David Bloor - Philosopy of Science

A Philosophical Approach to ScienceAuthor(s): David BloorSource: Social Studies of Science, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Nov., 1975), pp. 507-517Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/284813 .

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Social Studies of Science, 5 (1975), 507-17

COURSE BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Philosophical Approach to Science

David Bloor

BACKGROUND INTRODUCTION

In October 1967, the Science Studies Unit at Edinburgh University began teaching courses on social aspects of science and technology to undergraduates in Science Faculty. From the start, these courses drew material from the disciplines of philosophy, history and sociology, selected in such a way as to introduce science students most effectively 'to ways of analysing the role of the scientist (both within the scientific community and in society at large), and to some of the wider implications of scientific thought and practice'.' The 'stream' which draws on philosophical material has always been available to students as a separate 'half-course', and has been taught essentially in the form described below since 1970.

It is intended that the course will occupy between one-sixth and one-quarter of the student's time for two terms (i.e. twenty weeks). No prior knowledge is assumed. Every student prepares four essays during the course: these are read and discussed in fortnightly tutorials.

The outline below contains details of the literature which is expounded and discussed in the lectures. Most of the course deals with a closely-knit set of issues connected with T. S. Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, Second Edition, 1970). This is the 'set book' for the course, and students are advised to purchase it.

Most of the readings are articles and papers, rather than books. Where a book title is mentioned below without reference to specific chapters, it is usually within

Author's address: Science Studies Unit, Edinburgh University, 34 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JT, Scotland, UK.

1 The phrase is taken from the course entry in the Edinburgh University Calendar. For a brief description of the Unit's teaching, see D. 0. Edge, 'Science Studies: Portrait of a Course', Technology and Society (Bath University Press), 6 (March 1971), 84-87.

507



508 David Bloor

square brackets [1. This indicates that the lectures will draw the student's attention to relevant ideas from the book, but that the student need not read it all. There is a considerable overlap of reading matter between lectures and tutorials. Students are advised not to let their reading programme mount up so that they 'have to do it all in the last few weeks before the examination'. Helping students to read sensibly and methodically is one of the main challenges in teaching such a course: our experience is that easy access to all recommended readings is essential to success. If individual copies can be placed in students' hands, so much the better.

In the details below, the wording of the handout given to students is repro- duced verbatim.

Course Outline

LECTURES

1. Introduction Stress will be laid on the distinction between engaging in an activity and

reflecting upon it. Is competence in an activity a necessary and sufficient con- dition for making true statements about it?

2. Views of Science in an Empiricist Framework The writings of the nineteenth-century philosopher-scientist Ernst Mach will

be referred to in building a picture of science within an empiricist framework. E. Mach, 'The Economical Nature of Scientific Enquiry', from his Popular

Scientific Lectures, reprinted in J. J. Kockelmans (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Historical Background (New York and London: The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan, 1968), 174-87.

[E. Mach, The Science of Mechanics, relevant section reprinted as 'Newton's Views on Time, Space and Motion', in A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser (eds.), Philosophy of Science (Cleveland and New York: The World Pub- lishing Co. [Meridian Booksl, 1960), 335-48.1

[E. Mach, relevant sections of The Analysis of Sensations (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), esp. Appendix 1.1

P. Alexander, 'The Philosophy of Science, 1850-1910', in D. J. O'Connor (ed.), A Critical History of Western Philosophy (New York and London: The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan, 1964), 402-25.

G. Berkeley, 'Criticism of Newton's Doctrines on Space', from his The Prin- ciples of Human Knowledge, reprinted in Danto and Morgenbesser (eds.), Philosophy of Science, op. cit., 330-34.

K. R. Popper, 'A Note on Berkeley as Precursor of Mach and Einstein', in his Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), Chapter 6, 166-74.

3. Some Basic Concepts: (i) Inductiotn and Deduction The previous lectures will have introduced you to soine important concepts. It

is appropriate at this point to deal with a number of these which will be crucial for the rest of the course. A sharp and simple 'definition' of them is not possible. Rather what is required is an 'explication' of them in which their meanings and



Course Bibliography 509

implications are drawn out by examination and comparison of various competing defimitions. The first to be examined will be the concepts of 'induction' and 'deduction'.

J. S. Mill, 'On the Ground of Induction', in E. Madden (ed.), 7he Structure of Scientific 7hought (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), 293-96.

P. Medawar, 'Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?', in D. Edge (ed.), Experiment: A Series of Scientific Case Histories (London: B.B.C. Publications, 1964), 7-12.

[M. Hesse, Forces and Fields (London: Nelson, 1961), esp. Chapter VI.] [M. Hesse, 'Francis Bacon', in D. J. O'Connor (ed.), A Critical History of

Western Philosophy, op. cit. lecture 2, 141-52.1 [A. G. N. Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (London: Routledge and Kegan

Paul, 196 1).] [I. B. Cohen, Franklin and Newton (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1956), esp. Chapter 5.J

4. Some Basic Concepts: (i) Explanation, Laws and Theories The growth of the hypothetico-deductive model of science focuses attention

on the requirement for something being a satisfactory explanation, and on the logical characteristics of laws and theories.

E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

[J. J. C. Smart, Between Science and Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968).]

S. Toulmin, 7he Philosophy of Science (London: Hutchinson, 1953, 1967), Chapters I to IV.

J. Hospers, 'What is Explanation?', in A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Essays in Con- ceptualAnalysis (London: Macmillan, 1960), 94-119.

S. Some Basic Concepts: (iii) Verification, Meaning and Operationalism Another crucial concept is that of 'verification' and the allied notion of the

verificationalist theory of meaning. This was expounded by a group of early twentieth-century philosophers known as the Vienna Circle. It is closely asso- ciated with the doctrine of 'operationalism' expounded by the physicist P. W. Bridgman.

P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1960): see the reading of the same title in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), 34-46.

[P. Achinstein and S. F. Barker (eds.), The Legacy of Logical Positivism (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).]

F. Waismann, 'Verifiability', in A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Logic and Language, first series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951), 117-44.

(The first part of this article will be most relevant to this lecture but read the whole of the article, as it will all be useful later in the course.)

6. An Examination of Empiricist Assumptions Having made acquaintance with views of science proposed within an empiricist

framework, and having examined some of the crucial concepts (stressing the



S5o David Bloor

analyses that empiricists would give them), the time has come to try to bring out the presuppositions of this approach to science. This will be done partly by looking at the analysis of the concept 'cause' given by David Hume.

David Hume, 'The Idea of Necessary Connexion', in Madden (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Thought, op. cit. lecture 3, 216-21.

D. Shapere, introduction to Shapere (ed.), Philosophical Problems of Natural Science (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), 1-29.

[Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief, op. cit. lecture 3.1

7. The 'Dictionary' View of Theories and Reduction The assumptions of empiricism can be held in a variety of forms, some

stronger than others. A weaker version of empiricism permits a view of theories called the 'dictionary' view. This is discussed by the physicist Campbell and advocated by the philosopher Nagel. Nagel's views on how science progresses, which is related to a topic called 'reduction', will be introduced.

N. R. Campbell, Physics: The Elements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), since republished as Foundations of Science (New York: Dover Publications. 1957), Chapter 6: see the extract reprinted as 'The Structure of Theories' in Feigi and Brodbeck (eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science, op. cit. lecture 5, 288-308.

E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit. lecture 4, Chapters 5, 11.

8. Aspects of Popper's Philosophy of Science At this point aspects of K. R. Popper's views on the philosophy of science will

be introduced. Later discussion will relate to his important views concerning verification and falsification, induction anid deduction, the demarcation of science from non-science, pseudo-science and metaphysics, the progress of science towards truth, etc.

K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit. lecture 2, particularly Chapters 1, 3 and 10.

P. Achinstein, review of Popper, ibid., in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (B.J.P.S.), 19 (August 1968), 159-68.

9. Is There a Role for the Synthetic A Priori? Further criticisms of empiricism will now be discussed. The notion of the

synthetic a priori will be introduced and will be related to the later work of Meyerson and Watkins.

I. Kant, Empirical and A Priori Knowledge, in Madden (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Thought, op. cit. lecture 3, 63-71.

J. W. N. Watkins, 'Between Analytic and Empirical', Philosophy, XXXII (April 1957), 112-31.

J. W. N. Watkins, 'Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics', Mind, LXVII (1958), 344-65.

[E. Meyerson, trans. K. Loewenberg, Identity and Reality (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930, 1964).]

10. Hesse's Criticism of the Dictionary View of Theories In this lecture, Hesse's criticism of the dictionary view of theories and the

issue of the role of models will be discussed. M. Hesse, Forces and Fields, op. cit. lecture 3, Chapter 1.




M. Hesse, 'Models in Physics', BJ.P.S., 4 (1953), 198-214. M. Hesse, 'Theories, Dictionaries and Observations', B.J.P.S., 9 (1958), 12-28. P. Alexander, 'Theory Construction and Theory Testing', B.J.P.S., 9 (1958),

29-38. P. Duhem, trans. P. P. Wiener, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory

(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), Chapter IV, Pt. 1. E. McMullin, 'What Do Physical Models Tell Us?', in B. van Rootselaar and J.

F. Staal (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Amsterdam, 1967 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968), 385-96.

M. Hesse, review of Nagel, The Structure of Science, in Mind, LXXII (July 1965), 42941.

11. Is There an Observation Language? Criticism of empiricism is continued by asking if there is an 'observation

language'. N. R. fHanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1958, 1959), Chapter 1. M. Hesse, 'Is There an Independent Observation Language?', in R. G. Colodny

(ed.), The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), 35-77.

12. Criticism of Progress through Reduction E. Nagel's idea of science progressing through reduction of one theory or

another has been attacked by P. K. Feyerabend. P. K. Feyerabend, 'Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism', in H. Feigl and

G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume III (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964), 28-97.

P. K. Feyerabend, 'Hlow to Be a Good Empiricist', in P. H. Nidditch (ed.), The Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 12-39; also in B. Bautmrin (ed.), Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Dela- ware Seminar, Volume 2 (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1962/63), 3-40.

(Criticisms of Feyerabend's views will be briefly presented, but this topic is more fully treated later in conjunction with criticisms of T. S. Kuhn's views.) M. Hesse, 'A New Look at Scientific Explanation', Review of Metaphysics, 17

(1963), 98-108.

13. Kuhn's Picture of Science This will deal with Kuihn's view of science as a picture which incorporates the

anti-empiricist features which have been discussed previously. The point of the lecture is to draw your attention to features of the book as they relate to the above issues, and to stress how strange one should find some of the things Kuhn says (though this does not itself imply that they should be rejected).

r. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition, op. cit. (Set Book). T. S. Kuhn, 'The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research', in A. C. Crombie

(ed.), Scientific Change, Proceedings of a Symposium on the History of Science, Oxford, 9-15 July 1961 (London: Heinemann, 1963), 347-69.



512 David Bloor

T. S. Kuhn, 'The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research', in C. W. Taylor and F. Barron (eds.), Scientific Creativity: Its Recognition and Development (London: Wiley, 1963), 341-54.

T. S. Kuhn, 'The Function of Measurement in Modem Physical Science', Isis, 52 (1961), 161-93.

A view which bears some similarity to Kuhn's is to be found in S. Toulmin's readable Foresight and Understanding (London: Hutchinson, 1961). D. Shapere's readings, op. cit. lecture 6, contain sections by Kuhn, Touhnin and Hesse which you could well use for revision.

14. Criticisms of Kuhn's View of Science (1) Here we begin looking at detailed criticisms of Kuhn's position. Reviews of

Kuhn's book wifl provide a good starting point. Review by C. Gillispie, Science, 138 (14 December 1962), 1251-53. Review by D. Shapere, Philosophical Review, 73 (1964), 383-94. Review by G. Buchdahl, British Journal for the History of Science, 3 (1963),

55-69. Kuhn's concept of 'normal science' is attacked by J. W. N. Watkins, 'Against Normal Science', in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 25-37.

15. Crticism of Kuhn's View of Science (2) Further important criticisms come from [I. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967)J. but see the review of Scheffler's book by M. Hesse, B.J.P.S., 19 (August

1968), 176-7. An article which also presents criticisms of Feyerabend's views is D. Shapere, 'Meaning and Scientific Change', in R. G. Colodny (ed.), Mind and Cosmos (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), 41-85.

16. Kuhn Versus the Popperians An important exchange has taken place between Kuhn and various thinkers

arguing from the Popperian standpoint. One example has already been examined: the full confrontation is in:

Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, op. cit. lecture 14.

For a biased review see: D. Bloor, 'Two Paradigms of Scientific Knowledge?', Science Studies 1 (1971),

101-15.

17. The Role of Metaphor in Science Kuhn frequently seems more impressed with the differences than the simi-

larities of succeeding paradigms. Light may be shed on the mechanics of the changes that concepts undergo during general theoretical shifts by looking at the notion of metaphor. (Kuhn himself has recently acknowledged the role of metaphor: see his Postscript to the second edition of the set book.)

M. Hesse, 'The Explanatory Function of Metaphor', in her Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 157-77.




[D. Schon, Displacement of Concepts (London: Tavistock, 1963), since reprinted as Invention and the Evolution of Ideas (London: Tavistock Social Science Paperbacks, 1967).J

18. Science and Metaphysics Questions will now be raised concerning the connection of science and

metaphysics. l. Agassi 'The Nature of Scientific Problems and Their Roots in Metaphysics',

in M. A. Bunge (ed.), The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (New York and London: The Free Press and CoUier-Macmillan, 1964), 189-211.

K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit. lecture 2, esp. Chapters 1, 3 and 11 (although parts of 11 are technical, and not of interest to this course).

S. E. Toulmin, 'Contemporary Scientific Mythology', in A. Maclntyre (ed.), Metaphysical Beliefs (London: SCM Press, 1957, second edition 1970), 3-71.

A. Koyre, Metaphysics and Measurement (London: Chapman and Hall, 1968), Chapters 1 and 2.

[A. E. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, second edition 1932, reprinted 1964).]

[E. W. Strong, Procedures and Metaphysics (Hildensheim: George Olms Ver- lagsbuchlandlung, 1966).]

19. Science and Common Sense The relation of science to 'common sense' is closely related to the above issue

and raises fundamental questions concerning the possible changes in our ontology that science may bring.

G. Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), Chapters V and VI.

S. Stebbing, 'The Furniture of the Earth', in Danto and Morgenbesser, The Philosophy of Science, op. cit. lecture 2, 69-8 1.

D. H. MeHor, 'Physics and Furniture', in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Science, American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs, No. 3 (1969), 171-87.

M. Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), Chapter 4, Section II.

20. Purpose and Teleology in Biology There will now be a slight change of emphasis from issues which are raised

mostly in connection with the natural and physical sciences to those raised by the 'softer' sciences. In increasing order of softness, we will look at some topics connected with biology, psychology and sociology. First, the problem of tele- ological explanation in biology.

E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, op. cit. lecture 4, Chapter 12. [C. Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour (London: Routledge and Kegan

Paul, 1964), Part I. ] [A. Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (London: Macmillan,

1970).]



514 David Bloor

21. Problems in Applying Science to Man (1) It has been argued that there are special difficulties in applying scientific

concepts to man. First some of the issues as they relate to psychology. R. S. Peters and H. Tajfel, 'Hobbes and Hull - Metaphysicians of Behaviour',

B.J.P.S., 8 (1957/58), 30-44. [C. Taylor, The Explanation of Behaviour, op. cit. lecture 20.]

22. Problems in Applying Science to Man (2) Next some of the philosophical issues and problems as they relate to sociology

and anthropology. P. Winch, 'Understanding a Primitive Society', American Philosophical Quar-

terly, 1 (1964), 307-24. [P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,

1958).] M. Mandelbaum, 'Social Facts', in Madden (ed.), The Structure of Scientific

Thought, op. cit. lecture 3, 166-76.

23. Problems in Applying Science to Man: Some Replies Some replies which have been given to the views described in lectures 21 and

22 will now be discussed. E. Geilner, 'The New Idealism - Cause and Meaning in the Social Sciences', in

I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of an International Colloquium, London, 1965, Volume 3 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1968), 377432.

E. Gellner, 'Concepts and Society', in D. Emmet and A. Maclntyre (eds.), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1970), 115-49.

[J. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (New York: Random House, 1968).]

24. Summary Note: For revision purposes, you may find it useful to consult: Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 Volumes (New York

and London: The Free Press and Collier-Macmillan, 1967).

TUTORIAL TOPICS

Notes for Students

(i) Tutorial papers are to be read at the beginning of each tutorial and provide the basis for discussion. Approximately four sides of foolscap seems a reasonable length. Be very careful to organize your material in a coherent fashion; state clearly the topics that you are going to discuss and make it clear when you are presenting an argument for or against something.

(ii) As a guide to the writing of papers, questions have been formulated under each topic heading. You are not obliged to deal with all of them nor only with them. Relevant issues of your own formulation which arise out of the reading material are perfectly acceptable.




1. ThePhlogiston Theory (a) Can this be called a truly scientific theory? (b) Is the negative weight hypothesis absurd? (c) Was Priestley irrational to hang on to phlogiston theory? (d) Did Lavoisier's experiment disprove phlogiston theory? (e) Are there any problems over 'crucial' experiments? (f) Does the fact that Priestley was a believer in phlogiston have any signifi-

cance for the claim that it was Priestley who discovered oxygen? J. B. Conant and L. K. Nash (eds.), Harvard Case Studies in Experimental

Science, Volume 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), case 2.

S. E. Toulnin, 'Crucial Experiments: Priestley and Lavoisier', Journal of the History of Ideas, 18 (1957), 205-20; or see Chapter 10 of S. E. Toulmin and J. Goodfield, The Architecture of Matter (London: Hutchinson, 1962; republished Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin Books, 1965).

On the question of crucial experiments, see Duhem, op. cit. lecture 10, Chapter 6, reprinted in Feigl and Brodbeck (eds.), op. cit. lecture 5, 235-52.

A. Grunbaum, 'The Falsifiability of Theories: Total or Partial?', Synthese, 14 (1962), 17-34.

L. Laudan, 'Grunbaum on the Duhemian Argument', Philosophy of Science, 32 (1965), 295-99.

2. Dalton and Atomism (a) Did Dalton derive his theory from careful observation? (b) How does Dalton's theory differ from those of the Greek atomists? Is one

scientific and the other mere speculation? (c) Is Dalton's atomism just another way of stating certain laws of chemical

combination? (d)What force do you think must be granted to the positivist criticisms of

atomic theory by Mach, Ostwald and Stallo? Conant and Nash (eds.), op. cit. topic 1, case 4. Toulmin and Goodfield, op. cit. topic 1, esp. 229-37 and 263-69. Nagel, op. cit. lecture 4, Chapter 6, especially Section II, 'The Descriptive

View of Theories'. Mach, op. cit. lecture 2. [J. B. Stalo, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).] Notice that 'instrumentalist' views of theories are often taken for specific scientific reasons, as well as for general philosophical reasons; see: P. K. Feyerabend, 'Realism and Instrumentalism', in Bunge (ed.), op. cit.

lecture 18, 280-308.

3. Aspects of Popper's Philosophy of Science (a) What is Popper's criterion for calling something 'scientific'? (b) What is Popper's view of the relation between the content of a theory and

its 'probability'? (c) What lesson does Popper take from this regarding the sort of theories at

which we ought to aim?



516 David Bloor

(d) Does Broadbent's view of scientific strategy provide a basis for criticizing Popper?

(e) What are Popper's views on instrumentalist attitudes towards scientific theories?

(f) Will science ever achieve an end state of complete understanding where no more progress is possible?

(g) How does one demarcate science from metaphysics? Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, op. cit. lecture 2: Chapter 1 for (a), (b),

(c) and (g); Chapter 3 for (e); Chapter 10 for (b), (c) and (f); and Chapter 11 for (g).

K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1959, 1968), esp. Chapter V.

D. E. Broadbent, 'On the Limits of Hypothetico-Deductive Method', Chapter 12 of his Perception and Communication (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966).

W. Kneale, 'Scientific Revolutions for Ever?', B.J.P.S., 19 (1967), 2742. T. S. Kuhn, 'Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?' in Lakatos and

Musgrave (eds.), op. cit. lecture 14, 1-23.

4. The Role of Models in Scientific Theories (a) Are models essential for scientific reasoning? (b) What different sorts of models are there? (c) What is the relation of realism to the thesis that models are essential? (d) Does the 'dictionary' view of theories have any shortcomings? (e) If it has, are these rectified by taking account of the role of the model? (f) What is the significance of the wave-particle duality in modern physics for

the issue of the role of models? Hesse, three readings cited in lecture 10; Duhem, op. cit. lecture 10, Chapter

3; Campbell, op. cit. lecture 7; McMullin, op. cit. lecture 10. R. Harre, Theories and Things (London: Sheed and Ward, 1961), esp. Chapter

3.

5. 7he Role of Dogma in Science (a) What is the usual 'image' of a scientist? (b) Does dogma have any role in science? (c) Is a dogmatic education in fact given to scientists? (d) If it were given would it be functional or dysfunctional? (e) What are the arguments in favour of a theoretical pluralism? (f) Is Kuhn's account of science undermining its claim to objectivity? Kuhn, first three of the four readings cited in lecture 13. P. K. Feyerabend, 'Problems of Empricism', in R. G. Colodny (ed.), Beyond

the Edge of Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 145-260.

Feyerabend, 'How to Be a Good Empiricist', op. cit. lecture 12. Scheffler, op. cit. lecture 15. You may care to check some of Kuhn's historical examples, especially his discussion of Franklin, by looking up the relevant cases in the Harvard Case Studies in Experimental Science, op. cit. topic 1.




6. Scientific Discovery and the Explanatory Function of Metaphor (a) Does discovery in science have any features which distinguish it from other

sorts of discovery? (b) What is the distinction between invention and discovery? (c) Did Priestley discover oxygen?; did Dalton discover atoms?; did Freud

discover the Unconscious? (d) What is the 'Man-Friday Fallacy' (Toulmin)? (e) Does all creative thought take place through the 'displacement of con-

cepts'? (f) What are the two basic functions of displacement? (g) What, if anything, is the difference between a metaphor and a myth? (h) Is there any distinction between creative work in the sciences and the arts? (i) Does Schon's work provide support for any formulation of the basic tenets

of empiricism? Toulmin, op. cit. lecture 4; Schon, op. cit. lecture 17; Hesse, op. cit. lecture 17. T. S. Kuhn, 'Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery', Science, 136 (1 June

1962), 760-64.

7. Science and Metaphysics (a) Are metaphysical statements meaningless? (b) Is there any connection between science and metaphysics? (c) How, if at all, are the two to be demarcated? (d) Are there metaphysics which it is good or useful for a scientist to hold? Agassi, op. cit. lecture 18; Toulmin, op. cit. lecture 18; Koyre, op. cit. lecture

18; Watkins 'Conflrmable and Influential Metaphysics', op. cit. lecture 9; Popper, op. cit. lecture 2, see Chapters 1, 3 and 1 1.

8. Science and Common Sense (a) What is the relation of our ordinary common sense categories to those used

by science? (b)Can a commonsense picture of the physical world consistently co-exist

with a scientific account? Ryle, op. cit. lecture 19, Chapters V and VI; Stebbing, op. cit. lecture 19;

Mellor, op. cit. lecture 19; Mandelbaum, op. cit. lecture 19.



David Bloor - Philosopy of Science

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