Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank
description
Transcript of Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank
![Page 1: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response
David C. Wheelock*
Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis
November 6, 2008
*Views expressed are not necessarily official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.
![Page 2: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
The Housing Slump: Root of the Crisis
• Declining sales and rising vacancy rates• Less construction• Falling house prices• Rising foreclosure rates
– Cause mortgage-backed securities to decline in value, resulting in large financial losses and uncertainty about viability of counterparties.
![Page 3: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Sales of Existing HomesAnnual Rate
Last Observation: Sept 2008
4,000,000
4,500,000
5,000,000
5,500,000
6,000,000
6,500,000
7,000,000
7,500,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
![Page 4: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
Home Vacancy Rate
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Percent
Last Observation: Q3:2008
![Page 5: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
Months Supply of New and Existing Single Family Homes
Last Observation: Sept 2008
Months
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
New Single Family Homes
Existing Single Family
Homes
![Page 6: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
U.S. Building Permits and Housing Starts
Last Observation: Sept 2008
Thousands
750
950
1150
1350
1550
1750
1950
2150
2350
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Building Permits
Housing Starts
![Page 7: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Median Sales Price of Existing Single Family Homes
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Last Observation: Sept 2008
Year over Year % Change
![Page 8: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
The Growth In House Prices: United States Average
Last Observation: 2008:Q2
Year over Year % Change
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
OFHEO Purchase Only Case Shiller
2Q:2008 -15.38%
2Q:2008-4.77%
![Page 9: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
The Housing Boom (Bubble?)
• Many economists discounted the “bubble” notion:– Income growth was high
– Interest rates were low
• But, house prices rose much faster than GDP, rents, or median household income
![Page 10: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
House Price and GDP Growth
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Index and U.S. GDP Growth, 2001 = 1
Last Observation: 2Q 2008
House Price Index GDP
![Page 11: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
House Prices Compared to Rent
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Case Shiller Price Index to Rent Ratio OFHEO Purchase Only Index to Rent Ratio
Avg. 1987 to 1997
Last Observation: 2008:Q2 Note: OFHEO Purchase only index begins in Q1:1991. Value set equal to C-S index for Q1:1991. Rent Price is from CPI index.
![Page 12: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
House Prices Compared to Median Income
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1.60
1.80
2.00
2.20
2.40
2.60
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year US Ratio CA Ratio FL Ratio MO Ratio KY Ratio
Note: Income is Nominal U.S. Median Income. US Ratio is C-S HPI. Regional Ratios are OFHEO HPI.
![Page 13: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
What Caused the Boom?
House prices had been rising since the mid-1990s, but accelerated in 2002-03, coinciding with:– Low interest rates
– Rising household incomes
– Mortgage market innovations (“originate to distribute” – subprime loans and securitization)
![Page 14: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
House Price and Personal Income Growth
Last Observation: 2008:Q2
Percent
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
1998 - Q1 1999 - Q1 2000 - Q1 2001 - Q1 2002 - Q1 2003 - Q1 2004 - Q1 2005 - Q1 2006 - Q1 2007 - Q1 2008 - Q1
personal income growth
HPI
![Page 15: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
House Price Growth and Mortgage Rate
Last Observation: 2008:Q2
HPI growth rate Mortgage rate
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
1998 -Q1
1999 -Q1
2000 -Q1
2001 -Q1
2002 -Q1
2003 -Q1
2004 -Q1
2005 -Q1
2006 -Q1
2007 -Q1
2008 -Q1
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
Mortgage Rate (right scale)
HPI (left scale)
![Page 16: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Large Increase in Non-Prime Mortgages, 1995 - 2006
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Mortgages, $ Billions
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
(Debt/ Income)
Debt/Income (right scale)
Subprime Alt- A
![Page 17: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
What Ended the Boom?
House price appreciation began to fall in the second half of 2005, coinciding with:
– Slowing of U.S. personal income growth
– Rise in mortgage rates
– Hurricane’s Katrina and Rita
![Page 18: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Consequence of the housing slump…
![Page 19: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Financial Distress
![Page 20: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Falling House Prices and Financial Distress
• Rise in mortgage defaults and foreclosures– Mainly on subprime, adjustable rate loans
• Significant losses on mortgage-backed securities and derivatives (especially private-label MBS’s, even highly-rated securities)
• Uncertainty about the viability of counterparties caused risk spreads to increase and trading in financial markets to fall sharply.
![Page 21: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
House Prices and Foreclosure Rate
Last Observation: 2008:Q2
Rate of New Foreclosures % Change in House Prices Case-Shiller Index
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Foreclosure Rate(left scale)
House Price Grow th(right scale)
![Page 22: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
U.S. Foreclosure Rates by Loan TypeRate of New Foreclosures
Last Observation: 2008:Q2
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
2005 2006 2007 2008
All Mortgages Subprime ARMs Subprime FRMs Prime ARMs Prime FRMs
![Page 23: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
How this Became a Crisis
• “Originate to Distribute” lending model– Principal/agent problems – originators often didn’t
have skin in the game– Investors relied on ratings agencies that used
backward-looking valuations and had their own principal/agent issues
• Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had conflicting objectives, were highly leveraged but lightly regulated.
• Credit default swaps and other over-the-counter derivatives ($50+ trillion!)
![Page 24: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Interest Rate Spreads and Illiquid MarketsPercent
Last Observation: October 31, 2008
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
1/1/2007 4/11/2007 7/20/2007 10/28/2007 2/5/2008 5/15/2008 8/23/2008
%
1 Month EuroDollar
1 Month CD Rate
3 Month LIBOR
Funds Target
Lehman Brothers files for Bankruptcy, Sept 14, 2008
Term Auction Facility (TAF) Introduced, December 12, 2007
Fed lowers Primary Credit Rate 50 basis points to 5.75%
Fed approves $30 billion for Bear Stearns takeover by J.P. Morgan Chase
![Page 25: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Commercial Paper OutstandingSeasonally Adjusted, Billions of Dollars
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1000.0
1200.0
1400.0
2005 2006 2007 2008
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
Financial Asset Non Financial
Non FinancialFinancialAsset backed
Last Observation: October 22, 2008
![Page 26: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
The Fed’s Response
![Page 27: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
The TAF, TSLF, and PDCF
• Term Auction Facility (TAF): Fed auctions fixed amount of reserves to DIs; provides liquidity while avoiding the stigma of borrowing at the discount window.
• Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF): Fed lends Treasury securities to DIs in exchange for other marketable assets.
• Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF): Lending facility for all primary dealers, including non-DIs.
![Page 28: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Bailouts and Non-Bailouts
• Bear Stearns (March ’08): Fed lent $30 billion to facilitate JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear. Concern about systemic risk.
• Fannie/Freddie (Sept. ’08): Treasury places in conservatorship, replaces CEOs.
• Lehman (Sept. ’08): Allowed to fail.• AIG (Sept. ’08): Fed lends up to $85 billion
(increased later to $120); CEO replaced. Systemic risk – huge amount of credit default swaps outstanding.
![Page 29: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
The $700 Billion TARP
Troubled Asset Relief Program• Capital Purchase Program – Treasury will
purchase preferred stock in a qualifying financial firm.$125 billion in nine largest banks
$125 billion in other banks that apply and qualify
• Other program(s) may include purchases of MBSs and loans, insurance of troubled assets, and assistance to borrowers.
![Page 30: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Commercial Paper, Money Market Funds
• Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF): Fed will purchase highly-rated unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper.
• Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF): Fed loans to banks to purchase asset-backed paper from MMMFs.
• Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF): Sets up special vehicles to buy money market instruments. Fed committed up to $540 billion.
![Page 31: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Old Fashioned Monetary Policy
• The FOMC has sharply cut the fed funds rate target – negative real rate throughout 2008.
• Monetary base growth – up sharply since September (“quantitative easing”).
![Page 32: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Target Fed Funds Rate minus Yr/Yr CPI Inflation
Last Observation: Sept 2008
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Expected Fed Funds Futures, CPI MA Forecast
Forecast
Percent
![Page 33: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base, Yr/Yr Growth, SA
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
40.00%
1/1/2007 4/1/2007 7/1/2007 10/1/2007 1/1/2008 4/1/2008 7/1/2008 10/1/2008
Last Observation: 10/20/08
Percent
![Page 34: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Summary (1)
• The financial crisis was triggered when house prices began to decline and subprime mortgage defaults increased.
• Subprime accounts for about 10 percent of mortgage market. Subprime ARMs represent about 7 percent of loans, but 43 percent of foreclosures.
• Some $85 billion of losses on non-prime mortgage loans has mushroomed into some $1.4 trillion of losses world wide (IMF estimate).
![Page 35: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
Summary (2)
• Systemic failure centered in MBSs and other derivatives that have lost substantial market value.
• The Fed (and other agencies) have attempted to contain the crisis and re-start financial markets by providing liquidity and acting as lender of last resort.
![Page 36: Dealing With Financial Turmoil: The Fed’s Response David C. Wheelock* Federal Reserve Bank](https://reader034.fdocuments.us/reader034/viewer/2022051116/56814f91550346895dbd4d78/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
Questions?