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Deliverable reference: Date: Responsible partner:
D12.02 23/04/2014 ULANC
Bridging Resources and Agencies in Large-Scale Emergency Management
BRIDGE is a collaborative project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-SEC-2010-1)
SEC-2010.4.2-1: Interoperability of data, systems, tools and equipment Grant Agreement No.: 261817
Duration: 1 April 2011 – 31 March 2015
www.sec-bridge.eu
Title:
D12.2 BRIDGE Ethical, Legal and Social Issues:
Current practices in Multi Agency Emergency
Collaboration
Editor: Approved by:
Monika Büscher, Michael Liegl, Peter Wahlgren Dag Ausen and Evangelos Vlachogiannis Classification:
PP
Abstract / Executive summary:
Integrating information technology (IT) into emergency response produces complex intended and
unintended, positive and negative consequences, reaching from enhanced efficiencies to new digital
divides. This deliverable presents an analysis of core ethical, legal and social issues that practitioners
and other stakeholders currently encounter in multi-agency collaboration. The report provides a
broad overview and an inventory of international coordination initiatives and standarisation
activities. The focus lies on issues that are relevant to innovation in IT supported forms of multi-
agency emergency response. We examine current approaches and practices of managing these
issues, combining literature review with insights from empirical investigations. The purpose of the
work summarised here is to inform socio-technical innovation in system of system approaches to
large-scale multi-agency emergency response, and this purpose defines the scope of discussions.
Utilization of the document for this purpose is supported by a glossary and an extensive index. The
report concludes with a summary.
Document URL: http://www.bridgeproject.eu/content/d12.2_bridge_elsi.pdf
ISBN number:
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Table of Contents
Document Collaboration Notes ......................................................................................... 4
List of Figures and Tables .................................................................................................. 6
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................... 7
Glossary............................................................................................................................ 9
Executive Summary .........................................................................................................12
1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................16 1.1 Purpose and Scope of this Deliverable ....................................................................................................... 16 1.2 Methodology .......................................................................................................................................................... 17 1.3 The Structure of this Deliverable .................................................................................................................. 19
2 Emergency Ethics .......................................................................................................20 2.1 From Exceptions to Virtues ............................................................................................................................. 20
2.1.1 The Morality of Exceptions ............................................................................................................................... 20 2.1.2 Should we be bound by principles? Deontology versus Consequentialism ................................ 21 2.1.3 Threshold Deontology: Public and Supreme Emergencies ................................................................ 22 2.1.4 Virtue Ethics – Preparedness for All Hazards ......................................................................................... 24 2.1.5 Beyond the Call of Duty? Liability, Technology, Heroism .................................................................. 26
2.2 Emergency Response & The Ethics of Emergency Technology ........................................................ 31 2.2.1 Informationalizing Emergency Response: (Un-)intended Consequences ................................... 32 2.2.2 Disclosive Ethics and Opaque Technology: The Case of Facial Recognition Systems ........... 39
2.3 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 42
3 Codes of Conduct .......................................................................................................44 3.1 Humanitarian Principles in Emergency Response ................................................................................ 44 3.2 Ethical Principles for Disaster Risk Reduction ........................................................................................ 45 3.3 Principles for Effective Response and the Ethics of Teamwork....................................................... 47 3.4 The Ethics of Information Sharing ............................................................................................................... 50 3.5 Computer Professionals’ Codes of Conduct .............................................................................................. 53 3.6 Ethical Codes of Conduct for the Use of Technology............................................................................. 56 3.7 Ethical Principles of the Information Society .......................................................................................... 58 3.8 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 59
4 Legal Issues ................................................................................................................61 4.1 A Common Practice? .......................................................................................................................................... 63 4.2 The Constitutional Basis for Disaster Response ..................................................................................... 64 4.3 Legislative Strategies ......................................................................................................................................... 66
4.3.1 General Laws vs. Detailed Regulations ....................................................................................................... 66 4.3.2 Ad hoc Political Response or Long Term Oriented Legislative Reforms? ................................... 68 4.3.3 Proactive, Mitigating or Reactive Legislation? ....................................................................................... 69
4.4 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 70
5 International Cooperation ..........................................................................................71 5.1 Emergency Response, Local, Federal, State or Regional? ................................................................... 71 5.2 The EU Legal Framework ................................................................................................................................. 72
5.2.1 The Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) .................................... 73
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5.2.2 The EU Civil Protection Mechanism ............................................................................................................. 74 5.2.3 The European Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERC) .................................................. 74 5.2.4 EU Internal Security Strategy in Action ..................................................................................................... 76 5.2.5 Generic & Cross-sectorial Crisis Coordination: ARGUS, EU-CCA & EU-ICMA ............................ 77 5.2.6 EU Research Initiatives ...................................................................................................................................... 78
5.3 United Nations ...................................................................................................................................................... 78 5.3.1 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) ................................................. 78 5.3.2 The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) ........................................ 79 5.3.3 The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT ........................................... 80 5.3.4 The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction ....................................................................... 81 5.3.5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) .............................................................................. 81 5.3.6 United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) ............................................................ 82 5.3.7 UN sector organs................................................................................................................................................... 82 5.3.8 World Health Organization (WHO) ........................................................................................................... 82 5.3.9 International Organisation for Migration (IOM) ................................................................................. 83 5.3.10 The International Law Commission (ILC) .............................................................................................. 83
5.4 Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Law Programme ...................................................................... 83 5.4.1 International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme ................. 83 5.4.2 The Disaster Law Programme ........................................................................................................................ 86 5.4.3 Model Act for the Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance ............................................................................................................................................................ 86
5.5 Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. 87
6 Social Practices or Ethics and Law as Social Practices in Emergency Collaboration .......89 6.1 ELSI in Work Practice ........................................................................................................................................ 89 6.2 Organizational Practice: The Sociality of Multi-agency Collaboration .......................................... 91
6.2.1 Difficulties in Practicing Ethical, Lawful, Socially Responsible Emergency Response ......... 92 6.3 Community emergency response ................................................................................................................. 96
6.3.1 Communities and the Practical Ethics of Inter-Agency Collaboration ........................................ 99 6.4 Societal issues: A Crisis of Information? ................................................................................................. 101 6.5 Summary .............................................................................................................................................................. 104
7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 105
8 References ............................................................................................................... 106
9 Subject Index ........................................................................................................... 122
10 Name Index ............................................................................................................ 128
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Document Collaboration Notes
Version History
Version Description Date Who
1 Initial Structure 20.7.2011 Monika Büscher (MB)
2 Some Authors assigned 20.7.2011 MB
3 Reformatted added draft paper abstract 3.08.2011 LW
4 Draft ToC and content collection 15.02.2013 LW
5 Revised ToC and content collection, authors 22.03.2013 MB
6 Revised structure and content 29.04.2013 MB & ML
7 Revised structure and content 18.08.2013 ML
8 Legal Section Draft completed, assembled
contributions, outline of missing sections
11.10.2013 PW, MB
9 Draft for 1st Review 8.11.2013 ML, MB, PW
10 Final Draft for 2nd
Review 2.1.2014 ML, MB, PW
11 Final Draft for reviewers’ final comments. 18.2.2014 MB, ML, PW
12 Submission for approval by Project
Coordinator
20.2.2014 MB, ML, PW
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Authors
ULANC
mobilities.lab
Department of Sociology
Lancaster University
Lancaster,
LA1 4YD, UK
Monika Buscher,
Michael Liegl,
Lisa Wood,
USTOCK
Swedish Law and
Informatics Research
Institute, Faculty of Law
Stockholm University
106 91 Stockholm,
Sweden
Peter Wahlgren,
Reviewers
Fraunhofer-Institut für
Angewandte
Informationstechnik FIT
Schloss Birlinghoven
53754 Sankt Augustin,
Germany
Alexander Boden,
Thales D-CIS Lab
P.O. Box 90
2600 AB Delft
The Netherlands
Bernard Van Veelen,
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List of Figures and Tables FIGURE 1 MAP OF ELSI ISSUES (ISCRAM 2013). ..................................................................................................17
FIGURE 2 UNDERSTANDING THE BASIS FOR ‘GOOD’ INNOVATION FOR 21ST
CENTURY EMERGENCY RESPONSE .....19
FIGURE 3 EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES AND MISCONCEIVED ‘MORAL BLACK HOLE’ MYTHS. ...................................23
FIGURE 4 FOUR PHASES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ........................................................................................24
FIGURE 5 WHOSE VIRTUES? CATEGORY I & II RESPONDERS ..................................................................................27
FIGURE 6 ACTORS AND ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE .....................................................27
FIGURE 7 TRACING WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN KNOWN DURING THE 22/7 NORWAY ATTACKS. ...............................29
FIGURE 8 ‘WORKERS AT DAIICHI, FETED AS HEROES, WILL BEAR THEIR BURDEN FOR YEARS’. ...............................30
TABLE 9 ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND VIRTUES..........................................................................................................34
TABLE 10 THE ETHICAL ‘IMPACT’ OF TECHNOLOGICAL AFFORDANCES - PROS .....................................................35
TABLE 11 THE ETHICAL ‘IMPACT’ OF TECHNOLOGICAL AFFORDANCES - CONS .....................................................37
FIGURE 12 FACE RECOGNITION SYSTEMS ...............................................................................................................39
FIGURE 13 SILENT TECHNOLOGY ............................................................................................................................41
FIGURE 14 USER RESPONSIBILITIES (UK POLICE NATIONAL COMPUTER (PNC)) ...................................................56
FIGURE 15 GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION ..........................................................................................57
FIGURE 16 ETHICS, THE LAW AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ARE ENACTED – IN EVERY MOMENT ............................89
FIGURE 17 DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT FLOWCHART ...........................................................................................95
FIGURE 18 ‘NEXT GENERATION ICT FOR THE RESILIENT SOCIETY’ .......................................................................103
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List of Abbreviations ADNS Animal Disease Notification System
ARGUS European Rapid Alert System
CECIS Common Emergency Communication and Information System
CEP Civil Engineering Planning
CIIP Critical Information Infrastructure Protection
CPM The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. Facilitates co-operation in civil
protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies which may
require urgent response actions. It is a tool that enhances community co-operation in
civil protection matters and was established by the Council Decision of 23 October
2001, updated 8 November 2007. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it
can provide added-value to European civil protection assistance by making support
available on request of the affected country.
CSCW Computer Supported Cooperative Work
DMP Disaster Management Programme
DPP Disaster Preparedness and Prevention
DRA Dynamic Risk Assessment
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office
CURIE European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange System
EHR Electronic Health Records
EMIS Emergency Management Information Systems
ERC Emergency Response Coordination Centre (formerly Monitoring and Information
Centre (MIC)) - the operational heart of the Civil Protection Mechanism. ‘Based at
the European Commission in Brussels, the ERCC is accessible 24/7 and can spring
into action immediately when it receives a call for assistance. The ERC works in
close cooperation with national crisis centres throughout the 32 countries
participating in the Mechanism (EU 28, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway).’
ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency
ERCC Emergency Response Coordination Centre
ESS The European Security Strategy charts global challenges and key threats to the
security of the European Union and ‘clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with
them, such as building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and promoting an
international order based on effective multilateralism’. It also evaluates policy
implications from these objectives in the European context.
EU-CCA Emergency and Crisis Coordination Arrangements
EU-ICMA Integrated EU Arrangements for Crisis Management with Cross-Border Effects
EUROPHYT European Network of Plant Health Information Systems
EWRS Early Warning and Response System
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FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters
GPS Global Positioning System
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IASC Interagency Standing Committee
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IDRL International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles
ILC International Law Commission
ISSA EU Internal Security Strategy in Action
MIC Monitoring and Information Centre
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Government Organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
NGO Non Governmental Organization
RAPEX Rapid Alert System for Non-food Products
RAS
BICHAT
Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats
RASFF Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
STS Science and Technology Studies
UN United Nations
UN
HABITAT
United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNCRD United Nations Centre for Regional Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UNISDR The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organization
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Glossary Collaboration in an interdisciplinary team requires some ‘translation’ between domains and academic
disciplines. In this deliverable, we define ethical, legal and other terms as they are introduced, and
provide links to the literature where they are discussed in more depth. The short glossary below
supplements such in-text definitions. An index complements this to support quick reference.
Affordance the perceived qualities of an artifact that suggest how it should or
could be used (Norman, 1988). Affordances are not an inherent
property of an object or technology, they are relational in the sense
that they arise from interactions between people, the material and
design of the artifact, and the context.
All-hazards Approach that acknowledges that there are a multitude of natural
and manmade dangers, and that addresses actual hazards as well as
latent hazard conditions that may give rise to future incidents.
Consequentialism Ethical position where good results for the greatest number are the
most important moral criterion.
Crisis Management The term ‘crisis management’ covers the whole cycle of risk
assessment, preparation, emergency planning, emergency response,
recovery, and evaluation.
Deontology Ethical position of duty ethics, requires that we always follow
certain moral principles, regardless of the results.
Digital divide Economic inequality between groups, in terms of access to, use of,
or knowledge of information and communication technologies (ICT)
and by extension exclusion from participation in large areas of
contemporary society.
Digital
Humanitarian
Organisation
“Volunteer and technical communities” (V&CTs) who build tools
and organize “crowdsourcing” of emergency information.
Disclosive Ethics An approach in the ethics of technology formulated by Lucas
Introna that brings the usually silent and opaque operation of digital
technologies to the surface to open it up to critical scrutiny.
Distributive justice Principles of distributive justice are therefore best thought of as
providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures
that affect the distribution of economic benefits and burdens in
societies. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Emergency
Response
The acute phase of emergency response, including search and
rescue, controlling the cause and effects of an incident.
Ethics Philosophical/political investigation of what constitutes right and
wrong or good and bad behaviour.
Ethics of
Information Sharing
Information sharing is at the heart of effective multi-agency
emergency response, yet concerns about data protection have often
led to inadequate sharing practices. Ethics of Information Sharing
explores and codifies the need for this and ethical ways of going
about it.
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(Social) Exclusion Processes in which individuals or entire communities of people are
systematically blocked from rights, opportunities and resources that
are normally available to members of society.
Habitus (hexis -
Aristotle)
Acquired ‘character traits’ or set of dispositions, which form the
basis of how an individual will feel and act in a given situation.
Important concept in virtue ethics: virtues need to be trained in order
to be prepared and able to do the right or virtuous thing, when the
situation presents itself.
Indemnity To deal with issues of liability, emergency organizations and
individuals use indemnity insurance to protect themselves against
claims. In response to post-disaster reviews and inquiries, the costs
for such insurance are rising.
Informational self-
determination
The right of an individual to know when and to whom personal data
are disclosed. In some European constitutions, the right to
informational self-determination is understood to be part of basic
rights to freedom, which are inviolable.
Informational self-
determination
The right of an individual to know when and to whom personal data
are disclosed. In some European constitutions, the right to
informational self-determination is understood to be part of basic
rights to freedom, which are inviolable.
Informationalization The intensification of information processing in an ever growing
array of economic and social activities.
Intersubjectivity A concept developed, inter alia by Alfred Schutz. The concept
captures that people do not inhabit ‘private’, entirely subjective
worlds that they can never fully share with others through
communication, but that instead, all human experience is at heart
social and based on shared understandings.
Liabilty In emergency response logging can become an issue discouraging
first responders from certain actions for fear of liability. Using
information from social media can also carry legal liability. subject
digital volunteers to tort liability under U.S. law.
Moral Black Hole The threat that a breakdown of social order would bring about to a
‘second state of nature’, where all morals are dispended
Morality The lived practice of ethical principles. We do not have ethical
behaviour, but moral behaviour.
Practical Ethics The idea that the rules that apply to a situation are not given by its
domain but a matter of ‘discovery’, ‘invention’ and ‘negotiation’ of
those people who act together engaged in this situation.
Social sorting Term coined by David Lyon (2002) the use of data in order to
identify, to classify, to order and to control entire populations.
Threshold
Deontology
Form of deontological ethics, which accepts that moral obligations
hold up to certain thresholds, while under extreme circumstances
exceptions are possible
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Utilitarianism A form of consequentialism where happiness is seen as the ultimate
goal of all humans and all action must be evaluated on the basis of
whether they increase or decrease human happiness.
Values Cultural, social, political, personal preferences or rules.
Virtual Role
Systems
Organisation principle in emergency response, based on on
intersubjectivity (taking the perspective of the other) where every
crew member simulates all roles in their minds, metaphorically
turning each individual into a group.
Virtue Ethics Ethical position where the moral system is based on the virtues, or
good character of individuals.
Virtues Thought or behaviour guided by high moral standards.
Whole Community
Approaches to
Security
A philosophical approach on how to think about conducting
emergency management, introduced by FEMA in 2011: “As a
concept, Whole Community is a means by which residents,
emergency management practitioners, organizational and
community leaders, and government officials con collectively
understand and assess the needs of their respective communities and
determine the best ways to organize and strengthen their assets,
capacities, and interests” (FEMA 2011, 3)
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Executive Summary Informationalizing
Emergency Response raises
ethical, legal and social
opportunities and challenges
The 21st Century has been called the ‘Century of disasters’, due
to a rise in the number and frequency of disasters and
heightened vulnerability amongst an ageing, growing, urban
population. This is one of several drivers in an increasing
‘informationalization’ of crisis management. The term refers to
the growing availability and importance of information and its
intimate integration into emergency response organizations and
practices. Many opportunities arise here, including greater
capabilities for risk assessment and public engagement.
However, informationalizing emergency response also creates
ethical, legal and social challenges, ranging from digital divides
to new forms of surveillance and professional accountability,
and they can undermine important European values, from
professional integrity to privacy and other civil liberties.
Understanding current
practices of noticing and
dealing with these
challenges and opportunities
is critical for proactive
socio-technical innovation in
large scale multi-agency
emergency response.
The BRIDGE project is part of international, interdisciplinary
research efforts that aim to enhance understanding of intended
and unintended consequences of system of systems innovation
to identify and pursue ‘good’ design avenues. The overall goal
of this research is to enable qualitative improvement in large-
scale multi-agency emergency response and to identify and
mitigate negative impact. The purpose of this deliverable is to
explore current practices of managing ethical, legal and social
issues. This is important because the ways in which IT are
designed and appropriated are deeply entangled with how
societies conceive of risks, prevent and prepare for crises, and
how they organise, fund and practice crisis management.
Ethical principles and
debates about IT Ethics can
provide some orientation.
Principled ethical positions have been developed by
philosophers and a review can contextualise discussions on
ethical, legal and social issues in IT supported emergency
response. Faced with an overloaded lifeboat, consequentialists
may, for example, sacrifice the lives of some passengers,
because this could save more lives overall. Deontologists, in
contrast, argue that actions can be intrinsically right or wrong
and that it would be wrong to force anyone off the overloaded
lifeboat, even if all passengers could drown. Some observe (a
threat of) a moral black hole at the centre of all major
emergencies and define thresholds for the suspension of normal
morality. Critics argue that this is often done unnecessarily,
inappropriately, and with corrosive consequences for societies.
Virtue ethics demands
preparedness, an all-hazards
approach and ‘virtuous
technology’.
Virtue ethics offers a way out, positing a strong moral
imperative to maintain normal moral rules even in extreme
situations. Moral normality can be supported through
preparation and professional virtues. This approach demands an
‘all-hazards’ approach that addresses all potential causes of
emergencies (not just threats to security). A virtue ethics
approach draws attention to ethical challenges in IT supported
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Emergency responders do
not have to be heroes to fulfil
their part of the social
contract.
emergency response, such as injustices engendered through
surveillance and social sorting. But it also opens up new
avenues for innovative design, and calls for ‘virtuous’
technologies. These should be part of a broad acknowledgement
that there is a social contract between emergency responders and
society. It is not right for society to expect emergency
responders (or vital support staff) to be heroes. Society has a
duty to put resources and infrastructures in place for all
responders to work as effectively and safely as possible.
Current IT innovation has
unintended, positive and
negative consequences.
Ethics is distributed across
collectives of human actors,
socio-economic
‘environments’ and
technologies.
Technology can engender unintended consequences on many
levels of social equality, justice and human dignity. This is a
function of ‘affordances’ – the relational effects that arise at the
juncture of human users, specific cultural and socio-economic
contexts and technological capabilities. A pros and cons analysis
can map some of the hallmarks of informationalizing emergency
response and ethical, legal and social challenges, risks and
opportunities. However, a focus on pros/cons simplifies the
processes and closes off promising avenues for innovation.
Disclosive Ethics reveals the
distribution of agency and
responsibility across
contemporary socio-
technical collectives in a
way that opens up new
avenues for innovation.
A disclosive ethics approach can deconstruct socio-technical
collectives or networks of human, environmental and
technological agencies to reveal the distributed ‘sources’ of
unintended consequences. Using the example of face
recognition, we show that discriminatory effects may arise
without intention and in ways that are difficult to address. At the
same time disclosive ethics approaches to unpacking ‘silent
technologies’ can present novel innovation opportunities.
Ethical Codes of Conduct
capture central virtues of
emergency response, and
also of IT innovation. They
point to a need for a ‘social
contract’ in IT innovation
for emergency response.
Professional emergency responders, NGOs and associated
professions have devised ethical and professional codes of
conduct to specify which virtues are right for disaster. These
range from humanitarian principles to guidelines for disaster
risk reduction, ethics of teamwork and multi-agency
collaboration, and specific guidelines for information sharing.
These domain specific codes meet with ethical principles
formulated by computer professionals around their social
responsibilities to produce useful technologies, promote
beneficence and do no harm. However, unlike emergency
response, IT innovation has no social contract with society to
share responsibility for ethically, legally and socially
circumspect, pro-active innovation. Technology users do have
duties and responsibilities, but these are ill-formulated and ill-
supported. Moves towards formulating ethical principles for
information societies, where new responsibilities are being
explored, are limited. In any case, critiques show that the very
idea of ‘codes of conduct’ may undermine rather than support
ethical conduct in practice and innovation, because they can
lead to complacency and even cover-up of unethical conduct.
Current Emergency Law is a As a consequence of various traditions and developments in
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very heterogeneous field of
jurisprudence.
It is highly consequential,
not least because
emergencies can call for the
declaration of a ‘state of
emergency’ and open ‘a
legal black hole’.
different jurisdictions, legislation of relevance for emergency
response is heterogeneous. Similarly, responsibilities and the
arrangement of organisations active in the domain vary a lot.
An analysis of legislative strategies reveals differences in at
least three dimensions: the nature of the rule systems can be
categorised as being more or less general or specific, reform
policies may be primarily long term oriented or of an ad hoc
nature, and the focus of the existing legislation may to various
degrees be set on proactive, mitigating or reactive remedies.
A rich variety of mechanisms are important for effective
emergency management. When the focus is on collaboration,
there is a need to analyse to what extent various types of rules
governing the organisations involved have to be adjusted and/or
complemented to function as an integrated whole. General rules
must be complemented with specific provisions and standards.
Short term solutions and long term objectives should harmonize,
and proactive regulations must be complemented with
mitigating, reactive and restoring measurements.
Legislation around
international cooperation is
particularly diverse and in
flux. There is a vast array of
programmes, guidelines and
model laws to regulate
cooperation and a mapping
exercise reveals that
common practices are rare.
Although disasters usually become extensively documented,
systematic efforts to analyze legal aspects of disaster
management as an integrated whole are rare. Similarly
normative documents stipulating common practices for disaster
management are difficult to find. Efforts to address this have
generated extensive suggestions, guidelines and model laws for
international cooperation.
Existing legal initiatives to develop common practices are
general, primarily defining responsibilities for states (e.g.
concerning mutual assistance and co-operation) or specifically
address one isolated sector (e.g. nuclear risks, food, or water).
At an operative level the responsibilities rest on individual states
and administration and practices vary. Rule systems (acts,
ordinances, standards) may be categorized according to how
they refer to different phases of an incident (e.g. prevention,
response, recovery), whether they are general or specific, or
whether they reflect ad hoc or long term strategies.
The overall conclusion from an extensive review of current
administrative and legislative efforts is that common practices
(internationally accepted and recognized by a large number of
authorities in different sectors of society) are rare. It is also clear
that the responsibilities and the operative management in states
of emergencies vary a lot between different jurisdictions. In the
BRIDE project these aspects will be further addressed in D12.3,
focusing on requirements and potentialities for future practices.
Ethics, law and social
responsibility are practiced.
How information is mobilised in multi-agency emergency
response affects people’s capability for ethical, lawful and
socially responsible conduct. A fundamental insight is that such
conduct is a matter of social and material practices, which are
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deeply entangled with technologies as well as ‘environmental’
factors of culture, embodiment and situations. This draws
attention to the specificities of how people interact with others
and the subtleties of interaction this enables.
The social and material
specifics of practice matter,
because these shape ethical,
lawful and socially
responsible conduct.
It highlights that the skills and practices involved may be ill-
supported or even undermined by existing technologies, which
challenges people’s abilities to perform practical ethics,
lawfulness and responsibility. Social media and community
emergency response represent a particularly vibrant domain of
social innovation that is changing the landscape for ethical,
lawful and socially responsible emergency response. However,
these transformations are part of wider, societal transformative
trends in a century where ‘knowing capitalism’ is joining forces
with ‘big data’ and ideas of data fusion across different domains
of civil society. The convergence of ‘smart city’ innovation with
IT innovation in emergency response carries great potential, but
also significant danger, especially around an erosion of privacy.
Understanding the Basis for
‘Good’ Innovation for 21st
Century Emergency
Response
The research presented in this report seeks to chart how
practitioners and other stakeholders in multi-agency emergency
response currently encounter ethical, legal and social issues. We
have focused on issues that are relevant to innovation in IT
supported multi-agency emergency response. In a century of
disasters, where emergency response services are under intense
pressures to produce more efficient, collaborative and effective
emergency response with less funding, it is critical to pursue
ethically, legally and socially circumspect IT innovation.
Emergency situations are a breeding ground for exceptions,
including exceptions to fundamental constitutional rights and
suspension of normal moral rules and values, often fueled (but
often unwarranted) by fear of moral disorder. This can erode
important civil liberties, and ‘the wrong kind’ of IT innovation
can amplify detrimental unintended consequences. What should
designers, practitioners, politicians, policy makers, researchers,
and (non-) citizens do? A curbing of informationalizing
innovation in knowing capitalism is unlikely to be possible in
many societies worldwide today, and the twin pressures of
financial cuts and an increase in disasters make it highly
improbable in crisis management. ‘Don’t do IT’ may be a sound
conclusion to draw for some designers, analysts and
practitioners, but it is not easily practicable and – in our view –
not desirable, because much good can come out of integrating
IT more closely into emergency response. ‘Do IT more
carefully’ could be a better maxim, but to specify what ‘more
careful’ might mean, there is a need to better understand how
information is mobilised and shared in crises. This deliverable
contributes to this effort.
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1 Introduction Informationalizing emergency response produces complex intended and unintended, positive and
negative consequences, reaching from enhanced efficiencies to new digital divides. It raises known
ethical, legal and social issues (abbreviated ELSI), as well as generating new ones.
Informationalization refers to the intensification of information processing in an ever growing array of
economic and social activities (Lash & Urry, 1994). It began with the invention of bureaucracy, but
has leapt into a different dimension with digital technologies. In the first decade of the 21st Century,
which has been called the ‘century of disasters’ following a Royal Society report (eScience, 2012),
disasters have killed 1,149,920 people worldwide (145,774 in Europe), and over 2,167,404 have been
affected; with a total damage of over $ 1,571,681 million (Vinck, 2013:231). At the same time, digital
technologies have become more powerful and numerous. Statistics on mobile phone use, for example
show 6.8 billion subscribers in 2013 and double-digit growth (Vinck 2013:10). In emergency
response, information technologies (IT) can support enhanced risk assessment and increased surge
capacity, data sharing, communication and collaboration between emergency responders, as well as
closer engagement with people affected by disasters. But they can also engender – sometimes far-
reaching – transformations of practices. The use of digital radio in over 121 countries in the world1
and the rise of social media ‘crisis informatics’ (Letouz , Meier, Vinck, 2013; Palen, Vieweg,
Sutton, & Liu, 2007), for example, have changed emergency communications practices. Digital
activity and communications logs provide new opportunities to learn from experience in post-disaster
reviews of response efforts, but they also allow new ways of holding professionals to account. And
when data can be shared more easily and to great effect, exceptions from data protection regulations
may foster surveillance and erode European values of freedom and democracy. The recent scandal
over NSA surveillance starkly highlights the challenges to informational self-determination and
privacy arising in the context of IT use in security policy and practice. Clearly, the ways in which IT
are designed and appropriated are deeply entangled with how societies conceive of risks, prevent and
prepare for crises, and how they organise, fund and practice crisis management.
1.1 Purpose and Scope of this Deliverable
The BRIDGE project develops methods and tools that support run-time intra- and inter-agency
collaboration, a middleware allowing data, system and network interoperability, and advanced human-
computer interaction techniques for exploration of information. These advances support flexible
assembly of ‘systems of systems’ (Ramirez, Buscher, & Wood, 2012), that is, they allow emergency
responders to ‘plug together’ diverse information systems in response to the specific circumstances of
the crisis they find themselves in. This requires ‘emergent interoperability’ between systems or
support for achieving such interoperability (Mendonça, Jefferson, & Harrald, 2007; Ramirez et al.,
2012). The BRIDGE project is part of international, interdisciplinary research efforts that aim to
enhance understanding of intended and unintended consequences of system of systems innovation to
identify and pursue ‘good’ design avenues. The overall goal of this research is to enable qualitative
improvement in large-scale multi-agency emergency response and to identify and mitigate negative
impact. The purpose of this deliverable is to explore current practices of managing ethical, legal and
social issues (Figure 1). The explanations, examples, accounts of rules and descriptions of current
practices, as well as the elaboration of current challenges and opportunities for innovation in IT
supported multi-agency emergency response that arise at these junctures are meant to inform
innovation. A glossary and index support this function.
1 http://www.tetra-applications.com/item.html&objID=17222
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Figure 1 Map of ELSI Issues (ISCRAM 2013). Produced during BRIDGE-led ELSI Track http://itethicsincrisis.wordpress.com/page/2/
As Figure 1 illustrates, ELSI in IT supported emergency response encompass many opportunities,
risks, challenges, and problems. These need to be noticed and addressed by people, and the design of
technologies can help or hinder this. A core purpose of the BRIDGE project is to design technologies
that support good practices of noticing and dealing with ELSI. To achieve this, a good understanding
of current and newly emerging real world practices of multi-agency collaboration is necessary. This
should include an understanding of practices of noticing and managing ethical, legal and social risks,
challenges, and opportunities in this context is necessary.
In the BRIDGE domain analysis deliverables D2.2-2.4, we analyse practices of collaboration, and in
D12.1 we have explored issues of privacy. This deliverable focuses on how a broader range of ethical,
legal and social issues are currently noticed and managed in large-scale emergency response. Ethical,
legal, social and societal issues that arise in this form of IT supported emergency response are varied
and deeply entangled. But while ethics, the law, and social practices are intimately linked, it pays to
discuss these different dimensions separately at the outset, to identify and explore core issues in depth,
so as to be able to trace interdependencies more clearly later on. The report provides an overview and
in-depth discussion of a selection of core issues; through its structure, glossary and index it is designed
to support orientation and targeted reference to specific issues within this complex field.
1.2 Methodology
Understanding and addressing ELSI arising in the context of systems of systems innovation is
challenging, because these issues are often vague, cultural, contextual, distributed, fleeting, and
complex. A mixture of empirical, analytical and design methods is needed. Methods used in the
research for this report include:
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Literature review – review of theoretical and empirical studies of emergency ethics, law,
policy and technology across a range of disciplines (philosophy, sociology, organizational
research, policy research, law, computing, etc.)
Desk study – ongoing review of examples of IT use in emergency response, crisis
management and related areas as they are documented in reports and the media
Observations and interviews during project co-design workshops, demonstrations and
experimental implementations of BRIDGE technologies (Stavanger, April and September
2013) – which generate opportunities to observe existing and emergent future practices,
imaginations and reactions of stakeholders
Mobile methods (Büscher, Urry, Witchger, 2011)
o Go alongs – interviews and observations carried out while moving with emergency
responders through physical and virtual (information) spaces
o Subcam – recording individual’s paths through the physical, social and virtual
(information) spaces of emergencies (in exercises) (Glăveanu Lahlou, 2012;
Lahlou, 2011)
o ‘Following the information’ – an analytical orientation and method assemblage of
empirical (ethnographic) study, review of reports, inventive or designerly methods of
disruption to understand the specifics of data and data flows (Büscher et al. 2014)
Inventive methods (Kimbell, 2013; Lury & Wakeford, 2012) – methods of exploring socio-
technical futures, including
o Value Scenarios - an extension of scenario-based design which can support
envisioning of systemic effects of new technologies and help all stakeholders think
about ‘how the actions we take today will shape the conditions of our future’ (Nathan,
Klasnja, & Friedman, 2007:2)
o Critical Design methods or ‘design noir’ methods - design methods that uncover
hidden assumptions and dark sides of designs (Agre, 1997; Dunne & Raby, 2001)
o Living laboratories and experimental implementations of BRIDGE technologies that
involve stakeholders in analysis and design (Büscher, Kristensen, & Mogensen, 2007)
o Collaborative analysis and design – e.g. video prototyping (Mackay & Fayard, 1999),
where stakeholders sandbox emergency scenarios which use BRIDGE technology
Legal risk analysis – analysis of possible legal risks and legal consequences (Wahlgren, 2013)
Privacy Impact Assessment – Questionnaire-based inquiry into data and data processing used
by BRIDGE systems (De Hert, Kloza, & Wright, 2012; Wright & De Hert, 2012)
Ethical Impact Assessment – collaborative analysis of the ethical impact of BRIDGE
innovation through observations, semi-structured and open interviews with stakeholders.
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Wright & Mordini, 2012; Wright, 2010)
Analytical methods of thick description (Geertz, 1994), ethnomethodological investigations
(Garfinkel, 1967; Luff & Heath, 1998; Suchman, 2007).
Code archaeology and disclosive ethics – analysis of the ‘black boxed’ technology with the
aim of uncovering ethical issues (Gramelsberger & Mansnerus, 2012; Introna, 2007)
These empirical, regulatory and designerly methods are brought together in an iterative experimental
approach in the BRIDGE project, allowing insight into current as well as emergent future practices.
The emphasis in this deliverable is on literature review and desk study, but insights from other
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inquiries inform these. D12.3 will describe in more detail how these different methods come together
to shape an engaged socio-technical innovation process in the BRIDGE project.
1.3 The Structure of this Deliverable
The chapters in this deliverable extend and draw key insights from our research so far together (Figure
2). Chapter Two begins with an exploration of fundamental debates in emergency ethics, introducing
some of the values and virtues that analysts argue should shape moral conduct, technology design and
use, the law, and social practices. This leads into a discussion of key aspects of IT Ethics. Some of
these challenges are being taken up in professional ethics and codes of conduct, which we review in
Chapter Three.,
Figure 2 Understanding the Basis for ‘Good’ Innovation for 21st Century Emergency Response
Chapter Four, on legal issues, provides a regulatory perspective, exploring the constitutional basis for
IT use in emergencies and legislative strategies. Chapter Five explores frameworks of international
cooperation. In Chapter Six 6, we discuss social dimensions of ELSI in three inter-related areas –
professional work practices, organizational practices and emergency practices of individuals and
communities affected by disasters. The focus is on the specifics of practices of ethical, lawful and
socially responsible conduct, and cumulative effects at societal levels. The report concludes with a
summary and an outlook towards a discussion of emergent practices and design for ethically sound,
lawful and socially responsible 21st Century Emergency Response, which will be developed in D12.3.
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2 Emergency Ethics Natural disasters like floods or earthquakes, large accidents, explosions or chemical spills,
humanitarian disasters such as famine, or acts of violence disrupt the fabric of the normal, orderly and
ordinary. They disrupt the (social) order which is the very foundation for what we take to be right or
wrong, reasonable, appropriate and proportional. Emergencies can trigger states of exception, where
normal rules are suspended. There has been an ongoing ethical and political debate about what makes
an incident an emergency or disaster (often defined by scale, urgency, severity) and which emergency
measures are justified in which situations. These debates shape multi-agency emergency response.
For instance, when there is a general agreement about a universal right that people are not to be
harmed and consequentially about the duty not to harm other people, can there be circumstances, in
which it is justified or even necessary to inflict harm on some people, for example by allocating scarce
resources of search and rescue or shelter to some but not others, and who under which circumstances
would be justified to do so? In an emergency context this translates into questions like:
Does the end to save lives (resources or public order) justify the means?
Does an emergency justify suspending fundamental human rights?
If an emergency makes it necessary to violate certain rights, what should be the thresholds for
these exceptions and their limits (scope and duration)?
Are there absolute limits of exception? Many societies do not tolerate torture, but when faced
with a threat of a certain magnitude and urgency (a ticking bomb dilemma, Zedner, 2008)
could it become right to consider it?
How much investment of time, energy and resources in preparation should be expected to
avoid the need for exceptions?
When philosophers seek answers to these questions, they begin fundamental debates about the
tolerability of moral exceptions in emergencies, definitions of emergency and the scope of suspensions
of moral rules. In the first part of this chapter, we provide a review of such debates. Following this, we
examine ethical codes of conduct for multi-agency response.
2.1 From Exceptions to Virtues
There is a long tradition of using emergency scenarios to discuss moral systems. For example:
After a ship has sunk there aren’t enough life boats and as a result, one of the life boats is
overloaded and threatens to sink. In such a situation is it morally acceptable to sacrifice the
life of some of the passengers to prevent that everybody will drown?
Life-boat scenarios pose dilemmas that challenge moral systems which are built on absolute principles
such as ‘under no circumstances may the innocent be harmed’. At a larger level, disasters pose similar
questions about whether or not, in extremis, different moral rules than in everyday life should apply. A
call for exceptions is frequently voiced.
2.1.1 The Morality of Exceptions
Philosophers and political scientists test different responses to ethical dilemmas with the extreme case
of an emergency that threatens the state. Carl Schmitt, an influential figure in emergency ethics
scholarship, argues emphatically that the possibility of an exception must be granted:
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(t)he exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be
characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, ... it cannot
be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law. (Schmitt, [1922] 2012)
Schmitt suggests that heads of state must be allowed to place themselves above the law to be able to
safeguard the rule of law. If conditions for the rule of law are threatened, the head of state has to be
able to exempt their power ‘from constitutional rules that would prevent him [sic] from prevailing in a
contest of force with the state’s enemies’ (Ignatieff, [2005] 2012, p. 317).
Many ethics scholars argue strongly against Schmitt, citing evidence that the ability of stepping
outside constitutional law undermines the very essence of constitutional law, namely its capacity to
absolutely enshrine fundamental human rights (Scheppele, 2003). The exception serves as a precedent,
making future exceptions more likely. Michael Ignatieff’s review of the history of emergency
legislation in the U.S., for example, shows that ever since Lincoln suspended habeas corpus – the
right to be protected from unlawful imprisonment – and other liberties during the American Civil War
in 1863, this has been used to justify suspensions of rights in other emergencies. Examples are
Roosevelt’s ordering the detention of German saboteurs as ‘unlawful combatants’ in 1942 and the
Bush administration’s military tribunals to try terrorists: ‘the precedent he [Lincoln] set has provided
subsequent presidents with the warrant to abridge liberty in emergencies’ (Ignatieff, 2012: 305). Other
critics argue that through this turn to exception, politics has ‘contaminated itself with law’, excluding
complete categories of people from society, and thereby eroding human values that are critical to the
‘good life’ (Agamben, 1998, 2005). They propose an alternative position of ‘legal invariance’
(Ignatieff 2012: 317), first voiced in a US Supreme Court ruling from 1866, which said that ‘the
theory of necessity on which [the call for exceptions] is based is false; for the government, within the
Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence’ (ibid: 304).
The debate over whether extreme emergencies warrant a state of emergency that allows governments
to suspend constitutional rights matters directly and indirectly to the ethics of IT supported multi-
agency emergency response. On the one hand such decisions will be taken during the response phase
and the emergency agencies’ assessment of the urgency, scale, severity, and likely future course of an
emergency directly play an important part. This adds significance to the ethical requirement that IT
should support as accurate and as rich as possible dynamic risk assessment and risk communication.
On the other hand, emergent interoperability between diverse information systems can exacerbate the
scale and duration of exceptions by setting precedents for data sharing for surveillance. Such indirect
societal effects will be further discussed in Section 6.3.
2.1.2 Should we be bound by principles? Deontology versus Consequentialism
So far we have seen that emergency scenarios provoke debate about whether there are situations, when
our normal moral standards should be suspended or overridden by ‘what needs to be done’. Among
the various schools of moral thought this is an issue that will especially be a problem for
deontologists. Deontology, or duty ethics, requires that we always follow certain moral principles,
regardless of the results. Drawing on Kantian duty ethics, Larry Alexander describes the core principle
of deontology as ‘one may never use another as a resource without his consent’ (Alexander, 2000). So
the deontologists on board the sinking life-boat could ask passengers to sacrifice their lives based on
free, informed consent, but they could not force anyone to do so.
The other major and opposing approach is consequentialism, a category which applies to those ethical
theories that evaluate ‘rightness or wrongness based exclusively on the consequences or effects of an
act or acts’ (Powers, 2005). One of the most well-known varieties of consequentialism is
utilitarianism, a moral theory formulated by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, where what is
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moral should be determined by what brings the most happiness to the greatest number of people and
minimizes suffering (Crisp, 1997). ‘Consequentialists believe that an action is right if it … maximizes
positive outcomes. It is assumed that [overall] continued human life and well-being should be
maximized and that death and harm should be minimized’, even if this comes at the price of
sacrificing the lives of some (Zack, 2010:33). Consequentialists would be able to force particular
persons to sacrifice their lives in the interest of the other passengers of the life-boat. Consequentialism
is a position that is less concerned with the inviolability of the individual’s physical integrity and
dignity, but rather with the ‘overall’ best outcome or ‘greater good’. In emergency response,
consequentialist positions translate into maxims like ‘Save the Greatest Number (SGN)’ and ‘Save the
Greatest number, who ____ (SGNW)’, where criteria to decide who should be saved may include
gender, age or vulnerability (‘women and children first’) or context dependent variables (such as save
those who can row the life-boat), whereas a deontological position would insist on ‘Fairly Save All
Who Can Be Saved (FSALL).
Naomi Zack argues that, in normal times, Western democratic moral intuitions tend to favour
deontological ethical positions, with principles of fairness and justice, where human beings are to be
treated equally, and must not be harmed. As a thought experiment, life-boat ethics confronts
deontologists with extreme scenarios, challenging the morality of such principles. If deontologists give
up their principles to follow their individual moral compass or a socially negotiated moral decision,
their deontological position is invalidated. But they can define exceptions and take a position of
‘threshold deontology’. This posits that there are moral absolutes, such as a duty to never harm
another, but that this may be suspended or overridden in exceptional circumstances (Sandin & Wester,
2009:293). A strong case for threshold deontology are ‘public’ and ‘supreme emergencies’.
2.1.3 Threshold Deontology: Public and Supreme Emergencies
Tom Sorell provides one of the most widely cited definitions of emergency as ‘a situation, often
unforeseen, in which there is a risk of great harm or loss and a need to act immediately or decisively if
the loss or harm is to be averted or minimised’ (Sorell, 2003, p. 22). He holds that the great dangers
emergencies pose make it excusable for those taking measures to contain them to disregard certain
normally operable moral rules in the process: ‘The more effective one is, the greater the achievement,
and the more can be excused in the means chosen’ (ibid.:25).
He formulates an ethics of threshold deontology specifically for ‘public emergencies’, defined as
‘emergencies facing whole states or large numbers of people, and which are usually the responsibility
of public agencies and their officials’ in contradistinction to ‘emergencies confronting individuals in a
private capacity’ (Sorell, 2003:22). For Sorell, such emergencies threaten a breakdown of social order,
a ‘moral black hole […] that may seem even more repulsive than the desperate measures that
emergencies justify’ (ibid:26). The range of emergencies that can be classed as ‘public emergencies
following these definitions is very broad, which some analysts argue is highly problematic (Tanguay-
Renaud, 2009). Examples where exceptional measures along these lines led to problems include
Hurricane Katrina, where victims were portrayed as a dangerous (looting and raping) mob that needed
to be kept under control through the police and military (Tierney, 2006, Figure 3). Reputable news
agencies such as Associated Press and Agence France Press tagged images of black people as ‘looting’
and virtually identical images of white people as ‘finding’. Such rhetoric underpinned calls for a
switch from humanitarian efforts of search and rescue to policing and military force.
Definitions of a public emergency, amplified by media rumours led to scenes where victims were
harmed, physically and in terms of their human dignity, exemplified by the experience of Clarice
Buter, a nurses’ assistant on the interstate in New Orleans:
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They tried to kill us. When you keep people on top of the interstate for five days, with no
food and water, that’s killing people. . . . Helicopters at night shining a light down on us.
They know we was there. Policemen, the army, the whole nine yards, ambulance passing us
up like we wasn’t nothing. . . . We was treated worse than an animal. (Zack, 2010:112).
The failures in New Orleans were the result of many factors (ibid.), but to explain why some analysts
argue that such extreme emergency measures should be deemed ethically acceptable, we need to draw
parallels to the extremes of war for a moment. Michael Walzer, perhaps the most prominent political
philosopher in the field of emergency ethics, draws on Churchill’s ‘supreme emergency’ when he
justifies the bombing of German cities and the killing of civilians in WWII. Walzer argues that the
tensions between the principle that innocents must not be harmed and the moral call for saving the
largest number cannot be conciliated. While killing the innocent is morally wrong, in a ‘supreme
emergency’, there is no other choice. Persons who authorize or undertake a breach of normal moral
rules may be ‘culpable but not punishable’ (Kant). Walzer’s ‘supreme emergency’: ‘devalues morality
itself and leaves us free to do whatever is … necessary to avoid the disaster, so long as what we do
doesn’t produce an even worse disaster’ (Walzer, 2004:40).
Things have spiraled so out of control,
that the city’s mayor … has ordered
police officers to focus on looters and
give up search-and-rescue efforts.
(Washington Post, 1st September 2005,
in Tierney, 2006)
Governor Kathleen Blanco called the
looters ‘hoodlums’ and issued a
warning to lawbreakers: Hundreds of
National Guard hardened on the
battlefield in Iraq have landed in New
Orleans. ‘They have M-16s, and they’re
locked and loaded,’ she said. (New
Orleans Times-Picayune, 2nd
Sep. 2005,
in Tierney, 2006)
Figure 3 Exceptional Measures and Misconceived ‘Moral Black Hole’ Myths. Source: Associated Press, Agence France Press
Should there be scope for such threshold deontology outside of war? Sorell argues yes, the choice of
exception should be available in scenarios which threaten to ‘undermine everyday morality itself’, by
producing a moral black hole, even in natural and technical disasters (Sorell, 2003:32). But Sandin and
Wester (2009) challenge Sorrell’s logic. Most importantly, they question the assumption that
emergencies create a ‘moral black hole’, citing empirical research that shows that ‘dissolution of
morals does not seem widespread’ (ibid. p. 295) and that in many disasters public order and morality
are not in danger. In fact, crime rates tend to drop after disasters (Quarantelli, 1994), and a vast body
of sociological disaster research supports observations that emergencies engender solidarity, especially
in the response phase (Drabek, 2007; Dynes & Quarantelli, 1972). Sandin and Wester caution against
‘the insufficiently reflected transfer of the moral-black-hole argument to non-antagonistic situations
(2009: 299), and recommend that, rather than extending responders’ powers to curb rights and police
the crowd, analysts and societies should focus on leveraging solidarities for crisis management.
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2.1.4 Virtue Ethics – Preparedness for All Hazards
The right virtues will dispose us to do the
right things in disasters. (Zack, 2010:68)
The literature so far reviewed addresses emergency ethics primarily as an area of ethical dilemmas –
asking which measures are morally justified to tackle an emergency, save lives and infrastructure,
preserve social order, etc.. These discussions probe the limits of what can be morally justified, and
whether moral values can or should be weighed against each other. But of course, there is a
background understanding at work, namely that emergencies have to be managed and solved, people
have to be saved. The focus was on principles of non-maleficence (do no harm) and the rationality and
morality of different principled approaches to minimizing harm. While the discussion presented was
mostly about cautioning the threshold and limit-setting of what is allowed to be done – a negative
discussion – what has not been addressed are the fact that ethics is practiced (morality), and the
questions what should be done and how societies can do better. These are issues surfacing in virtue
ethics, often focused on emergency policy and the broader remit of crisis management, which includes
concerns with prevention or mitigation and preparedness (Figure 4).
Figure 4 Four Phases of Emergency Management Source: International Telecoms Union Emergency Telecommunications, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN)
At this juncture, ideas of beneficence (do good), the original ethical concern, arise more prominently.
Virtue ethics issues a call for action according to moral virtues. In contrast to consequentialist or
utilitarian ethics, where we should do that which maximises good, virtue ethics offers answers as to
how doing good can be done. Zack, for example, argues that:
disaster preparation is an ethical matter, and it is mandatory. The planning of this
preparation must be general enough to allow for unforeseen contingencies and must take
place in normal times, before a disaster occurs or is imminent. Disaster plans must be
consistent with normal planning principles of not intending harm and positively preserving
human well-being. … in an open, democratic society, the general disaster plan(s) should be
public information because the public will be affected. (2010: 19)
This notion is derived from Aristotelian ethics, elevating preparedness to a virtue which must be lived
to become effective. Importantly, and with reference to examples, Zack shows how:
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a preparation plan could restructure the conditions of response so that adequate response
could be envisioned beforehand, as not violating the ethical principles of normal life, for the
reason that resources will be scarce. (ibid.:21)
Thus, if you have prepared yourself, your organisations, tools, polity etc., then – in the case of disaster
– you are not forced to revert to exceptions that go against ordinary morals, integrity and dignity.
Aristotelian philosophers like Zack argue that one would deeply regret having given up one’s
professional integrity, therefore it is better to prepare. This also serves as her main argument against
state of exception and consequentialist ethics, which argue that one has to be ‘realistic’ about what is
possible and necessary in disaster, a stance that not only justifies ‘second best’ solutions but also plans
for ‘second best’ (and ultimately morally unacceptable!) solutions, leaving definitions and criteria up
to experts, politicians and first responders without consulting the public. And these consultations are
near impossible in the heat of an unfolding crisis – that is what preparation is needed for.
A focus on preparation is virtuous, not only because it places societies in the best position to maintain
normal moral codes, but also because it prioritizes a broad, ‘all-hazards’ approach to safety. A hazard
is a dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of
life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social
and economic disruption, or environmental damage. (EU Commission, 2010:9)
An ‘all-hazards’ approach acknowledges that there are a multitude of natural and manmade dangers,
and it addresses ‘actual hazard events as well as the latent hazard conditions that may give rise to
future events’ (ibid:10). This is critical, particularly with a view to the ethics of IT supported multi-
agency response, because a shift from concerns with all hazards and safety (a general concern with
risk) to concerns of security (focused on dangers arising from the illegal actions of others) was already
in progress before, but strengthened by 9/11. It has created significant ethical risks and challenges,
especially with a view to privacy and civil liberties. Initiatives to extend capabilities for data retention
and disclosure of personal data in the interest of security and for the purpose of promoting certain
‘public interests’ started well before the 9/11 attacks (Rauhofer, 2006), but the ‘war on terror’ led to a
‘securitization’ of emergency response in the US and Europe. It weakened data protection,
strengthened command and control approaches and eased activation of police and military. Research
suggests that this has diminished the emergency services’ capability to respond to natural disasters
(Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Birkland, 2009; Haddow & Bullock, 2005).
There are many virtues besides preparedness for all hazards, including courage, impartiality, creativity
and loyalty. The review of ethical codes of conduct in Chapter 3 will explore some of these in greater
depth. But there is another important aspect of virtue ethics we would like to discuss.
In contrast to ethical principles, virtues are dynamic and creative. Virtues take on the unique
individuality of those who practice them, whereas consequentialism and deontology yield principles
that remain external to particular individuals and situations. This focus on the individual in a specific
situation opens up fruitful opportunities for considering virtue ethics in relation to innovation in IT
supported emergency response, and this will be a key theme in D12.3, but we will briefly sketch the
argument here. Of all the ethical approaches it can be argued that virtue ethics is the most practical or
pragmatic. Its founder Aristotle defines virtues as ‘dispositions to act in certain ways over time’ (Zack
2009, 49). They are acquired ‘character traits’ (ibid.). He thought about how virtuous habits are
developed and is even the forefather of modern notions of ‘embodiment’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012) and
‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1984), when he talks about hexis, that is, a way of holding oneself or of adopting
a stance that needs to be trained in order to be prepared and able to do the right or virtuous thing, when
the situation presents itself. This philosophical paradigm is highly relevant to the ethical opportunities,
risks and challenges arising from new technologically ‘augmented’ forms of embodiment enabled in
IT supported multi-agency emergency response, and its capacity to transform human physical and
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mental capabilities, the way we inhabit space and time as well as our capabilities for a ‘practical
ethics’ or morality enacted through social, material and embodied practices (Chapter 6). As
professionals adopt wearable cameras, continuously recording video and audio, location tracking and
numerous devices that allow information to be distributed in networked spaces (including ‘clouds’),
and accept that data can be stored and accessed multiple times without trace, whilst ‘forgetting’ and
‘deleting’ become difficult, ideas, practices and experiences of ‘embodiment’ and ‘situation’ and the
conditions for a practical ethics are transformed (see Buscher, Perng, & Wood, 2013; Buscher &
Wahlgren, 2012 for a discussion in relation to privacy and liberty). For the ethics of emergency
response the question is then not only how institutions and people can act virtuously in crisis, but also
how technology can be designed in ways that support new practical ethics and virtuous conduct that
preserve cherished values. In other words: what is the possibility and nature of virtuous technology?
2.1.5 Beyond the Call of Duty? Liability, Technology, Heroism
It is useful to ask what circumstances and whose virtues we are talking about, and how limits are
defined. Taking the UK as an example, multi-agency response is required in emergencies that range
from ‘major incidents’ to ‘catastrophic emergencies’ (abridged, Cabinet Office, 2013):
Major incidents are routinely handled by the emergency services and other local responders without the need for central government involvement. Such emergencies may include major road crashes, local floods or industrial accidents. The local multi-agency response is co-ordinated through a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). The chair of the group, whether a police lead or a Local Authority Chief Executive, is colloquially referred to as a ‘Gold Commander’. (See Ramirez et al., 2012 for structures in other EU countries)
A Significant emergency (Level 1) has a wider focus and requires central government involvement from a lead government department (LGD) alongside the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations. There is no requirement for fast, inter-departmental/agency, decision making which might necessitate the activation of the collective central government response, although there may be value in using the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) complex to facilitate the briefing of senior officials and ministers. Examples include most severe weather-related problems. In addition, most consular emergencies overseas fall into this category.
A Serious emergency (Level 2) has, or threatens, a wide and/or prolonged impact requiring sustained central government co-ordination and support from a number of departments and agencies. The central government response would be co-ordinated from COBR, under the leadership of the lead government department. Examples of an emergency at this level could be a terrorist attack, widespread urban flooding.
A Catastrophic emergency (Level 3) has an exceptionally high and widespread impact and requires immediate central government support, such as a major natural disaster, or a Chernobyl-scale industrial accident. Characteristics might include a top-down response in circumstances where the local response had been overwhelmed, or where emergency powers were required to direct the response or requisition assets and resources.
The range of agencies involved can be large, including ‘Category I’ and ‘Category II’ Responders
(Civil Contingencies Act, UK Government, 2004) (Figure 5).
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Category I responders (‘core responders’)
Category 2 responders (‘co-operating responders’)
Emergency services
Police forces British Transport Police
Fire authorities Ambulance services
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Local authorities All principal local authorities (i.e. metropolitan, counties, districts)
Port Health Authorities
Health bodies Primary Care Trusts & Acute Trusts
Foundation Trusts Local Health Boards (in Wales)
Welsh NHS Trusts Health Protection Agency
Government agencies Environment Agency
Utilities
Electricity distributors and transmitters Gas distributors
Water and sewage undertakers Telephone service providers (fixed &
mobile)
Transport Network Rail
Train Operating Companies London Underground Transport for London
Airport operators Harbour authorities
Highways Agency
Health bodies Strategic Health autorities
Government agencies
Health and Safety Executive
Figure 5 Whose Virtues? Category I & II Responders
In addition, commercial organizations (such as supermarkets, hotels, and insurances), media, and
volunteer organizations may become involved, as well as members of the public, who are often the
first responders at the scene of an incident, providing first aid, transporting people to hospital or
initiating search and rescue (Dynes, 1970; Fischer, 2008; Palen & Liu, 2007; Tierney, Lindell, Perry,
& Press, 2001; Tierney, 1989) (Figure 6).
Figure 6 Actors and Organisations Involved in Emergency response
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The more serious the emergency, the more actors are involved. Often faced with overwhelming
complexity and adversity, these emergency responders can come under immense pressure.
Nevertheless, virtually all post-disaster reviews praise examples of exemplary efforts. However, they
focus on mistakes to identify lessons and opportunities for improvement, frequently utilising digital
logs of activities and communications to do so. Moreover, the interpretation of response efforts is
often measured against knowledge of technological potential. Two examples will give a sense of how
liability and (sometimes unrealistic) expectations based on digital logs and assumptions about
technological potential can be problematic. The first follows the L’Aquila trial, where four scientists,
two engineers, and a government official were accused of malpractice. They had participated
in a meeting of an expert panel of Italy’s Civil Protection Department on 31 March 2009 in
the central Italian town of L’Aquila to assess a series of tremors that had shaken the town
over the previous 3 months. After the group adjourned, two members gave a press
conference, accompanied by local officials. Prosecutors in a controversial manslaughter
trial say they downplayed the risk to L’Aquila’s inhabitants (Cartlidge, 2012).
This verdict was based on analysis of recorded conversations, and the accused
were found guilty of manslaughter because of what they said, or didn’t say, or were
reported as saying, shortly before the earthquake that killed 309 people on 6 April 2009.
They were each sentenced to six years in prison, ordered to pay damages of €7.8 million
between them and all permanently barred from public office.(Jones, 2012)
The verdict is controversial not only because it uses evidence of conversations without much concern
for the context, but also because it sets a precedent for prosecution on this basis, and because there is
no parallel effort to establish culpability elsewhere, for example in relation to the use of building
materials in L’Aquila (ibid).
The second example is similarly based on the use of digital logs as evidence during the expert inquiry
into the response to the 22/7 Norway attacks, but it goes beyond asking what was known to the
responders by turning to a consideration of what they could have known. The expert report finds out
that just ten minutes after the explosion in the government quarter in Oslo, at 15:35, a call was
received in the emergency call centre. The caller blurts out a lot of information, including a car
registration number, and the dispatcher asks:
Dispatcher: Just tell me briefly what did you see?
Caller: I saw what I thought was a policeman, but then I was surprised, a man with a protective helmet and police clothes and a drawn pistol who came up behind me, near the government building. I was surprised that he was walking alone and I just followed him out of the corner of my eye. Then he got into a car, a grey van with the following license number ...
(Transcribed from oral presentation of the report (Gjørv, 2012:31minutes))
The call taker realized that this information was important. She wrote a postit note and took it into the
control room, marked as important. But the note was not noticed until 20 minutes later in what was a
very busy control room. And even when it was found, it was not sent out over the radio, and
neighbouring counties were not notified.
The report asks ‘Could things have been different, if this tip-off had found a more interoperating
police force?’ and to explore ‘whether the assumption that an immediate forwarding of the
information could have stopped the Utøya attacks earlier is more than speculation’, the 22nd
July
Expert commission correlated recordings of the GPS tracks of the perpetrator’s’s getaway car with the
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locations of police vehicles in the area, assuming that officers in these cars could have stopped the
driver if an alert had been sent out. The experts find that the perpetrator (large dot in Figure 7):
passes a police vehicle [small diamond] close to the American embassy [in the centre of
Oslo] as early as 15:41. At Lusaka, he passes an out of town police car at 15:57, and at
16:03 he has just passed the police station at Samvika. (From oral presentation (Gjørv,
2012:33 minutes))
Figure 7 Tracing what could have been known during the 22/7 Norway Attacks. Screenshot from http://tinyurl.com/o59sjah
The inquiry experts argue that vehicle registration and live GPS data could have been instrumental at
this point, but ‘the technical systems both for notification and for sharing information were very poor’
(Gjørv, 2012:33:52 minutes). The report concludes:
The authorities’ ability to protect the people on Utøya Island failed. A more rapid police
operation was a realistic possibility. The perpetrator could have been stopped earlier on 22
July. (Gjørv, 2012, English version:11)
In this example there were no legal liability proceedings, but the report has had significant negative
impact on the reputation of the police and emergency services.
To deal with issues of liability, emergency organizations and individuals use indemnity insurance to
protect themselves against claims. In response to post-disaster reviews and inquiries, the costs for such
insurance are rising. The 2012 inquiry into failings of the Hillsborough disaster response in the UK,
for example, led to a review of indemnity insurance arrangements for the police (Jones, 2012:253).
But in the excerpt from the 22nd
July’s expert commission’s review above, we also witness the lived
transformation of professional obligations that underpins ethical debates about virtues and best
practice. We will discuss social/societal aspects of such transformations in Chapter 4. Here we would
like to note that the report’s experts define virtues of competence in relation to technological potential
not current utilization. They examine not only what was known to the emergency responders, but also
consider information that could have been known and correlated. Such technological imagination is a
critical force not only in post-facto critique, but also in the formation of what constitutes available,
relevant, legitimate information, and what people’s obligations are to obtain and consider it. By
tracing activities retrospectively with digital logs, post disaster reviews also prospectively trace socio-
technical futures onto the drawing boards of policymakers, politicians, and technology designers.
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Figure 8 ‘Workers at Daiichi, feted as heroes, will bear their burden for years’. Source: Time World http://world.time.com/2011/03/31/whats-in-store-for-japan’s-embattled-nuclear-workers/
But apart from highlighting mistakes and opportunities for improvement, post-disaster reviews and
perhaps even more so the media, also place a spotlight on the other extreme: heroic efforts by
emergency responders. However, this focus on heroism, too, can be problematic (Figure 8).
In their Ethical Guidance for Public Health Emergency and Response, Jennings and Arras (2008)
begin a discussion of professional obligations with a story of hundreds of Chinese physicians refusing
to return to their posts during the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak, while many more health workers were
faced with ‘anguished choices between serving the ill and protecting themselves and their own loved
ones from the threat of deadly disease’ (p. 108). They explore the capacity of ‘social contract’ and
‘virtue ethics’ approaches to find answers to the kinds of questions these professionals faced. The
social contract idea stipulates that society grants emergency responders a range of benefits in return
for their commitment to save others even in the face of personal risk. Such benefits include ‘social
esteem, comfortable remuneration, and perhaps most importantly, a great degree of professional
autonomy’ (ibid.:110). Moreover, the social contract gives, according to Jennings and Arras, society ‘a
solemn obligation to provide [emergency and] health workers with the protection and tools they need
to subdue the epidemic or blunt the effects of a natural disaster’ (ibid.:114). In the case of public
health, the provision of a well funded and functioning public health service is an integral part of this,
they argue. A virtue ethics approach complements this contract, because it implies that to enter the
emergency professions, certain virtues, such as competence and courage in the face of adversity must
be cultivated. Developing these virtues is part of (learning) the job, so to speak. While the social
contract approach focuses on the entirety of a profession, and thereby allows a loophole for some to
exempt themselves from the duty to accept personal risk as long as sufficient others are willing to do
so, the virtue ethics approach underscores ‘the importance of inculcating the requisite virtues into each
new generation’ (ibid.:112). Together, these two approaches provide a robust concept of a duty to
maintain one’s post even in times of great crisis. However, what about the Chinese physicians, who
withdrew from their posts because they were ‘outraged at what they perceived to be the government’s
ineptitude in handling the early stages of the epidemic, and because they were afraid to engage with
this mysterious new and lethal disease without adequate infection control’ (ibid.: 114)? Where do
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professional duties and obligations end if society does not fulfil its side of the bargain? And what
about non-professional emergency responders like the workers at the Daiichi power plant, or the
hospital secretaries, cleaners, and clerks in SARS hospitals? Jennings and Arras ask:
What duties, if any, are owed by non-professionals?
What does the larger society owe to emergency workers?
Where lies the tipping point between professional duty and what philosophers call the realm of
supererogation, i.e. conduct above and beyond the call of duty? (ibid.)
There are no clear cut answers, but Jennings and Arras conclude that society ‘has no right to insist on
heroism’ (ibid.: 115). Emergency response workers should not:
be expected to plunge into the fray without … appropriate training, resources, protective
equipment, and follow-up support to help perform their job safely. It is the duty of society at
large … to provide these resources. This is true, not only both because society cannot and
should not expect [them] to accept possibly lethal but unnecessary risks, but also because
such workers have a duty to keep themselves healthy so that they can continue to treat
others. … [in the case of health workers] a robust public health infrastructure, including
adequate personal protective equipment for health workers, not exhortations to heroism,
should be the primary focus of disaster preparedness. (ibid: 118)
Health workers are amongst the most active in formulating ethical guidelines to be prepared to make
the kinds of anguished choices demanded of them in times of crises. But they are not the only ones.
Chapter 3 will review a selection of relevant ethical codes of conduct and specify some of the virtues
needed to enact their principles. However, before we consider these, we need to discuss how
technology inserts itself into ethics in emergencies.
2.2 Emergency Response & The Ethics of Emergency Technology
Technology has always played an important role in the ethics of emergency response and the actors,
policies, practices involved. Physical technology such as breathing apparatus for fire-fighters, fire
engines and fire fighting technologies, portable defibrillators for medical personnel, guns and body
armour for police have augmented the capabilities of emergency responders for many decades. Policy
tools, such as incident command systems, too, have shaped the nature of response (Buck, Trainor, &
Aguirre, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Ramirez, Buscher, & Wood, 2012). What or who can be rescued or
protected changes, as do the processes and practices involved, and therewith the ethics and politics of
emergency response. Information and communication technologies introduce another dimension of
augmentation. They can augment responders’ capabilities to carry out risk analysis, communicate and
coordinate, act accountably, and to gather and process information about an emergency, but they can
also complicate risk analysis, reduce opportunities for face-to-face interaction, undermine existing
practices of professional integrity and accountability, and contribute to information overload. A
number of ethical issues arise from the amalgamation of ever more sophisticated ICT into people’s
imaginaries, practices and policies.
Yet, even recently edited volumes in emergency ethics, law and policy (Legrand & McConnell, 2012;
Viens & Selgelid, 2012) pay little attention to technology, and we find that IT ethics in crisis
management is a new field of study. One of the first publications to tackle the challenge is Jillson’s
chapter ‘Protecting the Public, Addressing Individual Rights. Ethical Issues in Emergency
Management Information Systems for Public Health Emergencies’ in Van de Walle, Turoff and
Hiltz’s Information Systems for Emergency Management (2010). Jillson discusses ethical
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opportunities, such as the capability of emergency management information systems (EMIS) to extend
surge capacity, to maximize availability and enable more equitable distribution of services, and to
enhance risk communication. But she also shows how the informational and communicative advances
that EMIS can enable can complicate adherence to core ethical principles of non-maleficence and
beneficence, respect for human dignity, and distributive justice (equal access). Jillson specifically
considers public health emergencies and asks how EMIS might support people in:
balancing individual right[s] to privacy with the need for information on which to base
protection of the public health, including defining “confidentiality” in practice – are
infectious diseases included [in the provision of medical confidentiality] or not? Should
public health agencies and other emergency response agencies have access to individual
electronic medical records? How should informed consent ... be applied when records may
be lost and the situation requires urgent decision making?
As we have already discussed, in their current use of IT, emergency responders often air on the side of
caution when faced with such questions, especially in multi-agency collaboration, often choosing not
to share data. Fragmentation of response through ‘silo-thinking’ is a common result and a challenge to
ethical conduct (Cole, 2010). Paradoxically, this is, at least partially, a result of the very capability of
information systems to support data sharing. They also enable others to monitor professional
communications and decisions, including decisions over data sharing. In an environment where such
meta-data can be treated as evidence for malpractice and attract blame and punishment, people are
reluctant to take risks. Since Jillson’s pioneering exploration, some publications considering the
ethical implications of technology in emergency situations, have emerged in a BRIDGE led track on
‘Ethical, Legal and Social Issues of IT Supported Emergency Response’ at ISCRAM 2013 (Buscher,
Bylund, Sanches, Ramirez, & Wood, 2013; Buscher, Perng, & Wood, 2013; Ellebrecht, Feldmeier, &
Kaufmann, 2013; Rizza, Pereira, & Cuervo, 2013; Watson & Finn, 2013) and a BRIDGE led special
issue of the International Journal of Crisis Management and Response (forthcoming).
To relate the affordances of currently used emergency IT technologies to some of the ethical principles
and virtues outlined in the previous sections, we present a ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ analysis below. However,
while this provides a useful overview of issues, it simplifies the ethics of informationalizing
emergency response, and – we will argue – leads to an innovation impasse. To overcome this, we will
delve deeper into questions of technologically augmented ethical agency. A core question here is
‘How does technology become ethically problematic or ‘good?’.
2.2.1 Informationalizing Emergency Response: (Un-)intended Consequences
When new technologies are invented and decisions about whether they ought to be used have to be
taken, the decisive question is: will this technology do good or will it prove dangerous? What are its
risks and can these be contained? If not, do the benefits outweigh the risks? Another question is
whether enough is known about the technology and its interaction with users, other technologies, the
environment, etc. to be able to make a safe assessment of its risk. Might there be unintended and
unfortunate consequences in store and are there ways to predict those, or at least be prepared for them?
Information technologies are amongst a range of technologies where such questions arise particularly
pressingly, others include nuclear power (Wynne, 1982), stem cell research, and genetically modified
crops (Irwin, 2013; Wynne, 2001).
The notion of ‘unintended consequences’ features prominently in the literature on risk, especially on
risk assessment of technology (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1984; Merton, 1936). Yet, it is unclear, whether
these are considered avoidable and expectable. And if they are expectable, what precaution could be
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taken to avoid them, and is this something that can be done before a technology gets implemented or
need there be an ongoing monitoring process, for detection and managing of such consequences:
For and by whom were these consequences unintended? Does ‘unintended’ mean that the
original intent was not achieved, or that things happened outside the scope of that
imagined intent? The notion also carries an implied exoneration from blame, since
anything ‘unintended’ was implicitly unforeseeable, even if things somehow subsequently
went awry. [...] The narrative of unintended consequences sets aside the possibility of
acting irresponsibly on inadequate knowledge … (Wynne & Felt, 2007, p. 97).
Technology can engender unintended consequences on the level of social equality, justice, and human
dignity. A classical example for this is Langdon Winner’s study of the highway system that links New
York City with the beaches in Long Island (Winner, 1986). Its planner Robert Moses designed some
of the system’s bridges in such a way that buses could not pass underneath. Winner argued that this
played into a contemporary politics of segregation, because the bridges combined with a socio-
economic structure of class and race that meant poor (often black) people, who could not afford cars
and relied on buses for transport, were cut off from direct access to the beaches. Regardless of Moses’
intentions2, this example illustrates how artifacts can have politics, that is, structure social realities in
certain – in this case discriminatory – ways.
To understand how such effects can take root it is useful to bring in the concept of ‘affordances’.
Affordances are the perceived qualities of an artifact that suggest how it should or could be used
(Norman, 1988). Affordances are not an inherent property of an object or technology, they are
relational in the sense that they arise from interactions between people, the material and design of the
artifact, and the context. Thus, had the buses been lower, or the socio-economic patterns, or the
transport culture been different, Moses’ bridges would not have afforded blockage and discrimination.
By combining our review of ethical principles and virtues for emergency response with an exploration
of core affordances offered by information technologies that are currently used in emergency
response, we can start to look into the ethics and politics of IT in emergency response, to map
intended and unintended, positive and negative consequences and begin a ‘stocktaking’ exercise of
what ‘informationalizing’ emergency response entails. This is a complex process in the BRIDGE
project and part of ongoing ethical impact assessment. We first present a summary of 10 core ethical
principles of emergency response as defined by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies Code of Conduct in relation to components of emergency services and virtues
needed to accomplish them (Table 9), and then explore selected, particularly significant ethical pros
and cons of current forms of digitally augmented emergency response (Table 10 and Table 11)3.
2 Moses’ intentions are a matter of contestation, see, for example, Joerges, Bernward 1999. Do Politics have
Artefacts? Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, NO. 3, 411-431.. 3 These matrices are inspired by a similar tabulation of ethical impacts and technological affordances in the 2013
World Disasters Report (Vinck, 2013).
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Ethical Principle Components of Service Virtues needed most4
Humanity Prevent and alleviate suffering
Respect for and active protection of dignity
Particular attention to the vulnerable
Safeguard and restore environment and social ties
Compassion, charity, hope, empathy, resilience respect, effective communication
Impartiality Non-discriminating
Based on need
With neutrality, that is, without ideological debate
Non-judgement, tolerance, justice
Solidarity Responsibilities and benefits shared equitably
Regardless of political, cultural, economic differences
Respect for sovereignty
Integrity, trustworthiness, respect
Cooperation Integration – e.g. with information sharing agreements
Inform & enable participation from all relevant parties
Direction – clarity of purpose
Subsidiarity
Prudence, improvisation, effective communication, respect, intersubjectivity, resilience
Information Sharing
Appropriate accuracy, precision, depth of detail
Consider effects of not sharing
Collect, process and share lawfully
Data minimization and sharing of aggregated data
Accountability & transparency
Evaluate effects on data subjects and informants
Avoid duplication
Prudence, integrity, trustworthiness, respect, empathy, effective communication
Human Rights Rights to privacy, freedom of movement, association, expression are actively protected
Compulsory evacuation is explained
Prudence, respect, empathy, non-judgement, justice
Preparedness Reduce vulnerabilities
Anticipation – e.g. through risk analysis & training
Continuity – grounded in familiar ways of working
Prepare for interoperability
Attitude of wisdom, prudence, respect, diligence, effective communication
Social contract Accountability to those in need, funders and society
Training and support for emergency responders
Prudence, respect, effective communication
Table 9 Ethical Principles and Virtues
These ethical principles, services and virtues can be pursued in a number of ways and IT can support
or obstruct their realisation. We now try to capture this in a ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ analysis around a
selection of currently used IT. These pros and cons reflect the fact that – as for Moses’ bridges – there
are several dimensions of influence on the ethics of technologically augmented practice:
the technology itself
the economic, social and cultural environment
the ways in which technologies are used
At every level both positive and negative effects can be produced, often simultaneously and in
complex ways. For example, novel communications technologies can support highly productive new
forms of communication and collaboration (e.g. through video-calls and screen-sharing between
remote participants). At the same time, these same technologies can reduce the need for face-to-face
human contact. Thus the pros and cons we list are not inherent, fixed properties of technologies, but
effects that arise in specific socio-political, economic and cultural environments and particular
contexts of use. This will be discussed further after this selective mapping of affordances.
4 Definitions of virtues will be elaborated in Chapter 3.
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Selected pros of IT use in emergencies
Ethical Principles
Technologies in Use [BRIDGE Technologies]
Augmentation opportunities:
Technology does not tire and it is impartial.
Impartiality Sensors and facial recognition technologies.
Support and augment human perception and reasoning.
Technology can go where people cannot go and detect things people cannot sense.
Preparedness Heat cameras, robots, CCTV. Support and augment human perception and reasoning.
Novel support to obtain, structure, analyse information from many sources, visualization.
Preparedness Cooperation
Expert systems, GIS. [BRIDGE Middleware, Advanced Situation Awareness, Information Intelligence, Master]
5
Enable deeper and broader dynamic risk analysis in the preparation phase and during the response phase.
Capabilities to identify and locate people and resources more quickly and easily.
Humanity Cooperation
Social media, GPS, satellite imagery, EHR, social service records on vulnerable persons, RFID. [BRIDGE HelpBeacons, Information Intelligence]
Enable faster and more targeted search and rescue and relief, provide opportunities for enhanced, dialogic engagement with affected populations and community resilience.
Advanced information management, visualization and sharing.
Preparedness Cooperation
Disaster Management Systems (e.g. Sahana), Ushahidi, 3D modelling, EU CPM Inventory databases, Tetra data. [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Information Intelligence, Master]
Strengthen situation awareness communication, coordination and collaboration, awareness of available resources.
Collection, storage and maintenance of information about experts and authorities.
Preparedness Information Sharing
CECIS Pool of Experts Database. [BRIDGE Federated Control Rooms]
Expanded capability to identify and communicate with trustworthy experts and relevant authorities.
Facilitate communication.
Cooperation Tetra Radio, mobile/smart phones, social media, cloud storage, collaboration systems [BRIDGE Master]
Availability of secure, reliable and selective channels for verbal and non-verbal communication, e.g. with wearable location and sensor signals, video and audio.
Facilitate coordination. Impartiality EU CPM Inventories [BRIDGE Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management, Federated Control Room Support, Master]
Advanced capability to utilise a wider range of resources to maximum capacity.
Facilitate participation. Information Sharing Cooperation
Social media, crisis mapping, [BRIDGE Information Intelligence, Adaptive Logistics]
Enhanced capability to identify trustworthy actors in the affected population and to engage with individuals and communities, possibility for novel partnerships.
Facilitate transparency and accountability
Impartiality Logging, search and visualization technologies [BRIDGE Middleware, Master]
It can be easier to trace communications and identify discrimination
Table 10 The Ethical ‘Impact’ of Technological Affordances - Pros
5 We include, in brackets, BRIDGE technologies in relation to which the respective point is particularly
pertinent. This is not meant to be exhaustive, but to begin to explore the context they may settle into and to
chart how they might amplify positive, but also negative augmentation effects. However, discussion of specific
affordances and effects of BRIDGE technologies will not be provided here. This will be discussed in D12.3.
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Selected cons of IT use in emergencies
Ethical Principles
Technologies in Use [BRIDGE Technologies]
Resulting risks, challenges and problems
Technology Dependence
Preparedness Cooperation
Most technologies, but especially communication, visualization, sensor and alarm technologies. [BRIDGE Adaptive Logistics, Resource Management, etriage, Federated Control Room, Master]
If technologies fail, tasks can be difficult to accomplish because traditional practices and tools have been forgotten or neglected.
Labour Intensiveness Preparedness Cooperation
… especially expert systems, GIS, databases. [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management]
Large amounts of manpower are needed to design and maintain technologies in good order.
Complexity
Preparedness Cooperation
… especially expert systems, workflows [BRIDGE Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management, Advanced Situation Awareness]
The operation of digital technologies is difficult to understand and new skills must be learnt continuously. Complexity also means more things can go wrong.
Increased Risk of a Breach of Data Protection Regulations
Sharing Information
… especially communication technologies, databases (e.g. Policing/Health) [BRIDGE Middleware, Adaptive Logistics, Helpbeacons, Master]
Complexity, increasing saturation of work practices with technology and the ‘invisibility’ of data flows make it more likely that data is incorrectly handled.
Limit traditional human interaction
Cooperation Humanity
… especially communication technologies, sensors, databases [BRIDGE Federated Control Rooms, Situation Aware Resource Management]
Computer mediated communication can undermine traditional practices of trust and shared understanding. It can be tempting for responders to ‘hide behind their laptops’. This can reduce humanity of response by reducing interaction with affected populations
Increase digital divides
Humanity … especially communication technologies, databases, GIS, data analytics tools [BRIDGE Middleware, HelpBeacons, Adaptive Logistics]
IT innovation can engender exclusion and render silent individuals or communities with no access or skill to use technology and thereby increase their vulnerability and isolation.
Surveillance Impartiality … especially communication technologies, CCTV and video, sensors [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Situation Aware Resource Management]
Making more information systems interoperable during a crisis increases the amount of data that can be known about individuals. This can produce detrimental effects, such as an erosion of privacy.
Social Sorting Impartiality … especially communication technologies, databases, GIS, data analytics tools [BRIDGE Middleware, Adaptive Logistics, Situation Aware Resource Management]
Informationalizing crisis management can engender discrimination on the basis of data about socio-economic factors, health, ethnicity or cultural criteria. This is often unintended and hard to trace to a specific decision, action or person. It can become structural, such as bias in security measures for the war on terror, or the focus of preventive measures on ‘vulnerable’ populations.
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Table continued:
Selected cons of IT use in emergencies
Ethical Principles
Technologies in Use [BRIDGE Technologies]
Resulting risks, challenges and problems
Information overload Social Contract
… especially communication technologies, expert systems, sensors [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Information Intelligence, Master]
The ability to gather more information means more information must be made sense of, this can be difficult, demand more manpower than is available and be timeconsuming. Too much information can cause stress.
Undermining professional integrity
Social Contract
… especially communication technologies, expert systems, sensors [BRIDGE Situation Aware Resource Management, Advanced Situation Awareness, Adaptive Logistics]
Who is responsible in a technologically augmented decision-making process? IT can make it difficult for people to act creatively, freely and responsibly, and to employ prudent judgement (e.g.if they do not understand how machines make suggestions or workflows).
New negligence lawsuits
Social Contract
… especially communication technologies, CCTV, expert systems [BRIDGE Middleware, Situation Aware Resource Management, Advanced Situation Awareness]
Logging of all communications makes it possible for inquiries to pinpoint ‘wrong’ actions or decisions, inevitably with hindsight and without being able to consider the full context of those actions or decisions.
Bias and manipulation by novel partnerships and vocal social media issue publics.
Impartiality
… especially communication technologies [BRIDGE Information Intelligence]
Through social media individuals and groups can undermine information superiority and information control in the operational process, promote vigilanteeism (Vancouver, Boston) and ideological campaigns.
Increased media influence and/or bias, promotion of disaster myths.
Cooperation Humanity
… especially communication technologies [BRIDGE Advanced Situation Awareness, Master]
The media rely on technology, too (access, network, audio-visual). Their needs may influence emergency response in an era of increased public and political accountability (being seen giving water to smiling children is preferable to clearing mud).
Table 11 The Ethical ‘Impact’ of Technological Affordances - Cons
This exploration of the ethical impact of emergency technology can help to sensitize designers,
prospective users (including the publics and communities emergency responders serve) and policy-
makers to ethical impacts – good and bad – that technology might contribute to in crisis management.
However, while it provides a useful overview of issues, it simplifies the ethics of informationalizing
emergency response and can lead to an innovation impasse. Designers and users can get stuck in a
‘pass the buck’ loop, where one holds the other responsible for undesirable effects. An excerpt from
exchanges between the authors of this report and a BRIDGE designer about the risk of increasing
undermining professional integrity and enabling new negligence lawsuits can illustrate this:
Bernard van Veelen: On both ‘Undermining professional integrity’ and ‘New negligence
lawsuits’: It is a fact that introduction of (any) technology changes well-known processes,
sometimes in an unpredictable fashion (eg introduction of SMS). Therefore tech
introductions should be accompanied by proper training and guidance, preventing (these
two) cons.
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Monika Buscher: Bernard, we’re not trying to say these issues are caused by or ‘the fault
of’ technology and therefore we shouldn’t build it or use it. We list these effects as likely
effects that need addressing. This is a matter of training and guidance, yes, but it is also a
matter of design. If we are alert to these issues, we can design in a way that will help people
notice them and avoid them. So BRIDGE annotated workflows are a means to help people
maintain professional integrity. And capturing more context or logging communication
anonymously or implementing forgetting in the BRIDGE middleware could be ways of
supporting professional integrity. ‘Graceful augmentation’ can preserve traditional
practices as an option (Jul 2007). That’s why I’ve not changed the text. (Discussion
February 2014, after 2nd
Review of this report)
To understand better how ethics is distributed between people, environments and technology, we will
delve deeper into questions of technologically augmented ethical agency. A core question here is
‘How does technology become ethically problematic or “good”?’. Asking this question reveals three
important short-comings of the matrices above.
First, however much we try to remain alert to the fact that neither technologies nor use in any simple
way cause effects, that, instead, both are implicated in complex ways in multi-layered effects, the
matrices invite search for causes in one or the other. As the exchange above highlights, this is
problematic when ‘the multistable nature of artefacts means that they may become used in ways never
anticipated by the designers or originators’ (Introna 2007:16).6
Secondly, the matrices above focus on technology in isolation, rather than in its socio-economic,
political, cultural and organizational environments and particular contexts of use. As could be seen in
the example of the Long Island Bridges, technologies produce effects (e.g. of exclusion) only within a
complex network of infrastructures (a highway system), social practices (going to the beach at the
weekend), other technologies (cars and buses), socio-economic and cultural structures (a transport
system where wealth translates into car ownership and poverty into public transport use), social
inequalities (where poverty and wealth divide along class and race lines), ideologies and common
sense understandings (that made exclusion associated with race an unnoticed fact of everyday life for
many). If we translate these considerations into crisis management, we must consider ethics across a
whole network of agencies and circumstances. Unless technology is analysed as one element within a
nexus of practices, misconceptions are likely. Introna and Wood argue persuasively that:
the politics of technology is more than the politics of this or that artefact. Rather these
artefacts function as nodes, or links, in a dynamic socio-technical network, or collective,
kept in place by a multiplicity of artefacts, agreements, alliances, conventions, translations,
procedures, threats, and so forth [...] Some are stable, even irreversible; some are dynamic
and fragile. Analytically we can isolate and describe these networks …. However, as we
survey the landscape of networks we cannot locate, in any obvious manner, where they
begin nor where they end. Indeed we cannot with any degree of certainty separate the
purely social from the purely technical, cause from effect, designer from user, winners from
losers, and so on. (Introna & Wood 2004, 179, emphasis added)
Thirdly, ethical values are relative and the matrices above obscure a dynamic process of change and
negotiation. In many European societies, ethics has become pluralized and ethical values change over
time. Values have become objects of debate, and they should be the subject of open democratic debate
(Habermas, 1994; Habermas, 1996; Mouffe, 2000; Rawls, 1971). However, for such debates to
happen, ethical issues have to be noticed and turn from matters of fact, that is, accepted, unnoticed,
taken for granted, common-sense facts of life, into ‘matters of concern’, that is, interrogated,
6 The history of SMS documents a striking everyday example (Taylor and Vincent 2005).
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dissected, contested objects of critique (Latour, 2005). A challenge for an ethically circumspect
approach to IT innovation in information societies therefore lies in the question of ‘how to make
ethical opportunities, challenges and risks (for example of innovation in IT supported multi-agency
emergency response) public?’ and ‘how to engage and include (which?) stakeholders?’ (Wynne and
Felt, 2007). D12.3 will describe methodologies of value sensitive design, co-realization and ‘design
after design’ to address this challenge.
But if we acknowledge that ethically ‘good’ and ‘bad’ effects are enacted in a manner that is
distributed across people, ‘environmental’ factors and technology, the question of how this happens is
critical and we must ask ‘what role does technology play?’. Introna (2007) suggests ‘disclosive
ethics’, that is, an approach that brings the usually silent and opaque operation of digital technologies
in current practice to the surface to open it up to critical scrutiny. This is a very effective approach that
can help diverse stakeholders and designers understand the ethical impact of IT innovation as it
happens, and his work on facial recognition technologies (with Wood, 2004) is particularly pertinent
in the context of IT innovation in emergency response.
2.2.2 Disclosive Ethics and Opaque Technology: The Case of Facial Recognition Systems
Since 9/11 there has been an increase in investment and implementation of face recognition systems
(Introna and Wood 2004, Gallagher 2013). Face recognition systems can compare images of the faces
of people captured by video or still cameras with a database of images of faces. The aim is threefold:
Verification: “Am who I say I am?”
Identification: “Who am I?”
Watch list comparison: “Are you looking for me?” (Phillips et al. 2003:6)
Figure 12 Face Recognition Systems Source: http://www.biometrics.org/bc2002/Phillips.pdf [accessed 16.2.2014]
The system presents matches to human operators and, when watchlist monitoring, it can highlight
matches to persons who are wanted. The matching is usually based on image analysis algorithms that
calculate similarities and differences between prominent facial features (such as distances between the
eyes). For crisis management and emergency response, Facial Recognition Systems have been used
for preventive policing to avert crises, for example, by monitoring for and identifying suspects at
airports, sports venues or in public spaces. For example, during the London 2012 Olympics, the
‘already famed CCTV infrastructure within London, [was extended with] new number plate and facial
recognition software’ and London became ‘the most watched Olympic Games in modern history, but
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not just in the traditional sense of sporting spectators’7. The US Department of Homeland Security is
currently testing the accuracy of Face Recognition Systems with audiences and volunteers at mega
sports events, to explore their capabilities and implication for government and first responders8. This
interest is based on expectations that such systems may be useful in the emergency response phase, for
example for emergency response victim identification (Gevaert & de With, 2013) or to identify
perpetrators during or in the immediate aftermath of violent attacks. In an experiment, researchers at
Michigan State University were able quickly to identify one of the Boston Marathon bombing suspects
from law enforcement video (Klontz & Jain, 2013, although see also Gallagher 2013 for a discussion
on how current facial recognition systems failed in this instance).
Advantages of such systems over human face recognition practices are the number of faces that can be
processed in this way, and the consistent, tireless application of procedures. Indeed, face recognition is
often hailed as less biased than humans. Introna and Woods cite statements not only from
manufacturers and vendors, but also from prominent security forums, such as ‘Face recognition is
completely oblivious to differences in appearance as a result of race or gender differences’ (2004:191).
In light of concerns over social sorting and discrimination against especially Middle Eastern and
Muslim populations in security measures (Vertigans 2010) such promises are powerful incentives for
ethically and socially responsible innovation champions. However, closer inspection reveals bias to be
an integral part of the technology. A 2002 Face Recognition Vendor Test of the most powerful
algorithms found, for example, that males were 6-9%points more likely to be identified than females
(cited in Introna and Woods 2004:190). This is problematic, because while ‘identification’ through a
Face Recognition can correctly identify a ‘good guy’ or a ‘bad guy’, it can also produce false
positives, that is, identify a ‘good guy’ as a ‘bad guy’ or a terrorist suspect, leading to potentially
intrusive investigations. In a study of ‘subject factors’ embedded in a particularly widely used face
recognition algorithm, Givens et al. (2003) also find racial and age bias. Their experiments show that
Asians are easier [to recognize] than whites, African-Americans are easier than whites,
other race members are easier than whites, old people are easier than young people, other
skin people are easier to recognize than clear skin people, and subjects with glasses are
easier to recognize than subjects without glasses.’ (Givens et al. 2003, cited in Introna and
Wood 2004:190)
This bias is not due to any intentionally built in prejudicial weighting, but it is accidental: A function
of the nature of images and their processing by this face recognition system. Amongst other factors, it
is caused by the more accentuated shadows in white and young faces, which create difficulties for
Face Recognition Systems matching processes and mean that they are less likely to be recognized.
Other skintones produce fewer shadows and higher recognition rates.
Being easier to recognize also makes being classed as a false positive and exposed to investigations
more likely. Thus, rather than being neutral, Face Recognition Systems can (unintentionally) amplify
political, cultural, and institutional forms of discrimination. At this juncture it becomes clear that
Morality is no more human than technology, in the sense that it would originate from an
already constituted human who would be master of itself as well as of the universe…
Morality and technology are ontological categories … and the human comes out of these
modes, it is not at their origin” (Latour & Venn, 2002, p. 254).
This highlights two important facts. Firstly, purpose and intentionality are not purely human:
7 http://www.army-technology.com/features/featurelondon-2012-olympics-games-security-strategy/
8 http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20131107-dhs-testing-face-recognition-biometrics
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Purposeful action and intentionality may not be properties of objects, but they are also not
properties of humans. They are properties of institutions [collectives of humans and non-
humans], apparatuses, or what Foucault called dispositifs’ (Latour, in Introna 2007:13).
Secondly, through a disclosive ethical investigation of the collectives of humans and non-humans that
are involved in the potentially exclusionary ethical impact of Face Recognition Systems, Introna and
Wood find that ‘there is often nobody there that “authored” it as such’, prompting reference to
Foucault (1975) and Kafka (1925).
Disclosive ethics is a methodology that seeks to enable analysis of how seemingly trivial details (such
as the light-reflective quality of different types of skins) can turn into a micro- politics and become
tied to, and amplified through other exclusionary practices (such as political and cultural prejudice
stoked by a rhetoric of a ‘war on terror’), so that ‘what seems to be a rather trivial injustice soon may
multiply into what may seem to be a coherent and intentional strategy of exclusion’ (Introna and
Wood 2004:179). The method proceeds by showing that many digital technologies are silent as
opposed to salient technologies and opaque as opposed to transparent (Introna & Wood, 2004:183).
Figure 13 Silent Technology (Introna &Wood 2004:183)
Facial recognition is a particularly striking example of a silent technology since it
can be imbedded into existing CCTV networks, making its operation impossible to detect.
Furthermore, it is passive in its operation. It requires no participation or consent from its
targets – it is “non-intrusive, context-free process” (Introna and Wood 2004:183).
Furthermore, the process is obscure, for two reasons. Firstly, ‘the software algorithms at the heart of
facial recognition systems are proprietary software objects. Thus it is very difficult to get access to
them for inspection and scrutiny’ (ibid.). Secondly, most of the algorithms are based on complex
statistical methods that even experts can struggle to interpret and understand. As a result, ‘for most
ordinary members of society facial recognition systems are an obscure “black box”’ (ibid.).
Using early versions of the current 2012 Facial Recognition Vendor Test, Introna and Wood examine
the operation of two of the most used algorithms and show (with the help of secondary literature on
experiments such as Givens et al.’s (2003)) that while the relatively small biases in recognition-
likelihood might not cause discrimination by themselves, effects are amplified when these ‘become
incorporated into a network of practices’ (ibid:191). For example in ‘face-in-the-crowd’ situations
(such as the Boston Marathon bombing), variations in image quality and a large database of often very
similar faces can increase the number of matches with watchlist faces and thereby the probability for a
match being a false positives. Human operators faced with such a situation can either try to spot and
ignore false positives, thus reducing the system’s functional advantage. Or they can set the threshold
for a match so high that it will barely ever occur. This would not only increase the likelihood of false
negatives (‘bad guys’ slipping through as ‘good guys’), but also undermine the utility of the system.
And, if someone is picked up by the system under these conditions, the human operators:
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may even override their own judgements as they may think that the system under such high
conditions of operation must ‘see something’ that they do not. This is highly likely as
humans are not generally very good a facial recognition in pressurised situations … Thus,
under these conditions the bias group (African-Americans, Asians, dark skinned persons
and older people) may be subjected to disproportionate scrutiny, thereby creating a new
type of ‘digital divide’. (Introna and Wood 2004: 192)
The lesson from this example of disclosive ethics is that morality is not simply human. Agency,
intentionality and ethics are distributed within socio-technical systems, and it is the particular way of
‘working together’ that makes a certain collective or network of humans, environments and
technologies have (un-)intended, potentially undesirable ethical effects. It would, therefore, be short-
sighted to think of technology as neutral, and to look for the ethics of action solely in the way people
use technology. Indeed, novel innovation opportunities arise out of disclosive ethics analyses, which
will be discussed in D12.3 and other BRIDGE deliverables and publications. In the case of facial
recognition, as we have seen, a technology can be employed with sincere intention, yet turn out to
have undesirable effects. That just this technology in just these circumstances produces discriminatory
effects should be notice-able and it should be possible for it to be made into a matter of concern. This
is in no way a technology deterministic reading, where we claim that technology is a ‘culprit’. Quite
the opposite, it could just as well be the technology correcting human bias (Latour & Venn, 2002;
Latour, 1992, 2004). The consequence however has to be that efforts are made to ‘subject
[technological] artefacts to the same level of scrutiny’ (Introna Wood 2004: 195) as humans and to
find approaches (in best practice, legal regulation and design) to ensure the scrutinizability of
algorithms and other silent and opaque technology, especially in already ethically charged areas such
as security or emergency response.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter we have reviewed key ethical positions to contextualise discussion of ethical, legal and
social issues in IT supported emergency response. Based on scenarios, philosophers and political
scientists have developed principled ethical stances in relation to the core question in emergency
situations: whether the threat to normal, social, political and/or environmental order should justify
exceptions to normal moral systems. For example, it is normally unacceptable to harm other people.
However, if an overloaded lifeboat is sinking, could it be right to throw some passengers overboard?
Consequentialists would say ‘yes’, because overall more lives might be saved. Deontologists, in
contrast, would argue that it is wrong to harm others, whatever the situation. They might ask
volunteers to sacrifice their lives, provided that they can freely give informed consent. However, if the
circumstances are escalated, some deontologists accept that exceptional circumstances could justify
harm to others. To hold on to deontological principles of intrinsic ethics, they propose thresholds and
hold actors may be ‘culpable but not punishable’. Heated debates over thresholds have generated
definitions of ‘public’, ‘extreme’, even ‘supreme emergencies, which are complicated by the media,
which often exaggerate disaster myths. Observing (a threat of) a moral black hole at the centre of all
major emergencies, some analysts extend deontological thresholds to allow far reaching exceptional
suspension of normal morality, including suspension of constitutional rights. This matters directly to
the ethics of IT supported multi-agency emergency response, because such decisions will be taken
during the response phase and the emergency agencies’ assessment of the scale, severity, and future
course of an emergency may play an important part; and it matters indirectly, because interoperability
between information systems in emergencies can set precedents for data sharing for surveillance.
Virtue ethics offers an alternative route, positing a moral imperative to maintain normal moral rules
even in extreme situations. It demands an ‘all hazards’ approach and can be supported through careful
preparation and the development of professional virtues. Virtue ethics draws attention to ethical
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challenges in IT supported emergency response, such as injustices engendered through surveillance.
But it also opens up new avenues for innovative design, because the exercise of virtues is a matter of
social and embodied practices, which can be augmented through technologies. An examination of who
the agencies in an emergency are, and under what circumstances they must exercise virtues raised
questions about the social contract between emergency responders and society. It is not right for
society to expect emergency responders (or vital support staff) to be heroes. Society has a duty to put
resources and infrastructures in place for responders to work as effectively and safely as possible.
Technology can engender changes in how virtues can be exercised and a pros and cons analysis of
selected ethical impacts around currently used information technologies began to map intended and
unintended, positive and negative consequences and begin a ‘stocktaking’ exercise of what
‘informationalizing’ emergency response entails. However, it raised questions about ‘where the ethics
is’ in technologically supported emergency response, and a discussion of face recognition as an
example revealed the value of a disclosive ethics approach to address this question.
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3 Codes of Conduct The question now becomes, which virtues are
right for disaster? (Zack, 2010:68)
A virtue ethics approach makes it clear that Zack’s question about emergency responders’ rights and
duties and societies’ obligations like those raised by Jennings and Arras as well as questions about the
ethics of technology must be addressed as part of the preparation for emergencies, because the strains
of a crisis situation will make reasoning about them difficult:
Disaster situations entail serious time exigencies that do not allow for protracted moral
reflection and ethical deliberation; thus, preventive measures and policies that amplify
virtue and ensure ethical corporate practice are warranted. Optimal moral action in a
disaster requires more than an understanding of utility, rationing, and triage. … codes of
ethics and conduct can help provide a moral framework that addresses at least some of the
many micro-, meso- and macro-level disaster challenges. (Larkin, 2010:496)
There are a variety of such codes of conduct and ethics, focusing on humanitarian issues, disaster
response and resilience, matters of work practice, and – more recently – on technology. Many
originate in the US or from international organizations such as the UN, the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), or the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM),
few have been formulated in the European Union. After a brief examination of humanitarian, disaster
response and resilience and work practice codes of ethics, this review focuses on the ethics of
technology in emergency response.
3.1 Humanitarian Principles in Emergency Response
The most widely used set of humanitarian principles is provided by the IFRC:
1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertizing activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.
Source: http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/code-of-conduct/
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Many of the principles expressed here for a self-policing code of conduct with humanitarian intention
are echoed by codes that focus more narrowly on disaster and emergency response.
3.2 Ethical Principles for Disaster Risk Reduction
European initiatives highlight that an increase in the frequency and severity of disasters poses risks for
the dignity and safety of individuals and the natural, cultural and environmental heritage within
Europe. The European and Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement proposes an ethical code of
conduct for all agencies involved in emergency response (Prieur, 2009). This addresses the whole
cycle of Prevention/Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (Figure 4). The BRIDGE
project focuses on the response phase, but many ethical issues raised in developing IT support for
emergency response are closely related to ethical issues in recovery, prevention and preparedness
phases, and it is useful to consider ethical codes of conduct across all of these phases. Prieur’s report
lists 10 general and 26 specialised principles to be applied prior to, during, and after disasters. This is
the first attempt to formulate such principles in a European context to our knowledge and it is an
important contribution. We extract an abridged set of general and response phase principles below.
General principles
Solidarity – Societies work together in a spirit of solidarity to strengthen disaster resilience and help victims. Financial costs and burdens, and benefits of preventative measures should be shared equitably. Particular attention is given to the most vulnerable individuals and communities.
Joint responsibility – All parties, emergency services, public authorities, the private sector, agricultural and industrial actors, non governmental organisations (NGO), individuals, the media and other parties share joint responsibility for the prevention of disaster risk and for participating in an efficient response.
Non-discrimination – Measures that aim to prevent, reduce the risk of or prepare for disasters, distribute relief or promote recovery, as well as fundamental rights (e.g. of movement, association and expression) are secured and implemented irrespective of gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, minority, socioeconomic circumstances, birth, disability, age or other status.
Humanity – All persons are treated humanely, in all circumstances, with respect, tolerance and compassion. Particular attention is paid to the most vulnerable. Dignity and rights is respected and protected in all circumstances.
Impartiality – Disaster prevention, preparedness, relief and recovery are implemented and provided on the basis of genuine needs alone, without any favouritism.
Neutrality – Assistance is provided without ideological debate, with the aims of protecting individuals, their rights, the environment, property, heritage, and to strengthen resilience.
Co-operation – Nations work together, regardless of political, economic, social and cultural differences, according to their capacities, to develop disaster resilience and respect for human rights, especially when there is cross-border impact.
Territorial sovereignty – States have a duty to protect persons on their territory, guaranteeing that, even if a disaster occurs, human rights are fully applied for not only their nationals, but also for foreigners on their territory including humanitarian assistance teams from abroad.
Role of the media – The media have an essential role in informing and raising the public’s awareness to the forecasting of disasters and the way they evolve. Disaster victims should be treated with dignity and full respect of their privacy.
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Ethical Principles during a Disaster
Humanitarian assistance – Humanitarian assistance is provided swiftly, fairly, impartially, without discrimination, with due regard for the vulnerability of victims and specific needs. Humanitarian assistance meets the needs of the populations concerned, in accordance with international standards and the best existing practices.
Information and participation during disasters – All persons, local and regional authorities and NGO affected are informed of and are entitled to participate in making decisions in response to disasters. They receive, in their own language, understandable information about the disaster and emergency measures planned.
Compulsory evacuation of populations – Compulsory evacuation can only take place if a clear explanation has been given of the risks of non evacuation. Persons who refuse to evacuate do so at their own risk and should not endanger rescue workers.
Respect of dignity – The dignity of all victims is respected, particularly concerning security, safety, access to food, clean water, hygiene, temporary housing, clothing and essential medical and psychological care. Sexual violence and abuse is intolerable.
Respect of persons – Personal rights are respected, particularly the right to one’s own image and the right to privacy. The presence of the media does not result in abuses.
Emergency assistance for the most vulnerable persons - Without prejudice to the priority, assistance is to be given to all who have a chance of survival, priority for humanitarian assistance go in priority to the most vulnerable people, such as pregnant women, children, people with disabilities, the elderly, ill and wounded. States train and provide equipment to members of the emergency services, so that they can search for and provide first aid to the most fragile persons.
The importance of rescue workers:
Measures are implemented in a spirit of humanity, solidarity, hope, impartiality.
Rescue workers behave with dignity, keep their fear under control, keep calm and never infringe the fundamental rights of the people they are rescuing.
Rescue workers, have a moral role as a model for the respect of human rights.
Emergency relief should be provided without discrimination or favouritism.
Rescue workers do not take advantage of exceptional situations. They never exploit the weakness of the persons assisted to force them into acts that infringe their human dignity or their physical and sexual integrity. They refrain from corruption.
Rescue workers of any nationality continue to enjoy all fundamental rights.
Rescue workers have psychological assistance available during & after operations.
States, organisations, institutions take every possible measure to guarantee rescue workers the necessary conditions to carry out their work properly, including conditions needed to protect their dignity, safety, physical, psychological integrity.
States, regional & local authorities and training establishments provide special training to rescue workers on human rights & ethical principles in times of disaster and the special arrangements for dealing with the most vulnerable persons.
Measures to safeguard and rehabilitate the environment – Practical measures are taken to ensure the quickest possible safeguarding and rehabilitation of environmental assets and the re-establishment of environmental quality.
Necessary measures to safeguard and restore social ties – Practical measures are taken to ensure that social ties are restored as quickly as possible, by foreseeing meeting places, places of worship and places for leisure activities.
This first attempt at defining a catalogue of ethical principles for multi-agency emergency
management provides insight into the values aspired to in current practice.
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3.3 Principles for Effective Response and the Ethics of Teamwork
A number of organizations propose principles for practices of multi-agency collaboration and
coordination. The UK Civil Contingency Act, for example puts forward eight guiding principles for
practicing effective response and recovery (HM Government, 2013, abridged):
October 2013
Emergency response and recovery arrangements should be flexible and tailored to reflect circumstances, but will follow a common set of underpinning principles. These principles guide the response and recovery effort at all levels – from local to national. There are eight guiding principles:
anticipation – ongoing risk identification and analysis is essential to the anticipation and management of the direct, indirect and interdependent consequences of emergencies;
preparedness – all organisations and individuals that might have a role to play in emergency response and recovery should be prepared and be clear about their roles and responsibilities;
subsidiarity – decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co- ordination at the highest necessary level; local agencies are the building blocks of the response to and recovery from an emergency of any scale;
direction – clarity of purpose comes from a strategic aim and supporting objectives that are agreed, understood and sustained by all involved. This will enable the prioritisation and focus of the response and recovery effort;
information – information is critical to emergency response and recovery and the collation, assessment, verification and dissemination of information must be underpinned by appropriate information management systems. These systems need to support single and multi-agency decision making and the external provision of information that will allow members of the public to make informed decisions to ensure their safety;
integration – effective co-ordination should be exercised between & within organisations and levels (i.e. local, sub-national and national) in order to produce a coherent, integrated effort;
co-operation – flexibility and effectiveness depends on positive engagement and information sharing between all agencies and at all levels; and
continuity – emergency response and recovery should be grounded in the existing functions of organisations and familiar ways of working, albeit on a larger scale, to a faster tempo and in more testing circumstances.
Virtually all of these aims require teamwork and while there are no formal ‘codes of conduct’ for
teamwork, there are proposals for useful criteria from practitioners and theorists. We will discuss
social issues in Chapter 6 and BRIDGE Deliverable 2.4 Domain Analysis III: Collaboration
Technologies (Liegl & Boden, 2014), but some of these considerations have a strong ethical
component and can shed light on the question of the kinds of virtues required for emergency response.
For example, reflecting on the lack of coordination of official and volunteer response in the aftermath
of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, Larkin (2010:495) observes:
it was this writer’s direct observation as an emergency team leader that both convergent
volunteerism (freelancing) and the lack of a coordinated disaster response caused serious
operational and ethical challenges on the ground. At the individual and organizational
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levels, turf wars ensued; acronyms flew across the satellite phone airways—“PIH, ICRC,
UN, PAHO, …”— reminding us that this was a cluster of volunteer organizations and
generating a new moniker for Western Hispanola: “The Nation of NGOs.”
What unfolded was a massive mismatch and duplication of services, expertise, and
resources. For example, bringing expensive hardware such as $70,000 scoliosis surgical
sets to poor Haitian hospitals made no more sense than the USNS Comfort saving
ventilator-dependent quadraparetics in a nation that seldom has 24 hours of electricity—let
alone chronic ventilator capacity. … Some teams came equipped with yoga instructors,
naturopaths, and Reiki masters. Indeed, Haiti became a sort of Bedlam peep show for
voyeuristic volunteers who, having little legitimate reason to be there, used, as their visa,
gifts they wanted to give, not necessarily gifts that Haiti needed. Coupled with a crippling
corporate chaos, this gross mismatch of motives and medical need revealed an obvious lack
of orchestration. It is not overstating the case to observe that, by their diversion of food,
water, fuel, and other resources—including time—volunteers with nothing to contribute
unwittingly increased morbidity and mortality among the earthquake’s victims.
In his paper and an earlier book chapter, Larkin suggests a set of principles for a ‘virtue-based ethic of
magnanimity and teamwork’, including:
Prudence which is the virtue of practical wisdom and the exercise of discernment, perspicacity,
judiciousness and discrimination. It is needed, for example, in triage, where a balancing of
burdens and benefits, decisions about provision or withholding of treatment, and over when
and how to transfer a patient are required.
Justice which is needed where careful stewarding of scarce resources is necessary It is paramount that
those responsible administer distribution fairly, making sure that basic services are available to
those who need them.
Non-judgement which implies an unconditional positive regard for others, an attitude unbiased and
unprejudiced, regardless of whether those others are intoxicated, have poor hygiene, poor
education or a value system different from one’s own.
Self-effacement/charity which requires genuine caring and selfless giving.
Compassion which brings together capabilities for understanding, empathy, sensitivity, tact,
consideration and gentleness. It is as significant as any technical skill, not only because it
allows technical skills to take effect, but also because it supports perception of efficacy under
emergency conditions.9
Trustworthiness which goes together with integrity. Like all virtues trustworthiness and integrity are
earned, not owned, which means they must be exercised and observed continuously over time.
Intellectual honesty, knowing one’s limits and having the humility and integrity to consult
others are aspects of trustworthiness. Larkin argues that it is the ‘primary prerequisite of all
emergency team workers’ (Larkin, 2001:2013), because it gives ‘the frightened, anonymous
and vulnerable patient and the sometimes mentally exhausted team member something to
believe in when they need it most’ (ibid.).
Resilience which is expressed through flexibility and optimism in the face of adversity. Not taking
insults or recalcitrance personally, being undaunted by aggression or despair, and being able to
9 This could be significant beyond the actual situation. Legal action about perceived malpractice by emergency
responders is a growing concern. Yet, ‘most lawsuits are NOT based on actual negligence, but on Lack of
Common Sense, Poor Communications, and Tiny Instances of Disrespect and Inattention!’ (Wirth, 2009).
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cope gracefully with disharmonies are aspects of resilience. Humour and socio-emotional
support within a team can enhance resilience.
Communication which ‘is the essence of teamwork’ and fostered through ‘empathy, shared power
and control, self disclosure/ventilation and confirmation’ (Larkin, 2001:214).
Empathy which implies an ability to see the world through the eyes of another, being aware of their
feeling and reasoning and allowing this to influence one’s responses.
The exercise of these virtues can directly enhance people’s ability to cooperate, or do so indirectly, as
each virtue ‘reflects one’s professional competency and is, thus, essential to the development of trust
and respect’ within a team (Larkin, 2001:211). Both direct and indirect contributions change people’s
outlook ‘from Me to We’, allowing them to realize that ‘the total outcome of the team’s larger
enterprise will exceed the sum of the individual members’ efforts’ (Larkin, 2001:497)
Through a close analysis of the tragic death of 13 members of a smoke jumper team during the 1949
Mann Gulch wildfire in Montana, Weick (1993) adds a powerful set of further guiding principles:
Improvisation and Bricolage: When the smoke jumpers realised that a wall of fire behind them was
advancing faster than they could escape, the crew leader stopped half way up a grassy slope
and lit a fire. He told his crew to join him and lie down in the burnt down grass at the centre of
this ‘escape fire’. This was an example of ‘creativity as figuring out how to use what you
already know to go beyond what you currently think’, to ‘create order out of whatever
materials were at hand’. The crew leader knew the famous fire triangle – the need for oxygen,
flammable material and temperature above ignition – and he knew that removing one of these
(flammable material) from the path of the advancing wildfire could save their lives, as it did
for him. However, his crew did not heed his advice.
One of the reasons Weick identifies for the crew’s lack of trust in their leader is that the role structure
within the team had collapsed. A number of factors led to this, but two were particularly significant.
Firstly, when they approached the wildfire, the members of the team became spread out and unable to
communicate with each other, which weakened an already weak chain of command. Secondly, when
the crew leader realised that the crew were trapped, he ordered them to ‘throw away their tools’. This
in effect stripped the members of their professional identity (and their responsibilities towards their
crew), turning each into an individual running for their life: ‘As the entity of a crew dissolved, it is not
surprising that the final command from the crew leader to jump into an escape fire was heard not as a
legitimate order but as the ravings of someone who had “gone nuts”’ (ibid: 637). To counteract such
disintegration, Weick calls for ‘virtual role systems’ and an ‘attitude of wisdom’.
Virtual Role Systems: This is based on intersubjectivity – every crew member simulating all roles in
their minds, metaphorically turning each individual into a group. This supports role
improvisation, i.e. the ability to take on others’ roles, which is a critical capability to cope with
the uncertainties of disasters (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Mendonça et al., 2007; Webb,
1998; Webb, 2004). It also has the effect that ‘each person can reconstitute the group and
assume whatever role is vacated, pick up the activities, and run a credible version of the role.
Furthermore people can run the group in their head and use it for continued guidance of their
own individual action’ (ibid.: 640).
Attitude of Wisdom: Emergencies are characterised by their ‘un-ness’ – they are unexpected,
unprecedented and unplanned for in their specific unfolding, however good emergency plans
and scenarios are. This makes uncertainty a defining feature (Crichton 2003, cited in
McMaster & Baber, 2008:6). Against this backdrop it is essential to realise that ‘ignorance and
knowledge grow together’ (Weick 1993:641, see also Gross, 2010). It is not possible to know
all that would be important to know about an emergency, however carefully one prepares, and
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the complexities of an unfolding situation will always exceed what can be known. This means
just-in-time learning is essential: ‘wise people know that they don’t fully understand what is
happening right now’ and ‘what organizations most need in changing times … [is] curiosity,
openness, and complex sensing’ (ibid: 641). Information technologies can support this.
An appreciation for the crew leader’s role from his team mates and vice versa, and a willingness to
learn through acute sensitivity to as wide a range of factors affecting their situation as possible, may
have saved some of the Mann Gulch crew. However, to make such virtues effective in extremely
stressful situations a social orientation can be powerful, and Weick calls for the ingredient that will
support the strongest social formation in a team: respect.
Respectful Interaction: This entails three virtues – (1) Trust, practiced through respect for the reports
of others and willingness to base action on them. (2) Honesty – practiced through reporting
scrupulously, allowing others to come to valid understandings. (3) Self-respect, practiced
through due regard for one’s own perceptions and judgements, and efforts to integrate them
with reports by others. These virtuous practices foster social interactions that are effective in
emergency response collaboration, including ‘mutual adaptation’, ‘imitation of creative
solutions’ and ‘trusting compliance’ (Weick, 1993:643). They also foster ‘nonstop talk, both
vocal and nonverbal, [which] is a crucial source of coordination’ and dynamic formulation of
‘superordinate goals – goals that transcend the self-interest of each participant’ (ibid.: 644).
Some of the virtues that attempts to formulate guidance for effective teamwork like these extol can be
subsumed under the concept of ‘leadership’. Some of the professional responders involved in the
BRIDGE project elaborate with concrete detail on ethical dilemmas arising here in a way that can
illustrate some of the difficulties. They highlight how such dilemmas are experienced at an individual
level, and how they affect the collaboration between responders and with other agencies. For example,
having been called to a fire in a house with only one troupe of firefighters, a commander was told that
there were two children inside the house, one on the ground floor, one on the first floor. The situation
meant that, in effect, he had to decide, which of the children would survive. In another example, he
had to decide between a mother and a child who had swum out to see and were being swept out by the
current. And, citing an example from colleagues, he recounted how responders were faced with a fire
in an entertainment venue, where smokedivers found two persons – a girl weighing 50kg and a boy
weighing 120kg. The decision to take the lighter girl first spelled death for the boy. In discussions over
how technologies insert themselves into situations such as these, he raised the potential for outsiders
(who may potentially know more than the persons on scene about, for example, backup being under
way) to be consulted. But he also highlighted that technology simply may not be useful in addressing
ethical dilemmas. Leaders have to prioritize life and health of victims, as well as crew safety. In a
situation where they will always ‘know too few facts that really matter and too many about things that
don’t’ (Rake and Njå, 2009). However, it is critical to note that it is not necessarily only designated
leaders who make decisions and practice leadership (ibid.). Everyone involved, not just named leaders,
appointed by seniority, needs to enact the virtues described above to make them effective.
3.4 The Ethics of Information Sharing
At various points, information sharing has been placed at the heart of effective response by these
codes of conduct and guiding principles. However, in a recent communications stocktaking effort
based on an extensive review of post-disaster reviews from across the EU, the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA, 2012) shows that current information sharing practices
between emergency agencies are inadequate. One of the reasons identified is an ‘over-zealous or
incorrect interpretation of the duties imposed on public organisations by the Data Protection Act’
(Armstrong, Ashton, & Thomas, 2007). Observations of barriers to information sharing and a
tendency towards silo-thinking (Cole, 2010) have prompted clarification of the legitimacy of data
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sharing in emergency contexts both nationally and within the EU as a whole (see BRIDGE D12.1
Privacy Protection and Legal Risk Analysis Buscher & Wahlgren, 2012 for a detailed discussion).
More recently, they have also stimulated the formulation of codes of conduct that encourage and guide
data sharing. In the UK, for example, general guidance by the Information Commissioner’s Office
highlights that emergency situations can override some data protection rules, such as the need to seek
‘informed consent’ from data subjects. The guidance also highlights the importance of preparation:
Where possible, organisations likely to be involved in responding to emergency situations
should consider the types of data they are likely to need to share in advance. This should
help to establish what relevant data each organisation holds and help prevent any delays in
an emergency. For example, the police, the fire service and local councils get together to
plan for identifying and assisting vulnerable people in their area in an emergency situation.
As part of the process they determine what type of personal data they each hold and put in
place a data sharing agreement setting out what they will share and how they will share it
in the event of an emergency. (ICO, 2013)
More specifically tailored principles encourage consideration of the consequences of not sharing:
Abridged from Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders. (Armstrong et al. 2007)
1. Data protection legislation does not prohibit the collection and sharing of personal data – it provides a framework where personal data can be used with confidence that individuals’ privacy rights are respected.
2. Emergency responders’ starting point should be to consider the risks and the potential harm that may arise if they do not share information.
3. Emergency responders should balance the potential damage to the individual (and where appropriate the public interest of keeping the information confidential) against the public interest in sharing the information.
4. In emergencies, the public interest consideration will generally be more significant than during day-to-day business.
5. Always check whether the objective can still be achieved by passing less personal data.
6. Category 1 and 2 responders should be robust in asserting powers to share personal data lawfully in emergency planning, response and recovery.
7. The consent of the data subject is not always a necessary pre-condition to lawful data sharing.
8. You should seek advice when in doubt – though prepare on the basis that you will need to make a decision without formal advice during an emergency.
However, the rapid appropriation of information technologies for emergency response, including by
actors such as non-governmental agencies, the media and members of the public has also given rise to
concerns, especially with regard to the processing of sensitive information. Humanitarian and human
rights organizations have been at the vanguard of developing codes of conduct that seek to strengthen
people’s sensitivities and capacities to address the challenges. The 2012 OCHA Report
Humanitarianism in the Network Age (OCHA, 2012) and the 2013 IFRC World Disasters Report:
Focus on technology and the future of humanitarian action (Vinck, 2013) begin to outline ethical
principles of information collection and sharing in large scale multi-agency disaster response efforts
from a humanitarian perspective. The International Committee of the Red Cross (2013) has been the
first to propose a set of standards with a view to the particularly challenging context of protection
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work in conflict situations. These standards resonate with concerns arising in current practices of
large-scale emergency response, where such codes have not yet been formulated.
Abridged from: Chapter 6 ‘Managing sensitive protection information’ of Professional standards for Protection Work (2013)
36. Protection actors must only collect information on abuses and violations when necessary for the design or implementation of protection activities. It may not be used for other purposes without additional consent.
37. Systematic information collection, particularly when involving direct contact with individuals affected by abuses and violations, must only be carried out by organizations with the capacity, skills, information management systems and necessary protocols in place.
38. Protection actors must collect and handle information containing personal details in accordance with the rules and principles of international law and other relevant regional or national laws on individual data protection.
39. Protection actors seeking information bear the responsibility to assess threats to the persons providing information, and to take measures to avoid negative consequences for those from whom they are seeking information.
40. Protection actors setting up systematic information collection through the Internet or other media must analyse the different potential risks linked to the collection, sharing or public display of the information and adapt the way they collect, manage and publicly release the information accordingly.
41. Protection actors must determine the scope, precision and depth of detail of the collection process, in relation to the intended use of the information.
42. Protection actors should systematically review the information collected in order to confirm that it is reliable, accurate, and updated.
43. Protection actors should be explicit as to the level of reliability and accuracy of information they use or share.
44. Protection actors must gather and subsequently process protection information in an objective and impartial manner, to avoid discrimination. They must identify and minimize bias that may affect information collection.
45. Security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information must be in place prior to collection of information, to ensure protection from loss or theft, unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or modification.
46. Protection actors must undertake an analysis of the associated risks for the interviewees and the interviewer before conducting interviews.
47. When conducting individual or group interviews, protection actors must only collect personal information with the informed consent of the person. Personal information must not be disclosed or transferred for purposes other than those for which they were collected, and for which consent was given.
48. Protection actors must integrate the notion of informed consent when calling upon the general public, or members of a community, to spontaneously send them information through SMS, an open Internet platform, or other means of communication, or when using information already available on the Internet.
49. Protection actors should, to the degree possible, keep victims or communities having transmitted information informed of action they have taken on their behalf – and of results. Protection actors should remain alert to any negative
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repercussions on the individuals or communities concerned, owing to the actions they have taken, and take measures to mitigate repercussions.
50. Protection actors must avoid, to the extent possible, duplication of information collection efforts, in order to avoid unnecessary burdens and risks for victims, witnesses and communities.
51. Whenever information is to be shared, its interoperability should be taken into account in planning the information collection.
52. When handling confidential and sensitive information on abuses and violations, protection actors should endeavour, when appropriate and feasible, to share aggregated data on the trends they observed.
53. Protection actors should establish formal procedures on the information handling process, from collection to exchange and archiving or destruction.
Source: (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013)
While the assessment of risks to information sources and other conflict-affected populations arising
from the public sharing of information is of critical importance in protection work, the sensitivities
targeted above also resonate with the broader concerns raised in the OCHA Report (2012) and the
World Disasters Report (Vinck, 2013), which include
the changing notion of informed consent in contexts where people might be unfamiliar with
digital technologies or unaware of the complex nature of digital data mobilities;
the challenges presented by the interpretation of data collected remotely;
the risks of bias and data manipulation;
the existence of digital divides
Codes of conduct in relation to information sharing developed by humanitarian organizations also
include guidelines for the crowdsourcing, production, analysis and use of crisis informatics,
geographical and other community or Big Data (Crowley, 2013; Letouze, Meier, & Vinck, 2013;
Shanley, Burns, Bastian, & Robson, 2013), as well as novel approaches to sharing information with
members of the public, for example through the use of SMS (see the first-ever Code of Conduct for
the Use of SMS in Disaster Response (GSMA, 2013).
3.5 Computer Professionals’ Codes of Conduct
Unlike emergency responders, engineers are often distant from the effects of their work and the
environments, social contexts and people they serve. However, engineers have long been aware of
their responsibility towards society. Within the field of computing, developers came together to
respond to the growing military use of computer technologies in 1981, founding the membership
organization Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a global initiative to promote the
responsible design and use of computer technology, with a focus on educating policymakers and the
public on a wide range of issues. The Computer Ethics Institute, another non-profit organization,
aiming to provide ‘A moral compass for the ocean of information technology’ was founded in 1985,
and it was the first to formulate a set of ‘ten commandments for computer ethics’:
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The Ten Commandments of Computer Ethics
1. Thou shalt not use a computer to harm other people.
2. Thou shalt not interfere with other people’s computer work.
3. Thou shalt not snoop around in other people’s computer files.
4. Thou shalt not use a computer to steal.
5. Thou shalt not use a computer to bear false witness.
6. Thou shalt not copy or use proprietary software for which you have not paid.
7. Thou shalt not use other people’s computer resources without authorization or proper compensation.
8. Thou shalt not appropriate other people’s intellectual output.
9. Thou shalt think about the social consequences of the program you are writing or the system you are designing.
10. Thou shalt always use a computer in ways that ensure consideration and respect for your fellow humans.
Source: http://www.computerethicsinstitute.com/images/TheTenCommandmentsOfComputerEthics.pdf
These principles have been developed by computer scientists and professional organizations. One of
the earliest comprehensive discussions is Forester and Morrison’s ‘Computer Ethics’ (1990), which
argues that ethics needs to be integrated deeply into all aspects of development and use of
computation. The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the world’s largest educational and
scientific computing society10
has developed a detailed code of ethics and professional conduct that
attempts to facilitate this integration. It contains 24 imperatives that describe general moral principles,
more specific professional imperatives, and principles particularly relevant to leaders and educators in
the profession. The excerpt below lists general moral imperatives and specific principles.
Excerpt from ACM Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct
1. GENERAL MORAL IMPERATIVES. As an ACM member I will ....
1.1 Contribute to society and human well-being. 1.2 Avoid harm to others. 1.3 Be honest and trustworthy. 1.4 Be fair and take action not to discriminate. 1.5 Honor property rights including copyrights and patent. 1.6 Give proper credit for intellectual property. 1.7 Respect the privacy of others. 1.8 Honor confidentiality.
2. MORE SPECIFIC PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. As an ACM computing professional I will ....
2.1 Strive to achieve the highest quality, effectiveness and dignity in both the process and products of professional work.
2.2 Acquire and maintain professional competence.
10
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_for_Computing_Machinery
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2.3 Know and respect existing laws pertaining to professional work.
2.4 Accept and provide appropriate professional review.
2.5 Give comprehensive and thorough evaluations of computer systems and their impacts, including analysis of possible risks.
2.6 Honor contracts, agreements, and assigned responsibilities.
2.7 Improve public understanding of computing and its consequences.
2.8 Access computing and communication resources only when authorized to do so.
Source: http://www.acm.org/about/code-of-ethics
All of these principles for professional and ethical conduct by engineers and designers of computer
technologies are relevant to the discussion at hand. But perhaps the most interesting with a view to the
ethics in IT supported large-scale multi-agency response are …
Most interesting principles … because
1.1 Contribute to society and human well-being.
In a ‘century of disasters’, improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of disaster response can contribute to well-being.
1.2 Avoid harm to others. The ‘wrong kind’ of emergency response technology – e.g. technology that is unreliable or that fosters expansion of surveillance – can harm individuals and social/political principles that underpin freedom & well-being in communities and societies.
1.4 Be fair and take action not to discriminate.
1. Technologies such as face-recognition, search for vulnerable persons or categorization during triage can be inherently (unintentionally) discriminatory (see Section 2.2.2).
2. Technology can exclude those who lack skill or resources from the provision of emergency services, creating ‘digital divides’.
The call to ‘take action not to discriminate’ should inform innovation that proactively avoids discrimination.
1.7 Respect the privacy of others. This imperative imposes a responsibility to address questions such as: How can emergency responders and response organizations be supported in keeping privacy intrusions proportional and minimal? What happens to data and data sharing affordances after an emergency? Innovative design is needed.
2.3 Know and respect existing laws pertaining to professional work.
This principle applies not only to the laws governing IT design, but also to laws that are relevant to the use of IT in the domain that computer professionals are designing for. In emergency response these include, particularly, liability and data protection.
2.5 Give comprehensive evaluations of computer systems and their impacts, analysis of possible risks.
Such evaluation and risk analysis requires a thorough understanding of the domain and a collaborative design approach with wide ranging stakeholder involvement.
2.7 Improve public understanding of computing and its consequences.
This imperative imposes responsibilities to address questions like: How can responders and populations be supported in understanding the complex intended and unintended consequences of IT supported emergency response? Innovative design is needed to support the apprehension of computational processes and products.
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By drawing out the relevance of these principles, it becomes clear that ethical sensitivities need to be
integrated into the products and processes of design. However, the ACM principles above are
strangely silent on questions of use. However, there are strong resonances to the social contract idea
employed in negotiating professional emergency responders’ responsibilities. Computer professionals
cannot effectively address ethical principles alone. They must be supported by society and individual
users of technology, who should carry more responsibility for the beneficence/non-maleficence of IT.
3.6 Ethical Codes of Conduct for the Use of Technology
The users’ responsibility is recognised in codes of conduct that specify how responders are to utilize
information technology. However, the excerpt from the 2012 UK Police National Computer Manual
below, obtained through the public evidence produced by the Leveson inquiry into press ethics,
illustrates that in explicating user responsibilities the focus lies on reference to the law (Figure 14).
Figure 14 User Responsibilities (UK Police National Computer (PNC)) Source: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Exhibit-KW-NIPA3.pdf
Human rights and data protection laws, too, include complex notions of purpose-binding, fairness,
transparency, purpose limitation and data minimisation (Figure 15).
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Figure 15 General Data Protection Regulation Source: General Data Protection Regulation. Inofficial Consolidated Version After Libe Committee Vote. By The Rapporteur
22.10.2013 http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/DPR-Regulation-inofficial-consolidated-LIBE.pdf
Human Rights Law adds further detail, including the notions of
Proportionality – any breach of the right to privacy has to be proportional to the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others.
Informational self-determination - the right of an individual to know when and to whom
personal data are disclosed. In some European constitutions, the right to informational self-
determination is understood to be part of basic rights to freedom, which are inviolable.
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As we have shown in an analysis of interviews and observations with users of the PNC in D12.01
Privacy Protection and Legal Risk Analysis (Buscher & Wahlgren, 2012), it is problematic that codes
governing the use of information systems focus almost exclusively on referring users to the law,
because it puts the onus on individuals without providing them with adequate support for establishing
knowledge about and comprehending the effects and visibility of their actions and for understanding
their lawfulness or otherwise in practice. Some expert policing analysts argue, for example, that in
relation to the legality of ‘criminality information sharing’ in the UK, ‘an intolerable level of
uncertainty as to the issue of that legality has now been reached’ (Grace, 2013). At this juncture the
BRIDGE project can make a significant contribution through innovative design that support users in
understanding and controlling how information sharing works in assemblies of advanced information
technologies in IT supported emergency response, as we will discuss further in D12.3.
3.7 Ethical Principles of the Information Society
The importance of educating and involving users in IT innovation has been recognised by
policymakers, too, and it has prompted the formulation of ‘ethical principles for the information
society’. For example, the Riga Global Meeting of Experts on the Ethical Aspects of the Information
Society (UNESCO, 2013) proposes a set of 15 principles to guide emerging practices, placing
particular emphasis on developing the skills and knowledge of ordinary citizens, captured specifically
in guideline No 4:
Raise awareness about the ethical implications of the ICT use and development, particularly
among young people, along with life-long education initiatives to equip all citizens with the
skills and competence to participate actively and knowledgeably in the information society.
New info-ethical and info-civic pedagogical paradigms may be envisaged in this regard to
support new modes of global citizenship fully integrating digital media and virtual political
spaces. (UNESCO, 2013)
And a discussion paper for the 2015 World Summit on the Information Society elaborates
‘Participation’ and ‘Responsibility’ as fundamental ethical values for a global communication ethic.
The Nine ‘Ps of a Global Communication Ethic. World Summit on the Information Society – Global Communication Ethic
1 Principles: Ethical Values
2 Participation: Access to Knowledge for All
3 People: Community, Identity, Gender, Generation, Education
4 Profession: Ethics of Information Professions
5 Privacy: From Dignity to Data Mining
6 Piracy: Intellectual Property and Cybercrime
7 Protection: Children and Young People
8 Power: Economic Power, Technology, Media and Consumers
9 Policy: Ethics of Regulation and Freedom
Participation is the right and ability to participate in societal life and in decisions of concern.
Responsibility is accountability for one’s own actions. The level of responsibility has to correspond to the level of power, capacity and capability. Those with more resources bear greater responsibility.
Source: http://tinyurl.com/qhk6jwk
Sharing the responsibility for intended and unintended consequences of IT innovation in crisis
management as part of a social contract between society at large and the multidisciplinary professional
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groups involved in IT design and implementation surely is a good thing. However, critics argue that
ethical guidelines and professional codes of conduct are ineffective means for achieving good moral
practices. In his paper The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: A Moral and Intellectual
Confusion John Ladd argues that if disciplinary procedures are associated with compliance, the idea of
a ‘code of ethics’ confuses ethics with law and this is a nonsense, because:
ethics consists of issues to be examined, explored, discussed, deliberated, and argued.
Ethical principles can be established only as a result of deliberation and argumentation.
These principles are not the kind of thing that can be settled by fiat, by agreement or by
authority.(Ladd, [1979] 1998:211)
He suggests that what usually is really intended is a ‘code of conduct’ and that these, too, are
ineffective:
Worthy and inspirational though such codes may be, he [Ladd] says that their existence
leads to complacency and self-congratulation – and maybe even to the cover-up of unethical
conduct. “Look, we have a code of ethics,” professionals might say, “so everything we do
must be ethical.” The real objective of such codes, Ladd says, are to enhance the image …
and to protect the monopoly of the profession. (Forester & Morrison, 1990:19).
Perhaps the strongest argument against Ladd is that whilst ethical guidelines and codes of professional
conduct may be ineffective in enforcing moral practice, they can scaffold it. Importantly, they can do
so in advance – anticipating and providing guidance for answering the anguished questions emergency
responders may have to address in case of an emergency, encouraging establishment of information
sharing agreements before disaster strikes, and training moral sensitivities.
3.8 Summary
To translate principled ethical stances into guidelines for professional conduct it is necessary to ask
‘which virtues are right for disaster response?’. The review of ethics guidelines and professional codes
of conduct in this Chapter has shown how humanitarian imperatives, impartiality, and informing and
involving affected communities are critical values. European initiatives also stress training, solidarity,
cooperation and a focus on assistance for the most vulnerable. Moreover, many organisations
recognize the need for multi-agency coordination, because ‘in the initial stages of a large and complex
incident, it is unlikely that any single individual or organisation will be in possession of all of the
information to fully understand the problem and formulate a solution – various organisations will be in
possession of ‘pieces’ of the puzzle (McMaster & Baber, 2008:7). Thus the UK civil contingencies act
highlights the need for subsidiarity, cooperation and information sharing.
Virtually all ethical principles require teamwork and, while there are no formal ‘codes of teamwork’,
practitioners and theorists have formulated key virtues of teamwork, including compassion,
trustworthiness, integrity, empathy, improvisation, intersubjectivity, and an attitude of wisdom that
recognises that ‘ignorance and knowledge grow together’. It is critical for responders to acknowledge
that there is a need to cast the nets of perception and communication widely, without thinking one
already knows. Indeed, communication and respectful interaction are at the heart of success.
Some codes of conduct are inspired by deficiencies in existing practice. Particularly significant are
inadequate use and sharing of information. Again, preparation is a key principle here. There is a call
for information sharing agreements to be sought between actors likely to be involved in all hazards
emergency response. In addition, emergency responders are reminded that data protection does not
prohibit information sharing, it is meant to provide a framework for sharing with confidence. Most
importantly, emergency responders should consider the effects of not sharing. Yet, there are also
concerns over careless use and sharing of information. Humanitarian organizations are at the vanguard
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of identifying and addressing challenges. Their efforts raise issues and formulate virtuous approaches
that are highly relevant for emergency response, including principles of data minimization, ensuring
the accuracy and reliability of data, and the need for transparent procedures for collection, processing
and destruction of data. Humanitarian organizations have also begun to address ethical challenges of
involving the public and digital humanitarian organizations in emergency response, where the risks of
bias and data manipulation, and the risk of digital exclusion are important considerations.
The chapter draws to a close by considering how these ethical guidelines and codes of conduct from
the domain of emergency response map onto professional ethics in the domain of computer science
and engineering. A shared aim to contribute to society and human well-being unites the parties
involved. In a century of disasters, sensitively designed and appropriated IT may enhance the
efficiency of emergency response to great effect. According to the most authoritative codes of
conduct, computer professionals should bring to this endeavour a commitment not only to avoid
discrimination, but to proactively take steps to minimize discrimination, respect privacy, and support
lawful conduct. They should engage closely with stakeholders and actively seek to improve public
understanding of computing and its consequences.
The last point, and the comparison of professional ethics in emergency response, where a ‘social
contract’ stipulates responsibilities for wider society, highlights a need for society to also take more
responsibility for the beneficence and non-maleficence of IT. There are some codes of conduct that
seek to support such societal responsibility, for example the UK’s police national computer user
manual, which defines user responsibilities in line with the Data Protection Act. However, such codes
of conduct for the use of IT currently place an undue burden on individuals and collaborating teams,
because at present, technologies are not designed to support understanding of complex information
systems. It was noted that this poses a significant challenge and opportunity for the BRIDGE project.
A brief excursus into emerging formulations of ethics in the information society then concluded the
review of codes of conduct, highlighting that these codes of societal ethics all incorporate calls for
more active and knowledgeable public participation in IT innovation in all walks of life. However, the
somewhat blue-eyed vagueness of ideas expressed here led into a critical evaluation of the usefulness
of ethical guidelines and professional codes of conduct. We might add to this doubt over the utility of
philosophically and intellectually principled ethical stances formulated in relation to fictitious
scenarios and end this chapter in an attitude of wisdom. We suggest that, while we might have learnt
much from the investigation so far, we do not fully understand practices of noticing and managing
ethical, legal and social issues in IT supported large-scale multi-agency emergency response. A ‘full’
understanding of these practices will remain elusive, but we can reach a firmer grasp. The next
chapters will explore legal issues and social issues to work towards this.
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4 Legal Issues Although state responses to disasters have a long history, Emergency Law is not an established sub
field of jurisprudence. A significant part of the contributions have originated during the twenty-first
century11
and published works are of an eclectic nature. The scarcity of legal instruments becomes
even more apparent when it comes to “current practices” and if the focus is narrowed down to “IT-
supported multi agency emergency response” the lack of material is obvious. This does not mean that
the existing legal doctrine can be disregarded however. IT supported emergency management relevant
in the BRIDGE project must take a number of things into consideration.
Most importantly, the acceptance of IT supported tools of this kind in an international setting
presupposes coordination with established rule systems, fragmented as they may be. Likewise, as any
development of a significantly new kind of IT-system is likely to provide new opportunities and give
rise to new demands, there is a need to relate to recognized legal strategies and policies. Consequently,
as a basis for an analysis of future potentialities for common practices and foreseeable standards for
BRIDGE type of systems it is necessary to research the legal context. To present a tool for emergency
management without a good understanding of the administrative framework is not possible. The legal
context must be observed despite whether it is satisfactory or not. In the first situation because the
system must comply to established rules and standards, in the latter case because new problems and/or
the need for legal reforms should be identified.
While Emergency Law12
is a conception in the process of being defined, disasters are not omitted
from the legal discourse. Issues related to disasters have been addressed separately in a variety of legal
contexts for a long time. Relevant material can be found in works dealing with Governmental Law
(e.g. regarding preconditions for declaring states of emergencies), Criminal Law (e.g. concerning acts
of terrorism), Procedural Law (e.g. about legitimate use of surveillance mechanisms), Military Law
(e.g. on the use of military resources in rescue operations), Insurance Law (on the allocation of
responsibilities and liability), International Law and Laws of War (lately restored in the conceived
“war on terror”).
In addition, at detailed level a large number of regulative instruments are related to the effective
managing of disasters and states of emergencies. Most significant are several parts of Administrative
Law. Illustrations are acts and ordinances providing rule bases for rescue organisations such as the
police, fire departments and health care. Of relevance are also laws stipulating that public authorities
and municipalities shall perform risk analysis and provide guidelines with the purpose of protecting
critical infrastructures and preventing accidents for enterprises operating within their area of
responsibility. Developed with the distinct purpose of avoiding mishaps and enhancing security are
furthermore innumerable standards for various types of industrial projects, constructions, energy
production, handling of food products, transports, etc. In this perspective, viewing the legal system as
a means to avoid and handle problems, the legal sub sections that may be relevant to include in a
survey of Emergency Law are difficult to overlook and delimit.
More recently issues relating to privacy and personal integrity have attracted growing attention in this
context. The background being that the ambition to create a secure society easily can result in a
society in which everything and everybody is monitored more or less continuously. In this way
11
Hufnagel, S, Roach, K, Conclusion, in Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, p. 539 [I]t
would have been difficult to contemplate a volume of 18 chapters being devoted to emergency law before
9/11 [2001]. 12
Sometimes Disaster Law is used as a synonym. See e.g. the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies “www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/idrl”.
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security mechanisms may become a threat to an open society and as surveillance technology become
more advanced, this is a growing concern. In this respect Emergency Law can be understood as a
means to balance security initiatives against human rights, privacy and ethical considerations with the
objective to preserve an open society and vindicate democracy. The latter is clearly reflected in the
continuous debate in Government Law about how to regulate states of emergency.
The increased debate about privacy issues is merely one illustration of the dynamics in the field.
Emergency Law in several ways is an open concept. Not only does an increased political focus on
disasters, more resources for security research and technical developments make it necessary to revise
and reformulate legal solutions more or less continuously. Noticeable is also that new events
drastically may alter the picture and recast the agenda. Disasters are per definition unscheduled and
the development in the security sector is to a large extent incident driven. Events like 9/11, the
hurricane Katrina, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the multiphase Fukushima disaster all
significantly changed the understanding of legal requirements and possible legal remedies. In several
cases unpredicted events have initiated substantial reorganisations of agencies responsible for
preventing and minimising consequences of future disasters. An increased need to coordinate various
activities has also lead to the establishment of new authorities with broad responsibilities, replacing
specialised agencies.13
Stakeholders and the categories of people potentially affected by notions of Emergency Law are
impossible to define in advance. Consequences of crises are not only a concern of victims, rescue
personnel, volunteers and media. Emergencies can affect any branch of society and all kind of
enterprises without geographical limitations – we may all in various ways be affected by a multitude
of potential disasters. Legal issues that can be related to Emergency Law are impossible to delimit in
any distinct way.
Another precondition is that the various kinds of regulations that may be related to Emergency Law
are of a multifaceted nature from a formal point of view. Some relevant provisions, e.g. concerning
privacy and the right to declare states of emergences may be found in constitutions. Other sets of rules,
e.g. concerning use of military resources and health care administration, may have been enacted
through specific laws or ordinances. Still other normative instruments may be the result of agreements
on cooperation between various organizations and/or self- and co-regulation. The domain also exhibit
a rich variety of soft law instruments, e.g. memorandums, resolutions, statements and guidelines. In
many incidents it is relevant and necessary to include material from several jurisdictions and interpret
international agreements. The consequence being that it may be difficult to identify, retrieve and
comprise the relevant legal material in actual instances of crises. To amend or revise the material may
be even more problematic as responsibilities, formal competence and interests often are divided.
13
The most noticeable example is the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S.A.
combining 22 different federal departments and agencies into a unified, integrated cabinet agency established
in 2002. After the September 11 2001, terrorist attacks the original intention was to revise and coordinate a
comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and respond to any future attacks.
The mission has thereafter been modified and broadened, see “www.dhs.gov”. A similar development can be
seen in Sweden where the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in 2009 replaced several agencies in
the security sector in order to improve coordination and efficiency. An incentive for this reorganisation was
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, affecting 20 000-30 000 Swedish citizens in the area. The Swedish rescue
operation was heavily criticised – more than 540 Swedes were killed and over 1.500 injured were in need of
emergency medical help and transportation. See “www.msb.se/en”. An example of a more stable and
distributed rescue organisation is the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) in Germany, founded in
1950, preceded by a similar organization established in the wake of WWI 1919, see “stiftung-thw.de”.
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4.1 A Common Practice?
From the ambiguous definition of Emergency Law follows that an overview over current practices
must take a number of factors into consideration. To delimit Emergency Law is a complicated task,
and if the ambition is to provide a distinct impression for a region encompassing several jurisdictions
the undertaking becomes even more problematic. Legal rules are often enacted at different points of
time, and laws may have been revised independently of each other, disregarding the fact that they
address the same problem. Noticeable is also that the ways in which these issues are dealt with vary a
lot between different countries, and sometimes also geographically within states. In addition, many
organisations embrace different traditions, and both practical and administrative presuppositions vary.
Use of various languages and lack of standardized terminology impose other kinds of problems.
An important precondition is also that disasters may affect all aspects of society and frequently do so
in unpredictable ways. From this follows not only that emergency responses have to be improvised
and diversified but also that the set of rules that may apply often will be of an ad hoc nature.
Consequently, to claim that there exists a common practice for the employment of Disaster Law would
be false.
Another observation is that within the EU so called “macro-regions” are emerging, partly prompted by
security concerns. Examples are provided by the EUSDR (EU Strategy for the Danube Region)14
and
EUSBSR (EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region).15
Such initiatives may lead to increased
coordination and enhanced efficiency within a region, but may in the long time perspective result in a
fragmentation of the EU framework. Similar negative effects may also be the result of the
development of emergency management at the EU level as such, as the cooperation may duplicate and
in some aspects clash with existing bilateral or regional international agreements or arrangements
which have been established within the UN.16
To establish a common international practice may also be problematic due to that the member states
face threats of various kinds and/or may want to allocate their resources differently.17
The fact that Emergency Law is an open concept is clearly reflected in the literature. The vast majority
of works of relevance for emergency research are case studies analysing specific events. Few such
studies have been initiated with the primary goal of providing a broad inventory of legal aspects.
Analysis of causes, descriptions of how events have unfolded, incidents responses and lessons learned
are the main focus. If addressed at all, legal issues are often dealt with in an unstructured and
superficial manner.
In depth studies of Emergency Law are however not lacking. The material can be structured in various
ways and broad international initiatives exist, aiming to bridge the gap between different traditions. In
this review three areas of concern are highlighted; the constitutional basis for disaster response,
legislative strategies and international cooperation. Each aspect suggested to be important for the
understanding of the preconditions for further development of collaborative practices in multi agency
emergency collaboration. Features relevant because IT-based support tools must not violate
fundamental rights, they must be in-cooperated with national strategies as well as administrative
structures, and preferably integrated with international developments.
14
“www.danube-region.eu”. 15
“www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu”. 16
Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies,
Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 8-9. 17
Olsson, supra note 16.
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4.2 The Constitutional Basis for Disaster Response
A large portion of the discussion found under the heading Emergency Law deals with the conditions
for declaring states of emergencies. The assumed precondition being that states of emergencies require
powers not usually provided by the legal order. Emergency Law has been described as law “outside
the legal order” as “[t]here exist no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense a
normal situation must exist…”.18
Is has also been suggested that “legal norms cannot apply in a state
of emergency” and that “a state of emergency is a lawless void, a legal black hole, in which the state
acts unconstrained by law”.19
From the fact that Emergency Law is interpreted as an extraordinary phenomenon follows that a
considerable part of the literature focuses on how a state should respond to emergencies requiring
actions outside the legal order, and at the same time avoid outright dictatorship outside the
constitution. Needless to say this is a fundamental issue and a precondition for upholding democracy
and legitimacy. Beyond doubt is also that use of extraordinary powers is a delicate manner that require
serious attention. History provides countless examples of the opposite – extraordinary power to a
sovereign can easily be used for political purposes, discrimination and abuse, sometimes for indecisive
periods of time. Apparent is also that consequences of the latter can be more severe than the effects of
the event that originally motivated the exception from normal state of affairs.
Consequently, much of the discussion under this heading is about how to “design checks and balances
to ensure … against the normalization of the state of emergency”,20
and how to create a formal
framework that can minimize the risks. A review of the literature thus reveals a multifaceted
discourse, drawing from a long tradition and including analyses of the role of elected parties, courts,
legislature, a free press, etc. References to Greek experiments with variants of democracy, ancient
Roman dictatorships as well as seventeen century philosophers are frequent.21
Contributions also
include in depth analysis of writings by twenty century fascist thinker Carl Schmitt as well as
renowned legal philosophers such as Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart and Richard Dworkin. Theories such
as liberalism, fascism, constitutionalism and bureaucracy are used in order to systemize various lines
of reasoning.
Perhaps the most elaborated contribution on how to create a formal framework for emergencies and
also a frequently referred article is The Emergency Constitution by Bruce Ackerman published in
2004.22
Apart from presenting a broad historical account Ackerman proposes a formal framework
which he refers to as “the supermajoritarian escalator”. In essence a formal set of rules giving power
to the executive “for the briefest period – long enough for the legislature to convene and consider the
matter, but no longer”. It is suggested that “the state of emergency should expire unless it gains
majority approval. But this is only the beginning. Majority support should serve to sustain the
18
Schmitt, Carl, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin 1922, (trans George Schwab, Political Theology, Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 p. 13). 19
Dyzenhaus, David, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order? in
Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 p. 4. 20
Dyzenhaus, supra note 19, p. 14. 21
See e.g. Ferejohn, J., Pasquino, P, The Law of the Excepton: A Typoplogy of Emergency Powers. In
Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 p. 63-92. 22
Ackerman, Bruce, The Emergency Constitution. In Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, p.
307-369.
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emergency for a short time – two or three months. Continuation should require an escalating cascade
of supermajorities: sixty per cent for the next two months; seventy for the next; eighty thereafter”.23
Closely connected to states of emergencies is the right to go to war and to give extensive powers to a
leader in order to defend the state. The rationale being that military responses usually require rapid
actions in order to eliminate external threats and that democratic mechanisms have to stand back. The
concept of “war” is thus also a frequent reference used in order to legitimate use of extraordinary
powers, Apart from war in the traditional meaning (use of force between independent states) the
notion of religious war has been the basis for various types of acts including use of force against
civilians and crusades. In the beginning of the twenty-first century the “war on terror” has played a
similar role. Critics have pointed out that a continuous broadening of the concept of war eventually
may lead to a situation where extraordinary means are used in order to legitimate almost any type of
state action, e.g. in wars against “environmental pollution”, “poverty”, “crime”, “drugs”, “dangerous
religions” or simply “dangerous thinkers”.24
The debate is in no way fading in intensity, on the contrary. A current example is the on-going
controversy about the legality of covert state surveillance of telecommunications and the internet.25
In
the U.S.A. motivated by the need to fight terrorism in a “war on terror”. The surveillance arguably
legal according to a time limited state of emergency “Patriot Act”,26
but heavily criticised as violating
human rights and the privacy of individuals. The war metaphor has also been a basis for detaining
“illegal combatants” without trial for more than a decade.27
Critical counter arguments being that acts
of terror are criminalized and thus something that should be dealt with by criminal law, and that
anybody accused of committing criminal acts and deprived the freedom have the right to have the case
tried in a court proceeding (the legal principle of habeas corpus).
The design of a formal framework for use of extraordinary powers in states of emergencies is not the
only sub topic that has attracted a lot of attention. Also the constitutional basis for engaging military
forces in rescue operations is a debated issue. In several countries use of military force on its own
territory is prohibited by the constitution based on the principle that no one should engage the military
against its own people. At first sight this restriction may appear unmotivated if the purpose is to assist
in pure rescue activities, but in practice the employment of military resources is often problematic. For
one thing because the concept of emergency lacks a commonly accepted definition. Is it e.g. legitimate
to consider large scale protests, demonstrations, or strikes as emergencies, and further, if such events
bring about riots or counter demonstrations, who is going to decide when and to what extent military
resources can be used? Likewise, if natural disasters bring about violence and looting in peoples
struggle for survival, or if criminals take advantage of disasters, what means can the military use in
order to uphold the order? Other complications lie in fact that chains of command may become
unclear if the engagement expands and interfere with the responsibility of the police and other civil
23
Ackerman, supra note 22 p. 325. 24
See e.g. Steinert, Heinz. 2003. The Indispensable Metaphor of War: On Populist Politics and the
Contradictions of the State’s Monopoly of Force, Theoretical Criminology 7.3 (2003) p. 265-291 “tcr.
sagepub.com/content/7/3/265.full.pdf”. 25
See e.g. 2013 mass surveillance disclosures “en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_mass_ surveillance_disclosures”. 26
See e.g. Scheppele, K.L. North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in Canada and the
United States. In Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, p. 131-161. 27
See e.g. Bring, Ove, De mänskliga rättigheternas väg – genom historien och litteraturen, Atlantis,
Stockholm 2011, p. 570-590.
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agencies. Recently also uncertainties relating to costs have hampered or delayed decisions of this
kind.28
Although general and sometimes relatively theoretical it is obvious that the constitutional aspect of
Emergency Law is relevant from the perspective of the BRIDGE project. Constitutional Law provides
a necessary framework for all type of emergency responses and in the EU the Directive on personal
data fulfils a similar function stipulating that “if it is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of
the data subject” or if it “is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or
in the exercise of official authority…”29
several provisions concerning prohibition against the
processing of personal data can be overruled. In practice this is a meta norm providing legal ground
for making exceptions in events of disasters.
Other issues that may become relevant in situations where new types of emergency management
systems are being used relate to Human rights. It is for instance easy to see that various governmental
actions in order to mitigate consequences of disasters can be interpreted as over reactions, severely
hampering peoples’ rights, e.g. large scale evacuations, extensive surveillance, use of quarantines, or
other ways of depriving people of liberty or property. In some jurisdictions these things may be
regulated in one way or another but as the technology develops and new emergency management
systems are being presented the need to specify and elaborate an authoritative constitutional
framework may become critical.
Additional components usually regulated by Constitutional Law, indirectly affecting the design of
emergency management systems like BRIDGE are the principles of freedom of information and
freedom of the press. Both of which affect how data processed by the system can be communicated
externally, upholding the balance between transparency and the need to protect sensitive information.
As for other constitutional aspects of Emergency Law, e.g. the formal framework for declaring states
of emergencies, means to delimit the risks of misuse of powers, and the preconditions for the use of
military resources, the discussion cannot be elaborated on here. Although emergency management
relevant to scenarios envisioned in the BRIDGE project in several ways may require extraordinary
powers (e.g. mandate to employ extensive forms of surveillance and processing of personal data,
initiate evacuations, quarantines and/or sealing off personal property ) it is also so that many
situations do not necessarily require formal states of emergencies or actions not provided for in the
constitution. And even if severe events may affect the preconditions for deployment of BRIDGE and
simultaneously call for extraordinary declarations of states of emergencies, any further analysis of
constitutional strategies to manage such scenarios lies outside the scope of this work.
4.3 Legislative Strategies
4.3.1 General Laws vs. Detailed Regulations
Use of various legislative strategies considerably affect the ways in which emergency collaboration
can be carried out in practice. This simply because various types of legislative techniques significantly
determined how systems can be designed and employed. Several differences can be perceived. One
28
See e.g. Head, Michael, The Military Call-out Legislation, in Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate,
Farnham, 2012, p. 195-216, Samek, Joshua, M. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, in p. 255-279
Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012, and Dougherty, Candidus, While the Government
Fiddled Around, the Big Easy Drowned, in Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012,p. 163-193. 29
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Articles 7
d-e.
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apparent distinction is between regulations addressing all types of emergencies and case specific
regulations30
and in between these extremes a mixture of more or less general regulative approaches
can be found. Goal oriented general legislation may simply state that IT systems in specific domains
must be designed in order to fulfil a certain purpose and/or adhere to a certain standard, and leave it to
the designers to decide how that goal should be achieved. Legislation may however also be very
detailed and explicitly define the functions and procedures that must be included in the system design,
the latter is for instance the case with the currently proposed EU regulation for the processing of
personal data, stipulating requirements concerning e.g. purpose, forms of consent, security, disclosure,
access, retention etc..31
The reasons for variations concerning the level of generality in regulations differ. Adherence to
separate legal traditions like common law (prioritizing case decisions) and civil law (prioritizing
general rules in legislation) is one obvious explanation but differences will in many instances also be a
reflection of how risk- and emergency related activities have been organized. A diversified
organization encompassing many public agencies with limited responsibilities is likely to produce
more specific rules than a more centralized authority. In this respect mandates may be functionally
separated and sometimes also geographically restricted.
To have any distinct opinion about the level of generality that is best suited in emergency management
is not possible. From the functional point of view the most important aspect is that various pieces of
legislation harmonize so that gaps, clashes and confusion is eliminated. In theory, however, general
type of legislation is usually understood as having advantages in the sense that it:32
is flexible with respect to differences in various situations and changing circumstances,
is possible to apply despite shifting values and new information, e.g. concerning
categorization of risks and means to avoid them,
can be applied despite regional and local variances,
allocates more responsibility and motivation to judges and other decision makers,
provides normative guidance despite incomplete knowledge about underlying facts,
conceal political disputes.
General type of legislation can at he same time be criticised as:
lacking precision and being a poor steering instrument,
increasing the risk for variations in practice,
being difficult to understand,
being difficult to predict, e.g. whether it will be implemented passively or used actively,
blurring the separation of powers between legislator and legal decision maker (erodes
democracy).
30
See Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 Part V: Articles on All risk Emergency Regulation
or Case Specific Regulation. 31
See “ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf”. 32
See Tala, Jyrki, Lagstiftningsforskning – ett nödvändigt perspektiv inom rättsvetenskapen, i Gräns, Minna,
Westerlund, Staffan (red) Interaktiv rättsvetenskap, Uppsala universitet 2006.
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Specific, detailed legislation, on the other hand, is usually understood as having advantages in
the sense that it:
is a precise steering mechanism,
facilitates the work of the decision maker,
increases predictability and uniformity,
clarifies the responsibility between legislator and legal decision maker,
reflects many ideals of legisprudence, i.e. simplicity and clarity.
Specific legislation can at he same time be criticised as:
domain complexity may require many sets of rules, which increases the risk for overlaps,
contradictions and rule clashes,
it is difficult to avoid gaps and grey zones which should have been covered,
comprehensive sets of rules are difficult to learn and administer,
rapid changes in the domain require frequent amendments of the legislation,
it may in specific cases lead to unacceptable (illegitimate) results, which in turn may require
the decision maker to find means to circumvent the rules.
Although general and specific regulation may have different advantages and consequences, the
decision how to prioritize between them cannot be made in a vacuum. Several factors, e.g. political
disagreements, lack of in-depth knowledge about the problem, few operative agencies and rapid
technical developments in the domain often result in general type of legislation. The consequence
being that it is a risk that the negative effects that can be related to this type of regulation manifest
themselves.
Important to observe is however that general and specific type of regulation do not exclude each other.
The power to specify general legislation may be delegated downwards in a regulative hierarchy, from
constitutions, via acts of law and ordinances to standards and common practices. If this is done in a
consistent and systematic way, general type of legislation reflecting political goals may be specified
by responsible agencies, and to some extent the advantages of both types of legislation may be
combined. In practice this means that sets of rules relevant to emergencies can be of more or less
specific nature and manifest themselves in various constellations depending on the jurisdiction. Such a
strategy however entails proficient coordination, and as indicated above, this is not a trivial
undertaking.
4.3.2 Ad hoc Political Response or Long Term Oriented Legislative Reforms?
As illustrated in the preceding section it is possible to separate between provisions scattered in
complex administrative frameworks on the one hand, and consistent, goal oriented general legislation
on the other. This is in no way unique for emergency legislation, the situation is similar in many
sectors of society and is usually a reflection of how frequent a rule system has been updated. When a
new problem appears there is usually a ministry, authority or agency dealing with similar matters in
place, and to expand the responsibility to the established organization is the obvious first choice. This
in turn often leads to a situation where an already implemented piece of legislation or an ordinance
will be amended in an ad hoc fashion. If such a practice is followed for a longer period of time,
however, there is a risk that regulations that ought to be coordinated become separated.
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Changes affecting the needs of the domain may e.g. be consequences of new technology,
internationalization or simply a reflection of the fact that the complexity of society increases as more
functions become integrated and interdependent. Eventually such a development may lead to a
situation where the formal allocation of responsibilities will cease to correlate with the requirements of
the domain, and if the legislator continues to issue specific provisions to an outdated administrative
structure, this will eventually result in fragmented and non-functional legislation.
Shortcomings related to outdated administrative structures in emergency management are well
documented in the literature.33
As mentioned, the development of emergency related legislation is
significantly incident driven as new events frequently reveal new needs. From the legislator’s point of
view new demands can be meet either by an ad hoc strategy, adding new provision to an established
set of rules and by giving more resources to an established organization. Alternatively, the legislator
can embrace a functionally oriented tactic, acknowledging the need to continuously revise underlying
administrative structures and, when appropriate, initiate extensive law reforms.
From a functional point of view it is obvious that the preconditions for collaboration in emergencies in
most cases benefit if the latter approach is preferred. From the legislators point of view, however, it
may often be impractical to initiate broad legislative reforms, e.g. because political consensus is
lacking, or there is a need to act vigorously. Ad hoc solutions are comparatively easier to manage and
can usually be implemented more rapidly, but eventually this may lead to a situation in which the
legislation is considered to be an outdated, hampering factor.
4.3.3 Proactive, Mitigating or Reactive Legislation?
Legislative strategies can also be measured on a proactive – reactive scale. The proactive policy
aiming to avoid incidents before they occur by means of implementing legislation with the aim of
enhancing security and eliminating risks, and the reactive approach, focusing on how to determine
responsibilities, impose sanctions for erroneous behaviour, and restore conditions to an agreed
standard so that they are ‘suitable for use’ for their defined future purposes. Between these two types
one can identify legislation intended to be activated during events, i.e. laws with the aim to facilitate
managing and mitigate consequences of on-going events.
Olsson et al, in a recent analysis of EU initiatives decompose the phases related to disaster
management somewhat differently and identifies what they call the “EU Crisis management cycle”
comprising prevention, preparation, response and recovery.34
Traditionally, the legal system can be described primarily as a reactively working phenomena. The
court system being the most forthright illustration. Most court proceedings deal with events that
already have occurred, and the focus is on analysing what has happened and how it should be
interpreted. Often with the explicit purpose of identifying responsible agents and determining whether
or not sanctions or liability should be applied. Indirectly this means that recovery and restoration is a
underlying purpose.
The reactive attitude can be contrasted to many other fields of human activity where reliance on
proactive routines to avoid mistakes is a self-evident feature. In the foregoing respect the legal system
is to a large extent atypical. Lawyers tend to work reactively, i.e. their efforts focus on solving
problems that have already arisen. The proactive approach is not unknown in the legal sphere, but in
33
See e.g. Emergency Law, Volume II, Ashgate, Farnham, 2012 passim. 34
Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies,
Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 11 with further reference to Drennan LT, McConnell A., Risk and crisis
management in the public sector. Routledge, New York 2007 and Alexander D., Principles of emergency
planning and management. Oxford University, New York 2002.
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this respect various legal sub domains and jurisdictions reflect differences. Proactive law is a
comparatively recently introduced notion and so far systematic attempts to change the legislation may
have been more or less successful in various settings.35
The legal sector is usually conservative and
traditional paradigms may be difficult to recast. Likewise legislation with the explicit purpose of
facilitating incident management and consequence mitigation may be more or less common among
different agencies involved in emergencies. In a serious analysis of how development of common
practices can proceed it is therefore necessary to clarify to what extent various rule systems correlate
in this manner.
Various degrees of proactive – reactive approaches are also reflected in how public authorities are
organised. Also here it is possible to se a continuous development, from organisations with restricted,
reactive tasks, towards agencies with broader, more proactive obligations.36
Apparent is furthermore
that the situation varies in different countries and jurisdictions, and that effective cooperation is
depending on that differences in this respect are observed and addressed. And although an effective
proactive approach, preventing disasters usually is a better alternative as compared to being dependent
on rescue operations and post disaster actions, it is obvious that there is a need for many types of
regulations, ensuring managing and coordination of proactive/mitigating/reactive/restoring functions.
To recall in this context is also that many disasters are unpredicted and that practical as well as legal
response to some extent therefore always will be of a reactive nature.
4.4 Summary
As a consequence of various traditions and previous developments in different jurisdictions legislation
of relevance for emergency response is heterogeneous. Likewise responsibilities and the arrangement
of organisations active in the domain vary a lot. An analysis of legislative strategies reveal differences
in at least three dimensions: the nature of the rule systems can be categorised as being more or less
general or specific, reform policies may be primarily long term oriented or of an ad hoc nature, and the
focus of the existing legislation may to various degrees be set on proactive, mitigating or reactive
remedies.
Each of the aforementioned approaches reflect adequate requirements and a rich variety of
mechanisms are important for effective emergency management. When the focus is set on
collaboration it is thus apparent that there is a need to analyse to what extent various types of rules
governing the organisations involved have to be adjusted and/or complemented in order to function as
a integrated whole. General rules must be complemented with specific provisions and standards. Short
term solutions and long term objectives should harmonize, and proactive regulations must be
complemented with mitigating, reactive and restoring measurements.
35
See e.g. Wahlgren, Peter, A Proactive Approach, Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law 2006
(Scandinavian Studies in Law Vol 49). 36
Cf note 13 supra.
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5 International Cooperation
5.1 Emergency Response, Local, Federal, State or Regional?
A fundamental precondition for all types of emergency response and crisis management is
cooperation. In most situations joint efforts by several agencies is the natural procedure. This is
apparent on a local basis, but the magnitude of the crisis, type of consequences, the geographical
preconditions, etc., may also call for international cooperation. In this respect efficient disaster
management is depending on preparedness and extensive planning for joint efforts, and in order to
understand the preconditions for further development of “current practices in emergency
management” it is necessary to investigate international activities. No system in this domain can exist
in a vacuum, trends and actors involved in potential standardisation must be observed. An
international survey of regulative initiatives is of course also necessary in order to identify
organisations and structures that may facilitate a broad dissemination of the BRIDGE system.
International cooperation that can be related to disaster management take many different forms.
Examples are the establishment of common standards and proceedings, coordination, joint training
and educational activities,37
the setting up of specific agencies with its own resources38
and the work
of non-governmental organisations.39
Some efforts encompass a whole region, others are of a bilateral
nature. Cooperation may also be of a more or less all-encompassing nature or be oriented towards a
specific sector and in the following international cooperation is exemplified. The focus is set on
projects in which regulative ambitions are manifest. Three initiatives are addressed, the works of the
European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the Disaster Law Programme indorsed by the
international Red Cross and the Red Crescent.
The intention is not to provide any in depth description of the selected organizations, nor to present
how the work has been organized in different countries. The latter vary a lot and an overview over the
structure of security related functions in 51 countries can be found in the International CEP Handbook
2009: Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC Countries.40
The CEP Handbook presents forms
of government, structures of civil emergency planning (tasks and objectives, organizational
structures), civil-military co-operations and legal frameworks for each country. In addition facts about
what is presented as “the seven most relevant organizations to Civil Emergency Planning” is included,
viz the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
UN, EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
An even broader inventory, including several hundred organisations working with disaster
management and risk reduction is provided by the so called PreventionWeb.41
The webpage makes it
37
See e.g. for maritime rescue operations the International Maritime Organisation “www.imo.org/Pages/
home.aspx” and the International Maritime Rescue Federation “/www.international-maritime-rescue.org”. 38
See e.g. Interpol, “www.interpol.int/”. 39
See e.g. The International Rescue Committee “www.rescue.org/” providing emergency relief, post-conflict
development and resettlement services for those uprooted or affected by violent conflict and oppression. 40
“www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/24677.pdf”. 41
“www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/contacts/” PreventionWeb is a project of the UN Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) (see further below section 5.3.4). It is presented as part of the Hyogo
Framework, “a global blueprint for disaster risk reduction efforts with a ten-year plan”, adopted in January
2005 by 168 governments at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. See
also, for a list of Organisations involved in disaster management with a global ambition, the webpage of The
World Confederation for Physical Therapy “www.wcpt.org/node/36994”.
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possible to retrieve information about relevant organisations related to type, various kinds of hazards,
regions, countries and what is called themes, e.g. disaster risk management, early warning etc.
Another ambitious illustration, concentrating on a specific sector, is the International CIIP Handbook
2008/09, providing an inventory of critical information infrastructure protection policies.42
The
handbook focuses on national governmental efforts to protect critical (information) infrastructure (CII)
with the overall purpose to provide an overview of CII protection. For 25 countries and 7 international
organizations43
the handbook identifies critical sectors, related initiatives and policies and the
organizational structure. The study also describes early warning mechanisms and reviews law and
legislation of relevance for information infrastructure protection.
The most comprehensive collection of available legal documents is the Disaster Law Database set up
by the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.44
The database contains
legal and policy instruments related to disaster management from the international, regional, national,
provincial and local levels. As of December 2013 the database comprises more than 1000 documents.
At the international and regional levels these include: treaties, resolutions and declarations of
intergovernmental organizations, exchanges of notes and letters, memoranda of understanding,
guidelines, codes, models, and other “soft law”. At the national, provincial and local levels the
database includes disaster-related laws, regulations and policies, relevant portions of national laws
relevant to international disaster assistance. The database also provides references to articles, book
chapters and reports relevant to disaster law.
5.2 The EU Legal Framework
Emergency management within EU is a complex matter. A comprehensive and well researched
survey of the system published in 2009 initially claims that “different types of initiatives exist almost
everywhere, they overlap, they are founded on different types legal documents or different treaties,
and they play different roles in different stages of a crisis, some are operative on a daily basis while
some are sleeping until activated.”45
Some 150 pages later it is concluded that it is “evident .. the crisis
management system of the Union is not the result of one master plan” and that “perhaps even to call it
a ‘system’ is too much since it has no overall administrative logic and since the EU itself has no self-
image of its own crisis management organisation”.46
Activities take various forms, e.g. as policy initiatives, establishment of administrative bodies,
practical efforts with the purpose of pooling resources, risk reducing activities and relief operations.
Initiatives manifest themselves in different sectors and at different levels, between agencies, countries,
42
Brunner, Elgin M., Suter, Manuel, International CIIP Handbook 2008/09: An inventory of 25 national and 7
international critical information infrastructure protection policies. Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich.
“www.isn.ethz.ch/ Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/ ?id=91952” 43
The EU, The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), Group of Eight (G8), NATO,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UN, and the World Bank Group. 44
”www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/idrl-database/”. 45
Larsson, P., Hagström Frisell, E., Olsson, S., Understanding the Crisis Management System of the European
Union, in Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of
Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 1. 46
Olsson, S., Larsson, P., The Future of Crisis Management within the European Union. In Olsson, Stefan
(ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht
2009 p. 157 and 167.
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in regions and in EU as such. Apparent is also that the development of disaster management within the
EU is an ongoing, dynamic process.
Although it is difficult to grasp the initiatives as an integrated whole it is possible to identify several
important initiatives and to some extent provide a picture of the organizational structure, although
incomplete and prismatic.
5.2.1 The Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
Several initiatives and mechanisms of relevance for emergency management have been presented. The
Commission’s European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was created in 1992.47
In 2004
ECHO became the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid. Civil Protection and a better
coordination and disaster response inside and outside Europe were added as responsibilities in 2010.48
ECHO has more than 300 people working in its headquarters in Brussels and more than 400 in 44 field
offices located in 38 countries around the world. In order to implement humanitarian operations,
ECHO cooperates with over 200 partners (14 United Nations agencies, 191 non-governmental
organizations and 3 international organizations: i.e. the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red
Crescent, the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent and the International
Organisation for Migration).49
ECHO’s response to the increasing number, frequency and intensity of natural disasters, especially
those related to the effects of climate change, has been to incorporate disaster risk reduction (DRR)
into its strategic planning50
and in this respect the work aims to be distinctly proactive. DRR being
defined as:
“The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse
and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards,
lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the
environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events”.
ECHO funding for DRR projects has increased significantly in the last decade, the current DRR
policy prioritizes support for activities that are ‘people orientated’: enabling local communities and
institutions to increase their resilience to disaster by reducing their vulnerability to hazards.51
ECHO
has a limited operational capacity and its financing of humanitarian aid is mainly administrated
through cooperation with non-governmental bodies, such as UN and the Red Cross.52
47
COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid (OJ L 163,
2.7.1996, p. 1), (consolidated version of original document), available at “eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri= CONSLEG:1996R1257:20090420:EN:PDF”. 48
“ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm”. 49
“ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm”. 50
European Commission, Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP):
State of play and strategic orientations for EC policy: Working Paper 2003, ”ec.europa.eu/echo/files/
policies/dipecho/dpp_paper.pdf”. 51
See “ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/prevention_preparedness/dipecho_en.htm” and especially, DG ECHO
Thematic Policy Document n° 5, Disaster Risk Reduction: Increasing resilience by reducing disaster risk in
humanitarian action, September 2013, available at “ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention_
preparedness/DRR_ thematic_policy_doc.pdf”. 52
Åhman, T, Nilsson, C, The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, in Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis
Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 89.
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5.2.2 The EU Civil Protection Mechanism
Described as the key instrument for European civil protection is the Civil Protection Mechanism
(CPM) which was established in 2001. The Mechanism for civil protection is a complex tool covering
prevention, preparedness and response to disasters, including environmental emergencies. 27 EU
Member States plus, Iceland, Norway, Lichtenstein, and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
participate. The main role of the Mechanism is to facilitate and support the mobilisation and coordina-
tion of European civil protection assistance in the event of major emergencies threatening people, their
environment, property and cultural heritage. Triggering events may be major natural or man-made
disasters, including acts of terrorism and technological, radiological or environmental accidents, and
accidental marine pollution, occurring both inside and outside the EU. The assistance can take
different forms (e.g. in-kind assistance, equipment and teams, sending experts to carry out
assessments). The work relies on government resources and, if assistance is required in third countries,
usually works in parallel with or hands over to humanitarian aid.53
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, CPM can provide added value to European civil
protection by making support available on request of the affected country. Any country exposed to a
major disaster that overwhelms its national response capacity can appeal for immediate civil
protection assistance through the mechanism. By combining the capabilities of the participating states,
by facilitating the transport of these capabilities and by enabling access to specific additional assets at
EU level, the CPM can ensure better protection, primarily of people, but also of the natural and
cultural environment as well as property.54
The revised legislation on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (adopted by the European Parliament
10 December 2013, set to come into force at the beginning of 2014) is designed to better protect and
respond to natural and man-made disasters. It will increase the safety of EU citizens and disaster
victims worldwide with provisions that ensure closer cooperation on disaster prevention, better
preparedness and planning, and more coordinated and faster response actions.55
To ensure better prevention, the Member States will regularly share a summary of their risk
assessments, share best practices, and help each other identify where additional efforts are needed to
reduce the disaster risks. A better understanding of risks is also the departure point for planning an
effective response to major disasters.
In the area of disaster preparedness, there will be more training available for civil protection personnel
operating outside their home countries, more exercising of civil protection response capacities (such as
search and rescue teams and field hospitals) and their cooperation, more exchanges of civil protection
and prevention experts and closer cooperation with neighboring countries; all of which will improve
the cooperation of Member States’ teams on the ground.
5.2.3 The European Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERC)
The operational heart of CPM was initially set up as the European Commission’s Monitoring and
Information Centre (MIC). MIC was in May 2013 upgraded and transformed into the European
Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and it is accessible 24 hours a day, seven days a
week.56
Any country affected by a disaster - European or not - can request European civil protection
53
“ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm”. 54
”ec.europa.eu/echo/about/presentation_en.htm”. 55
EU Civil Protection Legislation “ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/ thematic/civil_protection_
legislation_en.pdf”. 56
ECHO FACTSHEET Emergency Response Centre, “ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/ countries/factsheets/
thematic/ERC_en.pdf”.
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assistance through the ERC, which will facilitate and support the response by administrating the
assistance provided by the participating states. ERCC will have the capacity to monitor and respond to
disasters, ensuring that the Member States are fully informed of the situation and decide in a
coordinated way about the provision of financial and in-kind assistance.
As examples of support, mention is made of search and rescue teams or shelters in the case of
earthquakes, water-bombing aircrafts to extinguish forest fires, high-capacity pumps in cases of
floods, marine pollution response equipment in case of oil spills, prompt deployment of civil
protection experts to assess the situation and coordinate assistance on site, technical expertise and
high-tech tools, such as satellite images, etc.
So far CPM has responded to many emergencies outside the EU and the EU has a number of
agreements with third countries, regional initiatives and international organisations intended to
facilitate civil protection assistance and to undertake joint preparedness measures. In the past,
however, the ad-hoc character of the assistance administrated by the MIC sometimes made it difficult
to predict and plan relief operations, which therefore suffered avoidable delays. The new ERC is
therefore designed to manage a pre-identified pool of Member States’ response assets – ‘civil
protection intervention modules’ - that can immediately be deployed to any large scale emergency.
The countries participating in the Mechanism commit some of their core resources on standby in a
voluntary pool – ready to be instantly set in motion as part of a coherent European response when the
need arises. It is envisioned that better planning and the preparation of a set of typical disaster
scenarios will further enhance the ERC´s capacity for rapid response.”57
Of special interest for IT related development of disaster management is the EU Common Emergency
Communication and Information System (CECIS). The system is designed in order to facilitate
“communication between the ERCC with National Authorities, making response to disasters faster and
more effective.” The system has several objectives and is intended to function as a tool in prevention
and preparation as well as response phases, by means of facilitate exchange of information and
experience between responsible authorities. The main task of the system is to host a database on
potentially available assets for assistance, to handle requests for assistance on the basis of these data,
to exchange information and to document all action and message traffic58
From a strategic point of view The European civil protection also acknowledge that risk prevention
and preparedness before a disaster takes place is far more efficient as compared to relying on relief,
recovery and reconstruction afterwards. The focus is set on areas where a common European approach
is more effective than separate national activities. In practice this preventive work aims to create an
inventory of information on disasters, facilitate the sharing of best practices, and reinforcing early
warning tools etc.
Preparatory measures, in turn, intend to allow for rapid mobilisation of assistance teams in case of
emergency, ensure effective response capability and support available resources. The EU also supports
cooperation projects helping to prepare communities and the general population. For this purpose it
organises training programmes, exercises during simulated emergencies, exchange of experts
programmes, cooperation projects, and modules provided on a voluntary basis by Participating States
depending on the type and needs of the particular emergency.59
57
“ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/ERC_en.pdf”. 58
” ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/cecis_en.htm” 59
“ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mic_en.htm”.
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5.2.4 EU Internal Security Strategy in Action
Currently the overall EU policy of relevance in this context is the EU Internal Security Strategy in
Action60
“Five Steps Towards a more Secure Europe” 61
(ISSA) which was adopted in November
2010 and defines strategic objectives and actions for 2011-2014. One of ISS’s objectives is to enhance
Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters with a focus on solidarity in response and responsibility in
prevention and in preparedness. Including an aim to improve risk assessment and risk management of
all potential hazards at the EU-level.62
The initiative was explicitly motivated by references to recent years “increase in the frequency and
scale of natural and man-made disasters in Europe and in its immediate neighbourhood” which has
prompted a need for a stronger, more coherent and better integrated European crisis and disaster
response capacity. Mentioned is also the need to implement existing disaster prevention policies and
legislation concerning among other things climate change, terrorist and cyber attacks on critical
infrastructure, hostile or accidental releases of disease agents and pathogens, sudden flu outbreaks and
failures in infrastructure.
The ambition to increase Europe’s resilience to crises and disasters is related to a number of objectives
aiming to improve long-standing crisis and disaster management practices in terms of efficiency and
coherence. The strategy is assumed to require both solidarity in response, and responsibility in
prevention and preparedness with an emphasis on better risk assessment and risk management at EU
level of all potential hazards. Each objective specified in the ISSA is supported by a small number of
measurable and concrete actions, pointing out responsible organs and a time plan. For increased
resilience to crises and disasters four such concrete actions have been outlined:
1) Making full use of the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty stipulating a legal obligation on the EU
and its Member States to assist each other when a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or a
natural or man-made disaster.63
2) An all-hazards approach to threat and risk assessment by means of developing EU risk assessment
and mapping guidelines for disaster management, based on a multi-hazard and multi-risk approach,
covering in principle all natural and man-made disasters. The action includes specification of national
approaches to risk management, including risk analyses and a cross-sectorial overview of the major
natural and man-made risks that the EU may face in the future.64
3) Linking up different existing situation awareness centers. An action prompted by the insight that an
effective and coordinated response to crises depends on the ability to quickly pull together a
comprehensive and accurate overview of the situation. The ambition being to reinforce the links
between sector-specific early warning and crisis cooperation functions, including those for health,
civil protection, nuclear risk monitoring and terrorism, and make use of EU-led operational programs
60
See“ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/internal-security/internal-security-strategy/index_
en.htm” and “eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN: PDF#page=2”. 61
Besides resilience to crises and disasters the identified steps are: disruption of international criminal
networks, prevention of terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment, raising the levels of security
for citizens and businesses in cyberspace and strengthening security through border management. 62
“ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/crisis-management/index_en.htm”.
See also Council conclusions on the Commission communication on the European Union internal security
strategy in action “ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/pdf/3_council_conclusions_on_the_
iss_en.pdf”. 63
Article 222 TFEU. 64
Council Conclusions on a Community framework on disaster prevention within the EU, November 2009.
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in order to improve links with EU agencies and the European External Action Service, including the
Situation Centre, and enable better information sharing and, where required.
4) Development of a European Emergency Response Capacity for tackling disasters based on pre-
committed Member States’ assets on-call for EU operations and pre-agreed contingency plans. An
action based on the assumption that efficiency and cost-effectiveness can be improved through shared
logistics, and simpler and stronger arrangements for pooling and co-financing transport assets.
The Commission annually reports on the implementation of the ISS. Apart from describing the state of
the EU internal security in the five objective areas identified in the ISSA the reports contain
operational recommendations for the way forward. The last report on implementation of the ISS will
be presented in mid-2014. It is expected to assess “whether the objectives of the ISS have been met
and also consider future challenges within the field of internal security”65
.
5.2.5 Generic & Cross-sectorial Crisis Coordination: ARGUS, EU-CCA & EU-ICMA
For the EU as such a rapid alert system - ARGUS - has been created at the commission level. The
objective being to better coordinate the Commission’s response capacity by means of strengthening
the instruments ensuring effective and coordinated management of major multi-sectorial crises. As
incentives for the initiative the document containing the provisions defining this cooperation explicitly
mentions the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 terrorist attacks, as
well as foreseeable threats to human health (Influenza Pandemic). ARGUS brings together all relevant
Commission services to coordinate efforts, evaluate the best options for action and decide on the
appropriate response measures during an emergency.66
At a somewhat more detailed level ARGUS aims at
Allowing each Directorate General in the Commission to inform other Directorates General
and services of a beginning or risk of multi-sectoral crisis via an alert exchange.
Providing a coordination process that can be activated in case of crisis: the crisis coordination
committee.
Providing a common source of information that will be used by the Commission to
communicate in an effective and coherent way with citizens.67
Responsibility for handling and coordinating the response to the crisis including communication
aspects should be taken by the relevant Directorate General, under the responsibility of the relevant
Commissioner whose scope of activities usually includes this type of crisis because of its nature. The
coordination with other directorate general is made via Argus network.
ARGUS phase I consists of an internal communication network enabling (via an IT tool) the
Commission services to share in real time relevant information on emerging multisectoral crises or
foreseeable or imminent threat thereof and to coordinate appropriate response within the domain of
competence of Commission.
65
“ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/internal-security/internal-security-strategy/index_en.
htm”. 66
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF
THE REGIONS Commission provisions on “ARGUS” general rapid alert system, Brussels, 23.12.2005
COM(2005) 662 final ”eurlex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0662:FIN: EN:PDF”. 67
“ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/generic_preparedness/planning/argus_ en. htm”.
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Argus phase II provides for coordination in the event of a major crisis. A specific operational crisis
management structure (Crisis Coordination Committee) is established to lead and coordinate the
response to the crisis, bringing together representatives of all relevant Commission services.68
ARGUS is thus made up of and coordinates eight different systems: The European Emergency
Response Centre (ERC, formerly MIC) , the European Community Urgent Radiological Information
Exchange System (ECURIE), The Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS), the European
Network of Plant Health Information Systems (EUROPHYT), the Early Warning and Response
System (EWRS), the Rapid Alert System for Non-food Products (RAPEX), the Rapid Alert System for
Food and Feed (RASFF) and the Rapid Alert System for Biological and Chemical Attacks and Threats
(RAS BICHAT).69
Similar and affiliated are two other crises coordination mechanisms that have been set up to enhance
the EU’s crisis management capacity: The EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements (EU-
CCA) which define rules for interactions between EU institutions and affected EU States during a
crisis,70
and the integrated EU arrangements for crisis management with cross-border effects (EU-
ICMA)71
which facilitate practical cooperation between EU States. These arrangements provide a
generic arrangement for all types of crises, including natural and man-made disasters. The CCA is
intended to facilitate strategic crisis management on a high political level. It is lead by a Crisis
Steering Group and only intended to be activated in extremely rare, rapidly spreading crisis affecting
several member states.72
5.2.6 EU Research Initiatives
In an overview of EU initiatives on disaster management mentions should also be made of the fact that
EU is funding of a large number of research projects, primarily via the so called Framework 7
programme under the heading Security Research.73
5.3 United Nations
5.3.1 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Similar to the situation in EU emergency management within UN is a diversified and complex
phenomena. Relevant substantial initiatives are administrated by a number of organs. Most central is
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)74
which in collaboration with the
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is responsible for bringing together national and
68
Brussels, 20.7.2010 SEC(2010) 911 final COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER Taking stock of EU
Counter-Terrorism Measures Accompanying document to the COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCILThe EU Counter-Terrorism
Policy: main achievements and future challenges ”ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malm strom/pdf/
news/communication_counter_ terrorism_annex_en.pdf” p. 21. 69
See for more information about ARGUS, “www.msb.se/Upload/Produkter_tjanster/Publikationer/KBM/
RedovisningavEUsvarningssystem.pdf”. 70
Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies,
Springer, Dordrecht 2009 71
“consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/WEB15106.pdf”. 72
Larsson,. P., The Crisis Coordination Arrangemens (CCA) in In Olsson, Stefan (ed.), Crisis Management in
the European Union: Cooperation the Face of Emergencies, Springer, Dordrecht 2009 p. 127-138. 73
“cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/fp7-project-leaflets_en.html”. 74
“www.unocha.org/”.
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international humanitarian providers to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. The objectives of
OCHA is to:
Mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with
national and international actors in order to alleviate human suffering in disasters and
emergencies.
Advocate the rights of people in need.
Promote preparedness and prevention.
Facilitate sustainable solutions.
OCHA’s Strategic Framework consist of three parts, presented as: 75
1. Partnerships: broadening the coalition for multilateral humanitarian action
The scale and scope of global challenges requires working together in new ways, with new partners.
Partnership has always been integral to OCHA’s efforts. Sustained relations, built on trust and mutual
respect, are vital when preparing for and responding to humanitarian emergencies. OCHA has a
unique position within the international humanitarian system to convene and influence agendas. The
intention is to do this more strategically, with the aim of creating a more enabling environment for
humanitarian actions
2. Service provider: building a better system
The aim of OCHA is also to ensure that services and support to partners also evolve and meet clients’
needs. The focus is set on helping partners more predictably through humanitarian coordination
leadership, strengthening coordination mechanisms, and improving the evidence base for humanitarian
decision-making, planning and resource allocation.
3. Reliability and professionalism: creating better staffing and surge solutions to be there when it
counts
In 2010, OCHA introduced surge solutions to ensure the right people are on the ground immediately
after a new disaster. This will be coordinated with longer-term staffing to ensure continuity of OCHA
presence.
OCHA also provides the latest information on emergencies worldwide, and launches international
“consolidated appeals” to mobilize financing for the provision of emergency assistance in specific
situations. 76
The office is headed by the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator which in turn,
in a country affected by a disaster or conflict, may appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to ensure
response efforts are well organized. The HC works with government, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations and affected communities.
5.3.2 The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)
The coordination tool of OCHA is The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
(UNDAC) which is part of the international emergency response system for sudden-onset
emergencies. UNDAC was created in 1993 and designed to help the United Nations and governments
of disaster-affected countries during the first phase of a sudden-onset emergency. UNDAC also
75
For the following section, see“www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are”. 76
“www.un.org/en/globalissues/humanitarian/index.shtml”.
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assists in the coordination of incoming international relief at national level and/or at the site of the
emergency.77
The UNDAC system comprises four components:
1. Staff: Experienced emergency managers made available for UNDAC missions by their
respective governments or organizations. UNDAC members are specially trained and
equipped for their task.
2. Methodology: Pre-defined methods for establishing coordination structures, and
for organizing and facilitating assessments and information management during the first phase
of a sudden-onset disaster or emergency.
3. Procedures: Proven systems to mobilize and deploy an UNDAC team to arrive at the disaster
or emergency site within 12-48 hours of the request.
4. Equipment: Personal and mission equipment for UNDAC teams to be self-sufficient in the
field when deployed for disasters/emergencies.
As of December 2010, UNDAC had conducted 207 emergency missions in over 90 countries. The
UNDAC team also undertake disaster response preparedness missions. Such missions evaluate the
national disaster preparedness and response capacity and plans after specific request from
a Government.
5.3.3 The United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-HABITAT
UN-HABITAT Disaster Management programme78
helps governments and local authorities rebuild in
countries recovering from war or natural disasters. UN-HABITAT is mandated, through the Habitat
Agenda, to take the lead in disaster prevention, mitigation, and preparedness and post-disaster
rehabilitation with regard to human settlements. The Disaster Management Programme (DMP) has
been designed to fulfill this mandate through supporting national governments, local authorities and
communities in strengthening their capacity in managing human-made and natural disasters. This
applies both to the prevention and mitigation of disasters as well as the rehabilitation of human
settlements. DMP also creates awareness among decision makers and communities on mitigation
methodologies and adequate rehabilitation in human settlements. It bridges the gap between relief and
development by combining the technical expertise, normative understanding and lessons learned
through UN-HABITAT field operations. DMP provides support to national governments, local
authorities and communities by:
Developing techniques and tools for the management of disaster prevention, mitigation and
rehabilitation;
Designing and implementing training programmes, as well as supporting training activities
executed by other agencies and field projects;
Promoting horizontal cooperation by networking institutions, experts and experience on
disaster related activities in human settlements;
Design, implementation and backstopping of projects at local, national, regional and global
level;
Strengthening coordination and networking among communities, NGOs, governments and
external support organizations in addressing disaster-related activities.
From an operational point of view DMP provides a combination of long term technical and normative
support through ongoing partnerships within and outside UN-HABITAT with a surge facility to allow
77
“www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview”. 78
“www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=286”.
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for the provision of immediate support during emergency phases. A strategy adopted in order to
ensures that DMP is able to impact all phases of post-conflict and disaster management cycles n order
to promote sustainable human settlements development within situations of crisis with maximum
effect.
5.3.4 The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. UNISDR was created in December 1999 as
part of the UN Secretariat with the purpose of ensuring the implementation of the International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction..79
UNISDR’s mandate is to serve as the focal point in the United
Nations system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among disaster
reduction activities. Disaster Risk Reduction aims to reduce the damage caused by natural hazards
like earthquakes, floods, droughts and cyclones, through an ethic of prevention. UNISDR publish the
PreventionWeb, which provides contact information to a broad range of actors promoting or working
in disaster risk reduction who have shared at least one example of their work.80
5.3.5 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
The overall objective of UNDP is to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain
the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in 177 countries and
territories, UNDP offer global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient
nations. The organisation works in several ways with topics such as Poverty Reduction, Democratic
Governance, Environment and Energy. One focus area of UNDP is crisis prevention & recovery. In
this respect UNDP helps countries prevent armed conflict, alleviate the risk and effects of disasters
from natural hazards and build back better and stronger when crises happen. Among the focus areas
are the development of a Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (a fast, flexible
funding mechanism allowing UNDP to respond effectively to crisis prevention and recovery needs.
Also designed for quick action following a natural disaster or violent conflict, or when a unique
opportunity arises to reduce disaster risk or prevent conflict)81
, Disaster Risk Reduction82
(aiming to
develop the capacity of governments countries to respond to disasters and mitigate the risks) and
Crisis Governance83
(aiming to restore state functions and inclusive political process, rebuilding trust
between state and its citizens in terms of crisis) When a crisis strikes, UNDP ensures that while the
humanitarian response focuses on the immediate lifesaving needs of a population, those responsible
also work towards longer-term development objectives. A report of the work Preventing Crisis,
Enabling Recovery: 2012 Review of UNDP’s Work in Conflict and Disaster-affected Countries was
published in October 2013.84
79
“www.unisdr.org/”. 80
Cf above, section 5.1 “www.preventionweb.net/english”/. 81
“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/crisis_preventionandrecovery
thematictrustfund/”. 82
“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/climate_disaster_
risk_reduction_and_recovery/”. 83
“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/Crisis
Governance/”. 84
“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/2012-annual-report-crisis-
prevention---recovery/”.
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5.3.6 United Nations Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD)
UNCRD, established in 1971 based on an agreement between the Government of Japan and the United
Nations, strives to promote sustainable regional development in developing countries with a focus on
development planning and management in the context of globalization and decentralization trends, and
the growing concern towards global environmental issues and their impacts.
The centre administrates a Disaster Management Planning Programme with the objective to advance
disaster risk reduction globally and support efforts in making local communities, cities and societies
more resilient to the impacts of natural and human-induced hazards and disasters. The Programme
focuses on key elements of self-help, cooperation, and education through activities such as:
Research projects with specific focus on implementation and field experiences;
Dissemination of best practices through workshops, publications, reports and internet
homepage.85
5.3.7 UN sector organs
Important and more designated roles are assigned to several sector organs. The Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO)86
provides early warning of impending food crises and assesses global food
supply problems. Part of the United Nations system is also the World Food Programme (WFP)87
which is the principle supplier of relief food aid. The Office of United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR)88
provides assistance and advice to governments and other actors on human
rights issues, sets standards and monitors rights violations, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)89
assists disaster-prone countries in contingency planning and with disaster
mitigation, prevention and preparedness measures, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR)90
provides international protection and assistance for refugees, stateless persons and
internally displaced persons, particularly in conflict-related emergencies, and the United Nations
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF)91
works to uphold children’s rights, survival, development and
protection by intervening in health, education, water, sanitation, hygiene and protection.
5.3.8 World Health Organization (WHO)
The World Health Organization (WHO)92
provides global public health leadership by setting
standards, monitoring health trends, and providing direction on emergency health issues. WHO’s role
is to reduce avoidable loss of life and the burden of disease and disability and the organisation
provides a range of technical guidelines for health action in crises,93
pre-deployment training courses94
as well as manuals, handbooks, tools and references for emergency health management and logistics.
85
“www.uncrd.or.jp/disaster/goal.htm”. 86
“www.fao.org/home/en/”. 87
“www.wfp.org/about”. 88
“www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx”. 89
“www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home.html”. 90
“www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home”. 91
“www.unicef.org/”. 92
“www.who.int/en/”. 93
“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/en/”. 94
“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/training/courses/en/index.html”.
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A set of technical hazard sheets e.g. concerning earthquakes,95
drought,96
floods97
and landslides,98
has
also been made available.
5.3.9 International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
In this context mention should also be made of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)99
which is an intergovernmental agency which helps transfer refugees, internally displaced persons and
others in need of internal or international migration services. Established in 1951 IOM is not formally
a UN organisation. It was set up as a response to the chaos in Europe following from the second world
war. The organisation has expanded extensively and today operates with an annual budget of close to
$1 billion and some 5400 staff working in over 100 countries worldwide.
5.3.10 The International Law Commission (ILC)
The International Law Commission (ILC)100
is a UN body of legal experts elected by states to
promote the “progressive development of international law and its codification.” The work of ILC
include several topics. Of relevance in this context is that the organisation in 2007 began work the on
topic “Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” and thereafter a number
of draft articles have been published and adopted. Addressed issues include among other things
“purpose”, “definition of disaster”, “role of the affected state”, “human dignity”, ”human rights”,
“cooperation for disaster risk reduction” and “duty to prevent”. The work of ILC on the topic as has
been proceeding in accordance with successive resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.
5.4 Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Law Programme
5.4.1 International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme
An ambitious legal project was initiated in 2001 by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Council of
Delegates.101
The explicit purpose of the project, initially presented as the International Disaster
Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme, was to explore the role of law in the
response to disasters, particularly international disaster relief. More specifically the objectives were to
identify and share key legal instruments, lead efforts to identify gap areas and develop
recommendations to address deficiencies.
The work became concrete in 2007 when the the International federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies published a comprehensive desk study entitled Law and Legal Issues in
International Disaster Response102
describing the existing international legal frameworks for disaster
response. The study also pointed out major legal problem areas, as identified by the Federation’s
consultation and research, including over two dozen individual country or regional case studies.103
95
“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/earthquakes/en/”. 96
“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/drought/en/”. 97
“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/floods/en/”. 98
“www.who.int/hac/techguidance/ems/landslides/en/”. 99
“www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home.html”. 100
“www.un.org/law/ilc/”. 101
”www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/53419/idrl-cod-2001s.pdf”. 102
“ifrc.org/PageFiles/41194/113600-idrl-deskstudy-en.pdf”. 103
As for background material and the publication activities of the the International federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies, see also the Disaster Law Database, described in section 5.1 above. The Federation
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The same year a set of Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster
relief and initial recovery assistance was adopted by the state parties to the Geneva Conventions and
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.104
A year later, in 2008, the UN General
Assembly adopted resolutions encouraging states to make use of the guidelines.105
In addition, the
International federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were invited to continue research
and advocacy efforts, as well as encouraged to develop new tools and models to improve legal
preparedness for disasters.
The Guidelines consist of a set of non-binding recommendations for governments on how to prepare
their disaster laws and plans for common regulatory problems in international disaster relief
management. It is explicitly stated that “the Guidelines are meant to assist governments to become
better prepared for the common legal problems in international response operations,” and that by
means of using the Guidelines “governments can avoid needless delays in the dissemination of
humanitarian relief while at the same time ensuring better coordination and quality of the assistance
provided.”106
Relevant ministries might thus use the guidelines as the basis for designing
implementing regulations, plans and procedures. The intention is furthermore that executive
authorities should be able to draw on them in developing provisional rules enacted under emergency
powers when a state of disaster has been declared, and that governments might use them as a basis for
developing bilateral agreements resources available. To a large extent the recommendations are based
on existing international legal and policy documents, and they also explained and commented on in a
set of annotations,107
which provide references to the many specialized instruments that may be of key
support to governments drafting new laws and policies.
Both the Guidelines and the annotations are available in several languages and so far some 15
countries have adopted new rules or laws reflecting the recommendations in the IDRL Guidelines.108
Addressed problem areas include:
A Unnecessary red tape
Restrictions and delays in customs clearance for relief goods and equipment
Imposition of duties, tolls and other taxes on relief items and activities
Difficulties and delays in obtaining and renewing necessary visas and permits for
humanitarian personnel
Problems obtaining legal recognition of foreign professional qualifications for
specialized personnel (particularly medical staff)
also provide a web based news service compiling relevant new publications “www.ifrc.org/en/ publications-
and-reports/general-publications/”. 104
”www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/”. 105
63/137 Strengthening emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and prevention in the aftermath of the
Indian Ocean tsunami disaster “daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/479/01/PDF/N0847901. pdf?
OpenElement” 63/139 Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United
Nations“www.iom.ch/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/un/63/A_RES_63_139_EN.
pdf” and Resolution 63/141. Inter-national cooperation on humanitarian assistance in the field of natural
disasters, from relief to development “daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/479/25/PDF/N08479
25.pdf?Open Element”. 106
“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/”. 107
”www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/annotations.pdf”. 108
“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/new-legislation-adopted-on-idrl/”.
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Difficulties in legal registration for foreign humanitarian organizations, leading to
restrictions in opening bank accounts and hiring local staff
B Poor quality and coordination from some international providers
Importation of unnecessary or inappropriate relief items
Failure to coordinate with domestic authorities and other relief providers
Use of inadequately trained personnel
Failure to consult with beneficiaries
Culturally unacceptable behaviour
Proselytizing
In addition to an introductions describing the purpose and scope, as well as providing an extensive list
of definitions, the guidelines are divided into five parts. The recommendations are categorised under
the following headings:
Part I: Core Responsibilities
Responsibilities of Affected States
Responsibilities of Assisting Actors
Additional Responsibilities of All States
Responsibilities Concerning Diversion and the Intended Use of Resources
Part II: Early Warning and Preparedness
Early Warning
Legal, Policy and Institutional Frameworks
Regional and International Support for Domestic Capacity
Part III: Initiation and Termination of International Disaster Relief and
Initial Recovery Assistance
Initiation
Initiation of Military Relief
Termination
Part IV: Eligibility for Legal Facilities
Facilities for Assisting States
Facilities for Assisting Humanitarian Organizations
Facilities for Other Assisting Actors
Part V: Legal Facilities for Entry and Operations
Personnel
Goods and Equipment
Special Goods and Equipment
Transport
Temporary Domestic Legal Status
Taxation
Security
Extended Hours
Costs
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5.4.2 The Disaster Law Programme
In 2011 the work continued when the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent109
called on states to examine and strengthen their national legal frameworks and consider
making use of the IDRL, and also welcomed efforts to develop a Model Act for the Facilitation and
Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance.110
The Programme thus
broadened its focus to cover legal issues related to disaster risk reduction and recovery. In 2012 IDRL
Programme changed its name to the Disaster Law Programme, to reflect this evolving focus.111
The
Disaster Law Programme works in three areas:
1. Technical Assistance
Collaborating with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other partners to assist
governments in strengthening their domestic legal preparedness for disasters.
2. Capacity Building
Building the capacity of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to advise their
governments on the development of disaster management law.
3. Advocacy, dissemination and research
Building partnerships at the international and regional level on legal preparedness, disseminating
the IDRL Guidelines and fostering new and innovative research.
With the overall objective to reduce human vulnerability by promoting legal preparedness for
disasters, the Disaster Law Programme specifically aims to eliminate to legal gaps in disaster risk
reduction which can have a significant impact on the resilience of communities to disasters. The
ambition being to provide appropriate legal instruments which make it possible to deal with disaster
response and to contributes to more effective disaster preparedness and getting relief to vulnerable
people faster.
Based on the previous work of IDLR Programme a model act was developed over a two-year period as
a collaboration between the IFRC, the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance (OCHA)112
and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).113
The result, the Model Act for the
Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance was
presented in March 2013.114
5.4.3 Model Act for the Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and
Initial Recovery Assistance
The purpose of the model act is similar as the previously published guidelines and addresses “ -
Delays in the entry if international humanitarian personnel, goods and equipment .. not adapted to a
situation of urgency, - impositions of duties, tolls and taxes …, - problems granting legal recognition
of foreign qualifications for specialised professional personnel, - difficulties in granting legal
recognition for foreign humanitarian organsations. The act is quite comprehensive and consists of 71
Articles covering some 35 pages. It is divided into nine chapters, i.e:
109
“www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/53419/31IC_R7_disaster%20laws_adopted_ 12Dec_clean_ EN.pdf”. 110
“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/model-act-on-idrl/”. 111
“www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-law/about-idrl/background-on-the-programme/#sthash.
Nq13qLxN.dpuf”. 112
About OCHA, see section 5.3.1 above. 113
“www.ipu.org/english/home.htm”. 114
“www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/MODEL%20ACT%20ENGLISH.pdf”.
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General provision
Initiation and termination of international disaster assistance
Coordination and Preparedness for International Disaster Assistance
General Responsibilities of Assisting Actors
Eligibility for Legal Facilities
Legal Facilities for Eligible Actors
Supervision, Reporting and Sanctions
Transit of International Disaster Assistance
Implementation, Transnational and Final Provisions
In addition the original publication of the model act of 2013 present some 75 pages of commentaries,
providing background information, identifies links between the articles and the relevant sections of the
previously published guidelines, identifies the problems or issues of each chapter, explains the
intentions of the drafters, and provides examples and discusses alternative methods for
implementations.
5.5 Summary
Although disasters usually become extensively documented systematic efforts to analyze legal aspects
of disaster management as an integrated whole are rare. Similarly normative documents stipulating
common practices for disaster management are difficult to find. At an operative level these are
palpable conclusions. At an administrative level the situation is somewhat different. In recent years
many ambitious programs have been presented, often initiated by international organizations. As
illustrated in this chapter some of these efforts have generated extensive suggestions, guidelines and
model laws for international cooperation. Several projects are however still in development phases
an/or regionally restricted. Critics have also pointed out that many initiatives are poorly synchronized.
Thus, to suggest that there exist legally established common practices for disaster management would
be false. This is also true when it comes to applications with operative intentions similar to the
BRIDGE system.
Several factors may explain the lack of coordination. Disaster management must take a number of
variables into consideration, geographical preconditions, different risk scenarios and local traditions
are some of the most compelling ones. Other factors explaining the scarceness of established legal
practices are varying experiences of more or less unique events as well as jurisdictional differences.
The latter illustrated by legal systems prioritizing either general provisions or in casu decision making,
proactive or reactive legislative strategies and more or less frequent reforms.
Apparent is also that regulations affecting detailed operative efforts usually only exist in different
languages, that disaster management often turn out to be a cross-sectorial phenomena and,
consequently, that normative responsibilities as well as administration often remain distributed. A
secondary effect being that legal aspects may become poorly analyzed and unsatisfactory documented.
As for lack of normative information of direct relevance to the BRIDGE system (beyond general
system requirements described in D12:1) the lack of experience from similar tools is an obvious
explanation.
The fact that the legal requirements prompted by disasters are difficult, and sometimes impossible to
identify in advance is an other component to keep in mind – any sector of society and any function
may be affected in unpredictable constellations. As frequently pointed out in the literature this is also a
precondition complicating attempts to analyze disaster management from a theoretical point if view.
Disaster and/or crisis management are not well defined phenomena, and when it comes to effects
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urging for response and recovery operations the subject matters that may be included in the discourse
are innumerable. Against this background the scarcity of legally enacted common practices is no
surprise.
Existing legal initiatives aspiring to develop common practices are significantly general, primarily
defining responsibilities for states (e.g. concerning mutual assistance and co-operation during
emergencies) or specifically address one isolated sector (e.g. nuclear risks, food, or water protection).
At an operative level the responsibilities rests on the individual states and in this respect
administration and practices varies a lot. Enacted or suggested rule systems (acts, ordinances,
standards, etc.) may tentatively be categorized according to how they refer to different phases of an
incident (e.g. prevention, response and recovery), whether they are general – specific, and whether
they reflect ad hoc or long term strategies.
The overall conclusion from this overview is nevertheless that common practices (common in the
sense that they are internationally accepted and recognized by a large number of authorities in
different sectors of society) are rare. It is also apparent that the responsibilities and the operative
management in states of emergencies vary a lot between different jurisdictions. In the BRIDE project
these aspects will be further addressed in D12.3, focusing on requirements and potentialities for future
practices.
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6 Social Practices or Ethics and Law as Social Practices in Emergency Collaboration Thinking about social issues of IT in emergency response asks who are the members of the response
collective, how do they belong together, what are their practices, how are they assembled and what
role do technologies? As we have seen in the previous Chapters, technology can engender changes in
what is considered ethical and lawful. Changing the way things are done inevitably has moral and
legal implications. This is the case because actions imply and enact values (especially, but not only in
professions that have to do with health, safety, emergency and security), and they are accountable to
ethical and legal frameworks as well as social and cultural norms. In that sense action is ‘governed’ by
moral, legal, social and cultural rules. However, the practice of being ‘governed’ in this way is
complex. Formal and explicit ethical codes or legal regulations are weak, as are cultural and social
conventions, because what they mean is not altogether clear until they are embodied (in practice) and
practiced (Hester & Eglin, 1992), and this is a social process.
Chapter 2 discussed various ethical positions in their relationship to emergency and emergency
management, formulated by academic philosophers. However, moral investigation is not the exclusive
domain of philosophers, debates about values and principles are also an everyday, mundane practice.
‘Which value should prevail over another?’ is in the last instance always a practical question. Thus,
what is critical for our discussion of ethical, legal and social issues in emergency response is that value
judgements, ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct are not determined by rules, but orient to
rules through the practical exercises of reasoning, acting, enacting, adjusting, negotiating. This does
not mean that codes of conduct, moral values, plans, rules or laws are unimportant or relative and
negotiable. On the contrary, they are critical, only not in the sense of ‘pulling people’s strings’ but as
being the subject of practical efforts to situate them into particular contexts to define just how these
rules apply here and how actions taken in this context adhere to the rules. In other words, moral, legal
and socially responsible actions are practiced in embodied and situated ways. In this chapter we will
discuss how ethical principles, legal rules and social values become moral, lawful, socially responsible
conduct in, as and through social practices in the context of emergency response. We will do this in
relation to three different dimensions of social practices, which are work practices, organizational
practices, and community emergency response. In addition, we will discuss societal issues around
moral, lawful and socially responsible conduct arising from these social practices. In each case we ask
how morality, legality and social responsibility are practiced, embodied and embedded.
6.1 ELSI in Work Practice
Figure 16 Ethics, the law and social
responsibility are enacted – in every moment Source: http://dougsaunders.net/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/oslo-bombing-aftermath.jpg
Ethics, the law and social responsibility are enacted
in every moment, in particular ways. In the image
here, ambulance personnel and a police officer as
well as members of the public orient to ethical
principles and values of humanity and dignity, the
professionals enact their legal duty to provide
medical assistance and protect the public, and they
contribute to the benefit of society at large as part of
their activities. They do so in ways that are visible,
albeit often unnoticed. One of the most basic
elements of everyday moral conduct is that, at least
when in the presence of others, one has to coordinate
one’s own behaviour with that of (those) others. As
part of accomplishing this, human cultural practices
have evolved to be intersubjective, that is, to make
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intentions, trajectories of actions, rationales, etc. accountable and observable. This is done mostly as a
natural part of doing what we do, in embodied ways – posture, direction, hand-signals – such as
emergency responders in uniform bending over injured persons or waving away journalists from the
scene. In doing what they do members of a society make observable and accountable what this shared
situation is that they are in, and who they are in this situation, i.e. what the relevant characteristics,
features, roles that they bring to this situation are. Such ‘natural’ accounting for the situation is also a
moral activity for the sheer reason that failure to adequately display ones’ understanding of and role in
a common situation would lead to a breakdown in social interaction or bring others in the
uncomfortable situation where they are unsure about what is and is not appropriate. Misconceptions
about who the other person is or as who they are present in this situation could lead to confusion,
embarrassment and failed coordination. (Harvey Sacks calls this as who a ‘membership category’ and
the ways of showing who or in what relation to ‘membership categorization’ (Sacks & Jefferson,
1995) As Garfinkel (1967, p. 35ff.) showed, it is often the information that is kept implicit in an
interaction that will tell a lot about the relationship of the interactants (e.g. is it familiar or formal?).
Accountability is also the basis for planning and prospection, i.e. having a good idea about what might
come next in the social interaction. Ethnomethodology – a paradigm in social science that specifically
focuses on the making of social order in everyday interaction with other people and the material world
– shows in innumerable studies that part of every activity is the simultaneous accounting for it, that is:
making it observable-and-reportable, i.e. available to members as situated practices of
looking-and-telling’ and that these practices consist of an endless, ongoing, contingent
accomplishment; that they are carried on under the auspices of, and are made to happen as
events in, the same ordinary affairs that in organizing they describe’ (Garfinkel 1967, 1).
It is this accounting, which at the same time is deeply moral (perhaps the moral foundation of social
order) and which allows people to make conduct moral, lawful and socially responsible (or not), since
what is morally right or wrong, always depends on an adequate understanding of the situation. Indeed,
Garfinkel speaks of a practical ethics, where:
what the rules are, whether they are rules, and whether any rules have jurisdiction,
remain[s] to be ‘‘discovered’’ in the course of activities—‘‘discovered’’ not by sociologists,
but by the members whose actions the rules presumably govern. The circularity (or
reflexivity) of that process implicates what counts on a given occasion of activity as ‘‘the’’
relevant system of rules. (Lynch 2012:230)
Understanding the situation and what the rules are is especially important in cooperative work, where
coordination, knowing when to work together, and when to work side by side or in a division of labour
is crucial for the success of the common task, as are methods of working out how to work together.
This process involves methods of ‘discovering agreements by eliciting or imposing a respect for the
rule of practical circumstances, [which] a version of practical ethics (Garfinkel 1967: 73-74).
Example: Close ‘personal’ collaboration in face-to-face setting
An example will serve to illustrate the centrality of practical ethics. In a co-design workshop, we
discussed anxieties about breaching the data protection act when sharing data in multi-agency
collaboration. A dilemma was presented where a policeman needed to do something with a person and
that person was known to a paramedic to be HIV positive. The ambulance representative stated, ‘Now
we’d tell them discreetly “use your gloves”’. Conversely, a Norwegian police officer, described inter-
organizational collaboration between the police and ambulance personnel on the scene of an incident:
If there’s a known violent criminal who might be armed injured on the scene, you’d tell the
medics ‘be careful with him’
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The paramedic and the police officer use euphemisms. They don’t say: “Before you touch the victim,
beware that he has HIV which can be contagious through blood. Therefore I recommend you wear
gloves when you touch him”. Instead he says “use your gloves”. This is interesting in two regards:
Firstly we see, that in this situation very little has to be said explicitly for the situation and the
coordination to work. The reasons are on one level ‘metaphysically’ social - the police officer will
(hopefully) trust that any paramedic would have good reason to warn him like this, such as knowledge
of this person’s medical history, and follow the recommendation blindly. But on another level the
reasons for this economy of interaction are highly situated. The police officer and the paramedic are
together in a shared situation. The situation offers clues that invite membership categorization (i.e. by
saying ‘gloves’ the paramedic categorizes the person the gloves are worn for as a potential health risk
and relies on common knowledge that gloves are a standard protective measure against infection, and
there might be social or physical signs of being at risk for such a disease (e.g. drug use) (and these can,
of course, be stereotyped). The second interesting aspect is the fact that their euphemisms morally take
account of a) a demand for discretion and b) more importantly, manoeuvring the delicate practice of
data sharing, where it is operationally necessary, but potentially, if not handled with discretion, an
infringement of human dignity and a breach of privacy rights. So there is an ambiguous relationship
concerning sharing knowledge about the patient / victim / offender (which of these categories he falls
into depends on agency relevances) – where ‘respect for the rule of practical circumstances’ demands
to share what is relevant at the moment, and at the same time demands an understanding that what is
shared at the moment is to be treated as fleeting information. No definitive sensitive personal
information has been shared, yet it is at the basis of the collaboration that knowledge about such
information has been shared. The police officer may or may not infer that the person is likely to be
HIV positive, but he does not know. If engaging with this person in the future, he may remember and
act accordingly. He may even ‘inform’ others in a similar way.
The example highlights some of the complexities involved in sharing information, respecting human
dignity and data protection laws. Medical personnel, police, lawyers, priests, many professionals who
are called to exercise confidentiality about sensitive personal data from people they deal with, have to
find ways to manage this knowledge. To have this knowledge will inevitably create ethical dilemmas
in situations where they might want to reveal this knowledge to others, but are not (normally) allowed
to. Emergency situations can allow or even demand suspension of normal moral rules and data
protection laws and create dilemmas, but only for the limited space and time of the emergency. Such
dilemmas are currently delicately and highly skilfully negotiated and deliberated in situ, on the basis
of an understanding of a situation where the audibility, visibility and ‘lifespan’ of information is
determined by analogue technologies, as we see here.
The discrete oral exchange is not in breach of data protection regulations and highly effective for the
safety of emergency response personnel. It is an ethical requirement for information systems to (at
least) respect such delicate and skilful existing ethical practices. The above exchanges are likely to
happen in ‘fleeting moments’, in direct face-to-face interaction or, less likely, via the radio system.
The information would be ephemeral and it is relatively easy to understand who is within reach of this
information spatially, organizationally, and temporally. This situation is seriously changed, when such
communications are logged and the exchange and the implied knowledge are thus turned into data and
open up for retrospective scrutiny. This change of context might make professionals less inclined to
divulge what they know to protect their colleagues, for fear of breaching data protection regulations.
6.2 Organizational Practice: The Sociality of Multi-agency Collaboration
Multi-agency collaboration in emergency response, as we will see in section 6.3, can also include
groups or individuals who are ‘unorganized’. However, many of the agencies involved are formal
organizations with particular functions, goals and tasks and modes of operation, which is expressed in
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policies, a common skill set, language or culture of the organisation, and codes of conduct, as we have
seen in Chapter 3. Its members form not only a formal organization, but also a community of practice
(Wenger, 1998), that is a lived shared culture, which goes together with a professional identity, sense
of pride, solidarity and belonging for its members (Albert, Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000; Bechky, 2003;
Brown & Duguid, 1991; Thurnell-Read & Parker, 2008). So when looking at collaboration between
organizations during emergencies, it is necessary to take into account that the accomplishment of
ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct in collaboration between organizations also is a
practical accomplishment. Collaboration itself depends on virtues and values, and as an achievement
(or failure) itself is of ethical importance. In this section we will discuss a selection of particularly
pertinent challenges to ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct in multi-agency collaboration.
6.2.1 Difficulties in Practicing Ethical, Lawful, Socially Responsible Emergency Response
What does it actually mean that ‘agencies’ or ‘organizations’ are working together? Does work not
always imply individuals doing the job? Unlike in our first example, where inter-organizational
collaboration took place in a shared situation and face-to-face setting where the participants had
experience from former collaboration, multi-agency collaboration is more distributed. Each
organization has rules and procedures that other organizations might not be familiar with, and
accountability – which in the first example is accomplished economically and seemingly effortlessly
through shared situation awareness in a shared space of practice and a literally common operational
picture (COP) (based on being literally in the same situation) – is much harder to achieve. In large
scale emergencies, multi-agency collaboration has to happen ad-hoc in often vastly distributed
settings, between people who may have little understanding of the other organizations’ remit, and
there will be a lack of routine to accomplish the ‘articulation work’ necessary to establish and
coordinate a ‘working division of labour’ (Schmidt and Bannon 1992). Such collaboration then has to
explore possible functional work-arounds to personal acquaintance, work experience, co-present
bodies, a unified and unambiguous chain of command or common membership categorizations that
belong to a shared work context understanding like the gloves in the example above. We will now
present three examples to prepare a discussion of some core difficulties in practicing ethical, lawful,
socially responsible as well as effective and efficient emergency response.
Example: Information is a Matter of Trust
The first example here comes from the London bombings on 7th July 2005. During the 7/7 attacks,
three explosions took place in tube carriages that were either completely or partially inside
underground tunnels. It was necessary for responders to approach the trains by walking along the
underground rail tracks. These tracks carry a live electrical current and standing on them could be
fatal. It should also be noted that, even once the current on the tracks has been turned off, it is possible
for them to become live again through short circuiting or a train arriving onto deactivated lines. In her
inquest report, the Coroner, Lady Justice Hallett, describes how fire fighters and London Ambulance
Service personnel carried out a dynamic risk assessment and sought confirmation that the current had
been switched off from London Underground personnel, before dismounting from the platform and
entering the tunnels. The report recounts difficulties in establishing responder safety. One paramedic:
described how he asked a member of London Underground staff for confirmation, but
received only a vague assurance that a check had been carried out. He was therefore only
prepared to step on the rail once the member of staff had done so. (Hallett, 2011, p. 47)
Some fire fighters were even more reluctant to trust other agencies, waiting for confirmation that the
current had been turned off from their own fire brigade control centre. This took some time. In her
critique of how dynamic risk assessment was enacted here, the Coroner states that the London Fire
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brigade, like the paramedics, had faster methods of receiving confirmation that the tracks were safe at
their disposal. They could either
seek confirmation locally, speak to the line controller via the ‘head wall’ telephone,
discharge the current by short-circuiting the tunnel telephone wires (and in all such cases
confirm the position to Brigade Control), or request via Brigade control that the traction
current is turned off.” (Hallett 2011: 47)
The Coroner recommends that, once confirmation has been received by one organization, this should
be disseminated rapidly to all emergency personnel.
Example: Perceiving Risk differently
A second example will illustrate important further aspects of the difficulties in inter-agency
collaborations, where new technologies transform the landscape for ethical, lawful, and socially
responsible conduct. ACC Chesterman’s review into a series of shootings which took place in the
North of England in 2010 found that, despite ambulances being requested by members of the public
and Cumbria Constabulary, assistance was not sent. The reason given for this was a concern over the
safety of the ambulance staff. A gunman was on the move, shooting people in various locations,
pursued by police. The head of service for the North West Ambulance service referred to the
responsibility of the police to create a safe environment for the ambulance service to deploy and
provide an escort to the scene. The need to allocate police resources to continue the search for the
gunman meant that some police officers were left at scenes for significant periods of time with
seriously injured casualties. In other areas, police officers had to make the difficult decision of leaving
victims with members of the public in order to continue their chase of the gunman. In one event an
ambulance attended a scene and began to treat one of the victims when the ambulance control centre
instructed the crew to leave the scene. It was only the persistence of the police officer in attendance
which prevented the casualty being left. The refusal of the ambulance service to respond to the
requests for assistance highlights an important connection between interoperability and safety in inter-
agency collaboration. The police review states that the need for continued calls for the ambulance
service had an impact on the operational effectiveness of the police officers at that location. It was
reported during the coroner’s inquest that in some cases it took up to two hours for ambulance
personnel to attend the scene by which time the victims had either been taken to hospital by the police
or were attended to by members of the public (BBC 2011). Chesterman observes:
Interoperability between the police service and ambulance service should be improved. This
is particularly true in relation to differing risk thresholds.
(Chesterman 2011: 40-41 emphasis added)
Chesterman’s recommendations assume that more interoperability, information sharing and procedural
agreement between the different agencies could solve the problems encountered here. However,
observations around the complexities of the practical production of shared awareness between
different actors highlights that the matter is more challenging.
Example: A Clash of Cultures
The third example details how shared situation awareness can become difficult in the orchestration of
multi-agency response. During the summer of 2007, Walham power station in the UK was in danger
of flooding. The station supplies electricity to around 500,000 homes (approx. 2,000,000 people) in
England and Wales and it was ‘reported to provide electricity to Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) and a nuclear establishment’ (McMaster & Baber, 2008). The UK Environment
Agency and the military were called upon to build a barrier to prevent water from breaking in. The
Environment Agency usually work alone and routinely build flood defences. They were confident in
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carrying out their task. It was a very noisy environment, where floodwater posed a drowning hazard to
personnel. Access to the incident site was limited, not only due to the flooding across a large
surrounding area, but also because the road that provides access to Walham power station was reduced
to a single lane, because emergency service vehicles were double-parked along it. Prioritised traffic
included Fire and Rescue vehicles delivering pumping equipment. The Fire Service Bronze
commander did not have an incident command vehicle, which reduced his capabilities to communicate
and coordinate. Without seeking consultation with the Environment Agency, he was under the
impression that they were able to proceed with their work. But the Environment Agency ‘considered
the Fire and Rescue Service to be ‘in the way’ - having more equipment on site than they needed and
being slow to respond to access requests’ (ibid: 34). The situation became critical, when lorries
delivering Environment Agency’s barrier components were stopped from entering the cordon set up
around the site. As the lorry drivers did not have walkie-talkies, they were unable to tell the
Operations Delivery team that they had arrived. When the Operations Delivery Team Leader finally
found out about their arrival he made direct contact with the Bronze Commander through the
command chain. This resolved the issue, but also provoked resentment. McMaster and Baber explain:
The Environment Agency and Fire and Rescue services work together only infrequently and
do not train together for multi-agency incidents. They are therefore unlikely to have a great
deal of knowledge about each other’s working practices, such as the large size of lorries
used to transport Environment Agency equipment, or the number of resources the Fire and
Rescue Service might send to a Major Incident of this nature. If agencies are not familiar
with each other’s working practices, do not share the same awareness of the situation and
are not actively engaged in discussion about these matters …, then they are likely to come
to misinterpret each other’s actions. The Environment Agency’s perceptions of the problems
they experienced during the incident may have been affected by their impression that it was
their role that was crucial; thus the Fire and Rescue Service’s slower pace is interpreted as
getting ‘in the way’, not listening (“I’ll have to ask my boss”) and even having malign
motives (a public relations exercise). It appears that a low level of awareness of how other
agencies operate can translate into a lack of trust and that their ability and motives may be
called into question when their actions deviate from what they are expected to do. (ibid:35)
McMaster and Baber show that rivalries and differing cultural interpretations and practices can get in
the way of effective, as well as ethically, legally and socially responsible response efforts (see also
Quarantelli, 1966; Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Allen, Karanasios, & Norman, 2013; Scheppele 2003).
All three examples show multi-agency collaboration failing. In the first case we are dealing with a
matter of trust: The assurances from London Underground Staff were not sufficient and confirmation
from trusted sources was sought. In a situation where first responders from fire and ambulance in the
underground had no ways of communicating with their control centres to receive such confirmation
that the tracks were safe, this led to significant delays. A solution to this problem has been sought in a
TETRA radio standard that can link above ground (Airwave) and below ground (Connect) radio
communications. This was one of the key lessons learnt from this incident. However, on closer
inspection, the coroner’s recommendation that confirmation should be disseminated rapidly to all
emergency personnel as soon as received by one organization, does not answer how mere information
‘dissemination’ will make information into trusted information.
The second example provides some explanation why. It shows how currently practiced policies –
defining risk thresholds an agency is prepared to expose their personnel to – might differ between
organizations. As a result in some settings, multi-agency collaboration and ethical, lawful and socially
responsible conduct can become difficult. In practice, dynamic risk assessment must be conducted ‘on
the fly’, both in situ, but also from afar (e.g. by incident commanders in control rooms). This requires
assessment of the situation, a social and practical achievement, encompassing mental assessment (or
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thinking) but also vision, smell, an awareness of the actions of others amongst many other activities.
While attempts have been made to create a process for dynamic risk assessment to standardise such
assessment (Figure 17, Fire Service Manual), such processes abstract key steps from the practical
actions involved in dynamic risk assessment and chain them in a linear cycle. Critical inquests, like
ACC Chesterman’s report, trace these difficulties back to differing risk thresholds (which, he suggests,
should be ‘adjusted’). However, our analysis suggests that this is not a problem of acceptability or
adjustment. The ambulance and police officers’ reasoning reveals different epistemologies and
rationales. The risk does not just ‘look’ different from their different perspectives (which would make it
a matter of adjusting their optics), it actually is different for them. If there is no objective risk reality
baseline, we must pose the question, “can dynamic risk assessment move between response
organizations?” In other words, is Lady Justice Hallet’s suggestion to disseminated risk assessments
rapidly to all emergency personnel practicable? This is of particular importance in relation to the
design of new information technologies to support risk assessment and socio-technical systems for
collaboration and interoperability during large scale emergency response, which underpin ethical,
lawful and socially responsible conduct.
Figure 17 Dynamic Risk Assessment Flowchart
In this case, the police and members of the public took over, because they could assess the risks
locally, while ambulance service personnel, despite being requested, could not come because they
were instructed not to based on a risk assessment from afar. We see here that virtues and ethical
principles for emergency response outlined in Chapters 2 & 3, derived inter alia from European and
Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement, the UK Civil Contingency Act and other publications, and
including co-operation, anticipation, information, integration, etc. are hard to practice. More effective
collaboration would require harmonization of procedures, but also support for richer risk
communication.
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The third example reveals further detail around difficulties in practicing ethical, lawful and socially
responsible as well as effectively coordinated emergency response. In the 2007 UK floods, a large
amount of personnel and equipment from many different agencies (most prominently Fire & Rescue,
the army, and the Environment Agency) had to coordinate their efforts to prevent Walham power
station from being flooded. While in many emergency incidents, the collaboration between agencies is
organized sequentially, one agency carrying out their tasks after the other in a clear defined order,
the flooding incident at Walham substation featured multiple agencies working on the same
tasks simultaneously and towards a common goal (i.e. to save the substation from flooding);
as such it was a truly multi-agency incident. These tend to be rare – the Bronze
Commander had only seen perhaps 2 or 3 in over 25 years of service. (Mcmaster and Baber
2008, emphasis added).
In these rare kinds of incidents there is often little shared history of collaboration to draw on. This
concerns especially knowledge about other people’s and other organizations’ roles, methods and
processes. This makes it ‘difficult to know whether another agency was following a particular course
of action because that is just how they do things, or because they do not have the same understanding
of the incident’ (McMaster and Baber 2008, 44). For even when as in this case, there was agreement
on the ‘high level goal of “save the substation”, ‘this translated into conflicting plans on the ground’
and soon agencies were
competing for use of scarce ‘commodities’ (i.e. access and resources), which is a logistical
planning issue, but which was exacerbated by gaps in their shared understanding of the
situation. (McMaster and Baber 2008:44).
Working at the same location at the same time often also promotes a tendency to assume one ‘owns’
the incident, and viewing the other agencies as ‘playing a supporting (or hindering) role, which again
may compromise the response to large incidents that require the skills and resources from multiple
agencies’ (ibid., 44).
In order to avoid these kinds of misunderstandings, and the misgivings, competition and rejection
between agencies that might ensue, Liaison Officers can play an important role, working as
an interface between different organisations, bridging their different languages, practices
and perspectives on an incident…
Use of the Liaison Officer role demonstrates an understanding that it is necessary to gather
information on the incident from all of the agencies involved and that establishing an
effective working relationship with them is crucial to the swift resolution of the problem
McMaster and Baber 2008: 45)
Together, these examples show that the specifics of human social and cultural practices are central to
how information is mobilized in emergency situations, but these are intricately intertwined with the
affordances (or lack of affordances) of the technologies they use as part of these practices.
6.3 Community emergency response
Traditionally communities have played a major role in emergency response and recovery. This has
changed in recent years, when a) with disasters increasing in numbers and scope, the realisation that
government agencies alone will not be able to handle first response alone is settling in, and in fact, in
recent disasters (Haiti earthquake, Katrina, Sandy) local resources and knowledge have proven to be
invaluable assets for swift and efficient response: “A government-centric approach to disaster
management will not be enough to meet the challenges posed by a catastrophic incident. That is why
we must fully engage our entire societal capacity” (FEMA 2011:2). At the same time, the desired
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community involvement is already on the rise, using digital tools and forms of organisation. However,
traditional first response is not prepared to deal with the scale and speed of social innovation in crisis
informatics (Palen et al. 2007).
While our discussion of multi-agency emergency collaboration so far only addressed ‘established
organisations’ (mostly the blue light services) (Dynes 1970), in recent years emergency response has
seen a rise of ‘emergent organisations’ (ibid.) which is mainly due to the new possibilities provided by
information and communication infrastructures such as the internet, social media, GPS,
microblogging, etc.. These ‘emergent organisations’ can be as varied in kind as local communities,
digital communities, crowds, networks, but also independent, semi-professional grassroots
organisations that are using web2.0 capabilities to recruit, organise and support ad-hoc digital
volunteer networks, such as Virtual Operations Support Teams (VOST) (St Denis et al 2012).
In this section we will survey the wide and growing landscape of those communities, crowd agencies,
and ad hoc publics. We will show how they emerge, what their forms of organization are, and discuss
the obstacles for collaboration with official (government) first response agencies. We will also point
out legal and ethical uncertainties, which are a significant cause for the difficulties in interfacing with
official organisations.
We term these entities ‘community’ following current conventions in the context of emergency
response while being aware that it is a vague concept. It can mean as many things as ‘a national
population’ (the Haitian community), ‘a community of practice’ (the online volunteer community or
the emergency response community), ‘the inhabitants of a town, village or city’, ‘networks on social
media’ (the twitter community) but also ‘organisations’ such as digital humanitarian organisations,
which are often referred to as “volunteer and technical communities” (V CTs) who build tools and
organize “crowdsourcing” (Howe 2009) of emergency information (Palen et al. 2007, Starbird and
Palen 2013).
FEMA: Whole Community Approach
The most prominent and comprehensive approach to building “effective response networks” (Boin
‘t Hart 2010, 365) is FEMA’s call for a “Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management”
(FEMA, 2011), which envisions local disaster community building that operates along and builds on
the needs and demands and resources and characteristics of local communities. It follows three core
principles: Understanding and meeting the actual needs of the whole community, engaging and
empowering all parts of the community, and strengthening what works well in communities on a daily
basis” (ibid. 23).
While this strategy explicitly mentions social media and encourages its use “to disseminate messages,
create two-way information exchanges, and understand and follow up on communication that is
already happening within the community” (ibid. 20), it does not conceptually extend its notion of
community beyond local geographic notions of the term. At the heart this is an outline of a
communitarian (townhall!) emergency management strategy very much oriented to the actual local
characteristics of the community. If community members communicate through a wiki or a blog, then
this ought to be included, if they meet at the townhall, then this has to be addressed, if they don’t meet
and exchange at all, then disaster management might be a vehicle for community organizing.
Nevertheless there have been attempts to integrate “crowdsourced” digital emergency response in
FEMA’s emergency response efforts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 FEMA
collaborated with the Civil Air Patrol and HOT (Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team – see below) to
provide damage assessment from photographs collected by aircrafts piloted by Civil Air Patrol
personnel (Crowley 2013, 17 & 42).
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‘Tweeting up a Storm’: Communities and Digital Emergency Response
Social Media has become ever more important as a means and space for organising local communities,
especially after a larger emergency. It is used for reporting about ongoing peril like after a flood or an
earthquake, issuing missing person search requests, reconnecting with dislocated people, organising
get togethers, shelter, distribution of food and other donations. It has been used extensively, for
example, after the Haiti earthquake in 2010, Hurricane Sandy 2012, by communities in Colorado
tweeting about the floods (Vieweg et al 2010), after the explosion in West, Texas in 2013, but also
after the riots in the UK, where people organised for clean up processeses online (Glasgow and Fink
2013).
But Social Media is not limited to local response and organizing. Becoming ever more important in
emergency reporting and response it sometimes travels even faster than the actual phenomenon,
“giving early warning to those beyond the immediate impact zone”, as happened with the 2011
Virginia Earthquake:
Just as light from an exploding firework precedes the boom, a Twitter wave of memes about
the earthquake preceded the buckling of the earth’s surface. Citizens in New York and
Boston knew an earthquake was happening seconds before they felt any shaking, simply by
glancing at the surge of messages. (Crowley 2013:21)
The myriad of tweets triggered by such an incident, vary in content: they inform, report and warn,
request for help, offer help, organise help by putting the right people in touch with each other, or
organise self help by building local networks, starting off fundraisers, etc. There is of course also a lot
of talking, commenting, expression of sympathy, joking, worrying – traffic that from an emergency
response point of view could be categorized as noise. What is however at first glance the most striking
feature about these messages is their sheer quantity.
After the 2010 earth quake, Haitians sent hundreds of thousands of text messages in through
social media sites (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2011: 11), while Hurricane Sandy in 2012
“generated more than 20 million tweets, several terrabytes of satellite and aircraft imagery, and
an incalculable number of emails, SMS/test messages, and documents.” (Crowley 2013:22)
The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative’s report “Disaster Relief 2.0” describes this new quality in
disaster response:
For the first time, members of the community affected by the disaster issued pleas for help
using social media and widely available mobile technologies. Around the world, thousands
of ordinary citizens mobilized to aggregate, translate, and plot these pleas on maps and to
organize technical efforts to support the disaster response. In one case, hundreds of
geospatial information systems experts used fresh satellite imagery to rebuild missing maps
of Haiti and plot a picture of the changed reality on the ground. This work—done through
OpenStreetMap—became an essential element of the response, providing much of the street-
level mapping data that was used for logistics and camp management. (Harvard
Humanitarian Initiative 2011:8)
With the Haiti earthquake two important and related things changed in disaster response: the level of
mass-reporting with digital media took on unprecedented volume and at the same time “online
communication enabled a kind of collective [and global!] intelligence to emerge” (ibid. p.11)
Thousands of volunteers from all over the world “aggregated, analyzed, and mapped the flow of
messages coming from Haiti. Using Internet collaboration tools and modern practices, they wrote
software, processed satellite imagery, built maps, and translated reports between the three languages
of the operation [...]“ (ibid.).
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With these crowdsourced analysis efforts, it is ever easier for people with special skill sets to express
their solidarity and help from wherever they are in the world. And connected with these willing
volunteers, V&CTs, or as they are now (arguably more accurately – Crowley 2013, 28) referred to
‘digital humanitarian organisations’ (DHO). Organisations which support and interface between
affected communities producing data and the online – crowdsourced communities of analysts.
We derived this list of the most important DHOs and their activities from Crowley (2013, 30ff.)
Humanity Road “educate the public before, during and after disasters on how to survive,
sustain and reunite with loved ones”
Standby Task Force (SBTF) “provide live mapping support to humanitarian, human right,
and media organizations” (using Ushahidi)
Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) “coordinate the creation, production, and
distribution of free mapping resources to support humanitarian relief efforts in many places
around the world” Principles: open source and open data sharing towards humanitarian
reponse and economic development –trains communities how to map
GISCorps provides short term volunteer GIS services to underserved communities worldwide
both in post disaster, humanitarian relief, capacity building, and other services (2600 GIS
professionals)
MapAction can deploy teams of GIS experts anywhere in the world in a matter of hours.
Official mapping support element of the United Nations OCHA
Crisis Mappers international community of experts at the intersection between humanitarian
crises, technology, crowd source in, and crisis mapping. Critically important coordination
mechanism .
6.3.1 Communities and the Practical Ethics of Inter-Agency Collaboration
While comprehensive and inclusive approaches like “Whole Community” and the new digital
response entities arriving on the emergency response scene are certainly very promising, experience
has shown, that the immense information and support they are able to produce is still difficult to
translate into multi-agency collaborative efforts. In the last section we have seen the many obstacles
hampering collaboration attempts between established formal organisations, where protocols and
formal cooperation mechanisms exist. This gets even more difficult, when some of the participants
that should now play an important role in the response effort are ad hoc, uncertified emergent entities,
which do not adhere to structured and procedural regulated processes as formulated in regulations and
protocols that govern organisations.
The international humanitarian system was not tooled to handle these two new information fire
hoses—one from the disaster-affected community and one from a mobilized swarm of global
volunteers […] [T]he humanitarian system had no formal protocols for communicating with these
volunteer and technical communities (V&TCs). Despite the good will of field staff, their institutions’
policies and procedures were never designed to incorporate data from outside their networks. Some
view this as a lost opportunity; others worry about what this change might mean for humanitarians
who need to protect data about vulnerable populations. (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 2011, 9 &
11)
While many experts and even government organisations like FEMA, the Department of State and
the U.S. Agency for International Development agree that an integration of emergency efforts
with digital humanitarian organisations (DHOs) is invaluable, and have already started
establishing interfaces to grassroots networks (Crowley 2013, 39ff.), there are also strong
concerns and serious legal barriers still preventing such collaboration on a more general scale.
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Federal agencies are legally obligated to provide data that are accurate, reliable and
useful. They must take steps to ensure the integrity of information. They must also prevent
the release of data that breach the privacy or security of citizens or organizations, violate
nondisclosure agreements, or endanger national security.(Crowley 2013, 36)
However, using DHOs, despite their efforts of securing and validating the information they work with,
the standards for data accuracy can often not be met. Not because the data is wrong, but because it
cannot always be traced to a trusted person.
It is far easier to mandate data quality controls for machine learning of big data initiatives
than for collective intelligence projects (ibid.)
In contrast, collective intelligence requires a far greater openness around software, data,
and methodology. To harness the capacities of a network, large numbers of individuals must
be trusted to view or edit subsets of the total dataset. (ibid.)
It is issues like differing philosophies around the verification and processes of data accuracy, which
are the main obstacles for interfacing DHOs with government agencies:
The challenge of creating an interface between the grassroots and government is more than
integrating new techniques into federal workflows. It is about building trust around new
methods of generating knowledge in the open. This trust is one of the core challenges of
developing open government. (Crowley 2013, 37).
Shanley et al. (2013) also discuss a broad range of legal and policy challenges that occur with the
attempts of interfacing with crowd produced and community organized emergency information, and
review current research offering solutions
Needle in the Haystack: information overflow and loads of non-essential information in the
myriads of tweets during a large scale emergency. How to separate the useful from the non-
essential information?
Trust and credibility: “Peoples’ lives are at stake in crisis situations, so trust and credibility
play a critical role in what data are used and why. Crowd-generated data does not usually
come with metadata or assurances of its quality” (ibid., 868)
Privacy: “Using social media and collaborative web-based mapping inevitably raises privacy
concerns (Boyd 2011, Boyd and Crawford 2012, Obermeyer 2007). Digital volunteers and
responders sometimes aggregate many disparate datasets. While a single dataset may not
erode privacy, combining several may create greater risk” (Shanley et al 2013: 869)
Security: “Social networking tools and crowdsourcing approaches can be used by response
organizations and digital volunteers for the public good, but also by bad actors to manipulate
the public foment strife and undermine stability” (ibid., 870)
Intellectual Property: “Crowdsourced data production raises several important question
regarding intellectual property.” (870). Crisis mapping often relies on the aggregation of GIS
data, map data and tweets or new reports. Such data procurement can lead to “complex
copyrighting licensing situations” (ibid. 871).
Liabilty: “Providing or acting on crowd-generated information about conditions carries
potential legal liability [...] Crisis mapping, if conducted from or directed to the United States,
can subject digital volunteers to tort liability under U.S. law. Digital volunteers are at risk if
they fail to use reasonable care in making their responses. This could include disseminating
false information, sloppy software development, failing to act in a manner commensurate with
similarly situated individuals or failing to properly vet and supervise volunteers” (ibid., 872).
From these analyses, Shanley et al. conclude that:
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The greatest barrier to widespread adoption will not be technical: It will be legal and
institutional resistance. How do we build trust? How can government agencies like FEMA
successfully navigate administrative hurdles, such as privacy and procurement or the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)? How do they integrate crowd-generated data with official
data? What are the potential implications of using fused data sets for operation decision-
making (Burns and Shanley 2013) (in Shanley et al. 2013, 873).
As the digital volunteer community expands it will need training to better integrate its
efforts with those of the formal response organizations. The American Red Cross’ Digital
Volunteer Program, the Digital Humanitarian Network’s collaboration with UN OCHHA,
and the emerging VOST model offer useful models for trusted collaborations between
informal volunteers and contributors and the formal response community (874)
Current practices of community engagement are part of a ‘new reality’ for emergency services, where
budget cuts115
combine with increased frequency and severity of disasters, ageing infrastructures and
ageing populations, a generation change in the profession, with a lot of experienced officers retiring
followed by young, media-savvy colleagues, as well as increasingly intense and immediate and ‘close-
up’ media coverage, coupled with rising expectations from the public and a more active participation
from members of the public through social media. Good design around ethical, legal and social issues
arising around social media use is critical to being able to leverage crisis informatics for good.
6.4 Societal issues: A Crisis of Information?
The specific enactment (or lack of enactment) of ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct in
every moment of professional and lay social and material practices around crisis management and
emergency response accumulates at a societal level and this produces ethical legal, and social
challenges, risks as well as opportunities. In this short section, we examine key dimensions of this.
‘Data is the new oil’, perhaps the most vital ingredient for recovery from the current global economic
crisis (McKinsey 2011). But as ‘knowing capitalism’ is generating more personalized products and
services more profitably (Thrift, 2005), a ‘century of disasters’ is taking shape (eScience 2012).
Population growth, migration to cities, and climate change engender greater vulnerability and more
frequent and more severe natural and manmade crises. Under stress from austerity and increasing
demand, crisis management is one area where data-based efficiencies are eagerly sought. In
preparation or response to a storm, pandemic or terrorist attack, data about persons and places affected
can be pivotal for effective and (cost-)efficient response, and better data-sharing between emergency
and other public services is high on many governments’ agenda.
However, this ‘informationalization’ of services has long been recognized as problematic. In 2006
Caspar Bowden, former Chief Privacy Adviser at Microsoft warned that ‘trafffic data’:
constitutes a near complete map of private life: whom everyone talks to (by e- mail and
phone), where everyone goes (mobile phone location co-ordinates), and what everyone
reads online (websites browsed). (In Rauhofer, 2006, 323)
‘Traffic’, ‘transactional’ or ‘communications’ data are personal data116
generated by all but the most
marginalized people as part of everyday living with digital technologies. With growing capacity for
115
For example, in the UK, central government funding for police budgets in England and Wales is being cut by
20% by 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-19455784. See also
http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/13-06-14/Spain_s_austerity_healthcare_cuts_putting_lives_at_risk.aspx 116
According to the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC ‘personal data’ means ‘any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) ... who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
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capture, analysis, sharing and data-driven decision-making, the ‘seas’ of such data are becoming more
navigable and exploitable, increasing the risk of inadvertent disclosure or misuse of personal data.
72% of Europeans are ‘concerned that personal data may be shared without their permission’ (Reding,
2012), prompting a comprehensive reform of the EU’s data protection rules, which will come into
operation in 2014 (European Commission, 2012). Recent disclosures over surveillance through the US
National Security Agency and the UK Government Communications Headquarters are fanning the
debate (MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, Davies, & Ball, 2013). Sociological analysis has also long
warned that an exchange of personal data for more convenience, efficiency and security is a Faustian
bargain (Urry, 2007), and amongst citizens (and non-citizens! such as tourists and illegal residents),
policy-makers, politicians and academics, concerns over a crisis of information are spreading.
However, there is a dearth of studies of the specifics of data flows, intentions and practices of data
processing and effects in particular contexts (Yar, 2003). In this deliverable we contribute to debates
about a crisis of information through a study of ethical, legal and social issues in informational
mobilities in crises. This is useful because data-based efficiencies can apply across a wide spectrum of
crises, and the pressures that arise in crises often incite intense informational mobilities – for risk
assessment, intelligence and criminal investigations, or for determining the number, status and
specifics of victims, as well as causes and consequences of the crisis. Exceptional license to process
personal data can apply to historical data, utilizing mandatory retention of communications, for
example, during national security operations (Rauhofer, 2006).
In a recent emergency communications stocktaking effort, the European Network and Information
Security Agency (ENISA, 2012) shows that current information sharing practices between emergency
agencies are inadequate. One of the reasons identified is an ‘over-zealous or incorrect interpretation
of the duties imposed on public organisations by the Data Protection Act’ (Armstrong et al., 2007).
After the London bombings, for example, some responders deemed it to be illegal to pass on personal
data collected from victims by the Family Assistance Centre to successor organizations, which
complicated continuity of care.
While these effects are clearly deleterious, sociological research shows that there are often good social
and organizational as well as political reasons for separation between the different agencies
(Quarantelli, 1966; Drabek & McEntire, 2002; Allen, Karanasios, & Norman, 2013; Scheppele 2003).
In the European Union, calls for better technological support acknowledge this, at least partially:
We are not yet at a stage when we can envisage to interconnect information management
systems from different organizations to share situation assessment or automate coordinated
response procedures. For many reasons (political considerations, concern about ..
confidentiality .., competition or conflicting objectives between organisations, human
behaviour, lack of financing, etc.) there is no willingness to establish direct interconnection,
but rather a need to utilise human interfaces between systems (M/487, 2013)
But the ‘yet’ in the above quote also indexes a strong belief in technology as a panacea to overcome
these frictions, to interconnect and even automate response procedures. These hopes resonate strongly
with post-disaster and emergency planning reviews which often combine critique of response
agencies’ current lack of coordination with a vision of opportunities through better use of existing or
new information and communication technology (ICT):
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’. The Directive identifies ‘sensitive information’,
such as data concerning racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious and philosophical beliefs, health,
sexual life and criminal activities, and prohibits processing of all personal data without the consent of the
data subject. However, exceptions apply.
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Norway 22/7 2011: More sophisticated use of ICT has a substantial potential for improving
efficiency and quality … This is a key to better emergency preparedness in future. (Gjørv,
2012, 20)
New York 2012: The City did not immediately have access to accurate, timely data …. As a
result, it took a few days—and in the case of telecommunications, longer—to get an
accurate, comprehensive understanding of the magnitude of power and service outages ...
(Hurricane Sandy, Gibbs & Holloway, 2013, 18)
UK 2013: People aged 65 or over account for over 50% of all fire-related deaths …
Prevention … will need to be facilitated by better data-sharing across public
services.(Review of fire and rescue authorities in England, Knight, 2013, 71)
Innovation eagerly takes its cue from such critiques. But funders, technology developers,
implementing organizations and researchers also recognize that a lack of understanding of the realities
of organizational practices can lead to costly failures (Committee of Public Accounts, 2011; Shapiro,
2005). The BRIDGE project seeks to resolve some of the tensions by integrating ‘domain analysis’ –
qualitative studies of social practices of collaboration – and ELSI assessment with stakeholder
engagement and collaborative design methods to design new technology. Its main aim is to develop
computer infrastructures that can help responders assemble ICT systems to support inter-
organizational interoperability and information sharing in Europe. This research is also inspired by a
current convergence of ‘smart city’ and crisis management systems, powerfully illustrated by Maeda
et al’s vision of ‘Next Generation ICT Services for the Resilient Society’ (2010, Figure 2) in Japan:
Figure 18 ‘Next generation ICT for the resilient society’ Source: adapted from Maeda 2010
Such computer architectures can enable ‘one stop management’ of datasets ranging from personal
activities (diaries, location, photographs, blogs) to employment, taxation and health records,
telecommunications and risk registers. Researchers, organizations and governments in Brazil
(Naphade et al, 2011), the Netherlands (Steenbruggen et al., 2013) and the UK (Johnson, 2012) are
extending similar ‘one stop management’ to security and crisis management. In the European context
interconnections between legislative and executive agencies are governed by strict rules, but secure
information sharing that respects these rules (or is exempt through exceptions) is seen as an important
area for innovation.
However benignly intended, increasing information sharing poses challenges. It is not clear how
‘secure’ direct interconnections, respect for rules and responsible exception management can be
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supported with the technical, organizational, political and legal means that are being developed. In
fact, eager embrace of technological advances in everyday life, commercial and civic organizations
has so far brought unprecedented levels of surveillance and an erosion of democratic values and civil
liberties (Crang & Graham, 2007; Lyon, 2002). The social sorting that becomes possible with traffic
data can splinter societies (Graham & Marvin, 2001) and allow exceptions to spread (Agamben, 2005;
Scheppele, 2003). The all-pervasive focus on risk and security creates fearful societies (Aradau, Lobo-
Guerrero, & Van Munster, 2008), fostering the enactment of a pervasive securitization of mobility
(Amoore 2006; Adey, 2009). Some analysts observe a militarization of everyday life (Graham, 2008)
and the development of a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi, 2006), resulting in life ‘lived as the continuous
emergency of its own emergence’ (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2009) subject to increasingly
comprehensively enforced preventative measures in healthcare, justice and disaster management
(Amoore, 2011; Brown & Adams, 2007; Tulich, 2012). While some surveillance studies evoke
Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ as a metaphor to characterize the dangers, many highlight more ‘disorganized’
forms of surveillance, where many actors rather than one centralized bureaucracy, collect and share
data in ways that are hard to fathom (Lyon, 1994). Daniel Solove (2004) highly effectively evokes
Kafka’s novel The Trial to capture the surreal anxieties, violations, and anxious governmentalities that
an erosion of informational self-determination in this landscape can engender.
What should designers, practitioners, politicians, policy makers, researchers, and (non-) citizens do? A
curbing of informationalizing innovation for knowing capitalism is unlikely in many societies
worldwide (Urry, 2013), and the twin pressures of financial cuts and an increase in disasters make it
highly improbable in crisis management. With reference to information technology, ‘Don’t do IT’ may
be a sound conclusion to draw from surveillance studies, but it is not easily practicable. ‘Do IT more
carefully’ could be a better maxim, but to specify what ‘more careful’ might mean, there is a need to
better understand how information is mobilised and shared in crises.
6.5 Summary
This Chapter provides a sense of how information is mobilised – and what difficulties might be
encountered – in multi-agency emergency response with a particular emphasis on how this affects
people’s capability for ethical, lawful and socially responsible conduct. A fundamental insight is that
such conduct is a matter of social and material practices, which are deeply entangled with technologies
as well as ‘environmental’ factors of culture, embodiment and situations. This draws attention to the
specificities of how people interact with others and the subtleties of interaction this enables. It
highlights that the skills and practices involved may be ill-supported or even undermined by existing
technologies, which challenges people’s abilities to perform practical ethics, lawfulness and
responsibility. Widening the focus to multi-agency response we explored practices of trust, dynamic
risk assessment and organizational cultural differences and discussed how ‘simply’ providing more
information and more standardised organizational interoperability procedures are not enough. This is
in no small part due to the fact that the specific social and material practices of how people make sense
of emergencies and coordinate cooperation are so deeply entangled with technologies, environments
and situations. A focus on community emergency response then showed a particularly vibrant domain
of social innovation that is changing the landscape for ethical, lawful and socially responsible
emergency response. The way in which individuals and communities are appropriating social media to
provide and seek information and to self-organize help is a deeply transformative engine for
emergency response in a ‘century of disasters’. While there are many positive aspects, these
transformations are also part of wider, societal transformative trends in a century where ‘knowing
capitalism’ is joining forces with ‘big data’ and ideas of data fusion across different domains of civil
society. The convergence of ‘smart city’ innovation with IT innovation in emergency response carries
great potential, but also significant danger.
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7 Conclusion Disaster policy analysts argue that the crises of the future will increasingly be transboundary crises,
which will transcend geographic or political borders, affect multiple vital elements of infrastructure
and will not be contained in time (Ansell, Keller, & Boin, 2009; Ansell et al., 2010; Boin & Ekengren,
2009; Boin & Lagadec, 2000). In response to this, the European Security Strategy (ESS), declares
the EU’s commitment to combat a variety of security threats, including failed states, energy
security, terrorism, global warming, and disasters. The ESS adopts a comprehensive view,
explicitly linking internal and external threats, civilian and military capacities, and natural
and man-made disasters. (Boin and Ekengren 2009:287)
This necessitates cooperation between regional, national and international communities. The EU
Community Mechanism for Civil Protection is developing several tools to support this, including the
European Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERC) in Brussels and a Common Emergency
Communication and Information System (CECIS) that facilitates communication between ERC and
National Authorities. Core values that underpin EU emergency response collaboration include:
Solidarity, subsidiarity, unity in diversity: The EU has a long tradition of deliberative collaboration
that avoids unacceptable centralization and builds on long-term mutual respect and understanding
between partners. This translates into policies that emphasise solidarity and subsidiarity. In the 2004
Solidarity Declaration member states pledge to jointly mobilise civilian and military means to protect
the civilian population in a disaster. The principle of subsidiarity ensures that ‘decisions are taken as
closely as possible to the citizen and constant checks are made to verify that action at Union level is
justified in light of possibilities available at national, regional or local level’ (EU Glossary). Solidarity
and subsidiarity are components of broader values of ‘unity in diversity’, where EU objectives should
always leave sufficient implementation room so as to allow for national diversity and flexibility.
Democratic values and human rights: Proponents of a new security paradigm for the EU argue that
the EU ‘should strive to become a normative or an ethical power in world politics’ (Boin and
Ekengren 2009:289). Translated into innovation in best practice and the design and use of advanced
ICT, this demands careful attention to issues of autonomy, privacy, and citizen engagement.
Informationalizing emergency response produces complex intended and unintended, positive and
negative consequences. A focus on ethical, legal and social ‘issues’ acknowledges that socio-technical
transformations are complex. The research presented in this report seeks to chart how practitioners and
other stakeholders in emergency response currently encounter ethical, legal and social issues. We have
focused on issues related to innovation in IT supported multi-agency emergency response. In a century
of disasters, where emergency response services are under pressure to produce more efficient,
collaborative and effective emergency response with less funding, it is critical to pursue ethically,
legally and socially circumspect IT innovation. Emergency situations are a breeding ground for
exceptions, including exceptions to fundamental constitutional rights and suspension of normal moral
rules, often fueled (but often unwarranted) by fear of moral disorder. This can erode important civil
liberties, and ‘the wrong kind’ of IT innovation can amplify detrimental unintended consequences.
What should designers, practitioners, politicians, policy makers, researchers, and (non-) citizens do? A
curbing of informationalizing innovation in knowing capitalism is unlikely to be possible in many
societies worldwide today, and the twin pressures of financial cuts and an increase in disasters make it
highly improbable in crisis management. ‘Don’t do IT’ may be a sound conclusion to draw for some
designers, analysts and practitioners, but it is not easily practicable and – in our view – not desirable,
because much good can come out of integrating IT more closely into emergency response. ‘Do IT
more carefully’ to change the existing situation into a preferred one (Simon 1969) could be a better
maxim, but to specify what ‘more careful’ might mean, there is a need to better understand how
information is mobilised and shared in crises. This deliverable contributes to this effort.
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8 References
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9 Subject Index
A
Ad hoc publics · 97 Ad hoc solutions · 69 Administrative bodies · 72 Administrative framework · 61, 68 ADNS · 7, 78 Age · 22, 40, 45 Algorithm · 40, 111 All-hazards approach · 12, 25, 42, 59, 76 Analogue technology · 91 Anticipation · 47, 95 ARGUS · 3, 7, 77, 78, 108 Articulation work · 92 Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) · 44, 54 Attitude of wisdom · 49, 59, 60 Augmented practice · 31, 35 Authorization · 53 Autonomy · 105
B
Beneficence · 13, 24, 32, 55, 60 Bias · 36, 37, 40, 42, 51, 53, 60 Big Data · 15, 53, 100, 104, 107, 114 Boston marathon bombing · 40, 41, 113 Bricolage · 49 Bureaucracy · 16, 64, 104
C
Case specific regulations · 67 Catastrophic emergency · 26 Category 1 and Category 2 Responders · 6, 26, 27, 51 CECIS - Common Emergency Communication and
Information System · 7, 35, 75, 105 Century of disasters · 15, 16, 55, 60, 101, 104, 105,
110 Charity · 34, 48 CIS · 71 Citizen · 105 Citizenship · 58 Civil Air Patrol · 97 Civil law · 67 Civil liberties · 12, 15, 25, 104, 105 Cloud · 35 Code archaeology · 18 Codes of conduct · 2, 13, 19, 20, 25, 31, 33, 44, 45, 47,
50, 51, 53, 55, 59, 60, 89, 92, 112
Collaboration · 3, 16, 17, 35, 47, 50, 63, 69, 70, 89, 91, 95, 103, 105, 115
Command and control · 25 Common law · 67 Common operational picture · 92 Common practice · 14, 61, 63, 68, 70, 87, 88 Common sense · 38 Communication · 16, 34, 38, 49, 50, 59, 77, 91, 94, 102 Communication ethic · 58 Community resilience · 35 Compassion · 45, 59 Competence · 29, 30, 54, 58, 77 Complacency · 13, 59 Complex sensing · 50 Compulsory evacuation · 34, 46 Computer Ethics · 53, 54, 111 Computer Ethics Institute · 53 Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility · 53 Confidentiality · 32, 54, 91, 102 Conflict-affected populations · 53 Consent · 21, 41, 51, 67, 102 Consequentialism · 2, 9, 11, 21, 25, 116 Constitution · 64, 65, 66 Constitutional basis · 19, 63, 65 Constitutionalism · 64 Continuity · 47, 79, 102 Cooperation · 7, 14, 27, 34, 59, 62, 63, 70, 71, 73, 74,
75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84, 99, 104, 105, 115, 119 Coroner · 92, 93, 112 Corruption · 46 CPM · 7, 35, 73, 74, 75, 106 Creativity · 25, 49 Credibility · 100 Crisis Management · 9, 12, 15, 16, 18, 23, 24, 31, 36,
37, 38, 39, 58, 69, 71, 72, 78, 87, 101, 103, 104, 105, 109
Crisis Mappers · 99 Crisis mapping · 35, 99 Critical design · 18 Critical infrastructures · 61, 76 Crowd · 23, 97, 99, 100 CSCW · 7, 112, 115, 117, 118 culpable but not punishable · 23, 42 Cultural interpretation · 94 Culture of fear · 104 Curiosity · 50
D
Daiichi · 6, 30, 31 Data minimisation · 56, 60 Data mining · 58 Data mobilities · 53
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Data protection · 9, 16, 25, 50, 51, 55, 56, 59, 90, 91, 102
Data Protection Act · 50, 60, 102 Data sharing (see also Information sharing) · 16, 21,
32, 42, 50, 51, 55, 91, 99 Data sharing agreements (see also Information
sharing agreements) · 50 Deleting · 26 Deontology · 2, 9, 21, 22, 25, 106 Dialogic engagement · 35 Dictatorship · 64 Different traditions · 63 Differing risk thresholds · 93, 95 Digital divide · 1, 12, 16, 36, 42, 53, 55 Digital exclusion · 60 Digital volunteers · 10, 100 Dignity · 13, 22, 25, 32, 33, 34, 45, 46, 54, 58, 83, 89,
91 Direction · 47, 82, 90 Disaster Law Database · 72, 83, 113 Disaster Law Programme · 3, 71, 83, 86 Disaster myth · 37, 42 Disaster risk reduction · 13, 71, 73, 81, 82, 86 Disclosive ethics · 13, 18, 39, 41, 42, 43 Distributive justice · 9, 32 DMP · 7, 80 DPP · 7, 73, 110 DRR · 7, 73, 109 Duplication · 34, 48, 51 Duty · 9, 12, 20, 21, 22, 30, 31, 43, 45, 83, 89 Dynamic risk assessment · 6, 7, 21, 92, 94, 95, 104
E
EAPC · 7, 71, 113 Early warning · 72, 75, 76, 82, 98 ECHO · 2, 7, 73, 74, 108, 109, 110 ECURIE · 78 Effectiveness · 7, 9, 13, 15, 22, 24, 34, 39, 47, 50, 61,
70, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 86, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 105, 106
Efficiencies · 1, 16 ELSI · 1, 3, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 42, 60, 89, 101,
102, 103, 105, 108 Embodiment · 14, 25, 104 Emergency ethics · 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 31 Emergency response · 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 70, 71, 74, 77, 78, 79, 89, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 104, 105, 107, 110, 112, 113, 116
Emergent interoperability · 16, 21 Emergent organisation · 97 EMIS · 7, 31, 108, 113 Empathy · 49 Employment · 63, 65, 103 Environment · 46 ERC · 3, 7, 74, 75, 78, 105, 110
ERCC · 7, 74, 75 Escape fire · 49 Ethical challenge · 12, 43, 47, 60, 107 Ethical conduct · 13, 32, 54 Ethical considerations · 18, 31, 38, 45, 62 Ethical dilemma · 20, 24, 91 Ethical opportunities · 25, 32, 39 Ethical practices · 91 Ethical principles · 10, 13, 25, 32, 33, 34, 46, 51, 55,
58, 59, 89, 95 EU Civil Protection Mechanism · 3, 74 EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection · 105 EU Crisis management cycle · 69 EU Glossary · 105 EU-CCA · 3, 7, 77, 78 EU-ICMA · 3, 7, 77, 78 European and Mediterranean Major Hazards
Agreement · 45, 95 European Network and Information Security Agency ·
7, 50, 102, 110 European Security Strategy · 7, 105 Evacuation · 66 EWRS · 7, 78 Exception, State of Exception · 20, 21, 23, 25, 64, 103 Extraordinary powers · 64, 65, 66 Extreme Emergency · 21
F
Face Recognition Systems · 2, 13, 39, 40, 41, 43, 111, 113
Face-to-face interaction · 31, 34, 90, 91, 92 Fairly Save All Who Can Be Saved · 22 Fairness · 54, 55 False information · 100 False witness · 53 Family Assistance Centre · 102 FAO · 8, 82, 118 Fascism · 64 Favouritism · 45, 46 FEMA · 8, 11, 96, 97, 99, 101, 110, 112 Fleeting moments · 91 Forgetting · 26, 38 Formal competence · 62 Freedom · 10, 16, 34, 55, 57, 65, 66 Fukushima · 62 Fundamental rights · 45, 46, 63
G
GCHQ · 8, 93, 102 GISCorps · 99 GPS · 8, 28, 29, 35, 97 Guidelines · 13, 14, 31, 53, 59, 60, 61, 62, 72, 76, 82,
84, 85, 86, 87, 119
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H
Habeas corpus · 21, 65 Habitus · 25 Haiti · 47, 48, 96, 98 Harm · 13, 20, 22, 24, 42, 51, 53, 54, 55 Harmonization of procedures · 95 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative · 98, 99, 112 Hazard · 9, 25, 83, 94 Health records · 103 Heroism · 2, 26, 30, 31 Hexis · 10, 25 Hillsborough Disaster · 29, 113 HIV · 8, 90, 91 Honesty · 54 Human contact · 10, 11, 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 32, 33,
34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 51, 54, 55, 60, 62, 65, 69, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 89, 91, 96, 99, 102, 105
Human perception · 35 Human reasoning · 35, 44, 49, 64, 89, 95 Human rights · 20, 21, 45, 46, 51, 62, 65, 82, 83, 105 Humanitarian assistance · 22, 46 Humanitarian imperative · 44, 59 Humanitarian OpenStreetMap · 97, 99 Humanitarian principles · 2, 44 Humanity · 34, 35, 36, 37, 45, 99 Humanity Road · 99 Hurricane Katrina · 22, 62, 66, 96, 117, 118 Hurricane Sandy · 96, 97, 98, 103, 111
I
IASC · 8, 78 IDRL · 3, 8, 83, 84, 86, 117 Ignorance · 49, 59 ILC · 3, 8, 83 Impartiality · 35, 51 Indemnity · 10, 29 Indemnity insurance · 10, 29 Inefficiency · 59 Information
Abuses and violations · 51 Access · 54 Audibility · 91 Copying · 51 Disclosure · 25, 49, 51, 67, 102 Information superiority · 37 Integrity · 100 Loss · 22, 25, 51, 82 manipulation · 53, 60 Modification · 51 One stop management · 103 Reliability · 51, 60 Theft · 51 Unauthorized access · 51 Visibility · 91
Information and participation during disasters · 46 Information collection · 51 Information Commissioner’s Office · 50 Information overload · 31, 37, 100 Information sharing · 13, 29, 34, 47, 50, 53, 58, 59, 77,
91, 93, 102, 103 Information sharing agreements (see also Data
sharing agreements) · 34, 59 Information society · 58, 60 Information subjects
Associated Risks · 51 Informational self-determination · 10, 16, 57, 104 Informed consent · 21, 32, 42, 50, 51, 53 Integrity · 22, 25, 34, 38, 48, 59, 100, 113 Intellectual property · 53, 54, 100 Intentions · 33, 87, 90, 102 Interdisciplinary research · 12, 16 International CEP Handbook · 71, 113 International CIIP Handbook · 72, 107 International cooperation · 2, 14, 19, 63, 71, 74, 78, 87 International initiatives · 63 Intersubjectivity · 11, 34, 49, 59 Inventive methods · 18 IOM · 3, 8, 83 ISSA · 8, 76, 77 IT ethics · 12, 19, 31
J
Joint responsibility · 45 Jurisprudence · 13, 61 Justice · 9, 13, 22, 33, 34, 48, 67, 92, 95, 104, 110, 117,
120
K
Knowing capitalism · 15, 101, 104, 105
L
Law Administrative · 61, 120 Criminal · 61, 120 Emergency · 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 24,
27, 30, 31, 32, 44, 46, 47, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 79, 82, 91, 92, 97, 98, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120
Governmental · 61 International · 2, 3, 8, 24, 32, 33, 44, 51, 52, 61, 71,
72, 73, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 99, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 120
Military · 61, 66, 85, 111, 112 Procedural · 61
Leadership · 26, 50, 79, 82
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Legal black hole · 13, 64 Legal instruments · 61, 83, 86 Legal risk analysis · 18 Legal system · 61, 69, 87 Legality · 58, 65, 89 Legislation
General type of legislation · 67, 68 mitigating · 13, 70 proactive · 12, 13, 69, 70, 73, 87 reactive · 13, 69, 70, 87
Legislative Reforms · 2, 68 Legislative strategies · 13, 19, 63, 66, 70, 87 Legisprudence · 68 Legitimacy · 50, 64 Leveson inquiry · 56 Liability · 2, 26, 120 Liberalism · 64 Life-boat ethics · 22 Limits of Exceptions · 20 Lisbon Treaty · 76 Lives at stake · 100 Location tracking · 26 Logs and Logging · 10, 16, 28, 29, 38 London 2012 Olympics · 39 London bombing 2005 · 92, 102 London riots · 98 Looting · 22, 65 Loyalty · 25
M
Macro-regions · 63 Major incident · 26, 108 Mann Gulch · 49, 50, 120 MapAction · 99 Media · 10, 15, 16, 18, 22, 27, 30, 35, 37, 42, 45, 46, 51,
58, 62, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 106, 110, 118, 120 Members of the public · 27, 47, 51, 53, 89, 93, 95, 101 Memoranda · 62 MIC · 7, 8, 74, 75, 78 Middleware · 16, 38 Militarization · 104 Military · 21, 22, 25, 53, 61, 62, 65, 66, 93, 105 Military force · 22, 65 Military resources · 61, 62, 65, 66 Mitigation · 24, 45, 70, 80, 82 Mobile methods · 18 Moral absolutes · 22 Moral black hole · 12, 22, 23, 42, 117 Moral disorder · 15, 105 Moral imperative · 12, 42, 54 Morality · 12, 22, 23, 24, 26, 42, 89 Morality of Exceptions · 2, 20 Morbidity · 48 Mortality · 48 Multi-agency collaboration · 1, 3, 13, 16, 17, 32, 47, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99
Multi-agency emergency response · 1, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 39, 42, 46, 54, 60, 93, 97, 104, 105
Mutual adaptation · 50
N
NATO · 8, 71, 72, 113 Neutrality · 45 New Reality · 101 Non Governmental Organizations · 8, 45, 46 Non-discrimination · 45 Non-Professional responders · 31 Non-verbal communication · 35 Normal moral codes · 25 Norway attacks · 28, 29
O
OCHA · 3, 8, 51, 53, 78, 79, 86, 99, 116 OHCHR · 8, 82, 118 Openness · 50, 100 OpenStreetMap · 98 Oral exchange · 91 OSCE · 8, 71
P
Partnerships · 35, 37, 80, 86 Patriot Act · 65 Personal data · 10, 25, 50, 51, 57, 66, 67, 91, 101, 102,
109 Personal integrity · 61 Policy initiatives · 72 Poverty · 38, 65 Practical ethics · 15, 26, 90, 104 Preparation · 9, 12, 20, 24, 25, 35, 42, 44, 50, 59, 69,
75, 101 Preparedness · 2, 7, 12, 24, 25, 31, 34, 35, 36, 45, 47,
71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 103, 109, 110, 113, 118
Prevention · 7, 14, 24, 45, 57, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 88, 103, 109, 110, 114, 118
PreventionWeb · 71, 81, 119 Preventive approaches · 36, 39, 44, 45, 75, 104 Privacy · 12, 15, 16, 17, 25, 26, 32, 34, 36, 45, 46, 51,
54, 55, 57, 60, 61, 62, 65, 91, 100, 101, 105, 109 Privacy impact assessment · 18, 120 Privacy intrusion · 55 Pro-active · 13 Pro-active approach · 69, 70 Professional autonomy · 30 Professional integrity · 12, 25, 31, 37, 38 Professional obligations · 29, 30 Professionalism · 79
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Proportionality · 20, 55, 57 Proprietary software · 41, 53 Prudence · 34, 48 Psychological assistance · 46 Psychological integrity · 46 Public authorities · 45, 61, 70 Public Health · 30, 31, 113 Public interest · 25, 51, 66 Public understanding · 54, 55, 60 Purpose limitation · 56 Purpose-binding · 56
R
Race · 33, 38, 40, 44, 102 RAPEX · 8, 78 RAS BICHAT · 8, 78 RASFF) · 8, 78 Recovery · 3, 9, 14, 45, 47, 51, 69, 75, 81, 84, 85, 86,
88, 96, 101, 111, 112 Red Crescent · 3, 33, 44, 61, 71, 72, 73, 83, 84, 86, 113,
117 Red Cross · 3, 33, 44, 51, 52, 61, 71, 72, 73, 83, 84, 86,
101, 113, 117 Regulative instruments · 61 Resilience · 34, 44, 45, 48, 73, 76, 86, 109, 116 Resilient Society · 103, 115 Resolutions · 62, 72, 83, 84, 118, 119 Respect · 32, 34, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 60, 62,
67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 79, 81, 88, 90, 91, 103, 105 Respect of persons · 46 Rights and duties · 44 Risk · 9, 12, 16, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37,
45, 46, 47, 55, 60, 61, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 81, 87, 91, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 115, 120
Risk analysis · 31, 34, 35, 55, 61 Risk communication · 21, 32, 95 Risk register · 103 Role improvisation · 49 Role structure · 49 Rules · 3, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 42,
50, 51, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 78, 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 92, 102, 103, 105, 117
Rumours · 22
S
Safety · 25, 27, 45, 46, 47, 57, 74, 89, 91, 92, 93, 115, 116
SARS · 8, 30 Save the Greatest Number · 22 Saving lives · 20, 24 Science and Technology Studies · 8, 117 Search and rescue · 9, 20, 22, 27, 35, 74, 75 Securitization · 25, 104
Security · 3, 7, 8, 12, 16, 25, 36, 40, 42, 46, 50, 51, 57, 61, 62, 63, 67, 69, 71, 72, 76, 77, 78, 85, 89, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 119
Security mechanisms · 62 Security research · 62 Self-effacement · 48 Self-respect · 50 Sensitive information · 51, 66, 102 Serious Emergency · 26 Sexual integrity · 46 Shared situation · 90, 91, 92, 93 Significant Emergency · 26 Silent technology · 41 Silo-Thinking · 32, 50 Situation awareness · 35, 76, 92 Smart city · 15, 103, 104 SMS · 37, 38, 51, 53, 98, 112, 118 Social contract · 12, 13, 30, 34, 43, 55, 58, 60 Social Media · 98, 117 Social sorting · 10, 12, 40, 104, 115 Social ties · 46 Socio-economic factors · 13, 33, 36, 38 Socio-political factors · 34 Socio-technical · 1, 12, 13, 18, 19, 29, 38, 42, 95, 105 Socio-technical futures · 18, 29 Soft law · 62, 72 Solidarity · 23, 34, 45, 46, 76, 92, 99, 105 Sovereign · 64 Specialised agencies · 62 Standards · 11, 13, 14, 21, 46, 51, 61, 68, 70, 71, 82,
88, 100, 113 State of emergency · 13, 21, 64, 65 Statistical method · 41 Steps Towards a more Secure Europe · 76 Stress · 37, 50, 59, 101, 116 Subsidiarity · 7, 47, 59, 74, 105 Supererogation · 31 Superordinate goal · 50 Supreme emergency · 22, 23, 42 Surveillance · 12, 16, 21, 36, 42, 43, 55, 61, 62, 65, 66,
102, 104, 106, 113, 115 Surveillance technology · 62 System of Systems · 1, 12, 16
T
Taxation · 103 Teamwork · 2, 13, 47, 48, 50, 59, 114 Technological imagination · 29 Technological potential · 28, 29 Technology as a panacea · 102 Technology dependence · 36 Territorial sovereignty · 45 Terrorism · 25, 39, 61, 62, 65, 117 TETRA · 35, 94 Thick description · 18 Threshold Deontology · 2, 10, 22, 23
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Thresholds · 22, 23, 24, 41 Training · 31, 34, 37, 38, 46, 59, 71, 74, 75, 80, 82, 101,
109 Transformation · 29 Transparency · 34, 35, 56, 66 Triage · 44, 48, 55 Trust · 36, 49, 50, 79, 81, 91, 92, 94, 100, 101, 104 Turf war · 48 Twitter · 98, 119
U
UK Civil Contingency Act · 47, 95 UK Environment Agency · 93 UK Police National Computer Manual · 55 UN · 3, 8, 24, 44, 48, 63, 71, 72, 73, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84,
101, 118, 119 Uncertainties · 49, 66, 97 UNCRD · 3, 8, 82, 119 UNDAC · 3, 79, 80 UNDP · 3, 8, 81, 82, 119 Unethical conduct · 13, 59 UN-HABITAT · 3, 80 UNHCR · 8, 82, 119 UNICEF · 8, 82, 119 Unintended consequences · 12, 13, 15, 16, 32, 33, 55,
58, 105 UNISDR · 8, 71, 81 User responsibilities · 6, 56
V
V&TCs · 9, 99 Value scenarios · 18 Values · 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 26, 38, 46, 58, 59,
67, 89, 92, 104, 105, 113, 120 Victim · 40, 91 Violence · 20, 46, 65 Virginia Earthquake · 98 Virtual role system · 49 Virtue ethics · 2, 10, 11, 12, 24, 25, 30, 44, 48, 49 Virtuous habits · 25 Virtuous technology · 12, 26 Volunteer organizations · 27, 47, 48, 97, 99, 101 VOST · 97, 101 Vulnerability · 12, 22, 36, 46, 73, 86, 101 Vulnerable person · 35, 46, 55
W
War · 23, 25, 36, 41, 61, 65, 80, 83, 119 War on terror · 25, 36, 41, 61, 65, 119 Wealth · 38 Wearable cameras · 26 Well-being · 22, 24, 54, 55, 57, 60 West, Texas · 98 WFP · 8, 82, 120 WHO · 3, 8, 82, 120 Whole Community Approaches to Security · 11, 97, 99 Wisdom · 34, 48, 49 Witnesses · 29 Working division of labour · 92
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10 Name Index
A
Adey, P. · 104, 106 Agamben, G. · 21, 104, 106 Agre, P. E. · 18, 106 Åhman, T. · 73, 106 Albert, S. · 92, 106 Alexander · 5, 21, 69, 106 Allen, D. K. · 94, 102, 106 Amoore, L. · 104, 106 Anderson, R. · 106, 116 Ansell, C. · 25, 105, 106 Aradau, C. · 104, 106 Aristotle · 10, 25 Armstrong, H. · 50, 51, 102, 106
B
Beauchamp, T. L. · 18, 106 Bechky, B. A. · 92, 106 Beck, U. · 32, 106 Bentham, J. · 21 Birkland, T. A. · 25, 107 Boin, A. · 25, 97, 105, 106, 107 Bourdieu, P. · 25, 107 Bowker, G. · 106 Boyd, D. · 100, 107 Bring, O. · 65, 107 Brown, I. · 92, 104, 107, 115 Brown, J. S. · 92, 104, 107, 115 Brunner, E. · 72, 107 Buck, D. A. · 31, 107 Burghardt, M. · 107, 113 Büscher, M. · 1, 4, 5, 16, 18, 26, 31, 32, 38, 50, 58, 107,
108, 116
C
Cabinet Office · 26, 108 Cartlidge, E. · 28, 108 Chalmers, M. · 108 Chesterman, S. · 93, 95, 108 Churchill · 23 Cole, J. · 32, 50, 108 Committee of Public Accounts · 103, 108 Community Research and Development Information
Service · 109 Crang, M. · 104, 109 Crisp, R. · 22, 109 Crowley, J. · 53, 97, 98, 99, 100, 109
D
De Hert, P. · 18, 109, 120 Department of Homeland Security · 62, 109 Dillon, M. · 104, 109 Dougherty, C. · 66, 109 Drabek, T. E. · 23, 94, 102, 109 Drennan L.T. · 69, 109 Dunne, A. · 18, 109 Dynes, R. · 23, 27, 97, 109 Dyzenhaus, D. · 64, 110
E
Ellebrecht, N. · 32, 110 ENISA · 7, 50, 102, 110 eScience · 16, 101, 110 EU Commission · 1, 7, 25, 73, 74, 102, 110, 117
F
Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) · 62, 110 FEMA · 8, 11, 96, 97, 99, 101, 110, 112 Ferejohn, J. · 64, 111 Fischer, H. W. · 27, 111 Forester, T. · 54, 59, 111 Foucault, M. · 41, 111 Furedi, F. · 104, 111
G
Gallagher, S. · 39, 40, 111 Garfinkel, H. · 18, 90, 111 Geertz, C. · 18, 111 Gevaert, W. J. R. · 40, 111 Gibbs, L. I. · 103, 111 Giddens, A. · 32, 111 Givens, G. · 40, 41, 111 Gjørv, A. B. · 28, 29, 103, 111 Glasgow, K. · 98, 111 Glăveanu, V. · 18, 111 Grace, J. · 58, 111 Graham, S. · 104, 109, 111 Greenbaum, J. M. · 111 Gross, M. · 49, 112 GSMA · 53, 112
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H
Habermas, J. · 38, 112 Haddow, G. · 25, 112 Hallett, H. · 92, 93, 112 Harrald, J. R. · 16, 112, 115 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative · 98, 99, 112 Head, M. · 66, 112 Heath, C. · 18, 109, 112, 115 Hester, S. · 89, 112 HM Government · 47, 112 Howe, J. · 97, 112 Hufnagel, S. · 61, 109, 110, 111, 112, 117
I
ICO · 50, 112 IDC · 112 Ignatieff, M. · 21, 112 Interpol · 71, 113 Introna, L. · 9, 18, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 113 IPU · 86, 112 Irwin, A. · 32, 113
J
Jennings, B. · 30, 31, 44, 113 Jillson, I. · 31, 32, 113 Jones · 28, 29, 113 Jul, S. · 38, 113
K
Kafka, F. · 41, 104, 113 Kendra, J. · 49, 113 Kimbell, L. · 18, 113 Klontz, J. C. · 40, 113 Knight, K. · 103, 114 Knorr-Cetina, K. · 114 Kristensen, M. · 18, 108, 114
L
Ladd, J. · 59, 114 Lahlou, S. · 18, 111, 114 Larkin, G. · 44, 47, 48, 49, 114 Larsson, P. · 72, 78, 114, 116 Lash, S. · 16, 114 Latour, B. · 39, 40, 41, 42, 114 Legrand, T. · 31, 114 etou e , . · 1 , 11 Liegl, M. · 1, 5, 47, 107, 115 Luff, P. · 18, 112, 115
Lury, C. · 18, 115 Luzeaux, D. · 115 Lynch, M. · 90, 115, 117 Lyon, D. · 10, 104, 115
M
MacAskill, E. · 102, 115 Mackay, W. · 18, 115 Maeda, Y. · 103, 115 McKinsey Global Institute · 115 McMaster, R. · 49, 59, 93, 94, 96, 115 Mendonça, D. · 16, 49, 115 Merleau-Ponty, M. · 25, 115 Merton, R. · 32, 115 Mill, J.S. · 21, 109 Moses, R. · 33, 34 Mouffe, C. · 38, 115 Moynihan, D. P. · 31, 116
N
Nathan, L. P. · 18, 116 Norman, D.A. · 9, 33, 94, 102, 106, 116
O
Obermeyer, N. · 100, 116 OCHA · 3, 8, 51, 53, 78, 79, 86, 99, 116 OHCHR · 8, 82, 118 Olsson, S. · 63, 69, 72, 73, 78, 106, 114, 116
P
Palen, L. · 16, 27, 97, 114, 116, 118, 119 Perng, S. · 26, 32, 107, 108 Phillips · 39, 116 Polanyi, M. · 116 Powers, T. M. · 21, 64, 65, 111, 116, 117 Prieur, M. · 45, 116
Q
Quarantelli, E. L. · 23, 94, 102, 109, 116
R
Ramirez, L. · 16, 26, 31, 32, 107, 116 Rauhofer, J. · 25, 101, 102, 116 Rawls, J. · 38, 117
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Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies · 33, 44, 61, 72, 83, 84, 86, 113, 117
Reding, V. · 102, 117 Rizza, C. · 32, 117
S
Sacks, H. · 90, 117 Samek, J. · 66, 117 Sandin, P. · 22, 23, 117 Scheppele, K. L. · 21, 65, 94, 102, 104, 117 Schmidt, K. · 92, 117 Schmitt, C. · 20, 21, 64, 110, 117 Shanley, L. · 53, 100, 101, 117 Shapiro, D. · 103, 107, 117 Simon, H. · 105, 117 Sismondo, S. · 117 Solove, D. J. · 104, 117 Sorell, T. · 22, 23, 117 St. Denis, L.A. · 118 Starbird, K. · 97, 118, 119 Steinert, H. · 65, 118 Suchman, L. · 18, 118 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency · 62, 118
T
Tala, J. · 67, 118 Tanguay-Renaud, F. · 22, 118 Taylor, A. · 38, 118 The Food and Agriculture Organisation · 82, 118 Thrift, N. · 101, 118 Thurnell-Read, T. · 92, 118 Tierney, K. · 22, 23, 27, 118 Tulich, T. · 104, 118
U
UK Government · 26, 102, 118 UN General Assembly · 84, 118, 119 UN Habitat · 119 UN Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance · 119 UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction · 71, 119
UNCRD · 3, 8, 82, 119 UNDP · 3, 8, 81, 82, 119 UNESCO · 58, 119 UNHCR · 8, 82, 119 UNICEF · 8, 82, 119 Urry, J. · 108, 114, 119 US Department of Homeland Security · 40, 119
V
Vertigans, S. · 40, 119 Viens, A. M. · 31, 112, 117, 119 Vieweg, S. · 16, 98, 116, 119 Vinck, P. · 16, 33, 51, 53, 114, 119
W
Wahlgren, P. · 1, 5, 18, 26, 50, 58, 70, 107, 119 Walzer, M. · 23, 119 Watson, H. · 32, 120 Webb, G. · 49, 120 Weick, K. · 49, 50, 120 Wenger, E. · 92, 120 WFP · 8, 82, 120 WHO · 3, 8, 82, 120 Winner, L. · 33, 120 Winograd, T. · 120 Wirth, S. · 48, 120 Wright, D. · 18, 109, 120 Wynne, B. · 32, 33, 39, 120
Y
Yar, M. · 102, 120 Yeo, K. T. · 120
Z
Zack, N. · 22, 23, 24, 25, 44, 120 Zedner, L. · 20, 120