Exploring how innovative uses of media, technology,

and direct engagementcan accelerate

positive social change,counter radicalization and

build peace.

2016/2017YemenDeep

DiveSeries

Report

U.S. Institute of Peace

1

Deep Dive on YemenRNW Media - PeaceTech Lab

Summary

In light of the complex ongoing war in Yemen, RNW and The PeaceTech Lab convened a group session to share experiences and thoughts on what can be done. Researchers and representatives of NGOs, funders, and government agencies with experience and interest in Yemen came together in a 5-hour roundtable on 11/1/16 to discuss current conditions, activities, and possibilities for peacebuilding and humanitarian work in Yemen. After reviewing the current conditions on the ground, the group discussed their current activities in humanitarian relief, development, conflict resolution, and countering violent extremism—as well as prospects and challenges for future engagement. Key takeaways included that all work on the ground must focus on “ultra-local” modes of operations; access is extremely difficult; the media scene is underdeveloped and fragmented; and financial instability is a major issue. At the same time, attendees agreed that there are several avenues with great untapped potential, including local government, the private sector, and a large youth population eager to improve their quality of life and contribute to their communities. The report reviews these findings in further detail, then notes possible areas for future discussion.

1. CONDITIONS

1.1 Security and politics

The war is unlikely to end anytime soon. Politically, the Saudi Defense Minister needs a victory in Yemen; the difficulty of getting one means the campaign will continue. The battle lines on the ground have not shifted significantly in the last 6-12 months, meaning no faction has momentum toward a win or incentive to make concessions. While the U.A.E. undertook a major campaign earlier this year to weaken al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the group continues to operate in areas between coalition members’ zones of responsibility (i.e. al Bayda, Ma’rib, Shabwa).

AQAP and other jihadi-salafi militias are a larger concern than the Islamic State. While IS is present in-country, its administrative style and brutality are alien to Yemeni culture; it’s underfunded and unlikely to make a comeback. Many of the AQAP and salafi fighters are more experienced in battle than the state’s soldiers. Moreover, in 2015 AQAP shifted its strategy to become more closely embedded with local populations, and has survived the U.A.E.’s campaign in, e.g., Hadhramaut by joining up with U.A.E.-installed “elite forces” or simply hiding among the population. This is a phenomenon to watch closely.

Attempts at negotiating a settlement thus far have been unsuccessful due to their structure and focus. Negotiations have targeted the national aspect of the conflict between President Hadi and the alliance of the Houthis and former President Saleh. The negotiations’ failure to incorporate both the higher-level dimension of the conflict (geopolitical proxy conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia) and the lower level (local politics) weakens the potential for resolution. Even on their own terms, the negotiations are poorly positioned for success. Saudi Arabia’s unbending position has made Saleh unwilling to make concessions; meanwhile, the U.S’s commitment to state–to-state- relations and close cooperation with the Saudis gives the Houthis the reasonable impression that any negotiations will be biased against them. The E.U. expects the U.S. to take the lead and then find its own role within that structure, so it is unlikely to change this situation.

The Hadi coalition is a fragmented alliance of convenience, with little loyalty to Hadi or his government. It is likely to fracture quickly once conditions shift. The Houthi/Saleh coalition is more cohesive, with less self-interested goals and a sense of popular legitimacy for a significant portion of Yemenis. This situation complicates the question of who will ultimately gain power after the war, especially as separatist Southern Movement elements have grown stronger over the course of the conflict.

The conflict is taking a serious toll. In 2015, 45% of Yemenis polled said their household had lost its main source of income due to the fighting; 17% said they’d been displaced; 14% had lost a family member in the conflict; 11% had their homes damaged or destroyed by bombing; 9% had tried to leave the country and couldn’t. Trust in institutions is also weak. 66% of Yemenis have confidence in the military (very low for the region); 26% have confidence in financial institutions and in government. Yemenis are in an economically precarious situation with extremely low morale. 81% said their economic state was “poor”; 60% said their families had been unable to afford sufficient food at some point in the previous year. These numbers are likely low, since polling is unsafe in the hardest-hit areas. 41% rated their quality of life at 4 or below on a scale of 1-10, classified as “suffering.” That last number is one of the worst in the world—on par with Afghanistan, Syria, and Haiti. 37% reported unemployment, but again that figure is certainly low. More representative than the absolute number is the trend, and the trend is rising steeply. Similarly, the social fabric is breaking down along sectarian, regional, and ideological lines as well as divisions between the internally displaced and their hosts. Most of these divisions didn’t cause the conflict, but they are being exploited in its midst.

2

1.2 Access and operations

Challenges to access come from every possible front. All parties to the conflict make it difficult to cross frontlines and borders; bureaucracy is often reluctant to issue permits and visas; airstrikes not only endanger personnel but destroy civilian infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools), affecting not only access but civilian life and the viability of operations. Currency fluctuations and uncertainty around the Bank of Yemen also complicate dispersal of funds and any market-based projects. Even transferring funds from one locale to another can be difficult.

The greatest obstacle is delivery channels and capacity. There are few CSOs able to operate at the national level, very few that operate across any significant distance, and, practically speaking, no national government partner. Many smaller organizations do exist; they are largely effective, accountable, and representative, and their number is growing. However, here the problem is inefficiency resulting from large international NGOs (INGOs) dividing their resources among many small partners. Moreover, it can be difficult to verify the end use of funds with many of these organizations—because they are new, or because monitoring in general is difficult in conflict conditions. Import restrictions impede the delivery of all sorts of goods.

Humanitarian actors have struggled to respond to the conflict. As war has intensified, many (I)NGOs et. al. have shifted from development to emergency humanitarian work. There were obstacles to this shift: INGOs were initially somewhat paralyzed because many prefer to work through a legitimate government partner. Though they are adjusting, preexisting local partners may not be well-educated in humanitarian principles, and most weren’t organized for emergency work. Moreover, as the government has lost much of its income and liquidity, many Yemenis perceive aid organizations as having taken that funding away, leading to pressure and resentment from the 1.2 million civil servants and many pensioners going without income. Some have seen serious threats and attacks on their international staff, in part because they are some of the few people with cash. At the same time, many organizations have local staff and partners who are part of the population being affected by the conflict.

1.3 Media

In general, Yemenis do not feel safe expressing their political views. The constitution allows freedom of expression, but within restrictive laws. Nearly 50% of women said they and “people where they live” were afraid to speak openly about politics. 55% of people with a postsecondary education said the same (a very high number), reflecting pressure on intellectuals and thought leaders from within communities. Though the law was liberalized in 2013, little has changed in terms of how the state manages media because the new mechanisms haven’t been funded and implemented.

3

The media structure is not optimal for communicating with Yemenis and disseminating their messages. Yemenis rely first and foremost on friends and family for information, followed by television (54%), radio (25%), and then the internet and newspapers trailing behind. In particular, private radio stations have grown since 2012, and internet access has grown exponentially (from 3% in 2010 to 25% today—and 62% with mobile phones), including in rural areas. There is room to grow in some of these areas, as 69% of Yemenis report having a television in their home, and 34-36% have access to radio. (These numbers are low for the region. They are, however, higher than the cited figures regarding where Yemenis go for information—and much higher than the rate at which those polled said they’d consulted such channels in the previous day.)

However, social media has “power beyond its reach.” While relatively few Yemenis use social media, it can still serve as a tool for understanding local issues and audiences, and for identifying “interlocutors that can help you convey your messages.” Network analysis of the Yemeni Twittersphere identifies “hidden influencers” who may not have broad numeric reach, but who have high-quality contacts and readers, giving them greater leverage. (These include Hisham al-Omeisy (@omeisy), Ahmed Jahaf (@A7medJa7af, and Hooria Mashhour (@Hooria_Mashhour), the former Human Rights Minister.) In particular, social media can be a significant channel for reaching youth, as the Yemen Youth Panel project’s already extensive reach demonstrates. Most Yemeni users are young and urban—and approximately 65% of Yemen’s population is under 25, meaning engaging youth could have a major impact.

Effective communications strategies will vary widely depending on the objectives, as media usage varies significantly by province, age group, economic class, and education. Yemenis’ choice of information source is divided not only by medium and demographics but also by specific channel, as the media space is highly politicized. For example, internet users are mostly educated young men; illiterate Yemenis (32% as of 2013) are less likely to rely on television than their literate compatriots.

2. PATHS FORWARD

2.1 “Ultra-local”

While development and humanitarian efforts in Yemen have always been localized, they now must be even more so. Conditions vary widely from place to place in terms of politics, security, and the volatility of prices. As noted, freedom of movement is limited, and viable partner organizations are mostly small and “ultra-local,” rather than national-scale. Moreover, operations are all but impossible without the consent and cooperation of local authorities.

4

A key interface is the “local councils.” These councils are similar to a city council in the U.S., but they feature a unique member/manager called ‘aqil hara. These managers are found in every rural and urban neighborhood; they are elected and held accountable by their communities. They act as an interface between the members of those communities and higher levels of government, relied on and trusted from both sides. It is the managers to whom Yemenis turn to obtain birth certificates, identification, social welfare entitlements, matters of planning and zoning, paying zakat, mediation, and communication with government. They, and other executive committees (such as those created by UNHCR) can serve to facilitate a variety of programs. It’s essential to tailor engagement to the particular structure of authority in each location, as—like all other conditions—it varies.

To unlock this potential, local councils need capacity building. Since they have not been relied upon as partners due to the focus on the national government, they are inexperienced in presenting their needs to donors and unaware of what work has been done in the past. They haven’t produced needs assessments, damage assessments, or presentations; they don’t have access to the existing documents and plans that were produced for Sana‘a. The managers can become a steadier, long-term viable foundation for future projects.

The private sector also offers untapped potential. It represents an important opportunity to collaborate with humanitarian actors, as the private entities have logistical and delivery networks to offer. Moreover, many private companies in Yemen run social initiatives—some quite sizeable—meaning they have their own experience and knowledge in that sector too. Existing private companies aside, it’s possible to create and support markets to deliver aid and employment (where conditions allow). INGOs can work with local vendors to provide aid and support entrepreneurship at the local level—thus getting around the national financial issues—by connecting them with microfinance. (This is another area where education may be important, as “loan culture” and knowledge of business planning is not widespread.)

2.2 Media and technology

Expanding access to media is possible and useful. As discussed in Section 1.3, the media structure is limited and fragmented, making communication and messaging difficult. Projects working to provide more Yemenis with access to radio and internet enable journalists (many of whom no longer have employer organizations) to do their jobs, youth to express their feelings, and aid providers to communicate. (In particular, as resentment toward the U.N. is misdirected to aid workers, messaging and clear profile are increasingly important.) Radio is particularly useful, as it is low-cost and mobile, and it allows for highly localized dialect. However, a major pitfall is connectivity. Wi-fi is limited, and so is 3G. On the other hand, lower-tech solutions like providing materials for paper signs are sometimes just as effective.

5

Technology could be applied in new ways to assist humanitarian work. Humanitarian actors could communicate in real time about shipping backups, prolonged inspections, and other delays. Watchdogs could monitor civilian harm. Mobile phones could perhaps serve as an early warning system for local conflict flare-ups. Local partners have already been engaged to report information to humanitarian organizations via mobile phones (though this initiative was short-lived), and WhatsApp has been used to verify and report breaking news (despite its insecurity).

2.3 “We can’t wait”

Emergency response must be accompanied by longer-term projects. While most aid providers have pivoted from development to emergency assistance overall, several NGO representatives emphasized that it would be a mistake to hold off on development and peacebuilding. A top-down political settlement is unlikely to stick, but support for decentralized self-government, “pockets of peace,” and economic activity, where viable, can lay the groundwork for an eventual bottom-up national agreement. This approach will also help maintain existing local institutions and strengthen local governance and civil society in advance of Yemen’s likely decentralized future. Fortunately, there is significant demand across the country for non-humanitarian programming. Yemenis want to participate. The optimism many felt after the revolution for a more democratic future is battered, but not gone; Yemenis are eager to contribute however they can.

Opportunities for such programming abound. First, local councils’ role in both managing communities and connecting the local with the regional and national arenas make them a key entry point for shaping these “pockets of peace” now, and a broader peace in the future. It could be positive to link managers formally with tribal sheikhs (as was attempted in Sana‘a in 2014): integrating the tribal mechanisms for conflict resolution with formal institutions would allow the two to complement each other. Second, small CSOs are eager to work. When asked, CSOs expressed interest in media training, education in conflict resolution, support for infrastructure repairs, and women- and youth-targeted programming. Third, religious leaders have a role to play. INGOs have had success in spreading CVE and conflict resolution curricula through CSOs to religious leaders, who can influence local followers in turn. Fourth, youth have proven tremendously responsive to both online and offline forms of engagement aimed at counter-radicalization; some INGOs have had good results in recruiting youth ambassadors to work on issues like child protection, domestic violence, and community problem-solving.

*Nonetheless, humanitarian efforts are certainly essential. Some donors and practitioners thatare defined exclusively as development organizations have started directing significant funds touncharacteristic relief works, both to maintain institutions and partners and to meet a need theyperceive as truly urgent.

6

Highly localized micro-conflicts are exacerbated by the war and should be addressed whenever possible. The economic crisis, the movement of displaced persons, and the destruction of infrastructure limit available resources, pushing latent conflicts into activity. Community dialogue, peace education, and reducing scarcity can help alleviate these local, specific issues and prevent them from hindering future stability.

2.4 CoordinationIt’s essential that NGOs, INGOs, et. al. integrate their work when possible. Humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding efforts will always be most effective if they are aware of one another and able to make sure their work is complementary. While some coordination exists in-country, it should be reinforced and paralleled in D.C. Meanwhile, media-oriented organizations could collaborate with those possessing different strengths to maximize advocacy to the international community. Funders expressed a certain reliance on the NGOs for indications of when the time would be right to re-engage beyond immediate relief, suggesting that such “sensing” coordination is crucial.

7

Social media can fill in for in-person contact with local partners and staff. Some attendees have had success doing trainings through WhatsApp and Facebook groups. Meanwhile, maintaining contact with former partners who are currently unable to continue their work keeps those people engaged and prepared to address “day one issues” after the fighting stops. By the same token, in trying to engage stakeholders excluded from the formal negotiation process in advance of the conflict’s end, Skype and similar applications can enable dialogue across geography. Such conversations provide not just better information about what is happening outside a given locale, but also opportunities to think collaboratively about how to lay the groundwork for future priorities and create space for national dialogue. Social media is an imperfect solution, given its insecurity and the conditions discussed in Section 1.3, but better than nothing.

3. FUTURE DISCUSSION

• One of the areas of broadest agreement was the need to focus on local action, and onempowering local leaders, activists, peacebuilders, and educators. Sharing ideas, models,and past experience on this topic could be highly productive for many of the attendees.

• Attendees seemed to perceive the state of inter-organizational coordination very differently.While certainly some communication exists, opinions varied on whether it was sufficient,and what various attendees wanted out of it. Regardless of the current state of affairs, thislack of agreement suggests that coordination is an area that could benefit fromclarification and perhaps formalization.

• Some attendees felt that difficult conditions make non-humanitarian work impossible (seeSection 1.2), or in some funders’ cases, too risky politically and financially. Others arguedthat if this work is put off until the end of the war, it will be too late (as discussed inSection 2.3), and gave examples of how they have carried out non-humanitarian projectsunder these conditions. A productive avenue of discussion moving forward would be how tobalance both imperatives, and how aid actors can coordinate their activities across thisdichotomy.

• Innovation was a contested subject. Some researchers and NGO representatives emphasizedinnovation, especially in private-sector and financial approaches; others cautioned thatflashy-sounding, innovative methods will not always be viable for reasons of culture orimplementation, and proven methods shouldn’t be abandoned for the sake of novelty. Thatsaid, as noted in Section 2.2, innovative uses of technology could help fill gaps incommunication, information, and other capacities that aid and development organizationshave historically carried out in other ways.

8

• The data regarding media access and usage elicited different responses. Some saw in thosefigures major opportunities for engagement and growth. Others saw serious shortfall andconcluded that the key mode of engagement was person-to-person. How these approachescan be synergized and made complementary might be a valuable question. (One personnoted that online surveys are sometimes reported on by other media such as radio; howideas spread across different media, and how media and word of mouth interact, is an areaworthy of strategic consideration.)

•