DDI Speaking for Others K

7/30/2019 DDI Speaking for Others K

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Dartmouth Debate Institute ‘07

Speaking for Others K

Gunnarsdottir

INDEX

**1NC SHELL**

index.........................................................................................................................................................................1

strategy sheet............................................................................................................................................................3hear me roar 1 / 3.....................................................................................................................................................4hear me roar 2 / 3 ....................................................................................................................................................5

hear me roar 3 / 3.....................................................................................................................................................6

narrative link 1 / 2 ...................................................................................................................................................7

narrative link 2 / 2....................................................................................................................................................8Refugee Link............................................................................................................................................................9

Impact—hierarchies...............................................................................................................................................10

Refugee label = inhumane.....................................................................................................................................11Turns case—power relations..................................................................................................................................12

Western Feminist = subjugation............................................................................................................................13

African Representations = Colonial.......................................................................................................................14Representations first...............................................................................................................................................15

Representations matter...........................................................................................................................................16

Alternative—organic intellectual...........................................................................................................................17

ALT—interrogation key........................................................................................................................................18Our ability to assess the effects of a given discursive event is limited; our ability to predict these effects is even

more difficult. When meaning is plural and deferred, we can never hope to know the totality of effects. Still, we

can know some of the effects our speech generates: I can find out, for example, that the people I spoke for areangry that I did so or appreciative. By learning as much as possible about the context of reception I can increase

my ability to discern at least some of the possible effects. This mandates incorporating a more dialogic approach

to speaking, that would include learning from and about the domains of discourse my words will affect...........18

I want to illustrate the implications of this fourth point by applying it to the examples I gave at the beginning. In

the case of Anne Cameron, if the effects of her books are truly disempowering for Native women, they arecounterproductive to Cameron's own stated intentions, and she should indeed "move over." In the case of the

white male theorist who discussed architecture instead of the politics of postmodernism, the effect of his refusal

was that he offered no contribution to an important issue and all of us there lost an opportunity to discuss and

explore it................................................................................................................................................................18

Now let me turn to the example of George Bush. When Bush claimed that Noriega is a corrupt dictator who

stands in the way of democracy in Panama, he repeated a claim which has been made almost word for word bythe Opposition movement in Panama. Yet the effects of the two statements are vastly different because the

meaning of the claim changes radically depending on who states it. When the president of the United Statesstands before the world passing judgement on a Third World government, and criticizing it on the basis of corruption and a lack of democracy, the immediate effect of this statement, as opposed to the Opposition's, is to

reenforce the prominent Anglo view that Latin American corruption is the primary cause of the region's poverty

and lack of democracy, that the U.S. is on the side of democracy in the region, and that the U.S. opposes

corruption and tyranny. Thus, the effect of a U.S. president's speaking for Latin America in this way is to re-consolidate U.S. imperialism by obscuring its true role in the region in torturing and murdering hundreds and

thousands of people who have tried to bring democratic and progressive governments into existence. And this

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effect will continue until the U.S. government admits its history of international mass murder and radicallyalters it foreign policy. ..........................................................................................................................................18

ALT—Retreat solves.............................................................................................................................................19

AT: no agenda........................................................................................................................................................20at: “I speak for myself” .........................................................................................................................................21

AT: speaking for others good................................................................................................................................22AT: We Have Multiple Narratives.........................................................................................................................23

AT: Narratives = Empowerment............................................................................................................................24Aff—narratives key change...................................................................................................................................25

AFF—speech good................................................................................................................................................26

AFF—perm SOLVES............................................................................................................................................27AFF—Speaking matters.........................................................................................................................................28

AFF—Speaking for other = inevitable..................................................................................................................29

AFF—Speaking from your group justified............................................................................................................30AFF—speaking for others prerequisite to K .........................................................................................................31

aff—Oppressed must speak alone..........................................................................................................................32

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STRATEGY SHEET

Okay, the organization of this file is pretty self explanatory—except for the refugee Link/ Impact—all

though that is not exactly the same “speaking for others” argument that is made in the shell, those cards

can be used in conjunction with some other cards in this file against the refugees case the other labs arerunning as a more “representations bad” oriented K

My advice after talking to lab leaders and reading the literature is that the way to have the K be the most

useful—and make the most sense, is to explain it in terms of specifics, in terms of the narratives and

context that are given in the 1ac. Contextualize the use of the narratives to support the claim of how in

the 1ac the narrative is a form of commodification etc.

If you want to write blocks, they should be case specific because of the nature of this criticism but here is

a list of the best affirmative arguments that you will need answers to.

AT: We should not ignore themAT: We didn’t pick the narrative we are responding to them

AT: Narratives are key to breaking down dominant structures

AT: Narratives provide understanding/empowerment

AT: No other way for them to be heard

The answer to these arguments is all in the shell, I would suggest reading the entirety of those cards first,

for background.

If you have any questions, just ask

-Kristina

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HEAR ME ROAR 1 / 3

Politicizing Narratives is wrong—the affirmative acts under the guise of political empowerment, they

utilize narratives to accomplish their own goals—this is an act of commodification and colonial

domination

Linda Martín Alcoff (Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. “The Problem of Speaking For Others” Cultural Critique

Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32.) [Gunnarsdottir]

Feminist discourse is not the only site in which the problem of speaking for others has been acknowledged and addressed. In

anthropology there is similar discussion about whether it is possible to speak for others either adequately or justifiably. Trinh T

Minh-ha explains the grounds for skepticism when she says that anthropology is "mainly a conversation of ùs' with ùs

about `them,' of the white man with the white man about the primitive-nature man...in which `them' is silenced. `Them' always

stands on the other side of the hill, naked and speechless...`them' is only admitted among ùs', the discussing subjects, whenaccompanied or introduced by an ùs'..."4 Given this analysis, even ethnographies written by progressive anthropologists are a

priori regressive because of the structural features of anthropological discursive practice.

The recognition that there is a problem in speaking for others has followed from the widespread acceptance of two claims. First, there

has been a growing awareness that where one speaks from affects both the meaning and truth of what one says , and thus

that one cannot assume an ability to transcend her location. In other words, a speaker's location (which I take here to refer to her

social location or social identity) has an epistemically significant impact on that speaker's claims, and can serve eitherto authorize or dis-authorize one's speech. The creation of Women's Studies and African American Studies departments were founded

on this very belief: that both the study of and the advocacy for the oppressed must come to be done principally by the oppressed themselves, and tha

we must finally acknowledge that systematic divergences in social location between speakers and those spoken for will have a significant effect onthe content of what is said. The unspoken premise here is simply that a speaker's location is epistemically salient. I shall explore this issue further in

the next section. The second claim holds that not only is location epistemically salient, but certain privileged locations are

discursively dangerous.5 In particular, the practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf of less

privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reenforcing the oppression of the groupspoken for . This was part of the argument made against Anne Cameron's speaking for Native women: Cameron's intentions were

never in question, but the effects of her writing were argued to be harmful to the needs of Native authors because it is Cameron rather

than they who will be listened to and whose books will be bought by readers interested in Native women. Persons from dominant

groups who speak for others are often treated as authenticating presences that confer legitimacy and credibility on the demands of

subjugated speakers; such speaking for others does nothing to disrupt the discursive hierarchies that operate in

public spaces. For this reason, the work of privileged authors who speak on behalf of the oppressed is becoming increasingly

criticized by members of those oppressed groups themselves.6 As social theorists, we are authorized by virtue of our academic

positions to develop theories that express and encompass the ideas, needs, and goals of others. However, we must begin to ask

ourselves whether this is ever a legitimate authority, and if so, what are the criteria for legitimacy? In particular, is it evervalid to speak for others who are unlike me or who are less privileged than me? We might try to delimit this problem

as only arising when a more privileged person speaks for a less privileged one. In this case, we might say that I should only

speak for groups of which I am a member. But this does not tell us how groups themselves should be delimitedFor example, can a white woman speak for all women simply by virtue of being a woman? If not, how narrowly should we draw the categories? Thecomplexity and multiplicity of group identifications could result in "communities" composed of single individuals. Moreover, the concept of groups

assumes specious notions about clear-cut boundaries and "pure" identities. I am a Panamanian-American and a person of mixed ethnicity and race

half white/Angla and half Panamanian mestiza. The criterion of group identity leaves many unanswered questions for a person such as myself, since Ihave membership in many conflicting groups but my membership in all of them is problematic. Group identities and boundaries are ambiguous and

permeable, and decisions about demarcating identity are always partly arbitrary. Another problem concerns how specific an identity needs to be to

confer epistemic authority. Reflection on such problems quickly reveals that no easy solution to the problem of speaking for others can be found bysimply restricting the practice to speaking for groups of which one is a member.

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HEAR ME ROAR 2 / 3

Stop the sale of the African experience. Your ballot takes a stance against the commodification of African

life. We do not exclude anyone’s voice—our act of critique is recognition of the importance of the African

experience and the rejection of the first world impulses to engage in exclusionary discussions about the

third world.Linda Martín Alcoff (Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. “The Problem of Speaking For Others” Cultural Critique


(1) The impetus to speak must be carefully analyzed and, in many cases (certainly for academics!), fought against. This

may seem an odd way to begin discussing how to speak for, but the point is that the impetus to always be the speaker and to

speak in all situations must be seen for what it is: a desire for mastery and domination. If one's immediate impulse is to

teach rather than listen to a less-privileged speaker, one should resist that impulse long enough to interrogate it carefully

Some of us have been taught that by right of having the dominant gender, class, race, letters after our name, or some other criterion, we are morelikely to have the truth. Others have been taught the opposite and will speak haltingly, with apologies, if they speak at all. 16 At the same time, we

have to acknowledge that the very decision to "move over" or retreat can occur only from a position of privilege. Those

who are not in a position of speaking at all cannot retreat from an action they do not employ. Moreover, making the

decision for oneself whether or not to retreat is an extension or application of privilege, not an abdication of it. Still, it is sometimes

called for. (2) We must also interrogate the bearing of our location and context on what it is we are saying, and this should

be an explicit part of every serious discursive practice we engage in. Constructing hypotheses about the possible connections betweenour location and our words is one way to begin. This procedure would be most successful if engaged in collectively with others, by

which aspects of our location less obvious to us might be revealed.17One deformed way in which this is too often carried out is

when speakers offer up in the spirit of "honesty" autobiographical information about themselves, usually at the beginning of their discourse as a kind of disclaimer. This is meant to acknowledge their own understanding that they

are speaking from a specified, embodied location without pretense to a transcendental truth. But as Maria Lugones and others have forcefully arguedsuch an act serves no good end when it is used as a disclaimer against one's ignorance or errors and is made without critical interrogation of the

bearing of such an autobiography on what is about to be said. It leaves for the listeners all the real work that needs to be done. For example, if a

middle class white man were to begin a speech by sharing with us this autobiographical information and then using it as a kind of apologetics for anylimitations of his speech, this would leave to those of us in the audience who do not share his social location all the work of translating his terms into

our own, apprising the applicability of his analysis to our diverse situation, and determining the substantive relevance of his location on his claims.

This is simply what less-privileged persons have always had to do for ourselves when reading the history of philosophy, literature, etc., which makesthe task of appropriating these discourses more difficult and time-consuming (and alienation more likely to result). Simple unanalyzed disclaimers do

not improve on this familiar situation and may even make it worse to the extent that by offering such information the speaker

may feel even more authorized to speak and be accorded more authority by his peers. (3) Speaking should always carry with i

an accountability and responsibility for what one says. To whom one is accountable is a political/epistemological choice contestable,contingent and, as Donna Haraway says, constructed through the process of discursive action. What this entails in practice is a serious

commitment to remain open to criticism and to attempt actively, attentively, and sensitively to "hear" the criticism (understand it). A

quick impulse to reject criticism must make one wary. (4) Here is my central point. In order to evaluate attempts to speak for

others in particular instances, we need to analyze the probable or actual effects of the words on the discursive and

material context. One cannot simply look at the location of the speaker or her credentials to speak; nor can one look merely at the

propositional content of the speech; one must also look at where the speech goes and what it does there. Looking merely at the conten

of a set of claims without looking at their effects cannot produce an adequate or even meaningful evaluation of it, and this is partly

because the notion of a content separate from effects does not hold up. The content of the claim, or its meaning, emerges in interaction between words and hearers within a very specific historical situation. Given this, we have to pay careful attention to the discursive

arrangement in order to understand the full meaning of any given discursive event. For example, in a situation where a well-

meaning First world person is speaking for a person or group in the Third world, the very discursivearrangement may reinscribe the "hierarchy of civilizations" view where the U. S. lands squarely at the top. This effect

occurs because the speaker is positioned as authoritative and empowered, as the knowledgeable subject, while

the group in the Third World is reduced, merely because of the structure of the speaking practice, to an objectand victim that must be championed from afar . Though the

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HEAR ME ROAR 3 / 3

( Alcoff 92 )

speaker may be trying to materially improve the situation of some lesser-privileged group, one of the effects of

her discourse is to reenforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also to further silence the lesser- privileged group's own ability to speak and be heard.18 This shows us why it is so important to reconceptualize

discourse , as Foucault recommends, as an event, which includes speaker, words, hearers, location, language, and so on.

All such evaluations produced in this way will be of necessity indexed. That is, they will obtain for a very specific location and cannot

be taken as universal. This simply follows from the fact that the evaluations will be based on the specific elements of historica

discursive context, location of speakers and hearers, and so forth. When any of these elements is changed, a new evaluation is called

for.

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NARRATIVE LINK 1 / 2

The affirmatives choice to include narratives is an attempt to speak for the oppressed—the choice of

narrative exemplifies the affirmatives position of privilege.



In the examples used above, there may appear to be a conflation between the issue of speaking for others and the issue of speaking about others. This

conflation was intentional on my part, because it is difficult to distinguish speaking about from speaking for in all cases. There is an ambiguity in thetwo phrases: when one is speaking for another one may be describing their situation and thus also speaking about them. In fact, it may be impossibleto speak for another without simultaneously conferring information about them. Similarly, when one is speaking about another, or simply trying todescribe their situation or some aspect of it, one may also be speaking in place of them, i.e. speaking for them. One may be speaking about another a

an advocate or a messenger if the person cannot speak for herself. Thus I would maintain that if the practice of speaking for others is

problematic, so too must be the practice of speaking about others. This is partly the case because of what has been called

the "crisis of representation." For in both the practice of speaking for as well as the practice of speaking about others,

I am engaging in the act of representing the other's needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are, based on my

own situated interpretation. In post-structuralist terms, I am participating in the construction of their subject- positions rather than simply discovering their true selves. Once we pose it as a problem of representation, we see that, not only are speaking for

and speaking about analytically close, so too are the practices of speaking for others and speaking for myself. For, in speaking for myself, I am alsorepresenting my self in a certain way, as occupying a specific subject-position, having certain characteristics and not others, and so on. In speakingfor myself, I (momentarily) create my self—just as much as when I speak for others I create them as a public, discursive self, a self which is moreunified than any subjective experience can support. And this public self will in most cases have an effect on the self experienced as interiority. The

point here is that the problem of representation underlies all cases of speaking for, whether I am speaking for myself or for others. This is not tosuggest that all representations are fictions: they have very real material effects, as well as material origins, but they are always mediated in complex

ways by discourse, power, and location. However, the problem of speaking for others is more specific than the problem of representation generallyand requires its own particular analysis. There is one final point I want to make before we can pursue this analysis. The way I have articulated this

problem may imply that individuals make conscious choices about their discursive practice free of ideology and the constraints of material reality

This is not what I wish to imply. The problem of speaking for others is a social one , the options available to us are socially

constructed, and the practices we engage in cannot be understood as simply the results of autonomous individual choice. Yet to replace both "I" and"we" with a passive voice that erases agency results in an erasure of responsibility and accountability for one's speech, an erasure I would strenuouslyargue against (there is too little responsibility-taking already in Western practice!). When we sit down to write, or get up to speak, we experience

ourselves as making choices. We may experience hesitation from fear of being criticized or from fear of exacerbating a problem we would like to

remedy, or we may experience a resolve to speak despite existing obstacles, but in many cases we experience having the possibility to speak or not tospeak. On the one hand, a theory which explains this experience as involving autonomous choices free of material structures would be false andideological, but on the other hand, if we do not acknowledge the activity of choice and the experience of individual doubt, we are denying a reality o

our experiential lives.9 So I see the argument of this paper as addressing that small space of discursive agency we all experience, however multi-

layered, fictional, and constrained it in fact is. Ultimately, the question of speaking for others bears crucially on the possibility

of political effectivity. Both collective action and coalitions would seem to require the possibility of speaking for. Yet influentia

postmodernists such as Gilles Deleuze have characterized as "absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others"10 and important feminis

theorists have renounced the practice as irretrievably harmful. What is at stake in rejecting or validating speaking for others as a discursive practice?To answer this, we must become clearer on the epistemological and metaphysical claims which are implicit in the articulation of the problem. A

plethora of sources have argued in this century that the neutrality of the theorizer can no longer, can never again, be sustained, even for a momentCritical theory, discourses of empowerment, psychoanalytic theory, post-structuralism, feminist and anti-colonialist theories have all concurred on

this point. Who is speaking to whom turns out to be as important for meaning and truth as what is said; in fact what is said

turns out to change according to who is speaking and who is listening. Following Foucault, I will call these "rituals of speaking" to identify discursive practices of speaking or writing which involve not only the text or utterance but their position within a social space which includes the person

involved in, acting upon, and/or affected by the words. Two elements within these rituals will deserve our attention: the positionality or location ofthe speaker and the discursive context. We can take the latter to refer to the connections and relations of involvement between the utterance/text and

other utterances and texts as well as the material practices in the relevant environment, which should not be confused with an environment spatially

adjacent to the particular discursive event. Rituals of speaking are constitutive of meaning, the meaning of the words spoken as

well as the meaning of the event. This claim requires us to shift the ontology of meaning from its location in a text or utterance to alarger space, a space which includes the text or utterance but which also includes the discursive context. And an important implication

of this claim is that meaning must be understood as plural and shifting, since a single text can engender diverse meanings

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NARRATIVE LINK 2 / 2

(Alcoff 92)

given diverse contexts. Not only what is emphasized, noticed, and how it is understood will be affected by thelocation of both speaker and hearer, but the truth-value or epistemic status will also be affected. For example, in

many situations when a woman speaks the presumption is against her; when a man speaks he is usually taken seriously (unless his speech patternsmark him as socially inferior by dominant standards). When writers from oppressed races and nationalities have insisted that all writing is politicalthe claim has been dismissed as foolish or grounded in ressentiment or it is simply ignored; when prestigious European philosophers say that all

writing is political it is taken up as a new and original "truth" (Judith Wilson calls this "the intellectual equivalent of the `cover record'.")11 The ritualsof speaking which involve the location of speaker and listeners affect whether a claim is taken as true, well-reasoned, a compelling argument, or a

significant idea. Thus, how what is said gets heard depends on who says it, and who says it will affect the style and language in which it is stated. Thediscursive style in which some European post-structuralists have made the claim that all writing is political marks it as important and likely to be true

for a certain (powerful) milieu; whereas the style in which African-American writers made the same claim marked their speech as dismissable in theeyes of the same milieu. This point might be conceded by those who admit to the political mutability of interpretation, but they might continue to

maintain that truth is a different matter altogether. And they would be right that acknowledging the effect of location on meaning and even on

whether something is taken as true within a particular discursive context does not entail that the "actual" truth of

the claim is contingent upon its context. However, this objection presupposes a particular conception of truth, one in which the truth of

a statement can be distinguished from its interpretation and its acceptance. Such a concept would require truth to be independent of the speakers' or listeners' embodied and perspectival location. Thus, the question of whether location bears simply on what is taken to be true or what is really true,and whether such a distinction can be upheld, involves the very difficult problem of the meaning of truth. In the history of Western philosophy, there

have existed multiple, competing definitions and ontologies of truth: correspondence, idealist, pragmatist, coherentist, and consensual notions. Thedominant modernist view has been that truth represents a relationship of correspondence between a proposition and an extra-discursive reality. On

this view, truth is about a realm completely independent of human action and expresses things "as they are in themselves," that is, free of humaninterpretation.

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REFUGEE LINK

Refugee discourse causes oppression—the refugee is defined in terms of what they lack reifying states as

legitimacy and control over life and identity

James Ron (Johns Hopkins University “Imagining the World through Refugee Discourse” International Studies Review, 2000. p.139-141. http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00193”) [Gunnarsdottir]

This book’s main theme is simple yet elegant. Contemporary discourse about refugees strengthens efforts to imagine a world

in which territorially bounded nation-states appear to be the only natural political units. This is true even of well-meaning

attempts by humanitarian activists, groups, and human rights lawyers to protect refugees. Organized around providing legal and

humanitarian services to “refugees”, well-intentioned actors inadvertently strengthen a state-centric vision of the

world and contribute willy—nilly to the creation of a territorially divided and exclusionary world . Although

refugee activists provide essential short-term succor to persons displaced by poverty, war, or persecution, they enhance long-

term oppression by reproducing the modern world’s obsession with territorial boundaries , we/they divisions based

on citizenship, border patrols, immigration control, and passports. The term “refugee”, Nevzat Soguk argues, is a unique and entirelymodern way of categorizing the boarder phenomenon of “human displacement”. Displaced persons can be exiles, émigrés, sojourners

temporary travelers, or nomads; they become “refugees” only in a world monopolized by territorially bound nation-states. Notsurprisingly, and given his debt to Michel Foucault’s discourse studies, Soguks fundamental point is linguistic. He notes that the term

“refugee” makes sense only when it is juxtaposed to its opposite, a “citizen” residing in his or her own “state”. Refugees

are thus defined by what they lack—a state—and in so doing, they reinforce the state’s centrality . Refugee discourse defines

“refugeeness” as an “abnormal” situation. In so doing, it defines “normality” as a situation in which citizens residein their own, territorially bounded state. By emphasizing “statelessness” as the refugee’s essential characteristic, refugee

discourse reifies “states” as the sole legitimate form of political organization and “citizens” as the only legal

form of individual existence. One of Charles Tilly’s famous insights was that “states make war, and war makes the state”.

Focusing on the mutually supportive links between war making, collecting taxes, bureaucratic development, and state building.

Working in the realm of discourse and political imagination, Soguk makes a similar type of claim: states make refugees, but refugee

discourse also makes the state. Refugees are a discursive resource used by states to bolster their own position and centrality. One iseither a citizen and a legal member of a recognized state or one is “abnormal”, trapped in limbo and in desperate need of a state of

one’s own. There are no other acceptable options in today’s world, as Palestinians, Kurds, Albanian Kosovars, and the KuwaitBedoons have discovered. In suppressing other possible options, states deploy complex hidden instruments of “Statecraft” that reify

and naturalize the state-centric world. Statecrafting comes in many shapes and forms, but modern refugee discourse is one of its mos

important manifestations.

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Gunnarsdottir

IMPACT—HIERARCHIES

Speaking for others re-inscribes hierarchies and instills patterns of control



The emphasis on effects should not imply, therefore, that an examination of the speaker's location is any less crucial. This latter

examination might be called a kind of genealogy. In this sense, a genealogy involves asking how a position or view is mediated and

constituted through and within the conjunction and conflict of historical, cultural, economic, psychological, and sexual practices. But

it seems to me that the importance of the source of a view, and the importance of doing a genealogy, should be subsumed within anoverall analysis of effects, making the central question what the effects are of the view on material and discursive practices through

which it traverses and the particular configuration of power relations emergent from these. Source is relevant only to the extent that it

has an impact on effect. As Gayatri Spivak likes to say, the invention of the telephone by a European upper class male in no way

preempts its being put to the use of an anti-imperialist revolution.

In conclusion, I would stress that the practice of speaking for others is often born of a desire for mastery, to privilegeoneself as the one who more correctly understands the truth about another's situation or as one who can

champion a just cause and thus achieve glory and praise. And the effect of the practice of speaking for others isoften, though not always, erasure and a reinscription of sexual, national, and other kinds of hierarchies . I hope that this

analysis will contribute toward rather than diminish the important discussion going on today about how to develop strategies for a

more equitable, just distribution of the ability to speak and be heard. But this development should not be taken as an absolute dis-

authorization of all practices of speaking for. It is not always the case that when others unlike me speak for me I have ended up worse

off, or that when we speak for others they end up worse off. Sometimes, as Loyce Stewart has argued, we do need a "messenger" to

advocate for our needs.

The source of a claim or discursive practice in suspect motives or maneuvers or in privileged social locations, I have argued, though itis always relevant, cannot be sufficient to repudiate it. We must ask further questions about its effects, questions which amount to the

following: will it enable the empowerment of oppressed peoples?

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REFUGEE LABEL = INHUMANE

The label refugee is a static identity—once deemed as such it allows for the state to manage the life of the

refugee in the same manner which they manage a herd of animals

Oliver Bakewell (UNHCR researcher “Refugee aid and protection in rural Africa: working in parallel or cross-purposes?” Journalof Humanitarian Assistance, 2001) [Gunnarsdottir]

The refugee label is a bureaucratic one and does not necessarily coincide with people’s self-description. It is

therefore open to subversion. In as far as it is associated with access to resources there may be a strong motivation for people to

present themselves as refugees. In as far as it is associated with removal to a camp, refugees may make great efforts to avoid it. The

fact that the majority of refugees in Africa stay beyond the reach of international aid suggests the latter may apply to more people.

In order to impose the bureaucratic definition, extreme methods may be used during registration. Where it is anticipated that peoplemay avoid registration, refugees might be rounded up from villages in sudden sweeps. A priest in north-west Zambia described to me

how during the 1980s whole families fled into the bush at the sound of a vehicle from town for fear of being taken to a settlement and

they would stay away from their houses for some days. UNHCR may not have been directly involved in these exercises but they are

tainted by them and refugees in the settlement described being forced into the settlement by the UN. A decade later UNHCR’s

attempts at registration of refugees in the villages were made impossible by the memories and people’s continued fear of exposure.

In refugee camps it is expected that refugees will try to register repeatedly in order to inflate their numbers and gain extra ration

cards. The process will often include corralling refugees into counting areas, tagging them or marking them with indelible

ink, and then issuing them with the requisite ration cards. The whole exercise is carried out over as short a time-scale as possible to

minimize the chances of people ‘recycling’ and registering twice. It is hard not to draw parallels with them management of

animal herds; the term ‘shepherds’ has crept into a UNHCR guide on registration (see Hyndman 2000:130) . Not surprisingly such

registration procedures are widely resisted, sometimes violently especially where conducted with inadequate negotiation with the

refugees. Hyndman illustrates this with examples from Kenya and Tanzania and concludes that ‘it becomes clear that headcounts are a

coercive exercise conducted by humanitarian staff on the bodies of refugees’ (2000:127-131, see also Harrell-Bond 1999:154) .

The actual process of registration may thus impose on refugees inhuman and degrading treatment which is contrary to the UN

Declaration of Human Rights. It may be argued that this is only for a very short period of time and justified by the wider benefits

which it brings to the refugees in the form of improved aid delivery. However, this is debatable (Harrell-Bond 1999:158) . For themost part registration, especially in camps, does not have a clear protection benefit for the refugees but serves the interests of the aid

programme. When the registration process creates new protection problems for refugees, is it appropriate that the agency to whomthey might appeal is the very one which is infringing their rights?

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Gunnarsdottir

TURNS CASE—POWER RELATIONS

Speaking from a position of privilege props up power relations—the speaker relies on the assumption

that less privileged cannot speak for them selves

Nontsasa Nako (“Possessing the voice of the other: African women and the ‘Crisis of Representation’ in Alice Walker’s possessing

Secret of Joy” Jenda: A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies, 2001) [Gunnarsdottir]

In her essay, “The Problem of Speaking for Others,” Linda Alcoff identifies two widely accepted claims relating to speaking for others

(1994). The first one concerns the relationship between location and speech; that the position from which one speaks

affects the meaning of his or her speech. Therefore where one speaks from “has an epistemically significant impact on that

speaker’s claim and can serve either to authorize or disauthorize one’s speech”(Alcoff 1994, 287). This is perhaps the reason why

most critics tend to leave their identities and locations visible. One example is Chandra Mohanty in her introduction to a volume ofessays by Third World women, where she writes: “I [also] write from my own particular political, historical, and intellectual location

as a third world feminist trained in the U.S., interested in questions of culture, knowledge production, and activism in an internationa

context” (1991, 3).Whether such acts of self-identification are always possible is debatable, as it is now commonly understood tha

identities are fluid and always shifting. But it is clear that such acts are necessary, because for instance, in Mohanty’s case, by

foregrounding her position within the category Third World women she ensures that the meaning of what shesays is not separated from the conditions which produced it. She also acknowledges the difference within Third World

women, and this anticipates her definition of Third World women as “imagined communities of women with divergent histories and

social locations”(Mohanty 1991, 4).The second claim that Alcoff identifies is that power relations make it dangerous for a

privileged person to speak for the less privileged because that often reinforces the oppression of the latter sincethe privileged person is more likely to be listened to. And when a privileged person speaks for the less

privileged, she is assuming either that the other cannot do so or she can confer legitimacy on their position. And

such acts, do “nothing to disrupt the discursive hierarchies that operate in public spaces” (Ibid).

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Gunnarsdottir

AFRICAN REPRESENTATIONS = COLONIAL

Representations of Africa are inherently colonial—western portrayals of the third world involve the

invention of Africa as having “needs”—needs western solutions can remedy



It is up to the intrepid reader to recognize in this lament traces of a similar statement by the most credible critic of colonialism, Franz

Fanon, when he suggested that: “Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding people in its grip and emptying the native’s brain

of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts,disfigures and destroys” (Fanon, 154).

And perhaps attribute the same credibility to Walker. Against Ricciardi’s white colonialist reading, Walker’s credentials are

established. But despite Walker’s recognition of Ricciardi’s colonialist position, Walker also succumbs to the same colonialistdiscourse, in that her representation of Africans, like that of Ricciardi and other colonialist writers, evinces he

obsessions and pathologies as a representing subject rather than the Africans she is attempting to represent

What she tells us about Africa and Africans relates to her experiences, her “added safaris.” Her reading of African

women and their bodies evinces the same kind of ethnocentrism she decried in white feminist scholars. With herrepresentation of the African woman’s body, she does not account for the different meanings that different cultures attach to the body

Her reading of African women’s bodies is informed by her Western culture and its privileging of the body.

Thus Walker’s position when she reads female circumcision5 as genital mutilation is what Uma Nayaran has called the

colonialist stance because she “reproduces a Western tendency to portray Third World contexts as dominated by

the grip of “traditional practices” that insulate these contexts from the effects of historical change” (Nayaran 1997

49). This kind of representation highlights the role of the enlightened Westerner in the African’s salvation. As

Trinh T. Minh-ha reminds us: “The invention of needs always goes hand in hand with the compulsion to help the

needy, a noble self-gratifying task that also renders the helper’s service indispensable. The part of the savior has

to be filled as long as the belief in the problem of endangered species lasts ” (Minh-ha 1989, 89). Thus Walker creates a

position of power for herself, from which she can save the benighted Africans from themselves.

The second strategy that Walker employs is that double-consciousness. Walker employs what seems to be one of the most democratic

narrative strategies by incorporating as many voices in her text as she possibly can. The novel is a polyphonic text made up of storiesfrom different characters in the form of recollections, letters and perhaps diary entries. The narratives of the different characters are

meant to complement, complete and sometimes contradict each other, allowing for as many perceptions about female circumcision as

possible. Thus reading the novel requires the reader to participate in the narrative by completing some of the narratives, and deciding

on which of the narrators are reliable and which are not. However the multiplicity of voices is a stylistic device and does not offer

divergent perspectives, while the narrative is fragmented, the story is thematically monolithic. The characters never fundamentally

contradict each other but move toward a more integrated vision.

14

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Gunnarsdottir

REPRESENTATIONS FIRST

Representations must be evaluated first—how policies are framed impacts everything about the policies

impact

The FrameWorks Institute (The mission of the FrameWorks Institute is to advance the nonprofit sector's communicationscapacity by identifying, translating and modeling relevant scholarly research for framing the public discourse about social problems.

“The Frame Works Perspective: Strategic Frame Analysis” 2005) [Gunnarsdottir]

Strategic frame analysis™ is an approach to communications research and practice that pays attention to the public's deeply held

worldviews and widely held assumptions. This approach was developed at the FrameWorks Institute by a multi-disciplinary team of

people capable of studying those assumptions and testing them to determine their impact on social policies. Recognizing that there ismore than one way to tell a story, strategic frame analysis taps into decades of research on how people think and communicate. The resul

is an empirically-driven communications process that makes academic research understandable, interesting, and usable to help people solve social problems. This interdisciplinary work is made possible by the fact that the concept of framing is found in the literatures of numerous academi

disciplines across the social, behavioral and cognitive sciences. Put simply, framing refers to the construct of a communication —

its language, visuals and messengers — and the way it signals to the listener or observer how to interpret and classify

new information. By framing, we mean how messages are encoded with meaning so that they can be efficiently interpretedin relationship to existing beliefs or ideas. Frames trigger meaning. The questions we ask, in applying the concept of frames to the

arena of social policy, are as follows: How does the public think about a particular social or political issue? What is the public

discourse on the issue? And how is this discourse influenced by the way media frames that issue? How do these public and private

frames affect public choices? How can an issue be reframed to evoke a different way of thinking, one that illuminates a broader range of alternative policy choices? This approach is strategic in that it not only deconstructs the

dominant frames of reference that drive reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those alternative frames

most likely to stimulate public reconsideration and enumerates their elements (reframing). We use the term reframe to mean

changing "the context of the message exchange" so that different interpretations and probable outcomes become visible to the public

(Dearing & Rogers, 1994: 98). Strategic frame analysis™ offers policy advocates a way to work systematically

through the challenges that are likely to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies , to

anticipate attitudinal barriers to support, and to develop research-based strategies to overcome public misunderstanding. The domainof communications has not changed markedly since 1948 when Harold Lasswell formulated his famous equation: who says what to

whom through what channel with what effect? But what many social policy practitioners have overlooked in their quests to

formulate effective strategies for social change is that communications merits their attention because it is an inextricable part of

the agenda-setting function in this country. Communications plays a vital role in determining which issues the public

prioritizes for policy resolution, which issues will move from the private realm to the public, which issues will become

pressure points for policymakers, and which issues will win or lose in the competition for scarce resources. No organization can

approach such tasks as issue advocacy, constituency-building, or promoting best practices without taking into account the critical role that mass

media has to play in shaping the way Americans think about social issues. As William Gamson and his colleagues at the Media Research and ActionProject like to say, media is "an arena of contest in its own right, and part of a larger strategy of social change." One source of our confusion over communications comes in not recognizing that each new push for public understanding and acceptance happens against a backdrop of long-termmedia coverage, of perceptions formed over time, of scripts we have learned since childhood to help us make sense of our world, and folk beliefs we

use to interpret new information. As we go about making sense of our world, mass media serves an important function as the mediator of meaning —telling us what to think about (agenda-setting) and how to think about it (media effects) by organizing the information in such a way (framing) that icomes to us fully conflated with directives (cues) about who is responsible for the social problem in the first place and who gets to fix it(responsibility). It is often the case that nonprofit organizations want communications to be easy. Ironically, they want soundbite answers to the same

social problems whose complexity they understand all too well. While policy research and formulation are given their due as tough, demanding areasof an organization's workplan, communications is seen as "soft." While program development and practice are seen as requiring expertise and thethoughtful consideration of best practices, communications is an "anyone can do it if you have to" task. It is time to retire this thinking. Doingcommunications strategically requires the same investment of intellect and study that these other areas of nonprofit practice have been accorded.

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Gunnarsdottir

REPRESENTATIONS MATTER

Representations impact political calculus and decision-making

Robert Asen (Assistant Professor of Communication Arts at the University of Wisconsin-Madison “Imaging in the Public Sphere”

Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.4, 2002, 345-367) [Gunnarsdottir]

Imagining engages a particular power of discourse : a power of representation. In this section, I consider the

relationship between imagining and representation by addressing the politics and modalities of representation. Representing is no

a disinterested process, but one that implicates social judgments and relations of power . In this way, representing

enacts a politics of representation. Representing does not proceed exclusively through one mode of communication, but may

employ linguistic and visual symbols simultaneously and complementarily. In doing so, representing functions as a multimoda

process.

To say that representation enacts a politics is to say that all representation is tendentious. When participants in public discourse

describe themselves and others, they do not engage in a value-neutral and transparent process. Rather, representational processes

implicate participants in (often unacknowledged) choices regarding how people should be portrayed. As Linda

Hutcheon explains, these processes do not "reflect society as much [End Page 353] as grant meaning and value within a particular

society" (1989, 24-25). Representing does not occur outside of history and society, but works with the symbolic materials of specific

cultures. In this way, representing invokes social values and beliefs as well as the interests of participants in public discourse

Representing engages relations of power and social hierarchies. Further, the politics of representation producesconsequences—both for those representing and those represented. Our attitude toward and treatment of others depends

crucially on how we imagine others, and representations express our collective imagination (see Dyer 1993; Scarry 1996).

16





Gunnarsdottir

ALTERNATIVE—ORGANIC INTELLECTUAL

Speaking for others oppresses them—we must stop the impulse to speak to allow the organic intellectual

to rise up

Lauren Marino (published author in the Malacester Journal of Philosophy, Volume 14, Issue 1, Spring 2005. “Speaking for

Others”) [Gunnarsdottir]

What then is the solution? I agree with bell hooks that the oppressed must celebrate their position on the margins. The

oppressed should not try to move into the center but appreciate their counterculture. The oppressed must produceintellectuals so that the dominated can speak to the dominating. The idea goes back to Antonio Gramsci’s

concept of the organic intellectual.7 The elites are indoctrinated in the ruling ideology and have an investment in the curren

order. No matter how progressive their politics may be, the elite will always be the elite. Their investment in the

current social order precludes offers of true systemic change. Gramsci writes of the need for the working class to develop its own

intellectuals who are organically tied to their class. This argument is similar to hooks’ argument. The margin must produce

organic intellectuals. It might be thought that these organic intellectuals should translate between language games. But as hooks

points out, using “the oppressor’s language” is not adequate because it cannot articulate the experience of the oppressed. Yet, it is theonly language game the oppressing can play. Organic intellectuals affect the center from the margins if they are able to incorporate

multiple voices in the texts they create. The goal of the organic intellectual according to hooks is to “identify the spaces where we begin a process of revision” to create a counter-ideology.8 Hooks relates this agency to language. “Language is also a place of

struggle.”9 The counterculture can produce a counter-language, which is able to produce a new language to mediate

between the margins and the center. Necessarily the new game must include portions of both old language games or no one wil

understand it. It must use old understandings to create new meanings. These counter-languages can function as the intermediary

language games that the oppressed and the elites can be initiated simultaneously. A new language game must be created. A

good example of this is Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. He used concepts of freedom and democracy familiar to thecenter to explain the experience of the oppressed within in the mainstream language game, as well as created new metaphors and

linguistic form, i.e. the preacher’s sermon, to bring the voice of the oppressed and the oppressors into a realm of communication. (bel

hooks uses the preachers sermon form in her refrain ‘language is also a place of struggle’).10 One famous metaphor is freedom as a

bounced check to African Americans. This created a new understanding of the situation. It worked between the language of

oppression understood by African Americans and the center’s understanding of freedom and the promises of democracy. King was

able to include multiple voices, building a bridge between the margin and the center. The conclusion of hooks is that the margin can

be more than a place of oppression and alienation. It can be “a site of radical possibility, a space of resistance,” that is not open to

those in the center. It is the space to produce counter-hegemonic culture that the organic intellectual is looking for. The oppressedcan retell their story, and if we accept Rorty’s argument that the self is contingent, the oppressed create themselves in the

process. To speak for the oppressed is to silence them. Moreover, in their absence of voice, we define them. We can

define them in many ways, but they will always be a “they” and not an “us.” They will be the other. We must have faith

in the margins to produce new language games to communicate with us.

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Gunnarsdottir

ALT—INTERROGATION KEY

Discourse must be questioned—the meaning of discourse depends on its location and speaker,

interrogation is the only way to determine authenticity



Our ability to assess the effects of a given discursive event is limited ; our ability to predict these effects is even more

difficult. When meaning is plural and deferred, we can never hope to know the totality of effects. Still, we can know some of the

effects our speech generates: I can find out, for example, that the people I spoke for are angry that I did so or appreciative. By

learning as much as possible about the context of reception I can increase my ability to discern at least some of

the possible effects. This mandates incorporating a more dialogic approach to speaking, that would includelearning from and about the domains of discourse my words will affect.

I want to illustrate the implications of this fourth point by applying it to the examples I gave at the beginning. In the case of Anne

Cameron, if the effects of her books are truly disempowering for Native women, they are counterproductive to Cameron's own statedintentions, and she should indeed "move over." In the case of the white male theorist who discussed architecture instead of the politics

of postmodernism, the effect of his refusal was that he offered no contribution to an important issue and all of us there lost an

opportunity to discuss and explore it.

Now let me turn to the example of George Bush. When Bush claimed that Noriega is a corrupt dictator who stands in the way o

democracy in Panama, he repeated a claim which has been made almost word for word by the Opposition movement in Panama. Yet

the effects of the two statements are vastly different because the meaning of the claim changes radically depending onwho states it. When the president of the United States stands before the world passing judgement on a Third

World government, and criticizing it on the basis of corruption and a lack of democracy, the immediate effect of

this statement, as opposed to the Opposition's, is to reenforce the prominent Anglo view that Latin American corruption is

the primary cause of the region's poverty and lack of democracy, that the U.S. is on the side of democracy in the region, and that the

U.S. opposes corruption and tyranny. Thus, the effect of a U.S. president's speaking for

Latin Americain this way is tore-consolidate U.S. imperialism by obscuring its true role in the region in torturing and murdering hundreds and

thousands of people who have tried to bring democratic and progressive governments into existence. And this effect will continue

until the U.S. government admits its history of international mass murder and radically alters it foreign policy.

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Gunnarsdottir

ALT—RETREAT SOLVES

A retreat from the practice of speaking for others allows for receptive listening without sacrificing

political effectively



First I want to consider the argument that the very formulation of the problem with speaking for others involves a retrograde, metaphysicallyinsupportable essentialism that assumes one can read off the truth and meaning of what one says straight from the discursive context. Let's call this

response the "Charge of Reductionism", because it argues that a sort of reductionist theory of justification (or evaluation) is entailed by premises (1)and (2). Such a reductionist theory might, for example, reduce evaluation to a political assessment of the speaker's location where that location is seen

as an insurmountable essence that fixes one, as if one's feet are superglued to a spot on the sidewalk. For instance, after I vehemently defendedBarbara Christian's article, "The Race for Theory," a male friend who had a different evaluation of the piece couldn't help raising the possibility ofwhether a sort of apologetics structured my response, motivated by a desire to valorize African American writing against all odds. His question ineffect raised the issue of the reductionist/essentialist theory of justification I just described. I, too, would reject reductionist theories of justification

and essentialist accounts of what it means to have a location. To say that location bears on meaning and truth is not the same as saying that locationdetermines meaning and truth. And location is not a fixed essence absolutely authorizing one's speech in the way that God's favor absolutelyauthorized the speech of Moses. Location and positionality should not be conceived as one-dimensional or static, but as multiple and with varying

degrees of mobility.13 What it means, then, to speak from or within a group and/or a location is immensely complex. To the

extent that location is not a fixed essence, and to the extent that there is an uneasy, underdetermined, and contested relationship between location onthe one hand and meaning and truth on the other, we cannot reduce evaluation of meaning and truth to a simple identification of the speaker'slocation. Neither Premise (1) nor Premise (2) entail reductionism or essentialism. They argue for the relevance of location, not its singular power of

determination, and they are non-committal on how to construe the metaphysics of location. While the "Charge of Reductionism" response has been

popular among academic theorists, what I call the "Retreat" response has been popular among some sections of the U.S. feminis

movement. This response is simply to retreat from all practices of speaking for; it asserts that one can only know one's

own narrow individual experience and one's "own truth" and thus that one can never make claims beyond this.This response is motivated in part by the desire to recognize difference and different priorities, without organizing these differences

into hierarchies.Now, sometimes I think this is the proper response to the problem of speaking for others , depending on

who is making it. We certainly want to encourage a more receptive listening on the part of the discursively

privileged and to discourage presumptuous and oppressive practices of speaking for. And the desire to retreat sometime

results from the desire to engage in political work but without practicing what might be called discursive imperialism. But a retreat from speaking forwill not result in an increase in receptive listening in all cases; it may result merely in a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie lifestyle in which a

privileged person takes no responsibility for her society whatsoever. She may even feel justified in exploiting her privileged capacity for personahappiness at the expense of others on the grounds that she has no alternative. *The major problem with such a retreat is that it significantly undercuts

the possibility of political effectivity. There are numerous examples of the practice of speaking for others which have been politically efficacious inadvancing the needs of those spoken for, from Rigoberta Menchu to Edward Said and Steven Biko. Menchu's efforts to speak for the 33 Indiancommunities facing genocide in Guatemala have helped to raise money for the revolution and bring pressure against the Guatemalan and U.S.governments who have committed the massacres in collusion. The point is not that for some speakers the danger of speaking for others does not arise

but that in some cases certain political effects can be garnered in no other way. Joyce Trebilcot's version of the retreat response, which I mentioned athe outset of this essay, raises other issues. She agrees that an absolute prohibition of speaking for would undermine political effectiveness, and

therefore says that she will avoid speaking for others only within her lesbian feminist community. So it might be argued that the retreat fromspeaking for others can be maintained without sacrificing political effectivity if it is restricted to particular

discursive spaces. Why might one advocate such a partial retreat? Given that interpretations and meanings are discursive

constructions made by embodied speakers, Trebilcot worries that attempting to persuade or speak for another will cut offthat person's ability or willingness to engage in the constructive act of developing meaning. Since no embodied

speaker can produce more than a partial account, and since the process of producing meaning is necessarily

collective, everyone's account within a specified community needs to be encouraged.

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Gunnarsdottir

AT: NO AGENDA

Neutral representations are impossible—rituals of speaking re-inscribe certain power relations

Linda Martín Alcoff (Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. “The Problem of Speaking For Others” Cultural CritiqueWinter 1991-92, pp. 5-32.) [Gunnarsdottir]

Arguably since Kant, more obviously since Hegel, it has been widely accepted that an understanding of truth which requires it to be

free of human interpretation leads inexorably to skepticism, since it makes truth inaccessible by definition. This created an impetus to

reconfigure the ontology of truth, from a locus outside human interpretation to one within it. Hegel, for example, understood truth as

an "identity in difference" between subjective and objective elements. Thus, in the Hegelian aftermath, so-called subjective elements

or the historically specific conditions in which human knowledge occurs, are no longer rendered irrelevant or even obstacles to truth.

On a coherentist account of truth, which is held by such philosophers as Rorty, Donald Davidson, Quine, and (I would argue)

Gadamer and Foucault, truth is defined as an emergent property of converging discursive and non-discursive elements, when thereexists a specific form of integration among these elements in a particular event. Such a view has no necessary relationship to idealism

but it allows us to understand how the social location of the speaker can be said to bear on truth. The speaker's location is one of the

elements which converge to produce meaning and thus to determine epistemic validity. 12 Let me return now to the formulation of the

problem of speaking for others. There are two premises implied by the articulation of the problem, and unpacking these shouldadvance our understanding of the issues involved. Premise (1): The "ritual of speaking" (as defined above) in which an utterance is

located always bears on meaning and truth such that there is no possibility of rendering positionality, location, or context irrelevant to

content. The phrase "bears on" here should indicate some variable amount of influence short of determination or fixing. One importan

implication of this first premise is that we can no longer determine the validity of a given instance of speaking for others simply byasking whether or not the speaker has done sufficient research to justify her claims. Adequate research will be a necessary but

insufficient criterion of evaluation. Now let us look at the second premise. Premise (2): All contexts and locations are differentially

related in complex ways to structures of oppression. Given that truth is connected to politics, these political differences between

locations will produce epistemic differences as well. The claim here that "truth is connected to politics" follows necessarily from

Premise (1). Rituals of speaking are politically constituted by power relations of domination, exploitation, andsubordination. Who is speaking, who is spoken of, and who listens is a result, as well as an act, of political

struggle. Simply put, the discursive context is a political arena. To the extent that this context bears on meaning, and meaning is in

some sense the object of truth, we cannot make an epistemic evaluation of the claim without simultaneously assessing the politics of

the situation. Although we cannot maintain a neutral voice, according to the first premise we may at least all claim the right andlegitimacy to speak. But the second premise suggests that some voices may be dis-authorized on grounds which are simultaneously

political and epistemic. Any statement will invoke the structures of power allied with the social location of the speaker, aside from the

speaker's intentions or attempts to avoid such invocations. The conjunction of Premises (1) and (2) suggest that the speaker loses

some portion of control over the meaning and truth of her utterance. Given that the context of hearers is partially

determinant, the speaker is not the master or mistress of the situation. Speakers may seek to regain control here by taking into

account the context of their speech, but they can never know everything about this context, and with written and electronic

communication it is becoming increasingly difficult to know anything at all about the context of reception. This loss of control may be

taken by some speakers to mean that no speaker can be held accountable for her discursive actions. The meaning of any discursive

event will be shifting and plural, fragmented and even inconsistent. As it ranges over diverse spaces and transforms in the mind of its

recipients according to their different horizons of interpretation, the effective control of the speaker over the meanings which she puts

in motion may seem negligible. However, a partial loss of control does not entail a complete loss of accountability. And moreover, the

better we understand the trajectories by which meanings proliferate, the more likely we can increase, though always only partially, ourability to direct the interpretations and transformations our speech undergoes. When I acknowledge that the listener's sociallocation will affect the meaning of my words, I can more effectively generate the meaning I intend . Paradoxically

the view which holds the speaker or author of a speech act as solely responsible for its meanings ensures the speaker's least effective

determinacy over the meanings that are produced. We do not need to posit the existence of fully conscious acts or containable, fixed

meanings in order to hold that speakers can alter their discursive practices and be held accountable for at least some of the effects of

these practices. It is a false dilemma to pose the choice here as one between no accountability or complete causal power. In the next

section I shall consider some of the principal responses offered to the problem of speaking for others.

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Gunnarsdottir

AT: “I SPEAK FOR MYSELF”

Speaking for yourself ignores the effects your dialogue has upon others—this stance must be called into

question



Let me offer an illustration of this. The feminist movement in the U.S. has spawned many kinds of support groups for women with various needsrape victims, incest survivors, battered wives, and so forth, and some of these groups have been structured around the view that each survivor mustcome to her own "truth" which ranges only over herself and has no bearing on others. Thus, one woman's experience of sexual assault, its effect on

her and her interpretation of it, should not be taken as a universal generalization to which others must subsume or conform their experience. Thisview works only up to a point. To the extent it recognizes irreducible differences in the way people respond to various traumas and is sensitive to thegenuinely variable way in which women can heal themselves, it represents real progress beyond the homogeneous, universalizing approach whichsets out one road for all to follow. However, it is an illusion to think that, even in the safe space of a support group, a member of the group can, for

example, trivialize brother-sister incest as "sex play" without profoundly harming someone else in the group who is trying to maintain her realisticassessment of her brother's sexual activities with her as a harmful assault against his adult rationalization that "well, for me it was just harmless fun."

Even if the speaker offers a dozen caveats about her views as restricted to her location, she will still affect the other woman's ability to conceptualize

and interpret her experience and her response to it. And this is simply because we cannot neatly separate off our mediating praxis which interpretsand constructs our experiences from the praxis of others. We are collectively caught in an intricate, delicate web in which each

action I take, discursive or otherwise, pulls on, breaks off, or maintains the tension in many strands of the web in which

others find themselves moving also. When I speak for myself , I am constructing a possible self, a way to be in the

world, and am offer ing that, whether I intend to or not, to others, as one possible way to be. Thus, the attempt to

avoid the problematic of speaking for by retreating into an individualist realm is based on an illusion , wel

supported in the individualist ideology of the West, that a self is not constituted by multiple intersecting discourses but

consists in a unified whole capable of autonomy from others. It is an illusion that I can separate from others to suchan extent that I can avoid affecting them. This may be the intention of my speech , and even its meaning if we take

that to be the formal entailments of the sentences, but it will not be the effect of the speech, and therefore cannot

capture the speech in its reality as a discursive practice. When I "speak for myself" I am participating in thecreation and reproduction of discourses through which my own and other selves are constituted . A further

problem with the "Retreat" response is that it may be motivated by a desire to find a method or practice immune from

criticism. If I speak only for myself it may appear that I am immune from criticism because I am not making anyclaims that describe others or prescribe actions for them. If I am only speaking for myself I have no responsibility for

being true to your experience or needs. But surely it is both morally and politically objectionable to structure one's

actions around the desire to avoid criticism, especially if this outweighs other questions of effectivity. In some

cases, the motivation is perhaps not so much to avoid criticism as to avoid errors, and the person believes that the only way to avoid

errors is to avoid all speaking for others. However, errors are unavoidable in theoretical inquiry as well as political struggle, and they

usually make contributions. The pursuit of an absolute means to avoid making errors comes perhaps not from a desire to advance

collective goals but a desire for personal mastery, to establish a privileged discursive position wherein one cannot be undermined orchallenged and thus is master of the situation. From such a position one's own location and positionality would not require constant

interrogation and critical reflection; one would not have to constantly engage in this emotionally troublesome endeavor and would be

immune from the interrogation of others. Such a desire for mastery and immunity must be resisted.

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Gunnarsdottir

AT: SPEAKING FOR OTHERS GOOD

Speaking for others is a tautology—the assertion that the oppressed have no voice makes that a reality

when the privileged constantly speak for them

Jeanne Perreault (Professor of English at the University of Calgary, “Chain Gang Narratives And The Politics Of ‘Speaking For’”Biography 24.1 (2001) 152-171, Biographical Research Center) [Gunnarsdottir]

The problem of "speaking for" has become a problem since the spoken for have begun, publicly, to examine the

unconscious or unspoken assumptions of superior knowledge, insight, and solutions of well-meaning speakers for. The assumptionof the speakers for is that the oppressed have no voice, and thus intervention is required . This belief is a kind o

tautology: to be oppressed is to have no voice / to have no voice is to be oppressed . The figuring of oppressed

peoples as without voice is no longer accurate, however, if it ever was. We understand, as Canadian Métis writer Emma

LaRocque says, that the issue is not of speaking, but of being heard (xv). Some of the earliest challenges to speaking for

came from African American feminists like Audre Lorde and bell hooks in the 1970s and 1980s. They raised an impassioned

double assertion: that when white feminists made general references to "women," they were not speaking about

them; and that no one could speak for them. When those understood to be the disenfranchised or marginalized challengedthose understood to have greater privilege to look to their own histories and identities, the guilt for having socially designated

privilege was at least as pronounced as the fruitful examinations of responsibility inhering to their own subject positions.

22

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Gunnarsdottir

AT: WE HAVE MULTIPLE NARRATIVES

Incorperation of multiple voices is a stylistic devise—even if narratives are presented as divergent the

story is still monolithic



It is up to the intrepid reader to recognize in this lament traces of a similar statement by the most credible critic of colonialism, Franz

Fanon, when he suggested that: “Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding people in its grip and emptying the native’s brain of

all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys”

(Fanon, 154).

And perhaps attribute the same credibility to Walker. Against Ricciardi’s white colonialist reading, Walker’s credentials are

established. But despite Walker’s recognition of Ricciardi’s colonialist position, Walker also succumbs to the same colonialist

discourse, in that her representation of Africans, like that of Ricciardi and other colonialist writers, evinces her obsessions and

pathologies as a representing subject rather than the Africans she is attempting to represent. What she tells usabout Africa and Africans relates to her experiences, her “added safaris.” Her reading of African women and their bodies

evinces the same kind of ethnocentrism she decried in white feminist scholars. With her representation of the African woman’s body

she does not account for the different meanings that different cultures attach to the body. Her reading of African women’s bodies isinformed by her Western culture and its privileging of the body.

Thus Walker’s position when she reads female circumcision5 as genital mutilation is what Uma Nayaran has called the colonialis

stance because she “reproduces a Western tendency to portray Third World contexts as dominated by the grip of “traditiona

practices” that insulate these contexts from the effects of historical change” (Nayaran 1997, 49). This kind of representation highlights

the role of the enlightened Westerner in the African’s salvation. As Trinh T. Minh-ha reminds us: “The invention of needs always

goes hand in hand with the compulsion to help the needy, a noble self-gratifying task that also renders the helper’s service

indispensable. The part of the savior has to be filled as long as the belief in the problem of endangered species lasts” (Minh-ha 1989,

89). Thus Walker creates a position of power for herself, from which she can save the benighted Africans from themselves.

The second strategy that Walker employs is that double-consciousness. Walker employs what seems to be one of the mos

democratic narrative strategies by incorporating as many voices in her text as she possibly can. The novel is a

polyphonic text made up of stories from different characters in the form of recollections, letters and perhaps diary entries. The

narratives of the different characters are meant to complement, complete and sometimes contradict each other,allowing for as many perceptions about female circumcision as possible. Thus reading the novel requires the reader to

participate in the narrative by completing some of the narratives, and deciding on which of the narrators are reliable and which are not

However the multiplicity of voices is a stylistic device and does not offer divergent perspectives , while the

narrative is fragmented, the story is thematically monolithic. The characters never fundamentally contradict each other bu

move toward a more integrated vision.

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Gunnarsdottir

AT: NARRATIVES = EMPOWERMENT

Minority narratives establish victim politics—depictions of the minority struggle construct images of

minorities as helpless victims

Jodi Dean (Editor, “Cultural Studies and Political Theory”. Lauren Berlant, “The Subject of true feeling: pain privacy, and politics”

2000) [Gunnarsdottir]

The central concern of this essay is to address the place of painful feeling in the making of political worlds. In this I affiliate with

Wendy Brown's concern about the overvaluation of the wound in the rhetoric of contemporary U.S. identity politics. Brown argues

that the identification of mi nority identity with a wound-a conventional story about the particular and particularizing

injuries caused by domination-must lead to the wound becoming fetishized evidence of identity, which thereby awards

monumen tality and value to the very negativity that would also be overcome. As a result, minority struggle canget stuck in a groove of self-repetition and ha bituated resentment while from the outside it would appear

vulnerable to the charge of "victim politics ." In my view, however, what Brown locates in minority discourse generally

has a longer: more specific, and far more privileged genealogy than she suggests. In particular, I would like to connect it to

something I call national sentimetality, a liberal rhetoric of promise history which vows that a nation can best be built across fields

of social difference through channels of affective identification and empathy

24





Gunnarsdottir

AFF—NARRATIVES KEY CHANGE

Narratives are key to change, retreating undercuts political effectiveness—empirically proven


Winter 1991-92, pp. 5-32.) [Gunnarsdottir] This evidence has been gender modified

While the "Charge of Reductionism" response has been popular among academic theorists, what I call the "Retreat" response has been popula

among some sections of the U.S. feminist movement. This response is simply to retreat from all practices of speaking for; it asserts that one can onlyknow one's own narrow individual experience and one's "own truth" and thus that one can never make claims beyond this. This response is motivatedin part by the desire to recognize difference and different priorities, without organizing these differences into hierarchies

Now, sometimes I think this is the proper response to the problem of speaking for others, depending on who is making it. We certainly want to

encourage a more receptive listening on the part of the discursively privileged and to discourage presumptuous and oppressive practices of speakingfor. And the desire to retreat sometimes results from the desire to engage in political work but without practicing what might be called discursive

imperialism. But a retreat from speaking for will not result in an increase in receptive listening in all cases; it mayresult merely in a retreat into a narcissistic yuppie lifestyle in which a privileged person takes no responsibility

for her society whatsoever . She [they] may even feel justified in exploiting her [their] privileged capacity for

personal happiness at the expense of others on the grounds that she [they] has no alternative. The major problem with

such a retreat is that it significantly undercuts the possibility of political effectivity. There are numerous examples

of the practice of speaking for others which have been politically efficacious in advancing the needs of those

spoken for, from Rigoberta Menchu to Edward Said and Steven Biko. Menchu's efforts to speak for the 33 Indian

communities facing genocide in Guatemala have helped to raise money for the revolution and bring pressureagainst the Guatemalan and U.S. governments who have committed the massacres in collusion. The point is no

that for some speakers the danger of speaking for others does not arise, but that in some cases certain political effects can be

garnered in no other way. Joyce Trebilcot's version of the retreat response, which I mentioned at the outset of this essay, raises other issues

She agrees that an absolute prohibition of speaking for would undermine political effectiveness, and therefore says that she will avoid speaking forothers only within her lesbian feminist community. So it might be argued that the retreat from speaking for others can be maintained withou

sacrificing political effectivity if it is restricted to particular discursive spaces. Why might one advocate such a partial retreat? Given thainterpretations and meanings are discursive constructions made by embodied speakers, Trebilcot worries that attempting to persuade or speak for

another will cut off that person's ability or willingness to engage in the constructive act of developing meaning. Since no embodied speaker can

produce more than a partial account, and since the process of producing meaning is necessarily collective, everyone's account within a specifiedcommunity needs to be encouraged. I agree with a great deal of Trebilcot's argument. I certainly agree that in some instances speaking for others

constitutes a violence and should be stopped. But Trebilcot's position, as well as a more general retreat position, presumes an

ontological configuration of the discursive context that simply does not obtain. In particular, it assumes that one canretreat into one's discrete location and make claims entirely and singularly within that location that do not range

over others, and therefore that one can disentangle oneself from the implicating networks between one's discursive

practices and others' locations, situations, and practices. In other words, the claim that I can speak only for myself assumes the

autonomous conception of the self in Classical Liberal theory--that I am unconnected to others in my authentic self or that I can achieve an autonomy

from others given certain conditions. But there is no neutral place to stand free and clear in which one's words do not prescriptively affect or mediate

the experience of others, nor is there a way to demarcate decisively a boundary between one's location and all others. Even a complete retreat

from speech is of course not neutral since it allows the continued dominance of current discourses and acts byomission to reenforce their dominance . As my practices are made possible by events spatially far away from my body so too my own

practices make possible or impossible practices of others. The declaration that I "speak only for myself" has the sole effect of allowing me to avoidresponsibility and accountability for my effects on others; it cannot literally erase those effects.

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Gunnarsdottir

AFF—SPEECH GOOD

Even if speech is not liberatory—the act of speech challenge knowledge and imperialist discourse



The final response to the problem of speaking for others that I will consider occurs in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's rich essay "Can

the Subaltern Speak?"14 Spivak rejects a total retreat from speaking for others, and she criticizes the "self-abnegating intellectual" pose

that Foucault and Deleuze adopt when they reject speaking for others on the grounds that their position assumes the oppressed cantransparently represent their own true interests. According to Spivak, Foucault and Deleuze's self-abnegation serves only to conceal

the actual authorizing power of the retreating intellectuals, who in their very retreat help to consolidate a particular conception of

experience (as transparent and self-knowing). Thus, to promote "listening to" as opposed to speaking for essentializes the oppressed as

non-ideologically constructed subjects. But Spivak is also critical of speaking for which engages in dangerous re-presentations. In the

end Spivak prefers a "speaking to," in which the intellectual neither abnegates his or her discursive role nor presumes an authenticity

of the oppressed, but still allows for the possibility that the oppressed will produce a "countersentence" that can then suggest a new

historical narrative. Spivak's arguments show that a simple solution can not be found in for the oppressed or less

privileged being able to speak for themselves, since their speech will not necessarily be either liberatory or reflectiveof their "true interests", if such exist. I agree with her on this point but I would emphasize also that ignoring the

subaltern's or oppressed person's speech is, as she herself notes, "to continue the imperialist project."15 Even if the

oppressed person's speech is not liberatory in its content, it remains the case that the very act of speaking itselfconstitutes a subject that challenges and subverts the opposition between the knowing agent and the object of

knowledge, an opposition which has served as a key player in the reproduction of imperialist modes of

discourse. Thus, the problem with speaking for others exists in the very structure of discursive practice, irrespective of its

content, and subverting the hierarchical rituals of speaking will always have some liberatory effects.

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Gunnarsdottir

AFF— PERM SOLVES

Search for dialogue can be continued however speaking for others remains the only current means for

political accountability



I agree, then, that we should strive to create wherever possible the conditions for dialogue and the practice of

speaking with and to rather than speaking for others. Often the possibility of dialogue is left unexplored or inadequately

pursued by more privileged persons. Spaces in which it may seem as if it is impossible to engage in dialogic encounters need to be

transformed in order to do so, such as classrooms, hospitals, workplaces, welfare agencies, universities, institutions for international

development and aid, and governments. It has long been noted that existing communication technologies have the potential to producethese kinds of interaction even though research and development teams have not found it advantageous under capitalism to do so.

However, while there is much theoretical and practical work to be done to develop such alternatives , the practice

of speaking for others remains the best option in some existing situations. An absolute retreat weakens politicaleffectivity, is based on a metaphysical illusion, and often effects only an obscuring of the intellectual's powerThere can be no complete or definitive solution to the problem of speaking for others, but there is a possibility that its dangers can be

decreased. The remainder of this paper will try to contribute toward developing that possibility.

27





Gunnarsdottir

AFF—SPEAKING MATTERS

Listening is perquisite to speech—speaking and silence have political impacts



This brings us to the political issue. The intuitive response is to do everything possible to allow the oppressed to speak for themselves

This is not always possible. But, if language constitutes the self, then who can speak for the oppressed and how can she do so?

Alcoff’s understanding of speaking for others is a good starting point.5 Her general argument is that the location of the speaker affects

the meaning and truth of what is said. Moreover, the location of the speaker affects the speech itself. Language is a creative activity

and what we create is contingent on where we are located within society. Alcoff’s arguments can be added to Rorty’s interpretation of

the self. When we speak we are not only creating new truth relative to the language games we employ, but we create ourselves

Hooks uses this idea of selves to create a political program for oppressed groups. She extends the metaphor of language

as a game. If language is a game then it has elements of competition and power, and even playfulness. These elements can be

used to make a speech for others a speech to their advantage , but with a few caveats. The first is that we initially resistthe urge to speak for others and listen to them . This ideally allows the speaker to share agency with the

oppressed by including them in the creative process. Secondly, we must account for our location and context

when we speak . President Bush’s analysis of Iraq is very different from that of an Iraqi. Each should account for the way their

location affects his speech. Third, the speaker must be responsible for her own speech. Speaking on behalf of

someone else doesn’t enable the speaker to speak without thought. Finally, the speaker must attempt to take account of

the affects of the speech. Ultimately, we must recognize that speaking and silence are always a political decision . We

must use our voice consciously.

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Gunnarsdottir

AFF—SPEAKING FOR OTHER = INEVITABLE

Speaking for others is inevitable—we cannot speak without speaking for others



If the self is located within language games the there is a commonality between those who share language games. This removes some

of the barriers between selves and I do have access to the experience of those with whom I share language games. Sharing language

games means sharing experience. I am able to speak for those who language games I play. There are some problems with this

understanding. Alcoff thinks membership in a group is not precise or determinate. It is unclear which groups I could belong to and

which of those groups I should single out to affiliate myself. More importantly, membership in a group doesn’t necessarily mean anauthority to speak for the whole group. However, if we accept that the self is constituted within language, then those who share

language games with me have direct access to my experience in away that no one can ever have access to a Cartesian mind. We do no

need to ask for absolute identity, language and experience between speakers but just a commonality. Furthermore, Bernstein argues

that we cannot speak without speaking for other people. The speaker’s location is necessarily a location in

relation to other people. The relationship cannot be removed, and we cannot avoid it. Speaking at all makesspeaking for others inevitable.

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Gunnarsdottir

AFF—SPEAKING FROM YOUR GROUP JUSTIFIED

Speaking for others is justified as long as you speak within a group you are from—that will act as way

bring the views of the group into perspective



We return to the intuitive response to the struggle of oppressed groups: have the group speak for itself . Speaking becomes a type

of agency in which I construct myself because contrary to a Cartesian self, selves do not exist prior to or separate from language. To

lose my speech is to lose myself. The oppressed have the ability to communicate with each other and throughtheir language game they are able to discuss their struggle with one another. Sharing languages games enables

the oppressed to a specific, limited dimension of power. Their language game will always fail to communicate their struggle

to those who have not been initiated into it. They have direct access to the experience of oppression and their agency, but they can only reach their own group. Those on the margin cannot reach those in the center. On the other hand, those in the

center, the elites, share a language that can reach the majority of society. It is a language game they are familiar with and can use

adeptly. However, they do not have the experience with or access to the language game of the oppressed. They have the power to usetheir language but nothing to say. The catch-22 is the choice between a group who embodies the agency and the dimensions of

political struggle against oppression without a way to communicate it to the larger community, and a group with the language to reach

society but is ignorant of the political struggle. There lies a need for a synergy between the experience of the oppressed on the

margins and the language game of those in the center. The synergy requires a speaker who comes from the oppressed

but has knowledge of the language game of the center. Such a person could incorporate the experience of the

oppressed into a new language game that could be accessed by those in power. The concern is what is lost andsacrificed in translation. If the language games are so disparate that initiation in one, offers no insight into the rules of the other

than there is doubt that translation can be done at all. If translation cannot be done, the best to be hoped for is cooption

forcing the margins into the mainstream.

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Gunnarsdottir

AFF—SPEAKING FOR OTHERS PREREQUISITE TO K

Not speaking for others destroys critique—the ability to retreat from dialogue creates an individualist

ideology

Laura Sells (Presented at a Roundtable on "Public Speaking and the Feminist Public Sphere: Doing Difference Differently," at theWestern States Communication Association conference ”On Feminist Civility:Retrieving the Political in the Feminist Public Forum”

1997) [Gunnarsdottir]

In her recent article, "The Problems of Speaking For Others," Linda Alcoff points out the ways in which this retreat rhetoric has

actually become an evasion of political responsibility. Alcoff's arguments are rich and their implications are many, but one

implication is relevant to a vital feminist public forum. The retreat from speaking for others politically dangerous

because it erodes public discourse.

First, the retreat response presumes that we can, indeed, "retreat to a discrete location and make singular claims

that are disentangled from other's locations." Alcoff calls this a "false ontological configuration" in which we ignore how our

social locations are always already implicated in the locations of others. The position of "not speaking for others" thus

becomes an alibi that allows individuals to avoid responsibility and accountability for their effects on others . The

retreat, then, is actually a withdrawal to an individualist realm, a move that reproduces an individualist ideology and

privatizes the politics of experience. As she points out, this move creates a protected form of speech in which the individual is

above critique because she is not making claims about others. This protection also gives the speaker immunity from

having to be "true" to the experiences and needs of others. As a form of protected speech, then, "not speaking for

others" short-circuits public debate by disallowing critique and avoiding responsibility to the other.Second, the retreat response undercuts the possibility of political efficacy. Alcoff illustrates this point with a list of people--StevenBiko, Edward Said, Rigoberta Menchu--who have indeed spoken for others with significant political impact. As she bluntly puts it,

both collective action and coalition necessitate speaking for others.

31





Gunnarsdottir

AFF— OPPRESSED MUST SPEAK ALONE

The oppressed must speak for themselves—our intervention destroys effective representation

Carole Fabricant (The Johns Hopkins University Press. “Speaking for the Irish Nation: The Drapier, the Bishop, and the Problems

of Colonial Representation, 1999) [Gunnarsdottir]

In this situation, acts of representation--specifically, of speaking for the oppressed or the colonized--become

particularly fraught (if not indeed, on the face of it, a blatant contradiction in terms), and seem inconceivablewithout postulating a bad faith or false consciousness of mammoth proportions. Such acts seem to provide

powerful justification for Gilles Deleuze's insistence on "the indignity of speaking for others" and his assertion

that "only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf." 11 And yet, Spivak toohas a point (even though she chooses to overlook the compelling circumstances, namely the événements of May

1968, motivating his protest) when she challenges Deleuze on this matter, deriding the idea that we, as

intellectuals (or relatively privileged members of society) should simply back off in silence and let theoppressed speak for themselves: an act [End Page 339] which conveniently absolves us from the responsibility

of intervening in intolerable situations and which assumes the possibility of transparency, of an end to the need

for all representation. But as Spivak succinctly reminds us, "representation has not withered away." 12 Certainlyit showed little sign of withering away in eighteenth-century Ireland, where, when the oppressed did speak for

themselves, it was often both literally and figuratively in another language, one that required translation into the

idiom of power to have any effect within the governing structures of society.

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DDI Speaking for Others K

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