de Graaf, Beatrice - Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89

7/30/2019 de Graaf, Beatrice - Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 197989

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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)1

Al l stat ements of fact, opini on, or a nal ysis expressed i n th i s arti cle are those of theauthor. N othing i n th e art i cle shoul d be constru ed as assert in g or i mpl ying U S gov-ernment end orsement of an art i cles factual statements and i nt erp retati ons.

West -Arbeit (Western Operations)

Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 197989

Beatrice de Graaf

In the year 2000, the case of

former C ha ncellor Helmut

Kohl, wh o ha d sued the Ger-

ma n Office of the Commis-

sioner for t he Records of th e

St a te Security S ervice of the

G erma n Democra tic Republic(BStU) for releasing files con-

cerning his political activities

before 1989, invoked new int er-

est in a special category of vic-

tims a nd collaborat ors of the

Sta si , Ea st G ermanys Minis-

try for St a te Security (Ministe-

rium fr St aa tssicherheit

MfS). This cat egory involved

West G erma ns a nd other West

Eur opeans w ho were the sub-

ject of the St a sis West-Arbeit(Western operations). a 1

Several studies of the West-

Arbeit ha ve been published.

Some historians, for example,

Hubertu s Kna be, mentioned

th e possibility th a t 20,000 West

G ermans ma y ha ve been spies.

Official BS tU est ima tes are

much lower, perh a ps 3,500

6,000 over a period of 40 years.

In 1989, 1,500 of t hem w ere

still operational. These agents

spied on thousa nds of WestGerman companies, organiza-

tions, a nd citizens, including

H elmut K ohl. They a lso worked

aga inst Eas t G ermans who

were in conta ct wit h t he West. b 2

For t he S ta si, West-Arbeit

activities im und nach demOperationsgebiet(in a nddirected t o the ta rget region)

were organized not only in geo-

gra phic terms but in politica l,organizat ional , a nd structural

terms. With the scope of West-

Arbeit so broadly defined, the

boundaries between foreign

int elligence a nd domestic polic-

ing could not be discerned

clearly in Stasi activites.

Alth ough most of th e records

of the St a sis Main Directorate

for Intelligence (the Hauptver-

waltung AufklrungHVA)

a The BSt U (Die Beauftr gte fr die Unter-

lagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der

ehemaligen Deutschen Demokrat ischen

Republik)

is responsible for preserving t he

records of the St asi, w hich had r esponsibil-

ity for both external and internal security.

The files on Kohl suggested h e had ta ken

bribes from major firms on beha lf of his

party, the C hrist ian D emocrat ic Union.

The B StU s functions ar e described on its

Web site, ww w.bstu.bund.de.

b Kna bes 1999 study wa s reviewed by CIA

historian B en Fischer in Studi es in In tel l i

gence46, no. 2 (2002). It offers a usefuloverview in English of Ea st G erman intel

ligence.

With the scope of West-Arbeit so broadlydefined, the boundaries

between foreignintelligence and

domestic policing couldnot be discerned clearly

in Stasi activites.


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A Cold War Intelligence Battleground

2Studies in Intelligence Vol. 52, No. 1 (Extracts-March 2008)

Hatred of the enemy was the Stasis all encompassing idea.

ha ve been d estroyed, t ra ces of

the West-Arbeit can be found in

domestic depar tment s of the

MfS. Resea rch into this branch

of activities is all t he more

revea ling because t he files of

the West G erma n int elligence

a nd security services remain

closed.

The West-Arbeit had a direct

relat ionship to t he domestic

duties of the St a si, because the

enemy a gainst whom the opera-

tions w ere directed could be

located a broad, a mong foreign-

ers, or w ithin th e GD R popula-

tion it self. As ca n be deduced

from the tra ining manua l of the

Stas i , H aau f d en Fei nd(ha tred of the enemy) wa s the

organiza tions a ll encompa ss-

ing idea.

Est a blished as t he counter-

part a nd junior part ner of the

KG B a nd staffed with commu-

nist veterans like Erich Mielke,

Ernst Wollweber, and Wilhelm

Zaisser , the Sta si wa s a repres-

sive institut ion from it s begin-

nings. Because communism wa s

considered the logical and inev-

itable outcome of history, short-

comings a nd conflicts w ithin

th e system could only be caused

by external fa ctors, for exam-ple, sa boteurs inspired by t he

great cla ss enemy in th e West.

This d efinition of th e enemy

evolved over time, but it w a s

still in place during the neueOstpol i t ikof 197072 of West -G erma n C ha ncellor Willy

Brandt (196974). Brandts out-

reach brought the G DR consid-

erable gains: diploma tic

recognition (a nd t hus embas-

sies) in t he West , economic

treaties, technological imports

(microelectronics, computers),

and loans.

The gains also brought new

dangers: Ea st G ermanys pol-

icy of Abgrenzung(th e ideologi-cal, politica l a nd geographical

sealing off of the G DR from th e

West, in part icular from the

FRG ) began to erode because of

the many conta cts w ith the

West esta blished during this

period. The increased percola-

tion th rough t he Wa ll of West-

ern influences wa s mirrored by

the growth of the S ta si. The

shield an d sword of the par ty

ha d to ma ke up for the new

openness with a ma jor expan-

sion of its personnel, informa l

agents (in off iz iell e mi tar beit er),an d duties. At th e same time,

the S ta si ma de good use of con-

ta cts fostered by B randt s Ost-

politik an d began new

offensives a ga inst the West.

These were directed ma inly

aga inst West G ermany, but

other West E uropean coun-

tries, including t he Nether-

lands, a lso were target ted.

Th e Stasi s Image of theEn emy, as seen t hr ough t heNetherlands

Eva Horn (professor of Ger-

man literatur e and th e theory

of espiona ge) ha s wr itten th at

enemy ima ges a re the back-

bone of intelligence services,but tha t these ima ges can h ave

negative effects on their

efficiency. 3 With respect to

Sta si operat ions aga inst the

Dutch, I will argue that t he

ima ge of the enemy, conceived

through a Mar xist-Leninist per-

spective, drove St a si a ctions

with a ppa rent success at a ta c-

tical level. Stra tegica lly, how -

ever, the St as i actions fa iled to

prevent th e fall of th e regime it

was charged with protecting.

In t his ar ticle, I will investi-

gate wha t the MfS wa s after in

and a gainst the Netherlands and

to wha t extent t hese operations

were a ffected by its thinking

a bout t he enemy. Informat ion

a bout t hese opera tions is ava il-

able in th e ar chives of th e Sta sis

HVA (foreign intelligence and

counterespionage) as well as its

Directora te XX (intern a l opposi-

tion) (Hauptabteilung XXHA

XX), a nd H A I (milita ry in telli-

gence), w hich are m aint a ined by

the BStU .

I nt el l i gence Requi r ement sRegardi ng t he Netherl and s

According t o MfS gu ideline

No. 1/79, th e St a si w a s t o con-centrate on the following goals:

neut ra l izing and combat ing

political-ideological diver-

sion;

ga ther ing mili t ary in te ll i-

gence;


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gat hering economic intelli-

gence;

counterintell igence. 4

U nder th ese guidelines, at

least five MfS directora tes

H VA, HA XX, HA I, H A II

(count erespiona ge), a nd H A

XVIII (economic intelligence

an d security)ra n operat ions

aga inst the Netherlands.

Research into BStU holdings

revea ls a broad ra nge of topics

an d ta rgets between 1979 and

1989.

H VA (foreign int elligence)

files conta in int elligence on:

NATO-deployment prepara -

tions, t he AFCE NT-headq ua r-

ters in Brunssum a nd the

Dut ch position in t he INF-

negotiations;

prepara t ions for Eas t Ger-

ma n communist lea der ErichH oneckers visit t o th e Neth-

erlands in J une 1987;

act ivit ies of the host i le-nega-

tive forcesin the Dutch peace

movement;

reliability of the employees of

the GD R consulate and

embassy in the Netherlands;

the microelectronics program

of the P hilips Corpora tion;

the Dutch civi l and mil it a ry

securit y service (telephone

numbers, organization charts,

pictures);

security-relat ed issues, such

a s activities of right wing

groups, an d t errorist

incidents . 5

HA I (military intelligence)

collected material on:

milita ry exercises of the

Dut ch arm ed forces;

The Rot terdam harbour ;

HA II a nd HA XVIII wereinterested in:

opera t ional games by the

Dutch security services

a gainst the GD R embassy,

consula te, a nd personnel;

security issues surrounding

the emba ssy compound. 6

H A XX (int erna l opposition)

files contain most of the more

elabora te an alys es found inth ese files. These ma inly rega rd

the:

Dutch peace movement ;

contac ts between Dutch and

Ea st G erman churches, peace

groups, and individua ls;

polit ical posit ions of the

Dutch government concern-

ing detente a nd t he E a st-Westconflict.

I nt el l i gence Assets

East German intelligence in

the Netherlan ds involved the

use of open sour ces (OS IN T)

and technical and human col-

lection. OSINT w a s easy t o

come by: The Stasi collected

new spa per clippings, official

(government) publications, and

grey r eport s on G DR - or secu-

rit y-rela ted iss ues. The MfS

a lso mad e good use of art icles

on Dutch military and security

issues published by D utch left-

wing pacifist organizations and

part ies. The P a cifist P olitica l

P art y, the PSP , for exam ple,

exposed deta ils of th e structure

a nd a ctivities of the Dut ch

security service (the Binnen-

landse Veiligheidsdienst

B VD). These were imm ediat ely

a nalyzed and sent to Berlin .7

With respect to t echnica l col-

lection, little is known from the

existing files. There is some evi-

dence tha t t he MfS ma de use of

Dut ch rad io a nd telecommuni-cat ions, including t hose of

Dutch mili tary ra dio an d satel-

lite insta llat ions in Westerbork

and Eibergen. 8

Humint w as the Sta si s main

source for West-Arbeit in the

Netherlands. B efore the Dutch

officia lly recognized th e GD R in

J an ua ry 1973, the HVA ma de

use of the ha ndful of salesmen

a nd church officials w ho hadesta blished conta cts in t he

Netherland s. Because of the

proximity of the tw o count ries,

these so-called headq ua rters

operat ions w ere relat ively ea sy

to set up. According to a former

Dut ch int elligence officer, m ost

of the West-Arbeit against the

Humint was the Stasis main source for West-Arbeit in the Neth-erlands.


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On at least three occasions the MfS did run successful opera-tions over a longer period of time.

Netherlan ds wa s conducted

through headqua rters opera-

tions.

The agent s par ticipa ting in

those operations could be East

G erma ns, but sometimes they

had Dutch backgrounds.

According to the same Dutch

intelligence officer, most East

G erman headqua rters opera -

tions used Dutch citizens w hoeventua lly were doubled by the

BVD. 9 New St asi files suggest

this is not th e ca se.

From 1973 on, politica l a nd

economic rela tions a lso pro-

vided up-to-da te informa tion.

However, the MfS wa s espe-

cially int erested in non-govern-

mental relations between

protesta nt church congrega-

tions and peace groups in both

countries. Around 1978, some

100 parish contacts ha d been

esta blished, a nd by 1984 the

number ha d grown t o more

tha n 150. B y t hen, 9,000 to

12,000 Dutch protestan ts a nd

pea ce a ctivists were pa rticipa t-

ing in excha nge progra ms. 10

Diplomatic recognition also

enabled the MfS t o place at

least thr ee lega l intelligence

officers at its residentur a in t heembassy. Although the B VD

kept the G DR embassy under

strict sur veillance, the MfS r es-

identura wa s able to run sev-

eral informa l-agent operat ions

from the emba ssy. 11 The

records revea l tha t t he follow -

ing a ssets were recruited in the

Netherlands (through head-

qua rters opera tions or by legal

residents):

Three informal a gents in the

Dutch-Ea st G erman Friend-

ship Associat ion (a su bdivi-

sion of th e officia l Liga fr

Vlkerfreundschaft)

One in formal agent and one

prospective agent from theHorizonta l Pla t form, a Ma rx-

ist-Leninist offshoot of th e

Dutch Communist Party.

Severa l conta ct persons (not

quite informa l agents but

something less committed)

inside t he St op-th e-Neutr on-

B omb ca mpaign a nd other left

wing peace groups.

At leas t tw o in formal agents

not aff i liated w ith left w ing

organiza tions, but recruited

becau se they sought a dven-

tur e or ha d financial needs.

The MfS w a s not a llow ed to

recruit mem bers of the official

Dutch Communist P a rty ( they

could only be used a s cont a ct

persons, not a s informa l

agent s). Most informa l agents

and other sources were never-

theless draw n into its servicethrough their sympathy for

commun ist idea ls or thr ough

th eir progressive political con-

victions, as S ta si chief Er ich

Mielke phrased it. As late in

the Cold Wa r a s September

1988, the resident was com-

plaining about the large num-

ber of Dut ch citizens w ho were

showing up at the embassy to

offer th emselves to th eservice. 12

On the w hole, informal a gents

like these volunteers w ere of

limited utility as sources. The

members of the Fr iendship

Associa tion (th e informa l

a gents Aorta, Arth ur, and

Ozon, for exam ple) or mem-

bers of other G DR-affilia ted

organiza tions were either t oo

old, unemployed, or too suspect

to get a nywhere near interest-

ing milita ry or politica l infor-

mation. The resident came to

th e sa me conclusion: Their

a ssets were too leftist a nd

a tt empts to broad en the con-

ta ct scope did not produce ma ny

results, he lamented in 1988. 13

Sta si Success Stor i es

However, on a t least t hreeoccasions the MfS did run suc-

cessful opera tions over longer

periods of time: on military

int elligence, on th e Dutch pea ce

movement , a nd a gainst a group

of Dutch dra ft resisters w ith

Ea st German conta cts .

M i li tar y Reconnai ssanceAbruf

The MfS w a s first of all inter-

ested in political a nd milita ry

intelligence on the North Atlan-tic Treat y Orga niza tion, the

ma in enemy of the Wa rsa w

P a ct. Within pact collection

arra ngements , the GDR wa s

responsible for collecting intelli-

gence concerning the areas

a ssocia ted w ith NATO Army

G roup North and Army G roup


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The BVD, however, was a formidable adversary for the HVA.Cent ra l. The H VA, w ith 4,000

members, an d the mili tary

intelligence service of the E a stG erma n Army, w ith 2,000

members, w ere responsible for

carrying out these opera tions.

West Germa ny, Great B ritain,

Fra nce, the Benelux and Den-

ma rk w ere defined as principal

objectives.

Fulfilling this a im in the

Netherlands meant gath ering

early w a rning a bout NATO

prepa ra tions and securinginforma tion a bout the order of

battle and military disposi-

tions. In a ddition to the tar gets

listed above, HVA was also

interested in Dut ch milita ry

compounds and in the Schiphol

an d Zestienhoven a irports. 14

The B VD, however, proved a

formida ble a dversary for the

HVA. Int ensive Dut ch surveil-

lance turned the residentura inThe Ha gue into lit t le more tha n

a shelter for underemployed

case officers. HVA security

report s from 1984 on r egular ly

record Sta si suspicions th at the

B VD wa s using its connections

in th e Dut ch media t o publicize

a cts of espionage conducted by

the socialist st a tes. Ironically,

these complaints (part ially jus-

tified, as w e sha ll see) were

triggered by concern in Dutchconserva tive circles tha t Wa r-

saw P act countries were trying

to infi lt ra te and man ipulate the

count rys peace movement . P oli-

t icians asked quest ions in P ar-

liament, a nd th e Home Office

felt compelled t o increase secu-

rity measures.

According t o the MfS residen-tura in The Ha gue, the BVD

conducted so ma ny unfriendly

acts of surveilla nce and r ecruit-

ing act ivit ies against the

embassy , aga inst E as t G erman

citizens in the Netherlands, a nd

aga inst fr iendly organiza-

tions, such a s the Fr iendship

Associa tion G DR-Netherland s

(Vr i end schapsver eni gin g N eder-land-DDR), that they threat-ened to obstr uct t he positive

effect of the socia list det ente

politics concerning disarma-

ment q uestions. Tha t is, t he

Sta si blamed the B VD for dete-

riora ting Ea st-West relat ions

and troubled disarma ment

talks. 15

However, at leas t one Dutch

informal agent of the 1980s,

w hose codenam e wa s Abruf (on

call) wa s not discovered. Abruf

wa s run by a case officer code-

named Hilmar , who wa s a

member of the legal residen-

tura of the milita ry int elligence

depart ment of the East Ger-

ma n Army a nd w orked in close

cooperat ion w ith t he MfS sta ff

a t the Eas t G erman embassy .

Hilma r ha d recruited Abruf in

November 1983 a t a meeting of

the Communist Pa rty of the

Netherlands (CPN) that he, as

a comra de and emba ssy offi-cia l, could legally a tt end.

Hilma r described Abruf a s

young, unemployed, unhappy

with the perceived rightist poli-

cies of th e Dut ch governm ent,

frust ra ted by t he NATO-mod-

ernizat ion decision, a nd a

staunch supporter of commu-nism. Hilmar pla yed into this

zeal a nd general disa ffection

with the capitalist environ-

ment a nd ha d no difficulty

recruiting t he young ma n. 16

As his codena me implied,

Abruf wa s used as a freelan ce

a gent. H e received inst ructions

to photogra ph Rotterdam Ha r-

bor, the Schiphol and Zestien-

hoven a irports, industr ial

plant s in the region, a nd mili-

tary compounds. He also col-

lected m a teria l on NATO

Exercise RE FORG ER in 1985.

After 1985, he w a s told t o move

to Woensdr echt , a site th en

being prepar ed to receive new

NATO missiles.

Abruf received pa yment s of

100 Dut ch guilders for every

ta sk he car ried out. Conta ct

wit h his ca se officer wa s ma de

thr ough dead dr ops a nd in

short meetings (a fter long, fra n-

tic diversions a nd smoke

screens) in crowd ed pla ces,

such as the J ungerha ns depart-

ment st ore in Rott erdam . To

some of th ese rendezvous he

brought his girlfriend. 17

Abrufs employment ended

a fter th ree yea rs, in 1986, a fter

a n a ssignment in 1985 ra isedsuspicions. In t hat year , he w as

ordered to C oevord en, Ter Apel,

a nd Vriezenveen, wh ere he wa s

told to locate m ilita ry depots,

and to Woensdrecht, where he

wa s to photograph t he deploy-

ment site. On 25 Februa ry

1986, the B VD paid him a visit


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Interest in the Dutch peace movement and its church grew out ofopposition to the planned modernization and expansion ofNATOs intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles.

an d a sked a bout the tr ip to

Vriezenveen and about his con-

ta cts with the GDR embassy.

The B VD ha d st umbled across

Abruf while they were follow-

ing Hilma r. At t he time, Dutch

security did n ot seem to know

much a bout Abrufs history a nd

actua l act ivit ies as a n a gent .

Hilmar ha d already been

replaced by an MfS case officercodenam ed Ha upt. The B VD

visit ala rmed both Abruf a nd

the residentura, a nd the rela-

t ionship was mutua lly termi-

nated two days a f ter the

inquiry.

Informal a gent Abruf ha d pro-

vided the St asi w ith useful

reconnaissa nce ma teria l on

Dut ch milita ry a nd economic

capabilit ies centering a round

the R ott erdam region. H is cover

wa s never really blown, a nd the

B VD did not uncover his real

a ctivities. After 1989, he left

the Netherlands a nd disap-

peared.

Wha t Abruf provided wa s ty p-

ica l of the ma ny reports on

Dutch milita ry ma tters , some-

tim es via open sources, some-tim es of obscure origin, found in

St a si files. One of the show-

pieces is a deta iled description

of the organiza tional str uc-

tur etelephone numbers

includedof th e int elligence

department of the Dutch land

forces.18

Th e Stasi an d t he Dut ch PeaceMovement

Files unearthed in the BS tU

archives also provide insight

into a nother ty pe of int elli-

gence a ctivity , covert in fluence

opera tions. The S ta si focused in

th e lat e 1970s a nd 1980s on t he

Dut ch pea ce movement a nd

churches a nd invested hea vily

in them a nd selected leaders.

Ironica lly, the Ea st G ermans

would find their efforts t urned

aga inst them a s circumsta nces

in Eur ope and the S oviet Un ion

changed w ith t he introduction

of perestroika a nd other

reforms in the region.

Ea st Germa n interest in the

Dut ch peace movement a nd its

church grew out of West E uro-

pea n a nd D utch opposition t o

the planned modernization andexpansion of NATOs intermedi-

ate range ballistic and cruise

missiles in Western E urope in

1977. B y t he ear ly 1980s, hun-

dreds of thousa nds of Dutch

people would demonstrate to

at tempt to force the govern-

ment t o postpone or can cel th e

deployments.

The opposition s paw ned n ew

opportunities for Soviet andWarsa w P act leaders, and the

official commu nist World P eace

Council and its suborganiza -

tions were used to w a ge open

an d covert campa igns to capi-

ta lize on t he protests. 19

B etw een 1977 and 1979, the

ruling Ea st G erman S ocialist

Party (Sozialistische Ein-

heitspartei Deutschlands

SE D) an d t he peace councilwere responsible, among other

things, for fina ncial a nd logis-

tic support of the Stop the

Neutron B omb ca mpa igna

Dut ch communist front organi-

zat ion tha t cost Ea st B erlin

a round 120,000 Dut ch guilders

(110,000 West G erm a n D M). 20

In a ddit ion, the S ta si influ-

enced the foundat ion G enerals

for P eacea well known a nd

respected anti-nuclear peace

organ iza tion of former West

European generals, with Dutch

General Michiel von Meyen-

feldt (former chief of t he Du tch

Royal Militar y Aca demy) a s

secreta ry. To support its per-

spectives, the St a si gave it

100,000 West G erma n D M

annual ly .21

Even more potentia lly useful,

it seemed to the Kremlin a nd

Ea st B erlin , wa s the expansion

of the support ba se of th e pea ce

movement in th e Netherla nds

to include churches a nd t he

Dut ch Interchurch Pea ce Coun-

cil (Interkerkelijk Vredesber-

aa dIKV), which had sta rted a

campaign for unilat eral a tomic

disarma ment in the Nether-

lan ds. All influentia l Dut ch

churches part icipated in t he

IKV, and t he orga nizat ion suc-ceeded in mobilizing lar ge pa rt s

of Dut ch society. 22 Eas t G er-

ma n leader E rich Honecker

believed tha t t he Dut ch reli-

gious powers were t he ma in

cause of turning th e anti-

nuclear cam paign into a ma ss

movement, 22 and invita t ions


7/16



would follow to a va riety of

church officia ls to visit like-

minded groups in E ast Ger-man y .

However, St asi sympa thy for

the Dutch peace movement

sta rted to turn sour after 1981.

After Polish government

repression of th e independent

trade union Solidarity in

P oland a nd a fter exchan ges

with members of the Czechoslo-

vak dissident group Chart er 77,

the IKV radically altered itspositions a nd began t o target

not only NATO missiles but

those of the War saw P act a nd

demanded that al l membercountries start dismantling

nuclea r m issiles on t heir own

territories rather than pointing

fingers a t other nat ions. In

effect, t his mean t t he end of a

purely a nt i-NATO cam pa ign. 23

To make matters worse for

the commun ists, the IKV

extended its conta cts wit h dissi-

dents throughout Ea stern

Europe and declared that

repression in the E a st w as amajor political cause of the

arm s ra ce and not t he other

wa y a round. The IKV planned

to orga nize a pea ce

movement from

below t o confront

bothsuperpowers a tgrassroot levels. 24

With it s chan ge of

position, extant

church conta ctswi th in the GDR

beca me especia lly

interesting for th e

IKVa nd trouble-

some to the MfS.

Most invit ing wa s

a n independent

peace movement

tha t a ppeared in

Ea st Germa n protes-

ta nt churches in

1978 called S w ordsInto Plowshares

(Schwert er zu Pflug-

scha ren). The I KV

followed up an d sent

emissaries to vari-

ous peace groups in

the GD Ras tour-

ists, or under the

umbrella of church exchangesa nd eventua lly ann ounced the

forma tion of a joint P eace P lat -

form with E ast G erman dissi-

dents in t he summ er of 1982.

The Sta si rea d about the

development in a Dut ch news-

paper a nd w ent on red a lert .

Honecker himself ordered the

official sta te Secreta ria t for

Religious Mat ters (St a a tssekre-

ta riat fr Kirchenfragen) to

exert all m eans of influence to

elimina te th ese divisive forces

(Spal terk rfte).25

A four-part campa ign aga inst

the IKV wa s begun. First , the

Sta si act ivated i ts church

a gents to force the a ba ndon-

ment of the platform. 26 Second,

it s tart ed a smear campaign

aga inst t he IKV. IKV Secretary

Mient J an Fa ber a nd other off i-

cials of his group were regis-

tered a s persons of crimina l

intent . 27 P ar ty and s ta te of fi-

cia ls, newspa pers a nd front

organiza tions were instructed

to depict t he IKV a s a divisive

force wit hin t he West E uro-

pea n peace movement a nd

Fa ber as a n arrogant bully. 28

Third, Fa ber himself wa s

bar red from entering the

G D R. 29 And fina lly , the exist-

ing conta cts between Dutchreformed parishes and Ea st

German congregations were

thr eat ened. The Dut ch working

group within the Ea st G erman

churches wa s told tha t th e

obstructions were caused by t he

sta tes misgivings about the

IKV. Several visits of Dut ch

A four-part campaign against the IKV was begun.

A leaflet of the I KV illustra t ing t he coopera tion

bet we e n it a nd Ea s t Ge r man a nd Hung ar ian or g an i-

zations.


8/16



delegat ions to Ea st G ermany

a nd vice versa were can celled. 30

These measures were

informed by t he stra tegy of dif-

ferentia tion (Differenzierung),which wa s a very subt le method

of alienat ing divisive and neg-

a tive elements from their own

base. 31 The St a si sorted out

w hich IKV a nd church mem-bers disliked Faber a nd invited

them to Ea st B erlin . I t suc-

ceeded in ma nipulating t he

president of the IK V and

reformed church official J a n

van P utten, General von Mey-

enfeldthe wa s also an a dvi-

sor to the Reformed Churches

in the Netherla nds an d a board

member of t he IK Van d lower-

ra nking IKV members. 32 IKV

officials, Dutch church groups

an d journalists w ere led to

believe tha t t he IK Vs secre-

ta ry w as no longer in favour in

Ea st E urope or w ith t he protes-

ta nt churches in the G DR. 33

In l ine with t his strategy, theSt a si also tried to recruit

agents in the Netherla nds. IKV

Secreta ry J an neke Houdijk,

IKVs coordinator for Ea st G er-

many, was approached in

vain. She did not recognise the

at tempts for wha t they were

and remained loyal to Faber. 34

In t he end, however, the

efforts bore fruit . Ea st-G erma n

churches detached themselvesfrom their IKV conta cts and

froze most exchange activities.

In th e Netherlands, many

Dut ch church leaders a nd local

groups were convinced that

Faber was a threat to s t abil it y

a nd E a st-West relat ions. 35

Fa ber wa s threatened with dis-

missa l. Local IKV groups a nd

parishes sent angry letters to

IKV headqua rters a nd

demanded that Fa ber stop med-

dling in internal Ea st Germa n

affairs , le t alone lead a cam -

paign for huma n rights . 36 The

envisaged Pea ce P lat form never

came into being, frustra ted in

adva nce by the Sta si , which

wa s helped, knowingly or

unknowingly, by Dutch and

Ea st G erman church leaders.

Ironica lly, a fter Mikha il Gor-

bachev ca me to power in t he

Soviet U nion, Mar xist-Leninist

enmity t owa rds a democra t iza-

tion approa ch faded aw a y. The

new leadership in the Kr emlin

even developed sympa th y for it,

a nd, in 1988, Fa ber and B ritish

pea ce a ctivist Mary Ka ldor

were invited to Moscow to

observe the disma ntling of SS-

20 rockets. The sa me yea r, a n

IKV delegation visited Moscow,

invited by the K remlin itself. 37

The GDR, however, stuck to itsrigid policy. The St a si wa s

a ppalled by the t olerance of

Soviet communist s towa rd

Dut ch peace activists and did

not ada pt itself to the new lib-

eralism. I ndeed, it continued

the struggle aga inst the IKV

and even start ed a new a ct ion

The Stasi was appalled by the tolerance of Soviet communists to-ward Dutch peace activists and did not adapt itself to the new lib-eralism.

A page from the file of Mient J an Fab er.


9/16



aga inst it in 1988. Opera tions

were only a borted aft er the Ber-

lin Wa ll ca me down in Novem-ber 1989.

Oper ati on Bi cycl e Tour Gr oups other tha n the IKV

tried to esta blish excha nge pro-

grams with Ea st German peace

a ctivists, an d in doing so gener-

at ed a S ta si response that illus-

tra tes the enta nglement of

foreign a nd domestic intelli-

gence activity in East Germa ny.

In 1981, a group of dra ft r esist-

ers from t he northern Du tch city

of G roningen founded an organi-

za tion ca lled the P eace Sh op

(Vredeswinkel). The ent ity func-

tioned as a commun ica tion cen-

tre for pea ce a ctivists from the

region. Thr ough existing church

conta cts an d the Wa r Resisters

International, the leaders soon

conta cted a construction bra nch

of the Ea st German a rmy

known a s the B ausoldaten, tha t

ha d since 1964 been offering t he

possibility of completing obliga -

tory milita ry service not w ith

arms but with the spade. This

a lterna tive had been provided a t

the urging of Ea st G erman prot-

esta nt churches, which repre-

sented a bout 45 percent of the

G DRs populat ion.

As a gr as s roots organ izat ion,

the P eace Shop orga nized bicy-

cle tours through E ast G er-ma ny a s a joint venture of

Dutch , Eas t German, and ,

w hen possible, Czechoslovak

a nd P olish conscientious objec-

tors. The Dutch entered the

GD R a s privat e visitors , gath-

ered a t prea rran ged a ddresses,

and, w ith Ea st G ermans, cycled

to rural parts of the GD R and

discussed world politics and

disarma ment init iat ives. 38

In 1985, IKV Secreta ry F a ber

and E as t G erman Vicar Rainer

Eppelmann (a prominent fig-

ure in the Ea st G erman opposi-

tion scene) conclud ed a

personal contr act to work

together for peace. Many part ic-

ipant s in the Groningen-G DR

excha nge decided t o do th e

same a nd committed them-selves to not usin g violence

aga inst ea ch other in case of a

wa r. According t o the signa to-

ries, in doing t his, th ey contrib-

uted to detente from below. 39

Although their a ctivities w ere

rela tively low-profile a nd n ot

aimed at threat ening the GD R

system, the cycle tours

were betra yed by their

own success as the St as igot w ind of them. Lar ge

international groups

peddling, for exam ple,

from Ka rl Marx City

(Chemnitz) to Stra l-

sund, could not sta y

unn oticed, especially

aft er their frequency

increased to three or

four t imes a year .

Vetera ns of the B a uso-

ldat en were suspect to

begin w ith in the eyes of

the MfS, especially

wh en they orga nized

meetings with other

Ba usoldaten a nd West-

ern draft resisters.

Indeed, the Sta si had

been car rying out opera -

tions aga inst t he idea of socia l

pea ce service a s an a lterna tive

to militar y service since at least

1981. 40 (Vica r E pplema n, in

fact , had been a leader in th e

socia l pea ce service effort.)

HA XX, the departmentcharged with dealing with th e

churches a nd opposition cir-

cles, learned tha t Du tch partici-

pant s plann ed to publish storiesa bout t heir bicycle tours a nd

experiences in the GDR in

Dutch church a nd peace maga -

zines, and, in 1984, Peace Shop

members initiated a letter cam-

paign on behalf of Amnesty

Int erna tional for the relea se of

arres ted Ea s t German

dissidents. 41

Such activity fit perfectly in the communist vision of class ene-mies conspiring to create domestic unrest.

A member of the P eace Shop in Gr oningenand a n Ea st G erman diss ident exchange per-

sonal peace trea ties.


10/16



Such a ctivity fit perfectly in

the communist vision of class

enemies conspiring from out-

side the system to creat e

domestic unrest, a nd t he bicy-

cle tours th us becam e objects of

int ensive surveilla nce. In 1983,

the Sta si sta rted several Opera-ti ve Vorgange(intelligenceopera t ions a imed a t arrest ing

dissidents) against former Bau-

soldaten w ho had part icipated

in t he tours. H A XX recruited

several Ea st G ermans a s infor-

ma l agents mit Feindkonta kt

(in conta ct w ith the enemy),

w ho reported on a ll the meet-

ings an d prepar at ions.42

Alth ough bicycle tour par tici-

pant s kept t heir dista nce from

IKV officia ls, HA XX a nd t he

H VA nevert heless increas ingly

suspected them of being part -

ners of the IK V and executorsof the IK Vs gra nd st ra tegy of

developing a pseudopa cifist ,

bloctra nscending peace move-

ment. B y wa y of confirma tion

of this, one St asi report quotes

a D utch act ivist as saying

When t here a re no soldiers on

both sides, there will be no

w eapons used. 43

In t he belief that the P eace

Shop wa s helping dissidents,the Sta si was not mista ken.

The activists had indeed given

their East G erman conta cts a

typewrit er and helped finance

Bausoldatenactivities with2,000 Dutch guilders .

With gr ow ing Dut ch conta cts

in the so-called Political Under-

ground F orces (Poli ti sche Un ter-grun dtti gkeitP U T), wh ich theEa st German a uthorit ies saw as

a t hreat to communist rule,

increased interna tional pressure

on t he GD R, a nd a perceived

potentia l for embar ra ssment

during E rich Honeckers plann ed

J une 1987 visit t o the Nether-

lands, t he MfS tr ied to obstruct

and manipulate cross-border

exchanges. HA XX began an

Operativer Vorgang against the

Dut ch orga nizer of the bicycle

tours, Bert Noppers, who wa s

described as t he inspiratora ndorganisatorof the PUT tours.

As par t of its a tt a ck on Nop-

pers, HA XX used a let ter from

Noppers to an E ast G erman

friend in wh ich he wrote tha t

Dut ch intelligence ha d tried to

recruit h im in 1983 to report on

his East G erman conta cts .

Although Noppers st a ted in his

letter tha t he refused, the HAimmediat ely listed him as a

probable foreign int elligence

a gent. It t hen at tempted to col-

lect evidence to indict Noppers

for host i le agita t ion a gainst the

Ea s t G erman s ta te and for d is-

seminat ing informa tion to for-

eign int elligence ag encies or

other foreign orga niza tions to

discredit t he G DR. If convicted,

he fa ced tw o to 12 year s of

imprisonment.44

Nothw ithsta nding such

threat s , the P eace Shop orga-

nized a protest a gainst E a st

G erma n border contr ols in

1987, building a model Berlin

Wa ll of ca rdboa rd boxes

through G roningen a nd draw -

ing media a ttent ion to the con-

dition of their dissident friends

in the G DR. Although th e peace

The bicycle tours fit perfectly in the communist vision of class en-emies conspiring to create domestic unrest.

Demonstra tors by a card board B erlin Wall built through G roningen in 1987.


11/16



activists also criticized the

West Eu ropean an d Du tch con-

tr ibut ion to the a rma mentsra ce, these acts ha d no impact

on th e activities of HA XX. 45

St epped-up H A XX activit ies

included the recruitm ent a s

informa l a gents of three GD R

participants in the P eace Shop

exchanges. Codenamed Karl-

heinz, Bett y, an d Romeo, they

reported a ll of th eir activities to

HA XX. Romeo wa s sent a broad

to visit the P eace Shop in

G roningen in J uly 1988. How-

ever, t he depart ment could not

find en ough evidence to prose-

cute the Ea st G erman part ici-

pants or arr est the Dutch

organizer.

Even by the standa rds of the

Ea st German P enal Code, the

activists w ere just n ot subver-

sive enough. The Dut ch activist s

did not a dvoca te open criticism

or revolution. As Noppers put it

during a n interview in 2006, If

the East G ermans wa nted to

topple the regime, they ha d t o do

it by th emselves. We came fr om

abroad a nd did not w an t to tell

them w ha t to do. And a lthough

w e were no friends of commu-

nism, w e ha d enough criticism to

pass on capitalism and ma terial-

ism at home. 46 Moreover, t he

Ea st G erman government did

not w ant the MfS to make ran-dom a rrests, since that would

cause too much da ma ge to the

economic an d politica l relat ions

the GD R ha d established by

then.

Nevertheless, MfS surveil-

lan ce continued. H A XX ordered

continuation of the operations

a gainst Noppers, inspired by t he

sam e suspicions a gainst the

Dutch activist. 47 Although the

MfS knew tha t Moscow ha d

shifted policies and now aimed

a t coopera tion with t he IKV and

other West E uropea n peace

orga nisat ions, HA XX wa s still

plotting in April 1989 to use

intercepted inquiries by the

P eace Shop to members of the

Ea st G erman network to recruit

more informa l agents. 48

Only in October 1989 w ere the

Opera tiver Vorgange aga inst theEa st German B ausoldaten and

a ga inst Noppers called off. They

ended pa rtly beca use of a lack of

evidence and part ly beca use the

Sta si had a lready begun clean-

ing up its files in the fa ce of

grow ing unrest a nd pending rev-

olution. On 24 November 1989,

15 da ys a fter the fall of the Ber-

lin Wall, the Stasi finally closed

its files on Noppers.49

I n Sum : Tactical Gain s,Str ategic L oss

During t he last decade of its

existence, the MfS was success-

ful in ta ctical t erms. It suc-

ceeded in run ning one opera tion

to collect milita ry intelligence,

ma naged to infiltrat e and

ma nipula te most IKV conta cts in

the GD R, penetrated the P eace

Shop, and sta rted an OperativVorga ng a gainst the Dut ch coor-

dina tor of Ea st Eu ropean peace

tours. Moreover, th ere is reason

to believe tha t t he MfS employed

more Dutch informa l agents in

the 1980s tha n a re discussed

here but whose records remain

undiscovered.

The P eace Shop, on the corner, in Gr oningen.


12/16



Endnotes

1. Ga uck-B ehrde iritiert ber Aufgeregth eit im Westen um St a si-Akten, in

M agdebur ger Volkssti mm e, 28 April 2000.

2. Hubertus Kna be, D i eun terw anderte Republ ik . Stasi i m Westen(Berlin,1999); H elmut Mller-En bergs, I noff iz iel l e M it arbei ter d es M in ister i um s frStaatssicherh eit. Tei l 2: Anl ei tu ngen fr Ar beit en mi t Agenten, Ku nd schafternun d Spionen in der B un desrepubl ik Deutschl and(Berlin, 1998); Mller-

In t he overall, stra tegic setting,

however, the Ministry of Sta te

Security fa iled in its mission to

preserve the security of the G DR.

First , by entangling i ts foreign

intelligence operations with

domestic security interests, t he

Stasi focused on the foreign

inspira tion of domestic opposi-

tion at the expense of under-

sta nding tha t dissent in the G DR

drew on the systems own eco-

nomic, social, m ilita ry, a nd polit-

ical w eaknesses and the

governments a buses of its popu-

lation.

Second, the MfS itself became

part of the problem instead of

part of the solution, a s the

expa nsion of the security a ppara -

tus from the 1970s on a cted as a

driver for even more protest s.

Third, activities of the IKV a nd

other Dut ch pea ce initia tives like

the P eace Shop were blow n up out

of proport ion, a nd t hose in t he

G DR w ho were in touch with

them w ere deemed to be guilty of

high treason. In this intellectual

stra it-ja cket, the St asi w as

blinded to useful insight s a nd

could not see tha t t he Dutch

movements ga ve the S oviet bloc

opportunities to exploit genuine

divis ions in NATO.

Final ly , when the Sta s i got i t

right, it could not persuade it s

leadership. In Ma y 1987, the

HVA issued an study of Dutch

foreign a nd milita ry politicies

before Honeckers sta te visit t othe Netherlan ds. The ana lysis

precisely listed the deviations of

Dut ch politics from the US a nd

NATO lines. (The Dutch

denounced S DI, favoured a

nuclea r test ban a nd prolonga -

tion of the AB M treat y.)

Honecker, however, m a de no

effort to play into these differ-

ences and only uttered the usua l

clichs a bout peace-loving social-

ist countr ies. To him, th e Nether-lands remained part a nd parcel

of the imperia list block. 50 Pa in -

fully collected a nd sound int elli-

gence wa s ma de useless by

incapable and ideologically

deformed par ty lea ders.

During its last decade, the MfS had tactical success. Strategically,however, it failed to preserve the security of the GDR


13/16



Enbergs, Die Erforschung der West-Arbeit des MfS, in Suckut und Weber

(eds.), Stasi-Akten, 24069; J oachi m L ampe, J ur ist ische Aufar bei tu ng derWestspionage des M fS. Ei ne vor luf ige Bil anz. BF informiert Nr. 24 (B St U ,Berlin, 1999).

3. Eva Horn, Da s wissen vom Feind. Erkenntn is und B lindheid von Geheim-dienst en, in Wolbert K. S chmidt, et a l . , Geheim hal tu ng und Tr ansparanez.Demokr ati sche Kont r olle der Geheimdi enste im in terna ti onalen Ver gleich(B erlin , 2007), 25777. H ere: 259.

4. J ens Gieseke, Ann herungen und Fra gen an die Meldungen au s der

Republik, in idem (ed.), Staatssicherh eit un d Gesel l schaft . Stud ien zum H err -schaft sal l tag in der DDR(Gt t ing en 2007), 7998, here: 8990.

5. Vgl. Query in the SIRA da ta base 14, Druckau f t ragNr . 12839, AR 7/S G 03,Nr . AU 2585/05 Z.

6. HA XVIII , Pl ne und Massn a hmen feindlicher G eheimdienste gegen Aus-

lan dsvertretun gen und langfriestige Delegierun gskader der DDR im nichtso-

zialistischen Auslan d im J a hre 1985. B St U MfS H A XVIII , 3233.

7. Vorga ngsa na lyse zum Vorgang Aorta , 15 J uly 1986; Aufga benstellung

AA 1986. Forts chreibung der S icherheigsa na lyse H a upt, 1 Ma rch 1986;

Informa tion ber die ndl. Sicherheitsdienste. Ausw ertung der B roschre De

B VD en de Inlicht ingendienst en, Hrsg. by P SP , Amst erdam 1983, 1984.

B St U MfS H A I 1682, 2528; 9094; 12729.

8. For exa mple J a hresa bschlussbericht 1981 ber die Er gebnisse der Funka-

bwehrt tigkeit, 16 November 1981, in wh ich West G erman , Br itish a nd

Dut ch ra diocommunications a re ma pped. B St U MfS H A II 25043, 139.

9. Frit s Hoekstra , I n di enst van de BVD . Spionage en contr aspionage in N ed-erland(Amst erda m, 2004). See a lso Dick Eng elen, Fr ontd ient . De BVD in d e

Koud e Oorl og(Amsterdam, 2007).10. Beatr ice de Gra af , Over d e M uu r . De DD R, de N ederla nd se kerken en d evredesbeweging(Amsterda m, 2004), or D e G ra a f, ber d ie Ma uer. Di e DD R,di e ni ederl nd ischen K ir chen u nd di e Fr iedensbewegung(Mns ter, 2007)

11. RoD D en Ha a g, Fortschreibung der S icherheita na lyze zur RoD im Ausbil-

dun gsja hr 1987/1988, 11 November 1988. B St U H A I, 1682: 710.

12. H A I 1682, S . 11.

13. RoD Den Ha ag, Fortschreibung der Sicherheita na lyze zur RoD im Aus-

bildu ng sja hr 1987/1988, 11 November 1988. B St U H A I, 1682: 710.

14. Informa tion ber die Str eitkrft e der Niederlande, nr. 46/88, 27 J an u-

a ry 1988. BS tU MfS H A XVIII 91: 20215; Informa tion ber den mil-

it rischen B eitra g der Niederlande zu den S treitkr ften der NATO, 29 May

1987. BStU MfS HVA 47: 6079.

15. Telegra ms a nd reports t o MfS head qua rt ers from The Ha gue: 21 Mar ch

1984, 18 J a nua ry 1989, 31 Ma rch 1989, security report F ortschr eibung der

Sicherh eitsa na lyse zu r R od im Ausbildun gsjah r 1987/1988 of 18 November

1988. B St U , MfS HA I 1682: 111.

16. Several report s on IM Abruf by Ha upt a nd other MfS-personnel. BSt U

MfS H A I 1682: 29163.


14/16



17. Hilma r, Zum Einsa tz in den NL, 1985; Sicherheitsa na lyse zum Vorgan g

AM-V Abruf, 31 J a nu a ry 1986. BS t U MfS H A I 1682: 5863, 8184.

18. Anga ben zum Nachrichtendienst der Str eitkr fte der NL, insbesondere

der Lan dstreitkr fte, 4 J une 1985, Den H aa g. BS tU MfS H A I 1682: 3952.

19. Peter Volten, Brezhnevs Peace Pr ogram . Success or F ai l ur e? SovietDomesti c Poli ti cal Pr ocess and Power. Aca demisch P roefschrift (Emmen,1981).

20. Letter, Ha ns van der Velde (secreta ry of the Na tiona l Committ ee Initi-

at ief Interna tionale Sta fet t e) to the Ea st G erman P eace Council , Amsterdam,

12 J uly 1979; Letter Ku rt Hlker (deputy secreta ry-general of th e P eace

Council) to Ha ns va n der Velde, B erlin, 7 August 1979. B oth a t BundesarchivSti f t un g Ar beit erp art eien u nd M assenorgani sationen d er ehemal igen DDR(th ereaft er B Arch SAP MO), DZ 9 463.2411; Ca rel Horst meier, St op de Neu-

tronenbom! The last ma ss-a ction of t he CP N a nd t he Moscow-B erlin-Amst er-

dam tr ia ngle, in Carel Horstmeier etal(eds.), Ar ound Peter the Great: T hr ee

Centu ri es of R ussian -Dut ch Relat ions(Groningen 1997), 6577.

21. D e Gr a af , Over d e M uu r, 113; J ochen St aa dt , Die SED und die Generalefr den Frieden, in J rgen Ma ruhn an d Ma nfred Wilke (eds.), Di e verfhr teFriedensbewegung, 123140.

22. East German Peace Council, Information, 22 March 1978, 1, 6, 11, BArch SAPMO

DZ 9 463.2411;N eue Zeit, 2 J uly 1979. East G erman P eace Council , Manah-mepla n, F ebrua ry 1981, 2, B Arch S AP MO D Z 9 450.2354.

23. J a n Willem H onig, DefensePol i cy in th e North Atl ant ic Al l i ance. The Caseof th e N etherlan ds(London: Westport , 1993), 21112; Rona ld J eurissen, Peaceand Rel i g ion: An Empi r i cal-Th eological Stud y of th e M oti vational Effects ofReli giou s Peace At ti tu des on Peace Acti on(Ka mpen, 1993), 47; P hilip Ev erts ,

Publ ic Opin ion, th e Chu r ches and For eign Poli cy: Stu di es of Domestic Factorsin t he M akin g of Dut ch Foreign Pol i cy(Leiden, 1983); J rgen Ma ruhn a ndMa nfred Wilke, eds., D ie ver fhr te Fr iedensbewegun g: Der E i nf ludes Ostensauf di e N achr stun gsdebatte(Mnchen: 2002); U do B a ron, Kal t er K r i eg undheisser F r ieden. Der Ei nfl uss der SED un d i hr er w estdeut schen Verbnd etenauf di e Part ei Di e Gr nen(Mn st er 2003).

24. Mient J a n Fa ber, B rief van h et IKV-secreta ria at a a n alle IKV-kernen

over P olen kort na 13 december 1981, in: F a ber et a l. (eds.), Zes jaar I KV-campagne(Den Haag, 1983), 13334; Open letter of Charter 77 to the Inter-church P eace C ouncil, 17 Augus t 1982. B Arch S AP MO D Z 9 585.2879.

25. Report of Ha upt a bteilun g XX (HA XX) for the St ellvertret er des Minis-

ters, Genossen Generalleutnant Mittig, Negative Aktivitten von Personendes In ter kirchlichen Friedens ra tes (IK V) der Niederla nde, 9 August 1982,

B S t U MfS H A XX ZMA 1993/5, 3437, 5657.

26. Report of th e H A XX/4 (St a sidepar tm ent for chur ch an d opposition mat -

ters), Subversive Aktivit ten kirchlicher P ersonen der Niederlande, 15 J une

1982, BS tU MfS H A XX ZMA 1993/5, 2122; Lett er, C hr ist oph D emke (Office

of the Ea st G erman Ch urch Orga nisat ion) to Sta at ssekretr fr Kirchen-

fra gen, Kla us G ysi, 9 August 1982, B erlin, S ekreta ria t 3827-1632/82, Rep.

B 3 Nr. 711, Archive KPS Ma gdeburg.


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27. B St U MfS H A XX AKG -VSH . ZAIG 5. SLK 10964. ZP DB 2082010579.

E rf a ss un gs nr . 40438/1590/1993; HA XX AKG -VSH . ZAIG 5 1009. SL K 10994.

ZP D B 2082010587. ZMA 3420/19931580. VSH-Karte ikar tenare registercards, not a f i le . In J une 1982 Sta si s tart ed an Operat iv Vorgang(file) onMient J an Fa ber a nd Wolfgang Mller .

28. Report of th e HA XX/4, Int erkirchlicher Friedensr a t der Niederla nde,

October /November 1982, B S tU MfS H A XX/4 1917, 15; In th e mid -1980s,

IKV w as mentioned in a list of approxima tely 1,000 Zielobjekte (ta rgets ) ofthe Stasis Reconnaissance Service, the Hauptverwaltung Aufklrung.

Zielobjekte der HVA - a lpha betische List e, BS tU ASt G era B V Gera /Abt. XV

0187, 2139, in Knabe, West-Ar beit des M fS, 51854. See 537.

29. Vertreter hollnd ischer Friedensbewegung d rfte nicht in die DDR,

ADN- In fo rmat ion, 29 J uly 1982, B St U MfS H A XX ZMA 1993/4, 13.

30. Office of th e East G erma n Chu rches (B EK -Sekreta ria t), Arbeitsbeziehu-

ngen zwischen dem Bund der Ev. Kirchen in der DDR und dem Raa d van

Kerken in den Niederla nden un d einzelnen G liedkirchen un d G emeinden,November 1982, LD C NH K ROS 735.

31. Clemens Vollnha ls, Di e ki rchenpol i t ische Abtei l un g des Mi ni ster i um s frStaatssicherheit. B F in formiert 16/1997 (B erlin 1997). Concern ing t he st ra t-egy of different iat ion, t he follow ing orders w ere relevant : Richt l in i en zurBearbeit un gs Opera ti ver Vorgnge(RL 1/76), Oper ati ve Per sonenkontr ollen(RL 1/81), Dir ekt ive zur I M -Fhr ung(RL 1/79).

32. Ea st G erma n P eace Council, Mana hmeplan, B erlin, April 1981, 4,

B Arch SAP MO DZ 9 K295.1578; Ea st G erman P eace Council, Aktivit ten der

Rstungsgegner im Monat November 1981, Niederlande, 23, BArch

SAPMO DZ 9 450.2354.

33. E.g. , Ton Crijnen, Wa ar om Mient J a n Fa ber niet w elkom is in de DDR,De Ti jd, 31 December 1982.

34. B St U MfS Abteilung Rost ock, OV In tegr a tion 3/92.

35. Versla g van u itspr a ken van biss chop W. Krus che op de bijeenkomst met

de Ra a d va n K erken te Amersfoort d.d. 7-9-82, Series 3, Nr. 32, U tr echt

County Archive, Reformed Chur ches in the Netherla nd, G eneral Dia cona l

Council (Het Utrechts Archief, Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, Alge-

meen Diakonaa l Bera a d); Letter, Pr of. B erkhof to Vorsitzender des Bu ndes

der Eva ngelischen Kirchen in der D DR (Kru sche), 26 J uy 1982, Amersfoort,

Rep. B3 Nr. 711, Archive KPS Ma gdeburg; Letter, P rof. Berkhof to Fa ber,

2 J uly 1982, Amersfoort, LD C NHK ROS/IKV B ox 15.

36. All letters at the (Dut ch) Int erna tiona l Inst itut e for Social History (IIS H)

in Amsterdam , B ox IKV 455; Versla g Oost-Eur opad iscussie op de Cam pag-

neraad van 26 februari, in Kernb lad3, Mar ch 1983, II SH B ox IKV 453.

37. Int erview w ith Mient J an Fa ber, 10 September 2001, The Ha gue.

38. Int erview w ith B ert Noppers (former part icipant in these conta cts and

supporter of the Peace Shop), 20 March 2006, Utrecht.

39. Netw ork News, in: Peace M agazi n, 1 (December 1985): 1, 30.


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16

40. U w e Koch, Das M in ister i um fr Staat ssicherh eit , di e Wehr di enstverw eig-erer d er DDR u nd di e Bau sold aten der N ati onal en Volksarmee. Ei ne bersichtber den For schungsst and. Die Lan desbeauftr agt e fr die Unterlagen des

St a a tssicherheitsdienstes der ehema ligen DD R in Sa chsen-Anha lt und Meck-

lenburg-Vorpommern , Sa chbeitr ge 6 (Ma gdeburg 1999); Robert -Ha vema nn -

Archiv (ed.), Zi vi l cour age un d K ompromi ss, Bausold aten i n d er DDR 1964 1990, B ausoldat enk ongress Potsdam , 3.-5. September 2004(Ber lin 2005).

41. Vredeswinkel Groningen, Schr ij f een br ief!!!!![wr ite a letter! ! ! ! !], a roundJ an uary 1984. Mat thias Domaschk Archive Berl in, B ox Erik de Gra af .

42. OV Schw a ben. BS tU MfS B V Fr a nkfur t (Oder) AOP 1430/89; Abteilun g

XX/4, In forma tion ber feindlich-nega tive Aktivit ten zur Org a nisierun g und

Inspirierung politischer Unt ergrundt tigkeit, Fra nkfurt (Oder), 22 March

1985. BS t U MfS O V Ra dt our, 1091/87, Anla ge I, 8486.

43. OV Schw a ben. BS tU MfS B V Fr a nkfur t (Oder) AOP 1430/89; Abteilun g

XX/4, In forma tion ber feindlich-nega tive Aktivit ten zur Org a nisierun g und

Inspirierung politischer Unt ergrundt tigkeit, Fra nkfurt (Oder), 22 March

1985. B St U MfS OV Ra dt our, 1091/87, Anlag e I, 85.

44. Abteilun g XX/4, E rffnung sbericht zum OV Ra dt our, Fr a nkfur t (Oder)

3 September 1987. BS tU MfS OV Ra dt our, 1091/87, Anlage I , 712.

45. Abteilung IX/2, Stra frechtliche Einsch tzun g zum operat iven Ausgan gs-

material Radtour der Abteilung XX, Frankfurt (Oder) 10 September 1987.

B S tU MfS OV Ra dt our 1091/87, Anla ge I, 2223.

46. Int erview w ith B ert Noppers, 20 Mar ch 2006, U tr echt .

47. Abteilun g XX/4, Sa chsta ndbericht zum OV Ra dt our, 1091/87, F ra nk-

furt (Oder), 22 J uly 1988. B St U MfS OV Ra dt our, 1091/87, Anla ge II, 4751.

48. Abteilun g XX/4, Dienst reisebericht, F ra nkfur t (Oder), 20 J une 1988;

Abteilun g XX, Informa tion zu r Ost-West-G ruppe Gr oningen (Niederla nde),Fr a nkfur t (Oder), 5 April 1989. BS tU MfS OV Ra dtour 1091/87, Anla ge II,

1821 a nd 131133.

49. Abteilun g XX/4, Abschlussbericht zum opera tiv-Vorga ng Ra dt our,

Reg.n r. V/1091/87, Fra nkfu rt (Oder), 24 November 1989. BS tU MfS O V Ra d-

t our , 1091/87, Anl a ge II , 189192.

50. Inform a tion ber a ktu elle Aspekte der Auen- und I nn enpolitik der Nied-

erlande im Zusa mmenha ng mit dem offiziellen B esuch des G enossen

Honecker vom 3.-5.6.1987, 21 May 1987. BStU MfS HVA 47, 8591.

de Graaf, Beatrice - Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89

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Transcript of de Graaf, Beatrice - Stasi Operations in the Netherlands, 1979–89