Dan Weijers

Victoria University of Wellington

June 2011

Lots of experimental philosophy is designed to test empirical premises like: ‘We would not plug in’“Philosophers working in… ‘experimental

philosophy’ have begun… to collect data about folk intuitions”

Nahmias, E., et al. (2007). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Psychology, 18(5): 561.

But lots also just wants to understand how judgements about thought experiments are formed:“[To] use the methods of experimental psychology to

probe the way people make judgments that bear on debates in philosophy”

Nadelhoffer, T. & Nahmias, E. (2007). The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy, Philosophical Explorations, 10(2): 123.

Typical argument:1. If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in2. We would not plug in3. Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good

Test P2 (if true, go to next step, if false, then claim the argument fails) ACP: you did a faulty test: the wrong ‘we’ or

procedural biasTweak supposedly irrelevant factor of thought

experiment, test again, and compare results (if different in right way, claim that P1 is false because irrelevant factors unduly influence judgements) ACP: You did a faulty test: the wrong ‘we’, or

procedural bias, or added other irrelevant factors with your tweak

We can’t usefully test thought experiments with surveys when…

Respondents need to adopt the role of confronted agents… i.e. when they have to predict what they would do if

the scenario were realUsually involves “confusion, incredulity, fear, etc.” Smith, B. (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine?, Ethical Perspectives, 18(1): 45.

Because participants’ judgements about what they would do would otherwise not be made from the correct frame of mind… leading to the possibility thatThey might report what they think they should do or

what the experimenter wants to hear instead of what they would actually do

Our survey tests of thought experiments are less useful to the extent that: Respondents need to adopt the role of

confronted agentsWhen they “anticipate their own futures”, and/orThey “identify with the moral decisions of others” Smith, B. (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine?, Ethical Perspectives,

18(1): 46.

The survey suffers from methodological weaknessesSamplingParticipant ineptitudeProcedural bias: prepping, wording, question order

(Grice)

“…the inverted experience machine, as well as other[s]… have a unique set of characteristics that make it impossible to gather the right subjects to test. Therefore, in practice, these thought experiments are impossible to test.” Smith, B. (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine?, Ethical

Perspectives, 18(1): 37. (My emphasis)

“…unique set of characteristics…”:Requirement that participants adopt the role of

confronted agentsWhen they “anticipate their own futures” – e.g. when asked

‘what would you do?’Requirement for being a partially confronted agent: When they

“anticipate their own futures…, or attempt to identify with the moral decisions of others, to some extent” (Smith, 2011, p 46)

Setup makes it impossible for participants to adopt the role of confronted agentsSurveys “that address thought experiments about moral

dilemmas” (Smith, 2011, p 44) – Infer: all options involve significant losses?

Participants opinion asked for via survey, rather than behaviour observed in actual case (Smith, 2011, p 39 + elsewhere)

Requirement that participants adopt the role of confronted agents:When they “anticipate their own futures”

(Smith, 2011, p 46) – e.g. ask ‘what would you do?’This requirement is not met‘Anticipating their own futures’ is not a necessary

aspect of the Inverted Experience MachineE.g. What should a stranger choose in the Inverted

Experience Machine case?

Requirement for being a partially confronted agent:When they “anticipate their own futures…, or attempt

to identify with the moral decisions of others, to some extent” (Smith, 2011, p 46)This requirement is faultyJust because participants have to “attempt to identify with

the moral decisions of others” does not always mean that they need to get (at all) emotional to give a useful response

In fact making rational (not emotional) decisions is what we expect of those making important decisions on behalf of others in lots of cases

E.g. policymakers – should uni be free?

Amended requirement for being a partially confronted agent:When they “anticipate their own futures…, or

attempt to identify with the moral decisions of others, to some extent [in some cases]”This requirement does not apply to some cases of

testing the Inverted Experience MachineWhen deciding if someone should stick with a

machine life or go to reality we are better of putting emotions (“confusion, incredulity, fear, etc.”) behind us.

And, when trying to learn about what people think we should really value in a life, the same goes

It’s not clear where Smith stands on thisIf we can’t test the IEM because we don’t get

emotional, can philosophers make any use of it?

Did anyone feel “confusion, incredulity, and fear etc.” about the thought experiments?If not, then (according to Smith’s framework)

your judgement about it is uselessMaybe Smith doesn’t mind this result – I’m not

sure

Smith 1: thought experiments that require confronted agent respondents cannot be usefully surveyed because the appropriate emotions don’t come up

Smith 2: Inverted Exp. Mach. requires confronted agent respondents

Smith 3: Therefore, Inverted Exp. Mach. cannot be usefully surveyed

Me: not all Inverted Exp. Mach.’s require confronted agent respondents

Me: if Smith 1 is correct, then all use of dilemmas in philosophy is a waste of time or at least less useful than is usually thought