January 3. 2017

Senator Ron Wyden ich ciננr Martin H eםator S

Select Committee on Inte1ligence Seםate . U.S Office Building eםate 211 Hart S

20510 . Washington, D.C

: ch iמri He aםd Dear Sonators Wyden

you for your lettcr datcd Dcc:cmber 23, 2016. AB.requcsted, 1 havc complcted your 'I1עmk . 1 have enclosed my responses aםd , Prehearing QuestiODS

.d1 11 ו look forward to appearing before your committee on January

~ l מ!.-י S

~~ 1tpo Enclosure

-. Collestion Auihorities

his DominatioD םO מסPompeo וke QuestiODS for the Bonorab1e M" eaזiםg Preh to be the Director 01 the CeDtraI Intelligence Agencv;

eh eimיi Senators Wvden SDd H

2016 op-ed in The WaJl8tteet Journal in aננ.uary 1be Committee's ·questions reference your J C4Congress should pass a law re-establishing colleotion of al1 met8data, and :wי.נote which you

, oia1 and lifestyle infonnation into a oom.prehensive finaם combining it with publicly available . the following ad.ditional questioDS aםSWet' searohable database." Please

was a reference to bu1k cOllection of Jוetadata ~ Please c1ari:!y whether "collection of al1 . • metadata. If so, what kinds of metadata do you believe shou1d be oollected in buJk and

?" entered into a "oomprehensive, searchable database

1 was referring to metadata ofthe type oonected under the then-existing program. tbat was federaI וbavailable for review under procedures and conditions revieweci and approved

• judges

the מסpub1icly.available. data תa! to additio referrhנg As noted in the op-ed, 1 was generaIly hintemet or o1her pub1ic databases that can provide important clues in identifying those wם

ed, 1· will defer to poJicymakers, inoluding the nמwou14 seek: to harm America. If confi to ool1ect metadata and publicly available pזiate COI!gress, on whether it would be appro

on to be collected, who wouId col1ect suoh infonnation and מnati. data, the exact info appropriatc restrictions; 1 Dote tbat such activity wou1d be the responsibility.oftbe FBI.or

ons. 1 note aISO tbat the .In..telligence Community has, for many gaםizati other appropriate o.r uding in bנ.cl , U.S. persons סםcollecteci םסinfמסnati jmjze מdecades, applied restrictions to mj

1 • offederaljudges nםsome oase8, restrictions carried out under1be approval and supervisi • ts are botb appropriate and necessary נוire.men injmjzation req jוזbe1ieve. such

believe metadata for telephony and· eleCtronic comttl.unicati.ons should be treated ןןסDO Y • . . llection of one type ~ be more restrictions on tb.e ~ equally under tb.e Iaw, or should th

. ? of metadata vs. the other

These are very important questions tbat merit thorough study. There are a wide variety of statutory, and other regu1atory rules governing the treatment of different ~ constitutional

types of metadata. These l'IIIlgO, to just name a few examples, from Fourth Amendment InteUigence Surveillance Act (including items 1ike Pen igם. to thc Fore ~ consideratio

Registerffrap and T1'8CC provjsions,כ to Federal Comן~ mications COmmission rulesמס. subsoriber data.

t withlegal nsטl 1 will co ~ If confirmed, 8nd such issues were relevant to tbe CIA missi experts on the appropriate treatment of metadata to include examining the specific metadata

and the goveming.legal framework. 'Ihe CIA's data ~ at issue, the reasons for collectio mission. tגוtory d always be driven by its sta :נו.l sho ~ collectl.

What oonstitates "oםמ.םatiiםfo ia1 and lifcstylc finaםc. Plcasc clarify"publicly avaIlable • PסrClגaSed lude information provided by or iםc liclyavailablc information"? Docs it י'pub

? partics tbhיd from

thoughts on thc typca of information tbat may bc gסnCral My op--cd was dcsigncd to provide gסnCral but in itסms, c list of spe<נifi t set fortb. a o1 •ם did ~ 1he CQ tectiנוg pro מihelpfu1

. by third parties PגוrםhaSed iםfOrmatiOn not iםfOrmatiOn, to publicly avai1able ferriםg W8S rc on tbat may iםfסrmati ce 11igםם However. to the extent tha:e is publicly available relevant inte

dered םsi on should be .co inforנםati compliance with all privacy laws, such f1טl in taiםed bc ob . • 8s appropriate, ifnecessary to protect 1he country

vסrםmeזit le database. U Which u.s. go 1זa1נ Please c1arify && comprehenstve. searc • state. local andIor tribal entities, should eיבal, ll as fed סwand agenoies. as dePartmeם.tS

the database? what frסm. on derived iםfסmנati to נ::סhave 8ccess to the database aםd if any, do you boliove sh9u1d be placed OD searcbes· of the database oםs, cti ינestri

law aםd intelligeםCe . dissem.ination of the results of such searches, whetber to U.S the מion iםfסrmati sbould the oמg govemmen1s? How l םgrei סft entities or to eםforcemcm

'l זetained database be

tbe types of information tbat may be מOthoughts geםeral My op-cd was designcd to provide . · that wou1d ewסrk:fiעוn legislative fi1נl a pסse t pro מ.o protccting 1he COuntry. 1 did מihelpfu1

or ,םdisseminatiO aםd SCaזC.hCS מOoםs cti restזi govem cxact a<:eeSS to such infQrmation, thc the CIA, are subject iםננhנding cs, eםcl. timeframes. I am aware 1hat intelligence ag םoretenti

d1ing of מaes goveming thc access to and b riנl to Attomey oeneral guide1ines and detai1ed U.S. person data.

Please provide additional detail on the role of the CIA with regard to the • fCcomprehensive. searchable database," specifically whether, in your viow, tbe CIA

request וOaccess to the database, whethcr the CIA should conduct diכחCt should have u1d be disseminatcd sb1 םhe da1Bbue fiיOm on ~ whothcr inf ~ es of thc datab iזמq

of סse wbat restrictioris, if any, shou1d apply to the CIA's aםd CIA, thם to information fi:om the database.

rrnatiOD tbat may be iםfo the typcs of מOMy op-ed W8S designed to provide gcnera1 thougbts tbat wou1d franגeWOrk egisIativס thc coun1ry. 1 did not propose a fulll rotectiםg helpful in p

the restriCtions on searr.bes and ,םormatio iםf such סtgovern exact access by CIA cics, ageם. geםceiםteUi on. 1 am aware tbat mבatiiמfo use of ספon, or restrictions םati dissemi

Yםסiiם& are subject to Attorney oeneral guido1incs and dotailed rules go ~ C ~ inc1uding for collection would bc PrOgזarn y sucb מAdata. PCתOn . g ofU.S מlvmdJi aםd to נשCeSa the

of SPeCtrטm fiנl1 poUcymakers that account for tbe וb fסrih govemed by roles and law set d, .interestsםes wi1h aי:נtסto U.S. per&OD8 peי ttho CIA would be ex:pected 10 participate on1yס

its statutory m.ission set ti1נfilliDg it was eXteמt t1וe

to Section 702 ofFISAstate: ICCIA resaזd jmi'lstionprooedureswith מThe CIA'smj • neמtai l may qucry CIA e1ectronic and data storage systems persoםgcoגbמ

communications acquired in accordance with section 702 of the Act zeוi unmjmmj extract foreign aס.d fiםd [RBDACTBD] Such queries must be reasonably designed to

but 1שing maintain records of a11 such queries, incl שWinteJligence information. CIA I will אנכסes and identi.ties, and NSD and םam states person םited U םtnot limited

the requirement that tbe query b8 thaם s queries of content.11 Other י.review CIA atiOD," do you oםn d extract foreign inteUigence iDf םa"reasonably designed to .find

on CJA queries of U.S. persons for purposes of sםbelieve there shou1d be any limitatio requirements gםcations? what limitations and reporti iזנםreviewing the content of comm ved -יdcri 02 ךU.S. person queries.of 8ection םtdo you be1ieve should app1y

? metadata

Ot1פנr tbis cDIltExt a "query'" involves using a name, phone num.ber, em.ail address, or Iמ. cy ageם aמ. with that term within a Iarger pool of &18 tbat םns cati mmuתi to isolate co teמn

t to note that queries do not result in the rtaם bas a1ready lawfW1y collected. It is impo . . on. iםformati y aם. additional collection of

Surveillance Court (FISC) have eiגce y General ancl the Foreign Intellig ttorם.e The A ures, including its limitations on rocכed ization p מdםim reviewed and approved CIA's

es, :finding the procedures consisient with FISA and the Fourth Amendment. 1bose qםeri minimiz.ation procedures require that "Any Vnited States person identity used to query

ed by a statement Qffacts showing paםi tbe content of communications must be accom return foreign סtikely נis reasonably teגm as a query yזy such identi מatbat the use of .

8 ' 702 FISA." 1 understand that as part of Section מid defiנie ~. oםם,םati ence Jnfo iםtellig ~ ofNatio ~ D t1וeםf extensive oversight, the Department of lustice and the Office Inte11igence review a11'ofCIAי S. person queries' otSection ~ s Uך t02-aCquired contentס

the question. Any ·iמ ulated ~ ard staם.d ensuro each query satisfies the lega1 • S _ the FISC םgres~ ,tס reported both aזe nts ~ compliance inci

DNI is required to ~ queries ofSection 702-deri.ved metadata, ~ 1erms ofU.S. nזmake publicly avaiJable an annual :report that proyides - am.ong other things - a good

queries of Section 7.02-dcrived coDtent and םfaith esthnate afthe number ofU.S. perso . ' . Section 702-derived metadata.

.. and םthe CIA's missio תםbe appropfiate to perfo סtofthis program. cגs e.thc outlin v1ש be1i . '. dainenfa1 rig1rtS fטn gטard safe

p'otentia1 effects t1נek ed, 1 will be happy to discuss any specific proposals and nfiםם If co once 1 have been briefed on the t1נreafS analyze dוםiCIA's ability to discover םס.

. area. ~ y's eJforts in cםAge ~

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ts "reverse targeting" 1נi Inte1ligence SurveillanQC Act pro1u g702 .ם ofthe Forei םSectio .• CIA Director, what poficies would you adopt witb regard to AנJ • of U.S. peISODs

702 coUectionm order 10 guard against reverse םtargets of Sectio םatiםg nomi . . ge1iםg? tar

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aIready Agency po]icies to prohibit CIA officers ftom "reverse e1ועי understand there ted. States. Jf confumed, 1 intend·to .םi. persons inside the U ~ U.S. persons "eסng1a1יg

ons for םati O] nMews a1l nomi םcontinue those. policies. AB part of Section 702 oversight, the diםg ent8, inc]u iזem compliance with tbe tatgeting procedures and tb.e statutory.requ

.) reverse targeting (ODNI reviews a sample agaiםSt ition גh1כpro

Bi-monthly repoi'ts documenting tbe results of each review are submitted to Congress as ua1 reports required under 50 USC 1881f. Any compJiance incidents .נגםapart ofthe semi

discovered in tbe course of001 and ODNI's oversigbt are reported to tbe FISC pursuant to . reports שוnual R.ule 13(b) oftbe FISC's Rules ofProcedure and to Congress in tb.e semi

, to CIA access to egaזd r ~ y, do you be1ieve should exist מaif וwhat differences • queries of, and use, dissemination and retention ofU.S. person comm.unications

cations collected uםi collected pursuant to Ex.ecutive Order 12333 as compared to comm ? 702 t to Section ישsuan P

on is govemed by law .iםfomנati 1 understand tbat a1l collection and use ofU.S. person der Section 702 OCCU1'S under tb.e uם. cations uתi and policy. The collection of comm.

reign סfe co.mmunications of a .גנtimportant, but re1atively narrow, circumstances where , of a U.S. service provider ~ Dationa11ocateci abroad may be obtained with the assistanc

ization םim g and mi םsubject 10 tbe jurisdiction oftb.e FISC.· The types oftargeti erally appropriate to that collecti.on activity םeprocedures required by Section 702 are g

ge of co1lection tecbniques and raם because Section 702 conection involves sach limited because the involvem.ent ofU.S. service providers may implicate U.S. person

• of error eםt ons to a greatcr degree in the ev םac שucomm

Because CIA activities under B.O. 12333 are strictly focused on collection activities cou1d ~ abroad, with very 1imited exceptioDS, there is a smaller risk that these activiti

. 702 im.plicate U.S. person communications compared with. collection under Section varie1.y of conection gזeater Additionally, CIA's E.O. 12333 activities involve a far

ty is ortuםi der circUIDStances where the collection opp זm. techniques, and often occur with Section 702 oollection, tb.e טmpared limited, costly, risky, an.d ftagile. Thus) c

CIA's ool1ection activities under E.O. 12333 require a far greater degrec of agility and timeliness and reliability. For tbese eםt flexibility 10 obtain intelligence of suffici

reasODS, tbe CIA's access to, queries of, use, disseminati.on, and retention ofU.S. person commumcauons under B.O. 12333 are appropriately governed by broader and more

. 702 flexible guideJines, oompared with those required under Section

the United thiם ce wi םa1 suiיvei1 Executive Order 12333 states tbat tbe CIA may oonduct • easures to hosti.le unteתn aining, testing, or conducting co 1נ: purpose of thם States "f01'

. Ou ensure that any .implementatioD oftbis וHow would ".iDaתce electronic surve autb.ority does not aclversely affect U.S. persons' civilliberties or otherwise result in

ce ofU.S. persons'1 ~ CIA surve

Partners reעm PPD-28 and Fo

electronic surveiIlance wi1hin thc United iמ. Under E.O. 12333, tbe CIA may not engage g, testing, or conducting counterme&Sures to hostile trainiם ose of uגp States exccpt forthe p

electronic surveil1ance. Surveillancc conducted for those purposes is govcmed by rney GeneraJ, aftor זto approved by the A aםd proccdures established by the DCIA

" nic surveil1ance trם stitute "elec םconsultati.on with tbe DNI. In addition, activities that co StatUtOזY aratס within thc meaning ofFISA, 50 U.S.C. 1801(f), are subject to the sep

.) 1805(8 set forth at 50 USC eנrtsuhיem. req

ited ~ d civilliberti.es ofU.S. persons, these activities are l aזi In order to protect the privaoy accomplish the purpose ofthe activity and not סtin extent and. duration to those necessary

tתdning, espcc1 to testing or זicatioDS of a particu1ar person. With מudirected·at the comm y for זמסinformation obtained in tbe course of activity shou1d be re1abled and used aםY

as מpurposes ofthe particu1ar testing or training activities and destroyed as soo on should be used oםמatiiםf any collected ~נm practicable. With respect to counte

ted only to appropriate semiםa e or dis eillaםם st unautho1ized. surv agaiת on1y to protect ance. If surveש rized uםautho agencies for enforcement offedera1 statutes prohibiting such

• 1 inten.d to continue these protectiODS for tb.e privacy and civilliberties ofU.S ,םfirmed co . persons

social media 'oםs Do yoo belieye th.e CIA should be autborized to monitor U.S. pers .• 1 What lega1 oםs er what circumstances and subject to what Iimitati uםd , activities? If SO

? authority would provide tbe basis for such monitoring

. on re1ated to 1:b.e social media activities ofU.S rmiש. The CIA may aJready collect info : cewith the םad m accord םapersons only in fUrtb.e.ranCfJ ofits authorized f\mctions,

Constitution, federal statutes, and presidential· directives. The collection, retention, and. ertaken on1y in dnונon conceming U.S. persoDS may be מnati dissemination ofinfo .

• cedures םrp rסve4 accordancc with Attomey General-app

tll op-ed that nשיtbe statement in your Wall8t1'eet JO זerence The Committee's . questionS re . and imposes fםreignerS מסPresidential Policy Directive-28 "bestows privacy rights

the foUowing additional aםSWer Please .ייburdensome requirements to justify data collection . questions .

What do yoo see as thc possible costs to bi1ateral relationships, including bilateral • 281 PD ~ m.odifying ~ ps, to eliminating O םShi inte1ligence relatio

mes םuThe effect of eIiminating or modifying PPD 28 wiIl depend on the specific co ges. Some countdcs, for example, have haם volved and tb.e specific nature of 80y c םi

ct that are somewhat more liberal tban the restriCtiODS in PPD :tזe e מiinteDigence laws tDes might not object ifthe U.S. modified PPD 28 to be more in line םu28, and those co

on to PPD םati with their own laws. other natioDS might b., concerned about a modifi • 28 and seek a bilateral a8reement witb. respect to its citizens

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eral guidelines, it may Geם Il compIiance with law and Attomey טfderstand that, in m1ו rmation in bu1k. To the extent U.S. person iםfo be appropriate for CIA to collect

information is involved, CIA follows regulatioDS and Attorney General-approved shes U.S. person fטmi uDIl: If a foreign partner iםfoםתa g of 8uch םhandli מguidelines i

would a1so be handled pursuant to CIA םoderstand that informati םu1 tion, iםforma atioDS and Attorney General-approved guidelines. At times, U.S. PB1'Son guז re

oftbe oountry, such as a case where a Ctioם. t 10 prote םaformation may be bighly relev מi attacks to kill fOז iDg 1anמ arm.ed hostilities or p מiU.S. person abroad is engaged

. Americans

Burope that מiםoabout U.S. surveiI1ance activities have led to litigati ncerםs Co • the Safe םwdo ~ 10 8 iםםoU peaם c:e of the Euro סstiנ pro.mpted the Court of of data tתmSferS ' es iש:גHarbor Agreement (which was tbe legal basis Cor comp

• 10 U.S nםs refo suppסrt. OU וbetween tbe BU· and tb.e U.S.). As CIA Director, wou1d · ? order to address these developmentS iמ. ce programs eillaם surv

ed, 1 WiI1 oםfirm sector. If c PנiVate These issues atl'ect mu1tiple agencies, as well as the a ho1istic 1זעVe סWenSנוIס ent to vם:שin d outside of go aם· inBide aזtners engage with our p

. erstanding of concems reIated to U.S. SUlVeillance progrEUIIS before undertaking וmd • ed to be necessary and app1icable detemנin aנ:e se tlב.o ges or reforms, if chaם

a foreign וbco1lected in bu1k oם, Is it ever appropriate for U.S. person informati • partnerי a to be obtained, used and dissemםIf sO ~ ted by tb.e Intelligence Co iי

? shou1d be app1ied sםwhat limitatio

EeoDomie espiODage

s reJated to signals תבuAccording to·the CIA's poli.cies and proced • : intelligence

rmation or trade secreta is authorized זifo The collection o!loreign private commercial i " ers and alliea. 11 i8 a11וl to protect the lIational securitjJ o!the Uniled Statea 01' ita p עlon

tBrintelligence purpose 10 collect such m1101ז an autho1'ized jb1'etgn. intellip.nce or cO rd a competitive advantage 10 u.s. compantes and u8. bua;ness qlf10 ס i'l!ormation

g trade 01' sanctiolls }jוinווti secto1's commercially. Certain economic purposes. such as ide mpetitiעe litute co וtS uence 01" direction, ahaJl nol co iו(fl violations or govemment

" advantage.

alysis is not used to adVBDCe tbe םaand םo םcthat CIA colle eשייS.םeHow wlll you t1נe es and business sectors in which members of paםi fage of U.S. com םacompetitive adv

interest? מatheir famiIieS an.d associates, haw ~ adminis1ration

colleoting or frOנn C01זJ A o:ffi זc1 understand therc are already Agency po1icies to prohibit . tage advaמ ess with a competitive usiם ly to provide a U.S. b purס dbSemiDating information

ehי ward to learning m.ore about these po1ioies and oVB1uatbig th fo1 ~ :נf confirmed, 1 loo . . • effectiveness

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Jnterrogatioם-

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-oncryption in םgstזo Str,ef Jovma/ op-ed, you wroto tbat "the use of חIn your Wa • any circumstanccs in which tbCזe t1ag." Arc זcd may itsc1f bc a sםpersonal communicatio

. particularly of U.S ,SUrVזill1aםCe g encryption could be a basis for םstrס the use of ? persons

ted States, except in iםg electronic surveillance insidc the U סdזmfj CIA is prohibited from con who ,םsurvei11ance -of a U.S. perso םic duct electro םces. Tbe CIA may co rcumstBם limited ci

believe the U.S. parson is סtS1Btes, if tbere is probable cause תited is located outside tb.e U Bgent of a foreign power and upon obtsining a WaIrant by the Foreign Intelligence מa

. Surveillance Court

In my view, a U.S. person's use of strong encryption would not be sufficient by itse1f to -estabJish probable cause tbat the person is an agent of a foreign power. However, if CIA

has reason 10 believe tbat a named U.S. person bas been in con1act With known or suspected st propaganda onIine, expressed a desire to treנni viewed or posted violent ex ~ terro

cations. his or her uםi conduct a 80meland attack, and recentl.y started using encrypted comm use ofthose communications should be considered in tbe course oftbe FBI investigation into the person.

The FY 2016 National Dcfense Authorization Act prohibited any interrogation -• grcc tbat, undcr ~ techniques not listed in the Anny Field ManuaI (AFM). Do you

udiםg ques oot authorized by the AFM, incl hםi current law, the USC of interrogation tec han" the CIA's fonnerםi ced interrogation tec eםques"t is incgal undcr an hו

? ces ircuת:istan c

Deftm.se Authorization Act for FY2016 provides tbat no םal Section 1045 ofthe Natio ch appזoa technique or םo gaזi U.S. custody may be subjected to any interro מiindividual

13491 tb.e Arm.y Field Manual. Executive order מithat is not authorized by and 1isted dcring thc U8C of such techniques by thc CIA reם t thus םea similar requjrem sםcontai

~ Act of2005) the Torture S ~ etaiםםe luding tb.e D iםc , illegal. other statutes -alone or -in ~ gation te iםterrס and the War Crimes Act. would prohibit certain

. combination

p to autborize mתנT _deםt and you are directed by Presi COםfiםned If you are • bythe Army Fie1d Manual and are aUthםriZed interrogation tecbniques that are not

? therefore iJlega!, how would you respond

accept the tםםסd1 will never consider 1aking action inconsistent with the law. 1 aJSO p nנin reason to believe that President T סon. I bave n qסesti hypothetical premise tO tbis

wi1l direct me not 10 follow tb.e law and 1 will fol1ow tbe law. -1 have no expectation of • directions that do not comply witb 1aw וreceiving an

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detention and סtthe full Committcc of my cbanges infOסniםg · Wdl you commit to • interrogation po1icy?

d 1םid tbat detention UndCrStaש e interrogation iS8Uesזof a םiםal est to tbe congressio ltםt!y informed. curreם y and fנוll lligence committees, and 1 am comm.itted to keeping you eזin

al oteמti What is your view of Appendix M of the Army Fie1d Manual (AFM) and its p • of the AFM in order to authorizc gםfur abuse'1 Would you recommend a rewriti

? qucs teehםi gation interrס ve coeזci

1 a1tbםUgh aware of abuse related to Appendix M of1he Army Field Manua1, nםt 1 am posi1ioned to bCtteז have not consulted with the Departmcnt ofDcfense, which may be

provide a view. 1 do not see potential for abuse by tbe C1A and would expect any such activities to comp1y with the-1aw under appropriate oversight.

at otber organizatjons in the aםd ed, 1 will consult with experts at 1110 Agency confiתn If orm appUcation is 8Jl uםif U.S. govemment on whether the Army Field Manual

te of ~ t to gathering vital intelligence to protect tbe country or whether any םeimpedhn . Manual is needed. That said, 1 note tbat this is a manual ariginally ~ y Fi Arנn the

usual for thc CIA 10 play a mוdesigned to govem the armed fon:es and it would be rolc in changes to a manual designed to govorn the oonduct of the Arm.y. If caםtsigםifi

. y comply fנוll es chaםg ent is that such reqנזiזem eםtal any changes are justified, a fundam Aםd • and interrogation of individuals treatmeתt tbc verםiםg witb law, including 1aws go

y carefiנlJ. any such changes would nced to be bued on a clear, justificd nccd and implcmented by appropriatc experts and full ovenight. 1 wou1d ex:pect to consult with the

~ appropriate זסatbat differCםCeS IntelIigencc committees on any םal o מgressi full co . including any cpanges to law tbat would be required

Last August. the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HI'G) released its first • assessment of interrogation best practices. Have you read this report? If 80. what

bave you taken ftom it? leSSOםS

Yes, 1 have read the report. The report is a short overview of se1ected best practiccs, cd and organizcd, 1aםn should be p םns including tbat inteaogation is a team effort, interrogati

is a ~ uses strategies and evidence. 1 took away that the doc teaנn gation intםrro and the stratcgies. 1 certainly respect tbe iםgJ.aתn helpful, bigh level overview of organi7IJtion and p

the fסr der it a contribution to the debate. 1 allow coננsi work that went into the report and . possibility tbat others may have different views however

1DterroptloDProgram 'aמ Comm"*t! Stacly 01 the CIA'. Detgtiop

of the Committee's Study of YיUועmשeasc of the Executive S זe1 public tbם With regard to : eased a press statement tbat stated זe1 the CIA '9 Detention and Interrogatjon Program, yoU

can Ameנ.i wou1d put einstםiti F SeמatOr "It is hard to imagine a sound teason that usion left Open is that her releasc of the םc1 opcrators and their famiUes at risk .... The sad co

report is the rcsult of a narcissistic self·cJ.eansing that is quintcssentially at odds with her

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~ attack at then-Chainnan Dianne Fe YסUr duty to the country." A1though you directed d apply to all mcmbers, from both partics, who supportcd tbe release of wסul your criticisms

• the Executive 8ummary

ve 8WDDl81'Y not be cכcuti Why shou1d your reaction to the Committee's release of the Bx • interpreted 8s antipathy toward the role of congressional oversight of the CIA? Do you

from both parties, who supported the release of the Study ,SםםatOrS . 8 . believe tbat U . ?'~ acted "at odds with [their] duty to the

oversight oסa1 role of congressi rtaםt My statement did not express antipathy toWB1'd the impo strong congressional oversight is eSSentiaI and bclieve 1Iנat ofthe CIA, Indeed, 1 bclieve

. a part of such oversight in my rolc 8s a member of HPSCI םtbat 1 have bee

iנ:nPOrtaםt to 1be Committce, 1 have cxpresscd at lengtb. my views on thc מses In my respo ttכוe ovClSight ofthc CIA and the importance of keCPing the Commi מal o םgresai role of co

1 understand and have a great ~ fully and cummtly informed. As a Member ofthe HPS . our democncy מional oversight ngזessi r the role of co סfappreciation

rted acted at odds ~ No, 1 do· not believe that Senators who supported tbe release oftbe with their duty to thc country. Wbilc 1 stand by my concems about the release ofthe report,

re befס y ofwhich took p1ace over 11 dccade qo aild Iםan , ze tbis discussion of actMties זeali 1 rs and Seםato g1ם joined Congress, is the subject of significant disagreement, inC?ludJng amo . with the Admini.stnltion.

. crous daםg 1 feel strongly that intelligence professionals who are asked to do difficult and f1טl re with law, and do so after מaoompIJ fטl1 tbings that are on bebalf ofthc country 8nd in

deaerve ·our gratitudo, I10t endless ,'iנDtry oonsulUWon witb. thc highcst legal officials ofthe co . ~~~~י~

in full? If not, uמזmaזy 8 When you ma4e those 8CCU8Iitions, had you reBd the Bxccutive • ent? stזrtem by your original Staםd have you read it in fu1l since 1hen? If 90, do you

of the Bxccutive c:םtז h of the major olem eaם made, 1 bad reviewed ~ t statemeם When my . t but had not roviewed in full. 1 bave since reviowed in thc Bxeoutive Summary in ~ S

. by my anSwer above about the statement. Staםd 1 . ful1

PINse detail· any נזmmary? what lessons have yo-q taken frOm the Executive S • .Summaנ:y disagrcemcnts you have with the Executive

not סwזnthat ,AgסnCY the וbThe Executivo Summary details activilies. 8s acknowledged . ding up an activity staם discu.sses the difficulty of וUSO autb.orized. The Exocutive summary

1110 10 us pressure and·tbreat eםdo quiCkly tbat W8S new to the CIA undcr a time of trem a num.ber oflessons leamed that hILVe been aclcnowledged by tbe Wםre country. There

contained .in the rcport. managCםפגסt Agency concerning oversight, complW1ce, and e on h1וv d Jסreport wo 1hפ cems, 1 worried about the .effect tho releaac of םRegardjng co

Americans serving overseas and the message tbat CIA officezs might draw:ftom its conclusions.

aםd ofthe charges תrecitatio f1טl thc rebuttals are voluminous. A aםd The report OblllD8's admjDistration bas deםt countercharges would be impo8si'ble in this fonnat. Presi

drawn ~ olusio coם mary and the זim ts with the Executive S םeof dis8greem mגmber detai1ed a my Oסt m the activity. 1 have not carried fi.יo teUigence gathered םiin the report about the . on and .Admiתistrati g with 1he view ofthe םiown investiga1ioDs but have no basis !or disagree

lligשם:c ofthc intc VaנUe intelligence profcsaionaJs who have sct furth their view ofthe 1 ovenight and ngressjpםal example of aggressivc co מagathered. HowcvC1', thc report is

corc to our sנrcspect thc Committee's work, cspecia11y its owrsight function, which . . democracy

? 80 If not, wi11 you agree to do וtHave you read the fulI. classified Study. or portions thereo •

I've :read the unclassified Executive summary and small parts of the classitied study. If confirmed, 1 will be happy to review parts ofthe clusified Study relcvant to the pOsitiQJl of

. the SSCL aםd DCIA

there have been no םgaיYeaמJ of the Executive summary over two נ:eI.eaSO Since the • cations 1hat tb.e release resulted in attacks on Americans. what lessoD8 have you iםdi

? this frסm taken

vo SU1IlIIlB1Y on eouם act of the Bx hםp 1 have not reviewed any asscssmen18 about tbe or other negativc consequences from the release. Ifit ia the case .AmeriCaםS attacks against

.rtuםate attacks. wc are fo oםhave bcen נ:זזeגItthat

on and Interrogation Program wu operated"with Deteםti You bave stated that thc CIA's • mo ChJdrman ~ b tמםdid insteiת Fe SeםatOr » r Fcinstein. Seםato the full know1edge of

fWl Committeo about the thפ unti1 2009. The CIA has not disputed that it first briofed w88 initiatcd. שמrg6, 2006, morc tban four years after the pro pteזnber gnun on Se pIס

' ll knowledge" on bebalf of ftנ" Do you bavc any additional infurmation to indicate ? committee members

haa re1eased AdםנiniStratiOn 1 understand that the .תo :infסnnati 1 do not have additional provided to numerous members ofthe congressiona1 fiםgs records detailing the brie

that briefings did not include eזתtaםd leadership and intelligence committees and now und til the fu1l Committeeםס 2006 .

Rם ditIo תItransfeם

to tםםTorturc, AgaiםSt on 'V1םtiCoם tbe Uםder ,oם The United States recognizes its obligati are tIנere te a person to another state where eאJradi refoule,r') or '( retUr.ם. expeI. "

".tortשe of being subjected to daםger tial grounds for be1ieving that he would be in substaם

------------------------. - ----

? a1l circumstances מiDo you support this prohibiti.on •

. Yes, 1 support complying with current law

provide intelligence or other support to an סtor were .iמ lved ~ If the CIA were inv • extradition or rendition, to what extent do you believe the CIA shou1d direct resources to

. danger iמ. ee is detaiם t1נe that viםg ds for belie םucoDect on whe1her there are substantial gro ? subjected to torturc · beiםg of

. 1 understand CIA directs intelligence resources to understand the practices of other

. countries,. including at times the treatment of detained persons by other countries. As 1 bave the U .8. adb.eres to certain obligatioDS related to stmנduםder 1 , other responses מioutlined

fers of a ·person and CIA would respond 10 inte11igence traמs American involvement in lligence priorities and i.םtc pursuant to sםer and ob1igatio tזansf requirements related to such

. . • tasking

ent rely on (Cdipiomatic assurances" provided by erםm. To what extent sh0111d tbe U.S. Gov • be ssסrances 8 countries to which ddainees may be extradited or rendered? Should such

? tries with estab1ished records of committing torture -ש:נaccepted from co . .

1 understand that assurances provided by other countries have been a valuable too! for y to ~ other countries are ~ ensuring 1hat detainees are tn:ated hum.ane1y. In most

matter. Like any rt8םt treat assurances provided to the United States government as an impo ces shou1d be assessed on a case-by-case basis in םathe cIed.ibi1ity of any assur COmmitmeננt,

the diםg proVi uםtry uding the practices ofthe co ~ e1evant factors, 1זight of a11 the assurances as well as tbat country's record of complying with similar.surances provided to

. ted States and otber countries iםthe U

ftary eo.mmissioDS תGuantanamo aud m

captured by the US abroad shou1d uaגs You have m.ade comments indicaiing that indivld • . . . in 8מco_ssiQ . ז,ary federa1 .. court, .. but rather in.the mili מinot be·.prosecuted ....

comm.ems were made before many of the problems with tb.e rטGuantanamo. Som.e of Yo sftגl aI succes םus sdditio eזo s became apparent end before nmn םcommissio נםilitarY

of termrists in fed.era1 court. Given these deve1opments, do y01,1 still believe sםconvictio in tbe military ~ that terronst suspeCts captured abroad shou1d a1ways be pro

commissions or are there circumstances in which it is more appropriate to try them in federa1 court?

played s1מ spoke publically regarding my be1iefthat military commissio ,yנnaker As a po]ic an important role protecting America.and ensuring the prosecution ofterrorists Captureci

certain situatiODS, federal court may be a suitable venue, depending on the nature מJabroad. 'Ibe decision regarding .taנi.ces ofthe individual's conduct, the charges. and other circums :

de by tbe DCIA. riוa the appropriate method for detention and prosecution is not

.... --...... --------------

e of disputes becaסs The triaIS in the mllitary oommi&1!jODS have been delayed in part • terrogationProgram. םIand eten1ioם s D יonrelBted to the CIA mt'oםתati gess to ~ over

. ? How would you propose to resolve these disputes and accelerate the tria1s 1 understand that CIA has provided the Office ofthe ChiefProsecutor for the M"Jlitary

,sform.er 'cזA thפ ormati,onre18ted to iםf Commi_onsaccess:to a1aige amountof and Interrogation Program in order to meet its discoWry obligatioD8 and prepare מDetentio

a. ~ o Bay. Guaםtaםam secutions conducted at the U.S. Nava1 Base at םrfor the pending p 10 CIA continues to ptovide this assistance eמSUriננg ed, 1 will be committed to oם:fimג. If c

. sources .m methoc;ls ~ secutor, while also protecting U.S. Pזo the Chief

o at tbat 1aננam. y 19,2013, you stated tbat none of those who we.re still in Guan נlסon • the' Periodic Review Board has determined tbat theם, time shou1d be released. 8ince

.. oנi additi nנ• ty deםti. mistaken i מסseveral individua1s were detained based at least in part according to Inte1Iigence Community estimates, the majority of released detainees are

lives. Do these developments change your 2013 assessment?.Are there cefטl Hving pea ? to home or tbird countries tranSfeיזrםd circumstances in which individua1s may be

1he Periodic Review Board is an interagency en1ity responsible for detetmining whether a םst order to protect agai מi~ימaת.t ee is wa םcontiriued law ofwar detention of a detai

• It is vi1ai that the Periodic Review ~ t tb.reat to the security of the United Stat oaם. signifi reIated to a detainee when making its decision. eםce sider all relevaUt inteUig םBoard co

e case ofmistak:en identity - if it wcre to be dctemdned t1'ט Obviously, ifthere were to be a W8S not that person - then continued detention מbeHeved to bc in in dotentio PeזSסn that a

on should be ended. In every case, the rנnati o iםf' oftbat person based on tb.e erroneoU9 . tanamo detainees is limited Guaם g נ:cgardin CIA's role

, amo? Please describe tbe oircumstances aםtan Gu iמ. Who, if anyone, should be detained • t such a detention. warraם inc1uding membership in wbich groups, that wou1d

• ding tbat tbe CJA does not decide who should be detained. at the U.S taסננnders It is my and deםt Bay. Such decisioDS ultimately are made by the Presi GUan.taםamO Nava1 Base in

o are designated as Gםושtanam y detained at נוmmt1 1b.e individua1s c .םgre8S the U.S. Co 1s or persODS engaged in hostilities agajnst tbe Uni1ed States'or i:ts זan enemy comba

' . armed coDf1ict מacoa1ition partners during

en ~ mentP יםlReJationshiD8 with ForeigD Partners and U.s. Goye

ue a םDirector Brennan's August 6, 2016, letter 'stated that "[w]hen we choose to conti • ofhuman rights abuses. by individuals associated oמs 1iaison reJationship despite allegati

our fםiמםothat we take several steps to reqUhיeS with a liaison service: CIA policy rigbts abuses. First, maם. h1l tישefiג the risk of mitigatס d to םaartםeנ:s p eתt U.S .. Govermn

seek the chief of aםd cerםs we ad.vise tb.e local Chief ofMission ofClA's con • to·continuethe 1iaison re1atio.nship." Which. U.S םיct on w1urth iמpu s יםMissio

the CIA decides to Wheם rmed iםfo ld be ןוoGove.mment partners do you be1ieve sh . . rights abuses? what role umaם of h sםcontinue a liaison reJationship despite al1egatio

l

. otb.er components of tb.e U.S aםd shou1d thc Bureau of Intelligence and Research oations of these relationships? ~ ent of State play in <:onsidering tbe po1icy םpartm D

te with the local ~ ed, CIA wi11 continue to co confiתn מוa1 AB is standing practioe, if rights violations. 1 a1so umaם any credible aIlegations of h . gardiםg Chief ofMission re

sbip with the םlatio ג:e anticipate CIA continuing to coordinate CIA's intention to <:ontinue a p. CIA םshi o זe1ati llaison service in question. In weigbing the risk-benefit factor of each

ual Hmnan Aמn deration the Department of State's םsi also continue to take into co שWnמa select basis. and if appropriate, CIA may a1so info מO• Rights Report for each <:oun1ry

other U.S. Govemment partners of any bllman rigb.ts issues tbat cou1d affect the equi.ties of . the·other U.S. Govemment partner

10 22 U.S.C. 3927 states tbat "Underthe direction ofthe President, the chief ofmission • and ~ a foreign country ..• shall have fun responsibility for the direction, coorcUnatio

Do you " ••• untrיy ch employees in tbat co bזan supervision of all Government executive m the President. the CIA is obligated to cease יסifbeIieve that, absent direction

intelligenceI activities, including but Dot limited to 1iaison relationsbips tbat do not bave ? the approval of the cbief of mission

The relationship between the CIA and the Department of siate is crucial, both in e :fie1d. 1 look furward to .worldng with the Department of State on t1,נ. Washington and in

e aמs confirmed as Director. If a disagreement should im1 .נ if .erם conc mUtטa1 issues of with the Department of State <:oncernmg a CIA intelligence activity, 1 will seek. 10 resolve

circumstances in זare tbe extrem.ely מi, disagreement with the Secretary of s1ate or ~ guidance ftom tbe President. fנוrther whioh the disagreement cQu1d nOt be resolved, seek

Please desoribe how you would weigh. the oosts and beneDts of working with a liaison • service tbat has engaged in buman rigbts abuses? what lim.itations do you believe

g with foreign partners who may use 01Jl מte1ligence sban םJshould be placed on ? nts or' violate human rights oםe intelligence to repress political opp

, fits Qf ~~ c;osts and be ~ ~~~~~ ch qe ~ _e ~ 9Il,_jfJlon_fjrm ~ der my ~ U ~ . Jman rights abuse will continue ןh מiwith a liaison service alleged to bave engaged kiםg wor

individual basis, balancing the unique utility or specific access a aמ. to be weighed on palncu1ar llaison service could provide. . Any decision to continue a llaison re1ationship should only be made ifthe value to thc re1a1ionsbip clearly outweighs tbe risk of1bture

be made on ~ potential human.rights abuse. A decision to limit a liaison relationship shou1 . om liaison service to liaison servioe tiי basis and will differ ייCBSe a case-by

i! iתb uמta Aceo

The CIAts RCsponsc to the Committee Study inoluded a reoommendation to broaden the • , e ~ ed by tb.e ~ y systemic issues rev מaaddress 'יto scope of accountability reviews c

and 10 expand the scope ofthe review as warranted to include officers responsible for ? this recommendation gםDo you commit to implementi '.י problems ~ those systemi

.-------. ---- -----

n 1 understand 1hat tbe CIA has made im.provements in this area, wbicb, if ooתW1 ~nfiש. ve hםpro on1inue to look for ways to ~ implement. AB Director" 1 wi1l

ssia Rם

-elect's deםt morale at tbe CIA from 1be presi מסHow do you assess the im.pact • ed, oם:fum comments about the CIA's analysis on Russia and the U.S. election? If c

Ou address 1bis impact? וhow wou1d

, At this time, 1 am not in a posi1ion to make a judgment on this question. Genera1ly that their job remains to ~ however, if confirmed, 1 will make clear 10 the workfo

. objectively aםd d to analyze it faitbfully םaprovide and collectthe best intelligence

Before the election, you wrote that, CC[t]he next commander-in-chiefmust be clear­• tbe :face of terrorism, Putin's imperiaIism, and מiבשinguםtUn and ~ eyed, steel-hearte

be ref1eoted m intelligence acti.vities and tuזe Chinese aggression." How shou1d that pos ' ? ties iזprio

Ca1 ם onal security challenges on the horizon than at any otb.er tim.e םati The U.S. hu more and םbe to array our collectio שWobs as .Director נremember. If contirmed, one ofmy

and t1בreatS urgency on the most critical enSUrס t tbese threats to agaiננs ytic 1'eSOUICCS aםa1 . tor rising issues iםglobal coverage to mo

gence Adiylt:ies שThe White Housc and IDte

Co.mmittees Investigating tb.e I1'8I1-Contra Affair oםal The Report of the Congressi • (November 1987) found that: "The NSC staff was created 10 give the President policy

oreign policy iS8Ue8. Here, however. it WQ8 'll8ed ןadvice on major national securtty and t ope,.ations. This departure from its p,.oper ויigence and conduct cove ו/to galher inte

tjimcti01l8 conח buted topolicy jat1.שיeגג

Do you agree with the dangers of intelligence collection and cove11 operations the Iran-Contra report? Bow, 8s CIA מiucted by the White House, as described dםco

ure that intelligence activities are conducted by tbe eםs you seek to שW, Director ?oםgress 10 C ~ ity and מuIntelJigence Comm

1 agree that intelligence Rctivities must be conducted within the comprehensive statutory ecנוrity S םal 502 ofthe Natio SeCtiםם. ent under requireםנ ework. In addition to the fiיam

ed" of i.םfoמn Act to keep tb.e congressiona1 hrtelligence committees "fu1ly and current1.y aJl intelligence activities, " Section 503 requires that the "heads of all deparlmcmts, "

ent involved in a covert acrtion shaU Goveנ:nm agen.cies, and en1ities ofthe,United States rmed of al1 iםfo y זuיrentו. ttees fully and c comנםi onal intelligence gזessi keep the con

or are canied out for ו,ged in b eםga aזe ( covert actions which are the respoDSibDity o ". d states Govemment םiteע departm.ent, agency, or entity ofthe וo( an be1וalf Oמ: or

----_-

onal Overaigb.t זuיס!sBi Co

to סYO iם.StrUCted use םHbe if t1w President or the white םse What would your respo • ? Committee fטll m the fiס rmation סfםiwitbhold

and staff ofthe congressional MeוnberS ed, 1 will commit to keeping the nfiמn If oo ecr ofthe CIA's inte11igence activities, מniםfo tly םeזnוc:intelligence committces "fuIly and

rized disolosure of classified uתautho consistent with due regard for the proteotion from " y oםall g to sensi1ive inte1ligence SOUICeS and methods or other excepti atiם on rel mנa1i o iםf

As a general princip1e. 1 will recommend that CIA brieftbe fUIl .ייsensitive matter8 . h. has 1כranc סvCommittee. Note. hawever, the President, as the head of the executi

on. Such מnatiiםfo of properly classi:6.ed executivo branch uזe ovcr thc discl08 aUthסritY aflon 8s the law requires, but also to מחoauthority includes tbe responsibility to disclose inf

ty, and protect the secוni e such measures 8s deem.ed necessary to protect national גשdertak privi1eges and confidences neccissary for tbe President to fulfill the oflice's consti.tutional

. . mmes

its staff for aSSeSSmenU of the poIicy, budgetary and legal מOThe Committee relies • that al1 staff, eםSUring you commit to וll vities. W aםti s of intelligence מimplicatin

? including membcr designees, are read into all CIA programs

and staff of1he congressional embetיs ed, 1 will commit to keepjng the M coם:fiמn If intelligence committees "fu)ly and current1y informed" ofthe CIA's inteIIigence aCtivities, ,

thorized disclosure of cIassified uמau consistent with due regard for the protection from " ve intelligence sources and m.ethods or other exceptionally seתsiti rmation re1ating to iםfo

has branCנh, s." Note, howevcr, thc Prcsident, 8s tho head of1hc·executive nנatteI sensitive nnation. SUOO. infס authority over the disclosure of properly classitied executive· branch

so to גaudcs thc responsibi1ity 10 disclose information 8s the law reqWrcs, but iתcl authority ty, and protect the ~ onal םati measures deemed necessary to protect SUםh Uמdertake

duties. םal privileges and confidences necessary!or the President to the office's constitutio His determination that all StafJ not be read into all CIA programs may we11 bc appropriate

ertain inנd limi Cפes circ tבmStancגז.

. in CirCUםנStaת.CeS y מawhat is your view of the ., Oang of Eight" provision? Are tbere • it be used to Caם ? itive tactica1 matters tim.e-seםs which it can be used for other . than

1imit briefings on activities other than covert action and, if 80, what wou1d bc thc h statutory basis forםsed in which it can be ~ limitations? Are there uy circ SUס

t legal analyses ificaם grams or sign prס ing סgftom the full Committee OD COםCeal 10 ? igence ·activities iםtell related to

oםa1 i ngזess staff·ofthe co aםd Ifcon:firmeci, 1 will commit to 1ceeping the Members , ce actiVities lligeת s inte יy informed" ofthe CIA urreםtl intelHgence committees "fully and c ·

disc10sure of c1assified נוnaUthOriZed Kconsistcnt with due regard for the protection ftom 1ating to sensitive intell1gence sources and m.ethods or other exceptionally םrinformation

cb, has braם sensitivc matters." Note, however, the President, as 1he head ofthc executive n. such םiתformati authorlty over the disclosure of properIy classified exeautive branch

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I I

authority includes the responsibiIity to disclose information as 1he law requires, but also to tiona! security, and protect tbe aםundertake Sllch me8sures deemed necessary to protcct

ll the office's constitutiona1 נfprivileges and confidences necessary for the President to :ful • duties

Designations o{ Terrorist Groups

Regarding covert action, Section 503 of tb.e National Security Act provides that if thc g or diם es that it is essential to limit a.ccess to a covert action fin etemנin President d

notification may be limited ~ notification of a change to a previously approved covert Bctio .rity members ofthe congressional intelligence miם.o to the chairrnen and ranking

ty iזcommittees, the Speak.er and minority leader ofthe House ofR.epresentatives, tb.e majo and minority leaders ofthe Senate, and "such other member or members ofthe congressiona11eadership aS may be included by tb.e President." When the President

for sםthat notification should be limited, a written statement ofthe reaso deteםnineS , limiting access will be provided. The Act requires that not later 1han 180 days thereafter

ssional intelligence committee.s מgre the President shall ensure tbat aI.l members ofthe co are notified, or provide a statement ofreasons why access to the notification must remain limited. Furthennore, when covert action notification is limited, the Act requires tbBt the President notify all congressional inte11igence committee members that notification has been limited to those individua1s noted above, as well as provide a general description

aIl iמg regarding the finding or notification, consistent with the reasons for not inform . m.em.bers ofthe committee

If con:finned as Director of CIA, you mBy havc some input into govemment • s. Please םst organi2:atio תdetenninatioDS about whioh groups should be designated terro · should be used to make suoh a ~ provide details about the criteria you belie

tion. Once B designation is made, how broadly do you bclieve it should apply teנ.mina de ? to affiliated groups and individuals

ds nםon" dep orgaםizati rist סneרderstand that thc criteria used in designating a group a c םu1 gםates upon tbe context m whioh the designation is being made. The Secretary of State desi

"Foreign Terrorist Organizations," for examplc, in 8CcOldance with seotion 219 ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Bs amended. The criteria for such a designation

be a foreign organization; it must engage סst on m gaםizati the statute. The or מiare set forth in terrortst activity or retain the capability and intent to engage in terroriSt activity or

Btionals or the ם. terrorism; and its terrorist activity must threaten tbe seourity ofU.S ed, 1 will ensure that CIA provides tbe confuיm nited States. If סnational security ofthe

'ble for making designation determinations with the relevant intelligence to respoננsנ. agencies • their review מnםfo help i

would you take to ensure that MusJim civil rights and advocacy סres What meas • not adversely a:ffected as a result of these aזe groups, as well as legitimate charitiesJ

? tions gמa desi

Use 01 Lethal Force

1 .

I I I ! ! i

I i ו

: i i ו

!

If confirmed, 1 will ensure that CIA continues to conduct its intelligence ·mission in a duly t aut:horit:ies, including Executive Order תcטrre 8uthorized and appropri.ate manner under its

ure that sםguidelines. 1 wlll a1so e ~ 12333 and its implementing Attomey General-approv -a non מry mission and conducts its mission i tסtaש CIA remains focused on its s

• discriminatory manner

plicatiODS of targetinS or otb.erwise ~ Please describc your view of the lega1 and policy • 1aסםa U.S. G()vernment letbal operation. what additi מknowingly ki11ing a U.S. person i

? public transparency do 'you be1ieve would be warranted in that situation

• ted States iתIn previOus con:flicts, U.S. citizens fought in foreign armies against the U including with tb.e Axis counmes during World War n. Today, th.e:re are American citizen

. 8 . members ofISIS and a]-Qa'ida. Som.e ofthem are in Iraq and Syria-where 1he U thai םfirm Government is bombing. Longstanding Iega1 principles and court deoisions co

. t ftom attack ~ a comb ~ g a U.S. citizen does not imm beUנ

18 e United States knows in advance that the specifi.c object ofits attack t1נ. However, wben . in ~ an individual U.8. citizen, it proceeds on the assumption tbat constitutiona1 righ

particular, tb.e Fifth Amendment's Due Process C1ause and the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable searches and seizures--attach 10 1he U.S. citizen even while םסprohibition

10 wfטl the individua1 is abroad. Those rights are·considered in assessing whcthe.r it is la . • target the individual

. .ן

lethal strikes that are carried bסtwee.ם. The Obama adminis1ration.has ·IIiade a distinction • and those that take place :יostili1ies ~ p1aces it considers part of"areas of active מiout

. as weU as the appIicatioIi of 1be םoutside 1b.ese areas. Do you support this distinctio dance Gטi standards, requirements, and guidelines contained in the Presidentia1 Policy

suggest. שWyou sתe any modificatio 1כ(pPG)? If not, please descn

PPG provides policy standards and procedures for ~ The 22 May 2013 Direct Actio d.ertaking direct action against terrorist targets.outside the United States and outside areas םu

of acti.ve hostilities. Tbe phrase "areas of active hostilities" is not a le8aI term. of art-it is a is an םgio ~ n&tion that a ;teםח terin specific to the PPG. For tbe purpose ofthe PPG, the de ty of שten םiaםd 8S, the sCOpe זזactive hostilities' takes intO 8CCOunt, among other .thi fםcarea

y considereci to be. "areas of active נוrrent1 a are c yגi$ Iraq, and ,ghaםistan the flghting. Af In םs. in tb.ose locatio .oםs t apply to operati סhostilities," which means that tbe PPG does n

tb.e policy standards contained in the PPG exceed the requirements of1he law of ~ e geם to participate i,n any interagency laם ed, 1 would p confiמn armed contlict. Were 1 to be

• evaluation ofthe PPG and its jmplications for tbe war on terrorism

g requirements on םrםDo you support Executive Order 13732 vmich inoludes pubIic repo • comba1ant" and ''non-combatanf' casualties for strikes that take pla.ce outside areas' of "

g civilian viם den1s invol iנmi active hostilitics; a commitment to review or investigate izations in that מcasualties and to consider :information from non-govemmental orga

who viliaםs a payments to ci gזati rcview; and a commitmentto provide as appropr.ia1e ex Ifnot, please ?stזikes . s 'Who are 1dned in u.s iviliaם to the families of c זסare injured

. you would suggest sמdescribe any modificatio

states Policy on Pre- and Post-Sttike Measures To םited Executive Order 13732 on U Address Civi1ian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use ofForce describes the .

the use viמg in the context of operations invol aםs U.S. Govemm.ent's efforts to protect civili ed, 1 am coinmitted to ensuring that מfiמn y civilian casualty is tragic. and if co ננA. of force

whi1e מs, rism operatio untertenס le effective co eתab to ~ CIA provides 1imely inte . . • lives iםnocent preventing the loss. of

on Decembcr.2.2015, now-President-eleat Donald Tramp stated tb.e following: "The • when you get these וeir families ~ other tbing with the terrorists is you have to take out

t kid יםterrorists, you have to take out their families. They care about their lives, do yourself. Whcn they say they don't care about th.eir lives, you have to tak.e out their

ona11aw? terםatiiם ies." Do you agree tbat this would be a viol8tion of ךfaמn

u1d be impIicated by םw, both U.S. and internationa1 ~ 1 undersbm.d that a variety ofla to the·UfS., i1s alIies, or otherwise a tIוreat a tiםg ofpersons not presen etiםg targ םa1 intentio

d tbat a num.ber of Jaws may prohibit such derstaם. lawful target under exis&g Jaw. 1 un damage that 1l8teraנ. of co sםon the specific context (such BS consideratio diםg depen etiםg targ

1 may result from activity directed at.a lawful target). As stated throughout my answers, . ed B.S DCIA n:6מn will always act in accordance with the law should 1 be co

lםm

has said that undoing the Joint Comprehensive PIan of Action :reםםaם Director B • JCPOA) wou1d bc "disastrous'" and the ''heigbt of foUy" and wou1d.risk empowering (

d ~ CPOA w נt do you be1ieve the dismantling of tbe iנnpac \Y]בat . hard1iners in Jran and stability? SeCנזritY Iran and on regiona1 םסbave

• look. 1 anticipate that the U.S :fiיesh sue, which deserves a וUTbis is a complicatcd range ofIran's activities, :ftom f1נוl and the .lנ:aם, relationship with the Islamic Republic of

will be ~ bi1ity and supporting iiוsta 10 fomenting םe proliferatio ם$sil nuc1ear and . 1 will endeavor 10 answer COnfirנn.ed. top ofmind for tbe President-elect. Oenerally, if

1 • the Agency frםm the best analysis סsing a strictly objecti"e basis מOsuch questiODS make סtpolicymakers, not nמo bנf' 10 will be always mindfu] 1bat the DCIA's role is

. . poIicy

regime tbat existed prior to the JCPOA sםDo you beJieve that the intemational sanctio • agreement? זhe om :liי wa1 ~ the ewnt of a uni1ate11ll U.S. jמ, could be rebuilt

. Please refer to my answer. above.

Uםder classified setting, it is זm. that, ''Jn an ~ You stated, at a roundtable with reporter • an nuclear capacity. This is not an insurmountable task Iraםi 2,000 sorti.es to destroy tbe

for the coa1ition forces." what do you be1ieve would be t:b.6 cODSequences of miIitary ?~ t Ir aiםs operanons ag

Iran would have profound geopolitica1 agaiםSt Certainl.y, major military action of any kind 1 . w.h.e.re U.S. action would be taken. nםconsequences for the U.S. and at least in the regi

the option of Iast resort and ~ eertainly subscribe to the view that military action should • onal powcr to bear before resorting to force םati ts of eמien that tb.e U.S. should bring aU el

g intelligence to םiIf confirmed, 1 will be committed to the DCIA's role :in provid . t making policy סpolicymakers, n

BudgetaryMatters

ty, cou1d uםi and the broader Intelligence Comm ~ where do you believe the C • , resources? Wbere do you believe 1b.ere is waste ~ creas םibenefit ftom

. of lower strategic priorities where there are opportunities for ~ inefficiencies. or ? cost savings .

ntelligence Comm.unity זThe range, diversity. and immed.iacy ofthe issues that tbe fuces each day is formidable. 8nd it is even more complex with tbe pace of technological advancem.en1s. A stable budget environment is key to enabling the

10 tenn investments necessary gםIntelligence Community to :ma1re puq)osefullo . address these challenges. My underStandmg is tbat CIA is weJl postured to take on

resomces would enable the agency to' advance ם.a1 However, additio ~ those challenges . technology at afasterpace and im.prove.the Agency's abiIity to deal with the

source to conduct its mission is eזost important ~ ofthe future. The CIA's צtuncertain a workforce aiם develop, .and ret ~ ust ,contInue to attra ~ the agency's workforce, and it

1 will work with the COn:6rנned, ~ .. ges we face םethat is prepared to take on tbe chall d t1re most efficient םity to fi mןDNI and my colleagues across the Intelligence Comm

to the. CIA, 1 will drive for the most terםal our vital mission. In cti.סg way of condu .. efi'ective use of our resources and to align tbem to tb.e highest priorities

Attitudes Toward Islam.

tbat our MusJim partners overseas ו:msure ed as Director, how would you םfinn If co • ? on ~ t to work with tbe United States during tbis AdminiA waם continuc to

Foreign govemments and partnCD, of aIl types; choosC to work.with CIA w1nm they view the partnership as in their own national interest. 1 understand CIA bas many areas

of issues incIuding e<rtrטm across a sp eזs ofmutual interest and concem with partn c, terrorism, pro1ireration, environmental, and תii econo ,זnity politica1, military, sec

gence and security challenges, working with 1שec.hnologica1. In addition to shared in.te . and status 1hat arenot יabilities ~ the U.S. andCIA brings 8 combination ofresources,

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thc coפtinuo. ed, 1 will ~ 8IIti1ies. If :סנcoun1ries ~ with WOrkiםg וb~. with foreign govemments aזtםets1נlps p StrOננg ;מAgenay's efforts to bufid ancl ma1nta

. cusing on םfוby Muslim countries, iתant1 those:D:om predom udiםg l ~ .aזt:םers lIIld p • thesC'areas ofmutual concern and in1erests

1hat. MusJim CJA empJ.oyees eםSםre OU וd lססwed as' CIA Director, how onfiםn Jl c • ~ in thB OfIiCe of the וthat thcy have an aI1 aמ.d are pro1eCted and valued יthסY feel .

reCrטit to COםtiםUס tbe abllity of thc CIA.to aiתtajrj Dkector? How would you m made בתmarkS giםg 1age amidst tb.e dispara Jשrl OfIiCerS of MusIim. or Middle-Eastem

? g Administration nוiniםco · af the bnנeםום.by ,

10 that diversity' is critical ~ making it clear10 the wmk םםטapl שW1 ed, cםם:fiםn Jf rwise PIA's mission. 1 wi1l othם gg take &DYנוt10 eition sוש S1.Y contrary veryנזbedOו

employee based .aס.y agaiםSt atjon mUנ Djscri aCtiגנם. thc approprjate remedial okiםg mv . ' be to1erated. םot ble and'wm oםa ligiQD is deep1y objec1i eיזtbeir מO.

1.,

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