Decision Making By Leaders In High Consequence Disasters ...

Decision Making By Leaders In High Consequence Disasters:

A Study of Decision Making by U.S. Federal Coordinating Officers

by Jeffrey A. Glick

B.A. in Sociology, June 1973, University of California Santa Barbara

A.M. in Social Service Administration, June 1975, University of Chicago

M.A. in National Resource Strategy, June 1995, National Defense University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of

The School of Engineering and Applied Science

of The George Washington University

in partial satisfaction of the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 19, 2013

Dissertation directed by

Joseph A. Barbera

Associate Professor of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering

ii

The School of Engineering and Applied Science of The George Washington University

certifies that Jeffrey A. Glick has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor

of Philosophy as of February 26, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the

dissertation.



Jeffrey A. Glick

Dissertation Research committee:

Joseph A. Barbera, Associate Professor of Engineering Management and

Systems Engineering, Dissertation Director

John R. Harrald, Professor Emeritus of Engineering Management,

Committee Member

Gregory L. Shaw, Associate Professor of Engineering Management and

Systems Engineering, Committee Member

Joost R. Santos, Assistant Professor of Engineering Management and

Systems Engineering, Committee Member

Gary Klein, Senior Scientist, MacroCognition LLC, Committee Member

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Dedication

© Copyright 2013 by Jeffrey A. Glick

All rights reserved

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Dedication

To my father, who led the way to higher education for all of us to follow.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to convey my sincerest gratitude to all those that made this scholastic

journey possible. First, I want to acknowledge my advisor, Dr. Joseph Barbara whose

leadership and insights guided me along the many-step path to a successful conclusion. I

would also like to especially mention Dr. Jack Harrald who encouraged me to undertake

this research and continued to provide me support even after moving to Virginia Tech.

My research would not have been possible without the support of Dr. Gary Klein whose

research served as an inspiration to me for my own. In addition, I want to acknowledge

all the assistance and guidance Dr. Greg Shaw offered me throughout the dissertation

process and to Dr. Joost Santos who agreed to join my Dissertation Committee albeit new

to George Washington University. My friend and colleague Dr. Sergio de Cosmo

deserves un ringraziamento particolare. His help and guidance with the technical

aspects of this dissertation were invaluable.

A special thank you goes to all those Federal Coordinating Officers who volunteered

for my research. Your knowledge, insights and examples concerning your many

experiences made the interviews so interesting and informative I did not want them to

end. You are designated by numbers in my study, but I know each of you as unique

inspiring individuals and now as friends. Without your service, our nation would not be

prepared for the disasters that inevitably befall us. This nation is in debt to your

dedicated professionalism.

Finally, I want to thank my family and especially my wife who was my strongest

supporter and put up with days of solitude as I worked on this research.

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Abstract



This research focuses on the initial period of decision making by Federal

Coordinating Officers (FCOs) who are appointed by the President of the United States

with recommendation from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead the federal response to the most

serious domestic disasters in the United States. The goal of this research was to define

the decisional dynamics and influences concerning FCO decision making and model the

structure, variables, decision points and processes used by FCOs in making decisions

during the initial response interval of a Presidentially declared disaster. To achieve this

goal, this research included a survey of FCOs decision making experiences in the most

significant and serious disasters they led as an FCO. The focus of this survey and the

research was on FCO decision making and not whether any decision was “right” or

“wrong” per se.

The results of this research enabled the development of an FCO specific model of

decision making which diagrams the intuitive and rational decision making processes,

dynamics and structures utilized by the FCOs surveyed during the initial response

interval of a Presidentially declared disaster. In addition, the research identified the

FCOs’ views on factors that influenced their decision making processes such as the

characteristics of the disaster, its complexity, uniqueness and severity as well as the

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quality and quantity of situational information concerning the disaster and the resources

and time available to make the necessary decisions.

Together, the results of this research provide FCOs and their program managers with

an FCO validated model of their decision making process as well as identification of

influencing factors. These results support the development of tailored job aids as well as

the development of training and exercises for FCOs focusing on specific components of

these processes and factors. Understanding the decisional processes used by FCOs

during a disaster’s initial response interval when often the situation is most dynamic and

ill defined is fundamental to supporting the FCO in critical disaster response situations

where lives and property are most at risk.

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Table of Contents

Dedication ......................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ iv

Abstract .............................................................................................................................. v

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ vii

List of Figures .................................................................................................................. xii

List of Tables .................................................................................................................. xiii

Glossary of Terms .......................................................................................................... xiv

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................ xv

Chapter 1 - Introduction .................................................................................................. 1

1.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1

1.2. Statement of the Problem ......................................................................................... 3

1.3. Background .............................................................................................................. 4

1.4. Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 6

1.5. Significance.............................................................................................................. 7

1.6. Scope and Limitations.............................................................................................. 8

1.6.1. Scope ................................................................................................................. 8

1.6.2. Limitations ........................................................................................................ 9

1.7. Organization of the Document ............................................................................... 11

Chapter 2 - Literature Review ....................................................................................... 14

2.1. Overview ................................................................................................................ 14

2.2. Rational Actor as Decision Maker ......................................................................... 15

2.3. Bounded Rationality: Moving Away from the Ideal ............................................ 17

2.4. Cognitive Biases and Heuristics: Short-Cut Decision Strategies ......................... 20

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2.4.1. Illusory Correlation ......................................................................................... 21

2.4.2. Confidence Bias .............................................................................................. 22

2.4.3. Overconfidence Bias ....................................................................................... 22

2.4.4. Self-Serving Bias ............................................................................................ 22

2.4.5. Sunk Cost Fallacy ........................................................................................... 22

2.4.6. Anchor and Adjustment Heuristic .................................................................. 23

2.4.7. Availability Bias ............................................................................................. 23

2.4.8. Confirmation Bias ........................................................................................... 24

2.4.9. Cognitive Biases and Heuristics: General Discussion ................................... 24

2.5. Satisficing – The “Good Enough” Solution ........................................................... 25

2.6. Framing and Understanding ................................................................................... 26

2.7. Analogies and Metaphors: Shortcuts to Framing.................................................. 28

2.8. Intuition: The Silent Partner in Decision Making .................................................. 29

2.9. Factors Leading to Situation Awareness ................................................................ 31

2.10. Mental Simulation and Perception: A Construct for Decision Making Under

Stress ...................................................................................................................... 33

2.11. Recognition Primed/Bounded Rational Decision Making ................................... 34

2.11.1. Recognition Primed Decision Model, Variation 1: Simple Match ............... 35

2.11.2. Recognition Primed Decision Model, Variation 2: Diagnose the Situation . 37

2.11.3. Recognition Primed Decision Model, Variation 3: Evaluate Course of

Action…………………………………………………………………………...38

2.11.4. Recognition Primed Decision Model: Integrated Version ............................ 41

Chapter 3 - Research Goal, Design and Methodology................................................. 44

3.1. Research Goal and Questions ................................................................................ 44

3.1.1. Research Goal ................................................................................................. 44

3.1.2. Research Questions ......................................................................................... 44

3.2. Research Design..................................................................................................... 45

3.3. Research Methodology .......................................................................................... 47

3.3.1. A Review of Decision Making Literature ....................................................... 47

3.3.2. Development and Use of Draft Recognition Primed/Bounded Rational

Decision Making (RP/BRDM) Model ................................................................ 47

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3.3.3. Questionnaire Development and Description ................................................. 52

3.3.3.1. Research Introduction .............................................................................. 53

3.3.3.2. Questionnaire Overview .......................................................................... 54

3.3.3.3. Educational and Professional Background .............................................. 54

3.3.3.4. Selection of Disaster Example(s) ............................................................. 54

3.3.3.5. Achieving Situational Awareness ............................................................ 55

3.3.3.6. Decision Making Process ......................................................................... 55

3.3.3.7. Review of Draft RP/BRDM Model ......................................................... 56

3.3.4. George Washington University Institutional Review Board Approval .......... 57

3.3.5. Selection of FCO Cohort ................................................................................ 57

3.3.6. FCO Interview Process ................................................................................... 58

3.4. Analytic Procedures and Coding ........................................................................... 59

3.5. Data Collected and Analyses Conducted ............................................................... 62

Chapter 4 - Results and Analysis ................................................................................... 63

4.1. Overview ................................................................................................................ 63

4.2. FCO Professional and Educational Background .................................................... 63

4.2.1. Years of Service as an FCO ............................................................................ 63

4.2.2. FCO Expertise “Type” Rating ........................................................................ 64

4.2.3. FCO Professional Experience Prior to Joining the FCO Cadre ...................... 66

4.2.4. FCO Educational Backgrounds ....................................................................... 68

4.3. Disaster Selected .................................................................................................... 68

4.4. Achieving Situational Awareness .......................................................................... 71

4.4.1. Physical Characteristics: Influencing FCO Disaster Situational Awareness . 73

4.4.1.1. Physical Characteristic: Type of Disaster Influencing FCO tional

Situational Awareness ........................................................................................... 73

4.4.1.2. Physical Characteristic: Severity of Disaster Influencing FCO


4.4.1.3. Physical Characteristic: Geographic Size of Disaster Influencing FCO


4.4.1.4. Physical Characteristic: Disasters With/Without Warning Influencing

FCO Situational Awareness .................................................................................. 77

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4.4.2. Situational Awareness: Political Contexts ...................................................... 79

4.4.3. Situational Awareness: Managerial Contexts ................................................. 83

4.4.4. Direct Observation: A Necessary Component for FCO Situation Awareness 86

4.5. FCO Technology Tools.......................................................................................... 89

4.6. Use of Short-Cuts for Situation Awareness and Decision Making ....................... 92

4.7. FCO Training: Enhancing the Ability to Gain Situational Awareness and

Conduct Decision Making ...................................................................................... 96

Chapter 5 - Typology for FCO Disaster Decision Making .......................................... 99

5.1. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Introduction ................................................................. 100

5.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Situation Analogue? .................................................... 101

5.3. FCO-RP Path: Intuitive Decision Making ........................................................... 105

5.3.1. FCO-RP Path: Diagnose ............................................................................... 108

5.3.2. FCO-RP Path: Recognition ........................................................................... 110

5.3.3. FCO-RP Path: Evaluate Action and Will It Work? ...................................... 113

5.4. FCO-BRDM Path: Bounded Rational Analysis .................................................. 115

5.4.1. FCO-BRDM Path: Situational Awareness .................................................... 116

5.4.2. FCO-BRDM Path: Goals and Objectives Formulation ................................ 118

5.4.3. FCO-BRDM Path: Alternatives Development and Rank Ordering .............. 119

5.4.4. FCO-BRDM Path: Selecting Top Rated Alternatives .................................. 122

5.5. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Implement Course of Action and Results .................... 124

5.5.1. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Achieved ................................... 126

5.5.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Not Achieved ............................ 126

5.5.2.1. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Not Achieved – Insufficient

Time/Resources................................................................................................... 126

5.5.2.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Not Achieved – Sufficient

Time/Resources................................................................................................... 127

5.6. FCO-RP/BRDM Model – Integrated Decision Process....................................... 128

Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations ....................................................... 131

6.1. Research Goal and Questions .............................................................................. 131

6.2. Discussion and Recommendations ...................................................................... 133

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6.2.1. Dynamics Influencing Decision Making ...................................................... 133

6.2.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model Development and Application ............................... 134

6.3. Recommendations for Future Research ............................................................... 136

6.4. Significance of Research Findings....................................................................... 138

References ...................................................................................................................... 140

Appendix A - FCO Questionnaire ............................................................................... 150

Appendix B – GWU Informed Consent Form ........................................................... 156

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List of Figures

Figure 2-1: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Variation 1, Simple

Match (Klein 1998) ..............................................................................................36

Figure 2-2: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Variation 2, Diagnose the

Situation (Klein 1998) ..........................................................................................38

Figure 2-3: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Variation 3, Evaluate

Course of Action (Klein 1998) .............................................................................40

Figure 2-4: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Integrated Version (Klein

1998) .....................................................................................................................42

Figure 3-1: Bounded Rational Decision Making (BRDM) Model ....................................49

Figure 3-2: Draft Recognition Primed/Bounded Rational Decision Making

(RP/BRDM) Model ..............................................................................................51

Figure 4-1: Professional Background of FCOs Prior to Joining the FCO Cadre...............67

Figure 4-2: Levels of Education Achieved by FCOs .........................................................68

Figure 5-1: FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Situation Analogue? .............................................103

Figure 5-2: FCO-RP Intuitive Decision Path ...................................................................107

Figure 5-3: FCO-Bounded Rational Decision Making (BRDM) Path ............................116

Figure 5-4: FCO-RP/BRDM Model – Implement Course of Action and Results ...........124

Figure 5-5: FCO-RP/BRDM Model – Integrated Decision Process ................................129

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List of Tables

Table 4-1: Years of Service as an FCO .............................................................................64

Table 4-2: FCO Cohort by Expertise Type (Rating) .........................................................66

Table 4-3: Disasters Selected by FCOs .............................................................................70

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Glossary of Terms

Analogue: A situation similar to situations in whole or in part to those experienced in

the past.

Mental Picture: A mental model as to what the situation is, its component factors and

processes. Such a mental model of a disaster enables the FCO to reason consciously or

intuitively as to how a pending decision would impact the situation and be impacted by it.

Satisficing: A decisional technique of selecting the option that just satisfies the

requirement at some minimal level. There is no attempt to optimize the decision, but

rather just to select an option that is just “good enough”.

Situational Awareness: Understanding by an individual such as an FCO as to the

various elements, issues, relationships, and forces that exist concerning a specific event,

or occurrence and being able to project possible implications into the future. This

understanding is dynamic for the individual as more data is received and integrated into

data previously acquired, and information learned and experiences obtained. Note in this

research, situational awareness is solely focused on the individual’s perception of the

situation and not that obtained by a larger group or organization.

New Paradigm: The term “new paradigm” is used in reference to the personal decision

making of the FCO. That is, the disaster faced by the FCO is so personally

unusual/atypical and requires the dealing with new and unfamiliar disasters situations due

to hazard type and/or severity. This disaster constitutes a new paradigm for the FCO,

given the FCO’s personal decision making history.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

BRDM Bounded Rational Decision Making

DHS Department of Homeland Security

EOC Emergency Operating Center

FCO Federal Coordinating Officer

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GIS Geographic Information System

ICS Incident Command System

IMAT Incident Management Assistance Team

JFO Joint Field Office

NRF National Response Framework

NRP National Response Plan

RDM Rational Decision Making

RP Recognition Primed (decision making)

RPD Recognition Primed Decision

RP/RDM Recognition Primed/Rational Decision Making

RP/BRDM Recognition Primed/Bounded Rational Decision Making

Stafford Act Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121, et seq.)

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

“Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious,

than to be able to decide.”

Napoleon Bonaparte

(Schoemaker, 1994)

1.1. Introduction

How leaders make decisions when faced with competing demands in complex, high-

tension situations have been the fascination of scholars for many centuries. Even as far

back as 400 BCE, Thucydides attempted to explain the Peloponnesian War using the

decisional perspectives of the generals from Athens and Sparta who fought and

maneuvered in the pursuit of victory (Thucydides The History of the Peloponnesian War

1.21-23). In the modern context, how decision making is conducted in crisis continues to

be a topic of research, discussion and program implementation.

The United States government is in an ongoing search for the most effective

structures and processes by which to lead response and recovery from natural and

technological disasters or terrorism incidents. This search is driven by the ever-present

threat posed by hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and other natural or technological

disasters in combination with the now present threat of terrorism spanning biological,

chemical, nuclear or explosive incidents.1 Together, these threats create an

1 Throughout this research, the term “disasters” will be used inclusively to refer to natural disasters, acts of

terrorism and technological events resulting in disastrous consequences. It is the managing of these

disastrous consequences that is the focus of this research.

2

unprecedented need and demand for flexible effective disaster management and response

across the nation.

Over the past 15 years, the federal government in working with state and local

governments and the private sector has developed a series of organizational planning

documents to coordinate disaster response. The most recent document is the National

Response Framework (NRF) (Department of Homeland Security 2008b). In addition, the

federal government developed the National Incident Management System to be used in

conjunction with the National Response Framework (Department of Homeland Security

2008b). Together, the NRF and its supporting management system are intended to

organize and integrate federal disaster response capabilities and support with state, tribal,

territorial and local governments as well as private sector disaster response assets and

efforts (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008a).

This research focuses on Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) who are appointed by

the President of the United States based upon recommendation from the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS). The FCO leads the federal response to specific incidents where the President has

authorized the use of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance

Act (here-after referred to as the Stafford Act). These declared Stafford Act disasters

constitute the most serious disasters this nation faces, where a state governor notifies the

President that the state’s capabilities to respond to the disaster are exceeded and formally

requests federal assistance (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008b). Specifically,

this research defines and examines a decisional model that describes the dynamic

3

processes by which senior federal decision makers, FCOs, make critical decisions during

the initial response interval of a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster2.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

With disaster management becoming more complex and having to be capable of

responding to the ever-increasing severity and diversity of disasters, it is crucial to

understand the nature and characteristics of the decision processes utilized by key federal

leadership in responding to incidents and most importantly during large disasters that can

cause extreme stress for decision makers with lives and property at stake. While the NRF

defines the current organizational structure of federal incident response (U.S. Department

of Homeland Security 2008b) and the National Incident Management System defines the

management structure to be utilized within the Framework’s organization (U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, 2008a), it is the actual decision processes used by the

FCOs that guide and coordinate disaster response situations (U.S. Department of

Homeland Security 2008b).

This research explains and models one of the most significant components of this

dynamic response process, that of examining the factors and processes used by key senior

federal decision makers, the FCOs, as they make key decisions during the initial response

2 This “initial response interval” is defined not as a specific number of days, but as that period of time at

the beginning of a major response to a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster where there can be a

high degree of uncertainty and confusion, and where decisions confronting the FCO may have to be made

quickly, could be controversial, and can have high consequences and impact.

4

interval.3 Understanding the decisional processes used by FCOs during this initial

response period of a disaster when the situation can be most dynamic and not yet defined

is fundamental to enhancing these processes and refining the organizational and

management structures developed to support the FCO in these critical disaster response

situations.

1.3. Background

The U.S. federal government has been applying considerable effort and resources for

evolving organizational systems and operational approaches to emergency management

in disaster response and recovery ever since the early 1970’s. Building on California’s

experience with wildfires and its development of the fire response FIRESCOPE program

and use of the Incident Command System (ICS), the federal government sought ways to

better coordinate personnel, equipment, and approaches to organizing disaster response

[Buck, Trainor and Aguirre 2006; Carwile 2005). Within the federal government, ICS

was the basis for the National Incident Management System. This management system

established a core set of concepts, principles and processes that structure managerial and

operational relationships for all levels of government and the private sector working

together under an integrated response framework, the most recent version being the

National Response Framework (NRF) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008a;

Carwile 2005).

3 The term “decision making” is used throughout this research to mean the process whereby the FCO makes

decisions which can lead to direct implementation or could serve as a recommendation to other leaders in

the disaster response team such as state or federal officials.

5

The integrated approach to federal disaster response and recovery began in 1992 with

FEMA’s issuance of the Federal Response Plan focusing on the, “process and structure

for the systematic coordinated and effective delivery of federal assistance to address the

consequences of any major disaster or emergency” (U.S. Federal Emergency

Management Agency 1999). The latest edition of this all-hazards approach is the NRF

issued in January 2008, refined previous versions by emphasizing the national nature of

disaster response and recovery responsibilities and partnerships at all levels of

government, federal, state, tribal, territorial and local, and with non-governmental

organizations and the private sector (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008b).

It is under the NRF structure and through utilizing the National Incident Management

System that FCOs lead federal disaster response and recovery efforts for the most severe

disasters faced by this nation, those that are Presidentially declared for which federal

Stafford Act support becomes available. The Stafford Act notes that the FCO is the focal

point for federal disaster response and recovery coordination (Stafford Act, Section 302).

The NRF goes on to establish, “For Stafford Act incidents…upon recommendation of the

FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of Homeland Security, the President appoints an

FCO. The FCO is specifically appointed to coordinate federal support in the response to

and recovery from emergencies and major disasters” (U.S. Department of Homeland

Security 2008b). The FCO is the primary federal official that coordinates response and

recovery activities and resources of all federal departments and agencies with, and in

support of the State Coordinating Official appointed by the Governor to lead the state’s

disaster response and recovery efforts. In addition, the FCO is the primary federal

official to coordinate with other state, tribal and local officials setting goals and

6

objectives for, and defining and responding to the requirements and consequences

resulting from the disaster (FEMA 2008).

An FCO for a particular incident is drawn from the FEMA FCO cadre composed of

members selected by the FEMA Administrator under Presidential delegated authority

(44CFR 206). The FCO cadre is supported by an FCO program operated by FEMA

under authorization by Congress in the 1998 Congressional Appropriations Conference

Report (U.S. Congress 1997).

Understanding the dynamic decisional structure utilized by FCOs during the initial

response interval has been made all the more urgent by the increasingly dangerous

environment which currently envelops the United States. From increasing populations

living in areas threatened by natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods and earthquakes,

to the specter of terrorist attack, the decisional models and processes used by FCOs

encompass the full range and complexity of leadership at the federal level during the

initial response interval of a Stafford Act disaster. It is during this initial response

interval that key life saving and property protecting decisions are made, often under

extremely stressful conditions.

1.4. Purpose

This research describes and models the decisional structures and processes utilized by

FCO’s in the initial response interval of a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster.

More specifically, this research focuses on interviews with FCOs and their description of

the decisional processes they use and choices they have to make during the initial

7

response interval of a high pressure Presidentially declared Safford Act declared disaster.

Also discussed and reviewed are what background experiences and training the FCOs

consider valuable for decision making during this initial response interval and what

decisional processes and strategies have they found most effective during this interval

period and why. Finally, on a more theoretical basis, the FCOs’ decisional processes are

modeled, diagramming the variables and decision points that describe the dynamic

decisional process used by the FCOs during the initial response interval in a high pressure

Stafford Act disaster.

1.5. Significance

FCOs lead and manage the federal response effort to this nation’s most severe

disasters (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008b). Often in such disasters, lives

and property are in grave jeopardy. Decisions by FCOs as federal response leaders are

crucial to help limit losses and guide initial response actions. This research examined,

diagramed, and also afforded the FCOs the opportunity to discuss the decisional process

they individually used in responding to major disasters where life saving and property

protection decisions had to be made under time pressure and often confusing conditions

that existed during the initial response interval of a Stafford Act disaster. It is the

description of the decision process used by FCO decision makers, their own assessments

of these processes, and the development and validation of a decisional model that is the

focus of this research.

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1.6. Scope and Limitations

This Section discusses the scope and limitations of this research on FCO decision

making.

1.6.1. Scope

This exploratory research focused on interviewing only FCOs with direct Stafford

Act disaster leadership experience.4 FCOs with this experience were exclusively selected

rather than other decision makers in disasters (e.g., state governors, local officials, police,

fire or rescue officials) because the FCOs are the senior group of experienced federal

managers that have led the federal response effort to this nation’s most severe disasters.

They provided an experienced cohort upon which to examine decision making in high

stress environments. For this research, FCO decision making refers to specific decisions

made by FCOs, which could lead directly to implemented actions, or could be used as

recommendations to other disaster leadership (e.g., at the state or local levels). The initial

response interval was the exclusive focus for the period of decision making studied in this

research as this period could be the most stressful, where decisions might have to be

made under time pressure and in possibly confusing or ill-defined conditions.

This research first examined decisional theory as applied to the FCO leadership group

and the situations they faced in leading federal disaster response. Then using FCO

4 In some catastrophic disasters, a political appointee may be assigned to have overall lead for disaster

response. However, even in these cases, the FCO has a major decisional role due to their expertise and

experience. The political appointee is heavily involved in the political implications and issues surrounding

the disaster and leaves the FCO to make decision concerning the many important aspects of response

strategy and implementation. In large disasters, additional FCOs may also be assigned under the lead FCO

to be responsible for the federal component of important aspects of the disaster response during the initial

response interval.

9

interviews, the research surveyed their professional backgrounds, education and other

demographic information. The interviews then focused on the dynamic decision

structures under which disaster decision making for FCOs took place and the processes

used by these FCOs in making crucial decisions during the initial response interval.

These structures and processes were modeled by the researcher and then critiqued by the

FCOs in follow-up interviews.

1.6.2. Limitations

This exploratory research on decision-making in crisis was limited to the experiences

and operating environments the FCOs self-reported during the interview process. This

information was not independently corroborated beyond the interview process that was

tightly based on the interview questionnaire so as to provide consistency across all FCO

interviews. “Disasters” were defined broadly in this research (see Footnote 1, above) and

included: 1) Natural events such as major hurricanes and floods; 2) Technologically

oriented/caused events such as the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster; 3) Terrorist incidents

such as the September 2001 (“9/11”) attack on the World Trade Center.

Other disastrous events that have been discussed in the professional and popular

literature such as a massive earthquake that could occur along the New Madrid or San

Andreas faults, or biological or nuclear terrorism events have, thankfully, not taken place

and so did not serve as a context for FCO decision making in this research. The lack of

these dramatically severe events, and the severe and unique response dynamics for FCOs

that disasters of this magnitude and type would impose were, consequently, outside the

current FCOs’ experiences and so outside the scope of this research. Also, outside the

10

scope of this research were the FCOs’ experiences with Hurricane Sandy in October-

November, 2012, and other disasters that occurred after the interview phase of the

research was concluded.

Limiting the research interview sample on disaster decision making to specifically

FCOs, by definition, focused and limited the direct applicability of the research findings

to this group of professionals. Further, experienced FCOs were chosen for this research,

as those individuals have actually led the federal response in severe disasters or led major

components of that response rather than being in various lesser supportive positions often

given to less experienced FCOs (see Section 4.2 for more on the experience and

backgrounds of the FCO cohort). Importantly, this research focused only on the

perspectives of and decision processes used by this elite group of disaster leaders and not

on how these decisions were subsequently carried out by others or whether they were

“right” or “wrong”.

In addition, while the researcher has worked in the emergency management area, he

has never worked directly for the FCO cadre and the same questionnaire was used for all

interviews. To limit researcher bias, all interviews were electronically recorded and

professionally transcribed verbatim. All analyses of these interviews were conducted by

the researcher using the MAXQDA software to promote consistency in coding,

manipulation and description of the data (see Section 3.4 for more on the description and

use of this software).

Finally, throughout the research discussion, numerous FCOs were quoted concerning

specific topics and their specific conversational quotes are inserted verbatim throughout

11

this dissertation. However, many other FCOs also commented on the same specific

subject's where quotes are used. This research author chose between the excellent

thoughts and quotes provided by numerous FCOs in selecting illustrative examples. This

selection of examples should not be perceived as suggesting that other FCO comments

were not as informative or as valid, but rather that the concepts and observations

expressed by other FCOs were supported by the quotes and discussion provided. Also, to

protect the identity of the FCOs throughout the research, they are each referred to only by

a random number and not by name.

1.7. Organization of the Document

This document is organized into the following:

Chapter 1 Introduction: Provides an orientation to the research, its background and

rationale for focus on FCO decision making, scope and limitations.

Chapter 2 Literature Review: Examines emergency decision making as a crucial

component of emergency management. The chapter begins by reviewing key concepts,

theories and processes of decision making directly relevant to the types of decisions

FCOs are required to make during the initial response interval of a disaster. Then the

chapter goes on to review factors leading to situational awareness and mental simulation

as necessary for decision making under stressful conditions. Finally, the chapter reviews

bounded rational decision making and Gary Klein’s intuitive Recognition Primed

Decision model (Klein 1998). These models provided the basis for the analytic

interrogatory of FCO decision making in this research.

12

Chapter 3, Research Goal, Design and Methodology: This Chapter first discusses the

research goals and questions and then introduces the combined draft Recognition

Primed/Bounded Rational Decision Making (RP/BRDM) model that served as a baseline

for interviews conducted with FCOs. The introduction of the model is followed

immediately by discussion of the research design and specific methodology and interview

instrument used to obtain the quantitative and qualitative data from the FCOs. Finally, a

discussion of the analytic procedures and coding used in the research is provided.

Chapter 4, Results and Analyses: The Chapter describes the results of the research.

It begins by providing an analysis of the professional and educational backgrounds of the

FCOs who volunteered for the research interviews. Then Chapter 4 discusses the

physical factors influencing availability of disaster information and how FCOs gain

situational awareness, the value of training and of modern technology for FCOs in aiding

situational awareness and decision making.

Chapter 5, Typology for FCO Decision Making: This chapter develops a new model

for FCO decision making that combines the intuitive and bounded rational decision

processes as modified and expanded by the FCOs during the interview process. This

Chapter describes the decision making model section by section, the processes, structures

and decision points and then provides an integrated FCO-RP/BRDM model.

Chapter 6, Conclusions and Recommendations: Chapter 6 presents conclusions and

recommendations based on the research undertaken and the FCO-RP/BRDM decision

making model developed.

13

Appendices: This section provides a copy of the IRB approved questionnaire used in

the interviews with FCOs and the Informed Consent Form.

14

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

This Literature Review examines emergency decision making as a crucial component

of emergency management. The chapter begins by reviewing key concepts, theories and

processes of decision making directly relevant to the types of decisions FCOs are

required to make during the initial response interval of a disaster. Then the chapter goes

on to review factors leading to situational awareness and mental simulation as necessary

for decision making under stressful conditions. Finally, the chapter reviews rational

decision making, providing an illustrative model and reviews Gary Klein’s intuitive

Recognition Primed Decision model (Klein 1998). These models provide the basis for

the analytic interrogatory of FCO decision making for this research.

2.1. Overview

The importance of effective emergency management in response to disasters is

continually growing in the United States as the hurricane vulnerable coastlines become

increasingly populated, more and more homes and business are built on flood plains and

over earthquake faults, and the nation faces threats of terrorism, pandemics and

technological disasters (Rubin 2007; Day 2004; Argenti 2002; Perrow 1999). The many

major disasters that have befallen the United States since the establishment of FEMA in

1979 have had very different dynamics and have caused almost constant changes and

refinements by FEMA to management and decisional structures used for federal disaster

response [Haddow, 2003; Rubin, 2007]. In addition, high stress levels can impede

normal decision making processes by increasing process rigidity and reducing flexibility

15

needed to cope with the inevitable ambiguity and confusion. High stress can thus result

in added difficulty in understanding and assessing the situation, resulting in increased

possibility of errors in decision making (Holsti, O. R. 1978; Lerbinger 1997).

Haddow and Bullock state that emergency management can be defined fundamentally

as “managing the effects [consequences] of disasters” (Haddow 2003). However,

managing such effects is a complicated matter, especially in Presidentially declared

Stafford Act disasters which comprise the most severe disasters this country confronts

and which serve as the basis for this study.5 Consequently, managing federal

coordination for a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disasters can be a complex, high-

stress undertaking conducted by FCOs.

2.2. Rational Actor as Decision Maker

Perhaps the most classic decision making theory is decision making done by a

rational actor. The Rational Decision Making (RDM) model is based on a classic

economic paradigm of rational choice made by an individual who wants to maximize

their choice at minimum cost. March and Simon point out that such a classical rational

actor model assumes that the decision maker has perfect situational awareness and knows

all the alternatives as well as fully understanding the consequences and value of each

alternative both for today and in the future so that the true value of each alternative can

5 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended [42 U.S.C. 5121, et

seq.] empowers the President of the United States to issue a Disaster Declaration upon formal request for

assistance from a governor of the affected state. This request must certify that the disaster in question is

more severe than the state can handle and so federal assistance is requested to protect life, property or

public health. The President has the discretion to grant or deny the governor’s request and for a disaster

declaration. [Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

5121, et seq.].

16

be determined and compared (March and Simon 1993). The RDM model is thus based

on an objective reality that confronts the decision maker with choices through which

“perfect knowledge” of alternatives and consequences is applied by the decision maker

who then makes the best choice by maximizing utility and benefit at the minimum cost

and negative consequence (March and Simon 1993). Such rational decision making is

predicated on the decision maker existing in an objective world where incidents have

effects that are clearly defined and the chains of cause and effect clearly understood

(March 1994).

Because of its logical basis, the rational actor concept also serves as the foundation

for game theory as individuals seek to maximize their own advantage and utility in a

wide variety of life’s choices from political and economic to social and personal

(Schelling 1970; Goffman 1969). Game theory utilizing mathematics, illustrates the

alternatives (plays) available to rational actors (players) and the strategic interactions

between these players that can be defined in matrices and decision trees of alternatives.

Resulting choices are made and behaviors undertaken based on the results of these

matrices and so are offered as the way to resolve issues or conflicts (Dixit, 2004;

Schelling, 1970).

Rational decision-making can be seen as the logical intellectual ideal that decision

makers strive to emulate. Divorced from emotion or personal bias, decision makers even

in a crisis, “should” consciously move linearly through the decision process stages. In

examining the rational model of decision making, Lipshitz and Bar-Ilan found that other

researchers and theoreticians divided such a model into two or up to eight linear stages

(Lipshitz and Bar-Ilan, 1996).

17

The rational actor paradigm is an abstract ideal when placed against the harsh realities

of decision making in the imperfect real world, for which decision making in severe

disasters is an extreme case. During a crisis, the often high stakes decisional environment

is beset by confusion and complexity, and information is incomplete and inconclusive. In

this environment, “perfect knowledge” concerning the situation is not possible, all

alternatives to problems are not known, and indeed, problems themselves may not be

fully understood or even identified. Finally, the ability to accurately weigh known

alternatives may not be possible due to the lack of information concerning these

alternatives or knowledge concerning their consequences, good or bad, within the rapidly

changing dynamic disaster environment (Haddow, Bullock and Coppola 2008; Buck

2006; Klein 2003; Simon 1985, 1997). It is into this world of crisis that the FCO steps

during the initial response interval of a disaster.

2.3. Bounded Rationality: Moving Away from the Ideal

While the rational decision making approach is possibly the ideal to strive for, in the

initial response interval of a disaster it is impossible to achieve. Indeed, the rational

decision approach does not even agree with more recent decisional research and theory as

to how decisions are made by senior experienced decision makers in stressful situations.

A large body of scholarly work has developed which challenges the pure rational

actor mode of decision making. As noted by Paul Nutt from Cornell University in his

study of 78 cases of decision making, “The sequence of problem definition, alternative

generation, refinement, and selection, called by nearly every theorist, seems rooted in

18

rational arguments, not behavior” (Nutt 1984). Herbert Simon also researched the limits

of rational thought, noting:

“…when the limits of rationality are viewed from the individual’s standpoint, they

fall into three categories: he is limited by his unconscious skill, habits, and reflexes;

he is limited by his values and conceptions of purpose …; he is limited by the extent

of his knowledge and information. …Rationality, then does not determine behavior.

…Instead, behavior is determined by the irrational and nonrational elements that

bound the area of rationality.” (Simon 1997)

A variation of the rational actor model is that of “bounded rationality”. Bounded

rationality in this research applies the logical ideal to the more realistic limited human

condition. It is used as a term to overtly admit that the definition of issues, alternatives,

their value ranking and subsequent selection by the decision maker are all “bounded” by

the values, beliefs, abilities, experiences and knowledge of the decision maker and even

the information about the characteristics of the situation itself (Mingus 2007; Simon,

1997; Simon 1972; Simon 1956). As also noted by March, “Although decision makers

try to be rational, they are constrained [bounded] by limited cognitive capabilities and

incomplete information.” (March 1994).

Looking at the individual cognitive abilities and limitations which bound decision

making, March identified four problems faced by the decision maker: 1) Attention of the

decision maker is necessarily limited by time, simultaneous demands and the decision

maker’s own attention capabilities; 2) The memory of the decision maker is limited and

selective; 3) The decision maker’s comprehension forms the basis for attempting to

understand the situation, possible alternatives, decisions, and consequences through

organizing, summarizing and forming inferences about what is perceived to be relevant;

and 4) Difficulties communicating information, especially complex or specialized

19

information (March 1994). All four of these problem sets identified by March are

constraining realities for decision makers in severe disasters where a confusing

environment of multiple activities, events, decisions and consequences compete for the

FCO’s attention and involvement.

The steps for bounded rational decision making are the same as for pure rational

decision making. Only the influencing factors at each of the stages are different. Under

the bounded rationality concept of decision making, the decision maker's ability to

understand the disaster situation is bound (limited) by the capabilities, knowledge and

experiences of the decision maker. Along with the capabilities and psychological mix of

the decision maker are the realities of the present situation within which the decision

maker has to make the decision. For example, competing demands for attention, complex

and/or confusing aspects of a current disaster situation, and the needs of responders,

victims and the political establishment all may limit the decision maker’s ability to

understand the situation, rationally develop goals and alternatives, and then respond

reflecting all aspects of the situation. Consequently, “rational” decision making is

“bounded” by personal capabilities and limitations and situational realities that all affect

what the decision maker perceives to be the situation, the goals, alternatives and

ultimately the decision made.

The bounded rationality concept was a major move away from the strict mathematical

and calculated construct of decisional rationality to include a more complex, realistic and

fallible view of decision making incorporating human and environmental realities that

affected the decision maker’s decision processes. Indeed, while rational decision making

is attractively straight forward and calculating, on-scene situations such as a disaster

20

faced by an FCO are far from the controlled laboratory environment. Rather, they are

imbedded in the gritty confusing reality of the situation which can include incomplete

and/or confusing information and possibly multiple requirements and interdependencies

all competing for the same resources resulting in a lack of clarity for the decision maker

concerning what choices to make and how best to proceed in a stressful environment.

2.4. Cognitive Biases and Heuristics: Short-Cut Decision Strategies

Bounded by their innate abilities and past experience, decision makers develop over

time cognitive biases and heuristics that speed their decision making based on what they

perceived as having “worked” successfully in their past.6 First experimentally

demonstrated by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky 1982), other

researchers have also explored other cognitive biases and heuristics to understand the

context of the decision making and how to speed up the decision making process (Klein,

2009).

It should be noted that cognitive biases and heuristics are not bad, a priori.

Sometimes, the current situation and decisions required are indeed similar to a decision

maker’s past experiences, and so the successful biases and heuristics developed from

those earlier experiences are applicable to this situation. This relationship accelerates

correct understanding and decision making. For example, a decision maker could have a

bias for certain approaches that have worked successfully in the past, and given the

6 By heuristics, is meant self-initiated exploratory problem solving techniques to improve performance

(Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th

ed., 2000). Consequently, for this study heuristics could be

“rules of thumb” known to many FCOs or strategies, techniques and experiences known uniquely to an

individual FCO.

21

similarities to the current situation, could work successfully again. However, at other

times, these biases and heuristics are not, or not completely, applicable to the situation

and decisions based on them can lead the decision maker astray in situational

understanding and decision making. An experienced decision maker can bring a wealth

of past relevant experiences and approaches to the current disaster. If the present disaster

is like, or at least partially like those experienced before, those past biases and heuristics

may offer short-cuts for developing situational awareness and decision making. To the

degree the disaster is different or unique from those disasters experienced in the past will

be the extent to which heuristics and biases accumulated are irrelevant or worse, and

could lead the decision maker astray in situational understanding and decision making.

The more frequently used and important biases and heuristics identified by

researchers that are helpful or can be detrimental to FCO decision making include the

those listed below (Grimshaw and Baron 2010; Klein 2009; Perrow 1999; Roberto 2009;

Suedfeld 1992; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Myers 2001).

2.4.1. Illusory Correlation

When there is actually no relationship between events past and present, and the

perceived relationship is just a coincidence. In this case, the decision maker connects a

current event with one or more “similar” issues or events in the past while having

insufficient regard for differences in the two situations. This is the negative corollary to

Event Correlation.

22

2.4.2. Confidence Bias

When a decision maker enters a situation, decision, etc. and believes (is confident)

they understand it based on past experience, know how to react, and can make the “right”

choices to bring about the desired outcomes. These beliefs and perceptions can positively

bias situational understanding and decision making by giving the

experienced/knowledgeable decision maker the confidence to make faster situational

analyses and decisions.

2.4.3. Overconfidence Bias

When the decision maker erroneously believes he or she understands a situation,

when in fact there are variables and factors that make it different than what was

experienced in the past, leading to “wrong” choices and decisions. This is the negative

corollary of Confidence Bias.

2.4.4. Self-Serving Bias

Related to the Overconfidence Bias, this bias is when an egocentric decision maker

takes credit for successful decisions, but attributes unsuccessful decisions to events,

actions and variables outside the decision maker’s control or attribution.

2.4.5. Sunk Cost Fallacy

Refers to when the decision maker continues to make decisions that support previous

decisions or efforts because so many resources have already been expended in support of

23

these decisions or efforts that the decision maker is very reluctant not to support them

further and thereby admit that the resources already expended were wasted.

2.4.6. Anchor and Adjustment Heuristic

The initial estimates and decisions by the decision maker tend to be kept and so

“anchor” (distort) future thought and decision making on the same subject. So for

example, by making an initial decision, the decision maker’s subsequent decisions are

influenced by that initial decision. In essence, subsequent decisions extend from the

initial decision. Used in familiar situations, this heuristic can be a powerful tool to spur

the assessment process and decisional action forward. However, if the initial decision

anchoring a series of decisions is not correct, this error can then become multiplied as

subsequent decisions are based on it.

2.4.7. Availability Bias

When the decision maker decides to value, emphasize or rely on information they can

readily recall in making a decision verses information that takes longer to obtain, analyze

and/or understand. This bias can be positive or negative. For example, especially during

the initial stages of disaster response, it may well be more beneficial for the decision

maker such to go ahead and respond based on limited information that the decision maker

can recall, rather than waiting for more complete information which is harder or takes

longer to obtain or understand, thus delaying possible life saving/life protecting

decisions. Conversely, this bias can be negative by causing the decision maker to ignore

24

needed information that is harder or takes longer to obtain or understand, but is crucial

for effective decision making.

2.4.8. Confirmation Bias

When a decision maker relies on or seeks information that tends to support his/her

already held opinions, attitudes, beliefs or hypotheses as to what the situation is, what

needs to be done and the priorities for action. This bias is negative in that the decision

maker ignores contrary information, erroneously believing already held opinions,

attitudes, beliefs or hypotheses concerning the situation are relevant when in fact they are

not in whole or in part, resulting in distorted decision making.

2.4.9. Cognitive Biases and Heuristics: General Discussion

Biases and heuristics can provide the decision maker a short-cut to a correct decision

or to an error in decision making, depending on the true likeness of the current decisional

situation to those in the past or the ability of the decision maker to accurately extrapolate

in a valid and representative way from the past experience into the present situation and

decisions at hand.

Heuristics and biases are often written about negatively in the literature as interfering

with understanding and accurate decision making. However, in a study of disaster

response, Perrow pointed out that disaster managers’ use of heuristics could have three

important benefits for disaster decision making. First, “heuristics help prevent paralysis

of decision making” by pointing the way forward through past experiences and decisions.

25

Second, heuristics “drastically cut down on the ‘costs of search,’ the time and effort to

examine all possible choices.” Third, applied heuristics can be revised quickly based on

mental testing and actual implementation (Perrow 1999).

The heuristics and biases decision makers may use are born out of their past

experiences and successes (Suedfeld, 1992). Depending on the decision maker’s

experience and knowledge in the relevant subject areas concerning a decision to be made,

heuristics and biases may be applied accurately to the situation, issue or decision making

process. These heuristics and biases can be part of the decision maker’s mental “tool kit”

by which problems are approached and decisions made (Klein, 2009).

2.5. Satisficing – The “Good Enough” Solution

The decision maker “bounded” by innate abilities, past training and experiences, and

a set of learned heuristics and biases, faces making decisions in the crucial initial

response interval of a Presidentially declared, possibly catastrophic disaster. While the

rational, linear decision making process in Figure 2-1 is the theoretical ideal and indeed

appropriate in certain situations where there is time for all alternatives to be discussed,

considered and weighed, albeit a “bounded” process as discussed above in Section 2.3.

What Herbert Simon found in his research beginning in the late 1950s, was that decision

makers often, far from using a purely rational approach trying to maximize the results,

instead used a search technique he called “satisficing” (Simon 1957).7 That is, the

“optimal” answer or decision was not sought by the decision maker, but rather the first

7 “Satisficing” is a Scottish word meaning “satisfying” which Simon used to distinguish “good enough”

sub-optimal decision making.

26

creditable answer or solution was chosen as the decision – the answer that “satisficed” –

was “good enough” – in responding to the issue or problem confronting the decision

maker (Simon, 1956).

As March and Simon later noted, “Most human decision making … is concerned with

discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it

concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives” (March and Simon,

1993). To choose a satisfactory alternative, to "satisfice", only requires comparing

alternatives until some specific sufficing criteria is met, while the rational decision

process to obtain the “optimal” decision requires comparing all possible alternatives so

that the “best” alternative is chosen. Whether a decision maker chooses to seek an

optimal alternative or is willing to select the first acceptable alternative will depend on

the specific situation at hand, the pressure to decide quickly, the complexity or clarity of

the alternatives, and the decision’s short and long term consequences (March 1994).

2.6. Framing and Understanding

But what is “good enough”? Decision makers can “frame” situations they face and

the decisions they have to make. A frame is a mental construct by the decision maker

that describes and defines the component parts of a situation by fitting them into a

structure of elements and relationships in the situation, a mental model. Such a frame

helps focus attention and analysis (March 1994). Indeed, the decision maker can have

multiple frames relevant to the same situation and decision set required. The frame or

frames developed by the decision maker also provide a construct for assigning

27

importance to the various component parts and decisions needed in a situation

(Kahneman, 2000).

It is important to note that the information in the situation used by the decision maker

to construct a personally relevant frame, in turn helps in further defining what

information the decision maker considers relevant and so what information is

subsequently incorporated into the frame and into the decision making processes used by

the decision maker. The “frame is the foundation of understanding the situation and for

deciding what to do about it” (Beach, 1997).

Consequently, the information incorporated and mental frame developed by the

decision maker are in a dynamic relationship with each other, each adding to and refining

the other. This relationship breaks down when inconsistencies between what the decision

maker is observing concerning a present situation and the frame of reference developed

by the decision maker cannot be reconciled. When expectations based on the mental

frame do not materialize, conclusions drawn based on the established frame are proved

wrong, or at least unexpected situations and events take place which do not comport to

the mental frame of the situation established by the decision maker. In this case, the

mental connection of the decision maker’s established mental frame and the information

and events occurring is not sustained and dissonance is created. Such anomalies and

“surprises” are perceived by the experienced decision maker as causing the loss of

confidence in their present referencing frame for the situation and so requiring the

decision maker to initiate a process of refining the mental frame or creating a new one

based on what is now being experiencing and perceived as relevant (Klein et al. 2007).

28

2.7. Analogies and Metaphors: Shortcuts to Framing

Analogies and metaphors provide the decision maker with other important ways to

expeditiously develop frames of reference for decisional situations based on past

experiences and knowledge. Analogue reasoning enables the experienced decision maker

to use past experiences and knowledge to identify similar aspects or factors in the current

situation and from this association draw additional inferences and conclusions for the

current situation based on the experiences and knowledge gained in the past (Klein 1998).

Analog decision making enables the decision maker to quickly leverage past

experience and knowledge so as to make better choices, avoid past mistakes and save

time in the process. However, the decision maker needs to be wary of relying too much

on the similarities between present and past experiences to the extent that the differences

between the two situations are discounted or ignored completely. Obviously, analogies

are only as useful to the decision maker in framing a situation as the strength of the

associative relationship between the past and present situations, and the ability of the

decision maker to correctly extrapolate from them.

Metaphors can also be used by the decision maker to draw connections between

experiences or knowledge from the past that, while seemingly markedly different,

provide associative value to a current decision making process now confronted.

Connections drawn between the familiar and the new/unfamiliar, helps the decision

maker structure thinking and draw inferences concerning the new issues and decisions at

hand (Janis 1989). Metaphors can be powerful tools in that their relationship is more

conceptual and more experiential, for example the idea of “fog” as making the

29

environment unclear and confusing being adapted to discuss the “fog of disaster” as

referencing the confusion and lack of situational understanding initially present in a

major disaster – à la, the “fog of war” metaphor first defined by Clausewitz (Clausewitz,

On War, Book 2, Chapter 2).

Together with analogies, metaphors offer the decision maker a short-hand way to

better understand situations at hand, decisions needing to be made and desired outcomes

to be achieved. As the decision maker attempts to define the environment and the

decisions required therein, analogies and metaphors enable the use of past experience and

knowledge as tools for understanding and interpreting the present.

2.8. Intuition: The Silent Partner in Decision Making

An experienced decision maker relies on memory that can be defined fundamentally

as divided into two types, explicit and implicit. Explicit memory is conscious and

deliberate, brought to the fore by the decision maker’s direct efforts at recall.

Implicit/subconscious memory on the other hand is not conscious or deliberate

recollections, but occurs through mental association with past events, experiences and

knowledge brought to bear on the present situation’s decisions and issues unconsciously

by the decision maker (Roediger 1990). Cognitive biases and heuristics just discussed

can be either conscious or subconscious. The subconscious use of memory is what is

meant by “intuition”, the process that the decision maker uses to unconsciously bring past

experiences to assist in present decision making (Klein, 1998). As noted by Robert

Graves, the Twentieth Century English poet, “Intuition is the supra-logic that cuts out all

the routine processes of thought and leaps straight from the problem to the answer”

30

(Carter 1989). Sometimes thought of colloquially as “gut instinct” or a person’s “sixth

sense” intuition can assist the decision maker in recognizing situations, events, options

and impacts, in sizing up the present situation and devising and selecting ways forward

(Roberto 2009; Roediger 1990).

Fundamentally, intuition is based on a subconscious pattern recognition process

whereby the decision maker connects past experience and knowledge to aspects of the

present situation. These connections cause a comparison between what happened

successfully or unsuccessfully in the past with aspects of the present situation and in so

doing, providing clues as to what to emulate or avoid. This is not to imply that intuition

is not fallible, that wrong connections are subconsciously drawn between situations

believed similar that really are not, or that subsequently the wrong conclusions or

associations are drawn from legitimate mental connections between past experiences,

knowledge and the present situation.

Beginning in 1985, psychologist Gary Klein studied firefighters and how they made

life and death decisions under extreme pressure. In the process of this research, and later

corroborated with additional research by Klein and others, the important role of intuition

was identified as enabling rapid situational assessment and decision making in high stress

situations. The experienced fire fighter or through extrapolation, the FCO in the

emergency management area, is potentially able to successfully benefit from intuition in

that they have acquired a large internal memory bank of relevant knowledge and past

experiences and so are intuitively, subconsciously, able to better assess degrees of

relevancy and apply portions of this memory bank to the present emergency situations

they face (Roberto 2009; Endsley 2000; Klein 1993).

31

2.9. Factors Leading to Situation Awareness

Klein, Endsley, Weick and other scholars have shown that in developing situational

awareness, experienced decision makers tend to recognize consciously and/or

subconsciously cues in the current situation which trigger associations with patterns from

their past experience (e.g., associative collections of knowledge, experiences, conditions,

issues, decisions and consequences). As noted above, these past patterns may be very

similar to the present situation or similar only in selected aspects; however, the current

situation triggers conscious and/or subconscious mental associations rightly or wrongly

between the past experience and the present situation as the decision maker tries to make

sense of the situation. This associative process can be mentally triggered by analogous,

metaphorical, framing or intuitive thinking – or a combination of these and influenced by

cognitive biases and heuristics. Together these comprise a pattern recognition process

leading to mental model(s) that provide a shorthand way of assessing and responding to

the situation by the experienced decision maker having a wealth of experiences and

knowledge to consciously and subconsciously draw from (Klein 2009; Roberto 2009;

Cohen 2007; Myers 2001; Yates 2001; Endsley 2000; Klein 1998; Endsley 1995; Weick

1995; Janis 1989; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).

Endsley explored situational awareness in detail and divided the acquiring of

situation8 awareness into three parts: Level 1: Perceiving the critical factors and cues in

the situation; Level 2: Understanding and comprehending what these critical factors mean

8 Mica Endsley used the term “situation awareness” (vice situational awareness) and so the researcher has

continued that convention here in the discussion of her work. The term "situational awareness" in the

results and discussion section of this dissertation is distinct from the strict Endsley definition of "situation

awareness."

32

in context of the situation; and Level 3: Being able to project what will happen and the

impacts of these critical factors into the near future. For Endsley, perception of cues

(Level 1) is fundamental to developing an understanding of the situation. The lack of

perception can be due to the decision maker or factors in the situation that are not

allowing the decision maker to perceive needed information (an example of the latter

being the “fog of disaster” mentioned earlier). However, for successful situation

awareness, the decision maker has to successfully perceive the situation as the first step

towards awareness and successful decision making (Endsley 2000; Endsley 1997).

In Endsley’s construct, perception of critical factors and cues is only the first step and

not sufficient for full situation awareness. The decision maker has to comprehend what

these critical factors and cues mean, how they need to be combined and interpreted –

Level 2 of Endsley’s construct. This comprehension, which can be a conscious analytic

process and/or a subconscious one, provides the decision maker with the frame of

reference and mental models as a basis for a possible decision path forward for what to

do in the present situation and for incorporation of action scripts that were also used in

past situations providing possible approaches for the way forward (Endsley 2000;

Endsley 1995).

The collection of relevant past frames of reference, action scripts and development of

mental models add to the observations and understandings of the present situation

providing the decision maker a mental model for situational awareness, its description,

factors, contingencies, opportunities, limitations and options. It is against this mental

construct of the present situation that Endsley postulates the decision maker conducts

Level 3 projection analysis as to how the elements in the situation will evolve and Klein

33

postulates that the decision maker conducts mental simulations as to how a course of

action selected will actually unfold. (Klein 2004; Endsley 1997). These two concepts are

complementary with Endsley’s focus on projecting elements of the situation into the near

future as the final stage of developing situation awareness (SA) and Klein focusing on the

decision process for selecting options based on the decision maker having developed this

awareness. As Endsley states, “…SA is explicitly recognized as a construct separate

from decision making and performance. …SA, decision making, and performance are

different stages with different factors influencing them…” (Endsley, 1995).

Importantly, Klein and Endsley also conducted research, finding that experts they

studied in emergency/high stress situations (e.g., fire fighters, paramedics, fighter pilots)

did not usually approach problem solving by using a rational decision model, generating

a series of action options and then evaluating and ranking them based on an established

set of criteria deducing which of them would be “optimal”. Rather, as will be discussed

further in Section 2.10 directly below, the decision maker in high stress situations moved

from situational assessment directly to a potential course of action, testing courses of

action in series rather than in parallel, stopping when finding one that would “satisfice”

for the situation at hand (Klein 2009; Klein 2004; Endsley 2000; Endsley 1995).

2.10. Mental Simulation and Perception: A Construct for Decision Making Under

Stress

Decision making is very stressful during the initial response period when responding

to a Presidentially declared disaster is stressed by both time (i.e., decisions need be made

34

quickly) and impact (e.g., decisions can have life or death consequences for those

impacted by the disaster). As noted above, leadership may not have time for a long,

contemplative and exhaustive rational problem solving approach. Rather, a shorthand

way to test a necessary response option is sought by a leader making decisions in a high

pressure, fast-paced environment. According to Klein's model, they base their analysis

on a mental frame of the situation that they develop and then this construct provides a

frame of reference concerning the decision situation and the variables therein. Of course,

the option chosen is heavily dependent on, bounded by, the decision maker’s knowledge

and experiences, patterns and scripts already developed (Klein 2007; Klein 2004; Endsley

1999; Endsley 1995).

The decision maker may then “rehearse” the option under consideration within their

mental construct. If the decision maker is not satisfied that the action selected is correct

(“will it work”), they can modify their action choice or abandon it and go back to

reviewing the cues, patterns and action scripts they perceive relevant to arrive at another

decision option that will “satisfice” (Klein 2009; Klein 2004).

2.11. Recognition Primed/Bounded Rational Decision Making

The process by which expert decision makers use such tools as heuristics, analogies,

intuition, cues, patterns and scripts to develop a mental model and frame the decisional

situation, then simulate an option for an emergency response was diagramed by Klein as

his Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model (Klein 1998). Klein’s RPD model, Figure

2-4, including its variations (Figures 2-1 – 2-3), provide an initial way to view stressful

35

decision making while having limited time and resources. However, if other situations

allow for more time before a decision has to be made, the decision maker may choose

either an intuitive path or the BRDM path (Figure 3-1).

2.11.1. Recognition Primed Decision Model, Variation 1: Simple Match

In the simplest case, the decision maker recognizes the current situation as “typical”,

one faced before and labeled by Klein as a “simple match”, Variation 1 of his RPD model

(Figure 2-1). Recognition as a “simple match”, a typical situation means that the decision

maker can frame the situation, develop a mental frame of the situation based on past

experiences and knowledge, and can assess the cues of the current situation based on

those experiences and knowledge. The decision maker can then mentally simulate what

is expected to occur in this situation (“expectancies”) and what decisions and actions

would be most effective in response to achieve desired goals. This approach to situation

assessment, recognition of cues, expectancies, goal generation, and action selection is

straight forward for the decision maker due to the situation’s typicality (Klein 1998).

The more experienced the decision maker is with the types of possible decisions to be

made in different disasters, the more likely the disaster confronted will fall into a

“typical” category, that is, disaster situations and decisions the decision maker has

experienced before, a known type of event with known expectancies, decisions and

response options that can be selected for success or denied to avoid failure. As more

disaster experiences become repetitive for the decision maker, the assessments, analyses

and responses can become more intuitive (see Section 2.8, above). That is, the decision

36

maker can use a rapid subconscious process through which the decision maker “just

knows” what to do based on a personal wealth of similar past experiences and knowledge

that the decision maker “matches” subconsciously to the present situation. This “simple

match” rapid decision process is diagramed below as RPD Variation 1 (Figure 2-1).

Implement Course of

Action

Relevant Cues

Action (1,2,3...n)

Expectancies

Plausible Goals

Situation Typical?

(Prototype or

Analogue)

Experience the Situation in a Changing Environment

Yes

Recognition has four by-products

Figure 2-1: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Variation 1, Simple Match (Klein 1998)

37

2.11.2. Recognition Primed Decision Model, Variation 2: Diagnose the Situation

A situation requiring a decision that is not “typical”, but an anomaly for the decision

maker requires further analysis and diagnosis and so cannot be responded to intuitively.

Since the cues do not clearly map to a situation the decision maker has had previously or

conversely, map to multiple past situations, the decision maker needs to “diagnose” the

situation, examining and recognizing the features of the situation to build a mental model,

a “story” of what is taking place possibly using the different approaches described in

Chapter 2 above and gathering more data as required. Variation 2 in Klein’s construct

(Figure 2-2, below) embodies this situation.

While the situation is an anomaly, (i.e., atypical), to the decision maker’s past

experience, once the situation is clarified, assessed and a mental frame/“story” developed,

the features of the situation are recognized by the decision maker and mapped to a set of

“typical” past experiences and knowledge that serve as the basis for decision making and

action (Klein 1998). Thus, the situation once understood is one that the experienced

decision maker can reach back to past experiences and knowledge to assess, make

decisions and respond. The more experienced the decision maker, the greater the

likelihood that Variation 2 will work when Variation 1 did not, where the situation is a

novel variation of the decision maker’s past experience, but decisions can still be based

on the decision maker’s past experience and knowledge, perhaps combined in new ways.

38

Figure 2-2: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Variation 2, Diagnose the Situation (Klein 1998)

2.11.3. Recognition Primed Decision Model, Variation 3: Evaluate Course of

Action

Gary Klein was able to show through his research that experienced decision makers

in stressful situations such as fire fighters, medical professionals and military personnel

usually did not use the time consuming, resource intensive linear BRDM process with its

Implement Course of

Action

Clarify

Anomaly Relevant Cues

Action (1,2,3...n)

Expectancies

Plausible Goals

Diagnose

(Feature Matching,

Story Building)

Situation Typical?

(Prototype or

Analogue)

Experience the Situation in a Changing EnvironmentMore data

No

Yes

Yes


39

generation of multiple alternatives, cost/benefit ranking of these alternatives, and then

optimizing selection based on this analysis. Rather, Klein studied exclusively stressful

decision making taking place under time pressured, dynamic and stressful conditions

where the situation was ill defined or ambiguous and experienced decision makers were

much more likely to use “singular strategies”. That is, decision makers moved from

situational assessment to alternative response selection sequentially rather than

concurrently. This process is embodied in Variation 3 of the RPD model, Figure 2-3

below (Klein 1998).

Klein found that in high stress situations, experienced decision makers mentally

simulated options one at a time, sequentially, stopping as soon as they found one that

“satisficed”, was good enough. This sequential verses concurrent mental simulation

conclusion by Klein and corroborated by other situational assessment and decisional

research (i.e., simulating all options before choosing the “optimum”), reflected the fact

that Klein found most of the analytic time an experienced decision maker used in a

stressed environment was spent on developing situational awareness not alternative

generation and comparative merit analysis. (Klein 2009; Cohen 2007; Yates 2001;

Endsley 2000; Klein 1998).

40

Evaluate Action

(Mental

Simulation)

Will it work?

Implement Course of

Action

Modify

Relevant Cues

Action (1,2,3...n)

Expectancies

Plausible Goals

Situation Typical?

(Prototype or

Analogue)

Experience the Situation in a Changing Environment

NoYes, but

Yes


Yes

Figure 2-3: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Variation 3, Evaluate Course of Action (Klein 1998)

Klein found that instead of concurrently generating and analyzing the benefit of

multiple response alternatives, the analytic process employed was sequential, based on

cues in the situation leading experienced decision makers to use pattern recognition and

41

action scripts to help formulate a mental model of the current situation and decide on a

singular alternative that might work. Then the decision maker consciously analyzed and

mentally tested this newly proposed alternative by mentally simulating how the

alternative would work in the mental model developed. Only if this alternative did not

“pass” this mental simulation test (i.e., “did not work”) would another alternative be

generated by the decision maker modifying or even abandoning the mental model

originally created in favor of another model developed through what the decision maker

was observing, assessing and experiencing. This process underlies the portion of the

recognition component of the RPD model and delineates the blend of

intuitive/subconscious and conscious decision making processes that reflect the truly

satisficing, vice a maximizing mode of decision making which occurs in high stress

situations (Klein 2009; Klein 1998).

2.11.4. Recognition Primed Decision Model: Integrated Version

The different decision making approaches identified by Klein and discussed in

Variations 1-3 above can be merged into one integrated model displayed in Figure 2-4,

below. This RPD model integrates the possible intuitive beginnings of decision making,

Variation 1, with a conscious mental model development in Variation 2 and simulation

process in Variation 3 (Klein 1998).

42

Evaluate Acton

(Mental

Simulation)

Will it work?

Implement Course of

Action

Modify

Clarify

Anomaly Relevant Cues

Action (1,2,3...n)

Expectancies

Plausible Goals

Diagnose

(Feature Matching,

Story Building)

Situation Typical?

(Prototype or

Analogue)

Experience the Situation in a Changing Enviornment

NoYes, but

Yes

More data

No

Yes

Yes


Figure 2-4: Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) Model – Integrated Version (Klein 1998)

Together, the intuitive and deliberative processes of the experienced decision maker

draw on the decision maker’s many previous relevant experiences and knowledge, and on

43

the decision maker’s ability to develop a proposed solution and test (simulate) this

solution using their mental frame of the situation, and then expeditiously deciding on the

best-fit solution that will “satisfice” given the situation (Klein 2009). It should be noted

that the RPD model’s use is predicated upon the decision maker’s ability to relate the

present situation to components of their past situations and training, and generate new

alternatives and decisions based on them. When the situation is totally new, even senior

decision makers may not be able to rely on their training and experience. If there is

sufficient time and resources, a totally new situation will put the senior decision maker

into the BRDM model. Indeed, the BRDM and RPD models can be related and were

integrated in this prototype step for research on the decision making processes for FCOs.

44

Chapter 3 - Research Goal, Design and Methodology

This Chapter first discusses the research goal and questions and then introduces the

draft RP/BRDM model that served as a reference for interviews conducted with the

FCOs. The introduction of the model is followed by a discussion of the research design

and specific methodology and interview instrument used to obtain the quantitative and

qualitative data from the FCOs. Finally, a discussion of the analytic procedures and

coding used in the research is provided.

3.1. Research Goal and Questions

This section discusses the research goal and questions that served as a basis for the

questionnaire and development of the FCO decision model.

3.1.1. Research Goal

The goal of this research was to describe and model the decisional structures and

processes utilized by FCOs during the initial response interval of a Presidentially

declared Stafford Act disaster. Derivative from the goal were three research questions.

3.1.2. Research Questions

The following three research questions formed the basis of this dissertation:

1. Can FCOs describe the decisional structure and processes they use and choices

they have to make within the often high stress, dynamic and ambiguous

45

environments that exist during the initial response interval of a Presidentially

declared Stafford Act disaster?

2. Can a decisional model be developed based on the RPD and the BRDM models

that diagrams the structure, variables, decision points, and processes used by

FCOs in making critical decisions during the initial response interval?

3. Are there common background experiences, education or training that FCOs

consider valuable in decision making during the initial response interval that

could be considered “best practices” in support of FCO decision making during a

disaster?

Together, these three questions formed the basis for the decisional analysis of this

FCO group of leaders in emergency management response. This research reviewed the

commonalities and differences among FCOs in their decisional processes and

approaches. Further, FCOs were interviewed concerning the draft RP/BRDM baseline

(Figure 3-2) and the results of these interviews in addition to the research findings are

integrated into the FCO-RP/BRDM model (Figure 5-5).

3.2. Research Design

The following research design was utilized in this research and explained in more

detail in Research Methodology, Section 3.3 below.

Review of Decision Making Literature: Served as the basis for development of

the draft decision making model and questionnaire used with the FCOs.

46

Development of a Draft Decision Model: An initial draft model was developed

based on decision making literature. The resulting model combined bounded

rational and intuitive decision making (see Figure 3.2).

Development of the Questionnaire: The questionnaire used with all FCOs in the

research covered four subject areas:

o Introduction to the research and questionnaire overview

o Educational and professional background

o Decisional dynamics, development of situational awareness and the

decision process

o Critique of the draft decision model

George Washington University Institutional Review Board Approval: Approval

for the questionnaire and research methodology was obtained from the GWU

Institutional Review Board.

Selection of FCO Cohort: FCOs were notified of the research through email and

all FCOs participated on a voluntary basis. To be selected for the research,

volunteers had to have met the inclusion criteria, including significant experience

making decisions in Presidentially declared disasters.

Conduct FCO Interviews: All interviews were conducted by the researcher. The

first segment of the interview focused on the background and decisional

dynamics, structure and processes used by the FCO. The second part focused on

having the FCOs critique the draft decision making model.

Coding Interview Data: The researcher developed a coding structure and coded

all FCO interview data.

47

Analysis of Data: FCO interviews were analyzed and draft decisional model

modified by the researcher based on interview results.

3.3. Research Methodology

The following methodology was used in the conduct of this research.

3.3.1. A Review of Decision Making Literature

A review of the research based literature relevant to FCO decision making was

conducted. Results of the review are discussed specifically in the Literature Review,

Chapter 2, and referenced throughout the research.

3.3.2. Development and Use of Draft Recognition Primed/Bounded Rational

Decision Making (RP/BRDM) Model

A key component of this research methodology was to first develop a draft model as a

tool for defining how FCOs could possibly conduct decision making during the initial

response interval of a Presidential disaster. This draft model was then used to help

develop interview questions to investigate how FCOs actually conducted decision

making. Finally, FCOs were asked to modify the draft model to reflect their actual

experiences. The draft model was developed by the researcher and combined the generic

features of the Bounded Rational Decision Making (BRDM) concept with the

48

Recognition Primed (RP) concept and models, both discussed in Literature Review,

Chapter 2. The resulting integrated draft RP-BRDM model was used in all interviews

conducted for this research.

The BRDM component of the model developed for this research has the FCO moving

through the same linear stages as in pure RDM; however, the FCO’s cognitive abilities,

experiences and training interact with the actual physical and emotional decision making

environment to develop the FCO’s frame of reference and influence/“bound” the decision

process at each step (March, 1993, Simon, 1982; Simon 1972; also see Section 2.3).

More specifically, the draft BRDM component of the model contains six steps beginning

with situational awareness, then goals development, through generation of alternatives to

rank ordering these alternatives based on analyses of the costs and benefits of each option

given the desired outcomes, then selecting the alternative(s) that offers the maximum

utility/benefit, and finally implementation. Under this bounded rational rubric, the harder

or more important the decision, the more rational the FCO’s decision process “should”

be, within the context of his/her genetic capabilities and educational/experiential

background, to maximize outcomes and benefits resulting from the decision. This

generic BRDM linear stage model developed by the researcher for this research is

diagramed in Figure 3-1, below.

49

Goals Formulation

Situational Awareness

Alternatives

Development

Rank Order

Alternatives

Implement Selected

Alternative(s)

Select Top Rated

Alternative(s)

Figure 3-1: Bounded Rational Decision Making (BRDM) Model

As discussed in Chapter 2, an FCO could approach decision making intuitively and

different intuitive based variations were defined as part of the Klein RPD model (Figures

2-1, 2-2, and 2-3). Indeed, the vast majority of disasters in the United States are natural

disasters such as floods, hurricanes and tornadoes, and have similar aspects and features

to past disasters. While differences occur in extent or severity, an FCO may be able to

50

apply past disaster experiences and decisions concerning such issues as communications,

mass care, transportation, etc. at least in part to the present decisional situation.

However, if the situation was not “typical,” but new and if the FCO could not map it to

past experience or knowledge, and there was time and resources, the FCO could utilize

the step-by-step linear analytic BRDM decision process bounded by the FCO’s own

capabilities and limitations (Figure 3-1). Thus, depending on the situation, the FCO

could use the RPD or BRDM approach for decision making. The integration of these two

approaches/paths is provided in the draft RP/BRDM model below (Figure 3-2) and

served as the theoretical baseline for developing questions for and conduct of interviews

with FCOs participating in this research. Further, this draft model was reviewed and

critiqued by all FCOs interviewed and served as the basis for the finalized decision

making model discussed in Chapter 5. All models in this research were only intended to

diagram decision options and processes, and so there was no attempt to diagram the

consequences of a particular decision as being “right” or “wrong” per se.

51

Figure 3-2: Draft Recognition Primed/Bounded Rational Decision Making (RP/BRDM) Model

52

3.3.3. Questionnaire Development and Description

A mixed method design was utilized for developing the research questionnaire to

utilize both quantitative and qualitative approaches in data gathering and analysis. It

employed both quantitative and qualitative methods for collecting interview data. The

closed-ended quantitative section of the questionnaire was designed to gather specific

professional demographic data from the FCOs interviewed such as professional

background, education, years of FCO service, etc. (see Section 3.3.3.3, below). This

allowed making comparisons across the interviewed cohort (Corbin and Strauss 2008;

Creswell 2003).

The qualitative sections of the questionnaire consisted of open-ended questions that

explored FCO experiences, decision processes, strategies, rationale and techniques used,

decisions made, and lessons learned (see Sections 3.3.3.4 – 3.3.3.6). The last qualitative

section of the questionnaire focused on the FCOs describing and then critiquing the draft

RP/BRDM model of decisional processes and techniques they used in decision making

during the initial response interval of a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster (see

Section 3.3.3.7).

A qualitative approach was chosen for all but the demographic section of the

questionnaire because FCO decision making during the initial response interval can be a

high stress, confusing period of a disaster response with complex psychological and

environmental interactive processes. A discussion of decision making in this possible

operational environment benefited from exploration and exposition through direct

interview and discussion with FCOs allowing them to use their own frames of reference

and not be influenced or limited by prescribed fixed choices (Morse 2007). By

53

interviewing FCOs in the cadre as well as important former FCOs, the research provided

the opportunity to gather descriptions of FCO decision processes during the initial

response interval of a major disaster. Former FCOs were also included because they

were FCOs during some of the most severe, catastrophic disasters the United States has

had in the past 13 years (e.g., 9-11 terrorist attack and hurricane Katrina).

Capturing the processes, techniques and decisions of interviewees in “their own

words” provided authenticity and uniqueness to the responses unable to be captured any

other way. The linkages and differences between factors and between respondents

formed the basis for coding the qualitative section of the research and for developing the

FCO-RP/BRDM model of FCO decision making (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Creswell

2007; Richards and Morse 2007; Creswell 2003; Taylor and Trujillo 2001).

The research questionnaire (Appendix A) was divided into the following seven

sections.

3.3.3.1. Research Introduction

The purpose of the research was discussed along with defining terms (e.g. initial

response interval), the interview process, and subsequent analysis to be conducted.

Notably, the “initial response interval” was defined not as a specific number of days, but

as that period of time at the beginning of a Presidentially declared disaster where there

can be a high degree of uncertainty and confusion, and where decisions confronting FCO

leadership may have to be made quickly, may be controversial, and could have high

consequences and impacts.

54

3.3.3.2. Questionnaire Overview

Oriented the FCO to the interview questions, their order and content. The research

explained that the interview would be conducted in two parts; the first part covering the

introduction, background, situational awareness, and decision making questions

contained (see Sections 3.3.3.1 – 3.3.3.6) and the second part reviewing the draft

RP/BRDM model (see Section 3.3.3.7 below). Also, consent was obtained from all

FCOs to have their interviews recorded for transcription and analysis purposes.

3.3.3.3. Educational and Professional Background

This quantitative section focused on an FCO’s professional experience and education

related to disaster leadership and decision making. The educational background

questions focused on the FCO’s formal education leading to an advanced degree or on

professional schools whose content was directly related to disaster management such as

the National War College, Naval Post Graduate School or Harvard’s executive programs.

The experience questions included military service, first responder positions (e.g., police,

fire, rescue) and other disaster leadership positions in such organizations as the Red

Cross, state or local government or the private sector. The professional experience

questions also included the FCO’s experience since becoming an FCO.

3.3.3.4. Selection of Disaster Example(s)

Each FCO was asked to select one or two Presidentially declared disasters where they

had a leadership role and which they found most challenging during the initial response

55

interval. Questions ensured that the disasters selected placed the FCO in a

leadership/decision making position during the incident. Additional questions focused on

whether the selected disaster(s) provided the FCO with a rich source of information for

discussing the details of decision making strategies and techniques and modeling of the

processes, structures and decision the FCO had to undertake. All FCOs volunteering and

selected for this research had such leadership experiences, as they were the more senior

members of the FCO cadre.

3.3.3.5. Achieving Situational Awareness

This section included questions on how the FCO achieved situational awareness in

the disaster(s) selected. That is, the process the FCO used to perceive the elements of the

situation, comprehend their meaning individually and collectively, and be able to project

the situation and implications into the near future (Endsley, 1995). What information

assisted in gaining this awareness and what cues or related experience helped in that

process? Also included in this section was a discussion concerning “what if” questions

such as how an FCO with lesser experience could gain situational awareness? Finally,

questions concerning the process of developing a mental picture of the situation and the

role of intuition verses rational analysis were included in this section.

3.3.3.6. Decision Making Process

This interview section addressed the actual process of FCO decision making and

explored the pressures, priorities, and role of intuition, innovation and mental modeling.

56

The FCOs were then asked questions on their perceptions of the situation they faced,

assessments they made, decision processes conducted, and actions taken. Also, the value

of experience verses being a novice was examined and additional “what if” questions

were asked to more fully explore the decision process chosen and alternatives considered.

Finally, additional questions were asked concerning what training, exercises and

experiences, techniques, job aids and tools/technologies helped the FCO in conducting

their decision making process.

3.3.3.7. Review of Draft RP/BRDM Model

If the interview was conducted over the phone, the six sections above were initially

discussed and then the draft RP/BRDM model was emailed and follow-up phone

interview conducted to review the model and obtain how well it reflected the FCO’s

decision making experiences. All FCOs participating in the research agreed to have a

follow-on interview discussing the draft RP/BRDM model. Modifications to the draft

model reflected what multiple FCOs believed and could justify in detail to better explain

their experiences and understandings concerning decision making in the initial response

interval. Interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed. If the FCO interview

was conducted in person (5 out of the 25 interviews), the model was discussed

functionally as a second interview following the initial interview that discussed the first

six sections of the questionnaire. A copy of the draft RP/BRDM model was provided for

reference to the FCO being interviewed and, as with the phone interviews, comments

were recorded. FCOs comments from the second phase of the interview were used to

modify the draft model, resulting in development of the FCO-RP/BRDM model.

57

3.3.4. George Washington University Institutional Review Board Approval

Before the research could begin and interviews conducted, the George Washington

University Institutional Review Board using Expedited Procedures conducted a review of

the research procedures and instruments and gave approval for the research and for the

FCO questionnaire and Informed Consent Form (Appendices A and B respectively).

This Review Board approval ensured a high standard of scholarship and respect for the

individual FCOs interviewed.

3.3.5. Selection of FCO Cohort

During the data collection interval for this research, there were 44 FCOs in the FCO

cadre managed by FEMA (FEMA 2011). Since the focus of the research was on decision

making in major disasters, only the more senior FCOs had opportunities for this type of

decision making and seniority was the selection criteria for FCO participation. More

junior FCOs participated in disasters through support roles and so were not selected to

participate in the research. FEMA has a four-level “Typing” credentialing schema for

FCOs based on their experience and only FCOs in the top-two credential levels/Types

were asked to participate (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2001b).

FCOs were notified of the research through email and all interviewees signed up via

email on a voluntary basis. Of the 27 email notifications sent, 25 FCOs agreed to

participate with two responding that while having a lot of disaster experience, they had

not been in the FCO program long enough to feel comfortable participating. Of the 25

FCOs interviewed, 20 were from the current FCO cadre at the time of the research (46

58

percent of the total cadre). In addition, 5 former FCOs were also interviewed because

they were the lead FCOs during some of the more recent catastrophic disasters (e.g.,

Hurricane Katrina and the September 11, “9-11”, terrorism incident) and during a

technological incident (the breakup of the Space Shuttle Columbia upon return to earth

after a space mission). While there have been other catastrophic disasters or

technological events (e.g., Hurricane Andrew, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant

disaster), the FCO cadre did not exist at that time and so these disasters/events are not

referenced by FCOs in this research.

3.3.6. FCO Interview Process

The researcher conducted all 25 FCO interviews and all FCOs signed Informed

Consent Forms. All interviews were based on the questionnaire (Appendix A) that was

divided into quantitative and qualitative sections as discussed in detail in Section 3.3.3.

The last section of each interview involved presenting a copy of the draft RP/BRDM

model and a discussion of it based each FCO’s own knowledge, experiences and

situational understandings. The discussion of the draft RP/BRDM model was placed as

the last section in the interview so as not to bias or influence the FCOs’ answers to the

earlier sections in the questionnaire. For FCO interviews conducted over the phone, the

draft RP/BRDM model was emailed and reviewed after all the other interview sections

were completed. For the 5 FCO interviews conducted in person, the draft RP/BRDM

model was provided in hard copy and reviewed in the second part of the interview.

59

Notes were taken for all interviews and the interviews were electronically recorded

with permission to record being obtained from all FCOs. All recorded interviews were

transcribed verbatim by a professional transcription service.

The results of each interview were referenced in this research using a random number

designation for each FCO (e.g. FCO#1) to protect their identity. In addition, there was no

emphasis on, or attempt to discuss “correct” answers for decisions made, but rather the

focus was exclusively on the decision making processes used by the FCOs during the

initial response interval of a Presidentially declared disaster. The prototype RP/BRDM

model, Figure 3-2, was modified to diagram particular decisional processes, techniques

and suggestions by the FCOs, resulting in development of the FCO-RP/BRDM model

(Figure 5-5).

3.4. Analytic Procedures and Coding

The data analysis performed on all interviews had both quantitative and qualitative

components. Quantitative data was collected, coded and described the FCOs’ education

and professional backgrounds. Trends, common approaches, strategies and techniques

were derived from coding the qualitative data. The MAXQDA software was used to help

analyze the interview data by allowing the researcher to apply the coding structure to the

transcribed interviews that were entered into the MAXQDA software. The interview

transcripts could then be sorted for specific codes, examined for common elements or

trends and corroboration of ideas and concepts. Further, as more interviews were

conducted using the same questionnaire, coding elements were added reflecting the new

60

information obtained or issues raised. The researcher then was able to use the MAXQDA

software to go back and search the earlier interviews against these new code elements

(Verbi 2011). Together, the quantitative and qualitative mixed method design enabled

describing and modeling the FCOs’ decision making processes and techniques (Corbin

and Strauss 2008; Norman and Streiner 2003; Creswell 2003; Selltiz et al 1959).

FCO interview results were coded and analyzed in four groupings, mirroring the

questionnaire structure. The first group was the quantitative educational and professional

background data. Coding was done for the FCOs’ post-secondary formal education and

their disaster related professional experience before joining the FCO cadre (i.e., military,

firefighting, police, emergency management, Red Cross or other). The number of years

each interviewee had been working at FEMA as an FCO was also recorded as was the

Type skill level obtained at the time of the interview. This coded group also included the

specification by each FCO of one or two disasters from their career that were the most

challenging for them and for which they had decision making responsibilities. They each

used their individual one or two disasters as reference for discussion throughout the rest

of their initial and follow-on interview.

The next coded grouping focused on the process of how the FCO achieved situational

awareness. The perceived influences of the physical and political characteristics of the

disaster were included. The reasoning techniques (cues, metaphors, analogies) were

coded as well as the FCOs’ views on the role of intuition, bounded rationality and the

need for information from reports and through direct observation enabling the FCO to

develop a mental picture of the disaster situation. Also, the value of training and

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exercises and of professional experience, verses being a novice vis-à-vis gaining

situational awareness were included in this coded grouping of data.

The third grouping for coding was the decision making process FCOs used in the

disaster(s) they chose. How the FCOs developed goals and priorities were reviewed.

The roles of advice from others and the amount and type of information that was needed

as well as the processes of bounded rationality and intuition used in decision making

were coded. Finally, the roles of innovation and the pressure on the FCO to decide were

coded as well as how possible “what if” situations actually had developed and how these

other exigencies could have affected decision making.

The last group coded by the researcher was FCOs’ comments and suggested changes

to the draft RP/BRDM model. The coding first focused on how FCOs assessed the

decisional situation based on cues, features and expectancies, and whether the FCO

determined if the situation was “typical” (i.e., analogous to other decisions made in the

past) or not. How the FCO then dealt with the decision needing to be made, either

intuitively or through a bounded rational approach, how the decision to be made was

diagnosed and assessed, goals and objectives formulated, alternative(s) mentally

simulated or analyzed and selection/decision made from alternatives. Coding of the

second interview defined the FCO-RP/BRDM model (Figure 5-5) reflecting the FCOs’

collective comments and viewpoints.

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3.5. Data Collected and Analyses Conducted

The data collected, coding and analyses conducted was performed only by the

researcher for all interview data. Hence, no reconciliation of data gathered and analyses

made between different researchers was required.

The analysis and insights proved valuable in discussing and modeling the FCOs’

decision making processes and experiences. However, there was no attempt to generalize

the research results and conclusions from this exploratory research to other groups

beyond the surveyed FCO cohort. Any generalization or expansion of these findings to a

wider population requires additional research as discussed in Section 6.3

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Chapter 4 - Results and Analysis

4.1. Overview

This chapter focuses on the analyses and results of the interviews conducted with the

FCOs who volunteered for this research. The chapter begins by reviewing the

professional and educational backgrounds of the FCOs who volunteered for interviews

and then discusses the illustrative disasters selected by these FCOs for the interview

process. The physical factors influencing and limiting access to disaster information are

discussed next followed by a section focused on how FCOs gain situational awareness

during the initial response interval both from reports and direct observation. Finally, a

review of the FCOs’ decision making process is provided to include a discussion of the

roles of training and education as well as emerging technology in aiding FCOs in the

decision making process.

4.2. FCO Professional and Educational Background

4.2.1. Years of Service as an FCO

All FCOs that participated in the research volunteered and were selected because they

were more senior members of the FCO cadre. Of the 25 FCOs interviewed, 20 were from

the current FCO cadre at the time of the research (46 percent of the total cadre, N = 44).

Table 4-1 shows the years of FCO service for the 20 current and 5 former FCOs

participating in the research. All FCOs interviewed had 3 or more years of service with

19 current or former FCOs (76 percent) having 6 or more years and 10 FCOs (40 percent)

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having 10 or more years of service. The more senior FCOs participated in more

disasters, had risen to higher positions within the FCO cadre and so had more

opportunities for decision making during the initial response interval that was the focus

of this research. The five former FCOs interviewed were senior FCOs during some of the

most severe disasters the United States has had in the past 12 years (e.g., 9-11 terrorist

attack and Hurricane Katrina) and a major technological disaster (the re-entry

disintegration of the Columbia Space Shuttle).

Table 4-1: Years of Service as an FCO

Years

Service 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

No. of

FCOs 1 3 2 1 5 2 1 4 1 2 3

4.2.2. FCO Expertise “Type” Rating

A further measure of FCO experience and professional attainment was the Type

rating of each FCO in the cadre. The FCO rating Type system was composed of 4 levels

of expertise with the FCOs moving up the levels as they satisfy the educational and

experiential requirements for each level. The FEMA Federal Coordinating Officer

Professional Development Plan, 2011, lists 4 Type levels for FCOs divided as follows:

1. Type IV – Trainee: Focus on learning FEMA operations, roles of the different

components and roles of state, tribal and local governments in disaster response

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and recovery. Are mentored by more senior FCOs and may deploy to small

disasters as an FCO or be assigned as a Deputy FCO, Special Assistant or Chief

of Staff in larger disasters

2. Type III – Basically Qualified: Able to manage small-scale operations and

disaster response and recovery operations as the FCO with guidance.

3. Type II – Fully Qualified: Able to manage all but the most severe/catastrophic

disasters without direct oversight. Also able to serve as a Deputy FCO, Chief of

Staff or Special Assistant on severe/catastrophic disasters. Knowledgeable to

train or mentor other FCOs.

4. Type I – Expert: Capable of being an FCO managing severe/catastrophic, highly

visible and politically sensitive disasters. Serves as mentor to other FCOs.

Since the research focused on FCO decision making in high stress Presidentially

declared disasters, the FCOs surveyed had to have participated in those types of disasters

with decision making responsibilities. Consequently, no Type IV FCOs were selected for

this research, while 5 current and all 5 former Type I FCOs were selected (40 percent of

the total sample) along with 10 Type II FCOs. Only 5 FCOs (20 percent) participated at

the Type III level providing a less experienced perspective, but still having the requisite

experience of working as an FCO in Presidentially declared disasters and having worked

one or more previous careers with at least one of them having some relation to

emergency management (see Section 4.2.3, below). FCOs at the Type II and I levels

composed 80 percent of the interview population because they constituted the most

experienced group of FCOs with the most experience in disaster decision making.

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Table 4-2: FCO Cohort by Expertise Type (Rating)

Type (Level) IV III II I

FCOs

Participating 0 5 10 10

Percent of Total

Participating 0 20 40 40

4.2.3. FCO Professional Experience Prior to Joining the FCO Cadre

FCOs that participated in this research joined the FCO cadre as a second or after

multiple careers, all FCOs having at least one of their previous careers directly related to

emergency management. So while the FCOs had diverse backgrounds, there was a

disaster experience link in their backgrounds. For example, as a military officer they

were a Defense Coordinating Officer working with FEMA or were in charge of a military

base’s emergency programs among other duties. As firefighters, they were in leadership

positions having to make decisions in highly stressful situations where lives and property

were at stake. Working for the Red Cross, they led and managed efforts dealing with the

human and material effects of disasters, sometimes making decisions in the early stressful

hours right after a disaster occurred. As FCO#7 noted, “You know what, honestly I think

one of the things that I admire about our [FCO] cadre is our diversity, and our

backgrounds, and skills, and strengths.”9

9 Note: In this Section and in other Sections where specific characteristics of FCOs are discussed, FCOs

are not identified by number due to the fact that specific background details are mentioned and if FCO

numbers were used they could be connected to specific FCO individuals.

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Figure 4-1 below provides a breakout of the professional careers that FCOs

participating in this research had prior to joining the FCO cadre. All the experience

described below provided the FCOs leadership decision making and management

experience relevant to their FCO position. It shows that 15 FCOs interviewed (60

percent) had prior military, Corps of Engineers or U.S. Coast Guard experience. An

additional 5 FCOs (20 percent) had firefighter service, while 2 FCOs (8 percent) had

police experience. Finally, 3 FCOs (12 percent) had Red Cross experience and an

additional 8 FCOs (32 percent) held various positions of leadership in emergency

management at the state, local or private levels. Because some FCOs joined the FCO

cadre after having multiple disaster related careers, the total number of careers listed in

Figure 5-1 adds up to more than 25 – the number of FCOs participating in the research.

Military, 15

Fire, 5

Police, 2

Emerg. Mgmt., 7

Red Cross, 3

Other, 1

Figure 4-1: Professional Background of FCOs Prior to Joining the FCO Cadre

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4.2.4. FCO Educational Backgrounds

All FCOs in the research cohort had graduated from college and 15 (60 percent) had a

master’s degree. In addition, as part of the FCO professional development program, all

FCOs attended professional schools such as the Army War College, Naval Post Graduate

School, and/or various Harvard management programs (see Figure 4-2). Together, this

formal education by FCOs was supplemented by many FEMA courses and together

provided the scholastic underpinning to their professional disaster management

experience and decision making capabilities.

0

5

10

15

20

25

BA MA Professional School

24

15

25

Figure 4-2: Levels of Education Achieved by FCOs

4.3. Disaster Selected

Each FCO was asked to pick one or two of the largest, most severe disasters in their

careers where they were the lead FCO and found specific decisions personally most

challenging as a leader and decision maker. A further requirement was that the

disaster(s) picked had to have been Presidentially declared Stafford Act disasters. Thus,

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the disasters each FCO picked were designated by the President to be severe enough to

mandate Federal assistance and direct involvement. These one or two disasters chosen by

each FCO and the decisions they made served as the basis and reference points for the

answers provided by the FCOs to the series of questions on their decision making

contained in the survey questionnaire (Appendix A).

The disasters selected by the FCOs for the interview were of two types. They were

either more severe manifestations due to size and intensity of more “typical” disasters or

they were completely new types of disasters, “atypical” or prototype disasters. Examples

of the former type are Hurricane Katrina and the Midwest floods of 1993. While

hurricanes regularly come ashore in the United States during Hurricane Season, the

damage is not nearly as devastating or over such a large area as it was after Katrina – nor

as demanding on FCO decision making. Flooding occurs in the Midwest during many

spring seasons, but it is not usually as extensive or as devastating as that which occurred

in the spring of 1993 (Haddow, Bullock and Coppola 2008).

Examples of the second type of disasters chosen by FCOs for this study, those that

were totally new, atypical/prototype disasters were the 9-11 terrorist attack and the

breakup of the Columbia Space Shuttle upon coming back to earth after a space mission.

In each of these disasters, the FCO confronted new situations and challenges heretofore

not experienced nor even contemplated.

The interviewed FCO cohort selected a total of 33 disasters, with 8 FCOs each

selecting two disasters to discuss.

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Table 4-3: Disasters Selected by FCOs

Even though 79 percent of the FCOs picked at least one disaster that provided

warning before striking, all the disasters picked by the FCOs for this study required them

to deal with situations and make decisions that went beyond the routine or customary. In

addition, more than one FCO picked Hurricane Katrina for this research because the

hurricane was so devastating and geographically disperse in Louisiana and Mississippi

that the response required multiple FCOs in multiple Joint Field Offices.

Confronted by the severity and/or unusual nature of the disaster, the FCOs had to

make decisions in environments and concerning issues that were extreme and/or

unfamiliar during the initial response period of the disasters selected. In one example,

FCO#13 noted, “It was to a point that even the EOC had to evacuate…because the water

was coming down the hill so fast …nobody really had good situational awareness of how

devastating…Because that water – it came fast and furious...”

The extent to which FCOs could rely on previous knowledge and experience or

conversely, had to move into new decisional areas with largely new information,

situations and results are discussed in this Analysis and Findings Chapter.

FCOs

Select

Wildfire Snowstorm

7 6 11 4 2 1 1 1

Hurricane

KatrinaEvent

Hurricane

Other Than

Katrina

Floods Tornados

9-11

Terrorist

Event

Space

Shuttle

Disaster

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4.4. Achieving Situational Awareness

The decision making process for an FCO in the initial response period was composed

of two steps, first gaining situational awareness of the disaster and its implications and

second, the steps in actually making the decisions necessary. In the Literature Review

(Chapter 2), the personal perceptual factors of FCOs leading to or aiding in their

situational awareness were discussed. This Section now takes that discussion into the

area of external issues and situations in the disaster environment that influence what

information is available to the FCO.

Before the FCOs interviewed could engage in decision making concerning a disaster,

100 percent of the cohort expressed the need and value of developing situational

awareness, fitting the component parts of the situation into a mental frame of elements

and relationships and being able to project implications from this composite picture into

the future. All FCOs interviewed discussed the dynamics of the disaster they chose, its

physical impacts, political and response considerations, and the reliance the FCO had on

reports from others or the need for personal direct observation. As FCO#17 noted,

“There’s probably nothing that can guide a decision better than situational awareness.

And so, having situational awareness right up front to help guide your decisions, to make

sure you’re making sound decisions, is key.”

Accurate situational awareness was crucial for accurate decision making according to

all FCOs interviewed. Without it, or with inaccurate situational awareness, decision

making was viewed by FCOs as being inevitably flawed. As FCO#17 went on to

mention, “Poor situational awareness, and I’ll classify poor situational awareness as bad

information or misinformation, could be as detrimental to a decision as anything.”

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FCO#24 had “10 Big Questions” about a disaster to establish a mental frame for

understanding the situation, as the first step towards situational awareness – the “what,

where, how, when and who” which together summarize well what all FCO’s expressed as

needing for understanding the situation.

1. What are the physical characteristics of the disaster itself?

2. What's the current status of the federal, state and local response?

3. Where is the emergency-operation center and command post?

4. What has the state requested from the federal government?

5. Who else from outside the state or local government is involved in responding?

6. What are the state and local priorities?

7. What is the risk to individuals?

8. What are the ongoing life-saving activities?

9. What is the status of key and critical infrastructures like roads, electricity,

telephone, water, other?

10. Who is on my team, not just FEMA staff, but from other federal agencies, non-

government agencies, private sector folks?

The above questions assisting the FCO's in understanding the situation can be

summarized into two categories, 1) the physical characteristics and impacts of the

disaster itself, and 2) its political and managerial contexts and consequences. The

physical characteristics included the type of disaster, its severity, geographic size, and

whether it occurred with warning. The political and managerial contexts of the disaster

included such information as the state and local governing structures (e.g., strong

governor and mayor, or power residing with the legislature and city council), emergency

73

management structures and capabilities at the state, tribal, territorial, and local levels

(well organized, trained and equipped, or less so), and the relationships between states

and localities and their disaster response structures (e.g., friendly and supportive, or

independent or even hostile)

4.4.1. Physical Characteristics: Influencing FCO Disaster Situational Awareness

A preliminary step for all FCOs was developing situational awareness by gaining

access to required situational information. They uniformly believed that access was

fundamental and foundational for their understanding of the disaster situation and for

making decisions about it. The physical aspects of the disaster influenced the FCOs’

ability to this obtain situational awareness regardless of approaches or techniques they

utilized.

4.4.1.1. Physical Characteristic: Type of Disaster Influencing FCO


Disaster types that occurred more frequently such as floods, tornadoes or even

hurricanes usually had parameters and conditions that were more familiar to the FCOs

and enabled them to understand the situation they faced and what was happening more

easily because of their knowledge of, and multiple previous experiences with, similar

types of disasters. They knew the physical characteristics and effects of these disasters

on society’s infrastructures and individuals, and so knew what questions to ask and

74

information to expect. As FCO#23 noted: “…flooding happens every year, it’s a

function of snow saturating ground and then the ‘big one’ which is thaw…”

However, if the type of disaster was unusual, a prototype/atypical, the FCO had to

deal with new and unfamiliar situations and characteristics. A terrorism event such as 9-

11 or a technological event such as the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster were the

examples of these types of disasters to which three FCOs interviewed had to respond (12

percent of the cohort, see Table 4-3). These disasters were clearly not in the FCO’s

previous experience and required understanding of subject matter not studied

academically or operationally dealt with before. For example, the FCO interviewed who

responded to the Space Shuttle disaster did not know about the effects of hazardous

Shuttle parts and payloads now spread across the countryside. Similarly, FCOs

responding to 9-11 did not know about the consequences of falling 110-story office

buildings or the effects of pulverized debris that became airborne. The lack of familiarity

with the type of disaster faced, made it difficult to assess the situation and project

consequences from possible decisions.

For prototype/atypical type disasters, a significant component of information required

for situational awareness and sources for this information may be different than from

more typical re-occurring disasters. This could add difficulty for the FCO even being

able to perceive the critical factors/cues of the situation, as well as understanding the

situation or being able to project factors and decisional options into it. These types of

disasters could also bring together responders that had not worked with each other before,

adding further difficulty to sharing information and understanding between important

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responding groups. As the FCO noted, “I met up with the NASA lead…And they didn’t

know anything about FEMA. We didn’t know anything about NASA.”10

4.4.1.2. Physical Characteristic: Severity of Disaster Influencing FCO


Severity of the disaster was the second physical factor affecting FCOs ability to have

access to information either from direct observation or from reports. Even more “typical”

types of disasters became atypical or prototypes when they were of severe intensity. This

was the case for the disasters picked by 22 of the 25 FCOs interviewed (92 percent) for

this research (see Section 4.3 for more on disaster selection). For example, 6 of the FCOs

interviewed (24 percent) selected Hurricane Katrina to discuss in this study. While

hurricanes happen with regularity in United States, rarely do they have such devastating

effects and consequences. For a severe hurricane such as Katrina, the availability of

information initially was more limited and harder to obtain due to the disruption of the

normal means of gathering and reporting information needed for situational awareness.

As FCO#15 noted, “… information was not coming in about how bad it was. …on

Monday morning [we were] thinking, ‘Boy, we really dodged the bullet here.’…the

flooding was going on that night, but we didn’t have situational awareness of it.”

The lack of information during the initial response interval of Hurricane Katrina

affected responders at all levels. As FCO#15 continued, “We’d wholesale [supplies] to

the states and then the locals would distribute it. I don’t think they had an appreciation

10

This is another example of where an FCO number is not provided in the text to better protect FCOs’

identity. See Footnote 9, above.

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that their distribution network was gone, and so we were pushing stuff down…truckloads

of food and stuff…and they were…in parking lots around New Orleans...” The FCO did

not have information that the supplies the FCO was helping to move to the disaster area

were not getting to their intended recipients, but rather were being stopped outside the

area.

Of the FCOs surveyed, 60 percent (15 FCOs) commented directly that the disaster’s

severity directly interfered with the normal means to access information during the initial

response interval. This left the FOC and other responders at all levels making decisions

based on incomplete or inaccurate information.

4.4.1.3. Physical Characteristic: Geographic Size of Disaster Influencing

FCO Situational Awareness

The third physical factor influencing the FCOs’ ability to gain information was the

geographic size of the disaster area. Of the FCOs participating in this research, 17 (68

percent) picked disasters of this type. Disasters like Hurricane Katrina, which covered an

area roughly the size of Great Britain (GPO, February 2006) or the multi-state Columbia

Space Shuttle disaster which took place over a wide geographic area made it harder in the

initial response interval to obtain information on the extent and severity of disaster due to

the geographic size of the event itself. In contrast, the Joplin tornado while tragically

severe, took place over a relatively small area in one state. When a disaster had a small

geographic footprint, it was easier for an FCO to send teams to report on the situation or

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to personally travel to the impacted area to begin understanding the hazard and its

impacts.

Geographic size, like severity, added its own complexity and so difficulty with

interpreting disaster information. The geographically larger the disaster, the more local

and even state governmental jurisdictions were usually involved along with more private

sector organizations, groups, and citizens. The FCOs in the research discussing large

geographic disasters reported that gathering, merging and assessing information became

more involved with multiple sources of information and so possible miss-information or

conflicting information. In addition, while information might be valid for one particular

area, it might not represent the situation in the total area impacted by the disaster that

could include multiple jurisdictions, economic locations and population centers. Hence,

the geographic size of a disaster made it difficult for the FCOs to get sufficient, accurate

and reliable information covering all aspects of the disaster in all geographic areas in the

initial response interval.

4.4.1.4. Physical Characteristic: Disasters With/Without Warning

Influencing FCO Situational Awareness

The fourth physical characteristic that directly affected FCO situational awareness

was whether the disaster came with warning or not. Of the FCOs participating in the

research, 22 (88 percent) selected large geographic disasters that provided warning such

as those caused by hurricanes and floods. With notice of an impending disaster, 100

percent of those FCOs said they prepared for the situation by seeking out reports from

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federal, state, tribal, territorial, local and private sources. For example FCO#17 notes that

in advance of the onset of a flood disaster, “I basically had the conversation with the GIS

[geographic information system] and the weather folks, as well as the folks that had to

access the river gauges and that kind of stuff. And basically, through having a meeting

with these folks, …we were able to project out to a certain level of accuracy where we

expected fairly accurately what was going to be flooded so that we could order, the state

could order those evacuations ahead of time.” Also, FCO#4 noted concerning a

hurricane coming ashore, “We had a lot of awareness twice a day, every day for at least

five days before the storm hit. We had a great awareness of what the community needed;

what they were taking care of themselves, what the state needed to be provided, and what

we as a federal government might be prepared to provide once we had a pre-declaration

or declaration after the storm.”

Additionally, 8 FCOs also selected at least one disaster that had no warning.11

Even

these FCOs in no-notice disaster situations stated they still had to seek out and review

reports from federal, state, local and private sources; however, the time to acquire, read

and understand them was compressed as the need to obtain situational awareness and

ingest information merged with the demands to respond. FCO#23’s comment typified

this approach, “You know, whatever operations reports, the incident reports, whatever

they are publishing. …Read it; speed-read it as quickly as you can. Find the summaries,

the narratives. Try not to get too mired into the details. …News reports, Internet

searches.”

11

Some FCOs selected both a no-notice and a disaster with notice to discuss during the research. Hence,

33 disasters were selected for discussion by the 25 FCOs interviewed.

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4.4.2. Situational Awareness: Political Contexts

Disaster response occurs within the context of the state and local capabilities, political

realities and personalities. In a sense, all disasters are political in that all disasters that

befall a community and state have significant political overtones of responsibility and

accountability concerning how the political structures and those elected and employed

individuals in those structures respond to the disaster and take care of the citizens and

property impacted. Every FCO interviewed expressed the need to be aware of the

political realities and relationships before entering the disaster area. FCO#7

characterized this understanding by asking the following questions when going to a

disaster:

Is it [the disaster area] rural, is it urban? Are people, do people tend to seek help in

assistant centers or do they tend to go stay with family and friends? You know, is this

kind of a pull yourself up by your bootstraps kind of a community, or is it one that

really does seek and look for assistance. Is it best to communicate through radio, TV,

or print? You know, is English a second language? Things like that to give me an

idea of the resources I’m going to need to bring to make sure we reach out to people.

Further, 100 percent of the FCOs interviewed stated that they needed to know what is

the character and relationship between the governmental levels within the state. Does the

state central government have strong powers or are much of the governing powers at the

local level? Is the relationship between the state and local governments cooperative or

competitive, are they wealthy or poor, ready to respond to the disasters they face or in

need of significant assistance? As FCO#16 noted, “…especially [in] the New England

states, the counties are not even powerful. They have all these townships you have got to

figure out how to deal with that. So, what is the structure? So you need to do a little

homework on that if you have time. If you don’t have time, you have got to make time.”

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The FEMA headquarters and regional offices regularly engage emergency

community stakeholders at the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governmental

levels and at the nongovernmental emergency community stakeholders level concerning

disaster preparedness, mitigation, protection, response and recovery (FEMA Publication

1, November 2010). These FEMA offices informed the FCOs that participated in the

research about the strengths and weaknesses of the different governmental and

nongovernmental organizations involved in some way in the disaster response and

recovery. As FCO#18 stated, “So all the problem areas and everything that they [FEMA

Regional staff] have done in that state is right there to actually grasp in a briefing. …I

just talk to the Regional Administrator.” This information is crucial for the FCOs’

decision making by helping them determine the types and degree of assistance that may

have to be provided and the entities with which they may have to coordinate.

The FCOs were also supported from across the federal government through the 15

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) representing functional capabilities and resources

at both the national and regional levels. Each ESF represents one or more critical

functions in disaster response such as communications, transportation, energy, etc. (U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, 2008b). These ESF teams of experts served as FCO

staff and supported the development of situational awareness through developing

situational reports and analyses and by conducting outreach in their subject area. As

FCO# 12 noted, “Staff are important. They’re not just there for me to tell them what to

do. In fact, they’re not there for me to tell them what to do. They’re there because they

are skilled in their various functions and I certainly need to depend on them for just the

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thought processes, for making sure we’re not missing things to anticipate and to respond

appropriately.”

Finally, 100 percent of the FCOs participating in the research gained political

situational awareness from state, tribal, territorial, local and private representatives. The

need for all FCOs interviewed to coordinate closely with these representatives was a

common requirement in their gaining situational awareness. FCO#16 characterization of

this coordination is representative of the FCOs interviewed, noting: “... first of all, you

build relationships and really start with the state coordinating officer and the governor’s

policy guy or chief of staff, or whoever, and from there if you have the kind of trust and

candor, they can give you assessments. …Every government structure in every state is

different with different personalities. You know some have strong constitutional

governors, others …have very weak governors.”

The trusting advisory relationship between the FCO and their staffs and also with

state and local officials was an important and reoccurring theme for all FCOs

interviewed. The necessity for having, or quickly building, trusting relationships with

those that the FCO needed to work with in a disaster was crucial so that the FCO could

then trust the information given by these sources concerning situational awareness and

response options. As FCO#12 emphasized:

I will tell you, you’re talking to the right person if you want to talk about trust

because that’s huge to me. I highlight that on every operation. I tell people, ‘you

know, love makes the world go around that’s not true. It’s trust.’ Now we were

fortunate in this event for a couple of reasons. One is that FEMA Region had done a

lot of work and a lot of trust building with the states for which they are responsible.

Two is that we had been in the state… with an open JFO actually since March. So I

was already in an extremely good relationship with the state emergency management

with the governor’s office. We had people on the ground in the state working in a

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number of places…all the way down… So the trust level was high between the

region, the state and the already existing operation.

The more severe the disaster, the more crucial having or quickly establishing

mutually trusting relationships became in the initial response interval. This was noted by

all of the 8 FCOs interviewed for this research that had leading roles in the initial

response to catastrophic disasters. By way of illustration, in one catastrophic disaster, an

FCO was able to utilize truly exceptional trust relationships already established with

federal, state and city leaders, and also with the city’s emergency management

community to make crucial decisions and get resources moving. As the FCO noted:

I had been at FEMA long enough to know what kind of buttons I could push to get

stuff, I was able to, you know, just sort of bring in whatever I felt was required. And

because I had the trust of the top leadership…you know, to the mayor himself, …and

that same trust was at the state level because, again, I had known the…state

director…his team and his staff also had, you know, many, many years of experience

with working with me, and I built trust and I built a reputation of being someone who

they could rely on to help.

The FCOs in this research participated as the federal lead representative within the

political context of the federal, state and local governments and a host of private

organizations all either affected by or assisting in response to the disaster. It was

coordinating and maximizing the impact of requested federal assistance with these other

political and private entities in the context of the disaster’s characteristics and

consequences that was a particular challenge for the FCO, especially in the initial

response interval when events were extremely fast moving and confusing.

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4.4.3. Situational Awareness: Managerial Contexts

All FCOs interviewed gained access to disaster situational reports through joining a

team of federal, state, tribal, territorial, local and/or private responders, depending on the

disaster’s location and characteristics. While the FCOs led the federal responding team,

the position the FCOs held in all cases was that of a “coordinating officer” with other

governmental and private organizations and personnel. As FCO#16 cautioned, “First of

all as Federal Coordinating Officer, it’s not the Federal Commanding Officer, he or she is

the coordinating officer and so you are part of the team.” All FCOs interviewed stated

that they worked in the initial disaster response interval as part of this federal, state,

tribal, territorial, local, and private response team. Information for gaining necessary

situational awareness came from these sources and decisions made by the FCO were

often as recommendations to this response team.

FEMA and other federal agency headquarters staffs provided the FCOs interviewed

with high level/strategic guidance and information. In addition, these sources were

sources of specialized and impact information for the FCOs as well. This was especially

true if the disaster was having national impact and/or was highly unusual such as 9-11,

Hurricane Katrina or the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster. For example, the FCO

selected to lead the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster commented that while traveling to

Barksdale Air Force base where the disaster was being managed noted receiving initial

situational understanding from, “…conference calls with the White House, and we had

NASA on, FEMA on. I mean, that was a great thing because this was something that

we’d never trained for and never worked for, but we got good guidance.”

All the FCOs surveyed worked with one or more of the 10 FEMA Regional

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Administrators and their senior staff depending on the location and size of the disaster.

The FCOs also had access to Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) from the

FEMA Region where the disaster occurred, other FEMA Regions or even from FEMA

Headquarters national IMAT if necessary. These IMATs were dedicated, full-time rapid

response teams dedicated to support disaster response and provide situation awareness for

decision makers (FEMA, 2010). As FCO#4 commented when responding to a

geographically very large flood, “We had four or five Regional IMATs that were

deployed in key spots. So we would use them for [gathering] information.”

FEMA Regional Office staffs were also incorporated into the interviewed FCOs’

managerial team as a necessary source of situational awareness information. Regional

Office personnel worked with state and local emergency staffs on emergency program

development, planning, training and exercises on a daily basis, and with these same

groups during actual disaster response and recovery operations. As FCO#18 noted when

referring to Regional support, “You’ve got a team of experts with you and when I come

in, I have an operations person, I have a planning person, I have a financial person.” Or

as FCO#7 noted when initially responding to a major flood, “But most of the good

information came from two sources. It came from the [FEMA] Regional Administrator

and his Operations Officer, and then …from the State Coordinating Officer. Because of

all those sources I had a pretty good feel or handle of what was going on there.”

The value and necessity of working with state representatives in developing

situational awareness was also expressed by all FCOs interviewed. The FCOs worked

most closely with state leadership including the governor and emergency manager for the

state. The lead emergency manager for the state can be titled the State Emergency

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Director, State Coordinating Officer or even can be the state’s National Guard Adjutant

General. Whatever the title, this individual has been given the responsibility to

coordinate the state’s response to disaster and is responsible for coordinating that

response with the federal, local and private entities also responding. This person is the

FCO’s equivalent at the state level and all FCOs interviewed expressed the need to work

closely with the state lead as part of a team. As FCO#1 noted: “I was there two days

prior to the declaration in the anticipation of the Presidential Declaration and so during

that time of course the first place you go is the State Emergency Operations Center

(EOC) and you establish a good relationship with the Director of Emergency

Management and the Adjutant General who is in charge of the National Guard because he

is representing the initial response. Normally in every state, the first responders are the

first to respond and they are reporting to the State EOC so your best information is going

to come from State Emergency Operations Center.”

The above discussion concerning situation awareness in the initial response period is

not intended to imply that all information provided to the FCO is correct or not without

problems. For 8 FCOs interviewed (32 percent) problems arose with the information

being provided or not provided for situation awareness at different levels of support.

Hurricane Katrina provides the most spectacular example of this with the FCOs

interviewed for this research. As FCO#3 noted, “We were getting a lot of reports of

violence and hospitals being overrun…95 percent of them turned out to be false. So it

was the most difficult disaster I’ve ever been in for getting situational awareness.”

FCO#15 also pointed out, “And because, again, information was not coming in about

how bad it was…I too was one that fell into that trap on Monday morning thinking, …we

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really dodged the bullet here.”

The FCOs interviewed led and worked within a broad team both from political and

managerial contexts. However, to supplement and clarify the situational information

coming from the team, all the FCOs interviewed acknowledged the value during the

initial response period of getting out and directly observing the disaster’s impacts first

hand, meeting with local officials and talking to survivors.

4.4.4. Direct Observation: A Necessary Component for FCO Situation

Awareness

FCOs have two sources of direct observation to supplement reports given to them for

gaining disaster situational awareness. They can go see the situation personally,

observing the conditions and situations first-hand, meeting directly with officials and

those impacted by the events. In addition, they can send trusted agents. Trusted agents

are really a type of trusted reporting, but the FCOs interviewed categorized them with

personal direct observation in that they were personal extensions of the FCOs themselves.

As FCO#22 commented, “…You’ve got to go, either personally if you can, or you’ve got

to put some trusted liaisons into that disaster location that are – that have the luxury of

gaining information because most of the people in that disaster are in a flood fight or a

crisis response or … surviving.”

All FCOs interviewed acknowledged the value of personally going and seeing the

disaster’s damage and impact, of having some sort of “hands-on” personal experience

with the disaster area if possible, from a fly-over of the damaged area to a drive-through

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and/or walk-and-talk with responders and survivors so that the FCO can see first-hand

what they are dealing with. However, 15 FCOs (60 percent) chose to discuss the value of

direct observation at length. As FCO#23 noted, “You’re listening to conversations.

…You’re introducing yourself, but you’re gathering Intel. at the same time.” Also,

“FCO#22 noted, “…the main thing to me is there’s no substitute for visual assessment by

yourself. …you always have confidence in what you see and it’s not being filtered

through somebody else, so you understand personally – you’re able to put your own

experience and background to what you’re seeing, as opposed to it being filtered through

somebody else.”

The 15 FCOs that discussed direct observation at length discussed the political

advantage of personally seeing the disaster’s impacts and consequences. FCO#16’s

comment typified these viewpoints: “…as soon as it is safe I’ve gone into the impacted

area ...go visit the most impacted counties or jurisdictions myself along with the state

coordinating officer. …and that is not just to get the intelligence of what is going on, it is

also to show the flag and let them know that the state and the feds are there.” The FCO,

as the lead representative of the federal government in the disaster response, needed to

show concern and compassion for those individuals and communities affected by the

disaster. This also furthered the FCO’s legitimacy with the state and local responders and

they saw the FCO as a caring partner in the response effort during the initial response

interval.

If a personal visit by an FCO was impossible given the demands of the disaster during

the initial response period, the FCO’s discussed what they characterized as the next-best

alternative, that of sending “trusted agents” into the field to personally report back.

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These individuals were known to the FCO for their reporting reliability and interpretive

value. If the FCO could not get out into the disaster area directly, sending these

individuals was viewed by the 15 FCOs who discussed this topic at length as the next

best alternative. As FCO#16 commented, “But first of all get intelligence, you have to

have somebody on the ground you trust and knows what they are talking about, doesn’t

get hysterical and all that.”

In a sense, these “trusted agents” were personal extensions of the FCOs into the

disaster area and so were differentiated by these FCOs from more general reporting

information coming from emergency operating centers, media and state and local

officials, discussed above. As FCO#10 stated, “I never rely solely on myself. I’m

relying on trusted people. I don’t hesitate to call back the people whose opinions I trust.

I don’t hesitate to bring in people that I know can help and the extensions that we need

out there. It’s not about you …you need a lot of help.” These trusted agents could also

include fellow FCOs who for a particular disaster had different responsibilities, as

FCO#4 noted, “So those senior IMAT leads would call in, they were FCO cadre

members, and do situational awareness and let us know what the needs were.”

The FCOs relied on information reported and analyses conducted – and direct,

personal experience in the disaster area to develop a mental frame of the situation and a

thorough understanding of the disaster’s physical, social, economic and political impacts.

As FCO#25 mentioned, “…the first thing I want to do is a three-sixty of the entire event,

so I know – I have a picture in my own mind what it is I'm dealing with.”

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4.5. FCO Technology Tools

When the FCO has to make a decision during the initial response period of a

Presidentially declared disaster, the decision making process for FCOs interviewed

consisted first of developing situational awareness and then taking the steps to decide and

either having the decision implemented directly or serve as a recommendation to other

senior disaster response team members. All FCOs interviewed were asked whether there

was any technology they had that was useful in this decision process or would like to

have for aiding the decision making process. No overall consensus by FCOs emerged

concerning a particular piece or type of technology that would enhance their decision

making process. Coincidently, before the interviews were conducted for this research,

each FCO had recently been given an Apple iPad by FEMA (an “iPad 1”), but even this

new popular technology did not get widespread support from the FCOs surveyed.

Of the 25 FCOs surveyed, 22 responded concerning the value of the iPad. Only 4

FCOs (18 percent) responding positively concerning use of the device while the

remaining 18 FCOs (82 percent) responding negatively. For example, on the positive

side FCO#12 said, “I do know I think the iPad is helpful” and FCO#7 commented, “I’m

thrilled that we’re starting to see more I-Pads and things like that because they are

smaller and easier to carry.” FCO#9 also noted, “The iPad…it makes it so much easier

than trying to plug in a laptop and get in your car and getting everything going.” On the

negative side, FCO#8 summed up FCO comments, "iPads aren’t really that helpful. I still

haven’t found what I consider to be a good, solid, tactical use for them other than they are

great to carry around reference materials.” Also, FCO 2 noted, “You know the I-Pad is

the latest fad of the day. You know, if we all had I-Pads at 9/11 would that have helped

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us pull any more survivors?” It should be noted that when the research was conducted,

the iPads were newly given to the FOCs and, while too late for this research, the negative

views expressed by many FCOs might have been tempered or even reversed to positive

as familiarity with the devises grew.

The largest single technology request, made by 6 FCOs (24 percent), was for a better

Geographic Information System (GIS) that could enhance situational awareness by

displaying a wide range of data in different formats under different circumstances.

FCO#13 noted, “… I’m a big proponent in GIS and, you know, the operating picture is a

big thing…” Also, FCO 7 stated enthusiastically, “I am big on GIS technologies because

again, it allows for two-way dialog.” And finally, FCO#16 said concerning the use of

GIS, “Yeah well, to get a total picture of what is going on. By reaching out to private

sector and voluntary agencies and trying to get their real-time data, …then you can get a

picture of what the government should be bringing in relative to what is being brought in

by the private sector.”

After the iPad and GIS, the need for a radio capable of communicating with other

radios that are on different frequencies was the next desired technological aid, desired by

4 FCO’s (16 percent of all 25 FCOs interviewed). For example, FCO#2 stated, “Well, if

there were some kind of radio that communicated to all the other radios without having to

set a certain frequency so that you could just pick up and talk to everyone and they could

hear you, that would be what I’d like. Because that’s the one thing that keeps killing us is

communications, in every disaster.”

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Another technology that had less support, but mentioned by 3 FCOs (12 percent) was

for improved overflight technology from drones or satellites, like FCO#5 who stated,

"I’m telling you, that drone would reduce the amount of time I’ve got to spend in the air.

The drone can give me immediate assistance...” FCO#17 noted, “Satellites are pretty

high tech these days. And you can get some pretty good overhead views of what’s going

on. But unfortunately, at the lower levels those aren’t available. …it would be great to

have a series of satellites that can give you – can read license plates – that can be

available to decision-makers instantaneously.”

Also one FCO provided a noteworthy caution in the use of technology by FCOs.

FCO#7 noted that technology has the, “potential to get in the way if people over rely on

their technology and they’ll stop maybe using their intuition and their own decision

making skills and their own analytics…”

While the research did not uncover a “silver bullet” in technology for FCOs, most

saw the value of utilizing some technologies (albeit, not necessarily the same ones) for

assisting in their situational awareness and decision making. The diversity of technology

discussed by FCOs illustrates the diversity of technology available in the marketplace.

The challenge for FCOs and their FEMA management is to implement new technology in

such a way that it is meaningful to most FCOs, accepted and utilized by them in

developing situational awareness and making decisions.

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4.6. Use of Short-Cuts for Situation Awareness and Decision Making

All FCOs interviewed had previous disaster response related experience (see Section

4.2) and used this previous knowledge and experience interwoven with some of the

techniques and strategies discussed in Chapter 2 to gain situational awareness and for

decision making. While the FCOs did not use the terms presented in Chapter 2 in their

interviews for this research, they used the concepts that these terms describe. For

example, of the 33 disasters selected by FCOs, 73 percent of the FCOs interviewed used

“event correlation” (Section 2.4.1), linking the chosen disasters for this research to other

disasters previously experienced and so leading to faster situational awareness and the

ability to move more quickly through the decision making process based on an enhanced

understanding as to what the critical factors of the disaster, their impact and the ability to

project consequences resulting from possible decisions. The notable exceptions to this

were the 9 FCOs responding to the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster, 9-11 and Hurricane

Katrina. The first two disasters were unique and so did not have a corollary to FCO past

disaster experience. Hurricane Katrina was of a type of disaster experienced previously

by the 6 FCOs involved in its response, but it was so much larger and more devastating

that many aspects of response were unique and FCOs interviewed did not note that

previous hurricane experiences assisted them in situational awareness and decision

making.

One FCO noted a case of an “illusory correlation” (Section 2.4.2), a correlation that

was thought by the FCO to exist, but did not. FCO#15 noted, “And because again

information was not coming in about how bad it was…I too was one that fell into that

trap on Monday morning thinking, …we really dodged the bullet here.” The FCO

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believed there was a correlation between Hurricane Katrina and past hurricanes that were

not as destructive, when in fact Katrina the relationship was “illusionary” and Katrina

was much more destructive than past hurricanes the FCO experienced and called for

much more of a response in much faster time frames. Believing in this illusionary

correlation also led to complacency and deciding there was not a need to verify the initial

positive reports being received.

The disaster experience of FCOs interviewed enabled, 91 percent of them to “anchor”

(Section 2.4.8) at least portions of their situational awareness and response decision

making process in the disaster they selected for this research to previous disaster

experiences. For example, FCO#5 reflected this “anchor” concept in a quick comment,

“You know, is this the same old group that floods every time…” However, as FCO#13

discussed, anchoring situational awareness and making decisions accordingly can lead to

mistakes like establishing the Emergency Operations Center in an area that itself became

victim to flooding, “…even the EOC had to evacuate one time, because the water was

coming down the hill so fast.”

As was mentioned above, the goal for an FCO in developing situational awareness in

the initial response period was to mentally “frame” the disaster situation, its physical,

political, social, and economic impacts (Section 2.6) based on reports from various

sources, personal observation, and use of past experience and training. All the FCOs

(100 percent) were able to eventually develop a mental frame of the disaster they faced.

Sometimes this took longer due to complexity, lack of information (e.g. Hurricane

Katrina) and uniqueness of the event (Columbia Shuttle disaster or 9-11). The more the

current situation was like situations experienced or learned about in the past, the faster

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the FCO framed the current situation. In the intuitive case of decision making, this

framing was taking place unconsciously as the FCO “just knew” what the situation was

and projecting what needed to be done based on an intuitive mental simulation of the

situation (see for example the discussion of a “Simple Match” in Section 2.11.1).

Finally, analogies and metaphors were discussed in Section 2.7, and when

questioning the FCOs, all drew analogies between experiences from their previous

careers to decision making situations they faced as FCOs in the disaster they selected for

discussing in the research. What greatly assisted the FCOs in the use of analogies was

that they all had previous careers that included at least some experiences in emergency

management related activities. For example, an FCO noted the analogy between dealing

with the situation in the New Orleans Superdome during Katrina and a six-story building

fire dealt with as a firefighter, “The first thing you do, even though you have priorities

there are some things that you have to realize when you get on a scene like that. Whether

you pull up to a fire and you have six stories burning and two hundred people or two

hundred apartments, or you pull into the Superdome or whatever it is, you’re not going to

be able to do everything.” Another example from an FCO with a previous military

background related that background as being generally analogous to serving as an FCO in

a catastrophic disaster, “I served in combat in Vietnam. I commanded an artillery

battalion in Germany. I commanded a military community in Germany so I’ve been

exposed to large organizations. I had been exposed to high stress situations and had been

successful enough to rise through the ranks. So I think you know all of those little things

you pick up here and there when you’re faced with another situation, you just kind of

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draw back on the things that you had experience with in the past…”12

For this research, the FCOs interviewed did not discuss using metaphors in

developing situational awareness and decision making during the initial response period

of the disasters they selected. FCO#19 did use a metaphor of an envelope in discussing

the differences between different disaster responders’ abilities and willingness to take

calculated risks in disaster situations and how working with responders that are able to

take bigger calculated risks successfully, expands that responders’ own “envelope” for

taking successful risks in disaster response in the future:

Everybody has an envelope that they operate in. There are individuals that operate in

the center of the envelope and they’ll never get a larger envelope because they

operate in the center. So trying to push people to operate on the edge of their

envelope …with knowing that we’re never going to go past who has the largest

envelope’s ability to recover the event. So you can operate on the edge, but you don’t

want to operate so close that you become risk – too risk tolerant. When I go into an

event, that’s what I’m looking at, is how big is that individual’s envelope, and

sometimes their envelope may be larger than mine. So I can now learn to expand my

personal envelope.

With the gaining of situational awareness, the FCOs moved towards decision making

in a disaster’s initial response period and in doing so, followed either an intuitive or a

bounded rational decision process (see Section 5.2, below) as they described in

discussing the draft RP-BRDM model in the second part of the interview process.

12

In this discussion too, FCOs are not identified by number due to specific backgrounds being discussed

could enable identification of specific FCOs and then connection to specific numbers. See original

Footnote #9 on this subject.

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4.7. FCO Training: Enhancing the Ability to Gain Situational Awareness and

Conduct Decision Making

There were two broad categories of training and career development that were

required by FEMA of FCOs and all FCOs interviewed saw this training as beneficial in

developing their ability to gain situational awareness and conduct decision making in the

initial response interval of a disaster. The first category was more introductory training

given to FCOs new to the FCO cadre and the second category was proficiency training

provided on an ongoing basis throughout each FCO’s career. Both types of training were

described in the FCO Professional Development Plan developed by FEMA. This Plan

had three major components (FEMA, 2011b):

Credentialing: Requirements for each of the four Type/levels of FCO expertise

discussed above in Section 4.2.2.

Executive leadership and management training courses, conferences and seminars

Formal mentoring whereby new FCOs to the cadre had a formal mentoring

program with more senior FCOs.

By establishing performance based credentialing requirements, training and executive

leadership opportunities, and a mentoring program, the Professional Development Plan

laid out a formal approach to FCO development (FEMA, 2011b). FCOs interviewed all

thought this program was beneficial in developing their decision making capabilities.

Three FCOs particularly discussed the value of the mentoring program and all FCOs

interviewed valued the professional school opportunities that were offered at such

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institutions as the Naval Post-Graduate School and Harvard University, and the wealth of

training programs and resources available online.

Three FCOs provided specific suggestions concerning the need for more formal

training and mentoring. FCO#12 differentiated between the decision making needed in

more frequent disasters verses the more catastrophic ones: “I would like to see a little

more deliberate training for FCOs in relation to decision making in larger scale events

and how we apply resources. I think FCOs get good experience for the most part before

they’re released out into the field …but I think that larger scale events require a broader

thinking and I’m not sure that folks are always prepared for that…” FCOs #5 and #1

both noted that the mentoring program of pairing newer FCOs to one or two mentors

might not expose them to enough different types of disasters and issues, and the different

ways different FEMA Regional Offices operate before the newer FCOs were sent out to

operate on their own. As FCO#1 noted, “…you’re relying on one person in one part of

the country to groom you in the way that they do business.” FCO#5 even suggested that

FCOs should have a formal training academy, that there are too many subjects, legal,

personnel, types of disaster assistance (e.g., individual, public assistance), etc. for on-the-

job training in conjunction with “a few formal courses”. Rather FCO#5 believed that a

formal academy-type program was needed to provide a comprehensive introduction to

being an FCO, “the military’s got a boot camp, officers and firefighters have an academy.

…and that’s the lens I’m looking at when I looked at the way things are done here.”

FCO#25 made the comparison between how much training and mentoring each new

or more established FCO needed in regards to decision making and how much training

and experiences they have had before becoming an FCO. FCO#25 noted that Incident

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Command System (ICS) gave him the necessary structure and frame of reference needed

for decision making, “I was literally raised in the ICS environment, so it's second nature

to me. It's not necessarily second nature to everyone, so I think that gives me an

advantage.”

In summary, all FCOs saw the need for and value of the training provided and

described in the Professional Development Plan. There was no consensus as to what

additional training was needed, but that additional training concerning regional variations

and unique considerations for different types of disasters (e.g., severity, complexity, size)

as well as FCO-specific training to fill any “gaps” from a particular FCO’s background

would be helpful to least some FCOs. The value of establishing some type of FCO

academy as an approach to providing a comprehensive introduction to FCO leadership

and decision making was suggested by one FCO.

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Chapter 5 - Typology for FCO Disaster Decision Making

The high stress and often ambiguous decisional situations confronting FCOs during

the initial response interval of a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster make

acquiring situational awareness and decision making challenging. This Chapter develops

a new FCO-RP/BRDM model for FCO decision making that combines the bounded

rational and intuitive decision processes originally introduced in Sections 2.3 and 2.8

respectively and now in this chapter modified and expanded by the FCOs during the

interview process. Chapter 5 goes on to describe the FCO-RP/BRDM decision making

model section by section, the processes, structures and decision points.

The draft RP/BRDM model, Figure 3-2, was discussed with each of the FCOs

interviewed and facilitated further discussion of the processes involved in developing

disaster situational awareness and making decisions in the initial response period. The

overall content and flow of the model was very well received by all FCOs interviewed,

agreeing that its structure and flow captured what they experienced in gaining situational

awareness, developing a mental framework, and in decision making during the initial

response interval of a Stafford Act disaster. Illustrative of this FCO agreement in

accepting and referring to the draft RP/BRDM, FCO#22 stated: “This model is exactly

what happens” and FCO#5 noted, “ I really do like what you have. And I’m just thinking

of the way I do business.”

All FCOs interviewed did have at least one suggestion or comment to a particular part

of the model. These recommended changes added clarity and detail and in some

instances brought new concepts into the model making it more comprehensive in

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reflecting the decisions and process steps FCOs took in decision making. These

recommendations were added into the model’s flow chart symbology and into this

Chapter’s discussion. To add additional clarity, the model has been color-coded using

“blue” for those decision points and processes related to the intuitive RP path, “green” for

those decision points and processes related to the bounded rational BRDM path, and

finally, “purple” for those that are common to both the RP and BRDM decision paths.

5.1. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Introduction

By definition, the initial response interval of a Presidentially declared disaster

embodies a challenging, dynamic environment. In events with warning, such as

hurricanes or floods, the FCO gained situational awareness as discussed in Section 4.4

while preparing for the initial disaster impact to occur. In events without warning, such

as earthquakes or terrorist events, the FCO gained situational awareness while the

disaster and its effects were unfolding and while response decisions had to be initiated.

Disasters selected by FCOs for this study spanned disasters from the very well known

and even internationally known disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the 9-11 terrorist

tragedy to those lesser-known, but major disasters such as hurricanes Ike and Gustav in

2008 and floods in Arkansas, North and South Dakota, and Minnesota in 2009. What

made all the disasters selected by the FCOs significant to them was not only that they

were major disasters in their own right due to their type, severity and/or complexity, but

also that they created significant perceptional and decisional challenges for them

personally. As FCO#3 noted, “The problem was from the magnitude. And when you do

something on a scale different than you’d done before, sometimes things don’t work.”

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Also FCO#22 added, “I know that things have to be done quickly and the decision can’t

wait. And it kind of goes back to …are you willing to suffer the consequence of a bad

decision versus would you want to … suffer the consequences of not making that

decision?”

Flexibility of using RP or the BRDM path of decision making in the FCO-RP/BRDM

model for different decisions in the same disaster was a point raised by 19 of the FCOs

interviewed (76 percent). As noted in Section 2.4, it could be detrimental for FCOs to

prematurely decide that a disaster is analogues to ones they had experienced before and

use only an intuitive, RP, decision making approach, thereby ignoring unique

characteristics of the current disaster they now face. Maintaining flexibility of decision

making approaches was important to successful decision making for FCOs that faced a

wide variety of disasters with varying levels of severity, complexity and uniqueness (see

Section 4.4.1 for more on this subject). Note that the FCO-RP/BRDM process discussed

and depicted below is in reference to each individual FCO decision, not multiple

decisions. That is, the FCO-RP/BRDM flowchart models the decision process the FCO

used for a specific decision having to be made in the initial response period of a

Presidentially declared disaster.

5.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Situation Analogue?

All FCOs interviewed agreed that based on their situational awareness, determining if

a situation was similar – an analogue – to those experienced in the past was pivotal in the

FCO-RP/BRDM model (Figure 5-1 below).

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While the Draft RP/BRDM model used in the FCO interviews titled this decision box

“Situation Typical? (Prototype or Analogue)”, 12 FCOs (48 percent) had difficulty

understanding what “typical” really meant in this context. FCO#12 noted that some

situations were “atypical,” but believed that the title of the decision box did not allow for

this option. FCO#1 noted that the term was simply “not intuitive”. The researcher was

able to eliminate this confusion by replacing the term “typical” with “analogue,”

analogue meaning a situation similar to situations in whole or in part to those experienced

in the past. By relabeling the decision box, Situation Analogue? this more clearly

delineated the FCO’s decisional choice between having a disaster similar (analogous) in

at least some aspects to disasters they knew about and experienced in their past (the

“Yes” blue analogous path) verses a disaster different from their past experience and

knowledge – a new paradigm (Figure 5-1).

If a disaster was sufficiently analogous to those in the FCO’s past, the “Yes” path

coming down from the Situation Analogue? decision box would be chosen. As FCO# 2

stated about fellow FCOs: “Once they go to a few disasters and they've got that under

their belt, …then they can follow that middle model and use their intuition and use their

background, use the experiences they've had before to make the decisions that'll also get

them down that same path.” In the context of the FCO-RP-BRDM model that is, FCOs

are able to use their experience to understand what is to them an analogous disaster

situation and so are able to project the consequences of possible decisions.

If the FCO’s answer to the Situation Analogue? decision was “No”, then the FCO

would move to the Have Time/Resources? decision diamond. If the answer for this

decision was “Yes”, the decision maker would move to the BRDM rational analysis path

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as there was sufficient time and resources available to take this more rationally detailed

and methodical course of decision making (“green” path to the right of the Have Time/

Resources? decision diamond in Figure 5-1). If the answer was “No” to the “Have

Time/Resources?” decision, the FCO would move to the “blue” intuitive path (to the left

of the Have Time/Resources? decision diamond) to consciously or unconsciously use

feature matching and story building to diagnose the decision.

Figure 5-1: FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Situation Analogue?

Importantly, all FCOs noted that in deciding whether a situation was an analogue to

their past knowledge and experience, they would have to make this judgment without

having complete situation awareness concerning the disaster. FCO#10 noted that

“ambiguity and variability of the information” will play a significant role in the initial

response interval and FCO#4 noted that FCOs might only have 30 percent of the

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information they need. But whatever the percentage, all FCOs agreed that they did not

have full situational awareness when they had to make a decision how to proceed from

the Situation Analogue? decision box. FCO#14 characterized the decision to go with RP

or BRDM approaches at this point as a “gut decision” – a decision based on the FCO’s

intuition as to which was the best way to proceed. FCO#11 mentioned that sometimes

the situation “hits you like a train” (i.e., obvious, given the FCO’s previous experiences

and knowledge) or can be subtle with recognition “sneaking-up” on the FCO’s

consciousness. Finally, there were times where the FCO knew that the BRDM process

would yield a more complete result, but the FCO needed to balance that understanding

with the perceived need for a decision and the confidence that a decision could be made

correctly through the RP intuitive path. As FCO# 22 noted:

It is intuitive, if we go back to that, you know what has to be done, without thinking

about it or writing it down. And we’ve all been through the – gather information,

come up with courses of action, choosing the course of action – and those are great,

and they’re great, too, because if you have diversity in decision-making and you have

time and resources, you get different viewpoints, because sometimes you’ve got to be

able to see things different and maybe see them better than you do. But in our

business – emergency response – you’ve got to go with that intuitive ability.

A cautionary counter has to be made here concerning the FCO’s decision making

process and the FCOs reliance on past knowledge and experience. As FCO#23 noted in

an analogy for many FCOs with extensive experience, “So it’s been years of – we call it

the slide tray… Every time you go to an incident, you put it on a slide in that [mental]

Kodak carousel. And what they found from a decision making standpoint is that leaders

will fall back to what they know previously, what’s on the carousel… even if it doesn’t

totally fit the scenario.” Ultimately, the FCO had to decide whether the situation was

analogous to past experience and knowledge, and whether to move to the RP or BRDM

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decision path. Cognitive biases and heuristics could aid or hinder this decision process as

discussed in Section 2.4. There was no pre-established formula for FCOs deciding

whether disaster situations were analogous or not. Rather, these were personal decisions

dependent on the disaster situation to be dealt with and a particular FCO’s knowledge,

experience and decision making process.

5.3. FCO-RP Path: Intuitive Decision Making

If the situation was not considered an analogue by the FCO (a “No” decision at the

Situation Analogue? decision diamond) and the FCO had time and resources by which to

make the decision, the FCO moved from Situation Analogue? to the Have

Time/Resources? decision diamond and on to the bounded rational BRDM (green)

decisional path discussed in detail in Section 5.4 below. If the FCO lacked time and

resources, they moved from the Have Time/Resources? decision diamond to the RP

component of the model (blue path) beginning with the Diagnose process (Figure 5-2,

below). In this intuitive case, the situation was such that it had to be understood quickly

and a decision made based on information available and the FCO’s interpretative

knowledge and experience. The FCO did not have the time necessary to use the intensive

BRDM rational decision process because lives were in jeopardy, disastrous consequences

were pending, etc. As FCO#23 mentioned, “So you try to balance timeframes [and]

…threat. You know, I mean, if people are dying and where the potential of that is great,

you’ve got to act very quickly. If not, then you’ve got some time, and each scenario is a

little different, …then you can take time and be able to go deeper into the information,

the resources, the discussion, the relationships. If you don’t have that time, then you’ve

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got to be wise enough to know. We’ve got to act quicker, we’ve got to go, got to move

out.” As FCO#23 also noted concerning the ability to understand what are the critical

factors of the disaster, their impacts and being able to project the consequences of

decisions, “You rely on intuition, but that intuition I believe is built on many years of

experience, and repetitive experiences dealing with disasters.” And in relation to a

tornado that is a no-notice event, FCO#22 went on to make a similar point in more

dramatic style:

…what I did …and there was nothing, there was no checklist, there was no – you

showed up and it was like, ‘Holy ... this part of town’s gone.’ You immediately then

went, ‘Okay, what has to be done?’ First of all, you have to – people are trying to

survive, so you know that you have to provide …shelter, food and water and security.

And you know that there was no – you just do that. You just knew that, that had to be

done, and …probably came from a military background, maybe came from previous

deployments, but that came out immediately.

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Figure 5-2: FCO-RP Intuitive Decision Path

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There can also be a negative side to intuitive decision making, that of the FCO using

intuitive decision making when actually a BRDM approach would have been a better

choice. FCO#2 illustrated this problem by noting that an FCO’s decision making could

fall into the trap of Overconfidence Bias (see Section 2.4.4), “…here's how we've always

done it before and regardless of what the incident action planning process is, we're going

to do it our way and forget about that right-hand column [re. “green” BRDM path, Figure

5-3], we've got all the answers, we don't need to look at different courses of actions.”

Also, FCO#7 commented, “There is a caution I think in disasters… It feels so routine

that you want to do the same thing you’ve always done because that has always worked,

and you don’t necessarily take the time to say, does this really make the most sense?” RP

intuition decision making could be miss-applied such as through Overconfidence Bias

and the Anchor and Adjustment Heuristic, Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.6. It was incumbent on

the FCO to know when to use it – and that understanding itself came from experience and

knowledge in disaster decision making.

5.3.1. FCO-RP Path: Diagnose

At the Diagnose process box, the FCO had to clarify the situation in relation to the

decision having to be made via feature matching and story building, developing a mental

frame as to what are the critical factors and their impacts in the situation.13

After

developing this mental frame, the FCO made the decision whether there was a New

13

Note that the FCO just had to have sufficient information/data to believe they could move on the RP

decision path to diagnosing this situation. There was no requirement to have “complete” information or

even what eventually may have turned out to be correct or representative information. Rather, this was a

judgment decision by the FCO based on what they perceived at the moment as being “sufficient” quality

information.

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Paradigm and if so (“Yes” path) would then move to the Recognition process box or if

not (“No” path) back to the Situation Analogue? decision diamond based on the Diagnose

process revealed that the disaster and decision having to be made indeed had at least

some aspects that were similar to knowledge and experiences in the FCO’s past (Figure

5-5).14

The need for a New Paradigm decisional path from the Diagnose process was brought

up in interviews by 11 FCOs (44 percent). This New Paradigm decisional diamond in the

FCO-RP/BRDM model accommodated inclusion of events so unusual or unique that they

did not fit within the FCOs’ past experiences or knowledge. But once the situation and

decision having to be made was Diagnosed by an FCO and a new paradigm realized, the

FCO moved to the Recognition process. Note that the FCO still did not have sufficient

time or resources to use the BDRM rational decision process, but now had an

understanding that a new paradigm existed which had to be responded to quickly by

continuing down the intuitive RP “blue” path in Figure 5-2. Even in a new paradigm

disaster situation, there will be some aspects from past disasters that can be applied to the

situation such as working with the public media and coordinating with city and state

officials.

An example of where an FCO undertook the Diagnose – New Paradigm-Recognition

decisional path is during the 9-11 terrorism disaster response. This response was unique

to the FCO’s experience and the FCO had to develop a new paradigm for the grisly

14

The term “new paradigm” is used in reference to the personal decision making of the FCO. That is, the

disaster faced by the FCO is so personally unusual/atypical and requires the dealing with new and

unfamiliar disaster situations due to hazard type and/or severity. This disaster constitutes a new paradigm

for the FCO, given the FCO’s personal decision making history.

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drama before the FCO could continue into the Recognition process and could utilize

previous experience with New York City and the ability to coordinate with city officials.

As the FCO noted, “... I could call a deputy commissioner, which I did, and, you know,

assess what was going on. …I had contacts and 20 years of knowledge of what the city’s

needs would be. And I was able to make an educated guess, you know, of what I thought

in the first 24 or 72 hours would be their requirement, so I was able to articulate that…”

5.3.2. FCO-RP Path: Recognition

In the FCO-RP path, the FCO next moved to the disaster Recognition process from

either the New Paradigm or Situation Analogue? decision diamonds. This process

included the FCO defining Goals and Objectives based on the relevant Cues (critical data

and factors in the situation) and understanding the Expectancies as to what these critical

Cues meant in the disaster situation and how they possibly would evolve in that situation,

in addition projecting possible action(s) into the future based on these Expectancies and

the need to satisfy the Goals and Objectives as defined (Klein 1999). Relevant cues

could be discerned from analogous information or new paradigm information already

obtained and goals and objectives derived from them. The Recognition process is where

the FCO obtained situational awareness (Figure 5-2). As FCO#17 noted:

You know, you use your experience and understandings and you bring those to bear

on any decision that you make. And that’s essentially what happened there. I mean

it’s no less – no different than an Incident Commander at a fire who has a lot of years’

experience and is reading, so to speak, the building, reading the situation of the

building that’s on fire, reading the smoke, reading the intensity of the flames, reading

the movement of the fire so to speak, who then makes a decision to evacuate the

building and get his firefighters out because he feels it’s going to collapse.

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In the draft RP/BRDM model discussed with FCOs, only Goals were included in the

Recognition process. However as FCO#15 noted, goal formulation in the RP intuitive

scenario is also coupled with objectives formulation. This linking of goals and objectives

was mentioned specifically by the 15 FCOs (60 percent) that discussed goal formulation

in detail. FCO#15 went on to note that after goals, “But then there’s your objectives,

okay, … what are your tactical objectives – the more tactical things you’re doing to carry

out the goal.” Because of broad FCO support for the linking of goals and objectives, the

diagrammatic decision box in Recognition was relabeled “Goals and Objectives” in the

FOC-RP/BRDM model (see Figure 5-2).15

It should be noted that usually the FCO in the role of lead federal official could not

just begin to implement the defined goals and objectives. Rather, the goals and

objectives that the FCO formulated often had to be coordinated with other senior decision

makers at the federal, state and local levels. The FCO was often not “commanding” the

situation as such, but instead in the role of a facilitator and the coordinator of federal

resources. As FCO#3 noted, “You’ve got to know what the art of the possible is. I think

you get that from experience. And you’ve got to know how to work with people. You

have to know the culture you’re going into, too. States have different cultures. FEMA

Regions [regional offices] have different cultures and where they’re coming from. You

have to understand all that to get people to work together.”

With relevant Cues identified and Goals and Objectives formulated, certain expected

15

The term “plausible” was dropped from the Goals and Objectives process rectangle because the FCO

would not consciously define “implausible” goals or objectives. Hence the term “plausible” was

superfluous. Also, the “plausible” term was not used elsewhere in the FCO-RP/BRDM or even in the draft

RP/BRDM process or decision rectangle labeling (e.g. there was no “plausible expectancies” or “plausible

actions”).

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outcomes could then be thought through by the FCO leading to specified expected

outcomes – Expectancies within the Recognition process box (Figure 5-2). However, if

Expectancies could not be determined by the FCO, there were one or more anomalies that

the FCO had to Diagnose through a decision process of feature matching and story

building. If there was insufficient data for this diagnosis process, the FCO had to go back

to the beginning of the decisional process to gain greater situational awareness (Figure 5-

2). This happened to 5 FCOs interviewed (20 percent). FCO#20 noting for Hurricane

Katrina the, “Original briefing was basically, …the hurricane past, New Orleans is okay.

You know it’s hurricane damage, but nothing major …I get on the helicopter, I am flying

into what I am assuming is the New Orleans area. …You are looking at catastrophic

flooding there. So, I was just taken aback. …As we are flying in, it is not the way the

situation was briefed.”

The levies had broken during Hurricane Katrina’s impact passing through the area,

radically changing the expected level of damage and so the whole disaster environment

was radically changed and the urgency for FCO decision making increased. In the terms

of the FCO-RP/BRDM model, the Expectancies did not happen, an anomaly occurred

(levies breaking with unanticipated massive flooding) and the FCO has to further clarify

the situation before being able to continue decision making in the RP path due to the need

for decision making (i.e., the FCO did not have situational awareness). FCO#21 pointed

out that it is this point in the FCO-RP/BRDM model where the “Fog of Disaster” can set

in. The disaster consequences and impacts require quick decision making; however,

there can be confusion as to what the true situation really is causing a required

reassessment.

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5.3.3. FCO-RP Path: Evaluate Action and Will It Work?

When conducting the Evaluating Action (mental simulation) process (Figure 5-2)

then leading to the decision Will It Work? in the RP intuitive decision process, FCO#23

noted, “First step, let’s at least get moving and progressing. We can refine it later. But

the challenge with this, as well as – and I couch it in response or even in the fire service –

was you got to make decisions with limited information very quickly. You can’t take a

lot of time to go too in depth …you get decision paralysis. You can’t do that. You’ve

got to move. You’ve got to get going. …Knowing full well some of those decisions will

be modified or changed or might even be plain-out wrong, but you’ve got to get going.”

This quote also points out a point made by all FCOs interviewed, that their decisions have

to only “satisfice” – “work” in the context of the present situation, not be the “perfect” or

“complete” action, as discussed above in Section 2.5.

As an FCO moved in the RP path from Recognition to Evaluate Action, mental

simulation was used by the FCO based on the mental frame developed to evaluate action

and estimate “Will It Work?”. That is, the FCO projected the chosen action into the

situation as the FCO currently perceived it to be, to understand how the action would

work in the situation and further the defined goal and objectives. Note as discussed

above in Section 2.5, the decision does not have to At this stage, assessment continued,

albeit at a rapid pace. If the FCO thought that the chosen course of action would work,

the “Yes” path was chosen for moving to the Implement Course of Action process. As

FCO#9 noted, “But as you develop wisdom in certain areas and operate in stressful

environments, your ability to make decisions based on less and less data becomes easier

because you have some experience to draw back on to say, ‘I’ve seen a similar situation

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and it definitely led to this.” Alternatively, when at the Will It Work? decision diamond,

the FCO could decide the path of “Yes, but”, modifying the proposed action in some way

so as to account for a difficulty realized and then re-evaluating the now-modified action

by moving back to the Will It Work? decision diamond and mentally simulating this

modified action in the disaster situation as perceived by the FCO before moving again

down to Will It Work?

If the FCO thought the chosen course of action would not work, a “No” decision, led

back to a reassessment at the Situation Analogue decision box. The “No” decision

brought into question whether the decision to be made was really an analogue decision or

not. And if not, how it should be handled, see Section 5.2 above.

If the FCO stayed with the intuitive decision process and after further analysis by the

FCO in the Recognition process stage, the Expectancies could not be identified, the FCO

indeed had an anomaly and had to move back up to deciding whether there was Sufficient

Data to support the intuitive decision process and if not, move back up to Experience the

Situation process to gather more data (Figure 5-3) and begin the process again.

In summarizing this stage in the RP path, FCO#8 commented, “We make decisions in

real time based upon the information on hand and not in hindsight. We get reviews with

all the hindsight in there.” Afterward, decisions will be judged, but in the initial response

period in the RP decision path, decisions are made by the FCO in “real time”.16

16

The next step in the RP path after “Will It Work” is “Implement Course of Action”. However, this

decision point is common to both RP and BRDM paths in the FCO-RP/BRDM decision model (Figure 5-

5). Consequently, “Implement a Course of Action” is discussed in Section 5.5, after the RP and BRDM

Sections.

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5.4. FCO-BRDM Path: Bounded Rational Analysis

As opposed to the RP intuitive path, if the FCO was confronted with a decisional

situation not analogous to past experience and knowledge, but for which the FCO had

time and resources to decide, the BRDM decisional path was the preferred alternative.

That is, at the Have Time/Resources? decision diamond, the FCO chose “Yes” (have

time/resources) moving to the (green) BRDM path (Figure 5-1). All FCOs stated that the

preferred choice was to use the BRDM model in that this was the most overtly logical,

defensible decision path to take, where the decision process used and decisions made

were backed-up with step-by-step analyses, multiple alternatives, ranking and selection

that could be explained to others. The FCO was not using a decisional process that was

based on an intuitive situation, where they just “knew” the situation and the answers to

the decisions needed to be made. Rather, by choosing the “Yes” in the Have

Time/Resources decision diamond, the FCO knew the situation was not analogous to

disasters known about and experienced in the past, but there was sufficient time and

resources to choose the more ordered and rational analysis BRDM approach. As

discussed in Section 2.3 above, this approach was “bounded” by the FCO’s own

experiences, knowledge and personal abilities to understand and analyze data being

provided, and this bounded reality impacted each BRDM “rational” decision step

diagramed in Figure 5-3, below.

In the BRDM decisional path, the FCO had time and resources to benefit from

development of the ordered process for gaining situational awareness through a gathering

and understanding what factors in the disaster situation were critical and their impacts in

the situation, and then being able to develop goals and objectives, establish possible

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alternatives, rank-order these alternatives, and finally a selection process bounded by the

FCO’s experiences, knowledge and capabilities

Figure 5-3: FCO-Bounded Rational Decision Making (BRDM) Path

5.4.1. FCO-BRDM Path: Situational Awareness

Importantly, the BRDM decision path was appropriate for decision making both when

the FCO had some familiarity with the disaster situation and decisions needed to be made

or when the disaster situation was totally atypical for the FCO, a new paradigm, but the

FCO had the time and resources needed for a rational decision process. Many disasters in

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which the FCO led the federal response were disasters for which there was time and

resources for a rational decision making process. Many of the most frequent

Presidentially declared disasters such as floods and even hurricanes were of this type.

Floods were usually slow building and hurricanes were forecast in advance, enabling the

FCO to utilize the BRDM decision making process for many decisions in these types of

events. As FCO#14 noted, “Yes. In my mind’s eye I would go through those exact

[BRDM] steps, you know, in order to be able to come up with some type of action based

on the situation.”

There were also disasters that created a new paradigm for the FCO, but for which the

BRDM path in the FCO-RP/BRDM model was used vice the RP path. For example,

nothing like the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster had ever happened before, the situation

was not analogous to anything the FCO had experienced or had studied, but there was

time and resources to obtain situational awareness and mental frame of this unique

situation and so the BRDM path of decision-making was the preferred choice. As the

FCO noted:

I drove immediately down to Barksdale Air Force Base. And on the way, we had

conference calls with the White House, and we had NASA on, FEMA on – we got

kind of organized there. I mean, that was a great thing, because this was something

that we’d never trained for and never worked for, but we got good guidance. …Then

once you get on the ground that was where you could easily get sufficient situational

awareness. We didn’t know exactly what we were doing, but it was an event where

we had time to get it.

In BRDM situations, developing initial situational awareness is a rational process of

gathering representative disaster information and impacts thereby developing an

understanding of the situation and being able to project the perceived situation and

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consequences into the future. It should also be noted that flexibility of using RP and the

BRDM modes of decision making for different decisions in the same disaster was a point

raised by 19 of the FCOs interviewed (76 percent). As noted in Section 2.4, it could be

detrimental for FCOs to prematurely decide that a disaster is analogous to ones they had

experienced before and use only an intuitive, RP, decision making approach, thereby

ignoring potentially unique characteristics of the current disaster they now face.

5.4.2. FCO-BRDM Path: Goals and Objectives Formulation

In the draft BRDM decision path discussed with the FCOs, goals and objectives

formulation was generally a more deliberate processes involving not just the FCO alone,

but the FCO as part of a multi-level team of federal, state and local officials and staff. As

FCO#22 noted, “The first priorities come in from that initial meeting with the state, and

many times, you’ll be able to meet with the governor and the governor will give you his

priorities …your initial direction comes from that political side because there’s nothing

worse than launching and doing things that don’t match what the governor really wants

done. …Some of those priorities then, you sit down with your counterpart – whether it

be the incident manager or if a [Presidential] Declaration has come, a State Coordinating

Officer – and you build the objectives…”

In discussions with FCOs concerning Goals Formulation as the decision process was

originally titled in the draft RP/BRDM, all FCOs mentioned goals and objectives, not just

goals in their decisions. As FCO#3 noted, “But, you know, there’s sort of a two-step

process …if you added after goal formulation, objective formulation, then it’d be easy to

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see in the process. …I don’t normally rank alternatives to set goals. I would rank

alternatives to carry out objectives.” This is parallel to the discussion of goals verses

goals and objectives in the Recognition decision box back in the RP path, Section 5.3.2.

FCOs see goals and objectives as being complementary with objectives being the

actionable component of more general goals. As FCO#15 noted, “Well, …goal

formulation ought to be at the top. There is also where you’re setting your objectives,

developing alternatives, and ranking the order. That is actually what you’re doing to

meet your overall goals.”

To accommodate the derivative connection between development of goals and

objectives, the BRDM Goal Formulation decision process rectangle has been relabeled,

Goals and Objectives Formulation to more accurately characterize what is taking place at

this stage in the BRDM path.

5.4.3. FCO-BRDM Path: Alternatives Development and Rank Ordering

With goals and objectives formulated, decision response alternatives were developed,

evaluated and then the top ranked alternative(s) selected to accomplish the established

goals and objectives. All FCOs agreed with this sequence of the BRDM path. As

FCO#16 noted, “Then you do a Course of Action analysis. You say Course of Action #1

would be to put one in each of these counties, Course of Action #2 would be to put two in

this county, two in this, and one over there. And then you do an analysis, …what is the

advantage and disadvantage of each one of those? Then that will lead you, hopefully into

making some kind of orderly conclusion.” FCO#20 also noted, “…to me that’s kind of,

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you know, okay, we need to identify what our goals are, how are we going to do it. And

we can do this, we can do A, we can do B, we can do C. And then I would …rank order

alternatives.” There was no common approach to ranking alternatives as expressed by

the FCOs, each ranking also being very situation dependent. The FCOs’ views

concerning the ranking of alternatives were of course influenced – bounded – by the

experiences and knowledge that the FCO brought to the decision process, as the “B” in

the BRDM path intimates. The FCO’s experiences and knowledge would also determine

whether the disaster was viewed by the FCO as analogous to previous disasters

experienced or a new paradigm to be dealt with.

Developing alternatives and selecting the top rated alternatives in the FCO’s BRDM

decision making process was not only bounded by the FCO’s experiences and

knowledge, but also limited by the amount, quality and speed at which the information

was obtained by the FCO during the initial response interval. All these factors could

affect the situational awareness achieved by the FCO and the resulting mental frame used

to simulate possible alternatives and their ranking. In a disaster, the information initially

available could be limited by many different factors such as access to the disaster area,

communications, the type and severity of the disaster, and even its geographic location

and time of year. These conditions individually and collectively limited information

available to the FCO for decision making. FCO#4 noted, “Make a decision on 30 percent

of information. And then as we gather more information and we get more clarity …we’ll

redirect and re-decide and reconsider but we’re going to go with the 30 percent

information if that’s all we got right now and trying to stabilize and protect, save

property.” However, despite the limitations of information, through the methodical

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review and ranking of alternatives, the BRDM process helps assure that the alternatives

selected are those considered to have the highest probability of success.

Time available to make the decision was another crucial factor in the FCOs’ selection

of top rated alternatives. The more time available in the BRDM process, the more time

there was for detailed analyses to assist in decision making. As FCO#21 observed, “You

know the pressure is there because time is kind of a heavy thing; you’re never going to

have all the information you think you would like to have to make the decisions, so you

have to just make your best call.”

What further added to the difficulty of rank ordering alternatives was that the FCO

had to often convince other stakeholders in the disaster as to the “correctness” of the

alternatives and ranking that the FCO had selected. All FCOs interviewed were highly

experienced and trained disaster leaders and their “bounded rationality” reflected that

background. So too, other individuals in senior disaster leadership or political positions

at the federal, state, tribal, territorial, local or private levels might have their own set of

alternatives and rankings bound by their backgrounds that may be different from the

disaster experience and training background as the FCOs. Consequently, there might not

be one “rational set” of top rated alternatives and instead, the FCO would have to try to

convince other stakeholders as to the wisdom of the FCO’s preferred ranking of

alternatives.

Because of the many different stakeholders and their possible divergence in opinions,

all FCOs interviewed tried to be as inclusive in developing and ranking alternatives as

possible to help develop consensus around the “best” set alternatives and their ranking.

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As FCO#1 noted, “It’s collaborative. I like to – I really like to involve everyone in the

decision making processes when it involves them. In other words, all the stakeholders …

should be involved in this decision. And I don’t like to make decisions in a vacuum. I

want to have as much information as I can, and that’s why I always seek to gather, as

much facts, as much information, as I can, and work with as many people that could

potentially bring that information.”

5.4.4. FCO-BRDM Path: Selecting Top Rated Alternatives

As mentioned in Section 5.4.2 above, other stakeholders at the federal, state, tribal,

local and private levels had their own perspectives concerning the disaster and the “best”

alternatives. It was the challenge for the FCOs to convince these other stakeholders as to

the value of the FCO’s selection and try to obtain consensus. As FCO#20 noted

expressing some frustration based upon having extensive disaster response knowledge

and background, “Sometimes I feel like there are some folks, I don’t know why they

don’t just see the answer. I mean that sincerely, I don’t understand why they don’t just

see the answer.”

Eight FCOs (32 percent) discussed the need to be “comfortable” with possibly

making the “wrong” decision. This “comfort” came from having extensive experience in

disaster decision making. That is, FCOs willing to make a decision using the best

information at the time and then if necessary convince other senior stakeholders of that

decision, with the understanding that later in hindsight the decision may be viewed as less

than optimal or even wrong. However, at the moment when the decision needed to be

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made, a decision had to be made and the FCO was able to make it or advocate for it. As

FCO#22 noted, “I know that things have to be done quickly and the decision can’t wait,

so two things that I know and I bring to the forefront is you must make a decision and

you must do it now. And it kind of goes back to …crisis mode, are you willing to suffer

the consequence of implementing a bad decision versus would you want to, in other

words, suffer the consequences of not making that decision?” Also as FCO#3 mentioned,

“So I said, ‘Well, I’ll put you guys up on cruise ships.’ So that takes confidence to just

make a decision like that that has big ramifications. And if I didn’t have a lot of disasters

under my belt, I wouldn’t have had the confidence to say, “Let’s do that,” to take

chances. So …one thing that a lot of disasters give you is you’re not worried about

failing.” These quotes are again illustrative of the fact that all FCOs interviewed

commented that the decisions they made were not “perfect” or even necessarily the

complete action needed, but just that they had to “satisfice” (i.e., “work”) in the context

of the present situation they faced (see Section 2.5).

Once alternatives were selected by the FCO or were recommended by the FCO to

other senior stakeholders in the disaster, the BRDM decision process moved to

Implement Course of Action for the top rated alternatives. As FCO#22 noted, “Some

people can’t make decisions; some people are afraid to make decisions, and then some

people don’t want to make decisions. And in a response when you have an FCO, and

that’s what I think FCOs bring, …they bring a person to the incident that is willing to

make that decision.”

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5.5. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Implement Course of Action and Results

Whether the FCO’s decision making took the RP intuitive path or the BRDM

bounded rational path, these two decisional paths and processes met at the Implement

Course of Action decision process in the FCO-RP/BRDM model (colored purple

signifying a joint decision process, see Figure 5-4, below). This was where

implementation of selected actions decided on either through the RP or BRDM decision

paths took place.

Figure 5-4: FCO-RP/BRDM Model – Implement Course of Action and Results

For all FCOs interviewed, Implementing a Course of Action may have been their

direct responsibility, especially if only federal resources were involved. However, this

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process often meant implementing actions in coordination with the State Coordinating

Official for the disaster or other state, tribal, territorial, local and/or private senior level

stakeholders. The FCO was in the position of recommending actions from the position of

the Lead Federal Official. As FCO#5 said, “FEMA and the FCO are guests. Everywhere

we go we’re invited in.” This point was amplified by FCO #23, “…you don’t want to be

so autocratic that you try to come in, be big brother and take over, because then you’re

going to lose the relationship and you’re not going to be effective at all. And trust me,

the politics is huge.” Finally, FCO#25 concludes about FCOs position, “We're not the

lead, we are supplying the support to the state who is supplying that support down to the

local government. You have to be very careful, but I can look at a situation and know

instinctively, I think, what the first three or four moves should be to stabilize that

incident, but that's not my call, that's the local's call, or that's the governor's call…”

Working as part of disaster response leadership in implementing actions posed its

own challenges. Different people in leadership positions, coming from different levels

and parts of different governments with different levels of disaster related experience and

knowledge were all involved to some extent concerning implementing actions during the

often chaotic initial response interval. As FCO#3 notes: “You’ve got to know what the

art of the possible is. I think you get that from experience. And you’ve got to know how

to work with people. You have to know the culture you’re going into, too. States have

different cultures. FEMA Regions [Regional Offices] have different cultures and where

they’re coming from. You have to understand all that to get people to work together.”

If the course of action was implemented, there could be three results. The action

could have the result as originally intended, the action could have caused unintended

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results, or indeed, the action could have caused intended and also unintended results.

Intended and unintended result options are discussed in turn below, with the last option

requiring the FCO to process through both of these other two options.

5.5.1. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Achieved

If results intended were achieved (the “Yes” path in the Intended Results? decision

diamond) the Final Results were achieved and the FCO-RP/BRDM decision process was

over for the decision.

5.5.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Not Achieved

If unintended results were a consequence of the RP decision making path, either in

whole or in part, the “No” path from Intended Results? would be taken by the FCO to the

Have Time/Resources? decision diamond. At that decision point, depending on whether

the FCO did not have or indeed, did have sufficient time/resources for deciding, the

FCO’s decision path would move back up the intuitive or rational decision process paths,

respectively.

5.5.2.1. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Not Achieved –

Insufficient Time/Resources

If the FCO had insufficient time/resources for deciding (“No” answer for the “purple”

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Have Time/Resources? decision diamond), the FCO’s decision process moved back up

the intuitive path in Figure 5-4 from the Have Time/Resources? decision diamond to the

(“blue”) Unintended Results and up to the Anomaly process. At the Anomaly process,

the FCO would assess the anomaly and then make a decision whether there was

Sufficient Data? to move back to the Diagnose decision process and intuitively re-

diagnose what caused the unintended results.

If the FCO determined there was insufficient data (the answer was “No” to the

Sufficient Data? decision diamond), the FCO needed to move up to the top of the FCO-

RP/BRDM model and to the Experience Situation in Changing Environment process.

The FCO would engage in that process again to gain additional exposure to Experience

the Situation in the Changing Environment before re-initiating the decision making

process.

5.5.2.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model: Intended Results Not Achieved – Sufficient

Time/Resources

If there were unintended results in the FCO’s decision process (“No” in the “purple”

Intended Results” decision diamond at the bottom of Figure 5-5), but there was indeed

sufficient time/resources (“Yes” answer for the Have Time/Resources? decision

diamond), the FCO’s decision path would move back up the “green” BRDM decision

making path and the FCO decided whether there was sufficient data to conduct the

BRDM decision process. If so, the “Yes” path from the “green” Sufficient Data?

decision diamond would be taken with the FCO’s decision process moving to a Goals and

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Objectives (re)Formulation and so where analyzing the unintended results could begin

again through a bounded rational procedure.

If the FCO decided there was insufficient data (“No” path from the “green” Sufficient

Data? decision diamond), the FCO had to move back up to Experience Situation in

Changing Environment to seek additional experience from the situation, gathering

additional data before proceeding in the decision process. As FCO#17 noted, “...the

result that you get may not be the intended result which then requires you to again

implement a whole series of decision making, a new decision making process.”

5.6. FCO-RP/BRDM Model – Integrated Decision Process

Figure 5-5 integrates the decision processes discussed in this Section and

diagrammatically displayed in Figures 5-1 – 5-4. The integrated FCO-RP/BRDM model

in Figure 5-5 combines the intuitive process and the bounded rational process into one

integrated model of FCO decision making. This model reflects the work of Gary Klein

(discussed in Section 2.11 and elsewhere throughout this dissertation) and then modified

and customized through additional research and the interview process with 25 FCOs.

The color differentiation of “blue” designating the RP intuitive process, “green” for the

BRDM process and “purple” for those processes and decisions common to both are

retained for clarification.

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Figure 5-5: FCO-RP/BRDM Model – Integrated Decision Process

The FCO-RP-BRDM model integrates the options available to the FCO for decision

making in the often high pressure, sometimes chaotic initial response interval of a

Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster as validated by the FCOs themselves. As

130

FCO#23 noted, “Your RP/BRDM model really ‘nailed’ the decisional process 99 percent.

More you decide, the easier it gets, the more intuitive it becomes in the same types of

events.”

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Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations

This final chapter draws conclusions based on the previous chapters’ concept

development, interview results, modeling development and discussion of the FCO-

RP/BRDM model. This chapter concludes by focusing on possible contributions

resulting from this research and areas for further investigation.

6.1. Research Goal and Questions

The goal of this research was to define and diagram the dynamics concerning the

decision process used by FCOs during the initial response interval of a Presidentially

declared Stafford Act disaster. Derivative from this goal were the following three

research questions that were answered during the course of this research.

1. Can FCOs describe the decisional structure and processes they use and choices

they have to make within the often high stress, dynamic and ambiguous

environments that exist during the initial response interval of a Presidentially

declared Stafford Act disaster? Throughout conducting the interviews, all FCOs

were very able to describe and select specific disaster examples that illustrated the

disaster decisional dynamics and structures, processes and choices they have used

in responding to Presidentially declared disasters. Further, they were able to

relate their personal backgrounds and training into how they conducted disaster

decision making and able to use their extensive backgrounds and experience to

review and modify the draft RP/BRDM decision model.

2. Can a decisional model be developed based on the RPD and the BRDM models

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that diagrams the structure, variables, decision points, and processes used by

FCOs in making critical decisions during the initial response interval? The

interview process resulted in an FCO-RP/BRDM integrated decision making

model reflecting the FCOs’ use of both the intuitive RP and bounded rational

BRDM approaches to decision making during the initial response interval.

Are there common background experiences, education or training that FCOs consider

valuable in decision making during the initial response interval that could be considered

“best practices” in support of FCO decision making during a disaster? The FCOs

considered their knowledge and experiences as key for decision making in the initial

response period. All FCOs came to the cadre after having one or more previous jobs with

at least one of them disaster related as well as having various advanced degrees and

professional training. While the FCOs saw value in their own professional backgrounds

(fire, police, military, emergency management, etc.), there was no consensus as to which

backgrounds or educational experiences were most applicable to FCO disaster decision

making. There also was no consensus view among FCOs as to the value of any one type

of technology (e.g. Apple iPads) in assisting them in disaster decision making. However,

there was consensus by all FCOs interviewed concerning the need for having disaster

related professional experiences and related formal education in helping them conduct

decision making during the initial response interval. Indeed, this advantage was also

recognized by officials in FEMA, the FCOs sponsoring agency, both by hiring FCOs

already having disaster knowledge and experience, and in the development of the FCO

Professional Development Plan required for all FCOs. It may be that the interview

questions regarding Question 3 were directed at too high a level to discern common

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experiential or educational elements among FCOs. That is, “professional experience”

was explored by FCO’s each discussing their specific professional backgrounds rather

than further exploring the specific attributes within their professional backgrounds that

were particularly relevant to their work as an FCO. Also, the personal "educational

experience", was discussed by each FCO, rather than exploring in detail the specific

competencies within those experiences that would be valuable to FCOs and could be

furthered by education/training.

6.2. Discussion and Recommendations

The research method employed to meet the above research goal and questions was to

interview 20 (46 percent) of the current FCO cadre at the time of the research and also

interview an additional 5 former FCOs who were lead FCOs during some of the more

recent catastrophic disasters such as Hurricane Katrina and the 9-11 terrorism incident.

By combining the RPD and BRDM models of decision making, a draft decision model

was developed and used for discussion purposes during the interview process. The focus

of this research was on the FCOs’ decision making processes during disasters and not on

whether any of the FCOs’ decisions were “right” or “wrong” per se.

6.2.1. Dynamics Influencing Decision Making

Decisional theory as applied to the FCO cadre and the situations they faced in leading

federal disaster response was first examined in this research. The theories of intuitive

134

decision making as expressed by Dr. Gary Klein, bounded rationality, event correlation,

confidence bias, “satisficing”, development of a mental frame for decision making, etc.

were woven into the FCOs’ responses and approaches to decision making and

incorporated into the FCO-RP/BRDM model. Decisional theory as especially discussed

in Chapter 2, served as the foundation for this research and its findings.

Concerning achieving situational awareness as a component of decision making, all

FCO’s interviewed described the characteristics of the disaster(s) they chose, their

complexity, uniqueness and severity, as foundational to their ability in gaining situational

awareness and influencing the rate at which this situational awareness, as defined in this

thesis, was obtained. Also, impacting the FCO’s decision making processes were the

quality, amount and speed at which situational information was obtained by the FCO, the

resources for and time available to make decisions, and the consequences of those

decisions. These factors were reflected in the intuitive or bounded rational paths of the

FCO-RP/BRDM model.

6.2.2. FCO-RP/BRDM Model Development and Application

The intuitive, RP, approach was identified by FCOs as being used for decisions that

were similar in key aspects to decisions they made previously in their professional

careers and so they “just knew” the answer to the decision needed to be made.

Alternatively and importantly, the intuitive RP approach was also identified by FCOs as

being necessary when the exigencies of the disaster situation demanded a rapid transition

from developing situational awareness to decision making.

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If there was time and resources, the bounded rational BRDM approach was identified

by the FCOs interviewed as the decision path of choice. It allowed for a more measured

and defensible approach that facilitated explaining the decision made and rationale for

that decision to other stakeholders who needed to assist and support implementation of

the decision.

Notably, the FCOs added additional terminology, concepts, processes, and decision

points to the original draft RP/BRDM model that was presented and discussed during the

interviews. New and important additions were made to the draft model resulting in the

FCO-RP/BRDM variant, specific to the FCO decisional experience.

The need for identifying and accommodating the concept of a new paradigm

distinctly in the model was identified by FCOs and the diagrammatic incorporation of the

new paradigm concept allowed FCOs to discuss and include situations that were so

unusual or unique that they were not analogous with their past knowledge or experiences.

Another important FCO generated addition in the FCO-RP/BRDM model was the

focus on the consequences of implementing a decided course of action. The FCOs

believed that the model should not end at the point of Implementing a Course of Action,

but that the model needed to diagrammatically reflect the results of that implementation,

especially if there were unintended results derivative from the RP or BRDM paths.

These unintended results caused additional processes and decision points to be

undertaken in either the intuitive RP or bounded rational BRDM decisional approaches.

All these suggested changes were accommodated in the final FCO-RP/BRDM model

developed at the conclusion of this research (Figure 5-5).

136

In discussing the use the intuitive RP or the bounded rational BRDM approach for a

given decision with the FCOs, they focused on the characteristics of the disaster itself, the

importance of and speed by which decisions needed to be made and their previous

knowledge and experience as key factors in determining whether to use an RP or BRDM

approach for a specific decision. In addition, FCOs noted that in one disaster they could

make an intuitive RP decision first and then have another decision that was better suited

to the BRDM path and so on. FCO#2 noting, “I think to bring order to the chaos, you

really need the right-hand [BRDM] side, and that to me is your incident-management

system, the crisis-action system and all those kinds of things when you've got to a large

group of people that can pretty well put that together for you, … but again, while that's

happening, you're going to have other things pop-up off cycle if you will, that are going

to require senior leadership to make some quick decisions response-wise in that center

[RP] track.”

Ultimately, every disaster had unique aspects to it, be they in the specific disaster

characteristics, the group of responders, the political pressures, etc. Together, the RP and

BRDM paths of the FCO-RP/BRDM model diagrammed the decision processes and

options available to the FCO given the specific decision to be made in context of the

disaster, the timeframes and resources available, and the experience and knowledge the

FCO brought to the situation, and decision needed to be made.

6.3. Recommendations for Future Research

This research only focused on the initial response period of disaster decision making

137

by FCOs. Additional research could validate, modify and possibly generalize from the

findings and FCO-RP/BRDM model process of decision making by FCOs. FCOs

continue to make decisions as the federal lead representative well past the initial response

period, through the rest of the response and into recovery from the disaster. Applying

and modifying the model to fit these additional periods of disaster response and recovery

would enhance the usefulness of the model to FCOs and their program managers.

Another valuable addition and application of this research would be applying,

assessing and refining the FCO-RP/BRDM model relative to non-FCO disaster decision

makers in the U.S. and internationally, and to decision makers inside and outside of the

U.S. making stressful/crisis decisions, but in non-disaster related subject areas. By

applying and modifying the model to other decision makers dealing in stressful situations

both in the U.S. and internationally, the model could possibly be made into a more

general analytic of decision making under stressful conditions.

Within the U.S. alone, there are many other types of disaster response teams at all

levels of the federal government, for example the U.S. Coast Guard National Strike Team

(USCG 2007) and the Environmental Protection Agency National Response Team (EPA

2011). There are additional disaster teams at the state and local levels from community

firefighters through local and state government departmental response teams that handle

all types of disasters. Modifying the decision model described in this research to include

the decision processes for these other decision makers in these other organizations may

enable the model to be a useful analytic tool to define and discuss decision making

processes well beyond the FCO cadre to the more general domain of crisis management

within the U.S.

138

Finally, further research could be conducted with FCOs and other groups of crisis

responders to better define the types of backgrounds, education, and experiences that

could be most beneficial to disaster decision making in various settings and conditions.

The personal background questions asked in this research were perhaps discussed at too

high a level to determine common, valued background elements across the FCO cohort.

More specific questions may have been more enlightening, focusing on what specific

attributes were particularly valuable in the backgrounds of the decision makers, what

made them so valuable in disaster decision making, and what specific subjects,

competencies and experiences were most beneficial and why in aiding disaster decision

making may further refine this research’s conclusions. This could lead to enhanced

training and exercise possibilities for FCOs and possibly disaster decision makers

generally.

6.4. Significance of Research Findings

This research focused on actual disaster decision makers and their experiences, not on

subjects in laboratory settings and extrapolating to the world of disaster decision making.

The results of this research provide FCOs, their program managers and others involved in

their decision making process with a specific, FCO-validated model of their decision

making processes and factors impacting these processes. The “road map” to decision

making provided by the FCO-RP/BRDM supports the development of job aids and

standard operating procedures focused on specific steps in the FCO-RP/BRDM model

such as conducting a rational analysis (e.g., goal and objective setting, alternatives

development, etc.), determining what constitutes a new paradigm, and how to conduct

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and assess the Will It Work decision process. The “road map” afforded by the FCO-

RP/BRDM model will also be valuable in the development of training and exercises for

FCOs which can focus on specific components of the processes as well as factors and

relationships defined in the FCO-RP/BRDM model. In addition, simulations of disaster

situations could be developed utilizing the model’s decision process structure and factors.

For example, simulations could be developed that examine the factors that assist in the

Recognition process or determine whether a situation is analogous or not, and what

adequately constitutes a decision concerning Have Time/Resources? in which disaster

context(s).

For the FCOs, decisional processes and factors embodied and diagrammed in the

FCO-RP/BRDM model serve as a basis for understanding how they analytically approach

disasters by making decision processes previously implicit, now diagrammatically

explicit and defined in this decisional domain. With processes descriptively explicit,

decisional process best practices can more easily be identified, documented and then used

to support training and exercises. Also, such information could be valuable in defining

the knowledge, skills and abilities for selecting and then training and tailoring

experiences to develop decisional capabilities of new FCOs in a structured and defined

way. Certainly understanding the decisional processes used by FCOs during a disaster’s

initial response interval when the situation is often the most dynamic and ill defined can

assist in developing FCOs skills and capabilities, and in supporting this cadre of

professionals during critical disaster response operations.

140

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APPENDICES

150

Appendix A - FCO Questionnaire

This Appendix provides a copy of the FCO questionnaire used in this research

entitled: “Decision Making By Leaders In High Consequence Disasters”. The George

Washington University Institutional Review Board reviewed and approved this

questionnaire.

156

Appendix B – GWU Informed Consent Form

This Appendix provides a copy of the Informed Consent Form signed by all FCOs

that took part in this research. The Form was reviewed and approved by The George

Washington University Institutional Review Board.

157

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Decision Making by Leaders in High Consequence Disasters

(IRB #041132)

Principal Investigator: Dr. Joseph Barbera, 202-994-8424

Principal Contact: Mr. Jeffrey Glick, 202-701-6944

INTRODUCTION

You are invited to take part in a research study being conducted by Jeffrey Glick, PhD

candidate at the School of Engineering and Applied Science, George Washington

University. You are being asked if you want to take part in this study because you are a

current or former Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).

Please read this Consent Form and ask any questions that will help you decide if you

want to participate in the study. Participation is completely voluntary and even if you

decide to participate, you can choose not to answer any specific question asked and you

can stop the interview temporarily or permanently at any time. Your employment status

will not be affected in any way should you choose not to take part or withdraw at any

time.

PURPOSE

This study will examine and model the decisional processes used by FCOs during the

beginning of a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster, the initial response period,

where there can be a high degree of uncertainty and confusion, and where decisions

confronting the FCO have to be made quickly, may be controversial, and can have high

consequences and impact.

PROCEDURES

If you decide to participate, you will have a one-to-one interview with the researcher

(Principal Contact) focusing first on your educational and professional background, and

your military and other relevant experience. Then the interview will continue, focusing

on the disaster management and decision making processes you used during the high

stress, often confusing initial response period in one or two major Stafford Act disasters

that you had decision making responsibilities for and wish to discuss. The total interview

should take about two hours and it is the preference of the researcher to audio record the

interview if you approve. If you do not approve or if the interview is conducted over the

phone, written notes will be taken by the researcher.

158

RISK & CONFIDENTIALITY

There is a small chance that someone not part of this research study will find out that

you took part in it. However, your name and identifying background information

will be kept separate, from the questionnaire audio recordings or notes made to the

presentations prepared, and dissertation or other documents written. Your

information may be reviewed by Dr. Joe Barbera and departments of George

Washington University responsible for overseeing research safety and compliance of

this study.

There is a small risk of mild emotional discomfort for participating in this study due

to discussion of past events and decisions that occurred during formerly high stress

situations. Risks of emotional discomfort will be minimized by allowing you to stop

the interview at any time, either temporarily or permanently and you can refuse to

answer any specific question being asked.

All interviews will be conducted by the researcher. With your approval the interview

will be audio recorded to ensure information is captured. If you do not wish to be

recorded, notes will be taken by the interviewer. Audio recordings transcribed will

have transcribers provide written assurance that they will not release any of the data

other than to the researcher.

Due to personal interviews being conducted, you will not have anonymity to the

researcher. However, the results of all interviews and questionnaires will be

aggregated and discussed in the dissertation absent any reference to names or

locations of respondents. Although you will not be identified by name or location, it

is possible that someone reading the dissertation could guess your identity. In the

Dissertation, each FCO will be referred to as FCO-1, FCO-2, etc.

All interview transcripts, notes and audio records will be maintained by the

researcher on a stand-alone/non-networked computer protected by password access

with external hard drive backup. An electronic file separate from the interview

transcripts and audio records will be maintained to relate your name to the FCO-1 or

FCO-2, etc. designation for reference by the researcher of the dissertation text back

to the transcripts, notes or recordings.. All electronic files and written notes will be

maintained by the researcher seven years for reference.

BENEFITS

Taking part in this research will not benefit you directly; however, the goal of this

study is to provide a greater understanding concerning decision processes used by

FCOs during the initial response period which can often be the hardest period of

disaster response decision making in a Presidentially declared Stafford Act disaster.

This greater understanding will further define the dynamics and influences affecting

the FCOs’ decision making processes and should enable new or modified training

and exercise programs to be developed for this important cadre of professionals.

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