DECEMBER 2003 FLIGHT AIRWORTHINESS …...2004/01/28 · ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED...

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This issue of FAST has been printed on paperproduced without using chlorine, to reduce

waste and help conserve natural resources.Every little helps!

Editor: Denis DempsterArt Director: Agnès Massol-Lacombe

in association with Chandler Gooding

London • Leeds • Toulouse

Customer Services Marketing Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 39 29

Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 27 67 E-mail: [email protected]

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FAST may be read on Internet http://www.airbus.comunder Customer Services/Publications

ISSN 1293-5476

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Escape slides & slide raftsA330/A340 FamilyScheduled maintenance operational testSébastien Asse

A380 - A solution for airportsWilly-Pierre DupontThomas Burger

Approach and Landing Accident ReductionA global programme for flight operations safety enhancementMichel Trémaud

Preventing ignition sources inside fuel tanksJosé-Luis Mauriz-DigonRoss Walker

Anemometric leak detection using new helium pressure toolXavier BarriolaAlain Marsan

From the archives...Approach & landing - Part 2

Customer ServicesAround the clock… Around the world

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Airbus Customer Services

© AIRBUS 2003. All rights reservedThe articles herein may be reprinted without permission except where

copyright source is indicated, but with acknowledgement to Airbus. Articles which may be subject to ongoing review must have their accuracy verified

prior to reprint. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They arebased on the assumptions shown and are expressed in good faith. Where the

supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, the Company will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.

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Photo cover © Airbus - Computer graphic by I3MPhotographs by Hervé Bérenger, Hervé Goussé and Philippe Masclet

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2ND AIRBUS FLIGHT OPERATIONS MONITORING & SAFETY DEVELOPMENTCONFERENCE22-24 September, 2003 Rome, Italy

As part of its commitment to increase safety,Airbus held its second conference in Rome. 70 representatives attended from 48 operators.

Airbus will continue to organise this proactive safety dialogue in the futuretogether with other safety initiatives.

18TH HUMAN FACTORS SYMPOSIUM 28-30 October, 2003 New York, USA

In cooperation with JetBlue Airways, this event attracted 130 participants.

Topics of the programme have been, amongst others, the implementation ofa safety culture right from the beginning of an aircraft operation, the safe-ty evaluation methods and tools, the ways and means to prepare the digitalfuture in the cockpit.

A300/A300-600/A310 TECHNICAL SYMPOSIUM 17-21 November, 2003 Seville, Spain

This year the A300 Family Symposium gath-ered 250 representatives from 51 airlines and16 vendor representatives. The programmecovered aspects of ageing aircraft, major in-service issues, improved responsiveness,aircraft upgrades and freighter versions.Demonstrations on fuel leak detection andrepair as well as AOLS were performed dailythroughout the conference.

Awards for ÔExcellence in OperationÕ were given to Japan Air Systems andKuwait Airways. Exceptionally an award for ÔRecognition of outstandingperformanceÕ were given to European Air Transport, Korean Airlines andTAP Air Portugal. Pakistan International Airlines, Qatar Airways and TAPreceived a recognition for the highest aircraft utilisation.

19TH HUMAN FACTORS SYMPOSIUMMay 2004 Location not yet decided

Airbus will continue the dialogue with its operators at a suitable forum, dis-cussing human factors aspects with practical and operational perspectives.

The first, of two scheduled for 2004, will take place in May. A provisionalagenda will soon be sent to all operators.

A330/A340 FAMILY SYMPOSIUM 14-18 June, 2004 Athens, Greece

Airbus is pleased to announce the date andlocation of the next A330/A340 TechnicalSymposium. The working sessions will beginon Monday morning and will continue throughto Friday midday. These sessions will as usualcomprise presentations based on actual serviceissues affecting the A330/A340 programme aswell as subjects of more general interest.

A provisional agenda will soon be sent to all operators.

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ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE OPERATIONAL TEST A330/A340 FAMILY

Sebastien AsseGroup Manager Cabin Interior

Customer Services Engineering

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Each door on a passenger aircraft is fitted with anescape slide for emergency evacuation of passengersand crew. Most of the slides may also be used as liferafts in the event the aircraft lands on water. Forsimplicity in this article, slides includes slide rafts.Slides can be compared to parachutes: they arepacked to work once. Following use, it is necessary

to repack them to be ready for the next deployment.And, before each deployment, there is no absolutecertainty that they will work. Since they are not usedoften it is necessary to have a means of gatheringinformation on their reliability and particularly toidentify potential deployment failures: the only way is to perform scheduled deployments of slides.

Escape slides andslide rafts A330/A340 Family Scheduled maintenance operational test

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WHEN AND WHERE SLIDESARE TESTED

Today, deployment tests are per-formed at different stages in thelife of the slide.

AT THE MANUFACTURINGFACILITYDuring the manufacturing processby the supplier, Goodrich, all slidesare tested before delivery toAirbus. This acceptance test con-sists of deploying all units from amock-up of the aircraft door. Afterinflation the slide is checked inorder to correct any anomaliessuch as bonding and leaks betweenpieces of material. In the event ofdeployment failure, the slide isreconditioned and tested again.Each deployment is video recordedand the tape is archived byGoodrich.

SAMPLING ON NEW AIRCRAFTDURING AIRBUS A330/A340 FINAL ASSEMBLYSince 2002 a sampling programmewas organized during A330/A340final assembly in order to test inreal conditions, from the aircraft,the newly installed slide. Beforedelivery of a new aircraft to thecustomer, one door is selected atrandom and the correspondingslide is deployed. All the tests arevideo recorded from three differentangles (inside the aircraft, outsidein front of the door and on theside). This permits identity ofpotential issues, which are notlinked to operational or in-serviceconditions.

WHEN FITTED ON IN-SERVICEAIRCRAFT (MAINTENANCEREQUIREMENT)The Airbus Maintenance PlanningDocument (MPD) requires thatoperators perform a scheduledoperational test on the slide fittedon their A330/A340 Family. Theminimum requirement is to per-form one deployment per fleet(A330/A340), per door position(1, 2, 3 and 4 left or right) every 36months. However, depending onnational regulations, some authori-

ties request their local operators toperform more deployment teststhan Airbus requires.

Airbus requests each operator toreport all deployment tests (suc-cessful or unsuccessful) throughSIL 25-061. Also, every 36months, each slide has to be over-hauled in a qualified shopapproved by Goodrich, and listedin their Component MaintenanceManual(CMM)

TESTING THE SLIDE

The tests have to be done on theaircraft by opening the relevantdoor in armed mode to allow thedeployment of the slide. TheAircraft Maintenance Manual(AMM) operational test task andSIL 25-124 describes the proce-dure to follow and the correspond-ing safety precautions.

It is important to follow the rules inperforming this test in order toensure that slide deployment willoccur in the best conditions (closeto an emergency situation).

• Door handle lever is lifted with door in armed mode.• Door booster is activated. • Gas under pressure goes into the door damper.• Door starts to open quickly and move forward.• Release-pin lanyard is under tension, and then the two release pins are pulled.• The slide packboard drops on to the door sill and the rail adapters are extracted from the rails.• The packboard is detached from the door. • Door moves to the side and allows the packboard to drop outside the aircraft.• The packboard starts to rotate and then the parachute pin is pulled.• Soft cover lacing opens (packboard rotated about 90 degrees).• Packboard continues to rotate to a total of 270 degrees so that the top outboard corner of

the packboard (rail adapters) is pointing towards the fuselage. • The aspirators detach from the packboard and the cylinder is then extracted from

the pack.• The firing lanyard being under tension, the firing pin is pulled out of the regulator valve

and the inflation is initiated.• Pressurised gas (3290 psi of mixed nitrogen and CO2) passes from the cylinder through

the aspirators to the inflatable part of the slide and opens the aspirators’ flapper valvewith the help of a venturi.

• The aspirators’ flapper valve draws in external air.• The mix of gas under pressure and external air starts to inflate the slide.• Inflation is finished when the slide raft has reached the requested pressure controlled by

a pressure relief valve(PRV).

Slide deployment sequence

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The complete deployment sequence,from the door opening until the fullinflation of the slide, should notexceed 16 seconds. Actual slideinflation from the packboard beingreleased until deployment is com-plete takes less than six seconds.

The Goodrich method is to extractthe complete packboard from theaircraft, let it drop against the fuse-lage and then commence inflation.During the deployment and infla-tion, the packboard, which is builtfrom hard composite material, maycome into contact with the fuselage

skin. Dents on the fuselage (orbelly fairing for door 3) may resultfrom this contact. It is thereforenecessary to protect the aircraftduring test slide deployments.

Initially the only recommendationwas to use a “protective mat” forthe fuselage during slide deploy-ment, without giving a materialspecification. Most of the time justbefore deployment test, mechanicshad to find something in the hangarto tape to the aircraft skin. Usuallyplastic sheet, a piece of carpet,cardboard or bubble wrap were themost easily available materials andwere quickly taped to the fuselagebelow the doorsill.

IN SERVICE EXPERIENCE

Several reports have been receivedfrom the field showing that the useof such materials has allowed dam-age to the fuselage and in somecases prevented normal deploy-ment of the slide raft:

• damage to the fuselage and par-ticularly to the belly fairing wasdue to a protection that was toolight (Figure 1)or not locatedwhere contact would occur,

• deployment failures were mainlydue to the slide pack beingcaught in protective material(particularly bubble wrap),which decreased the drop inertiaand stopped the deploymentbefore inflation (Figure 2).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Further to these reports, Airbusreviewed in detail how to protectthe aircraft skin during a deploy-ment test. The first step was todetermine the fuselage area to beprotected at each door position.The second step was to define amaterial able to protect the fuse-lage structure without disturbingthe deployment sequence.

Figure 1

Figure 2

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Figure 3

Filletfairing

Bellyfairing

Tape

4m (13.12ft) 2m (6.56ft)

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Type A door

Type 1 door

Figures 4 and 5

PROTECTIVE MATERIALHaving determined the area to beprotected, the type of protectionchosen is also important to ensureadequate protection without dis-turbing the deployment sequence.The protective material shouldsimulate the aircraft skin. Afterreview of existing materials andsome tests on the final assemblyline during a sample deployment, ithas been decided to use two differ-ent materials, bonded together, toprovide the required protection.

WHICH AREA TO PROTECTDuring the deployment sequence,the packboard may hit the fuselageand cause damage. This happenswhen the packboard is rotated a totalof 270 degrees, and its top outboardcorners (rail adapters) point towardsthe fuselage (figure 3). The degreeof contact depends on the droppinginertia. At the door 3 position, due tothe contour and composite materialof the belly fairing located below it,a heavy dent may result.

After review of the different condi-tions it has been decided to have aspecific protection fitted duringthe test, just below the doorsill andcovering the maximum area ofpackboard movement:

• for passenger exit (Type A doorequipped with slide raft) the pro-tection dimension should be 3mdeep x 4m wide (figure 4).

• for emergency exit (Type 1 doorequipped with slide) the protec-tion dimension should be 3mdeep x 2m wide (figure 5).

Being a system designed to beused in emergencies, slidedeployment is fast and quiteviolent, as the slide has to beready to evacuate passengersfrom the aircraft very quicklyafter the door opens. Becauseof this deploying a slide or slideraft for test requires some pre-caution in order to prevent any

fuselage damage or interferencein the sequence. Making avideo of the tests in order to beable to investigate possible fail-ures is recommended.

Airbus would be grateful forfeedback on all deployments,successful or otherwise, asdescribed in SIL 25-061.

Conclusion

CONTACT DETAILS

Philippe Le BigotGroup Manager Cabin InteriorCustomer Services EngineeringTel: +33 (0)5 61 93 44 59Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 44 [email protected]

Protective material

Outer layer with hard and smooth faceMinimum thickness: 1.2mm (0.06in.)

Inner layer of foam to absorb the load Minimum thickness: 10mm (0.39in.)

Figure 6

tective cover: Make sure the pro-tection is correctly attached withtape to the aircraft structure. Thisprevents the suction of loose pro-tection material into the aspiratorduring the deployment test. Looseprotection material can cause dam-age to the aspirator, with the riskthat the deployment test will not besatisfactory.

Use adhesive tape (Material No.05-069) or ADETEC 5350 toattach the protection sheets to thefuselage below the doorsill. Makesure that there are no gaps betweenthe edges of the sheets and that theself-adhesive foam sheet goesagainst the fuselage.

Follow all safety instruction pro-vided in AMM 25-62-00-501.

This protection is made oftwo separate layers (Figure 6):

• The outer layer is fibreglass-reinforced polyester laminateMaterial No. 05-109 (Refer toAMM 20.31.00), which has aminimum thickness of 1.2mm(0.06in). This layer has a hardsmooth surface, which cannotcatch parts of the packboard, asit falls during deployment. Thesurface is also impact resistantand spreads the load evenly.

• The inner layer is polyethylene foam Material No. 05-082 (Refer to AMM 20.31.00), which has a minimum thicknessof 10mm (0.39in). It absorbs theload.

HOW TO BUILD AND FIT THE PROTECTION ON THEAIRCRAFT SKIN

Refer to figures 4 and 5 for thedimensions and position of the pro-tection required for each type ofdoor. Three different sizes of pro-tection can cover all A330/A340door types: (one for all Type Adoors 1, 2 and 4; one for Type Adoor 3; one for Type 1 door 3).However the protection for door 3Type A can also be used for Type 1if both door types are present in thefleet. Then cut both outer and innerlayers to the appropriate dimen-sions. Attach the self-adhesivefoam sheets to the polyester lami-nate sheets.

Use an adjustable access platformto help position and attach the pro-


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Since the preparation of this article,Sébastien Asse has moved on an othergroup and therefore questions on slidesshould be sent to:

A380 - A SOLUTION FOR AIRPORTS

Thomas BurgerSenior Marketing Analyst A380

Airbus Marketing Division

Willy-Pierre DupontDirector Infrastructure & Environment

A380 Programme

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Most major airports are facing significantpassenger growth, growing congestion,

and limited potential for expansion.

Given the unique nature of the A380’s size withgreater span, height, seating capacity and weights, ateam dedicated to the A380 airport compatibilityaspects was set up in 1994, 12 years before theplanned entry into service. Dialogue with major worldairports is now well-established and many are usingthe A380 as the reference aircraft for master planning.The availability of the A380 Airplane Characteristicsfor Airport Planning manual, on the Airbus web sitesince February 2002 has significantly supported thisprocess. In parallel, work with regulatory authoritiesand on environmental aspects is ongoing. Manyaspects of the A380 design have been driven byairport compatibility considerations, thus minimising

the amount of adaptation and, hence investment,required by airports to accommodate the aircraft.

Most major airports are planning for operations oflarge aircraft, mainly because they are facingsignificant passenger growth, growing congestion,and limited potential for expansion. These airports,therefore, see the A380 as a boost for business: it willenable them to increase revenue for relatively littleexpenditure within the limits of their existinginfrastructure. Dialogue and combined workinggroups are key elements in defining the A380 andairport master plans.

A380 A solution for airports


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Airbus is working closely with 60 airports (Figure 1) that are likely to seethe A380 before 2010 as indicated by existing and potential customers. Ofthese airports, many are A380 compatible today and those that do requireinfrastructure changes have planned and in some cases started work on therelevant upgrades. In addition surveys have been carried out and contactsestablished with further airports based on carrier interest and Airbusforecasts for future A380 routes.

AIRPORT COMPATIBILITY

Many recommendations thatAirbus received during it’sextensive consultations withairports and regulatory authoritieshave directly shaped the design ofthe A380. The main characteristicsthat have been optimised for betterairport integration are summarised

in Figure 2. The landing gearwidth and 20-wheel design willallow the aircraft to use 23m widetaxiways and have a comparablepavement loading to existingaircraft. Furthermore the A380will be certificated for unrestrictedoperations on 45m wide runways.In the context of terminaloperations, the door locations andcabin layout allow comparableturn around times to the 747-400with 35% more passengersboarded. Ground servicing pointsare located in similar positions toother widebody aircraft allowingthe use of existing groundservicing equipment. As well asthe physical characteristics, thefield performance of the aircrafthas been optimised to allow theA380 to operate from any airportthat the 747 does today.

There are a number of factors thatrelate to the wingspan, weight andcapacity of the aircraft that airportswill have to take into considerationhowever. With a wingspan of79.8m(262ft) and fin height of24m(79.6ft) the main area thatairports will need to address arerunway and taxiway separationdistances. These vary from oneairport to another with many newerairports already being fully A380compliant. Although the pavementloading of the A380 is comparableto existing aircraft, the weight-bearing limit of tunnels andbridges will need to be verified toensure they are capable of

supporting the 562t MaximumRamp Weight of the aircraft.Parking stands will need to beupgraded to cater for the greaterwingspan, alternatively the size ofaircraft on the stands either side ofan A380 could be limited. With aseating capacity approximately35% higher than the 747-400,terminal facilities directly relatedto aircraft capacity such as gateholding rooms, may requiremodification. The amount ofmodification required at airportswill vary considerably dependanton the compatibility of existinginfrastructure.

Figure 1 - Likely first A380 airports

Figure 2 - Designed for airport integration


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THE SMART INVESTMENTFOR AIRPORTS

Many airports are alreadycongested today, accommodatingfuture growth with the existingaircraft mix would requireadditional infrastructure to providethe extra stands and slots. Thiswould require the construction ofnew runways, taxiways, parkingareas, terminals and gates withcosts in the region of severalbillion dollars. As aircraft capacityhas hardly changed for threedecades there is an urgent need toprepare for the future. The A380carries 35% more passengers thana 747, thus allowing airports toaccommodate growth within theircurrent infrastructure, thereforemitigating the need for suchmassive infrastructure investment.Adaptation of airports toaccommodate larger aircraft ischeaper, simpler and more spaceefficient than the duplication ofrunways and gates. For thoseairports that are land constrainedand/or movement limited by localenvironmental legislation, largeaircraft are the only solution tocater for growth. The costs relatedto the integration of the A380 areincremental and relate only toairside, apron and terminalupgrades ($100 million - AirportsCouncil International – NorthAmerica average). They aredependent on a variety of factorsincluding the level and layout ofexisting infrastructure, frequencyof A380 operation and adoption ofoperational recommendations. Thislevel of investment is small incomparison to total airportexpenditure and much less than

that required for new airports,which are also subject to very longplanning and construction periods.

REGULATORY ASPECTS

The costs of adapting an airport tohandle the A380 can be minimizedby applying current accepted air-port operational recommendationsrather than design recommenda-tions (Figure 3), which are applica-ble to new airports and new areasof existing airports. The A380Airport Compatibility Group(AACG) was the first group dedi-cated to airport operational recom-mendations and they now workjointly with the FAA and ICAO onA380 operations. The AACGCommon Agreement Documentwas completed at the end of 2002.Four European civil aviationauthorities have signed a letter,stating that the AACG documentconstitutes a sound basis for anyadaptation of their respective regu-lations, to facilitate the introduc-tion of the A380 for safe and har-monised operations into existingairports. A CD-ROM containingthe complete AACG documenta-tion was officially released toICAO on January 31st, 2003.

Dissemination of AACG work toICAO, FAA, A380’ airlines andairports, international and workinggroups dealing with new largeaircraft operations was conductedthrough presentations at ICAOEurope (October 2002), ICAOMontreal (November 2003) andFAA (November 2002).

Following the dissemination of theAACG work Airbus is currently


Figure 4 - Turning Radii of the A380compared to existing wide-body aircraft

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assisting in the definition of opera-tional recommendations in con-junction with both ICAO (circularon new large aircraft operations,including A380 specifics discussedat Airport Design Study Groupmeetings in July and October 2003- planned to be issued by year end)and the FAA (modification of stan-dards requested by major US airports - expected FAA answersby early 2004).

GROUND OPERATIONS

The main driver for ground opera-tions of the A380 was to be as com-patible as possible to existing wide-body aircraft in all key areas, theseinclude manoeuvrability on rampand taxiway systems and terminaloperations. To facilitate this aim,Airbus has and continues to workclosely with airlines, airports,ground handling companies,ground servicing equipment (GSE)manufacturers to ensure the allaspects of ground operations willbe ready for the A380 when itenters service.

MANOEUVRABILITY

Recent modifications to corners oftaxiways to suit the greater turningcircles of the A340-600 and 777-300 will allow the A380 to manoeu-vre without restriction (Figure 4).Although the track of the A380landing gear is slightly wider thanthose aircraft its wheelbase is short-er. This means that the effectiveclearance between the main wheelsof the A380 and the edge of thetaxiway is greater. Visibility fromthe cockpit also directly influencesthe accuracy of ground manoeu-vring and in this respect the A380’smid-deck cockpit position offers abetter field of vision than the 747.It also makes the transition fromother Airbus wide-body types to theA380 easier for pilots.


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between Doors 1 left and right onthe main deck. This allows thesame two bridge arrangement tobe used as the 747 but results inseparate and simultaneous board-ing flows onto the upper and maindecks (Figure 7). This consider-ably improves passenger boardingand de-boarding times, a criticalcomponent in the turn around timeof a large aircraft.

In those cases where airlines or air-ports wish to offer an increasedlevel of passenger service or fasterturn-around times, specialisedequipment such as upper deckboarding bridges and upper deckcatering vehicles are required. Inthose applications which necessi-tate new equipment with directupper deck access capability,Airbus has taken a proactiveapproach in facilitating the com-munication between the airlines,airports and GSE manufacturers.This primarily includes the organi-sation of working groups and openforums where manufacturers canpresent their design concepts andreceive feedback from airlines andground handling companies. Aswell as the organisation of thesemeetings, Airbus provides A380technical data and has set up e-rooms which greatly aid the inter-change of information betweenworking group members.

Instigated in February 2001, theupper deck catering vehicle work-ing group is the longest running ofthese forums. Several manufactur-

TERMINAL OPERATIONS

Essentially from the main deck toground level the A380 offers thesame accessibility as existingwide-body aircraft. Ground servic-ing locations have been agreedwith airlines to ensure compatibil-ity with existing ground servicingvehicles (Figure 5 & 6). The sizeof the A380 cabin will drive spe-cific ground servicing require-ments, in particular for the amountof electrical power and precondi-tioned air. Additional ports forground electrical power and ahigher flow rate for the precondi-tioned air cater for the increaseddemand, which existing servicingequipment can provide. The cabin architecture of the A380allows turn-around times similarto the 747-400. This has largelybeen achieved by the optimal posi-tioning of the A380’s wide duallane stairs in the cross aisle

Figure 8 - Initial positioning testsconducted at the full scale A380 upper

deck catering vehicle mock-up

Figure 7 - Balanced boarding flows

1. Pressure refuel connectors2. Hydraulic reservoir servicing panel

(reservoir filling and reservoir pressurisation)3. Engine oil filling4. VF generator oil filling5. Toilet and waste service panel6. Ground electrical power7. Low pressure preconditioned air8. Yellow hydraulic ground connector9. Green hydraulic ground connector10. Potable water service panel11. APU oil filling12. High pressure air engine start13. Refuel/Defuel control panel14. Oxygen system

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Figure 5 - A380 conventional ground servicing points

Figure 6 - A380 ramp layout with main deck servicing

ers have shown detailed designsolutions for such a vehicle whosemain requirement is to service the8m high upper deck directly. Aspart of its commitment to ensuringthe availability and safe operationof such vehicles by A380 entryinto service, Airbus has recentlycompleted a full scale partialmock-up of the A380 in Toulouse(Figure 8) which will be used foroperational testing. These testswill initially use existing 5m maindeck capable catering vehicles tovalidate positioning concepts andthe interaction with other GSE.When prototype upper deck cater-ing vehicles are available, themock-up will be offered for fullscale operational testing and pos-sibly familiarisation training.


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PAVEMENT LOADING

Full scale pavement testing tooptimize and validate A380landing gear design was started in1998 at Toulouse Blagnac airport(Figure 9) with two phases(flexible and rigid pavement tests). New test-validated methodologiesare under development, using a

Figure 11 - Modular landinggear test vehicle

software called ALIZE tosupplement and eventually replacethe current Aircraft/PavementClassification Number (ACN/PCN)method which although widelyused has limited theoretical basis.The development process willsee ALIZE calibrated againstresults from full-scale static andfatigue tests using real aircrafton both flexible and rigidpavements. A380 landing gearconfigurations as well as thosefor some competing aircraft werereproduced using a landing gearconfiguration test vehicle. Theresults obtained from the testvehicle were also validatedagainst production aircraft.

In both of the tests four 30m x 35msegments of pavement wereprepared, each separated by 5m ofneutral pavement. (Figure 10).Each segment represented apavement laid on a differentquality of natural foundation calledsubgrade and measured on theCBR (California Bearing Ratio)

Figure 9 - Location of PavementExperimental Programme (PEP) sites

• Modular assembly (2 to 5 bogies)• Full-scale landing gear• Variable track and tandem• Wheel load up to 32 tons• A340 tyres (pressure adjustment to

simulate other aircraft tyres)• Auto-powered (2 to 4km)

Airbus can now simulate anylanding gear configuration with theassociated aircraft weight and loadtransferred through each wheel.The strain gauges on the eightpavement and subgrade samplesshow the actual load on thesurface. Results obtained from thepavement tests have been in linewith the outputs from the ALIZEmodel and validate the comparablepavement loading of the A380 toexisting aircraft.

scale. The three weaker subgradesCBR10, 6 and 4 were covered firstwith a layer of humidifiedreconstituted crushed gravel then alayer of asphalted gravel andfinally with a layer of eitherasphalt for the flexible surface orconcrete for the rigid surface.Dozens of strain gauges wereplaced in the surface to measurethe effect of different weights ofaircraft on the pavement.

The landing gear configuration testvehicle was built to simulatedifferent full scale landing gearlayouts and different weights ofaircraft (Figure 11). A340 wheelsand tyres were used with tyrepressure being varied to simulatethe tyres of different aircraft types.A load per wheel of up to 32 tonneswas made possible by the additionof ballast to the vehicle. BothAirbus and other aircraft were usedto validate the results obtainedfrom the vehicle tests.

Figure 10 - Pavement tests


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The A380 offers airports animmediate solution to cope withthe forecast ongoing growth inair traffic. With its larger capaci-ty it offers the most efficient useof terminal stands and runwayslots thereby mitigating therequirement for complex andcostly infrastructure develop-ment. Through a process ofconsultation from a very earlystage, many aspects of theA380 have been optimised forairport compatibility resulting inan aircraft that can be integrat-ed into existing airports with aminimum of change

and hence investment. Airbuscontinues to work with all par-ties concerned to ensure thatairports will be ready for theA380 when it enters into servicein 2006.

From an environmental per-spective the application ofnew technology and intensiveresearch has enabled theA380 to combine the intrinsicadvantages of its largercapacity with much lowernoise compared to existinglarge aircraft.

ConclusionCONTACT DETAILS

Willy-Pierre DupontDirector Infrastructure & EnvironmentA380 ProgrammeTel: +33 (0)5 62 11 03 12Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 35 [email protected]

Thomas BurgerSenior Marketing Analyst A380Airbus Marketing DivisionTel: +33 (0)5 62 11 84 73Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 31 [email protected]

ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTNOISE

Low noise characteristics havebeen a major design driver and as aresult the A380 will besignificantly quieter than currentlarge aircraft and have substantialmargins in relation to today’s(ICAO stage 3) and future (ICAOstage 4) noise limits. As well asinternational regulation, the A380also has a significant advantageover existing large aircraft basedon the very stringent local noiseregulation such as the Quota Count(QC) system at the Londonairports of Heathrow, Gatwick andStansted (Figure 12).

These noise levels have beenachieved through the optimisationof the engines, nacelles andairframe. In addition to thephysical optimisation, the A380will be equipped with a novelfunction that will see the FlightManagement System (FMS)programmed with optimal noisetrajectories. These will allow theaircraft to reliably andcontinuously follow the NoiseAbatement Departure Procedure(NAPD) while taking into accountactual aircraft parameters andambient conditions.

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Figure 12 - A380 noise levels in comparisonto international and local limits

This web edition updates the paperversion reflecting the evolution ofthe programme.

Michel TrémaudSenior Director Safety and Security

Airbus Customer Services

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Aviation safety, measured in terms of number of hull losses per departure, has reached a mature, but stable, level. Any furtherenhancement of this achievement requires a systematic approachwhere the aircraft, the operations and the operating environmentare considered globally.

The on-going industry effort to reduce approach-and-landingaccidents is an illustration of global teamwork involving theaircraft manufacturers, the airlines, the state regulatoryauthorities and all other actors of the aviation system (e.g., flight academies, service providers).

Approach-and-LandingAccident Reduction

A global programme forflight operations safety enhancement

APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION


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DATA-DRIVEN APPROACHTO CONCLUSIONS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

The Flight Safety FoundationALAR task force collected andanalyzed data related to asignificant set of approach-and-landing accidents, including thoseresulting in controlled-flight-into-terrain (CFIT). The task forcedeveloped conclusions andrecommendations for practicesthat would improve safety inapproach-and-landing, in thefollowing domains:

• air traffic control - training and procedures,

• airport facilities,• aircraft equipment,• aircraft operations and training.

All conclusions and recomm-endations were data-driven andsupported by factual evidence oftheir relevance to the reduction ofapproach-and-landing incidentsand accidents.

CONCLUSIONS ANDRECOMMENDATIONS FORFLIGHT OPERATIONS ANDTRAINING

The conclusions of the FlightSafety Foundation ALAR taskforce identify the following flightoperations and training issues asfrequent causal factors inapproach-and-landing accidents,including those involving CFIT:

• standard operating procedures,• decision-making in time-critical

situations,• decision to initiate a go-around

when warranted,• rushed and unstabilized

approaches,• pilot/controller understanding

of each other’s operational environment,

• pilot/controller communications,• awareness of approach hazards

(visual illusions, adverse wind conditions or operations on contaminated runway),

• terrain awareness.

The Approach and Landing AccidentReduction (ALAR) effort certainly isthe largest flight safety initiative everinitiated by the aviation industry. TheALAR project was launched by theFlight Safety Foundation in 1996 asa new phase of the Controlled FlightInto Terrain (CFIT) accidentreduction programme started in1992.

The Flight Safety Foundation isan international membershiporganization dedicated to thecontinuous improvement ofaviation safety. Safety initiativeslaunched by the Flight SafetyFoundation draw on the supportof the worldwide aviationindustry, thus ensuring the wideacceptance and dissemination ofthe resulting conclusions andrecommendations.

Airbus has been an activecontributor to the CFIT accidentreduction project and makes acontinuing major contribution to theon-going ALAR effort.

SIZING ELEMENTS

Approach-and-landing accidents(defined as accidents occurringduring the initial approach, finalapproach and landing) representapproximately 55% of total hulllosses and 50% of fatalities.

The flight segment from the outermarker to the completion of thelanding roll represents only 4% ofthe flight time but 45% of hulllosses.

This statistical data has not shownany down trend over the past 40years.

Five types of events account for75% of approach-and-landingincidents and accidents:

• CFIT (including landing short of runway),

• loss of control in flight,• runway overrun,• runway excursion,• unstabilized approach.

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Upcoming workshops include twoin the Gulf region and one innorthern Asia. This continuingregional communication effort isparalleled by regional translationinitiatives that have further eased thedissemination of the ALAR safety-awareness information in thefollowing languages: Spanish,Portuguese, Chinese, Russian andFrench.

The cooperation and contributionof all players in the global aviationsystem are of paramountimportance to enhance partnership,cooperation and communicationbetween:

• operators (commercial, cargo andcorporate),

• manufacturers,• national and international

airlines and pilots associations,• air traffic control/services,• state regulatory authorities,• state navigation agencies,• services providers,• training organizations.

This is essential to achieve a widedissemination of the ALAREducation and Training Aid (ALARTool Kit), including:

• CFIT and ALAR awareness videos,

• Briefing Notes,• Safety Alert Bulletins,• Awareness Tool (checklist),• Risk Reduction Guide.

They are also vital to facilitate aneasy and fast implementation of allconclusions and recommendations.

ALAR BRIEFING NOTES

Airbus provided major leadership inthe development of the Flight SafetyFoundation ALAR Briefing Notes.

The ALAR Briefing Notes providean overview of the operationalstandards, factors and preventionstrategies related to the variousaspects involved in approach-and-landing accidents.

Each conclusion is complementedby a set of recommendations that hasbeen translated in a corresponding setof Flight Operations Briefing Notes.

In addition to flight operationsand training recommendations,the ALAR task force encouragesthe operators to consider theimmediate benefit of:

• existing technology andequipment such as TerrainAwareness Warning Systems ofGlobal Positioning Systems,

• flight operations monitoringsystems,

• aviation information sharingprogrammes.

IMPLEMENTATION

The conclusions and recomm-endations of the ALAR task forcehave been translated into industryactions to ensure their effectiveimplementation. These actions havebeen endorsed by the ICAO, the USFAA, the European JAA and theCAAC (Civil Aviation Authority ofChina), to name the main regulatoryauthorities supporting this effort.

In 2000 the Flight Safety Foundationstarted a worldwide awarenesscampaign that will ensure theavailability of this information toeveryone who participates inapproach-and-landing operations, sothat they can all play a part inimproving safety within their sphereof influence.

This global effort, to which Airbus iscontributing, has raised theawareness of the aviation communityin the following world regions:

• Central America and Caribbean area,

• South America,• Iceland,• Africa,• Southeast Asia,• Australia,• People’s Republic of China,• Russia / CIS• Europe.

TAWS Terrain Awareness Warning System (this is the ICAO terminology for EGPWS)

EGPWSEnhanced Ground proximity Warning System (this is, in fact, an Honeywell trademark)

GPS Global Positioning System

FOQAFlight Operations Quality Assurance (this is, initially, an FAA terminologythat refers primarily to the analysis of flight data)

FOMFlight Operations Monitoring (this is an Airbus terminology)FOM includes three components :- Flight data analysis

(LOMS software = Line Operations Monitoring System)- Line observations

(LOAS software = Line Observation Assessment System)- Crew reporting

(AIRS software = Aircrew Incident Reporting System)

ALAR BRIEFING NOTES

APPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTIONAPPROACH-AND-LANDING ACCIDENT REDUCTION

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Airbus published the ALAR BriefingNotes in the brochure "Getting togrips with Approach and LandingAccident Reduction" (Issue 1,October 2000). Flight SafetyFoundation published the BriefingNotes in "Flight Safety Digest" (Vol.19, Nos 8 to 11, August to November2000) and in "ALAR Tool Kit" (CD-ROM).

Overall, approximately 35000copies of the ALAR Briefing Noteshave been disseminated worldwide,under paper or CD-ROM format.

The scope of the ALAR BriefingNotes actually extends well beyondapproach-and-landing accidents, byaddressing:

• wind shear awareness in allflight phases, including takeoffand landing,

• terrain awareness in all flightphases,

• descent-and-approachpreparation,

• initial descent management,• go-around and missed-approach.

This extended scope addresses thetype of events and causal factorsinvolved in approximately 70% oftotal hull losses.

ALAR Briefing Notes consist of 34standalone documents grouped under8 chapters, (see table right).

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Figure 2

Figure 1

Figure 3

1 STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPS)1.1 Operating Philosophy1.2 Optimum Use of Automation1.3 Operations Golden Rules1.4 Standard Calls1.5 Normal Checklists1.6 Approach and Go-around

Briefings

2 CREW CO-ORDINATION2.1 Human Factors in Approach-

and-Landing Accidents2.2 CRM Issues in Approach-and-

landing Accidents2.3 Effective Pilot/Controller

Communications2.4 Intra-Cockpit Communications –

Managing Interruptions andDistractions

3 ALTIMETER AND ALTITUDE ISSUES3.1 Altimeter Setting – Use of Radio

Altimeter (see figure 1)3.2 Altitude deviations

4 DESCENT AND APPROACHMANAGEMENT4.1 Descent and Approach Profile

Management4.2 Energy Management during

Approach (see figure 2)

5 APPROACH HAZARDS AWARENESS5.1 Approach Hazards Awareness

General5.2 Terrain Awareness5.3 Visual Illusions Awareness5.4 Windshear Awareness

6 READINESS AND COMMITMENT TO GO-AROUND6.1 Being Prepared to Go-around6.2 Flying a Manual Go-around6.3 Terrain Avoidance ( Pull-up)

Manoeuvre6.4 Bounce Recovery – Rejected

Landing

7 APPROACH TECHNIQUES7.1 Flying Stabilised Approaches7.2 Flying Constant-Angle non-

Precision Approaches (figure 3)

7.3 Acquisition of Visual References7.4 Flying Visual Approaches

8 LANDING TECHNIQUES8.1 Preventing Runway Excursions

and Overruns8.2 The Final Approach Speed8.3 Factors Affecting Landing

Distance8.4 Optimum Use of Braking Devices8.5 Landing on Wet or Contaminated

Runway8.6 About Wind Information

What’s your Current Wind ?8.7 Crosswind Landing

Note: Should any deviation appearbetween the information provided inthe ALAR Briefing Notes and thatpublished in the applicable AirplaneFlight Manual (AFM), Flight CrewOperating Manual (FCOM), QuickReference Handbook (QRH) andFlight Crew Training Manual(FCTM), the latter shall prevail atall times.

ACCIDENT-PREVENTIONSTRATEGY

The ALAR Briefing Notes have beendesigned to allow an eye-openingand self-correcting accident-prevention strategy. To support thisstrategy, each Briefing Note:

• presents the subject in the CFITand/or ALAR context, usingstatistical data,

• emphasises the applicablestandards and best practices (e.g., standard operatingprocedures [SOPs], supplementarytechniques, flying techniques andtraining guidelines),

• lists and discusses theoperational and human factorsthat may cause flight crews todeviate from applicable standards(for eye-opening purposes),

• provides or suggests companyaccident-prevention strategiesand/or personal lines-of-defense (for preventionpurposes or for correctionpurposes),

• establishes a summary ofoperational and training keypoints,

• provides cross-reference toother Briefing Notes, wheneverappropriate,

• refers to ICAO, US FAR andEuropean JAR regulatorydocuments.

The proposed education andtraining strategy is valid at bothcompany and personal level for:

• risk awareness (eye-openingaspect),

• exposure assessment,• identification of risk-related

prevention strategies (atcompany level) and lines-of-defense (at company and/orpersonal levels),

• supporting the analysis of flightdata, line checks and line audits,

• implementing relevantprevention strategies and/orcorrective actions.


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Flight safety enhancement has been, and willcontinue to be, the result of technologicaldevelopments. However, 85% of accidentstoday are operational events that involvehuman performance at every stage of thesafety chain.

Human performance can be, and must be,enhanced by the wide dissemination ofsafety-awareness information.

Safety awareness is a mindset, it is …being mentally prepared.


Michel TrémaudSenior Director Safety and SecurityAirbus Customer ServicesTel: +33 (0)5 61 93 33 30 04Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 29 [email protected]

Jim BurinDirector, Technical ProgramsFlight Safety [email protected][email protected]://www.flightsafety.org

BEYOND THE ALAR EFFORT

The wide acceptance of the ALARBriefing Notes by the pilotcommunity and the positivefeedback received from customershave prompted Airbus to initiatethe development of new sets ofFlight Operations Briefing Notes,in order to cover the entire flightprofile and address the mainthreats and hazards to flightoperations safety.

This effort will span the years2003-2006 and will cover thefollowing domains:

• takeoff and departure safety,• climb and cruise safety,• weather threats,• environmental hazards,• cabin safety and security,• other operational hazards, as

suggested by the lessons learntfrom the operational and humanfactors analysis of in-serviceoccurrences.

HOW TO USE AND IMPLEMENT THE ALAR BRIEFING NOTES

The ALAR Briefing Notes should be used by airlines to enhance the awareness of approach-and-landingaccidents (including those resulting in CFIT) among flight crews and cabin crews.

MANAGEMENT PILOTS should review, customise (as required) and implement the ALAR recommendations,guidelines and awareness information, in the following domains:

■ Operational Standards: standard operating procedures (e.g., to incorporate ALAR-critical items), proceduresand techniques/ supplementary techniques.

■ Training Standards: simulator training to develop new scenarios for line oriented flight training (LOFT) orspecial purpose operational training (SPOT), crew resource management (CRM) training to develop newtopical subjects to support CRM discussions.

■ Safety Awareness Information: airline bulletins and airline safety magazine articles, classroom lectures(using ALAR Briefing Notes and associated presentations and videos), stand-alone reading.

LINE PILOTS should review and compare the CFIT/ALAR recommendations, guidelines and awarenessinformation with their current practices and enhance their techniques and awareness level, as required.

OTHER ACTORS in the global aviation system such as: air traffic control services, navigation state agencies,operational authorities, service providers, flight academies… should use the provision of the ALAR BriefingNotes to evaluate their possible contribution to the reduction of CFIT and Approach-and-Landing accidents.

PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS

José-Luis Mauriz-DigonSenior Engineer Fuel Systems

Customer Services Engineering Services

Ross WalkerEngineering Programme Manager

Fuel Tank Safety (SFAR88)

Following the B747 TWA centrewing tank explosion in 1996, theNational Transportation SafetyBoard (NTSB) in the UnitedStates made recommendations toenhance the already good safetyrecord of aircraft fuel systemsworldwide. Subsequently the FAAand JAA introduced newrequirements relative to theprevention of fuel tank explosions.This article describes the majoractivities undertaken by Airbus, inorder to further improve safetymargins.

Preventing ignition sources inside fuel tanks

The FAA has identified 6 cases of large aircraft fuel tank explosions since 1963:

◗ 1963 - B707, Elkton in Maryland. Empty wing tank explosion◗ 1970 - DC-8, Toronto. External fuel fire caused tank explosion◗ 1976 - B747-100, Spain. Iranian Air Force, empty wing tank explosion,

lightning strike during descent◗ 1990 - B737-300, Manila. Philippines, empty centre tank explosion during

pushback from gate◗ 1996 - B747, TWA 800, Long Island USA. Empty centre tank explosion during

climb◗ 2001- B737-400, Bangkok Thailand. Empty centre tank explosion a few

minutes after refuelling

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PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKSPREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS

JAA AND FAAREQUIREMENTS

In April 2001 the FAA issuedSpecial Federal AviationRegulation (SFAR) 88 applicableto aircraft registered in the USA.The JAA developed a similar pol-icy, the JAA INT/POL 25/12,mandatory for all Airbus aircraft.Both regulations relate to the pre-vention of ignition sources withinfuel tanks of current type certifi-cated aircraft. Both regulationsrequire carrying out a one-timefuel system safety and designreview. However, the assessmentmethodology differs:

JAA INTERIM POLICY 25/12

JAA require current standards asper JAR 25.1309 methodology i.e.demonstrating that an ignitionsource could not result from eachsingle failure, and from all combi-nations of failures not shown to beextremely improbable. The effectsof manufacturing variability, age-ing, wear, corrosion, and likelydamage must be considered.

FAA SFAR88

FAA requires an additionalassessment demonstrating that anignition source could not resultfrom each single failure in combi-nation with each latent failurecondition not shown to beextremely remote.

The FAA also distinguishesbetween High Flammability andLow Flammability fuel tanks inthe consideration of failure com-binations. A tank is considered tobe a High Flammability Tank ifthe fuel ullage remains flammablemore than 7% of the fleet opera-tional time for the aircraft type(the time from the start of prepar-ing the aircraft until the disem-barking of payload and passen-gers). If it is flammable less than7% of the time, it is considered tobe a Low Flammability tank.

For Low flammability tanksknown combinations of failuresshould be assessed. “Known”means those conditions that haveoccurred in-service and are likelyto re-occur on other products ofthe same or similar type design.

AIRBUS ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO FAA/JAA REQUIREMENTS

An exhaustive design review ofthe fuel systems installed on thevarious aircraft types has beenlaunched in order to identify any situation that may in certain con-ditions lead to the presence of anignition source inside or adjacentto a fuel tank, and initiate appro-priate action.

An inspection programme knownas Aircraft Fuel System SafetyProgramme (AFSSP) was devel-oped. Many representatives of theair transport industry, ATA (AirTransport Association ofAmerica), AEA (Association ofEuropean Airlines), AAPA(Association Asian PacificAirlines), AIA (AerospaceIndustries Association ofAmerica), AECMA (EuropeanAssociation of AerospaceIndustries) and other groups par-ticipated.

The aim of this inspection pro-gramme was to:

• gather data on the condition ofin-service fuel tanks,

• where necessary, identify fol-low-up activities to ensure thecontinued airworthiness of thesetanks. These follow-up activitiesincluded updated maintenanceprogrammes and / or correctiveaction Service Bulletins.

The conclusions of the designreview, inspection programme andthe subsequent engineering analysis,showed that the design of the fueltank systems used on Airbus aircraftremains in general valid and func-tional throughout the aircraft life.In addition to above activitiesAirbus participated in the FAAAviation Rule Making AdvisoryCommittee’s (ARAC) Fuel TankHarmonisation Working Groups(FTHWG) 1 & 2.

The aim of the first FTHWG wasto:

• review in-service history offuel tank explosions to identifycommon contributory factors,

• assess various means of reducingor eliminating exposure to opera-tion of transport airplane fueltanks with explosive fuel air mix-tures, or eliminating the resultanthazard if ignition does occur,

• assess the level of fuel tankexposure to flammablevapours.

It concluded that:

• heated centre wing tanks had asignificantly higher incidenceof fuel tank explosions thanother types of fuel tank,

• heated centre wing tanks had asignificantly higher exposure toflammable fuel vapours thanunheated fuel tanks.

The aim of the second FTHWGwas to provide a cost benefitstudy of fuel tank NitrogenInerting Systems. NitrogenInerting is a process where inertgas is introduced into the ullage(volume within fuel tank notoccupied with liquid) of a fueltank so the oxygen content of theullage is reduced to a point whereignition and subsequent combus-tion is precluded It concluded thatInterting systems were not yeteconomically viable with theInerting requirements stipulatedby the FAA (Oxygen concentra-tion less than 9%) and the exist-ing technology.

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FAA assessment standard/methodology: AC 25.981-1B

In-tank current limit 30mA (no previous limit)

Maintenance error considered to exist on every flightIn-tank energy

limit 20µJinstead of 200µJ

Existing latent failure considered to exist on every flight

Adverse environmental conditions considered to exist on every flight

Tank flammability exposure

Wing tanks <7%Trim tank <7%

Additional centre tanks (pressurized) <7%

Heated centre tanks (pressurized) >7% ) High flammability tank

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AIRBUS COMPLIANCE TO AIRWORTHINESSAUTHORITIESREQUIREMENTS

On 4th December, 2002,Airbus issued a single set ofdocuments by aircraft family(A300/A310, A320 and A330/A340 Families) to satisfy boththe JAA INT/POL 25/12 andFAA SFAR 88 requirements.These reports provide theresults of the design, safetyand maintenance review car-ried out on the fuel systemsand zones adjacent to the fueltanks of each Airbus aircraftfamily.

Airbus assessment considersonly safety. The solutions con-sidered cost and retrofit feasi-bility. The results of the Airbusassessment are based onAuthority, Industry and Airlinemeetings and on the FAA state-ment that “Non compliancewith SFAR 88 by itself is notautomatically an unsafe condi-tion”.

The assessment identified the fol-lowing subjects where correctiveaction/modification is required tocorrect non-compliance:

◗ 1. In-tank wiring

◗ 2. Pump wiring

◗ 3. Pump dry running

◗ 4. Bonding

◗ 5. Adjacent systems

◗ 6. Arc gaps

Many of the modifications weredeveloped by Airbus as part ofContinued Airworthiness Processprior to the new JAA and FAAregulations, but were not mandat-ed for all aircraft by theAirworthiness Authorities. Thecomplete list of modifications canbe found in the Airbus-On-Line-Services FTP site “Aircraft FuelTank Safety”

1. IN-TANK WIRING

Threat:Electrical energy entering thefuel tank due to normal oper-ation, short circuits andinduced current/voltage on tofuel systems wiring potentiallyleading to ignition of flamma-ble vapours.

The only wiring inside the Airbusfuel tanks is intrinsically safewiring associated with the fuelquantity indicating (FQI) and fuellevel sense systems (FLSS). Thereare no high-power cables in thefuel tanks including all fuel pumpwirings which are routed exter-nally to the fuel tanks.

Investigations prior to the SFAR88 regulation showed on A319and A320 aircraft that shortingbetween 28V DC and FQI probewiring could cause the FQIprobes to be heated to a tempera-ture in excess of 200°C (230°C isthe auto ignition temperature ofJet A fuel). All FQI probes are co-routed with 28V DC wires. In1999 Airbus introduced fusedadapters for the FQI probe har-nesses of the centre tanks andfused plug connectors for the FQIprobe harnesses of the wingtanks. The fuses prevent the FQIprobe temperature from exceed-ing 200°C in the event of a short

PREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKSPREVENTNG IGNITION SOURCES INSIDE FUEL TANKS

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For High flammability tanks“Foreseeable” combinations offailures must be assessed. Anevent or condition is consideredforeseeable if the physics of thefailure can be defined and theoccurrence of the failure duringthe exposure period in questioncannot be acceptably ruled out.

The FAA also proposed AdvisoryCircular (AC) 25.981-1B. ThisAC sets a new and more stringentdesign standard for the industryand considerably reduces thedesign limits for in-tank energyand current. The previous energylimit of 200 micro Joules isreduced to 20 micro Joules fornormal operations (excludingthreats from environmentaleffect, e.g. lightning for which200 micro Joules existing limitstill applies). A new current limitis also set to 30 milliAmps fornormal operations (no previousexisting limits).

FAA SFAR 88 SPOT AMENDMENTFLAMMABILITY EXPOSURERISK

Following research by the FAATechnical Centre, the FAA estab-lished that the oxygen concentra-tion required to prevent fuel tankignition on military aircraft incombat zones (9%) was exces-sively conservative when appliedto commercial aircraft. The FAAidentified that, at sea level, anoxygen concentration of 12% isan acceptable level of protectionagainst fuel tank ignition for com-mercial aircraft.

The FAA also assessed that thetechnology for nitrogen inertingto reduce the oxygen concentra-tion to less than 12% is practicaland cost effective.

The FAA issued a SpotAmendment to the SFAR 88 inAugust 2002. This amendmentintroduced an alternative meansof compliance (AMOC) affectingthe assessment required for HighFlammability tanks. The AMOCallows fuel tank inerting to beused to lower the flammability ofHigh Flammability tanks suchthat the assessment required isequivalent to Low Flammabilityfuel tanks.

Typical external wiring to fuel pumps


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circuit between 28V DC wires andthe FQI probe wires. This modifi-cation, applied in production since2000, is identified as required forcompliance to the SFAR 88 andJAA INT/POL 25/12.

Airbus identified a possible use ofnon fuel resistant ‘P’clips in somefuel tanks. This could facilitate thepotential for FQI and FLSS har-nesses chafing against the metallicpart of the clip. Airbus will issuean Inspection Service Bulletin tocheck the clips and where neces-sary replace them with fuel resis-tant clips.

In investigations prior to the SFAR88 regulation Airbus also identi-fied, on A300/A310 and A320Families aircraft, the lack of segre-gation between FQI/FLSS wiresand 115V wiring, external to thefuel tanks. Short circuits betweenthese wires could introduce energylevels in excess of 200µJ into thefuel tank. Modifications have beendeveloped to reduce that risk toacceptable levels.

The FAA has re-defined in-tankenergy and current standards with

AC 25-981-1B, leading to non-compliance with SFAR 88 withinAirbus fuel tanks. Airbus fueltanks were designed to the moststringent intrinsic safety standardsat the time of certification. Airbushas assessed that this non-compli-ance is not an unsafe condition(The FAA agrees that “Non com-pliance with SFAR 88 by itself isnot automatically an unsafe con-dition”) and therefore there is noidentified need for modificationssuch as wiring segregation,shielding, or barrier devices tolimit the amount of current andenergy into the tank such asTransient Suppression Units(TSU).

2. PUMP WIRING

Threat:Spark erosion and hot spotsdue to short circuits of pumpwiring.

The fuel pump wiringis external to fueltanks in allAirbus air-craft.

The FAA acknowledges that rout-ing of the cables outside fuel tanksis a good practice.

Prior to SFAR 88, Airbus analysisof in-service experience high-lighted that some flight & mainte-nance crews reset tripped circuitbreakers (C/B) without checkingthe circuit for continuity and shortcircuits to ground. This practice ifrepeated could cause damage toequipment and or structure thatcould lead to energy in excess of200µJ being released in an adja-cent zone containing flammablevapours or cause heating or sparkerosion of the structure. Airbusupdated the Aircraft FlightManual (AFM) and AircraftMaintenance Manual (AMM) toinclude the statement not to resetthe C/B until the fault is isolatedin the event that any fuel tankpump C/B is tripped.

In November 2002 the FAA madea specific request to all manufac-turers to assess Ground FaultInterrupter (GFI) devices. A GFIis a device that monitors the pumpsupply and isolates it when a shortcircuit to ground is detected. Asummation of the currents flow-ing in the 3-phase supply isdetected by a hall effect sensor. Ifa short circuit to ground is detect-ed the supply to the pump is cutby a relay. Arc occurrence to iso-lation takes approximately10msec. Airbus did not identifyany unsafe condition that wouldrequire GFIs to be installed. SoGFIs were not included in theAirbus compliance document.

3. PUMP DRY RUNNING

Threat:Mechanical sparking due tocomponent wear or foreignobject damage (FOD) insidethe pumps.

The FAA requirement as identifiedin AC 25.981-1B is that contactingof the fuel pump impellers withFOD should not cause an ignitionsource.

To meet the requirements it mustbe assumed that:

• FOD exists in the fuel pumps,• the fuel tank ullage is always

flammable,• latent failures in the tank/pump

exist,• crew does switch off pumps

when required to do so by theLow Pressure indication.

All engine feed pumps areinstalled inside a collector cell thatis always maintained full limitingthe potential for fuel pump dryrunning. All transfer pumps(except for some early A300B2/B4with a three man crew) have anautomatic shut-off feature thatoperates when the affected fueltank is empty.

In addition, even though Airbusdesign always keeps the pumpinlets covered with fuel, testingwas successfully performed topositively demonstrate that thepumps do not run dry for a periodin excess of the complete scavengecycle. Therefore no modificationsare needed to meet the require-ments of AC 25.981-1B.

4. BONDING

Threat:Electrical discharge in the fueltank due to lightning, HighIntensity Radiation Fields(HIRF), static, and/or faultcurrents.

The FAA requirement as identifiedin AC 25.981-1B is that electricaltransients caused by environmentalconditions, such as lightningstrikes, with the potential to createelectrical sparks and arcs in the fueltank should be limited so that theenergy from any electrical spark orarc from the electrical transient isless than 200 micro Joules.

To meet the requirements it mustbe assumed that:

• vapour in the tank is alwaysflammable,

A320 fuel pump installation

A320 fuel pipes bonding installation

5. ADJACENT SYSTEMS

Threat:Ignition sources adjacent tofuel tanks due to:

• ignition of the fuel in the tank due to electrical arcingexternal to the fuel tank penetrating the tank walland causing auto-ignitionof the fuel due to heating of the tank wall. (During theassessment normal systemoperation, system failure andan external fire were consid-ered.)

• explosion of the adjacent area itself. (The presence of vapours is assumed, there-fore no ignition sourceshould be present. Liquid fuel falling on to hot sur-faces is also considered).

In the A320 Family, the electri-cal connections to the mainte-nance light installed in thehydraulics bay are not explosionproof and could under certainfailure conditions cause ignitionof flammable vapours if presentin the zone. Airbus has intro-duced a modification to discon-nect and stow the wiring untilsuch time as a new fully explosionproof maintenance light hasbeen developed.

On A330 and A340-200/300 air-craft, in the event of a fuel leakfrom the centre tank, fuel coulddrip on equipment whose temper-ature could be in excess of 200°C.This could result in an undetectedfire in this zone. Airbus developeda modification that installs dripshields above unprotected equip-ment to mitigate this risk.

On Airbus aircraft equipped witha trim tank and a single APUbleed leak detection loop (A340-500/-600 have a dual loop), in theevent of an uncontrolled APUbleed leak adjacent to the trimtank, the tank wall temperaturecould exceed 200°C. UnderMMEL, with the single bleed leak

detection loop failed, the aircraftcould be dispatched with norestriction to APU bleed usage. Asan immediate solution the MMELhas been revised to prohibit use ofthe APU bleed if no APU bleedleak detection loop is functioning,in addition instructions for a sys-tem test are being developed toidentify if the system has failed.As a long-term solution onA330/A340-200 and -300 aircrafta modification to the flight warningcomputer will remove the need toperform a system test. In addition,the introduction of a second bleedleak detection loop is being devel-oped for these aircraft so that theycan be dispatched under MMELwith one loop failed.

A300/A310 aircraft have wires onthe wing leading and trailing edgesrouted freely and directly fixed tostructure. Wires could potentiallychafe on screws or sharp structure,in various locations. This couldlead to the ignition of flammablevapours in the zone that could bepresent on the ground.

Bonding lead serviceable


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• latent failures exist, such as failure of bonding jumpers, since there is no annunciationor indication of the bonding failure,

• FOD exists in fuel tanks,• the aircraft is struck by lightning

at the same time.

Due to the findings on the inspec-tions carried out as part of theAFSSP the FAA have expressedconcern that a bonding-lead fail-ure is not an extremely remoteevent.

As of September 2002, the FAAhas been promoting a one offinspection of the ‘critical’ bond-ing leads in each aircraft fleet toensure that the configuration ofeach aircraft is correct.

Based on the AFSSP survey find-ings, the introduction of a sched-uled maintenance inspectionevery 12 years (8C check) on allbonding leads is considered nec-essary. In addition, an enhancedclosing procedure requires a veri-fication of the bonding configura-tion after each tank entry withinthe work area to ensure the bondsare maintained in good conditionfor the life of the aircraft.

A bonding lead should bereplaced if the lead is found bro-ken, frayed or corroded. A lead isconsidered frayed if more thanfive out of the 33 strands are bro-ken. Airbus analysis identifiedthat less than five out of the 33strands are all that are needed toprovide an adequate bonding path.

Prior to SFAR 88 Airbus analysisrevealed that the electrical bond-ing of some equipment in fueltanks is not in accordance with theappropriate Design Directives andtherefore the adequacy of thebonds cannot be assured for thelife of the aircraft. Airbus ServiceBulletins, for all Airbus aircraft,require a revision of the electricalbonding procedure for equipmentidentified as not having a dedicat-ed bonding path.

Drip shields to be installed above hot surfaces

Bonding lead corroded

Bonding lead frayed/corroded

A320 maintenance lights (pre mod situation)

Water drain valve

Unprotected connections

Unprotected connections

Centre fuel tank

and descent rates and different operational configurations of theOn-Board Inert Gas GenerationSystem (OBIGGS).

Flight tests have demonstrated thefunctionality of the system. Nomajor abnormal system operationwas observed during differentphases of the ground and flighttest, and no significant impact canbe observed on the Engine BleedAir system when the FRS operated.

Variation in supply pressure andtemperature has a significanteffect on the overall system per-formance. A reasonably uniformoxygen concentration was observedwithin the tank during the climband cruise. Normal servicing ofthe aircraft was not hindered, butthe maintenance crew werebriefed on the operations associatedwith the potential hazards ofNitrogen rich atmosphere (e.g.asphyxiation).

Airbus did not identify any unsafecondition that would require FRS,

and the FRS was not included in the Airbus compliance proposal.The installation of an FRS systemwould not remove the requirementto apply the ignition risk mitigation

modifications already agreed withthe EASA and listed in the AirbusOn-line Services FTP site underAircraft Fuel Tank Safety.

Due to the age of aircraft and thevariations between each aircraft,an Inspection Service Bulletin(ISB) is being developed in con-junction with the Aging TransportSystems Rulemaking AdvisoryCommittee (ASTRAC). The ISBwill require a one-time inspectionof the leading and trailing edgeswith a requirement to correct anyinstallations that could chafe orare not to the correct installationstandard.

6. ARC GAPS

Threat:Inadequate separation bet-ween components and struc-ture that could allow electricalarcing due to lightning

To prevent electrical dischargebetween un-bonded metallic com-ponents and structure, a minimumseparation distance is required.Prior to SFAR 88, Airbus issuedsome inspection and modificationService Bulletins to ensure thatthe minimum clearances are metbetween metallic components inall fuel tanks.

EASA/FAA FEEDBACK

In October 2003 the EASA(European Aviation SafetyAgency) replaced the JAA as theprime certification AirworthinessAuthority for Airbus. The EASAconsiders that Airbus has showncompliance for all fuel tanks(high and low flammability), forall identified unsafe conditions,by the existing design and subse-

quent modifications and actions.The EASA states that they con-sider ignition risk mitigation, andflammability reduction as sepa-rate issues that should not bemixed.

A modification embodimentschedule has been agreed with theEASA:

• EASA require all modifica-tions necessitating entry into the tanks to be embodied by the end of 2009,

• some modifications external tofuel tanks have a more restric-tive compliance date.

The FAA has not at the date ofwriting of this article made a for-mal response to the Airbus com-pliance proposal.

Harmonization is needed toachieve one solution for manufac-tures and operators and to facili-tate transfer of aeroplanes fromcountry to country. The FAA andJAA have previously stated thatharmonization is achieved exceptfor High Flammability Tanks. TheFAA and EASA are activelyworking to establish a harmonisedposition relating in the differencesin the rules explained previously.

AIRBUS INVESTIGATIONS ONFLAMMABILITY REDUCTIONSYSTEMS

Airbus is investigating thefeasability and benefits of FRS asan additional layer of protectionon top of existing ignition riskmitigation. Airbus and the FAAagreed to launch a joint test initia-tive on A320 MSN1 flight test air-craft using the FAA developedNitrogen Inerting System.Ground testing of the systemincluded a period of 50 hoursmini endurance tests to gain con-fidence in the system operation.The flight-testing phase includednine flights, exploring system performance over a range of fuelquantities in the tanks, climb


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A300/A310 potential chafing points

Airbus has undertaken majoractivities related to fuel tank ignitionprevention. Most of Airbusmodifications addressing ignitionsources were developed as part ofContinued Airworthiness Processprior to the new EASA and FAAregulations.

Airbus issued in December 2002 asingle set of documents by aircraftfamily to satisfy both the JAAINT/POL 25/12 and FAA SFAR 88requirements. Airbus assessmentconsidered safety first. The EASAconsiders that Airbus has showncompliance for all fuel tanks by theexisting design and the identifiedmodifications and actions.

As an additional layer of protection,Airbus is investigating aFlammability Reduction System.

Airbus and EASA consider ignitionrisk mitigation and flammabilityreduction as separate issues thatshould not be mixed. Even with thefitment of an FRS system, theignition risk mitigation modificationsagreed with the EASA will berequired.

The FAA has not made a formalresponse to the Airbus complianceproposal yet. Depending on theoutcome of the EASA/FAAharmonisation activity, therequirement for additionalmodifications may be identified.

Airbus has set up an SFAR 88Operational Team to ensure that allAirbus resources are put in placefor a smooth introduction of allignition prevention relatedmodifications.


José-Luis Mauriz-DigonSenior Engineer Fuel SystemsCustomer Services Engineering AirbusTel: +33 (0)5 62 11 80 09Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 32 [email protected]

Ross Walker Engineering Program ManagerFuel Tank Safety (SFAR88)Tel: +33 (0)5 61 93 29 31Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 41 [email protected]

Potential chafingwith rib

FQI wires

Conduit exit Potential chafing point

OBIGGS installed in the A320 cargo bay

ANEMOMETRIC LEAK DETECTION USING NEW HELIUM PRESSURE TOOL

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ANEMOMETRIC LEAK DETECTION USING NEW HELIUM PRESSURE TOOL

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AN INNOVATIVEAPPROACH

Airbus has investigatedseveral devices and methods

to decrease leak detectiontime and has selected a ground

pressure generator using helium,manufactured by HELITECH. Thisnew device offers the requiredsensitivity and reliability, and is agreat step forward compared toprevious methods. A procedure hasthus been created and implementedin the Aircraft Maintenance Manual.

THE HELIUM TECHNIQUE

Helium is a non-toxic, inert gas,which does not react chemicallywith any other element, making itintrinsically safe. In addition, due toits low relative molecular mass, ithas a high penetration capabilityallowing it to pass through thesmallest gaps. Helium is particularlyeffective for leak detection becauseof its low concentration in theatmosphere, which allows easydetection of any small increase.Finally, it is an industrial gasavailable anywhere in the world.

The procedure starts with a leakcheck as described in the AMM(34.10.00 Page Block 501) toconfirm the leak on the affectedsystem. Then, using the HeliumDetection Kit (referenced in theTool Equipment Manual 34.13.00

Up to now the method used to locate leaks in the air datapressure line was a difficult andtime-consuming operation. Thehelium technique has beentested on several aircraft and hasproved its efficiency; it can easilysave several hours of groundtime. This procedure has alreadybeen implemented for the AirbusA310 in the AMM 34-10-00Page Block 501. A300 andA300-600 AMM will be updatedat the next opportunity.

Conclusion

CONTACT DETAILS

Xavier BarriolaNavigation, Flight Guidance &Flight Management SystemsAirbus Customer ServicesTel: +33 (0)5 61 11 81 08Fax: +33 (0)5 62 93 44 [email protected]

Alain MarsanTechnical Publication AuthorMaintenance Support Navigation Airbus Customer ServicesTel: +33 (0)5 61 93 02 53Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 04 [email protected]

as PN 102-01171) the air data pressure line is filled with helium,with pressure maintained at20mb/30mb. The helium pumpedinto the tube is then detected. Whenthe sniffer probe is moved along thepressure pipes, there will bedifferent sound frequencies emittedby the detection device dependingon how far the probe is from theleak of helium.

Moreover, an optional telescopicprobe (1.5m long) can be adaptedto the equipment for use underfloor without having to remove thefloor panels to gain access to thepipes to be tested. This processpermits significant timesaving foraircraft maintenance and avai-lability, and the flexibility of theequipment means that it can beused on all types of aircraft.

Xavier BarriolaNavigation, Flight Guidance

& Flight Management SystemsAirbus Customer Services

BACKGROUND

Airbus experience shows thatairspeed and altitude issues areoften reported in service. Onecause of trouble could be pressureleaks either on the total pressureline or on the static pressure line.

Airbus A300, A300-600 and A310are fitted with two main Air DataSystems and one standby system.Each of these main and standbysystems includes one pitot probe (total pressure) and two staticprobes (static pressure) connecteddirectly to the Air Data Computer(ADC) for the two main systemsand to the standby instruments(altitude & airspeed indicator) forthe standby system. Theseconnections are made throughseveral meters of pressure lineswhose length makes leak detectiondifficult and time-consuming.

Up to now, localising air data leaks has been a relatively difficult andtime-consuming operation for operators. This article describes the new

detector which has been tested and validated on A300, A300-600 andA310 to find leaks in the air data systems.

Anemometric leak detection using new helium

pressure tool

Alain MarsanTechnical Publication

Author Navigation SystemAirbus Customer Services

ARTICLE

RCSM location Country

Macau S.A.R. ChinaMadrid SpainManchester United KingdomManila PhilippinesMauritius MauritiusMemphis United States of AmericaMexico City MexicoMilan ItalyMinneapolis United States of AmericaMonastir TunisiaMontreal CanadaMoscow RussiaMumbai IndiaNanchang ChinaNanjing ChinaNew York United States of AmericaNingbo ChinaNoumea New CaledoniaPalma de Mallorca SpainParis FrancePhiladelphia United States of AmericaPhoenix United States of AmericaPittsburgh United States of AmericaPort of Spain Trinidad and TobagoQingdao ChinaQuito EcuadorRabat MoroccoRome ItalySan Francisco United States of AmericaSan Salvador El SalvadorSantiago ChileSao Paulo BrazilSeoul South KoreaShanghai ChinaShenzhen ChinaShenyang ChinaSingapore SingaporeSydney AustraliaTaipei TaiwanTashkent UzbekistanTehran IranTokyo JapanToronto CanadaTulsa United States of AmericaTunis TunisiaValetta MaltaVancouver CanadaVerona ItalyVienna AustriaXi'an ChinaZurich Switzerland

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Customer support


Abu Dhabi United Arab EmiratesAmman JordanAmsterdam NetherlandsAthens GreeceAtlanta United States of AmericaAuckland New ZealandBandar Seri Begawan BruneiBangkok ThailandBeirut LebanonBrussels BelgiumBuenos Aires ArgentinaCairo EgyptCharlotte United States of AmericaChengdu ChinaColombo Sri LankaCopenhagen DenmarkDalian ChinaDamascus SyriaDelhi IndiaDenver United States of AmericaDerby United KingdomDetroit United States of AmericaDhaka BangladeshDoha QatarDubai United Arab EmiratesDublin IrelandDuluth United States of AmericaDusseldorf GermanyFrankfurt GermanyGuangzhou ChinaHangzhou ChinaHanoi VietnamHelsinki FinlandHong Kong S.A.R. ChinaIndianapolis United States of AmericaIstanbul TurkeyJakarta IndonesiaJinan ChinaJohannesburg South AfricaKarachi PakistanKingston JamaicaKishinev MoldaviaKiyev UkraineKuala Lumpur MalaysiaKuwait city KuwaitLanzhou ChinaLarnaca CyprusLisbon PortugalLondon United KingdomLouisville United States of AmericaLos Angeles United States of AmericaLuton United Kingdom

Customer Support CentresTraining centresSpares centres / Regional warehousesResident Customer Support Managers (RCSM)

CUSTOMER SUPPORT AROUND THE CLOCK... AROUND THE WORLD

WORLDWIDEJean-Daniel Leroy VP Customer SupportTel: +33 5 61 93 35 04Fax: +33 5 61 93 41 01

USA/CANADAPhilippe BordesSenior Director Customer SupportTel: +1 (703) 834 3506Fax: +1 (703) 834 3464

CHINARon BollekampDirector Customer SupportTel: +86 10 804 86161Fax: +86 10 804 86162 / 63

RESIDENT CUSTOMER SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIONJean-Philippe GuillonDirector Resident Customer Support AdministrationTel: +33 (0)5 61 93 31 02 Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 49 64

TECHNICAL, SPARES, TRAININGAirbus has its main Spares centre in Hamburg, and regional warehouses in Frankfurt, Washington D.C., Beijing and Singapore.

Airbus operates 24 hours a day every day.AOG Technical and Spares calls in North America should be addressed to: Tel: +1 (703) 729 9000Fax: +1 (703) 729 4373

AOG Technical and Spares calls outside North America should be addressed to:Tel: +49 (40) 50 76 3001/3002/3003Fax: +49 (40) 50 76 3011/3012/3013

Airbus Training centre Toulouse, FranceTel: +33 (0)5 61 93 33 33Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 20 94

Airbus Training subsidiariesMiami, USA - FloridaTel: +1 (305) 871 36 55Fax: +1 (305) 871 46 49Beijing, ChinaTel: +86 10 80 48 63 40 Fax: +86 10 80 48 65 76

APPROACH AND LANDING - PART 2

APPROACH AND LANDING PART 2

Accidents were a way of life in the very early daysof flying. They varied in form from slightlyembarrassing to fatal. In those days the light-weight construction which gradually collapsed, andslow speed, largely attenuated the effects of thephysical shock.

Mr Brindejonc’s aeroplane, having flown into a crane in 1911. Probably a Bleriot.

Mr Frey’s accidentin Cannes in 1910. Probably a Farman..

Geo Chavez was the first person to cross the Alps from Switzerland to Italy, on 18 September 1910. Unfortunately, 10 metres above the ground on approach at

Domodossola near Milan, his Bleriot suffered structural failures an crashed. He was severely injured and died in

hospital nine days later.

.

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ARTICLE


Macau S.A.R. ChinaMadrid SpainManchester United KingdomManila PhilippinesMauritius MauritiusMemphis United States of AmericaMexico City MexicoMilan ItalyMinneapolis United States of AmericaMonastir TunisiaMontreal CanadaMoscow RussiaMumbai IndiaNanchang ChinaNanjing ChinaNew York United States of AmericaNingbo ChinaNoumea New CaledoniaPalma de Mallorca SpainParis FrancePhiladelphia United States of AmericaPhoenix United States of AmericaPittsburgh United States of AmericaPort of Spain Trinidad and TobagoQingdao ChinaQuito EcuadorRabat MoroccoRome ItalySan Francisco United States of AmericaSan Salvador El SalvadorSantiago ChileSao Paulo BrazilSeoul South KoreaShanghai ChinaShenzhen ChinaShenyang ChinaSingapore SingaporeSydney AustraliaTaipei TaiwanTashkent UzbekistanTehran IranTokyo JapanToronto CanadaTulsa United States of AmericaTunis TunisiaValetta MaltaVancouver CanadaVerona ItalyVienna AustriaXi'an ChinaZurich Switzerland

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Customer support


Abu Dhabi United Arab EmiratesAmman JordanAmsterdam NetherlandsAthens GreeceAtlanta United States of AmericaAuckland New ZealandBandar Seri Begawan BruneiBangkok ThailandBeirut LebanonBrussels BelgiumBuenos Aires ArgentinaCairo EgyptCharlotte United States of AmericaChengdu ChinaColombo Sri LankaCopenhagen DenmarkDalian ChinaDamascus SyriaDelhi IndiaDenver United States of AmericaDerby United KingdomDetroit United States of AmericaDhaka BangladeshDoha QatarDubai United Arab EmiratesDublin IrelandDuluth United States of AmericaDusseldorf GermanyFrankfurt GermanyGuangzhou ChinaHangzhou ChinaHanoi VietnamHelsinki FinlandHong Kong S.A.R. ChinaIndianapolis United States of AmericaIstanbul TurkeyJakarta IndonesiaJinan ChinaJohannesburg South AfricaKarachi PakistanKingston JamaicaKishinev MoldaviaKiyev UkraineKuala Lumpur MalaysiaKuwait city KuwaitLanzhou ChinaLarnaca CyprusLisbon PortugalLondon United KingdomLouisville United States of AmericaLos Angeles United States of AmericaLuton United Kingdom

Customer Support CentresTraining centresSpares centres / Regional warehousesResident Customer Support Managers (RCSM)

CUSTOMER SUPPORT AROUND THE CLOCK... AROUND THE WORLD

WORLDWIDEJean-Daniel Leroy VP Customer SupportTel: +33 5 61 93 35 04Fax: +33 5 61 93 41 01

USA/CANADAPhilippe BordesSenior Director Customer SupportTel: +1 (703) 834 3506Fax: +1 (703) 834 3464

CHINARon BollekampDirector Customer SupportTel: +86 10 804 86161Fax: +86 10 804 86162 / 63

RESIDENT CUSTOMER SUPPORT ADMINISTRATIONJean-Philippe GuillonDirector Resident Customer Support AdministrationTel: +33 (0)5 61 93 31 02 Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 49 64

TECHNICAL, SPARES, TRAININGAirbus has its main Spares centre in Hamburg, and regional warehouses in Frankfurt, Washington D.C., Beijing and Singapore.

Airbus operates 24 hours a day every day.AOG Technical and Spares calls in North America should be addressed to: Tel: +1 (703) 729 9000Fax: +1 (703) 729 4373

AOG Technical and Spares calls outside North America should be addressed to:Tel: +49 (40) 50 76 3001/3002/3003Fax: +49 (40) 50 76 3011/3012/3013

Airbus Training centre Toulouse, FranceTel: +33 (0)5 61 93 33 33Fax: +33 (0)5 61 93 20 94

Airbus Training subsidiariesMiami, USA - FloridaTel: +1 (305) 871 36 55Fax: +1 (305) 871 46 49Beijing, ChinaTel: +86 10 80 48 63 40 Fax: +86 10 80 48 65 76

Our service managers know every aircraft down to thelast nut and NSA5031-6-19.

www.airbus.com

Knowing every inch of our aircraft is just a small part of being an Airbus service managerAnd we apply the same principle to our customers. By understanding you as well as weunderstand our planes we can cater to your needs. This takes co-operation, a lot of listeningand, above all, dedication, which is why our Customer Service is so well respected. It’s nobig thing, but it means a great deal to our customers. Airbus. Setting the standards

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DECEMBER 2003 FLIGHT AIRWORTHINESS …...2004/01/28 · ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED...

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Transcript of DECEMBER 2003 FLIGHT AIRWORTHINESS …...2004/01/28 · ESCAPE SLIDE & SLIDE RAFTS - SCHEDULED...