Dancing with the ElephantBy K.L. Billingsley

I ate last October, In whatwould become perhaps the ^

^bost significant moment in t||'female aviation history sinceAmelia Earhart dropped from ra-dio contact into the Pacific, Navy L..Lt. Kara Hultgreen took off fromSan Diego's Miramar Naval AirStation in a Grumman F-14ATomcat. The 29-year-old Hull- ^•green was the first of only two 'yfjwomen to qualifyas pilotsof theNavy's premier fighter since na- .... . .val policy was changed on the is- jsue of women in combat early in |pHuK|j||^1993. EverythingHultgreen did, Btherefore, had the feel of symbol- ^ism. She was not only a fighter fpilotbut also someone whocar-ried thebanner of gender equity,whether she wanted to or not—

an airborne white female equiva-lent of Jackie Robinson whomfate had appointed to shoulderothers' hopes and fears as sheclimbed into the cockpit. iMplffiiii

On this dear fall afternoon,Hultgreen chmbcd to cniising altitudeand then flew southwest toward the air-craft carrier U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln,which awaited her some 50 miles offshore. Setting up her approach, sheswung herplane to the"abeam" position l.I to 1.2 miles from the ship, atapproximately 600 feet inelevation and with 180 degreesof turn remaining before her landing. Herair speed wasapproximately 155 mph asshe prepared to"call the ball."areference tothevisual glidescope provided byascries ofFresnel lenseson the carrier's deck. Just after threeo'clock.Lt. MatUiew Klemish, the Radar Intercept Officer ridingbehind the pilot, said, "One oh three. Tomcat ball.Hultgreen," asLt. Hultgreen swung into her final approach."Roger ball," replied the Landing Signal Officer (LSO)from the deck as Hultgreen made her final turn.

Thestarboard engine wasspewing exhaust butnothing came from theport engine. Wliether because ofthat orsome other problem, Hultgreen swung wide of theccntcrline, critical for an accurate landing. Her F-14 thenbegan to yaw tothepilot's left. "Wave off," the LandingService Office said with relative calm. But then he shouted"Wave off!" twice more with escalating urgency as theplane's air speed dropped dangerously. At that moment,theLSOalso usedhis electronic"pickle"to flash warninglights ondeck. "Power! Raise your gear!" heyelled intothemicrophone from hisplatform beside thedeck, anareasurrounded bya netintowhich theLSOs candiveindangerous situations. But now Hultgreen's fighter was banking steeply to the left and wasi/i extremis, beyond the pointof no return. Only one option remained.

"Eject! Eject!" screamed the LSO. Radar OfficerKlemish initiated theejectionprocedure. Hischuteopened,and he got one swing in the air before splashing to thesurface with only minor injuries. But by the time Lt.Hultgreen had ejected a fraction ofasecond later, the F-14had rolled so far that it catapulted the pilot directly intothe water. It was not until November 13 that a salvage teamdiscovered her body in 4,000 feetof water, still strappedintotheejectionseat that restedsome90 yardsawayfromthe sunken aircraft. The first female combat pilot to fly theF-14 had become the first to die.

i 6A completeunderstanding of all of the facts lead-.Zi. ing tothismostunfortunate accidentwillnever

be known,"saidAdmiral R.J.Spanein the Navy'sofficialreport on the accident, released on February 28. Yet despite thisapparent agnosticism, the Navy tried towave offthe whole incident by blamingit on engine failure. That

Navy Lt. Kara llullgreen

caused promoters ofwomen incombat todeclare victoryand to attack critics of the new policy such as LindaChavez, who had written about Hultgreen's death weeksearlier in her USA Today column: "It's been almost twoyears since the Department of Defense started its BraveNew World campaign to put woman in combat roles,and the casualties are starting to mount....Morale andmilitary readiness are clearly strained by the Pentagon's attempt to ignore human biology and psychology. [Under such conditions) it's doubtful that any honest investigation into Hultgreen's tragic death is evenpossible."

Tlie.se views infuriated California Sen. BarbaraBoxer, who said, after the Navy released its report, "Iurge Chavez to withdraw the scurrilous and irresponsible charges made about women in the military." In asimilar vein, liberal columnist Ellen Goodman wrote;"So it was the engine after all. Not the pilot. Lt. KaraHultgreen did not die on the altar of 'political correctness' or 'preferential treatment' or 'reverse discrimination.' She died because the F-14 Tomcat stalled as itapproached the aircraft carrier." Boxer and Goodmanmay have thought that they had trumped Chavez in theintramural waramong feminists over themeaning of theaccident, but the basic issues still remained unresolvedaftertheNavy report's attempt toaffirm theidea ofwomenin combat.

It was not accurate to simply say that the Tomcathad "stalled," Even the Navy report said that only oneengine malfunctioned. The F-14A can fly, and land,quite well with one engine, and Lt.Hultgreen knew all theprocedures forboth ofthese functions before she evergotin thecockpit. "Single engine emergencies arcdiscussedand trained to daily in flight briefs and simulators,"the Navy reporton the accident says. Whether she wassufficiently good at handling those emergencies isanother question.

Tlie fevered statements of Boxer, Goodman, and otli-ers worried that the accident would set back women's participation incombat confirmed tliat they knew little aboutNaval aviation and had not read carefully the Navy reportor theanonymous letters ofotherNavyflyers whosaw theaccident as avoidable, letters they simply dismissed as

"vicious" misogyny.The communications from Navy personnel that fol

lowed the accident were anonymous not because thosewho sent them were cowardly or chauvinistic, or because their authors hated Hultgreen. They were anonymous because, in today's Navy, any public expression critical of gender neutrality, or any complaint aboutdouble standards favoring women, can terminate thespeaker's career.

Anyone doubtful that this is .so shouldconsider thecase of Lt. Cmdr. Kenneth Carkhuff, an officer with asuperb record—"unlimited potential" and "destined forcommand and beyond," said his fitness rcport.s—who isbeing drummed outof theNavy for expressing his beliefthat women should not be subjected to the violence ofcombat. At the .same time, he told his commanding officers of that belief, he also said he was willing to go intocombat with women if so ordered. On January 29, tlieNavy moved to dismiss him for "substandard performance" in the "failure to demonstrate acceptable qualitiesof leadership required of an officer in your grade asevidenced by your refusal to support and execute thepolicies of the Department of Defense and United SlatesNavyregarding women in combat."

Given this reality.I will guard the identities of twoof my sources for this stoiy. both F-14 pilots who arcformer TopGun insuuctors at Miramar. each with thousands of hours in the plane. One of them is a LandingServiceOfficerqualified to landany aircraft in the fleet.The other is a former safely officcr as well. These two officers reviewed with me the official materials, the communications sent by anonymous aviators,and the Navy'svideo of the crash.

The worldof Navy aviation is a small one with fewsecrets, and both men know key players in the incident,tliough neither had spoken out before this article. Theyagree with each other in the conclusions they draw aboutthis mishap: Pilot error was indeed involved, and Lt.Kara Hultgreen was given special treatment in training. |These two men believe that the record also shows that 3the Navy has been less than truthful in this incident as well |as on questions involving women incombat ingeneral. |Instead of candidly facing the conclusions that might ^

HETERODOXY

be drawn from this incident, these pilots believe, the Navycontinues to move forward blindly with policies thatcould mean the needless deatli of our uoops or of civiliansand the loss of expensive equipment, not to mentionthe loss of a combat engagement to our foes.

Asthe first exhibit in this case, these pilots point to theplane itself. As Saddam Hussein and others have

learned bydirectexperience, when anF-14Tomcat iscoming after you, you've definitely got a problem. The all-weather F-I4A can hit speedsexceeding Mach2 andsoarto altitudes above 50,000 feet. It can track 24 differenttargets sinuiltaneously and shoot down sixofthem atoncewith its Phoenix AIM-54A missiles.

Few pilots get to fly this $38-million weapon,which also packs several tons ofsophisticated air-to-groundordinance and a Mk-6IA1 Vulcan 20mm cannon. Butthe Grumman engineerswhodesignedthe F-14A, operational since 1973, did so without any considerationthat any woman would everfly it.According totheNatyTimes, there are nine concerns for women with theF-14A and other aircraft: helmets; urine collection devices(there are none for women on most aircraft); torso harnesses; survival vests; anti-exposure coveralls; flyer'scovcralls; anti-gsuits;andcold-weather andsummer jackets and boots.

Of these, helmets are particularly important.Standard helmets are generally too big for women, because their faces are narrower than men's. A shiftinghelmet is dangerous, and hair worn outside of a helmetis a fire hazard. Navy officials told the Navy Timesthat"politically it isn't accepiable to tel! female aviatorsto have short hair," a confession that politics trumppractice and a possible reference to an incident in whichSen. Barbara Boxer chastised a commander who sent afemale pilot home for refusing to keep her hair underher helmet.

Custom-designing equipment for women, whichthe Navy is doing, is a complicated and expensiveprocess.In addition to equipment, there is the planeitself. From the beginning of its career, the F-14 hasproved adifficult and,particularly with theTF-30 engine,dangerous aircraft. A relatively small percentageof male Navy aviators has the ability to fly the F-14successfully.

Among the female ranks the Navy had found onlytwocandidates, Kara Hultgreenand Lt. JO CareyLohrenz.According to Lt.Cmdr. Tom Pokorski, a Navy investigator and authorof a study on musclestrengthrequired foraviators, pilot strength isn't anissue "untilsomething goeswrong. If they losehydraulics oranengine or twoengines,itgetsreallytoughto fly theplane."Having saidthis.Commander Pokorski is quick to add, "The thing is we don'twant to discriminate against anyone."

The Miramar Top Gun trainer and Landing ServiceOfficer who gave background for this article boasts animpressive physique but says thathe often required twohands on the stick. Kara Hultgreen herself told the NavyTimes that flying the F-14 was like "dancing with an elephant—you have to be very careful and stay one stepahead of the airplane."

Despite charges thatthose critical oftheNavy's waffling on theaccident wereanti-woman, most of thenavalflyers who spoke out about thecrash were respectful ofHultgreen andfelt thatherdeath wasa lossto theservice."There is no dishonor or disgrace in making a mistake inthe most difficult task in aviation—landing on a carrierdeck," editorialized the Navy Times on March 13."[Hultgreen], like her male colleagues, dead or alive,areheroes for risking tlieir livesevery time thcycatapuU."Thetwopilotswhospoketo meagreewiththatsentiment, andit pained them to watch the video of the crash.

Kara Hultgreen, who aspired to be an astronaut, held adegree in aerospace engineering from the Univer

sity of Texas. As tlie Navy Times observed, "Hultgreenhad been one of a group of female pilots outspokenand active in pushing the Navy and Congress towarddropping combat exclusion for women." And when theexclusion was lifted she said "it was sort of like women being able to vote for the first time. It was historic. 1felt super."

"hie analogy was a stretch. Anybody can vote, butnot anybody can land a fighter on the heaving deck of anaircraft carrier in a space of several hundred feet. TTiat'swhat they do in the Navy, all over the world, day andnight, 24 hours a day. The pilot who can't put the aircraftdown "on the boat," however smooth his or her landingson dry land, is out of his or her league here. It's dangerousbusiness, as the six Navy aviator fatalities during DesertStorm indicate.

PAGE 13

of seven. One of the naval fiyers who called in to a SanDiego radio station in tlie aftermatli of the crash said that,as a trainer, he had votedto lakeaway thewingsof pilotswith grades of3.4to3.6. Athird F-14 pilot I interviewedagreed thatsucha ruling would notbe unusual.

TheNavy considered Hultgreen a fully qualified andabove-average pilot. ButbothTop Gun pilots, one ofwhomhas landed on carriers out of fuel and with his plane shotup, say there is more to thestory.

All combat pilots must be able to land on carriers, dayornight. Butthatsituation, as tricky as itcanbe,does

not approach the physical demands of actual combat, asupersonic slugfest that can easily stretch the humanframe and mind beyond the breaking point. Pilots mustcontend with g-forces that can black them out, hotconditions in the cockpit, and, of course, a well-armedfoe trying to kill them. Based on the clear strengthdifferences, it remains dubious if women could competewith men on an equal basis in a shooting situation. And,asGeorge Will has pointed out, sending the second-best ina military situation is like having the second-best pokerhand. You have two choices: Bluff or fold.

One of the Miramar Top-Gun trainers has heardreports from other aviators that Hultgreen failed toeven getherwheels down ondeck during a night-landingexercise. (Pilots need six of these to qualify.) Accordingto this pilot and others, a mistake of that magnitude atthat stage of training would be enough to get mostpilots cashiered. The Navy Times noted that Hultgreen"had disqualified during her first trip to the carrierduring F-14 training this April (1994]," adding however that such a development was "not unconunon amongstudent pilots."

Tlie Navysays that about25 percentof pilotsdisqualify their first time. But both of theflyers who spoketo me say that, following a "down," the normal procedure is some sort of formal review, such as a Fleet NavalAviators Review Board followed by remedial training.Apparently Hultgreen had not been subjected to such aboard hearing, something thatwould havebeen standardforany male fiyer. "Maybe she would not have survivedthe Fleet Naval Aviators Review Board decision," said onenaval aviator in a fax to a local radio station, "but she wouldbe alive."

InApril 1994, about thetime Hultgreen wasfailingto qualify, Lt. Ellen B. Hamblet, a Navy reservist andformerintelligence officerforanearly-warning squadron,wrotean article in the Navy journal Proceedings entitled"Who's to Blame When Women Don't Measure Up?"Hamblet cited the case of a female pilot who blew a tireandranofftherunway. Thispilotwas"praisedbytopleadership for keeping her wits abouther but thegeneralconsensus among thejuniorofficers was that if a male pilothad done the same thing, he would have been severelydisciplined."

Hamblet also notes the case of "a woman nearthe bottom of her class being allowed to continue at thetraining command...because the commanding officerneeded to keep a female instructor." Hamblet funhercharged that women were "being allowed to carrier qualify, although they didn't meet the required standards."And while stories of mishaps involving male aviatorsseem to end with the words "so he lost his wings," storiesabout women often end in "and can you believe she isstill flying?"

Many female Navy personnel, including some pilots, share Hamblet's views, which correspond to those oftheanonymous Navyfaxerwho wrotea San Diegoradiostation after the accident that Hultgreen "was an accidentwaiting to happen, every one of her squadron mates knewit. but they could not speak up for fear of reprisal." "HieTop Gun F-14 trainers I spoke to agree and note that special treatment continued after the accidcnt.lt is a view corroborated by the Navy Times, which wrote: "TWo Navyinternalmessagessent in the days after the mishap—-whichoutline that Hultgreen had gone too wide on her approachand caused her engine to stall as she tried to correct it-were quietly recalled."

The Navy gave Hultgreen an elaborate funeral atArlington, with many dignitaries in attendance. It isnot normal practice to retrieve downed planes fromdepths of 4,000 feet (downed male pilots, says one F-14veteran, are regularly abandoned "to become part ofthe food chain" and their planes left in the drink), but theNavy did so without hesitation in Hultgreen's case.The Navy estimates this cost at $100,000. In another unusual move, the Navy gave a copy of Hultgreen's flightgrades to her mother, Sally Spears of San Antonio—butnot to the press.And two days before the Navy released itsFebruary 28 report to the press, Mark Galpin, a commander

"Any landing isacontrolled crash," says one of theformerTop Guninstructors whom I interviewed.The massive F-14A NATOPS manual (Naval Aviation TacticalOperating Procedures Standardization) is replete withEXTREME CAUTION warnings. "Everytimeyouseethat,it'swritten inblood," says theother F-14 pilot who agreedtospeak for this article. "Itmeans that someone has beeninjured or killed during thatprocedure."

Kara Hultgreen would have been familiar withall those danger warnings and the procedures forlanding with one engine; she would have memorized anumber of steps to take in emergency situations. Shehad flown the EA6B for years, logging what the Navysaid was"considerable flight time"before movingon tothe F-14, a plane tlmt is far trickier to land. "The F-14is the most difficult airplane to land aboard," she toldthe Navy Times. "Tlie lineup to land is very difficult....It was the challenge they made it out to be." She madethat statement just days before crashing as she attempted that very maneuver. At the same time, she also toldthe Times that tliere had been "incrcdible pressure to perform"and thatwaswhysheand CareyLohrenz, tlieotherfemale combatpilot,hadasked the Navyto keepthe media away during their training.

Muchof that "incredible pressure" came as a resultof the Tailhook scandal of September 1991 in Las Vegas.That wild affair launched a witch hunt and gave anti-military types inCongress such asPat Schroeder a powerfulpretext touse ininfiicting a PC agenda regarding womenon the armed forces. "Tlierewassocial engineering wellbeforeTailhook," saysoneof theTopGun trainers. "Thatjustbrought it intotheforefront andgave Schrocder something to hook on."

AfterClinton's election, the restrictions on women fiy-ingin combat were soon lifted. The Navy, knowing

thata Democratic Congress would be eyeing themilitarybudget, was desperate toshake theTailhook stigma byfinding and showcasing qualified women pilots, who lobbiedCongress in uniform and appeared for thepress in flightsuits, both breaches of the rules. Hence the pressure toperform for their two prime candidates. And with it thetemptation to cut them some slack.

Hultgreen came toSanDiego's Fighter SquadronVF-213 known as the Black Lions in May 1993.She workedout of Miramar, home of the Replacement Air Group orRAG. The RAG commander, interestingly enough, wasTom Sobieck, who had caught considerable flak overTailhook even though, as withmanyotherofficers, it wasfar from clear whether he had actually done anythingwrong. Butofficers under Sobieck's command saythathefelt he was"under the gun" and that pushing women incombat waspartof hisatonement. "Theman wascapableof putting pressure on his junior ofiicers," says one ofF-14 veterans who spoke to me.

Combat pilot training usually takes six to sevenmonths, and thereare fewrightsto privacy. Everylandingis filmed and graded, with the grades posted in orderofachievement in the "ready room." These grades followpilots wherever theygo.Oneterm used intheNavy's Tactical Shipboard Training Assessment (TSTA) isa "down,"which indicates an unsatisfactory performance in a critical area.Asthe termcleariy denotes, sucha mistake couldmean a plane and pilot going down.

On February 28, 1995, when theNavy released itsreporton the Hultgreen accident, I attended a pressconference at the North Island Naval Air Station in Coronadoat whichI askedAdmiral Jay B. Yakeley, commander ofCarrierGroupThree,ifLt. Hultgreen hadany"downs"onher record. Momentarily startled,Yakeley responded thatshe did indeed have one but did not elaborate and quicklyadded that manyother pilots also have them. The Navyreportreleasedthatdaydoes notusetheterm"down,"butit docs refer to a "mishap"by Hultgreen that was"beingcounted as a wave-off," adding that the pass "should not-be included on [Hultgreen's] landing gradecalculations,"whichthe Navy calculated as3.083(outof a possible4),aperformance "slightlybelow average compared with therest of the Air Wing."

Was this "mishap" the "down" to which AdmiralYakeley referred? I have asked the Navy, in writing, toprovide thecircumstances ofLt.Hultgreen's down,whetherthere were any injuries, what sort of boards reviewed heraction,and whatkindof remedialtrainingshe was requiredto undertake. The Navy has yet to respond.

Tlie Navy also told ihe San Diego Union-Tribunethat last July Hultgreen scored 3.24 on field carrier landing practice, placing third in a class of seven. On her daylandings on the carrier she scored 3.22, with a boardingrate of 89 percent, first in class of seven. Her night grade2.82 with a 71 percent boarding ranked her sixth in class

in HuUgrcen's unit, flewto SanAntonio to briefSpearson the results of the investigation and to presenther witha complete copy of the 6-inch thick official reportandthe Navy video of the accident.

It might be noted that when the Navy releasedits first report on theTailhook scandal virtually nobodybelieved it. The document only confirmed press suspicions that there was more to the story than the Navywas lettingon. But the Hultgreen report, since it had apolitically correct message, elicited the oppositeresponse.When some reporters asked forthe fullreport,the Navy told them they would have to file a Freedomof Information Act request. Yet what was released forpublic consumption isenough toraise doubts, if reporters had taken the lime to study it.

The report blames the crash on a mid-compres-sion bypass valve, but italsostates that"Noindicationsof pre-impact failure was found in the Flight ControlSystems, theAirInletControl System, Hydraulic PowerSystems. Electrical Power Systems, Fuel Supply FeedSystem or CockpitThrottleCommand."

Thereport concedes thatHultgreen was "relativelyinexperienced in the F-14."She had logged 217 hoursin the aircraft, compared to 460 hoursfor her radarofficer Matthew Klemish. (Klemish did not appear at theNorth Island press conference, and word aroundMiramar is that the Navy is keeping him from reporters.) "There existed a very small window of opportunity through which to recognize a deteriorating situation and to make critical flight control inputs," says thereport. "If these critical flight control inputs are notperformed quickly and correctly, then the aircraft willbe placed inexiremis. In this accident, the window ofopportunity for a successful recovery was missed. Finally, inexperience prevented the crew from recognizingthepointat which recovery wasimpossible andejectiontheonlyalternative." (Note thereport's evasive pas-sive-voicc construction in this passage: "the window ofopportunity was missed.")

Further, there was "a delay in recognition of theextremis condition, either due to preoccupation withcorrecting the overshooting start, or the timing of the

stall warning system." In addition, "the Landing Service Officer call for wave-off was extremely timely, butsubsequent pilot technique permitted Angle of Attackto increase to a pointwhere rudder effectiveness beganto be reducedto nil and departurefromcontrolledflightwas imminent."

The report further says that in Hultgreen'strendanalysis, "her tendency was to make largepoweradditions on the start due to a lineup or perceivedglidescope deviation which caused her to go high inthe middle to in close and make adequate correctionson the ramp tocatch middle wires." Soshehad apparently made similar lineup errors before—and the Navyknew it. (The San Diego Union-Tribune, citing Navysources, saidinearlyApril thattheNavy hadrigged thetests.)

And if, as the report said, the exact cause of theaccident will never be known, then attempts by the Navyto duplicate the situation in flight simulators can neverbe more than speculative.Further, in mid-MarchNewsweek magazine picked upleaks of theNavy's MishapInvestigation Report (MIR). This report, written toexacting standards and for Navy consumption only, issharply critical ofLt.Hultgreen and even notes that thefaultybypassvalvedoesn't fullyexplaintheoneormoreleft-engine stallsHultgreen's plane suffered.

Both pilots contacted by Heterodoxy, and many otherNavy personnel, say the Navy can salvage some

thingfrom this tragic accident by using it as an opportunity to review its policy on women in combat. Butthat does not seem to be what they have in mind.At theFebruary 28pressconference, a reporter asked AdmiralYakeley if thisaccident would cause theNavy to makeany change in the policy of training female pilots. "Absolutely not," Yakeley responded. And in a March 19interviewwith the 5fln Diego Union-Tribune, secretaryof the Navy JohnDalton said he was pleased withcurrent gender policies and argued that all but a few die-hards in the Navy were too.

Butsome point thefinger elsewhere. "The fault isnot with women," writes Lt. Ellen Hamblet. "but with

Navy leaders whoallowsubordinates tocontinuedoingjobs for which they are not qualified....Thc true faultlies with senior officers who refuse, for whatever reasons. to offer honest feedback and criticism and to enforce tough, unpopular decisions. They are perpetuating a terrible disservice to the poorerperformers, whoare allowed to continue in an atmosphere where theycannot compete safely. At the sametime, they alsoarecheating mostof theoutstanding personnel—both menand women—who crave and deserve a challenge to performto theirutmostcapacity, operatinginan atmosphereof excellence."

These lough words from a female officer arebacked up by the tough editorial of the Navy Times,which said thai "the Navy,still sensitiveover Tailhookandgender, has goneoutof its wayto reacha predetermined conclusion about the cause of Hultgreen's fata!crash" and that "the apparent Navy dishonesty—theshading of truth for fear of admittinga mistake or saying something politically incorrect—undermines Navycredibility."

The overall record suggests that it is not conservative critics such as Linda Chavez—who was, after all.rightabouttheNavy investigation—who needtoapologize. Rather, it is the liberal Schroeders. Boxers, andGoodmans who promoted the double standards thatneedlessly took a young woman's life and have madetoday's Navy a perilous place indeed.

They might pay heed to another prophecy of theanonymous Navyfaxer whowrote theSan Diego radiostation two days after the accident. "This death of Lt.Hultgreen was tragic, absolutely could have beenavoided, and is waiting to happen again."

Theymighteven pay attention to the testimony ofLt. KaraHultgreen herself."Guys likeyouhave to makesure there's only one standard,"Hultgreen told RearAdmiral Robert Hickey last year. "If people let me slidethrough on a lowerstandard, it's my life on the line. Icould get killed."

K.L. Billingsley writes regularly for Hetero-doxy.

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