifically elucidated why there were''^marked differences on [the] respective strokes and style of writing" but thisis only because there was no further need to state the obvious. The trialcourt's comparison of Exhibit "F" (subject check) and Exhibit "2" (BarangayCertificate No. 203-05) was enough to arrive at its conclusion that thesignature of Abundo on subject check was forged. The upward almostdiagonal slant of the signature as well as the compressed style with which theletters were written, highlighted by the upward line by which the letter "A"was crossed, was what gave way. But while Abundo limited the comparisonof his signature with his letter to Atty. Ronillo (Exhibit "D"), his signatureappearing in Exhibits "A" (Resolution No. 002 Series of 2002), "B"(Resolution No. 012-S-06), and "C" (Request for Obligation of Allotment)and "D" (letter dated August 11, 2006) are more telling with the finding ofdisparity.

We reassert nonetheless that forgery is not presumed; it must be provedby clear and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden ofproving the same. To determine forgery, it was held in Cesar vs.Sandiganbayan^^ that:

[']The process of identification, therefore, must include thedetermination of the extent, kind, and significance of this resemblance aswell as of the variation. It then becomes necessary to determine whetherthe variation is due to the operation of a different personality, or is only theexpected and inevitable variation found in the genuine writing of the samewriter. It is also necessary to decide whether the resemblance is the resultof a more or less skillful imitation, or is the habitual and characteristicresemblance which naturally appears in a genuine writing. When these twoquestions are correctly answered the whole problem of identification issolved. ["']

Where a comparison of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo'ssignature was thus made and where he likewise took the witness stand totestify on the same, a handwriting expert need not be called in to make adeduction that the signature on subject check was forged.

More importantly, it cannot be overlooked that subject check was foundin accused-appellant's possession who then had every intention to encash theforged check. Under these circumstances, there arose the legal presumptionthat the possessor and user of a falsified document is the forger thereof.^^When it is proved that a person has in one's possession a falsified documentand makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that suchperson is the forger. The rule is &at if a person had in his possession a falsifieddocument and made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profitingthereby, the presumption is that one is the material author of the falsification.

G.R. Nos. 54719-50, January 17,1985, quoting Osborn, The Problem of Proof, lifted from Viaje, etal. v. Pamlntel, etai, G.R. No. 147792, January 23,2006^ Caubang v. People, G.R. No. 62634, June 26,1992

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This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was soclosely- connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may beproven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have closecormection with the forgers, and, therefore, had complicity in the forgery. Inthe absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of aforged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.^^

The finding of forgery of the trial court, therefore, will not be disturbed.

There lies no need to re-calibrate or

re-evaluate the testimony ofprincipal witness Andrew S.Abundo as no inconsistencies

marred his judicial declarations.

In this case, the records bear out that three (3) trial judges heard thetestimony of witnesses in the following sequence:

(i) the testimony of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo was heardby former Presiding Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala on July 30,2008;

(ii) the testimony of prosecution witness SP03 Joel Sioson was heardby Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla on December 2,2010;

(iii) the respective testimonies of prosecution witness Yvette V. Lunaand accused-appellant were heard by incumbent Presiding Judge Manuel B.Sta. Cruz, Jr. on Februaiy 20,2014 and May 11,2015.

While the accused-appellant has not raised an issue in this regard, let itbe said nonetheless that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneoussolely because the judge who heard the case was not the same judge whorendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a judgmentthat the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in itsentirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes takenduring the trial as the basis for his decision.^^

The purported inconsistencies pointed by the accused-appellant in thetestimony of Barangay Chairperson Andrew S. Abundo, however, wereculled more from the prying questions and cutting remarks made by formerPresiding Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala, quoted in the Appellant's Briefs asfollows:

i38 Serrano v. Court ofAppeals and People, G.R. No. 123896, June 25,2003 *33 Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, September 11,2013 ' ̂

People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 14 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

DECISION ON APPEAL

In page 17 of the TSN on the testimony of Kap. Abundo dated July 30,2008:

Court: So how do you check whether you should sign the checkalready? What do you do?

XXX XXX XXX XXX

XXX

Witness: It will be checked, Your honor.

Court: You did not mention that. You must be complete in youranswer, you 're on the witness stand.

In page 18 to 19 of the TSN of the . same witness, the Court was able toobserve as follows:

Court: You mean to say it is the Treasurer who certifies whetherthe fimds is available? Earlier you have a different answer.

Witness: Adequate, your honor.

Court: You really do not know what you are saying and what youare talking about. How can the Court believe you, you 're notcredible that way.

The same presiding judge has also noted that the evidences beingpresented were mere generalizations and not proofs of the case. With thequestioning of the presiding judge, witness Abundo also admitted that he wouldbased [sic] in his memory whether he signed a check or not. In page 23 of the sameTSN, we find:

Q: So you based that in your memory, you mean, whether yousigned a check or not?

A: Somehow, I based it in my memory that I was not able to sigpas such and I also asked the Committee Chairman of theAppropriations Committee' if there is an allotment but he told methat there was none your Honor.

Further reading of the TSN would also show that witness-complainantAbundo also admitted that while he knew of the accused alleged forgeries in thepast, he did not lose confidence in her. In fact he also admitted that there wereinstances when he found out of some alleged forgeries but that he did not doanything and that even after knowing these, accused continued to act as theBarangay's treasurer.

Court: You see. Earlier, I was asking you about when in the pastshe also made forgeries of checks and you said you wrote to thebank manager. But that is not referring to the present casealready. So during the first time that she did that in the past, youdid not do anything, correct?

Witness: Yes your honor.

(page 26, TSN of Kap. Abundo, dated July 30, 2008)

Court: That is now but in the past, you did not. You said you didnot do anything, you did not take action because you did notcheck So if that is unchecked, that is not true, you have no basisfor stating that. It was a loose statement without basis. You didnot check It is not true that in the past you did it. It is not true.You did not take action, you did not do anything.

XXX XXX XXX XXX

1

People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 15 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

DECISION ON APPEAL

A perusal of* the entire transcript of stenographic notes taken on thetestimony of prosecution witness Andrew S. Abundo showed that formerPresiding Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala snagged more queries from thewitness than the public prosecutor could muster, ranging from questions thatoften berate the witness on barangay procedure"^® to arguments she herselfraised on why no action was done when accused-appellant was found toencash forged checks in the past/^ These are not inconsistencies that woulderode the truth or destroy the credibility of the prosecution witness. Theseare mere perceptions of the trial judge whose overwrought intervention in thetrial has done more to upstage the prosecutor or the defense counsel inexamining the witness. The reference that the witness has not mentioned orcompleted an answer, or did not know what he was talking about, or did notdo anj^hing in the past to report the malfeasance of the accused-appellant,were remarks generated from Judge Regala's own questioning on howbarangay disbursement was made, which did not even proceed as follow uppoints from the questions propounded by the public prosecutor. It is obviousthat Judge Regala wanted to know more about the budget cycle in barangayappropriations but could not stop herself from voicing opinionated statementsthat appeared overbearing, if not scathing. It was only fortunate that mainwitness Andrew S. Abundo did not lose his equanimity, despite the rigors ofthe courtroom, and stood his ground.

Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot isolate such tongue-lashingcomments from the trial judge in her favor when an overall review of the sameshowed no inconsistency. The material testimony of prosecution witnessAndrew S. Abundo that accused-appellant was caught red-handed inencashing a forged check with no barangay appropriation to account forremained unblemished. In this regard, no inconsistency was belabored by theaccused-appellant, when this was tlie main crux of the criniinal charge.

At the time of the commission of the crime, accused-appellant wasindisputably the appointed Barangay Treasurer of Barangay Marilag, QuezonCity."^^ As such, under Section 395 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwiseknown as The Local Government Code, accused-appellant was mandated toperform the following functions and duties:

(e) The barangay treasurer shall:

COURT: Thafs why I was wondering why the Secretary did not certify [the barangay resolution]. You were thewitness then, you are the one who certified those documents? That is self-serving. You ask your Barangay Secretaryto certify that (TSN dated July 30, 2008, p. 5)

COURT: The question is why did you not take action against her no matter what she did?

Witness Abundo: We suspended her right after we discovered. Your Honor.

COURT: That is not true, she continued to be your Treasurer until after August 28,2006. You cannot evenremember [when] in the past you claim that her forge[ry] happened and you did not even do anything about that.You did not even suspend her then because she continued to be your Treasurer.(TSN dated July 30,2008, p. 31)

^2 Exhibits "A" and "A-r

People V. Aieii Abella-Serrano 16 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004DECISION ON APPEAL

(1) Keep custody of barangay funds and properties;

(2) Collect and issue official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions,monies, materials, and all other resources accruing to the barangay treasuryand deposit the same in the account of the barangay as provided imder TitleFive, Book II of this Code;

(3) Disburse funds in accordance with the financial proceduresprovided in this Code;

(4) Submit to the punong barangay a statement covering the actualand estimates of income and expenditures for the preceding and ensuingcalendar years, respectively, subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book IIof this Code;

(5) Render a written accounting report of all barangay funds andproperty imder his custody at the end of each calendar year, and ensure thatsuch report shall be made available to the members of the barangayassembly and other government agencies concemed;

(6) Certify as to the availability of funds whenever necessary;

(7) Plan and attend to the rural postal circuit within his jurisdiction;and

(8) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties andfunctions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.

In this contemplation, the accounts and financial records of thebarangay were kept in the custody of the accused-appellant as BarangayTreasurer, which included checks drawn against the depository account of thebarangay. Accused-appellant was one of the authorized signatories in checksfor purposes of disbursing barangay funds, the other being the barangaychairperson."^^ Hence, it did not come surprising that she had in her possessionat the time of her apprehension subject check. Only, the disbursement beingmade was unauthorized. As significantly pointed out by BarangayChairperson Abundo, the check disbursement had no allocation fi*om theCommittee on Appropriation of the baranagay, as certified to by prosecutionwitness Kagawad Yvette V. Luna in her capacity as Chairperson of saidcommittee."^"^ Her warrantless arrest by SP03 Joel Sioson only followed as amatter of course."^^

No inconsistency here prevailed; on the contrary, the respectivetestimonies of Kagawad Yvette V. Luna and SP03 Joel Sioson stronglybolstered the accusation made by Barangay Chairperson Abundo. Besides, itis not for accused-appellant to speculate that it was Landbank branch manager

vide: Barangay Fund Management viewed from http://www.dbm.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/BB-6.pdfon October 18,2017

^ TSN dated February 20,2014, pp. 4-7; Exhibit "E"^ TSN dated December 2,2010, pp. 4-5; Exhibit "H" ///

People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 17 1 P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

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Atty. Rosemarie J. Ronillo who was the vital witness who could have given afirsthand account of the check encashment at the bank. Only the prosecutorhas the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented forthe prosecution."^^ The non-presentation of Atty. Ronillo as a witness by theprosecution is thus not tantamount to suppression of evidence. The SupremeCourt has repeatedly ruled that the prosecution may decide on who should bepresented as witnesses. Moreover, the adverse presumption from suppressionof evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not wilful; (2) theevidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3)the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is anexercise of a privilege."^^ If accused-appellant was truly convinced that Atty.Ronillo could shed more light in her favor, she could have called her as awitness, but she did not.

We thus remain penchant to the time-honored rule that in the matter ofcredibility of witnesses, the fmdings of the trial court, in ordinary criminalproceedings, are given weight and respect by appellate courts and, generally,will not be disturbed on appeal. Deviation from this rule will only be allowedif there is any showing diat the trial judge overlooked some material orsubstantial facts which, if given consideration, will alter the assaileddecision."^^

We, therefore, find no reason to deviate from the factual findings andconclusions of the trial court.

The preventive suspension of theaccused-appellant will have asubstantial bearing on herconviction for the crime of

malversation

There is no question that accused-appellant is an accountable officerpursuant to Section 101 (1) of P.D. No. 1445 which defines an accountableofficer to be "every officer of any government agency whose duties permit orrequire the possession or custody of government funds or property shall beaccountable therefor andfor the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law,"As already adverted to, among the duties of the accused-appellant as BarangayTreasurer under Section 395 of Republic Act No. 7160 is "fkjeep custody ofbarangay funds and properties.

4Angeles v. People, G.R. No. 172744, September 29,2008 ' ,47 People V. De Jesus, G.R. No. 93852, January 24,1992

^Ambagan, Jr. v. People, G.R. Nos. 204481-82, October 14,2015-♦s People V. Pantaleon, Jr., etal., G.R. Nos. 158694-96, March 13,2009

People V. Aleii Abella-Serrano 18 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004DECISION ON APPEAL

Per Resolution No. 012-S-06 dated August 10,2006,^® it would appear,however, that accused-appellant was imposed an indefinite suspension forbreach of trust and loss of confidence by the Sangguniang Barangay ofBarangay Marilag effective August 11,2006. This fact cannot be overlooked,especially when accused-appellant points out in her Appellant's Brief thatthere was no proof that she has received the order or resolution of suspension;hence, there may be truth to her claim that she did not know about herindefinite suspension in the first place.^^ The Prosecution, however,disregarded proof of such notice, rationalizing that her suspension fi'om officeis "neither an indispensable fact nor an essential element that needed to heestablished under the given circumstances.

Contraiy to prosecution's stance, the imposition of indefinitesuspension^^ is material in determining whether the crime of AttemptedMalversation was committed. . For how can an accused under indefinitesuspension be liable for malversation if she is temporarily incapacitated fromperforming the duties of her office, particularly in the custody of barangayfimds, as in this case?

Necessarily, the concept of preventive suspension, like indefinitesuspension, has to be taken into consideration.

In the case of Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,^^ the Supreme Court EnBanc ruled that as an effect of preventive suspension, the suspended officialis barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receivesalary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office.Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the servicerather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then,protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary prohibition onthe exercise of the functions of the official's office; the official is reinstatedto the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted.

In this context, is it even crucial to determine, as accused-appellantharps, that she was actually served with a copy of the barangay resolutionimposing upon her indefinite suspension? Apparently, this is not so.

Significantly, in the case of Legaspi v. City of Cebu, et al.,^^ theSupreme Court belabored a discussion on the constitutional guaranty of due

50 Exhibit "B"

51 at paragraph 2552 Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 1553 Per DILG Legal Opinion No. 41, s. 2009 citing DILG Legal Opinion No. 38 s. 2003, the determination of the conditionsupon which preventive suspension may be imposed is vested exclusively with the sanggunian concerned. Preventivesuspension is said to be an incident to jurisdiction and/or tool for the disciplining authority; that is, the sanggunianconcerned, to make use In the course of its administrative investigation. See also Section 389 (b) (5) of the LocalGovernment Code

^ G.R. No. 184836, December 23,2009 - ^55 G.R. No. 159110, December 10,2013

f/' ̂

People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 19 1 P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004DECISION ON APPEAL

process of law as against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government,whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary.Among other salient points, it emphasized that:

Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural dueprocess. Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which theabsence of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denialor deprivation of due process. Among the instances are the cancellation ofthe passport of a person being sought for the commission of a crime, thepreventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges,the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking ofrestaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies,and the abatement of nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person inflagrante delicto. [Emphasis supplied]

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

The ratio has been fully explained in the vintage case of Comejo v.Gabriel, et which truth still echoes to this time, viz:

The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with anadministrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As JudgeCooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said,due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the processby means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of societymaintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much dueprocess of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter ofright in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwisesince they rest upon different principles. (Weimer vs. Bunbury [1874], 30Mich., 201; Den. vs. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. [1856], 18How., 272, followed in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco [1910], 16 Phil., 534;Tan Te vs. Bell [1914], 27 Phil., 354; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus [1915], 31Phil., 218 and other Philippine cases.) In certain proceedings, therefore,of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear ofcontradictions that the right to a notice and hearing are not essentialto due process of law. Examples of specifically or summary proceedingsaffecting the life, liberty or property of the individual without any hearingcan easily be recalled. Among these are the arrest of an offender pendingthe filing of charges; the restraint of property in tax cases; the granting ofpreliminary injunctions ex parte; and the suspension of officers oremployees by the Governor General or a Chief of a Bureau pendingan investigation. (See Weimer vs. Bunbury, supra; 12 C. J., 1224;Administrative Code, sec. 694). [Emphasis supplied]

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of lawprohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as "property." Itis, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is notproperty within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of dueprocess of law, but is a public trust or agency. In the case of Taylor vs.Beckham ([1899], 178 U. S., 548), Mr. Chief Justice Fuller sjaid that:

. "Decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies

56G.R. No. 16887, November 17,1920,041 Phil 188 //• f

People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 20 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

DECISION ON APPEAL

or trusts, and not property as such." The basic idea of government in thePhilippine Islands, as in the United States, is that of a popularrepresentative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulersof the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary orcontractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts officepursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for thepeople whom he represents.

Coming now to the more specific consideration of the issue in thiscase, we turn to the article by Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, generallyconsidered the leading authority in the United States on the subject ofAdministration LaWj in Vol. 29, Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, andfind the rule as to suspension of public officers laid down very conciselyas follows: "Power to suspend may be exercised without notice to theperson suspended." (P. 1405.) The citation by Professor Goodnow tosupport his conclusion is State of Florida, ex rel. Attorney-General vs.Johnson ([1892], 30 Fla., 433; 18 L. R. A., 410). It was here held by theSupreme Court of Florida that the governor could, imder section 15 of theexecutive article of the Constitutions suspend an officer for neglect ofduty in office without giving previous notice to the officer of the chargemade against him.

A later compilation of the pertinent authorities is to be found in 22Ruling Case Law, pp. 564, 565. On the subject of suspension of publicofficers it is here said:

"The suspension of an officer pending his trial for misconduct, soas to tie his h^ds for the time being, seems to be universally accepted asfair, and often necessary.... Notice and hearing are not prerequisites tosuspension unless required by statute and therefore suspension withoutsuch notice does not deprive the officer of property without due processof law. Nor is a suspension wanting in due process of law or a denial ofthe equal protection of the laws because the evidence against the officeris not produced and he is not given an opportunity to confront his accusersand cross-examine the witnesses."

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

Regardless of whether accused-appellant was notified of ResolutionNo. 012-S-06 imposing upon her indefinite suspension, therefore, she was, forall intents and purposes, suspended from office effective August 11, 2006.Indeed, the office she serves is not property she can hold on to, for publicoffice is public trust. This is only concomitant to Section 389 of the LocalGovernment Code where she can be appointed, and removed, from officeupon approval of the majority of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay.To wit:

Section 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions. -

(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangaygovernment, shall exercise such powers and perform such duties andfunctions, as provided by this Code and other laws.

People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 211 P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004

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(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purposeof which is the general welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuantto Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall:

XXX XXX XXX xxx;

(5) Upon approval by a majority of all the members of thesangguniang barangay, appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, thebarangay secretary, and other appointive barangay officials; [Emphasissupplied].

At the time of her apprehension on August 28, 2006, it is thus odd whyaccused-appellant still held in her possession a check charged to the accountof Barangay Marilag which she attempted to encash. Under thesecircumstances, can she still be held liable for the complex crime of AttemptedMalversation thru Falsification of Commercial Document?

For a prosecution of the crime of malversation to prosper, concurrenceof the following elements must be satisfactorily proved:

(a) the offender is a public officer;

(b) the offender has custody or control of the funds or property byreason of the duties of his office;

(c) the funds or property are public funds or property for which heis accoimtable, and, most importantly; and

(d) the offender has appropriated, taken, misappropriated orconsented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted anotherperson to take them.^^

Since accused-appellant was under indefinite suspension at the time ofthe commission of ihe crime on August 28, 2006, the second element isinescapably missing. Her temporary prohibition from holding office barredher firom exercising the functions of her office which is the custody ofbarangay funds and properties under Article 395^® of the Local GovernmentCode. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot be held liable for malversationwhich was alleged and proven to be in the attempted stage. In this regard, shemust be acquitted of the crime of Attempted Malversation.

Accused-appellant, however, should answer for the remaining offenseof Falsification of a Commercial Document, which elements have beensufficiently established in this case, viz:

57 Panganiban v. People, 6.R. No. 211543, December 9,20155® Section 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment, Qualification, Powers and Duties, -xxx

xxx xxx xxx.

(e) The barangay treasurer shall: ^ ̂(1) Keep custody of barangay funds and properties; y

People V. Alell Abella-Serrano 22 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004DECISION ON APPEAL

(1) that the offender is a private individual or a publicofficer or employee who did not take advantage of his officialposition;

(2) that the offender committed any of the acts offalsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and

(3) that the falsification was committed in a public,official or commercial document.^^

The ruling made in Monteverde v. People, is apropos:

X X X. Still, acquittal firom a component offense will notnecessarily lead to an acquittal fi'om the other (or others). When a complexcrime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomaticthat the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trialall the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime. We stressthat the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes andthe acquittal arising fiierefi-om will not necessarily lead to a declaration ofinnocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complexcrime is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the componentoffenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are

proved.

The first element has been established, as accused-appellant herselfdoes not deny that she was appointed as Barangay Treasurer of BarangayMarilag of Quezon City per Resolution No. 002-S-2002.^^

The existence of the second element is tied to the forged signature ofBarangay Chairperson Abundo found on subject check.^^ The forged natureof such signature has already been affirmed despite the absence of an experthandwriting analysis on the matter.

The third element has been concretized with the presentation ofLandbank Check No. 0000467807 dated August 28, 2006 in the amount ofR35,000.00 which was found in the possession of the accused-appellant at thetime she attempted to encash the same. There is no question that subjectcheck is an instrument which has the peculiar qualities as a commercialdocument as it places certain funds under the special control of its lawfulholder so long as it is retained in one's possession, giving the holder not onlythe right to the funds against which it is dravm, but a claim against the drawerand previous endorsers in the event of a failure of these funds in whole or inpart.^^

)

In this sense, accused-appellant had every intention to utter subjectcheck by presenting the same with the forged signature of Barangay

David V. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, March 18,2015G.R. No. 139610, August 12,2002

61 Exhibit "A" I62 Exhibit "F"

66 United States v. Sham, G.R. No. 6781, November 6,1911

/ •

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Chairperson Abundo, the other authorized signatory thereto. Such instanceconsummated the offense^ in contemplation of the following ruling, viz:

"[W]henever someone has in his possession falsified documents[which he used to] his advantage and benefit, the presumption that heauthored it arises."

. . . This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forgeddocuments was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the useror possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery,or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicityin the forgery.

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found inpossession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumedto be the forger.

Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via falseremittances to his savings account, his subsequent withdrawals of saidamount as well as his unexplained flight at the height of the bank's inquiryinto the matter more than sufficiently establish . . . involvement in thefalsification.^"^

Accused-appellant's denial that subject check for payment was signedby Andy," without satisfactorily explaining why this diverged frombarangay appropriation procedure, should only wane. As a matter of fact,during trial, accused-appellant was candid enough to admit that:

In her cross examination, the accused admitted that: she startedworking as Barangay Treasurer of Barangay Marilag on August 16, 2002;in the disbursement of funds in the barangay, she first makes a request forappropriation or allotment, which is done by the Punong Barangay; thesame request is approved by the Chairman of the Commission of Accountsas to the availability of funds; thereafter the Chairman of Appropriationscertifies to the existence of the appropriations; she in turn certifies theavailability of funds for the obligations; when she attempted to encashLand Bank check no. 0000467807 there was no request forappropriation; likewise there is no approval by the Chairman ofCommission on Accounts regarding the availability of allotment; alsothere is no Certification from the Chairman of Appropriations thatthere was an existence of appropriations; finally as a BarangayTreasurer, she has no Certification of any availability of fundsamounting to P35,000.00.^^ [Emphasis supplied]

Accused-appellant's hand in the falsification of the commercialdocument cannot be denied since she was not even authorized to possesssubject check in the first place in view of her indefinite suspension.Considering it was her who took advantage of and intended to profit therefiromthrough the use of the forged check, the presumption was that she was the

^ People V. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6,2014® Vide: Judgment dated August 25,2015, p. 3; Records, Volume 1, p. 173

f '/■f

People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano 24 | P a g eSB-16-A/R-0004DECISION ON APPEAL

material author of the falsification.^^ Accused-appellant's denial of her guiltis thus not sufficient to destroy the probative value of the testimony of thewitnesses for the prosecution.

For her penalty for Falsification, Article 171 of the Revised PenalCode^^ provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary orecclesiastic minister. — The penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not toexceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify adocument by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

XXX XXX XXX XXX.

The value of the defraudation is regardless as the same is not taken intoaccount in the imposition of the prescribed penalty, unlike malversation,estafa or thefl. Following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimumterm of the penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower to thatprescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed forFalsification is prision mayor, the penalty next lower would then be prisioncorreccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)years. We fix the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4)years and two (2) months. Then again, in fixing the maximum term, note istaken that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commissionof the crime; hence, the medium period of prision mayor shall be imposedwhich has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Wefix the maximum term at eight (S^years and one (1) day.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED.The assailed Judgment dated August 25, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City, Branch 226, is hereby MODIFIED, finding accused-appellantAleli Abella-Serrano GUILTY of the crime of Falsification of Commercial,Document defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Codeand is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) dayof prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant is likewise imposed thepenalty of FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). /

Vide: Pacasum v. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16,2009" Amended by Republic Act 10951 but which cannot be given retroactive effect at this instance since the prescribedpenalty is higher and hence, not favorable to the accused-appellant

People V. Aleli Abella-Serrano

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25 I P a g e

SO ORDERED.

MA. THERESA DOEDRES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTAAssociafe Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

V. TRESPESES

mssociateJustice

BAYAMHIJJACINTOAssociate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached inconsultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of theCourt's Division.

got.»^ORESMA. THERESA DOttORES C. GOMEZ-ESTOESTA

Associate Justice, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and theDivision Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions inthe above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assignedto the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

[FARO M. CABOT^JE-TA]Presiding Justice