Deborah G. Martin Reconceptualizing Resistance Residuals of the State and Democratic Radical...

7/27/2019 Deborah G. Martin Reconceptualizing Resistance Residuals of the State and Democratic Radical Pluralism

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Reconceptualizing Resistance:Residuals of the State and

Democratic Radical Pluralism

Deborah G. Martin

Graduate School of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA;[email protected]

Joseph Pierce

Department of Geography, The Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA;[email protected]

Abstract: Arguing that resistance to the state is too narrow a conceptualization of apolitical project that challenges neoliberalism, we posit that there are latent, residualapparatuses of the state which can be activated as part of a systematic progressive politics.

We examine Massachusetts Dover amendment, a legal framework which governs grouphome siting throughout the state. Dover offers a powerful tool with which to resist aneoliberal socio-spatial agenda, though it has been underutilized toward enabling analternative landscape. We analyze how and why Dover has often remained latent as a tool

for socio-spatial resistance, and consider a provocative case in Framingham, Massachusettsthat suggests how residual state apparatuses may be leveraged in support of an explicitlyresistive, progressive agenda.

Keywords: resistance, law, state, democratic radical pluralism, group home siting, urbanpolitics

IntroductionExtensive scholarship documents our age of neoliberalism, characterized by

discourses of private markets with extensive publicprivate collaboration for capitals

gain in every aspect of the political economy (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey2006, 2008; Leitner, Peck and Sheppard 2007). This work identifies a broad range

ofresistancesto neoliberalism, including anti- and alter-globalization protests (such

as against the World Trade Organization and IMF; Cumbers, Routledge and Nativel

2008; Peet 2007; Wainwright 2007), as well as more local, smaller scale resistance

focusing on labor rights or rights to space (Boyer 2006; Leitner, Sheppard and

Sziarto 2008; Mitchell 2003; Purcell 2008). Purcell (2008), drawing on Laclau and

Mouffe (1985), argues that successful resistance to neoliberalism builds on a network

of agonistic coalitions: temporary, strategic alliances among various activist groups

sharing some common goals but not seeking unity in identity and mission. We notice

in these accounts an emphatic attention to the always-already entwined nature of

the state and capitalism, highlighting the need to make visible, and then challenge,

the fundamental support that states give to capital (Harvey 2003, 2005).

AntipodeVol. 45 No. 1 2013 ISSN 0066-4812, pp 6179 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.00980.xC 2012 The Author. Antipode C Antipode Foundation Ltd.


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In this paper, we argue that an examination of the different and contradictory

faces of the state reveals that a potential for resistance against neoliberal policies

is present within the hydra-headed state itself [an argument sympathetic to

Lakes (2002) assertion that government needs redirection]. These non-neoliberal

residuals are laws, policies, and agencies that were created in earlier eras, and

which offer latent tools for a variety of activists and institutional actors against thedominance of neoliberal thinking and actions within governments at multiple scales.

Our focus on state residuals is not a plea for change initiated from or by the state,

but for the tactical use of residuals by activists to disrupt and challenge the states

ever-increasing support for capital.

In Massachusetts, the law known as the Dover Amendment offers an illustration

of the fact and promise of these residuals. Dover is a state law that limits the power

of municipal zoning over the siting of land uses which provide, among other things,

an educational function (Massachusetts General LawsMGL, chapter 40A, section

3, 2003). This educational function has been interpreted to include services such

as addiction treatment and life-skills training in residential social service facilities,

or group homes. While this law is actively employed by social service agencies

in their efforts to open such facilities, a further examination of how, and to what

extent, Dover is employed illustrates its latent resistive potential and, as a result, its

potential for deployment as part of a more active resistance to the neoliberal project

of social service devolution and marginalization.

In what follows, we examine and situate the term resistance in geography, as

well as the contentious and urban politics literatures, focusing on examinations of

anti-neoliberalism in particular. Since neoliberalism requires active state engagement

with and support of a pro-capitalist agenda, we consider how resistance maychallenge and use the state via engagements with its more democratic and

inclusive frameworks, or what we call residual state apparatuses. We illustrate these

residuals and their potential use through an examination of the Dover Amendment,

considering its resistive potential using case studies of group home sitings in

Framingham and Worcester, Massachusetts. In doing so, we draw on data from a

broader research project examining the legal dynamics and decision-making in land

use conflicts.1 In particular, our analysis here is informed by media coverage of group

home siting conflicts, and qualitative, in-depth and open-ended research interviews

with 28 stakeholders conducted in the summer and fall of 2008 in Framingham andWorcester, including social service agency staff, lawyers, city officials, and residents

opposed to group home sitings. We conclude with thoughts about the broader

implications of conceptualizing and enacting residual apparatuses as a tool for

neoliberal resistance.

Contemporary Resistive Urban PoliticsThe term resistance has wide usage within geography, focusing on challenging

hegemonies, be they political-economic, cultural, or some combination (eg Boyer

2006; Cresswell 1996; DeFilippis 2004; Elwood 2006; Peck and Tickell 2002; Pile

and Keith 1997; Routledge 1994). Mitch Rose (2002:389) argues that theories

of resistance conceptualize how people creatively and diversely react to that

C 2012 The Author. Antipode C Antipode Foundation Ltd.


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Reconceptualizing Resistance 63

which already exists. He insists that whatever exists need not be hegemonic;

existence is always contested and in the process of becoming. Nonetheless, we

see a pervasive theme of resistance to hegemonyone Rose (2002) acknowledges

as wellthroughout the resistance literatures in geography. These literatures

include, for example, Routledges (1994) exploration of how particular political,

economic, ecological, and cultural forces in specific places combine to createresistance; Cresswells (1996) attention to the ways that people challenge normative

space via transgressive acts (doing things not usually done in particular places);

and Laws (1997) exploration of the politics of bar dancing, in which gender norms

can be challenged via female labour market participation.

Resistance seeks to subvert or overturn power, especially institutions and relations

that maintain or support capitalism. For Peck and Tickell (2002), for example,

exposing the systemic rules of global capital investment offers a kind of resistance

that challenges the apolitical, free ideology of neoliberalism. Wainwright,

Prudham and Glassman (2000) focus on global inter-state agencies as a primary

target of resistance, via networked organizing among a variety of small and large

non-profit, labour-rights groups, and community and environmental activists across

the global North and South, leading to coordinated protests at events such as

Seattles 1999 WTO ministerial meetings. Challenges to these global agencies

foster alliances and communication among alter-globalization networks, creating

broad coalitions of anti-neoliberal activists (Cumbers, Routledge and Nativel 2008;

Routledge 2003). In these cases, resistance both exposes power/hegemony and

seeks to overthrow it. Accounts of the struggle against capitalist hegemony in

the critical resistance literature, then, are often centered on resistance against

state and extra-state structures because of the states role as a primary instrumentand enabling regulatory architect of neoliberal capitalism (cf Harvey 2005; Smith

1996).

The resistance literature contains and parallels a more interdisciplinary

conversation characterized by the term contentious politics (as in Leitner,

Sheppard and Sziarto 2008). Scholarship oriented to contentious politicsor social

movementsoften seeks to theorize modes of resistancesuch as organizational

structure, identities expressed in and through activism, and relations with various

stateswith an eye to spatializing, or making more geographically sensitive, a

relatively aspatial interdisciplinary literature (Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto 2008;Martin and Miller 2003; Miller 2000). This literature is distinct from the resistance

literature primarily because of its focus on the dynamics of activism itself [although

Routledge (1994, 2003) explicitly attends to activism as resistance]. Use of one term

or another tends to signal orientation to different scholarly audiences: resistance

as a term appears more frequently in a geographical literature, while contentious

politics tends both to a more interdisciplinary theoretical and topically activist-

organizational audience. For both the resistance and contentious politics traditions

there is an empirical thread of anti-hegemonic activism in cities that some scholars

have tried to unpack (Hackworth 2007; Mitchell 2003; Purcell 2008).

Scholarship on urbanization processes broadly draws from the social

movement/contentious politics, and resistance traditions, but we note a tendency

in urban geographical literature in which resistance often signifies activism aimed



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at checking the usually untrammeled power of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism in this

scholarship refers to hegemonies of private capital: the insistence upon private

market approaches to the political economy, even for social needs such as health,

housing, and schools (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Hackworth 2007; Leitner, Peck

and Sheppard 2007; Peck and Tickell 2002; Purcell 2008). While neoliberalism

discursively celebrates private capital and its markets, it employs the state, as Peckand Tickell (2002) argue, to roll out state policies that support capital, such

as charter schools that rework the relationship of teachersand their unionsto

both capital and the state (Hankins and Martin 2006), or economic development

programs that reinvent urban landscapes via private investments, with little formal

state input beyond using state powers to assemble and clear large tracts of land.

Wyly and Hammel (2005) posit a neoliberal urbanism, in which state action is not

so much muted as transformed: particular kinds of state intervention and regulation

to successfully reshape the urban socio-spatial landscape. In the neoliberal city, the

task of the city is to make it easier to be middle class, because that is who financially

and politically supports the systemic transformation that is underway.

Sometimes analyses of resistance include an explicitly scalar dimension: in Boyers

(2006) examination of welfare reform in the United States, for example, resistance is

enacted via legal challenges to state policies, both at the (municipal or state) scale of

neoliberalized welfare service provision, and to challenge the (national) underlying

framework of such revanchist policy changes. In her discussion of legal challenges,

the state is both target and tool (through the law) of resistance; activists engage

the state to achieve anti-neoliberal goals. The legal tools that they use to do so,

however, are not the focus of her scalar analysis; instead, the outcomes are. Her

attention to scalar dynamics reflects the ongoing and necessary strategizing on thepart of activists over the appropriate level of engagement (scale of resistance) with

the state (Cox 1998). Beyond questions regarding the scale of resistance, however,

lies a complex state, multivalent at a single scale as well as multiple scales. Our

approach offers a theorization of state residuals as a means of resistance at any scale

or many scales.

The state offers a complex set of power structures against and with which

resistance struggles (Holloway 2005; Scott 1988; Tormey 2004). Indeed, Holloway

(2005) sees the state as so entrenched in power relations such that any resistance in

or through the state is irrevocably bound up in its power logic. We acknowledge statepower as always present, but not necessarily as monolithic.2 Despiteor perhaps

because of the power relations inherent in state frameworks, it is in part through

laws and state regulations that activists can achieve reworked economic relations

such as worker ownership, community banks, or cooperative housing (DeFilippis

2004). Hackworth explicitly acknowledges the possibility of a neo-Keynesian

resistance which seeks to maintain relatively left-leaning state functions. Ultimately,

though, he dismisses the resistive potential of such neo-Keynesian efforts, arguing

that they have yielded highly limited successes (2007:191). We argue, however,

that focusing on a states ordering functions [the police component of states;

as in Ranciere (2004)] may provide a lens for examining how resistance through

the state might destabilize or subvert neoliberal hegemony. We articulate the

notion of residuals, or mechanisms of the state that can, or have historically, been



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wielded to mitigate inequalities of capitalism. In order to explore this arena as

potentially productive for resistance, we first consider radical democracy as an

already-articulated conceptualization of neoliberal resistance (Laclau and Mouffe

1985; Purcell 2008). Radical democracy does not seek to enroll the state in resistance

to capital, per se, but recognizes the simultaneous co-presence of a hegemonic (but

always changing) state, and anti-hegemonic resistances.

Radical Democracy: Responding to Hegemony?The concept of radical democracy provides a framework for articulating where

residual state apparatuses stand amidst the myriad layers of state functions, power,

and hegemony (cf Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Ranciere 2004). We imagine a politics

in which the state whether capitalist or not is always hegemonic, and thus always

produces an outside or excluded that is resistant to the hegemonic order. Radical

democracy as initially described by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) offered a theory of

resistancealthough they did not use that termto capitalist hegemonies.3 Their

goal was to identify a leftist, anti-hegemonic political project that did not rely on

unitary categories such as class, in response to the identity politics of the 1970s to

1990s and post-structural theorizing of the absence of any common (structural or

cultural) basis for political transformation. The theory of radical democracy posits

that anyorder is an hegemonic order; the post-Marxist socialist project of Laclau and

Mouffe seeks to destabilize the hegemonies of capitalism and work towards more

democratic articulations that marginalize capital, even as forms of inequality may

persist (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Nonetheless, they can seek more articulations,

more opportunities for social protest and struggle over multiple inequalities. Eachstruggle will produceor seek to producenew orders, or hegemonies, but these

will be unseated by other struggles; this process describes a democracy not defined

solely by a capitalist hegemony.

As scholars have increasingly taken neoliberalism as the distinct form of

contemporary capitalism in response to which resistance is engaged, they have

explored the ways that its intense market logic constricts possibilities for traditional

political activism to engage the state: the state is responsive primarily to the logic of

facilitating the work of private capital (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2005;

Mitchell 2003; Peck and Tickell 2002; Purcell 2008). At the same time, however,neoliberalism opens possibilities for resistance because of its internal contradictions

(like all hegemonic orders); it simultaneously engages the state to facilitate capital

expansion, yet rhetorically rejects the state as an active player in market logics

(Leitner, Peck and Sheppard 2007; Peck and Tickell 2002; Purcell 2008). In doing

so, the door is opened for alternative projects and resistances.

Purcell (2008) takes up the ideals of radical democracy to focus on how it might

provide specific means for resistance to neoliberalism. He wants to take the insights

of Laclau and Mouffe and apply them to a particular, empirically informed framework

for engaged activism that actually interrupts, if not challenges (and mostly not, in

his examples), neoliberalism. As a result, Purcell engages specifically with the idea of

chains of equivalence, which he defines as entities [which] must simultaneously

be both different and the same (2008:74). Political coalitions and actors with



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shared or complimentary challenges to neoliberalismbut distinct in character,

goals, and identitiesform networks of equivalence [Purcell (2008), drawing from

Hardt and Negri (2004) as well as Laclau and Mouffe (1985)]. Simply put, networks

of equivalence conceptually allow for multiple groups with different specific interests

and identities to band together to challenge the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism.

The crucial point for Purcell, however, and the key radical pluralist component is thatthose groups can work together without having to resolve their internal differences;

they need only share a common questioning of the neoliberal prioritizing of private

capital. They share a struggle, then, for a different hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe

1985; Purcell 2008).

In the battle against global finance, for example, activists with different specific

interests (agriculture or trade policy or environmental protections) confront the

state in the form of police in the streets of Seattle or Cancun (Wainwright 2007);

their objections are to the state policies and agreements which support and create

frameworks for world trade. In Purcells (2008) networks of equivalence in Seattle,

a similar, yet more spatially circumscribed network of neighborhood community

activists, environmental activists, and a Native American tribe work together to

challenge the terms of the environmental clean-up of toxins in and around the

Duwamish River. Their target is the corporate interests being held responsible for

actually funding the clean-up. The agent helping to hold the corporate interests

accountable is the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Seattle area

environmental activists have been able to form a chain of equivalence with the

EPA in the Duwamish clean-up in part by inserting themselves into an EPA framework

that seeks stakeholder input through a participatory planning structure. The shared

interests of the EPA and environmental activists are not obvious or easy to negotiate;the EPA, as a bureaucracy with many actors situated within the US federal system, is

positioned as a complex institutional agent. But its particular mandate with regard

to environmental protection offers a difficult relation to capital, one sometimes

allied with non-state actors seeking limits to capital. Purcells (2008) account of

this case is insightful and engaging. We are highly sympathetic to his project of

conceptualizing resistance and, by connection, a better, more complete democracy.

But we differ over some of the detailsessential detailsof how best to enact

successful resistances.

In his case study of the Duwamish River clean up in Seattle, Purcell (2008) citesgovernment policies as the factor enabling community resistance and involvement.

His account is historically detailedand necessarily so, for the complexities of

the state have everything to do with the sedimented and sometimes inherently

contradictory nature of its policies and procedures. In brief, he points to the EPA, the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)

(also known as Superfund), and associated environmental laws as a sort of

environmental Keynesianism that the federal government enacted in the decade

of the 1970s (through 1980) (Purcell 2008:137). For Purcell, the neoliberalisation

of these laws is evident in the increasing local devolution of governance authority

over particular Superfund sites, including his case of the Duwamish River, resulting

in a proliferation of ad hoc and special purpose entities [that] increasingly carries

out the everyday decision-making in Superfund cleanups (2008:137). At the same



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time, however, Purcell (2008:138) acknowledges that such flexibilization . . . tends

to create political opportunities that social movements can exploit. We want to

engage the idea that such flexibleor Keynesiantools of the state are levers that

can force the state to act in ways that might be counter to capital and in the service

of greater democracy.

In particular, we hope for a more complex, and, we expect, more practicallyproductive conceptualization of resistance in relation to the state. While Purcell

(2008:38, 183, note 2,2) acknowledges resistive possibilities from engagement

with the state, he also notes that the state is fully imbricated in the project of

neoliberalization (a point also made elsewhere; cf Harvey 2005; Holloway 2005;

Mitchell 2003; Smith 1996; Wainwright 2007). We do not disagree with the

basic contention that the state regulates and administers a hegemonic political

economic order of and for capital. But the state is complex; following the persuasive

arguments of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and the example of the EPA in Purcell

(2008), the state ought to be conceptualized like any actor: as multifaceted, with

many possible subjectivities in relation to any particular conflict. This complexity

offers the possibility that the state can be a tool for resistance, one we explore

further in the rest of this paper.

In the next section, we conceptualize how such a theory of the resistance with the

state might appear, drawing on the case of the Dover Amendment in Massachusetts,

in order to argue that resistance cannot and ought not abandon the state to

neoliberalism. If we accept that the state is primarily a shill of neoliberalism, we

cede too much to neoliberalism, challenging it on its own terms rather than, say,

reclaiming the state. Claiming the state will not erase state power or hegemony,

but may force the state to be an agent of change and challenge of its ownhegemonies. In order to conceptualize how we might [re]claim the state, we turn

to conceptualizations of the state in the resistance literature and our notion of

residuals of state power and policy.

Reconceptualizing Resistance: Residuals of the StateThe increased engagement of state power in the defense of the interests of capitalists

since the 1970sand the concomitant decline in the use of state power to support

the interests of non-capital interestshas been widely reported (Harvey 2003; Peet2007). This process, headlined by the pullback of the state from social service

provision (Laws 1989; Peck and Tickell 2002; Wolch 1989) and the glocalization

of economic activity (Swyngedouw 2004) has produced (in the American context)

a somewhat smaller, more entrepreneurial state (Harvey 1989) with reduced

capacity to support, or take responsibility for, its most vulnerable citizens (Brenner

and Theodore 2002).

But the complexity and heterogeneity of actually existing states is often not

captured by this overarching narrative. The particularities of the shape of the

state may offer more resistive potential than is often acknowledged. The state

is neither monolithic nor static: it is a sedimentary agglomeration of statutes and

specific bureaucracies at a variety of scales that evolve over time (Brenner 2004).

Some scholars have described the corpus of more Keynesian bureaucracies still



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existing within the more entrepreneurial, neoliberal state that has emerged as the

residual welfare state (Lee 2005, 2006; Murphy 2003). This notion of a residual

or sedimentedstate is particularly productive for thinking about resistance, as it

points to a variety of contingent, historical and scalar potential relations between

states and resistance movements, from hostile to accommodating (for example,

the US federal governments several positions on the civil disobedience of the civilrights era, and the contrasting regional and municipal state crackdowns on the same

disobedience; McAdam 1982).

A variety of historical ideologies about the goals of the application of state power

(ie New Deal state welfare, post-war Keynesian) that produced various (now residual)

state apparatuses have since been largely supplanted by neoliberalism. Yet because

these embedded narratives predate contemporary neoliberalism, and because they

support discourses about the role of the state which have since been superseded,

they may contribute to a basket of state-supported outcomes somewhat orthogonal

to the nominal goals of neoliberalism [a point also made by Lake (2002) and Purcell

(2008)]. Yet in some cases, their continued existence is tolerated and even enrolled

in contemporary economic projects, operating as legal mandates or government

agencies and institutions. These residual apparatuses have varying resistive potential,

even if they are not actively used resistively.

State apparatuses become deactivated (or relatively less activated) through a

process that is subtle and lapidary: over time, they are deprioritized, devalued, and

defunded, leaving their capacity to regulate private and public interests defanged.

Whether the broad political project of defunding the state is an intentional and

strategic strategy for isolating its welfare-oriented mechanisms (Harvey 2005), or the

casual and to some degree unconscious result of political horsetrading, re-activatingthese mechanisms can be a part of an ongoing resistive politics. A resistance that

conceptualizes itself as partially tactically allied with rather than wholly against the

state would want to seek out and deploy these residuals systematically. The EPA, for

example, forces business, capital etc to sit down at the table with government

defined stakeholders including various communities, environmental groups, or

indeed nearly anyone who owns property or has an organized interest in the

ecosystem being examined.

We argue, then, that left-leaning activists should not concede that state power

has been straightforwardly and wholly enrolled in the contemporary project ofneoliberalism. Certainly, the state is made up of a heterogeneous assemblage

of actors and institutional tools, some of which offer immediate opportunities for

resistance. Additionally, though, an ongoing engagement with different residual

apparatuses borne of varying historical hegemonic regimes offers not only tactical

opportunities but discursive ones as well. Such engagements challenge the framing

of state action in the service of capital as politically neutral by identifying the existing

obligations of the state, as embodied in its own structure, to regulate or interfere

with unbridled profit orientation.

Working to realize the latent resistive potential of residual state apparatuses is not

a replacement for other modes of resistance. We most emphatically are not arguing

that the decentered, network-oriented new politics which Purcell and others have

identified should be abandoned, or are not relevant. Rather, we argue that the state



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is a field within which such politics are enacted, and is itself fragmented not just

by formal scalar divisions (as identified in Boyer 2006; Brenner 2004; Cox 1998),

but by sedimented or residual logics. State apparatuses have particular leverage and

legitimacy which can be incorporated in resistive efforts to great effect. We illustrate

such potential with reference to the Dover Amendment, below.

Case Study: Activating Dover

Dover amendment is like a great shield . . . it was our biggest tool in our arsenal in this

discussion (Social Service group home provider interview with first author, December

2008).

Dover is a law [that] allows [social service agencies] to do anything they can do and not

what they should do (Worcester resident, interview with first author, July 2008).

The Dover Amendment in Massachusetts, as suggested above, offers social service

agencies (SSAs) great power in the group home siting arena. Legally, Dover provides

a framework that ensures non-profit, educational institutions (broadly conceived)4

the ability to bypass local zoning restrictions as they make locational decisions. By

eliminating most local zoning from the group home siting process, Dover potentially

circumvents conventional, market-driven limitations on property use. It is useful to

unpack the history and contemporary use of Dover to see how this state housing law

functions to resistive effect. Dovers resistive potential lies in the way its deployment

can challenge to the logic of segmentation and segregation embedded within

conventional land use zoning.

Strictly speaking, the amendment is a part of Massachusetts statutory housinglaws, the MGL (chapter 40A, section 3, second paragraph, 2003).5 Dovers resistive

potential was certainly not apparent or intended when it was initially passed in

1950, preventing the town of Dover from using its zoning code to restrict religious

educational institutions from residential areas (Healy 2005). Since 1950, several

legal decisions have established that social service agencies that offer residential

programming to address chronic homelessness, addiction, or other mental health

issues fall under the framework of Dover. The law has been altered over the years,

mostly to clarify that while zoning cannot restrict land uses that are non-profit,

religious and/or educational, local governments may apply reasonable regulationsto the physical elements of structures and lot layout (MGL, chapter 40A, section

3, second paragraph, 2003). The ideologies of 1950s Massachusetts that produced

Dover, essentially in defense of the Catholic Church and its parochial schools, situate

the law squarely as a residual of another era.

The promise of Dover is an opportunity of access to landaccess which offers

greater choice than that accorded to other prospective landowners, precisely

because local zoning is set aside for organizations that qualify for Dover. The law

allows social service agencies to site in land use zones that would otherwise be

restricted from group home uses: single family residential zones. Dover is wholly a

state apparatus, but it protects devolved social service agencies.

Despite the protections and promises of Dover, however, SSAs exist inside a

privatized, individual rights-oriented property market. Dover does not offer SSAs



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the ability to buy any property that they wish; it offers them the promise of being

able to site their educational programs in any location that they can obtain (given

reasonable physical limitations such as adequate parking, set backs of buildings from

the street etc) While most social service agencies receive government funds for their

programs, via contracts for services relating to public health, they do not receive any

programmatic or legal assistance in siting their programs (author interviews 2008).Following a neoliberal logic (Peck and Tickell 2002), the state supports social services

financially, but expects agencies to deliver services with market-oriented efficiency

in the private market, including finding suitable property for sale and obtaining

financing.

Administrators of SSAs in central Massachusetts acknowledge the property market

realities in which they operate, but nonetheless describe themselves as having a

great deal of siting latitude (author interviews 2008). In particular, they cite Dover

as giving them the leverage that they need to choose the locations which suit their

needs best, over the sometimes vocal opposition of local residents. According to

one administrator, Dovers very important [if it were to be repealed] it would really

open a door to shutting down programs [or] stopping them from [siting] (author

interviews 2008). When asked about Dover, many social service administrators

reflected on how they would do their work in its absence. Another administrator

talked about the saved legal costs of not having to make federal anti-discrimination

claims (under, for example, the Fair Housing Act): if Dover were to be removed . . . it

could be we would be in federal court doing federal fair housing law . . .Which means

more time more money . . . [and] they dont pay you for the legal stuff (author

interviews 2008). This quote points to the constraints of the governing neoliberal

context in which SSAs must act, sometimes in contradiction to SSAs discourseof the importance and freedom of Dover. We highlight two key mechanisms

through which constraint is exercised: damaging discursive framing in the media

and politicized state funding organs.

While SSAs which serve relatively high-risk populations are to some degree

insulated from market pressures, in that their clients do not pay for their services

(or are highly subsidized), they are not immune to concerns about how they are

represented in public. Highly critical commentary in visible outlets (such as local

or regional newspapers) are threatening to SSAs, who work in concert with other

service organizations throughout the region in their efforts to deliver adequateservices. As a result, the threat of vocal opposition from either local residents or,

more potently, local or regional governmental leaders can sway SSA decision-making

even before potential sites are publicly known. According to public statements by

Worcesters city manager, for example, social service agencies [have] legal right[s]

to proceed with their plans. Laws and statutes provide them with exceptional rights,

but these rights come with great responsibility to their clients and the community

that they are within (Hammel 2006). Agencies are expected to behave in certain

ways, and when they challenge such behavior, there may be costs, both in terms

of perception and more directly, via budgetary constraints. In the case of a group

home siting in Worcester, Massachusetts, a State Senator removed state funding

for a shelter that an agency was to open (Hammel 2006). Eventually, funding

was restored and the home was opened; it relied on more than one source



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of government funding. But the fact that such cuts can be made in politically

heated environments acts as a strong inducement for SSAs to avoid political

controversies.

The bulk of SSA funding for residential services comes from local and regional

governments, largely in the form of service contracts as state responsibilities are

devolved from state bureaucracies to private organizations in cost-competitivebidding processes (author interviews 2008). Two dynamics result from this financial

relationship. First, as indicated above, state legislators may seek voter approval by

exercising direct limits on social service funding as a response to public opposition

to some sitings. Second, all state funding sources are increasingly limited by ever-

tightening state budgets, even those relatively insulated from legislative interference.

In the first case, in Massachusetts, some agencies receive funds directly as part

of state budgets, as line items, rather than via state contracts (agencies may

obtain funding from both sources, as well as other private sources). As one SSA

administrator described in an interview (author interviews 2008): when youre out

there like we are, a. . .

line item the legislators have to insert each year in the budget

makes a really sensitive prospect, and so has a lot of impact on where were gonna

decide to site.

Clearly then, siting decisions are mediated by more than the protections or

promises of Dover. The broader structural context, in which states chronically

underfund social services and agencies seek sites in the private land market, represent

significant contemporary and neoliberal constraints on social service agency siting.

These structural constraints shape SSA administrators siting processes, likely

considerably more than any perceptions of freedom offered by Dover. As a result,

even though SSA administrators may experience a great deal of latitude in sitingdecisions as a result of Dover, the aggregate pattern of the siting decisions that are

actually made follow a straightforwardly revanchist neoliberal logic: social services

for lower-income residents are concentrated in neighborhoods with low-value real

estate and minimal capacity for organized homeowner opposition, as shown in

Figure 1.6 Dover offers the nominal possibility of the ability to site at willat least

within the context of physical requirements for the buildings they hope to occupy

but that ability appears to go systematically under-exercised.

Resistance is Futile? Enabling the Resistive Powerof Residuals

While Dovers resistive utility has often gone underutilized, the case of the South

Middlesex Opportunity Council (SMOC) in Framingham, Massachusetts offers a

provocative example of the kind of resistive siting that Dover can enable. SMOC

is a SSA which provides a range of housing, mental health and substance abuse,

and economic independence programs for low-income individuals and families in

both Middlesex and Worcester, counties in East-Central Massachusetts. SMOC has

been in existence since the mid 1960s, created as a Community Action Program to

address poverty in western-metropolitan Boston (centered on Framingham). Some,

but not all, of their housing programs qualify for Dover protections. Many are

funded via state contracts. Since the early 1990s, SMOC has operated a program



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72 Antipode

Figure 1: Location of residential service agencies (group homes) in relation to regions ofhigh household poverty in Worcester, MA (source: US Census 2000; City of Worcester 2006)

in Framingham called Sage House that provides housing and substance abuse

treatment and counseling services to homeless families (author interviews 2008;

SMOC 2010). In 2005, the state agency with whom they are contracted to operate

the program asked them to expand its size so that more families could be served;

expansion required a new site with more space. SMOC was able to identify anempty building that had previously functioned as a nursing home; the facility was

located in a higher value residential neighborhood than the original location of Sage

House (author interviews 2008). When SMOC bought the facility and tried to obtain

a housing permit and Dover exemption, they encountered some resistance from

neighborhood residents, and from various agencies of the Town of Framingham,

including the Board of Selectmen and the Planning Board (author interviews 2008).

After a great deal of procedural delay, including multiple hearings by the Planning

Board, SMOC eventually was granted their Dover exemption and a certificate of

occupancy from the town planning board (Saltzman and Noonan 2007). The entire

Sage House relocation process, which included multiple Town Board hearings and

heated debates on a city listserv, prompted a federal anti-discrimination lawsuit

brought by SMOC under the Fair Housing Act against the Town of Framingham.



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In fall 2010, the suit was settled, with Framingham paying SMOC $1 million and

agreeing to anti-discrimination training for Town officials (Noonan 2010).

The SMOCFramingham case of Sage House illustrates the potential resistive

power of Dover; using it, SMOC was able to site a social service group home that in

all likelihood would not have otherwise been locatable in the neighborhood (Sage

House was sited before the lawsuit was settled; Dover enabled the siting regardlessof the Federal discrimination claims). Without Dover, town zoning would simply

have prevented the new Sage House location. SMOC made a siting decision (eg

to choose a site) that contradicted a core expectation of higher-value property

owners: that high-value property should be (through the financial mechanisms of

the market and state mechanisms of regulations like zoning) reserved for high-

value uses, and that the governments role in the land market is to protect land

owners from socially problematic uses (Knox 1994; Wyly and Hammel 2005). The

fact of zoning barring group homes in certain residential neighborhoods means

that without Dover, SSAs would not be able to site in those zones. Thus, the

Dover Amendment in Massachusetts provides the widest possible landscape for

a potential group home site. SMOC was able to take that landscape of promise and

turn it into a site that truly challenged or interrupted the usual status quo of land

useand the vociferous opposition to the siting reflects the degree to which the

intended use of the property violated neighborhood expectations of what uses were

appropriate, and which were not (SMOC v Town of Framingham et al 2007). SMOC

was able to achieve the siting because they could find the right property in terms

of size, it was available, and they had the money to buy it. They were also willing

and able to withstand the local opposition and wait 2 years to obtain residency

permits.SMOCs steadfastness indicates an agency seemingly immune to financial and

public pressure. In Middlesex and Worcester counties, where SMOC provides

services, residents who object to sitings complain that SMOC disregards the

character of their neighborhoods, concentrating poverty in a few central

Massachusetts cities and towns (Hammel 2006; Saltzman and Noonan 2007).

SMOC as an organization receives a lot of negative press and public opinion.

Some organizations might fear such popular disdain, but SMOC seems to hold

it in abeyance. Clearly they, like other SSAs we interviewed, believe that the law

in Massachusetts gives them the right to site and they intend to exercise theirrights (author interviews 2008). Yet the high-profile opposition to SSAs locating

group homes in residential areas, especially higher income areas, offers a strong

disincentive to challenge the status quo, if SSAs perceive any link between public

opinion and their abilities to purchase property, secure Dover exemptions, or even

state contracts. SSA administrators do point to their experiences of connections

between public opinion and their abilities to successfully site group homes: in our

interviews with 10 SSA staff and administrators of different agencies operating in

Worcester and Framingham, all agreed that they could not publicly indicate their

intentions to purchase a property. Public notification, they argued, had to proceed

after a final sale was complete. Otherwise, they argued with some illustrations to

past experience, sales would fall through, sometimes because the sellers suddenly

found other buyers with better offers.



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74 Antipode

The existence of Dover does not in itself create resistance, nor does it motivate

resistance on the part of SSAs. The social and political pressures that constrain

SSAs in the current political-economic context do not disappear because of Dover

in Massachusetts. However, for a SSA with the motivation to resist the ongoing

state-led financial and discursive devaluing of their contributions to society, Dover

enables resistive siting acts by tying the hands of both state and non-state politicalactors who might otherwise deploy formal state power toward reinforcing existing,

inequitable development patterns.

SMOCs action is resistive in at least two different ways. First, their insistence that

they would site Sage House in a context that the processes of local land politics would

otherwise prohibit is an incremental step in producing a more just landscape of social

service provision. The agency made a conscious choice to pursue the site that they

believed was the most effective setting for their social service provision, despite

the clear opposition they faced in doing so. In this sense, when SSAs use Dover

resistively, they contribute the construction of a different kind of landscape. Despite

the storm of local opposition it can produce, this sort of resistance through individual

moments of spatial reorganization has limited individual impact. To be substantively

disruptive, this spatial incursion must be one of many similar re-organizing moments.

In insisting on using Dovers protective umbrella from the conventional

mechanisms of local development politics, however, SMOC also discursively exposes

the ways that neoliberal logic of the contemporary local land market promotes

unjust outcomes. Other local political actors (in Framingham, Selectpeople and

Town Meeting Members) were forced either to accept SMOCs efforts at spatial

redistribution or to position themselves publicly in opposition to the alternative

logic of development enabled by Dovers residual state apparatus.The volume of public opposition to siting highlights how the state residual

of Dover inscribes an alternative logic, one offering a more just distribution of

social goods. Dovers status as a formal state apparatus is an important part of

the discursive power SSAs can wield by making use of it. Its political viability and

continued use in the face of widespread condemnation of its effects directs attention

to the widely shared social benefits of Dovers implicit logic. SMOCs insistence on

siting against public preference via the power of Dover opens a space for a public

forum for debating which state logics serve best to produce public good.

Strategies for Resisting/Contesting Through TacticalUse of State ResidualsThe experience of SMOC in Framingham illustrates both the multiple ways in

which SSAs siting choices are in practice constrained and the potential for

using a state residual to resist and partially circumvent that constraint. This case

illustrates that a search for, and intervention through the use of, state residuals can

challenge neoliberal hegemony both by building new geographies and disrupting

normative claims about the appropriate distribution of goods. Dover is a government

mechanism of the regional state that is routinely used by SSAs, but its resistive

potential more often than not remains latent, as demonstrated in the extant

landscape of residential SSA facilities in cities like Worcester. We suggest that it



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takes a confluence of financial wherewithal, motivation, and institutional capacity,

to realize this latent potential.

Some scholars have questioned whether the institutionalization of community

organizing and capacity building has undercut the possibilities for resistance, co-

opting groups that initially sought to challenge hegemonies but which have become

reliant on steady funding streams, professional staff, and institutional ties to variousstate and corporate entities (Lake and Newman 2002; Lustiger-Thaler and Shragge

1998; Martin 2004; Stoecker 1997). In contrast, institutions such as SMOC go about

their business despite their imbrication in broader systems of governance. They are

the kinds of actors who are exploring what it means to resist in the shadow of

neoliberal hegemony.

In the case of SMOC, this willingness to resist has ensured it some critical attention

in central Massachusetts. After the city of Worcester contracted with SMOC to run its

homeless shelter, and subsequently SMOC sought to open some group homes in the

city under the Dover framework, a city councilor was quoted in the city newspaper

with a characterization that captures the impact of the organizations willingness

to act resistively: We cautioned the city about SMOC coming in, because we

knew SMOC had tremendous political power, tremendous financial assets, and they

would not necessarily partner with the city because they were powerful enough

that they didnt have to, said Haller (Kocian 2005). As in the case of Sage House

in Framingham, the agency faced a hail of political pressure to abandon its chosen

sites, but continued unabated.

In Framingham, indeed, SMOC did more than persist; it went on the offensive in

filing a federal lawsuit. With a $50 million annual budget, it may be less dependent

on any specific, particular grant than most of its peer SSAs. As one Worcester socialservice administrator noted, discussing SMOC: they just kind of charged in there . . .

protected by the Dover Amendment . . . They knew how to handle it . . . with regards

to loss of funding. This administrator was comparing SMOCs ability to withstand

legislative funding cuts with his organizations more precarious financial situation.

Simultaneously, SMOC is atypically situated as a regional SSA that is not embedded

within a larger health bureaucracy (such as a state agency or hospital system). Its

constraining fiduciary responsibilities, then, have an unusual degree of separation

from the structuring of the neoliberal, devolving, entrepreneurial state. In addition

to their financial capacity, SMOCs leadership has shown in this case a willingnessto challenge the social/political, soft constraints from which similar SSAs have

shied away. As evidenced above, other SSAs and local politicians alike view SMOC

as operating more independently, even defiantly, in cases where their sitings face

opposition.

SMOCs success in siting Sage House in a relatively higher-income neighborhood

of Framingham points to the possibilities of state residuals such as the Dover

Amendment in Massachusetts to enable resistance to neoliberal logics such

as property markets and social services. In another state, local zoning might

have foreclosed the potential site altogether, by limiting land uses to residential

households with no more than three or four unrelated persons. In such a situation,

resistance has no leverage. Dover, however, makes such restrictive zoning moot

where social services offer the range of life skills education that they routinely provide



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76 Antipode

in group homes settings. Thus, it gives SSAs a big stick to interrupt prevailing land

use patterns.

Given a tool like Dover, we can imagine a landscape in Massachusetts in which

a determined, deep-pocketed SSA could deliberately and successfully redraw the

land use pattern of residential districts across the state. Yet such a pattern does

not exist: Dover has promise, but remains unfulfilled (A. Scherr, Starved equality:funding limits and distribution requirements for group homes under the fair housing

act in progress, in progress). Arguably, an SSA which did seek to use Dover to

realize more of its promise might initiate a rebuke or even elimination of the law

itself. But doing so would also provoke open and public commentary on the law,

opening conversations about the public responsibilities for mental health services,

and the extent of privatization of social services. Debates about appropriate state

intervention may result in evisceration of protections like Dover, but they may also

point to the limitations of neoliberal logics and policies. While Dover is in force, it

can be used to demonstrate that private property markets suffer little harm from

social service uses (Dear 1992). The current failure of Dover to enact a more explicit

challenge to prevailing property markets may be the result of the weak financial

and institutional status of many SSAs. Yet Dover already provokes debate about

social service siting; a more confrontational, deliberate use of Dover could produce

a subversive political confrontation about the devolved and chronically underfunded

position of social services under the neoliberal state. Such a confrontation, in the

face of the resistive actions enabled by Dover, could force reevaluation of the

underlying assumptions of urban neoliberalism, particularly of discursive practices

which constitute mental health needs as subordinate subjectivities (Mouffe 1992).

ConclusionConceptualizing Dover as a tool for resistance to neoliberalism requires recognizing

the neoliberal state as a particularly complex and contradictory actor. Understanding

the state as multiple and fractured opens the door to viewing the state itself

as potentially resistive that is, as containing the seeds (or residuals) of its own

contradictory stance vis a vis capital. Dover constitutes a specific example of such

a residual apparatus that can be exploited and constructed through an interaction

between state and non-state actors at the scales of the regional and local statesin Massachusetts. This particular scalar configuration of Dover should not be

overlooked, as scale is important to the dynamics in the case. However, the fact of

the scalar (and thus, territorial) limits to Dover ought not to obscure the fundamental

character of Dover as more than simply a tool of a regional state, but also a state

residual: an echo of past state logics, which can beand may bepresent at any

and many scales.

An understanding of the state as composed of many partially contradictory,

residual faces is fully compatible with radical democracy, which emphasizes the

multiple positionalities of any actor, and the contingencies of political stances

(Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Radical democracy posits an always-hegemonic power

structure, regardless of whether the state is aligned with capital; state power

produces hegemonies outside of its economic alliances. A resistance that can

build chains of equivalence with actors positioned in the state, or frameworks



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of the state, can challenge assumptions aboutand by extension, the practices

ofthe straightforwardly neoliberal state. Residuals such as Dover, then, offer

an opportunity for resistance that engages the state itself toward an anti-

neoliberal stance (and necessarily towards an alternative hegemony, which itself will

produce resistances) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). One of the requirements for such

engagement is actorscitizens, agencies, organizationswho consciously deployor seek to enact state residuals as elements of resistance. Resistance thus needs to

intentionally and deliberately employ the state to sow greater lines of contradiction

within the states neoliberal project.

Endnotes1 We gratefully acknowledge support for this research by the National Science Foundation:NSF-BCS 0730195. The analysis, conclusions, and opinions offered here are our own and not

necessarily shared by the NSF.2 We differ therefore with Lakes (2002) call for a return to big government because wesee any form of state powereven ones seeking to limit capital as necessarily hegemonicand productive of resistance (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; see our discussion below).3 Their focus was less on resistance per se and more on conceptualizing a basis for politicalparticipation, founded not on essential identities but on fragmented, flexible subjectivitiesalways in definition and engagement.4 State and federal courts have interpreted the term educational when applying the statute(Fitchburg Housing Authy v Board of Zoning Appeals of Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, 874, 1980).

A commonly cited standard in these decisions is that education is the process of developingand training the powers and capabilities of human beings (Mount Hermon Boys School vGill, 145 Mass. 139, 146, 1887).5 Dover does not apply to the cities of Boston and Cambridge, which have separate, butnot dissimilar, state home rule/municipal enabling laws. Cambridges law allows it someregulation over educational and religious facilities over a certain size (Massachusetts Councilof Human Service Providers 2006).6 An extensive exploration of the dimensions of this spatial distribution is beyond the scopeof this paper, although we hope to discuss it in a separate publication.

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