DCE RFC 68.4 Public Key Certificate- Based DCE Login
Transcript of DCE RFC 68.4 Public Key Certificate- Based DCE Login
DCE RFC 68.4DCE RFC 68.4Public Key Certificate- Public Key Certificate- Based DCE LoginBased DCE Login
The Open Group Member’s Meeting27 April - 01 May 1998San Diego, Calif. USA
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AgendaAgendaIntroduction and historyKey technologies, standardsBasic PK-INIT KRB_AS_REQ/REP flowsPrivilege Service changesThe end-goalProof-of-concept demoQs&As
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HistoryHistory
Initial DCE Public Key work done in DCE 1.2.2. PKI was immature, products/stds were evolving at this time.
IETF PKINIT protocol specification moved on after DCE 1.2.2.SIMC catalyzed customer requirements for DCE-PKI integration.Vendors met to work on open architecture.
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HistoryHistory (continued) (continued)DASCOM, Digital and IBM proposed a solution. IETF CAT Working group modifying PKINIT to support solution.TOG+vendor agreement with proposal, providing feedback.TOG Fast Track proposal now pending.
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MotivationsMotivations
Some PKI based mechanisms are inevitable:Signing of email messagesNon-repudiation enablementScaleable authentication for e-commerce applications
Cross-organizational trust models for extranetsLaymen’s terms result of DCE-PKI integration:
If an email can be signed, a DCE login can be achieved via the same mechanism that signs the email
Integrated environment: Digital signatures & envelopesDCE’s “role” is as an authorization system for PKI
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RFC 68.4 SynopsisRFC 68.4 SynopsisX.509v3 Public Key Certificates for authentication to DCE
The DN is the principalNew pkinit_cms_* component
Cryptographic Message Standard (CMS) for digitally signing and enveloping parts of Kerberos authentication flowsIsolation of the public key certificate and CMS functionalitySupport for smart cards and delivery of a software smart card in the reference implementation"PKI-neutral" implementation that supports multiple PKIs.
A Credential Acquisition ServiceInput: Verified DNOutput: EPACEnables an installation to implement its own DN==>EPAC mappings.
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Architectural FoundationArchitectural FoundationKRB_AS_REQ/REP Kerberos messages upgraded/rationalized to latest IETF "PK-INIT" DraftCryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) used to create/consume signed and enveloped messages within the PK-PA-AS-REQ/REP PADATA portions of the KRB_* messagesReference implementation will use CDSA for low-level crypto, certificate/trust and data store operations
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Architectural Foundation Architectural Foundation (continued)(continued)
sec_login_*
pkinit_cms_*
S/MIME Freeware
Library (SFL)
CDSA
PKCS#11 v2.01-Conformant Smart Cards;
signature/crypto ops, certificate & key store
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SFL ArchitectureSFL ArchitectureFigure 1. S/MIME Freeware Library Architecture
C Application C++ Application
C & C++ APISFL High-Level Lib
C++ API
SFL ASN.1 Lib
C++ SNACC Lib
C API
CM API Library
C SNACC Lib
C & C++ APISFL BSAFE CTI
Lib
C & C++ APISFL Crypto++ CTI Lib
C & C++ APISFL Fortezza CTI Lib
C APIBSAFE
C APIFortezza CI
C++ APICrypto++
Fortezza Card
SFLHigh-Level
SFLCryptoTokenInterfaceLevel
ExternalCryptoTokenLibraries
…
…
Other SFLCTI Librariescan be added
Other CryptoToken Librariescan be added
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Application Using Cryptographic Services and Application Using Cryptographic Services and Persistent Storage Services of a Class 2, Persistent Storage Services of a Class 2, PKCS#11 devicePKCS#11 device
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Client-to-KDC Message OverviewClient-to-KDC Message Overview
Client KDC...,PA-PK-AS-REQ,...
PA-PK-AS-REQ
pkcs7SignedAuthPack
userCertClient's signature certificate,
Client's encryption certificate (may be same as signature certificate)
version,
digestAlgorithms,
encapContentInfo,
signerInfos
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Details of CMS SignedData ObjectDetails of CMS SignedData Object
pkcs7SignedAuthPack
version
digestAlgorithms
encapContentInfo
eContentType
PkAuthenticator
kdcName, kdcRealm, cusec, ctime, nonce
signerInfos
version, issuerAndSerialNumber (of client’s signature certificate), digestAlgorithm, signatureAlgorithm, signature
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KDC-to-Client Response OverviewKDC-to-Client Response Overview
Client KDC...,PA-PK-AS-REP,...
PA-PK-AS-REP
encSignedReplyKeyPack
kdcCertKDC's signature certificate
encTmpKeyPack
tmpKey replyKey nonce KDC{[ , ] }
{ } ’tmpKey Client sencryption publickey
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Credential AcquisitionCredential Acquisition
Client
Client’s Asserted DN
Credential
Acquisition
Service
Installation-definable
DN=>credential
policy
AS
PS
Client’s Verified DN
secd
Client’s Verified DN
Client’s EPAC
DNEPAC
LDAP
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Secure
Web
Browser
Secure
Web
Server w/
DCE
Proxy
PKI "Backplane"
https
Client Certificate
Server Certificate
Credential
Acquisition
ServiceLDAP
RPC DNEPAC
Internet & DCEInternet & DCE
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SIMC/NYSE ScenarioSIMC/NYSE Scenario
NYSE’ s
DCE Cell &
PKI
Trading
Firm "A"’ s
DCE Cell &
PKI
"A" issues its employees X.509v3 Public Key
Certificates
These certificates are used w/i "A" and for using
NYSE applications
NYSE doesn’ t want to be in the business of
administering "A"’ s employees
NYSE wants to assign roles (DCE EPACs w/i its
DCE cell to "A"’ s employees based on their
certificates
SSLv3 connection through
extranet; DCE Inter-Cell not
allowed
ProxyRPC
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The End-GoalThe End-GoalPublic Key Certificates for authenticationDCE EPACs for authorizationOver time eliminate the DCE Rgy as the holder of user information
Move to LDAP-accessed directoriesThis "vision" ties in well with customer inputIt integrates with other "certificate-aware" applicationsIt can better address the Internet space
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SummarySummaryRFC 68.4 is built on open standards
CDSACMSKerberos PK-INIT
Work is correctly allocatedDCE is not a PKI, it’s a consumer of PKIsPotential for leveraging DCE as authorization system for PKIs
This has truly been a collaborative effortTOG members’ feedback sought
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Kudos to the Development TeamKudos to the Development Team
Peter Calvert, DASCOMHenry DeAngelis, IBMSherif Ebady, IBMUt Le, IBMDavid Reynolds, DASCOM
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Enterprise Desktop Example/SolutionEnterprise Desktop Example/SolutionDigital Signature-Based AuthenticationDigital Signature-Based Authentication
PKI
Authentication
DCE
Authorization
SSL
Browser
News
...
Applications
SSO
(GSO)
Sec. File
(DFS)
Tunneling
AgentsCORBA
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"Internetized" DCE"Internetized" DCE
PKI "Backplane"
LDAP
IBM DCE’
Client
(WinNT)
SSLv3
Client
DASCOM’s
IntraVerse
Server
(Unix)
IBM DCE’
secd (Unix)
DCE Server
Application
Credential
Acquisition
Service
RPC
SSL
X.509v3 CertificateDN
EPAC
DASCOM Slim DCE’
Client (WinNT)
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UsersUsersUser definitions converge over time to LDAPCommon authentication mechanism (X.509v3 public key certificates + digital signatures)Credential Acquisition Service provides flexible DN<=>EPAC mapping, e.g.,
Verisign Class 1 cert.: role=MinTrustCert. from trading partner: role=TrPrtnrCert. from enterprise’s CA: role=RegEmpl
DCE auditability maintained with DN as principal name
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