DAWES-Religion without God-ARTICLE.pdf

7/28/2019 DAWES-Religion without God-ARTICLE.pdf

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subject of the third talk in Jesus Reconsidered and of a book-length study

published some years later, Resurrection: A Symbol of Hope(1971).[3] it

happens, I believe this book to be Geerings best. But once again, it is not

representative of his broader concerns. What I want to focus on is Geeringsunderstanding of the doctrine of the incarnation and its implications for

Christian faith. What shall I argue? As Geering himself notes, his view of the

incarnation is very similar to that found in the early work of the nineteenth-

century philosopher and critic of religion, Ludwig Feuerbach (180472). But

Feuerbachs later work, I shall suggest, is more straightforwardly atheistic. It

lacks the positive reinterpretation of religious belief which we find in

Geerings work. The question my discussion raises is this: If we share

Feuerbachs view of religion, then how should we live? Should we follow the

early Feuerbach and embrace the Christianity without God of which LloydGeering is an advocate? Or should we follow the later Feuerbach and cut loose

from our religious heritage altogether? What is the point in using the term

God when we no longer believe in the supernatural being to which that term

has traditionally referred? And perhaps there are dangers in the continuing

use of religious language, dangers which a more straightforward atheism

would avoid.

The Early FeuerbachTheology as Anthropology

In our own day, Ludwig Feuerbach is a neglected figure. If he is referred to at

all, it is generally by students of religion. Even then he is, perhaps, more often

mentioned than read. But for his contemporaries, he was a figure of

considerable standing, and not only for the study of religion. He was

considered to have played a vital role in the movement from the philosophical

idealism represented by the work of G.W.F. Hegel (17701831) to the

materialist philosophy of Karl Marx (181883). Marx himself pays tribute to

Feuerbachs significance in his Theses on Feuerbach, written in 1845 but

published by his collaborator Frederick Engels only in 1886, as an appendix to

Engelss own study of Feuerbachs philosophy.[4] Engels himself describes

Feuerbach as the post-Hegelian philosopher who had the most influence on

the development of Marxist thought. Given this fact, it is particularly

appropriate that the chapter on Feuerbach in Geerings Faiths New Ageis

followed by one on Marx, in which Marxism is described as one of the new

forms of religion in the post-Enlightenment world.[5] Historically, this is

surely the correct context in which to discuss Feuerbachs ideas.

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The Role of Feuerbach

What role, then, is played by Feuerbach in Geerings work? One similarity

between the two authors may be noted immediately. While Feuerbach wrote

his first major work on what he called The Essence of Christianity(1841), he

wrote even less than Geering about the historical figure of Jesus. Feuerbach is

familiar with the biblical criticism of his time, particularly the work of his

contemporary (and later admirer) David Friedrich Strauss (180874), but he

does not consider its results to be particularly significant. Indeed when

Feuerbach cites Strauss, he generally refers to Strausss Die christliche

Glaubenslehre (1840),[6]which is a work on the history of Christian thought,

rather than to Strausss more famous The Life of Jesus Critically

Examined(1835).[7] In other words, Feuerbach is more interested in the

Christ of faith than in the Jesus of historyit is Christian beliefaboutJesus,

rather than the figure of Jesus himself, that is the focus of his attention.[8]

Feuerbach has little sympathy for the traditional understanding of the

Christian doctrine of the incarnation. Indeed he is convinced that this

doctrine suffers from certain fatal contradictions. What Feuerbach is

interested in is how such an absurd doctrine could have arisen, and whether it

still has any significance. This is, of course, a familiar project. Since the

eighteenth century, there have been scholars of religion who have attempted

to explain the puzzling fact of religious belief, after having become convincedof its falsity. The tradition may be said to begin with David Hume (171176),

whose two works on religionthe Dialogues Concerning Natural

Religion(1779) and The Natural History of Religion(1757)neatly embody

the philosophical-evaluative task on the one hand and the anthropological-

explanatory on the other.[9] tradition continues in our own day in the work of

thinkers such as Stewart Elliot Guthrie (who has the audacity to call his

reworking of Humes ideas a new theory of religion), Scott Atran, and,

perhaps most impressively, Pascal Boyer.[10]

So when Geering turns to Feuerbach, it is for two reasons: firstly, tounderstand how it is that human beings have come to believe in God, and

secondly, to reflect on Feuerbachs interpretation of the doctrine of the

incarnation. The two issues are closely connected, at least in Feuerbachs The

Essence of Christianity. But lets start with Feuerbachs theory of religion, in

particular the Christian religion. What does Feuerbach argue? His central

contention may be stated very briefly. What Feuerbach argues is that the true

sense of Theology is Anthropology,[11] anthropology here being understood

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as a doctrine of human nature, of what it means to be a human being. More

precisely, for Feuerbach, what people refer to as God is in fact a projection of

certain human qualities. As he writes,

God as an extramundane being is . . . nothing else than the natureof man withdrawn from the world and concentrated in itself, freed

from all worldly ties and entanglements, transporting itself above

the world, and positing itself in this condition as a real, objective

being.[12]

While this may appear a simple thesis, it emerges from a number of lines of

argument, which a more detailed study would try to disentangle. [13] But we

may readily grasp the central thrust of Feuerbachs claim. Religion, he

suggests, is an objectification of the idealised attributes of humanity. How did

this objectification occur? Religion arises when the individual, in his

encounter with other people, becomes aware of his own limitations.[14] But he

becomes aware of his own limitations only by becoming aware of the

perfection, the absence of limitation, that is characteristic of the human

species.[15] Discomforted by his own by his own sense of limitation, the

individual creates the idea of perfect being, one in whom the essential

attributes of the human speciesreason, feeling, and willare expressed.[16]

It follows that if I worship what I think of as God, I am actually worship

human nature,[17] what I take to be Gods love for me is nothing other than

my self-love deified.[18] least some of the contradictions in Christian

theology arise from the tensions that emerge when these human attributes are

idealised. Of particular significance is the tension between the idealised

attributes of intellect and feeling.[19] Indeed in Feuerbachs view, the

Christian God consists of nothing other than an impossible combination of

personal and metaphysical predicates.[20]

Religion as Alienation and Self-Knowledge

What are the implications of this, Feuerbachs early view of religion? On theone hand, it means that religious belief is a delusion and a source of

alienation.[21] By attributing these human powers to a divine being, religion

deprecates the human: insofar as these powers are attributed to God, human

beings are deprived of them.[22] Christianity in particular cuts individuals off

from the community of fellow human beings by exalting the individual over

the collective.[23] It also cuts human being off from the natural world by

creating a deity removed from nature and by offering individuals the

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religion, or rather of religion as it has been up to now.[29]

What he objects to, Feuerbach continues, is the way traditional religion turns

poetry into prose, mistaking the objects of human imagination for actual

beings.

The Doctrine of the Incarnation

Geering also endorses Feuerbachs reinterpretation of the doctrine of the

incarnation, the belief that God became a human being in the person of Jesus.

[30] For Feuerbach, the doctrine of the incarnation is first and foremost an

expression of belief in the love of God. It is out of love that God laid aside his

divinity, as it were, to become a human being, for God is love. But God is

love, Feuerbach argues, should not be understood as though love were a mere

predicate, a mere characteristic of a deity who exists independently of that

love. A deity who existed independently of love would be an omnipotent

being, but an omnipotent being is something quite other than a loving God; he

isin Feuerbachs wordsa severe power not bound by love.[31] reality

expressed by the statement God is love is to be found in its predicate, not its

subject. The key term is love, not God. By speaking of a God who renounces

his divinity out of love, the doctrine of the incarnation bears witness to this

fact. Taken seriously, it leads inevitably to atheism. As Feuerbach writes (in

one of his most famous passages),

who then is our Saviour and Redeemer? God or Love? Love; for

God as God has not saved us, but Love, which transcends the

difference between the divine and human personality. As God has

renounced himself out of love, so we, out of love, should renounce

God; for if we do not sacrifice God to love, we sacrifice love to God,

and, in spite of the predicate of love, we have the Godthe evil

beingof religious fanaticism.[32]

Furthermore, since what believers call the love of God is in reality simply

human love, the doctrine of the incarnation is clear evidence that in religionhuman beings are contemplating their own nature.[33] What follows from

this? The central doctrine of Christianity, interpreted in the light of

Feuerbachs theory of religion, points towards the abolition of traditional

theism.

It is no coincidence that the abolition of traditional theism is precisely

what Lloyd Geering advocates, particularly in his more recent works. In

Christianity Without God, Geering argues that Christianity is able to abandon

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theism, without losing its distinctive character or its religious power. In

abandoning belief in God, Geering suggests, Christianity is not unfaithful to

its founder. For Jesus himself stood within the wisdom tradition of Israel,

which was more concerned with the human condition than with God.[34]And,as Feuerbach showed, Christianitys central doctrinethat of the

incarnationtended towards this goal.[35] But Geering also argues that

Christianity mustbecome non-theistic. It must do so because belief in a

supernatural being to whom we must submit ourselves is a violation of human

autonomy, which demands that we no longer be enslaved to an external

authority.[36] And monotheism, the exclusive worship of a Sky-Father (as

opposed to an Earth-Mother) has had tragic consequences. In particular, it

has led us to overlook our dependence on nature, in a way which threatens

our very future.[37]

The Later FeuerbachTheology as a Delusion

I have highlighted the importance of Feuerbachs discussion of the

incarnation, as found in his early work, The Essence of Christianity. It is this

view of the incarnation upon which Geering draws in arguing for a non-

theistic Christianity. But what about Feuerbachs later work? What

implications would this have for the Christian theologian? It is true that a

similar interpretation of the incarnation is found in his later Lectures on theEssence of Religion.[38]Yet the relationship between the earlier and the later

Feuerbach is not as simple as it might appear. By the time Feuerbach comes to

present these lectures, there has been a shift in his thinking. Gone is the

suggestion that religion has value as a form of self-knowledge, as a way in

which human beings come to awareness of the essential attributes of their

species.[39] This earlier view, which still owes something to the influence of

Hegel, has all but disappeared. What is now dominant is what Van Harvey

calls the naturalist-existentialist motif in Feuerbachs thought,[40] focuses on

the relationship between human beings and the natural world. Because of

this, Feuerbachs later work is more straightforwardly atheistic. It offers little

comfort to those theologians who, like Geering, wish to abandon theism, but

retain religion. For the early Feuerbach, religion has a certain revelatory

value, even if what it reveals is not God but human nature. For the later

Feuerbach, religion looks much more like a simple delusion, from which we

ought to liberate ourselves as quickly as possible.

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The Naturalist-Existentialist View

What, then, is Feuerbachs later view of religion, the one that Van Harvey

refers to as the naturalist-existentialist strand? At times, the Feuerbach of

theLecturesseems to be offering a relatively simple theory of religious origins.

Religion arises, he suggests, out of the insecurity human beings feel when

confronted with the threatening powers of nature and the fragility of their

own existence. Human beings recognize their dependence on the natural

world,[41] and render that dependence less threatening by creating from their

imaginations personal beings who are thought of as in control of that world.

Man does not have his life in his own hand, or at least not entirely;

some outward or inward circumstance, if only the bursting of a

tiny blood vessel in my brain, can suddenly end my life, andremove me against my will from my wife and children, friends and

relatives. But man wants to live; his life is his most precious

possession. Impelled by his instinct of self-preservation, his love of

life, he instinctively transforms this desire into a being capable of

granting it, a being with human eyes to see his tears, with human

ears to hear his complaints. For nature cannot grant this desire;

nature, in reality, is not a personal being; it has no heart, it is blind

and deaf to the desires and complaints of man.[42]

In order to create these deities, the human imagination personifies someaspect of the natural world, whether particular beings (in the veneration of

sacred objects), nature as a whole (in a religion such as that of the Qur an), or

(in more philosophical forms of theism) the general ideas that we abstract

from the concrete reality of things.[43] beings also personify and deify that

which is most characteristic of human beings, namely the power of mind,

expressed in speech, so that the monotheistic god resembles a human ruler,

who can govern millions by his mere word.[44]

To this point, Feuerbachs later theory of religion seems far from

original. The theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (17681834) had already

traced religion back to a feeling of dependency, as Feuerbach himself notes,

[45] although in support of a somewhat more traditional form of belief. And it

was David Hume who championed the idea that religions emerge from our

feelings of insecurity when confronted with the powers of nature. Humes

description of the precariousness of our human state and the way in which it

gives rise to religion is particularly close to Feuerbachs view:

We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true

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springs and causes of every event are entirely concealed from us;

nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to

prevent those ills, with which we are continually threatened. We

hang in perpetual suspense between life and death, health and

sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the

human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is

oft unexpected, and always unaccountable. These unknown

causes, then, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and

while the passions are kept in constant alarm by an anxious

expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in

forming ideas of those powers, on which we have so entire a

dependance.[46]

Hume goes on to note that since we have a universal tendency towardsanthropomorphismwe find human faces in the moon, armies in the clouds;

and by a natural propensity, if not corrected by experience and reflection,

ascribe malice or goodwill to every thing, that hurts or pleases us[ 47]it is

not surprising that we think of those unknown powers that control our fate as

personal beings.

But at other times Feuerbach takes this line of argument further; in

doing so he does seem to be breaking new ground. He suggests that at the

heart of religion there lies something deeper than our sense of dependency on

the natural world. More precisely, perhaps, the natural world with which weare confronted is not merely something external to us. It includes much of our

own being. In Feuerbachs own words,

The object of religion is nature, which operates independently of

man and which he distinguishes from himself. But this nature is

more than the phenomenon of the outside world; it also includes

mans inner nature, which operates independently of his

knowledge and his will. . . . The ultimate secret of religion is the

relationship the conscious the unconscious, the voluntaryand the

involuntary in one and the same individual.[48]

On the one hand, we human beings are subjects, that is to say, conscious

beings, in partial control of our world. But at the same time we sense that vast

areas not only of the external world but also of our own nature are mysterious

to us and beyond our control. We are not masters over the forces that

produced us or the impulses that drive us. The conscious being, the I, is

confronted with the world of nature, the not-I, from which it emerges. In a

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passage, which (as Van Harvey notes) reads like the work of a much more

recent thinker,[49] Feuerbach writes:

Man with his ego or consciousness stands at the brink of a

bottomless abyss; that abyss is his own unconscious being, whichseems alien to him and inspires him with a feeling which expresses

itself in words of wonderment such as: What am I? Where have I

come from? To what end? And this feeling that I am nothing

without a not-Iwhich is distinct from me yet intimately related to

me, something other, which is at the same time myownbeing, is

the religious feeling.[50]

The personification and deification of this world of the not-I is what gives

rise to religion. In Feuerbachs words, religion transforms everything that is

not a product of the human willinto a product of the divine will, everything

that is not a human achievement, the work of man, into the achievement, the

gift, the work of God.[51]

Do We Need Religion?

If all we knew of Feuerbach was his early work The Essence of Christianity, it

would be easy to argue for the ongoing significance of religion in general and

Christianity in particular. Stripped of its claims to speak of a divine being

distinct from the world, it could be said, the doctrines of Christianity could be

taken to be disguised expressions of human self-knowledge. They may not tell

us anything about God, but they do tell us something about human beings. In

this sense, the early Feuerbach could be a friend to the theologian who has

abandoned God, yet wishes to retain religion. And, as we have seen, Geering is

a leading exponent of a theology of this type. But if the interpretation I have

offered is correctan interpretation which owes much to the work of Van

Harveythe later Feuerbach adopts a less sanguine view. While Part One of

The Essence of Christianityis devoted to what Feuerbach calls the true oranthropological essence of religion, there is no corresponding section in the

Lectures, the whole of which is devoted to the criticism of religion and its

explanation as a form of delusion.

For the later Feuerbach, if there is a truth in religion, it is simply the

truth of our dependency on the natural world,[52] and what wisdom is

available to human beings comes from a recognition and acceptance of that

dependency. As Feuerbach writes of himself,

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though I myself am an atheist, I openly profess religion in the

sense just mentioned, that is, nature religion. I hate the idealism

that wrenches man out of nature; I am not ashamed of my

dependency on nature; I openly confess that the workings of

nature affect not only my surface, my skin, my body, but also my

core, my innermost being, that the air I breathe in bright weather

has a salutary effect not only on my lungs but also on my mind,

that the light of the sun illumines not only my eyes but also my

spirit and my heart. And I do not, like a Christian, believe that

such dependency is contrary to my true being or hope to be

delivered from it. I know further that I am a finite mortal being,

that I shall one day cease to me. But I find this very naturaland

am therefore perfectly reconciled to the thought.[53]

Only by an acceptance of the fact that we are indeed part of nature can we be

liberated from absurd desires, such as the longing for immortality,[54] and

become whole human beings, creatures of this world rather than beings who

long for another.[55]

Religion After Feuerbach

The question which I hope this discussion has raised is this: If we accept

Feuerbachs criticism of religion, what is left of our traditional faith? Do we

still need religion? If so, what kind of religion do we need? In a short work

published in 1998, entitled Does Society Need Religion?, Geering addresses

precisely this question. He notes that those who have attempted to stamp out

religion have merely created new forms of religion. Our own age has seen a

proliferation of new religious movements, and those movements which set

out to abolish religion, such as Marxism or secular rationalism, have often

functioned as secular religions. This is hardly surprising. As individuals, we

search for meaning and purpose and as a society we need common symbols

around which we can rally. So yes, Geering argues, society does need religion.

What it needs, he writes, is a common religion which nurtures and preserves

the personal bonds of trust and good will needed to hold a society together.

[56]

What would this religion look like? Well, not surprisingly, it has much

in common with Feuerbachs later views. In particular, it embraces the idea

that we are entirely dependent on the natural world out of which we have

sprung. As Geering writes in Tomorrows God, the meaning system (or

religion) which is appropriate for the global world must therefore clearly focus

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on the earth.[57]Why? It is because we have evolved out of the earth and we

remain dependent on it for our well-being and our future. . . We humans have

come forth from the earth as from a cosmic womb. We are utterly dependent

on the earth for our continued existence.[58] But because we are aware of ourdependence on the earth in a way in which other creatures are not, our

relationship with the earth constitutes a new kind of mystical union.[59]

God-Talk After Feuerbach

What distinguishes Geerings work from that of the later Feuerbach is that

Geering describes his new religious position as belief in God. But of course it

is not religious belief in any traditional sense of that term. Geering spells out

what this new form of belief entails in the words of the theologian Gordon

Kaufman:

To believe in God is to commit oneself to a particular way of

ordering ones life and action. it is to devote oneself to working

towards a fully humane world within the ecological constraints

here on planet Earth, while standing in awe before the profound

mysterious of existence.[60]

If this is what it means to believe in God, thenas Geering himself

writesfew would wish to call themselves atheists.[61] the question I want to

raise is: Is this helpfully described as belief in God? Why use the term God inthis context? What function does it have, if it no longer denotes a supernatural

being? Do we need this language, if we have indeed abandoned theism?

Let me illustrate what I mean by reference to a particular passage from

Geerings work. Almost any of his discussions of the term God would do, but

a useful instance is to be found in Does Society Need Religion?At one point

Geering writes that

to worship God in the 21st century is to marvel at the living

ecosphere of life on this planet, of which we are a product and on

which we depend for our existence and continuing sustenance. Life

on this planet is itself the manifestation of God and our own life

participates in the life of God.[62]

But just what could that last sentence mean, given that there is no God, as an

supernatural being distinct from the world? What could it mean to say that

life on this planet is itself the manifestation of God? Perhaps Geering would

suggest, following Kaufman, that living beings manifest a serendipitous

creativity, an astonishing ability to adapt to new circumstances and continue

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to flourish.[63] Perhaps it is this creativity to which Geering is referring when

he uses the term God.[64] Fair enough. But then why use the term God, if

what you really mean is creativity? In the context of a non-theistic

understanding of God, is religious language not redundant? What needs tobe said can be said without it.

At times Geering suggests that whether we continue to use the term

God is a relatively unimportant question. The important thing, he suggests, is

the way of life which we embrace. As he writes in Tomorrows God,

whether we continue to use the word God, or not, in order to speak

about this faith, is a matter of personal choice. The particular

words we use, being arbitrary, are relatively unimportant; what is

important are the supreme values we come to associate with such

time-honoured words as God, and the responsibilities to whichthose values call us.[65]

But this seems, at the very least, disingenuous. Geerings popularity as a

religious writer stems from the fact that he offers us a new way of

understanding the term God. And he himself argues that if we abandon this

word, we may have to invent another verbal symbol to take its place as a focus

of meaning.[66 ]So we apparently need God, or something closely

resembling it. We need such a term both as an ultimate point of reference

and as a way of avoiding the hubris of seeing ourselves as self-made beings.

[67] given the power of religious symbols, to which Geerings work testifies, it

can hardly be a matter of indifference whether God is used.

The Dangers of Non-Theistic Religion

If it is used, if we do continue to speak of God while no longer believing in a

supernatural being, then we must face up to the dangers inherent in such a

practice. The first danger is that we will invite misunderstanding. Our

continued use of religious language demands of our readers or hearers that

they continually reinterpret the word God, stripping it of its traditionalassociations. Not all readers or hearers are going to do this. And unless we can

offer a clear alternative meaning, we are making our hearers task almost

impossible. It is all very well to say that the term God is now being used

functionally, to establish a focus of meaning.[68] if we fail to spell out just

what that focus of meaning is, thenwhether we like it or notour language

may be interpreted as lending support to traditional theism. And if we do

spell out what the term God now means (as in the case of serendipitous

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creativity), we must face the charge that this reality is more accurately

described in non-religious terms.

And perhaps it would be better described in non-religious terms. For

there is a second danger associated with the continued use of religiouslanguage. It is a danger which Geering himself has highlighted, in other

contextsthe danger of creating new idols for old.[69] it traditional theism

objectionable? Because, Geering writes, it enables people unconsciously to

project their own beliefs on to a divine authority, and then attempt to impose

them on their fellows, in the belief that in doing so they are simply obeying the

divine imperative.[70] But while the term God continues to enjoy its

traditional associations, are we not in danger of perpetuating this practice? By

using the term God do we not risk making an idol out of our political

commitments? We may no longer go on crusades in the name of God, settingout to defeat the infidel. But if we join Greenpeace in the name of God, we

may be merely giving religious fanaticism a new goal.

To his credit, Geering himself once spoke of precisely this danger. In

God in the New World, he wrote that the continued use of the word God

with all its associations and images. . . always constitutes a temptation to turn

back in the direction of mythology, and that leads to idolatry.[71] But it is one

thing to be aware of the danger; it is quite another to avoid it. If you continue

to use religious language, while denying that it has an other-worldly object,

then you inevitably speak of some this-worldly reality as if it were divine. And

this looks suspiciously like idolatry.

Do I exaggerate this danger? I dont think so. In a paper delivered in

1996 to a Sea of Faith conference, Geering cites with approval the words of

Thomas Berry:

The ecological age fosters the deep awareness of the sacred

presence within each reality of the universe. There is an awe and

reverence due to the stars in the heavens, the sun and the heavenly

bodies; to the seas and the continents; to all living forms of trees

and flowers; to the myriad expressions of life in the sea; to the

animals of the forest and the birds of the air. To wantonly destroy

a living species is to silence forever a divine voice.[72]

To wantonly destroy a living species is to silence forever a divine voice. If this

is not idolatry, giving divine status to a this-worldly reality and (by

implication) to our efforts to preserve it, then I dont know what idolatry

means. In saying this, I am not saying that we should not join Greenpeace. I

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am not saying that we should not oppose the destruction of living species. On

the contrary, I believe that we should. But I also believe that we contribute

nothing helpful to the ecological debate by describing the values we are trying

to preserve as divine.The early Feuerbach or the later Feuerbach, a Christianity without God

or an atheism which cuts loose from our religious heritage. . . those are the

choices which lie open to those who accept Feuerbachs analysis of religion.

Geering opts to remain within a religious tradition, albeit in a radically

reinterpreted form. And perhaps he is right to do so. Perhaps we human

beings are incorrigibly religious; perhaps we cannot live without religious

language and ritual practices. If so, let me make my own position clear. I

would prefer Lloyd Geerings religion to most of those that are currently on

offer. But it brings with it some of the same dangers which attendedtraditional theism. The most serious of these is that we risk falling into new

forms of idolatry, giving divine status to this-worldly realities and to our own

political ideals. So perhaps a thoroughly secular alternative is worth

examining. Can we live without God? We certainly can. On this, Geering and I

are agreed. Can we live without God? I dont know. But perhaps we should at

least try.

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