Daria-Ioana Sipos

Why has populism had more success on the right in France but on the left in

Greece? A comparative case study of left/right political continuum relevance within

a populist approach

Abstract This study will a5empt to determine in what ways the poli8cal and economic circumstances in France and Greece can explain the rela8ve a5rac8veness of a le?-wing or right-wing populist candidate. To this end, this paper will explore the concept of populism in order to understand how its applica8on to the specific circumstances in France and Greece has re-configured the na8onal poli8cal spectrum. By structuring the poli8cal scene, the aim is to iden8fy the opportuni8es for new entrants from a supply perspec8ve which along with the vo8ng behaviour of the electorate on the demand side will enable an analysis of whether either or both create a poli8cal environment inherently more favourable to the populist le? or right.

The findings of this par8cular compara8ve case study cannot be generalised without further a5empts to apply this template to other countries, which future research could poten8ally address. However, a hypothesis can be drawn, which suggests that:

A) Profound de-legi8miza8on of an ins8tu8onal approach projects the poli8cal trade-off on a populist scale, where party strategy is a be5er predictor of success than le?/right affilia8ons;

B) A deteriora8on of an ins8tu8onal approach increases the legi8macy of populist actors to contend their mainstream alterna8ves. Success of the populist le? or right is thus mainly based on whichever mainstream party's weakness disaffiliates most voters and on the prominence of immigra8on issue-vo8ng.

What is populism? The complexity and wide range of applica8ons of the term “populist” requires a solid theore8cal framework to allow further research without the danger of fallacies of equivoca8on. Two variables must be precisely located to contextualize the concept: firstly, what it means on its own, and secondly where it stands in our understanding of poli8cal environments.

An extensively debated term among poli8cal theorists, the concept of populism suffers from widespread confusion caused by general overuse and misuse, which leads to inevitable deformity. In light of the complica8ons brought by modern manifesta8ons of populism, the academic tendency first advocated by Ernesto Laclau is to find a minimal defini8on that allows further explora8on of the concept without unnecessary complica8ons. Subsequent academics, notably Cas Mudde, have revisited Laclau’s plea for simplicity and formulated a shortened star8ng point for populist research which this study will adopt:

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“a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ul4mately separated into two homogenous and antagonis4c groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that

poli4cs should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people". 1

There is a permanent iden8fica8on of an element of cri8cism of a corrupt “elite” within populist discourse, irrespec8ve of the accompanying poli8cal ideas. In discursive terms, the nodal point of 2 3

populist rhetoric is a homogenous “pure people”, antagonized, with emo8onal rather than ra8onal appeal, against the morally corrupt “elites”.

To address the second theore8cal necessity of placing the populist phenomenon within the poli8cal environment of a na8on, this study will again adopt the perspec8ve of Ernesto Laclau. He regards poli8cal response to popular demands as placed on a scale of two extremes: on one end a separa8on of individual demands so thorough that it makes it impossible to aggregate them, and on the other what he makes reference to as “mass psychology” or complete equivalence of demands- something which he would consider “pure populism. Every poli8cal system thus has, correspondingly, an 4

ins8tu8onal approach on the one hand, where the demands of divergent groups are addressed according to a specific strategy, and a populist one- where a general will is deducted and claimed to be represented. For Laclau then, populism is a pure ques8on of extent to which a movement can be iden8fied as employing elements of populist discourse, notably what he calls the “logic of equivalence”. 5

Divergent demands- no aggrega8on Equivalent demands- “mass psychology”

Left- and right-wing populism

Varia8ons of populism on the le? or right can be a5ributed to its classifica8on as a poli8cal style rather than a coherent ideology. The difference in manifesta8on is significant to the extent that the poli8cal circumstances priori8ze the style of indigna8on itself (which seems apparent in Greece) or the host ideology, but under a more populist rather than ins8tu8onal expression (which appears true of France).

Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposi1on, Volume 39, Issue 4 (2004), pp. 541-63.1

Jan Werner-Muller, What is Populism, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, 2

"discursive" in this context should be seen as deno8ng all “systems of meaningful prac8ces that form the 3

iden88es of subjects and objects". D. Howarth and Y. Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing discourse theory and poli8cal analysis’, in Discourse Theory and Poli1cal Analysis: Iden11es, Hegemonies and Social Change, ed. by D. Howarth, A. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (Manchester: Manchester University Press – St Mar8n’s Press, 2000), pp. 3–4.

Ernesto Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a name?”, in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. by Francisco 4

Panizza (London: Verso, 2005), pp.32-50

Ernesto Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a name?”, in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. by Francisco 5

Panizza (London: Verso 2005), pp.32-50

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Ins8tu8onal approach Populist approach

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The idea that populism is not a set of coherent poli8cal ideas (thus enabling malleability and applica8on across the poli8cal spectrum) has become almost unanimous, with the influen8al Ernesto Laclau asser8ng that populism ‘is not a fixed constella8on but a series of discursive resources which can be put to very different uses.’ Muller is also careful to detach populism from a statute ideology, 6

jus8fying its convergence under a single term by asser8ng the existence of what he calls an “inner logic” . Yves Surel reinforces that by deeming populism “less of a poli8cal family than a dimension of 7

the discursive and norma8ve register adopted by poli8cal actors.” Has8ngs also classifies populism 8

as a poli8cal style, considering its appeal a rhetorical one, with a minimal program cast at the periphery of its discourse by a symbolic series of “indigna8ons”. This implies that poli8cal actors 9

across the le?-right spectrum can temporarily borrow a populist argument. Cas Mudde calls this an a5achment to a host ideology, which is a useful perspec8ve to have for the purpose of this research. More precisely, he exemplifies this in subsequent accounts to be associated with 10

“na8vism on the right and socialism on the le?”. The ques8on then becomes whether the success 11

of populist par8es is more related to its host ideology or to its populist rhetorical strategy. Herzinger makes an accurate theore8cal point in claiming that populism is a post-ideological response to the disillusionment of the electorate towards outdated disputes over the tradi8onal le?-right spectrum and so should not be classified with reference to it. This may be true from a theore8cal 12

perspec8ve, as a5empts to understand every ideology with respect to le?/right dis8nc8ons may have limita8ons. However, as far as voter behavior is concerned, the findings of this paper suggest that in the context of France and Greece the extent of the disloca8on from a tradi8onal scale differs, and it appears to be due to the different degrees of de-legi8miza8on of their respec8ve poli8cal establishments (i.e- different posi8ons on Laclau’s ins8tu8onal/populist approach scale).

Inclusionary/exclusionary populism The formal difference derived from discursive dis8nc8ons between le?-wing and right-wing populism seems to be the idea of immigra8on, which means its importance as a vo8ng issue may affect le?/right populism preferences.

Having established the discursive nature of populism rather than conven8onal policy-expressed ideology, the le?/right difference as outlined by Mudde and Kaltwasser lies in inclusionary/exclusionary terms respec8vely. This has two sides: both in their respec8ve defini8ons of “the 13

people” and in the role they assign to them in the pursuit of change. Firstly, “the people” are in both

Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), p.1766

Jan Werner-Muller, What is Populism (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 7

Yves Surel quoted in: Yannis Stavrakakis & Giorgos Katsambekis, “Le?-wing populism in the European 8

periphery: the case of SYRIZA”, Journal of Poli8cal Ideologies, vol. 19, no. 2 (2014), pp. 119-142

Michel Has8ngs, “The Success of Extremist Par8es in Europe”, in The Rise of Populism and Extremist Par8es in 9

Europe, ed. by Isabelle Durant and Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Brussels: the Spinelli Group, 2013)

Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism: A Very Short Introduc8on (Oxford : Oxford University 10

Press, 2017)

Cas Mudde, “The problem with Populism”, The Guardian, 17 February 2015, sec8on Europe-opinion, h5ps://11

www.theguardian.com/commen8sfree/2015/feb/17/problem-populism-syriza-podemos-dark-side-europe [accessed 3 March 2017]

Richard Herzinger, “Power to the Populists”, Foreign Policy, No. 133 (Nov.-Dec. 2002), pp. 78-7912

Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing 13

Contemporary Europe and La8n America”, in Populism In Europe, Volume 48, Issue 2 (April 2013), pp. 147-174

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cases a homogenous group, with a united conscience and who can pool together their wishes and interests under a “common good”. The painted picture of homogeneity is forced through the exclusion of opposed voters as “not part of the real people”. Nonetheless, the le?’s “people” are otherwise inclusive, while the right poses further excep8ons on basis of race, ethnicity and sexual orienta8on. Secondly, the le? advocates change through the people, thus staying closer to the idea of people rule, while the right seeks consent for an authoritarian figure, as single legi8mate representa8ve of the pure people.

1. Supply-side factors

1.a. Far right/far left heritage and opportunities The provenance of the compe8ng populist movements is relevant in explaining their original electoral niche. In the context of France and Greece it seems to be true that the more successful populist movement is the one which appeals to a poli8cal-spectrum extreme whose support has successfully been fostered since the crea8on of their respec8ve modern poli8cal cultures.

Both France and Greece are characterized poli8cally by their strong two-party systems swinging power between the centre-le? and centre-right ever since their respec8ve libera8on from extreme right-wing regimes in 1958 and 1974 respec8vely. The experience of these regimes prompts a natural expecta8on of a higher a5rac8veness of le?-wing poli8cal movements, in both cases symbols of resistance against oppression and posi8vely framed by the democra8c regenera8ons of the two countries.

Indeed, this is true of SYRIZA in Greece, whose posi8oning on the le? gave it the moral advantage drawn from a posi8ve historical heritage of le?ist movements, which it invokes in its discourse to bolster support. It claims to draw inspira8on from the EAM Na8onal Libera8on Front (1941-44) led by the communist party KKE, which resisted against German occupiers. Also, war8me resistance hero Manlois Glezos was a former member of SYRIZA, further strengthening the opportunity to foster a favourable correla8on in the minds of the electorate. However, interes8ngly, France presents a 14

Discourse qualifier SYRIZA Front Na4onal

Who are the people?

“every democra8c ci8zen” “priorité na8onale”, “patrio8sm social”

“French ci8zenship, you inherit or you merit it.”

Who are the elites? The internal and external pro-austerity forces (ND, PASOK, DIMAR and the EC, ECB, IMF respec8vely)

Globaliza8on and Islamic fundamentalism

Who are the advocated drivers of change?

“I’m assigning this task to you to save us”

“Marine Le Pen, the voice of the people, the spirit of France.” 10 references to her, no reference to the party as a whole

Panayotopoulos, P. “Poli8cal uses of history 2010–2012. Radical le? and extraneous meaning of the trauma”, 14

in Civil War–Cultural Trauma, ed. by N. Demertzis, G. Antoniou & E. Paschaloudi (Alexandria, Athens, 2012), pp. 252–287.

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different scenario where despite the extreme right heritage of the Front Na8onal leading to an expecta8on of its exclusion as a poli8cal contender, it managed to foster support for the populist right. The need to explain this peculiarity highlights the importance of another factor in studying the heritage of the poli8cal extremes- the con8nua8on of the support triggered by their similar experiences of libera8on. In the a?ermath of the fall of the military regimes, the communist par8es in both countries posi8oned themselves as third-par8es on the poli8cal stage, maintaining an open an8-system alterna8ve. Greece’s communist KKE remained a constant presence on the na8onal poli8cal scene, partly due to the more recent libera8on from right-wing dictatorship (1974) and delayed development of a welfare state. The lack of involvement in mainstream party coali8ons of government allowed the resilience of the KKE and so fostering of extreme le?-wing support in Greece. Conversely, although France’s communist PCF was a prominent force in the provisional government of 1944-47, who subsequently benefited in electoral showing and remained a third, an8-system party un8l the 1980s, its involvement in the centrist Mi5errand government in 1981 sent its vote share tumbling to 9.7% in 1986. This allowed a pragma8c re-defini8on of the cause of the extreme right, this (for whom the loss of the imperialist Algerian War cause was a crucial point to re-frame its cause and culminated with the aggrega8on of extreme right movements under the banner of the Front Na8onal in 1972 ). The fall of the PCF was thus seen to have le? an electorate ripe for 15

the an8-system appeal of the Front Na8onal, strategically captured by its adop8on of a protec8onist stance of chauvinis8c welfare. This was first iden8fied as part of the FN agenda in 1993 and was 16

correlated with a surge in working-class support, significant re-alignment in favour of the FN through its welfarist stance which Pascal Perrineau referred to as ‘Gaucho-Lepénisme’ . 17

In both countries a union crackdown as those of the UK or the US was absent, allowing a base of appeal for the le?. But, because the socialist party in France did not undergo a neoliberal cosme8sa8on as did the majority in Europe, it remained a beneficiary of this situa8on and thus allowed less space for the a5rac8veness of a far-le? movement. Conversely, the neoliberal shi? of the mainstream socialist party PASOK in Greece, le? a poten8al niche of appeal.

The far le? in France therefore seems to be since squeezed between the FN’s welfarism and the socialist party, which did not undergo a neoliberal shi?, whereas in Greece there seems to be an opportunity between the communism of the KKE and the neoliberal-adjusted socialism of PASOK.

1.b. Post-crisis reconfiguration of the political spectrum The posi8ons of the par8es and the lines along which electoral debates were played post-crisis suggest that the populist right had a structural advantage to the le? in France, whereas a lack thereof in Greece meant that the populist le? emerged as successful not due to posi8ons related to the le?/right spectrum, but thanks to more effec8ve party strategy.

Overton’s window It is important to see the populist contest differently in France and Greece: because in France there was a lingering necessity for any outsider party to pose as a credible-governance party and normalise its pla{orm, the debate was s8ll relevant in terms of the le?/right poli8cal spectrum, with voters

Nonna Mayer and Marie5e Sineau, « III: France: The Front Na8onal » , in Rechtsextreme Parteien Leverkusen 15

Leske & Budrich, ed. by Helga Amsberger, Brigi5e Halbmayr

Paul Hainsworth « The extreme right in France: The rise and rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's front na8onal » , 16

Representa1on, Volume 40, Issue 2 (2004), pp. 101-114

Pascal Perrineau, «La Dynamique du vote Le Pen. Le poids du gaucho-lepénisme», in Le Vote de crise: 17

l'élec1on présiden1elle de 1995, (Presses de Sciences Po, 1995), pp.243-261

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conceivably choosing their side first, and then placing themselves on a scale of extreme-to-centre. Conversely, in Greece populism had a less nega8ve connota8on historically, which coupled with de-legi8miza8on of the ins8tu8onal approach levelled the playing field between the populist le? and right by marginalizing the mainstream.

Reference to the concept of Overton’s window will help arrange the opportuni8es for the success of third par8es in terms of posing as credible governance par8es. Overton’s window refers to the debates and posi8ons which are available for poli8cal candidates within the electorate’s percep8on of what is acceptable to discuss and support. The construc8on of the Greek state in a populist climate (the post-1974 poli8cal reconstruc8on of Greece was the pursuit of the le?, with Papandreou’s PASOK, described by Aslanidis as the first instance of European le?-origina8ng populism, with the slogan ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks’) and the persistence of the prac8ce of mass-clientelism (the party offering most benefits to the electorate wins) can be interpreted to frame the poten8al future adop8on of a populist agenda as situated within Overton’s window. Also, the memory of oppression under right-wing military dictatorship can be expected to place the extreme right in both countries outside Overton’s window. S8ll, in France, the FN managed to shi? its posi8on early on towards more of an Overton-insider by capturing the welfarist pla{orm of the fallen communist party, a first step towards the normaliza8on of its pla{orm. The second step was subsequent to Sarkozy’s presidency and the leadership of Marine Le Pen who rhetorically detoxified the party.

Going back to his ins8tu8onal/populist approaches scale, Laclau (2005) maintains that populism develops “when a large number of social and economic demands accumulate, which cannot be sa8sfied within the exis8ng ins8tu8onal system”. Both France and Greece have entered different degrees of crisis-situa8ons as a consequence of the global financial crisis. Whilst both countries have experienced a restructuring of the poli8cal arena, this has been a lot more profound in Greece due to the gravity of the situa8on, and created circumstances in which the “normaliza8on” stage of an an8-system movement, required for it to pose as an upholder of credible governance, was deemed irrelevant. For the same reason, the le?/right spectrum was side-lined and party strategy le? as the main determinant of success. In France, it remained a requirement that the Front Na8onal entered the realm of legi8mate democra8c alterna8ve party, and its success in swi?ly doing so guarded its advantage of historical support from the emergence of a le? populist contender. Because the FN has long been the single alterna8ve for the electoral niche of disillusioned voters with the current poli8cal system, with no viable populist contender on the le?, it started from a strong posi8on which it has adapted in line with ins8tu8onal requirements and voter demand. This put the insurgency of the new le? populist alterna8ve-the 2017 France Insoumise candidate, Jean-Luc Melenchon at a structural disadvantage, requiring a much more definite breakthrough and/or big mistakes in the FN’s adapta8on process which did not come about.

A brief overview of the compara8ve situa8ons France and Greece was experiencing by 2012 reveals more deep-rooted discontent in Greece. Unsustainable levels of foreign debt have been downplayed to fit the Eurozone imposed limits. The revela8on of the upwards-revised figures by the PASOK finance minister led to the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding in May 2010, the first of three interna8onal bailouts, offered on the condi8on of imposi8on of austerity measures and market reform in the Greek economy. Economic ac8vity, in decline since 2008, con8nued to contract sharply: -3.1% (2009), -4.9 %( 2010), -7.1% (2011) and -6.4% (2012). The social impact of this deep recession was a 9.3% drop in the employment rate by 2012, with youth unemployment reaching

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43.6% that year (double that of the adults), along with a 24.8% at-risk-of-poverty rate in 2011. 18 19

SYRIZA rose from minor party status to that of main opposi8on party in the twin “earthquake” parliamentary elec8ons of May and June 2012, going on to win the 2014 European elec8on and the na8onal elec8ons of January and September 2015.

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France saw compara8vely lighter symptoms, but nonetheless damaging rela8ve to its size and prominence in the European Union. The situa8on by 2012 reflected a mere 0.2% GDP growth, a 14-year high unemployment rate of 10.9% and a debt-to-GDP ra8o approaching 90% and forecast then to hit 97% in 2013 . The first monumental success of the Front Na8onal was in 2002 when the then-20

leader Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the second round of the presiden8al elec8on. However, the subsequent extent of defeat in the second round the same year, failure to reach it again in 2007 and internal problems faced by the party within the leadership ranks and with the headquarters led to commentators virtually declaring the FN a lost insurgency. Nonetheless, the leadership takeover by

Jean-Marie’s daughter Marine proved a turning point in the fortunes of the Front, managing in 2012 to break the record level of support that propelled her father Jean-Marie into the second round and in reaching the second round presiden8als in 2017, largely due to her successful rhetorical

detoxifica8on of the party, moving away from her father’s explicit racism.

Structural opportunities In ordinary condi8ons, perhaps the most prominent vo8ng behaviour theory is the median voter theorem, whose main idea is that the poli8cal party which manages to posi8on itself as close to the centre of the le?-right poli8cal con8nuum will win an elec8on. However, the situa8ons of crisis presented above have led to the demise of an essen8al assump8on of this theory- that the poli8cal spectrum is a single, one-dimensional axis.

SYRIZA electoral performance 2004-2015

0

10

20

30

40

2004 2009 Jun-12 Sep-15

Hellenic Parliament European elec8ons

Figures from :Dr. Dimitris Karan8nos, “The Social and Employment situa8on in Greece”, (Brussels: 18

Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2013), pp.8-11

The situa8on has further deteriorated since, but the figures are given so as to paint the picture of social and 19

economic discontent in the run-up to the May 2012 elec8on when SYRIZA became the main opposi8on party.

Euronews, “France’s economic crisis”, h5p://www.euronews.com/2012/03/20/france-s-economic-crisis 20

[accessed 24 June 2017]

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Both countries have the common characteris8c of being members of the European Union, which has had an impact on their na8onal poli8cal stage by adding a new issue-dimension that cut across the tradi8onal le?-right divide. A notable aspect in the repolariza8on of the French poli8cal stage was the 2005 referendum on a proposal for a European cons8tu8on, in which all three major poli8cal

par8es (PS, UMP and UDF) campaigned for the “yes” camp, but the result came 54.67% against, which created a new issue-dimension along pro-/an8-European integra8on lines. The pro-/an8-EU axis in Greece has to be seen in the context of the ques8on of the interna8onal bailout. As such, the debate in Greece not only concerns the membership of the EU/Eurozone, but also the acceptance of the bailout terms. Nonetheless, while in Greece the depth of crisis and widespread impact across the popula8on has made the bailout debate an unavoidable electoral criterion, the ques8on of Europe in France can be overlooked at the ballot box by voters not feeling par8cularly affected by decisions in Brussels (the axis is correspondingly drawn as dashed).

Given the strikingly welfarist character of the Front Na8onal’s economic policy, it seems appropriate to model the Le?-right axis in France by the “Horseshoe Theory”. This sees the far right and far le? in much too similar terms to place them on the poli8cal spectrum as polar opposites.

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In Greece, the profound shock of the situa8on described has given priority to a new axis: the pro-/an8-bailout, even ahead of the tradi8onal le?/right scale. It must be remembered that historically, electoral wins in Greece have belonged to the party able to offer most benefits to the electorate, in a mass-clientelism format, so the le?/right axis may be seen as less prominent from the start. The issue of the bailout has fundamentally shi?ed Overton’s window due to the depth of the resentment felt, with anything cri8cizing the economic mismanagement or the issue of na8onal sovereignty (returned through the ques8on of interna8onally-imposed austerity cuts) regarded as poten8ally acceptable, largely to the benefit of the extreme right whose na8vist agenda was framed as more jus8fied.

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Step 1: Adop8on of a welfare-chauvinis8c

agenda to replace the imperialist cause.

Step 2: Sarkozy’s presidency and Marine’s

rhetorical de-demoniza8on.

Far le?

Daria-Ioana Sipos

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Note: Greek party system post-financial crisis. The bailout agreement issue transcends leS/right poli1cal con1nuum: there are supporters and dissenters from either ideological spectrum side

Mainstream contenders in recent years The situa8on of the mainstream le? and right par8es in both France and Greece can help explain whether either populist side has more opportunity to a5ract voters from its mainstream alterna8ve and how protected it is from the contest of the mainstream.

The best chances of electoral success for minor par8es, in Norris’s view, come from the strategy of claiming ownership of issue gaps le? by major par8es. The necessity for mainstream poli8cal forces 21

to campaign on the pro-bailout side in order to maintain an image of fiscal responsibility interna8onally and of credible governance na8onally opened up this opportunity for populist contenders in Greece. They hence remained largely protected from grabs of voters by their mainstream alterna8ves and had a stable electoral niche to appeal to, leaving the contest to be played out between them. However, an obvious general weakness of this strategy is that major par8es which perceive a growing threat may decide to appropriate rather than accommodate the minor party’s message. While the situa8on in Greece protected its populist actors from this 22

outcome, France was in a different posi8on. The 2007 presiden8al elec8ons in France saw the mainstream right represented by candidate Nicholas Sarkozy do just that : take a strong posi8on on 23

law and order and adopt a populist discourse to a5ract the niche of the Na8onal Front, leading to a resounding victory and reminding that the FN voters are primarily right-affiliated. However, the inability to successfully implement his populist agenda whilst in government sent disillusioned voters back to the original upholders of the right populist banner in 2012, whilst also legi8mizing the posi8on of the Na8onal Front and helping it proceed into Overton’s window. A?er this scenario played out, it is plausible to assume that the FN also remains largely protected from leaks to the

Greek Party System

Bailo

ut a

gree

men

t

-4

-2

1

3

5

Le?/Right

-4 -1.8 0.5 2.8 5

Pippa Norris, « The Rise of the Radical Right: Par8es and electoral compe88on in pos8ndustrial socie8es », 21

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 2-7

Tim Bale, ‘Cinderella and her ugly sisters: the mainstream and extreme right in Europe’s bipolarising party 22

systems’, West European Poli1cs, vol. 26, no. 3 (2003), pp. 67–90.

Aurelien Mondon “Nicolas Sarkozy's legi8miza8on of the Front Na8onal: background and perspec8ves”, 23

PaVerns of Prejudice, Volume 47, no. 1 (2013), pp. 22-40

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mainstream right, though not en8rely so. Also, the populist right benefits from a lack of opportunity for the radical le?. There is evidence of a decline of the mainstream le? o?en traced back to the referendum campaign of 2005. The issue proved divisive for the Socialist Party, who held a vote to determine what official stance they would take in the referendum campaign, resul8ng in a 59% victory for the yes camp. However, allied par8es of the PS such as the Ci8zen and Republican Movement or Workers’ Struggle as well as trade unions were opposed, leading to a fracturing of the moderate le?ist front. The same issue of Europe led to the forma8on of the far le? Front de Gauche to contest the 2009 European elec8ons from an an8-EU pla{orm, movement which is the source of the populist France Insoumise. This split the le? electorate between the moderate and far le? and can explain the rela8ve weakness of the populist le? as compared to the right, especially given the similarity of the programmes of the two le? groupings in the 2017 presiden8al elec8ons.

In terms of opportunity, in Greece the centre-le? PASOK lost more support a?er the crisis situa8on, which could be explained because it was in government when Greece’s bankruptcy was announced and the majority of Greek voters held it responsible for this outcome. This more marked disaffilia8on on the le? leaves more floa8ng voters the populist le? can appeal to.

Structural advantages- conclusions

2. Demand-side factors- Populist alternatives 2.a. Social movements Intui8vely, the grassroots appeal of le? populism would benefit from fostering protest social movements. Although both countries experienced such social movements in response to the economic degrada8on as a result of the financial crisis, in both cases benefi�ng the le?, their larger scale in Greece offered SYRIZA a much bigger electoral boost than it did for the France Insoumise. Also, through the more successful fostering of social movement support SYRIZA outperformed the populist right alterna8ve Golden Dawn, while France Insoumise was unable to overtake the advantage already held by the FN.

France Greece

Overton’s window A lingering necessity for a far-right party to posi8on itself inside a s8ll-relevant Overton’s window.

A flexible Overton’s window legi8mizing the radical rhetoric due to the scale of disillusionment and resentment.

Structural advantages A structural weakness of the far le?, squeezed between the mainstream socialist party and a welfare-chauvinist populist right.

No apparent structural advantage of the le? or right.

LeQ/right scale Resilience of the le?/right poli8cal spectrum and mainstream alterna8ves.

Prominence of the pro/an8-bailout scale before the le?/right spectrum, on which par8es are aligned in ins8tu8onal vs populist strategy-holders (or mainstream vs outsiders). Thus le?/right scale is marginalized.

Pro/An4-EU scale A new scale of pro-/an8-European integra8on of varying relevance among voters (and clearly subordinated to the le?/right scale).

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In Greece, the depth of crisis led to the bailout being perceived as an illegi8mate imposi8on of power and breach of sovereignty, aggrega8ng the responses of ci8zens and, as expected, rising the appeal of extra-ins8tu8onal ac8vism (Sakellaropoulos, 2012). The behaviour of populist par8es in Greece, notably SYRIZA and Golden Dawn almost as “ins8tu8onal ac8vists” and their pragma8c grassroots appeal fostered this developing social sen8ment, a crea8on of what could be described as “demand-side populism”.

According to research conducted by Aslanidis and Marantzidis , in Greece the non-par8san, non-24

ideological Indignados social movement became a “mel8ng-pot” for feelings of frustra8on of Greek ci8zens, and disaffiliated tradi8onal voters as well as provided a pool of demands that opened the electoral market for new contenders capable of appropria8ng their strategy to the publicly expressed discontent against the bailout. Given that SYRIZA was already protected from mainstream party contenders, it needs to be explained why it was more successful than its populist alterna8ves. This goes back to the effec8ve channelling of the momentum triggered by the Indignados protests- firstly, because its loose organisa8on of 13 le?ist groups origina8ng from a split with the Communist party KKE in 1968 allowed the covert collabora8on of several party members with the grassroots of the Indignados movement without a centrally-approved approach, and secondly- because its leader Alexis Tsipras was the only outspoken enthusias8c leader towards the protest from its onset. This 25

suggests it was mostly party structure and strategy that propelled it ahead of its populist counter-parts, who could have equally well gathered the momentum of the social movement. Their links to the Indignados movement were also present- Panos Kammenos, ANEL leader, claimed the structural heritage of Indignados, having signed an agreement with 11 cons8tuent groups at its forma8on in 2012, and Golden Dawn although not directly linked to the movement benefi5ed from its revival of na8vist rhetoric to gain legi8macy.

Interes8ngly, the spring 2016 demonstra8ons against the new labour law implemented by Manuel Vall’s socialist government were paralleled to the Indignados and led to the forma8on of La France Insoumise, as Melenchon’s project. Previously, he contested the 2012 presiden8als on the pla{orm of Le Front de Gauche, but adapted a Trotskyist cause under a populist banner in 2017 (a?er the poor performance in the 2014 Europeans, the party ebbed away). The fact that he polled a strong 19% support in the 2017 presiden8al elec8ons, while the socialist candidate only got 6.2% suggests there was a strong transfer of votes from the centre-le? to the populist le?, facilitated to some extent by the momentum around La France Insoumise stemming from this social movement. However, the scale of the demonstra8ons remains a lot smaller than the Greek Indignados, thus being an insufficient boost for the populist le? to overtake the right.

2.b. Immigration issue-voting France and Greece both seem to exhibit immigra8on issue-vo8ng favouring a preference for right-wing populist par8es. However, the intensity of an8-immigra8on feeling being lower in Greece as well as side-lined by the economic issues and geographical concentra8on, impeded the rise of the right, in contrast to France where the more acute presence of these factors favoured it.

Paris Aslanidis and Nichos Marantzidis, “The Impact of the Greek Indignados on Greek Poli8cs”, June 2016, < 24

h5ps://www.researchgate.net/publica8on/303982152_The_Impact_of_the_Greek_Indignados_on_Greek_Poli8cs>, [accessed 25 July 2017]

Paris Aslanidis and Nichos Marantzidis, “The Impact of the Greek Indignados on Greek Poli8cs”, June 2016, < 25

h5ps://www.researchgate.net/publica8on/303982152_The_Impact_of_the_Greek_Indignados_on_Greek_Poli8cs>, [accessed 25 July 2017]

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Given that the main policy dis8nc8on between right-wing and le?-wing populism surrounds the issue of immigra8on, its prevalence among voters could help determine whether a right-wing populist party is likely to be more successful than a le?-wing one because it meets voter demand more appropriately. Although the FN has other dis8nctly radical right policy issues, Marcus (1995) 26

regards immigra8on as a matrix policy through which other elements are filtered: security, culture, educa8on.

Vo8ng behaviour theory maintains that there are three prerequisites for issue vo8ng to happen, which will be applied compara8vely to Greece and France on the issue of immigra8on.

Firstly, there is the prominence of the issue. The presence of immigrants is significant in both countries. For Greece, the tougher restric8ons on immigra8on of its neighbouring countries have redirected the flow of African immigrants towards it, the border with Turkey has made it the main des8na8on for refugees fleeing humanitarian crises in the Middle East and the porous borders of the country have a5racted increasingly high numbers of illegal immigrants. Similarly prominent, in 27

France the Muslim popula8on represents around 7.5% of the en8re popula8on. The difference is, however twofold: firstly, Greece has a highly concentrated immigrant popula8on in the transit islands of Kos and Lesbos, where support for the populist right Golden Dawn actually prevailed, whereas in France the immigrant popula8on is more evenly distributed. More importantly, prominence does not only refer to the number of foreigners, but also their visibility. This can be understood in France, in the context of elec8ons, through the Michigan model in vo8ng behaviour theory. This sees electoral

decisions opera8ng in “funnel mode” with long-term factors such as party allegiance and family educa8on at the back and short-term developments with a more focused impact in the final campaign days. The over 230 people killed in the last 2 years by Islamist militants and the long-term state of emergency declared as a result strongly links the issue of immigra8on with that of tough law and order in the context of France. , boos8ng the a5rac8veness of the populist right from two 28

direc8ons. Correspondingly, in 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen shockingly reached the second-round presiden8al elec8ons. Subsequent electoral analysis iden8fied circumstan8al developments linked to na8onal security such as the post 9/11 climate and incidents of terrorism close to the elec8on campaign as central to explaining the unexpected result . In 2017 again, when the FN candidate, 29

Marine, again reached the second round a gunman, then iden8fied as an ISIS militant ambushed three Parisian police officers on the Champs-Elysees on the eve of the first round, killing one and wounding two others. These incidents may have contributed to electoral decisions in France in a short-term mode, crea8ng an immediate climate more favourable to the populist right, whilst this immediacy was not present in Greece, leaving the long-term, background problem of economic crisis at the top of vo8ng priori8es, which is part of the answer as to why the immigra8on issue was more influent in France.

Secondly, voter preference on the issue must be strong and united. In France, an IPSOS survey in 2013 on the subject of immigra8on revealed that 70% of respondents agree that “there are too

Jonathan Marcus, “The Na8onal Front in French Poli8cs” (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995)26

Charalambos Kasimis, “Greece: Illegal immigra8on in the midst of crisis”, <h5p://www.migra8onpolicy.org/27

ar8cle/greece-illegal-immigra8on-midst-crisis>, [accessed 13 August 2017]

Saphora Smith, “French Elec8ons: Marine Le Pen Is Backed by Quiet Army of Women”, h5p://28

www.nbcnews.com/news/world/french-elec8ons-marine-le-pen-backed-quiet-army-women-n748136 [accessed 5 August 2017]

Paul Hainsworth « The extreme right in France: The rise and rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's front na8onal », 29

Representa8on, Volume 40, Issue 2 (2004), pp. 101-114

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many foreigners in France”, 67% say they “no longer feel at home as before [in their country]” and 74% believe the Muslim religion is not tolerant or compa8ble with French values. The situa8on in 30

Greece according to a 2016 opinion poll is also predominantly nega8ve towards immigra8on: “94.5%

of those interviewed agree or probably agree that the number of immigrants in Greece over the last decade is excessively high. 74.9% also agree that high levels of immigra8on increase crime levels and 69.8% believe that it also increases unemployment levels, while 63.6% disagree with the view that immigra8on can cause posi8ve effects on the economy, or that immigra8on enriches our culture (70.2%) or even that immigra8on could improve Greece’s precarious demographic situa8on (74.5%)” Solely from the numbers, it seems rather odd that it was France and not Greece who 31

experienced a surge in support for the populist right. One possible explana8on could be the violent pla{orm advocated by Golden Dawn, the main an8-immigra8on party in Greece, which required unwavering an8-immigra8on feelings to commit to a vote, whereas the compara8vely more moderate image of the Front Na8onal capitalised on a shallower strength of feeling. Also, the surveys interes8ngly seem to suggest that an8-immigra8on feelings in France are more connected to a cultural/ethnic element of disrup8on, which a right-wing populist party appeals to, whilst in Greece the main worry seems to be economical (quite predictably due to the depth of crisis), making the opportunity cost of choosing the populist right much higher in perceived value of factor importance. Therefore, it is more likely that Greek voters could compromise their an8-immigra8on views in favour of a candidate perceived as more economically promising, and thus vote for the populist le?, whilst in France the FN’s an8-immigra8on agenda addressing desire for cultural homogeneity was complemented by its welfarist agenda appealing to the economic distress and thus removing a need to compromise between the two.

Finally, there must be a clear dis8nc8on between candidates on the issue, thus channelling the vote of the strongly-opinionated in a narrow direc8on. James Shields remarks that although the FN has forced other par8es to reciprocate its strong posi8on on immigra8on, its posi8on as a poli8cal outsider enables it to have a tough posi8on which cannot be sufficiently appropriated by mainstream par8es. In Greece, the Migra8on Policy Ins8tute summarizes the failure of mainstream par8es to 32

deal with the immigra8on waves, which renders a5empts to analyse their stances fu8le as the de-legi8miza8on of their pla{orms seems to extend to management of immigra8on, and so they are unlikely to be perceived as viable candidates on this issue: “More than 20 years a?er the increase of immigra8on flows to the country, Greece has not managed to design sa8sfactory and opera8onal policies” Therefore, the populist right both in France and Greece are highly likely to be the primary 33

beneficiaries of immigra8on issue-vo8ng.

Having fulfilled the outlined criteria, it is plausible to assume that issue-vo8ng on immigra8on could be present in both France and Greece. A look at some empirical evidence on the correla8on between an8-immigra8on issue-vo8ng and support for right-wing populist par8es in France and Greece gives mixed responses.

IPSOS survey, 2013, « Les nouvelles fractures francaises » , h5p://www.ipsos.fr/decrypter-societe/30

2013-01-24-france-2013-nouvelles-fractures [accessed 22 May 2017]

GERASIMOS MOSCHONAS, « What do Greeks believe », February 2016, h5p://www.dianeosis.org/en/31

2016/02/what-do-greeks-believe/ [accessed 29 July 2017]

James Shields, “The extreme right in France: from Petain to Le Pen”, (London: Routledge, 2007), p.20432

Charalambos Kasimis, Greece: Illegal Immigra8on in the Midst of Crisis, March 2012, h5p://33

www.migra8onpolicy.org/ar8cle/greece-illegal-immigra8on-midst-crisis [accessed 02 October 2017]

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As can be seen on the map below, there are a number of regions where a high immigrant popula8on correlates with high levels of support for the Front Na8onal (yellow dots). Also, in Greece the far-right populist party Golden Dawn doubled its share of the vote in the most concentrated regions hit by an influx of refugees- Kos, Lesbos, A�ca and greater Athens, However, a study conducted by Le Monde regarding the 2017 French presiden8al elec8on found that the correla8on coefficient between a high concentra8on of immigrant popula8on and strong support for the FN was only 0.28 (the closer to 0 the weaker the correla8on) . This can be interpreted to reflect the trade-off 34

between the two compe8ng theories seeking to explain immigra8on issue vo8ng. Firstly, in terms of compe88ve threat theories of group dynamics - namely, voters will vote for an8-immigra8on right-35

wing populist par8es when the level of compe88on for scarce resources (welfare provision, jobs etc.) from migrant groups reaches a cri8cal level. This, of course, implies that two variables affect the level of threat perceived: the rela8ve size of the immigrant popula8on in a certain area, as well as the scarcity of resources (affected by the current economic situa8on) . This also means that the 36

immigrant popula8on may have a bigger impact on the na8ve popula8on in 8mes of austerity cuts and economic difficul8es, as those faced by Greece and to some extent by France. Secondly, through the intergroup contact theory, which maintains that the closer the contact with a migrant popula8on, the more likely that the ethnical and racial prejudice will be minimized and there will be generally peaceful cohabita8on. It may be that a sudden influx as that witnessed by Greece is more likely to lead to the applica8on of compe88ve threat theories, as well as high levels of scarcity given by the harsher austerity measures faced by Greece compared to France. Even though it seems an8-immigra8on issue vo8ng is more suited towards the explana8on of the far-right populist rise in Greece, a survey of vo8ng inten8ons in 2012 revealed that 29% of the GD votes were primarily of indigna8on and protest, followed only second by 27% for its stance on immigra8on. This suggests that while the le?/right scale may be more important with respect to immigra8on in Greece, it is s8ll outweighed by the an8-system character of the populist vote.

Mathilde Damge, “Presiden8elle: le vote FN est il concentre dans des zones avec peu d’immigres?”, May 34

2017, h5p://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/ar8cle/2017/05/10/presiden8elle-le-vote-fn-est-il-concentre-dans-des-zones-avec-peu-d-immigres_5125715_4355770.html [accessed 2 June 2017]

Lawrence D. Bobo, 1999 “Prejudice as Group Posi8on: Microfounda8ons of a Sociological Approach to 35

Racism and Race Rela8ons." Journal of Social Issues, Volume 55, (Issue 3): (1999), pp. 445-72.

Lincoln Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Popula8on Composi8on 36

and An8-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." American.", American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Aug., 1995), pp. 586-611

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37

Conclusion In conclusion, it seems that the le?/right spectrum is more relevant in France in terms of voter iden8fica8on than in Greece. In France, voters for populist par8es on the le? and right seem to be primarily disaffiliated voters from their respec8ve mainstream alterna8ves. Conversely, in Greece, the depth of crisis has led to a more definite de-construc8on of the poli8cal spectrum and the situa8on of government mistrust and the weight given to the bailout agreement have priori8sed the trade-off between par8es along the line of pro-/an8-bailout which incidentally corresponds to mainstream vs populist par8es.

Given this dis8nc8on, there are separate conclusions to be drawn about rela8ve success of the populist right and le? in each of the two countries. In Greece, it was primarily issue ownership strategy on the part of SYRIZA who most successfully appropriated the trade-off between bailout resentment and a s8ll predominantly pro-European sen8ment through policy ambiguity and rhetorical devices. In France too, strategy played a significant part in making the FN pla{orm more “acceptable” but the historical base of support for the far right and the “impasse” of the le? remain predominant reasons for rela8ve success.

Despite a certain overlap of the agenda of the populist le? and right, the two poli8cal phenomena remain dis8nc8ve. The experiences of France and Greece are very different and broadly seem to suggest that if, as is the case in Greece, the context of the rise of populism is a profound de-legi8miza8on of the ins8tu8onal approach to poli8cs, the le?/right scale is of less importance and the party with the best strategy in terms of addressing the newly constructed predominant interest scale is likely to emerge as strongest. This is because the impact of the bailout agreement was so extensive that other policy content was marginalized in the electoral debate in Greece. Alterna8vely, if, as in France, there is a perceived worsening of the socio-economic situa8on which empowers populist actors, this serves to create alterna8ves on the poli8cal spectrum which draw their support from the electorate of mainstream par8es, mainly along le?/right ideological lines, with immigra8on issue vo8ng playing a significant part in the rise of a right populist movement over a le? one. Further research should focus on whether the conclusions of this case study are generally applicable, or if

Damge, “Presiden8elle: le vote FN est il concentre dans des zones avec peu d’immigres?”37

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they reflect the par8cular compara8ve configura8ons of the poli8cal and economic situa8ons in France and Greece.

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