Czechoslovakia and the Powers, September 1938 Author(s): David Vital

8/13/2019 Czechoslovakia and the Powers, September 1938 Author(s): David Vital

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Czechoslovakia and the Powers, September 1938Author(s): David VitalReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1, No. 4, Socialism and War the Dismissal ofJellicoe Munich: The Czech Dilemma Russians in Germany 1900-1914 (Oct., 1966), pp. 37-67Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

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zechoslovakia n d t h eP o w e r s eptember 9 3 8David VitalThe presentarticle s concernedwithtwocloselyrelatedquestions:why did the CzechoslovakGovernmentaccept the terms of theMunich Agreementand to what extent was the alternativeof re-jectingthe Agreementa feasible courseof action?

* * *At the foundationof Czechoslovakoreignpolicy lay the alliancewith Franceand the cornerstoneof that alliancewas Czechmili-tarypower.Masaryk ndBenesmayhavebeen,in theirway,ratherold-fashioned iberals,but they were not pacifistsand they were,on the whole,unsentimental n theirappreciation f worldaffairs.Duringthe firstWorld Warthey conceivedand formed the CzechLegionsto servetwo ends: to embody n the mosttangiblewaythestill unrecognizednationhoodof their country and at the sametime, by contributing o the generaleffort,to lay a claimon theloyaltyandrecognitionof the Allies. After the establishment f theCzechoslovakState much the same purposesunderlaythe verygreat effortput into the armaments ndustryand into the armyitself. A small nation, they reasoned,surroundedby greaterandlesserenemies,needsgreat riends.Tradition,politicalphilosophy,the Versailles settlement, common interests and sentiment alldictated hatthealliancewith Francebe madeas secureaspossible.The sometwo scoreCzechdivisionswere conceivedas a contribu-tion that no French General Staff could ignore; nor could theSkoda plants at Brno and Pilsen; nor the possibility of all thismilitarywealth falling into the hands of the Germans.1Finally,there was Czechoslovakia's eographical ituation,the spearhead

1 President Benes was preparedto remind French listeners of this result'dans l'hypothese inconcevable de votre ddfaillance'. Interview with Prof.Henri Hauser on o1 May I938, in L'Annee politique franfaise et dtrangere, I939,p. 114.37

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CONTEMPORARYHISTORYin Germany's side or, as Hitler put it on another occasion, the'aircraftcarrier' in the heart of Europe.

While active French interest in Czech military power tended toevaporate with the general failure of French nerve in the face ofresurgent Germany, this last advantage, the geographical one,attracted them to the end. Facilities for French bomber squadronswere maintained in Czechoslovakia, whence Berlin could bebombed at a distance shorter than that between Paris and theGerman frontier at the nearest point.2There was no question of the Czechs refusing the French theuse of these facilities and there was no question that in the eventof war between France and Germany they would enter it. This wasaxiomatic; it was the price they had to pay for their own security.In 1933 and again in 1936 the Germans offered the Czechs a non-aggression pact. On both occasions Benes stood firm.On the other hand, if it was the Czechs who were attacked, itwas not expected that the French would rush to assist them actively.What was expected was that the French declare war on Germany.That alone would immobilize a substantial part of the Germanarmy. The Czechs, for their part, would defend themselves againstthe rest. The main thing was for the Germans to realize that a warwith Czechoslovakia implied a general war.It was a simple, brave theory, easily translated into an evensimpler national policy: everything must be subordinated to theinterests of the French alliance, which with time acquired a certainsanctity. It was rude to question it. 'How dare you say such thingsof your country, you a Frenchman ?' said an indignant Benes tohis good friend Hubert Beuve-Mery, in the spring of 1938, whenthe latter came to warn him that he should not put absolute reli-ance in France.3 The indignation was sincere. 'I know the historyof France. She has never failed her word. She will not begintoday.'The nub of the matter, however, was that the Czechs foundedtheir belief in the permanence of their alliance with the West on

2 Documents on British Foreign Policy, Third Series (henceforth DBFP),vol. ii, pp. 395-6.3 H. Beuve-Mery'stestimonybefore the French ParliamentaryCommissioninquiringinto the events leading up to the second World War, in AssembleeNationale, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission chargie d'enqueter sur lesevdnementssurvenus en France de I933 a 1945 (henceforth Les evtnementssurvenusen France),Annexes(Depositions),vol. iii, p. 8I8.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSthe undoubted fact that both they and the French were bene-ficiariesof the Versailles ettlement.They wereamongthe firsttorecognizethat Hitler was intent on the destructionof Versailles,and Benes and his colleaguesmade the greatest possible efforts,over a periodof years,to convince all who caredto listen that thevictorpowersand their clientsmust sticktogether.Germanywasbent on destroyingVersaillesand the key to the VersaillesarchwasCzechoslovakia.t was therefore n the interestsof the Britishand the Frenchto help Czechoslovakiao help itself. By doing sotheywould enhance heir ownpower.It wasa good case,sincerelyheld. It was persisted n to the end:Even f the Czechoslovak overnment ereresigned o the proposedsacrifices,hequestion fpeacewouldn nowaybesettled... To para-lyse Czechoslovakiaouldentaila profoundpoliticalchange or thewholeof Centraland South-eastEurope.The balanceof forces inCentralEuropeand in Europe n generalwould be upset;and thiswouldnotfail to producemportantonsequencesn everyotherstateandparticularlylso n France .. Czechoslovakiaasalways emainedfaithful o treaties nd has carried utengagementsrising romthem... Shehas beenandalwayss ready o honour reaties n all circum-stances.4Thus the centralargumentof the initial Czechoslovak eplyto theAnglo-Frenchproposalsof 19 September,rejectingthe demandthat the frontiersbere-drawnon abasis of self-determination.Butby then, unfortunately, he foundation of the case (and of thealliance)had long since collapsed.In I938 the maintenanceofVersailleswasno longerthe firstpriorityof the French,still less ofthe British.The two governmentswere now concernedwith onematterabove all others: the avoidanceof war. And they held tothis with great tenacity. In contrast, the centralpurposeof theCzechoslovakGovernmentduring the months leading from theAnschluss to the Septembercrisis- and duringSeptember"tselfpractically o the end- was to manoeuvrea return o the statusquoante.At thevery easttheyhopedto salvage omethingof substancefrom the wreckage.To this end they agreedto a series of verysubstantialconcessionsto westernpressure,the efficacyof whichwas vitiatedfrom the outset by the divergent purposesand out-look of the two sides. These concessions were demandedby the

4 DBFP, vol. ii, p. 43I-4.39



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYBritish and French as steps towards the settlement of the SudetenGerman problem and, of course, more generally as a means ofappeasing Germany. The Czechs, on the other hand, saw themexclusively as concessions in the interests of preserving theirrelationship with the West. But in this the West had already lostmuch of its interest.

Nevertheless, the concessions were of the highest importance asstages by which the Czechs progressed towards a situation inwhich, once placed, they believed themselves compelled to capitu-late. And, indeed, by I8 September, when the Anglo-Frenchministerial conference opened in London and the crisis was un-mistakably upon them, they had added up to a great deal.On 23 July I938, the Czech Government agreed to the arrival ofIord Runciman as 'mediator'. On 5 September they concededself-government to the Sudeten Germans. On I5 September Benesmade a point of mentioning to the British Minister in Prague,Newton, that at the Paris Peace Conference he, Benes, had per-sonally been in favour of excluding certain German-speaking areasfrom Czechoslovakia. This was duly reported to London, as it wascertainly meant to be. A day later, the Prime Minister, Hodza,hinted to Newton that if some territorial cession was insisted uponit might be possible to surrender the areas Benes had had in mind.Lest there be any mistake, the British Military Attache, Lieutenant-Colonel Stronge, was on the following day given to understand thatthe Army would not object to such a transfer.5 (All this was takento concern a fairly substantial area inhabited by from 800,000 toone million people.) Thus by the time Chamberlain had returnedfrom Berchtesgaden and was meeting the French Ministers inLondon on the i8 September, the assembled Ministers and theiradvisers were awarethat step by step, under their own heavy pres-sure, the Czechs had made two vital concessions. They had acceptedthe Western Powers as their interlocutors in their conflict withGermany, rather than deal with the Germans themselves. Theyhad accepted, too, that they must offer a territorial sacrifice. Thesewere, of course, the two fundamental elements of the MunichAgreement.The consequence was that when the ministerial conference

5 DBFP, vol. ii, pp. 333, 358, 364-5.40



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA ND THE POWERSopened in London the participants had no reason to contemplatetoo seriouslya Czechrefusalof what Hitlerand Chamberlain adostensibly agreedupon at Berchtesgaden,.e. that the solutionofthe problemthey were, formally, consideringwould be based onthe principleof self-determination.Nor did they.Daladier could be even more specific. He told Chamberlainprivately,beforethe formalconferencebegan,thathe hadreceiveda confidential ntimation romPrague hatthe Czechswouldagreeto concessions. So you see there is nothingwe cando.' Chamber-lainreplied, 'Prague tselfrecognizes hat.'6

In the courseof the London discussions t wasreadilyconcededthatthe Czechs wouldrejectthe ideaof holdinga plebiscite n thedisputedareas.It wouldopenthe floodgates odemands romotherneighbours.On the otherhand,a straightforwardessionof terri-tory was in a differentcase. 'If friendlypressurewerebroughttobearon Prague,pointingout all the difficultiesand stressingthenecessity of giving up some portion of Sudeten territory,'then,Daladier elt, the CzechoslovakGovernmentmight agree.7Thus by the time the crisisopenedwith the presentation o theCzechsof theAnglo-Frenchproposals toaccept heBerchtesgadenformulawith all its implications), he Czechpositionvis-a-vis theWesternPowers had been thoroughlyeroded. And as the crisisdevelopedand as furtherddmarches, anoeuvresand concessionsfollowed,it became ncreasinglydifficult o reverse he directionofevents.The Anglo-Frenchproposalsof 19 September, f implemented,would have meant very nearly as substantialan amputationofCzechoslovak erritory,wealth and militaryinstallationsas laterfollowedat Munich. So whilethe Czechshadresigned hemselvesto cedingterritory, imited, they hoped, to a palatableminimum,theynow sawthatthey hadmiscalculated.Their firstreactionwasto temporizeand to suggesta watering-down, pecifically o returnto what they themselves had alreadyofferedthe Sudetenleadersand, at the sametime, to invoke their Treatyof ArbitrationwithGermany.But the pressurethat accompanied he proposalswasso intensethat in verynearly he samebreath he Czechs ndicated6 Daladier related this to the French ParliamentaryCommission. He wastestifying under oath, afterthe war. There is no apparentreasonto disbelievehim. (Les dvenementssurvenus en France, Annexes (Depositions), vol. i, p. 33-4.)7 DBFP, vol. ii, p. 389-90.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYthat this wasnot theirfinalanswer.Meanwhile hey debatedwhatto do - almostcontinuously rom the earlyafternoonof 19 Sep-temberto the afternoonof 21 September.Before them was theuncompromising emand hatthey give a positiveanswerwithoutdelay. Chamberlainwas due back at Godesbergfor his secondmeetingwith Hitleron 22 Septemberand 'it might be disastrousif he shouldhaveto go withoutanyanswer romPrague'.The specialhorrorof the trap they had helped to prepareforthemselves ayin the fact thattherewas now no difference,exceptin tempo, between what the Germansdemanded and what theBritish andthe Frenchrequired.The alliancewith the West hadbeen turned inside out and upside down. Instead of easing theGermanpressureon Czechoslovakia,he Britishand the Frenchwere addingto it. And becauseof the historical, deologicalanddoctrinalaurathe allianceborein Czecheyesthe westernpressurewas,if anything,morepainfulandmore effective han the German.Three courses of action were now open to the CzechoslovakGovernment:

(a) They coulddefy the GreatPowers,rest on theirarms andawait developments in the full expectationof war with theGermans.(b)They couldappealeitherto the Russiansor to the Leagueof Nationsor bothandmeanwhileproceedas in (a).(c) They couldgivein to westernpressureandseekto salvagewhatremainedof the traditional oreign policyandorientation.

To encourage he Czechs to adoptthe third coursethe WesternPowershadbaitedtheirdemandwiththe offerof guarantees.Thusthe BritishMinisterin Praguecould argue, quite plausibly,thatfromthe pointofviewof the futureof the country t seemedto himthat the choice lay between worse than loss of everything acquiredinI918 and on the otherhandthe retentionbackedby a Britishguaranteeof nearlyeverythingwhich they had gainedin so far as concernedtheunity and independenceof the Czechsand Slovaksthemselvesand theterritories n which they were a majority.This wasshrewdandconcise.Benesretorted hatthe guaranteehealreadypossessedhad now provenvalueless.Yet Newton felt hecouldreporthis impression hat 'PresidentBenesis morelikelyto

8 Halifax to Newton, DBFP, vol. ii, p. 406.42



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSacceptthanto refuseandis veryreceptive o anyreasonwhichwillhelp him justifyacceptance o his people'.

It is, indeed, characteristichat even at this earlystage,namelythe initialpresentation o Benes of the Anglo-Frenchproposalsat2 p.m. on I9 September,Newton alreadyhad somethingmoresubstantial o go on than his 'impression' hat the Presidentwouldprobablyaccept hem.The samemorning andthereforebefore heinterview with the President) the British Military Attache hadvisited the GeneralStaffand had discovered hat the substanceofthe proposalswasalreadyknown.He wasalsotold thatit wasnotproposed o resistand that'everyofficer... wouldobeythe ordersof the Chiefof the General Staff'.9It is almost inconceivable hatthis conversation should have taken place without authority.Furthermore, n view of the generalattitudeof the Army to theissue in question, here s everyreason o suppose hat theauthorityin questionwas the politicalone.Forthese reasons t is hardto escapethe conclusion hatthe firsttwocourseswereneverseriouslyconsideredbythepolitical eaders.Subsequentdevelopmentstend to bear this out, and in view ofBenes'profound nfluenceon events it is readilyunderstandable.By 1938 Edvard Benes had been responsiblefor the foreignrelationsof his country ornineteenyears,as President n the lateryearsno less than asForeignMinister n the earlierperiod.He wasa most experienceddiplomatand a professional tatesmanof thehighestorder.Hard-working, ntelligent,educated,possessedof afirst-handknowledgeof menand events that was almostunrivalledin his time, he wasregardednot withoutjustification s a consum-matenegotiator. n this he wasstrengthenedbyagiftthatWickhamSteed - who knew him well - thought exceptional:Especiallytrikingwashisability anabilityhe sharedwithMasaryktoputhimself ntheplaceofany oreign tatesman ithwhomhemighthave o deal,andto thinkout his ownproblemsntermsof thatstates-man's nterests rprejudices. hus he savedmanya minister rpoli-tician n Alliedcountriesrom rksomemental ffort.10Such an abilityhas been an essentialpartof the equipmentof theweakwhen dealingwith the strongin all times; Wickham Steedwas probably right in ascribing to it much of Benes' success

9 DBFP, vol. ii, pp. 416, 4I7, 412.10 Wickham Steed, 'Edward Benes', in Jan Opocensky, ed., Edward Benes(London, I945).43



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYthroughout the years. Yet this kind of sophisticationcan bedangerous. t canlead to too greata stressbeinglaid on diplomacyand to a tendency to believe that by diplomatictechniques thestatesmancando more thanbridgeminor andmarginalgulfs anddifferencesbetween states. There is a tendencyin the successfuldiplomat - and Benes was nothing if not that - to persist in believ-ing that always,somehow,somewhere, here is a solutionwaitingto be conjuredupby a sufficiently iftedoperator.This is perfectlynatural;the alternative s for the diplomat,like a doctor at thedeathbed, o retireandcallinarepresentativef anotherprofession.Loyalty, professionalreflexes and a sense of responsibilityareusuallyall toostrong or that.Sincethe alternative o acceptanceof the Anglo-Frenchproposalswaswar with Germany, omethingmust be saidaboutthe relativestate of the Germanand Czech forces. The question of Sovietassistancewill be consideredseparately; n anycase it was condi-tional n the first nstanceon Czechresistance,quiteapart romtheproblem arisingfrom the formal Soviet undertaking o aid theCzechsprovidedthe French fulfilled theirobligations.The Czechoslovaks evotedbetween15and20 percentof theirannualstatebudgetto defence.In the recordyearof 1938 plannedexpenditure oseto 44 percent. These areofficial igures,andit isnot clear whether they fully reflect acquisitionof aircraftfromabroad.They are nevertheless ndicativeof the effortmade, andby the time of the crisis there wasa good dealto showfor all thatmoney.

The peace-timestrengthof the CzechoslovakArmy11was 17infantrydivisions and 4 motorizeddivisions,and this could berapidly expanded upon mobilization. When mobilizationwasdecreed on 23 September 1938, some 35 divisions were formed;11The figures that follow are all derived from published sources. Though thedetails cannot be entirely accurate, the figures do suggest the orders of magni-tude involved. No unreasonable discrepancies were noted in the informationsupplied by the principal sources which were: General Faucher, 'La Defensenationale tchecoslovaque, I918-1938', in L'Annde politiquefran;aise et etrangere,

I939, p. 85-I02; H. Ripka, Munich: Before and After (London, I939), P. I34-5;S. Grant Duff, Europe and the Czechs (London, I938), passim; Jiri Dolezal andJan Kren, La Tchecoslovaquieen lutte (Prague, I961), p. I3I; The Times, 27, 28September I938, and 24 March 1939; General Armengaud in La Revue desDeux Mondes, I5 April I938, p. 766-79; General Gamelin, Servir (Paris, I946),vol. ii, p. 353-5; and Czechoslovakia in Maps and Statistics (London, I944).44



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSbut even this did not represent he full strengthavailable,as overandabovethe divisional ormations herewere some60,000specialfortress roops,bringing he land forcesup to the roughequivalentof 40 divisions.Furthermore,he Septembermobilizationwasnotcomplete.A secondlinereserveequivalent o another en divisionscould havebeen calledup, but asit is not clearwhether hereweresufficientarms orthem,the totalof40 divisionsof landtroopsmaybe taken as a measureof the effectivestrength mmediatelyavail-able. Thus:

LandForces:I,250,000 men organized in I5 army corps of 35 or 34 divi-sions, of which at least seven were of special troops,i.e.armoured,mountain or cavalryformations;plus fortresstroops.30,000motorvehicles.700 tanks.16 armoured rains.200,000 horses.over one millionrifles.60,000light and heavymachineguns.2200 field guns (one source gives a figure of 3200) of allcalibres anging romlightfieldpiecesto 305mmhowitzers.2500 anti-tankguns.Air Forces:60 wingsequippedwith 1200 aircraft.Of these 600-700 werefirst-line craft.

The principaldeficiencieswere in anti-aircraft ndheavyartillery.(The German forces will be dealt with below, but to put thesefiguresin perspective t may be mentioned herethat the Germanplanof attackprovided or the employmentof 37 divisionsorgan-ized in ten corps.)The CzechoslovakArmy was a hardy, sober, and disciplinedforce. It was well trained and its officerswere well qualified ortheir tasks,though some foreignobservershad doubts abouttheprofessionalcapacity of those generals who still survived fromLegiondays. Its moralewashigh andthe Septembermobilizationdemonstrated eryamplyboth the disciplineandthe loyaltyof thereserves.Cases of Germanor Magyar roops failingto answer hecall or sabotaging t were extremelyrare. In any case, the great

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CONTEMPORARYHISTORYmajorityof the troops were Czechs and Slovaksand the officercorps overwhelminglyso. Even the non-commissionedofficerswere85 per cent Czech or Slovak.No unit hadnon-Czechoslovaktroops in a proportion higher than I5 per cent and even thenminority roopsdid not normallyservein frontierareas.It was generallybelieved that the staff work was good. TheBritishMilitaryAttache in Praguereportedon 3 September hatthe CzechoslovakGeneral Staffundoubtedlyavea capacityororganization,nd I do notexpectanyserioushitch n theprocess frapidmobilization,oncentrationr sub-sequentdispositions, xcept n so far as thesemaybe occasioned yenemyaction.The wholeprocesshasbeenthesubject f careful tudy,and such lessonsas canbe learnt romrecentmanoeuvres,he Sokols&c.,give groundorconfidencen thisrespect.12Their equipmentwas generally irst-rate.It wasproduced or themostpart n three arge actorieswhich wereamong hebiggestandmost efficient in the world at that time. Besides weapons andvehicles,the Czechsproducedverygood aero-engines.They werealsoequippedwith a plantfor theproductionof poisongas.The essentialmilitary unctionof the CzechArmywasto defendthe national erritory.In this taskit was aidedby the fact thatthepre-Munichfrontiersran throughdifficultterrain,except in thesouth. To makethe most of the naturaladvantagesand to com-pensate where there were none, the Czechs had constructedaformidablechainof fortifications. t was an immensecomplexofundergroundblockhousesand casemates,forts, electric barriers,tank barriersand undergroundaerodromes.By September1938,all this was complete with the exception of the sector facingAustria.Eventhere,however, he frontierwasveryfarfrombeingeasilypassable.The GermanArmyat this time wasby no means the largeandself-confident orcethatcutthroughFranceandthe LowCountriesalmosttwo yearslater.In April I938 its effectivestrengthwasnomore than 27 divisions, only three of which were armoured,cavalryor mountain roops.It was then estimated hat by dint ofspecial call-ups another I8 divisions of unequalvalue could beformed.(In the event,the Germansdidbetter.)In September hey

12DBFP, vol. ii, p. 258. See also General Faucher's testimony, Les devnementssurvenus en France, Annexes (Depositions), vol. v, p. 1191-21.46



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA ND THE POWERSplanned o employ37activedivisionson the Czechoslovakrontier,leaving five on the western front. Four reserve divisionswere tobackup the five active ones in the west, togetherwith 14 Land-wehr divisions.13The latter did not amount to much. The threeremainingactivedivisionswereleft in EastPrussia.Overandabovethis the Germanswere of course able to increasethe size of thearmyafter the fightinghadbegun;the French estimated hattheycould do so at a rate of fifteen divisions per month,'4 but inSeptember, the 37 divisions represented the maximum forceavailableor the attackon Czechoslovakian September venontheassumptionthat no more than a covering force was needed inthe West or on the Polish border. The decision to leave thewestern rontpracticallybarewasa most importantelement of theGermanplan.The qualityof the Germanformationcommanderswas almostcertainlyhigher than that of their Czech opposite numbers,butthat of the Germantroopswas not. Many were still half-trained,and there were not enoughjuniorcommanders ndNCOs.Germanequipment, too, was in many respects inferior to that of theCzechs,particularly he fightingvehicles and heavy artillery.Sixmonthsbefore,on theentry ntoAustria, henew German rmouredformationshad disgraced hemselves.Hitler laterrecountedhow'In the spring of I938 we enteredAustria. On the stretchfromLinz to Viennawe saweightytanks mmobilizedby the side of theroad- andyet what an easyroadit was Ourmen hadn'tenoughexperience'.15On the other handa higherproportionof the Ger-man Armywas mechanized,as indeed it had to be as it was theattacking orce.Thus in roughlymeasuredterms of order of battle, qualityofcommandersand troops,morale and equipment,neitherside wasobviouslysuperior o the other. Onthe Czechsidetherewere threestrategicadvantages,one of them immense. They were on thedefensive,and therewas no questionof morethanlimitedtacticalsurprise.They hadthe advantageof interior ines. And, aboveall,they had their fortifications.The Germanstook the Czech fortificationsvery seriouslyand

13 Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (New York, I953),p. 327; Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (New York, I952), p. 2IO.14 Gamelin, vol. ii, p. 347.15Hitler's Secret Conversations (New York, I961), p. 207.47



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYconsidered them the major obstacle. At a fairly late stage in theoperational planning, Hitler had altered the plan of battle lest,among other reasons, there be a 'repetition of Verdun' and a'bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished' by vonRundstedt's 2nd Army. But it soon emerged that there was no wayof avoiding the major fortifications entirely, for where they wereweakest, opposite Austria, a 'thrust in the I4th Army area will failbecause of [lackof] means of transport'. Hitler therefore ruled thatthe motorized and armoured divisions be assembled in the IothArmy, based on Schwandorf and roughly opposite Pilsen, and thatthe major thrust be made there. Only then would the i2th Army,based on Passau and coming up from the South, strike through tothe heart of Bohemia.16 At this time Keitel was denouncing thosewho doubted their ability to break through as planned. But atNuremberg he admitted thatWe wereextremelygladthatit hadnot cometo a militaryoperationbe-cause throughoutthe time of preparationwe had always been of theopinion that our means of attackagainstthe frontier fortificationsofCzechoslovakiawere inadequate.From a purely military point of viewwe were not strong enoughto stagean attackwhich would involve thepiercingof the frontierfortifications;we lackedthe material or such anattack.17As against this, the Germans could, in the long run, bring up vastforces to augment their effort. Taking the rough French estimatethat a month after the commencement of hostilities the Germanscould increase their forces at the rate of 15 divisions a month, theGerman force could have been more than doubled by the end of theyear, providedthere was no western intervention.18 Clearly, if themilitary balance of forces is considered in total isolation from thepolitical scene, there can be little question that Germany had it inits power to defeat Czechoslovakia. Where two states are of com-parable technological and social development and where onepopulation outnumbers the other five to one (or seven to one if the

16 Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D (henceforth DGFP), vol. ii,p. 686-7.17 International Military Tribunal, Proceedings, vol. ix, p. 2.18 The British Military Attache in Prague, commenting on a Czech GeneralStaff estimate that 75 German divisions might be used against them, thought thistwo to one superiority 'not excessive in view of the defence and the interior lines'.Telegram dated 27 September, DBFP, vol. ii, p. 567.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSminoritiesareleft out of the Czechaccount,asperhaps heyshouldbe), thereis no apparent easonwhy the greaternation shouldnotdefeatthe smaller f it has the will to do so. And of this lastfactor,atanyrate,there was no question.Butonlyin the ongrun;whereasit wasthe clearpurposeof the Germans o avoidan extendedcam-paign at all costs. It was on this issue, whetherin fact Czecho-slovakia ould be speedilybeaten,thatHitlerandhisgeneralsweredivided.Hitler saw fromthe first that the attackon Czechoslovakia adto be conductedwith the speed of lightning - blitzartigschnell.This was foreseenat the nowcelebrated onferenceof 5 NovemberI937, andreiterated n all the operationaldirectives.Thus, in thefully formulated Directivefor OperationGreen'of 30 May I938,it wasclearlystated thatIf concrete uccesses renot achievednthe first ewdaysbylandopera-tions,a Europeanrisiswillcertainly rise.Realizationf thisought ogivecommandersf all ranks nincentive o resolute ndboldaction.19Preciselywhata 'European risis' mpliedwas not noteddown;butit wasclearly ntendedto pointto a catastrophe f epicproportionswhich did not bearthinkingabout in detail.The reasoningbehindthis insistenceon speed is plain enough. First, the western fronthadto be left practicallybareforlackof troops.Determination nd2000 anti-tank guns were expected to prevent disaster if theFrenchmoved,but clearly he Bohemiancampaignhad to be overand done with andthe bulkof the troopsbackalongthe SiegfriedLine before Berlincould breathefreely. Second, the prospectofbeingboggeddownin a long campaign n Czechoslovakia,venifthe French did not intervene,wentagainstHitler'spoliticalgrain.It was not merelya matterof prestige.It could have a disastrouseffect on moraleathomeanddrastically lterthe pictureGermanynow presentedto the West and to the Russians. It would inviteintervention. It would change the political and psychologicalclimate in which the Germanswere now operating. The timeallowedfor the completionof the task was, at first, 'a few days',laterit was extendedto eight. Whetherfromthe politicalor mili-taryaspect,speedwas an essentialelement of the plan.The CzechoslovakArmywas conceivedby its commanders s abodythatwould act in strategicco-ordinationwithalliedforces.A

19DGFP, vol. ii, p. 357.49 4



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYwarin which Czechoslovakiawould haveto fightalone wasneverenvisaged.Onthe otherhand, t wasperfectlyplainto all concernedthatin termsof battle,Czechoslovakiawouldindeed be alone,thedifferencebeingthatultimatelyhe full weightof westernmilitarypressurewould be turned againstthe Germansand the day besaved.It was neverfor a momentin doubt at the Czech GeneralStaff,or amongst competentprofessionalobservers, hat initiallythe full weight of the GermanyArmy would be thrownagainstthem and that they should and could withstandit.20Thus theimmediateand crucialdifferencebetweenwhatthey had plannedfor andwhatthey would be in for if theirgovernmentdecidedforresistancewastwofold:in military erms,the criticalperiodwouldbegin after a protractedresistance of, say, three months; inpsychological erms they would be only too consciousof beingalonein the ringwith a powerfulenemyandhostilebystanders.The Czechgenerals'essentialconfidence n theirabilityto with-standa Germanattackwas matchedby the Germangenerals'dis-like of OperationGreen. Their objections were technical andprofessional,not political.They didnot believethe GermanArmywasready orwar,theyhadno confidence n theirabilityto chargethroughthe Czechfortifications, hey were fearfulof leavingthewesternfront bare with a pitiful scatteringof troops and a stillincompleteSiegfriedLine, and they did not believethat the featcould be performed n a week and the troopsrushedbackto thewest. In theirview, too, therewas a distinctdangerof the situationdegenerating nto a world war. They believed they had a good,professionalcase against OperationGreen and they were unani-

20 See Memorandum submitted to the Supreme Defence Council by the Chiefof the General Staff on 9 September, in J. Dolezal, op. cit., p. I7-I9. GeneralKrejci complained of the tendency to underestimate Czech strength and over-estimate the opposition. Also: views of British Military Attache, DBFP, vol. ii,p. 258, 412, 567, 581; of General Gamelin, Servir, vol. ii, p. 353-5; of GeneralFaucher both in the article cited and in his testimony before the French Parli-amentary Commission; and almost all other authorities concerned. That it wasalso the considered view of the 2eme Bureau of the French General Staff maybe gleaned from an article on the subject in L'Europe nouvelle, 24 SeptemberI938. Those who thought differently were often plainly ignorant of the facts,though their influence on the formulation of policy was not impaired thereby.Thus Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times: 'After all, with a great power likeGermany surrounding your country on three sides, a row of fortresses in thehills cannot mean much more than the chance of holding up an invasion for afew days. It is a case of being killed on Friday instead of on Tuesday ' (Historyof The Times (London, I952), vol. iv, 2, p. 935.)

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA ND THE POWERSmous and not infrequentlyoutspokenin their oppositionto it,Keitel excepted.21Keitel and Jodl inveighed againstthem, but itwas indeed a good case andno professional rounds orignoring tcould be adduced.Jodl complainedabout their Miesmachereindnoted in his diarythat the General Staffdid not reallybelieve inHitler'sgenius,22and this wasvery close to being the crux of thematter.Hitler had no militarysolutionto the professional roblemposed by his ownrequirements.Presumablyhe hopedthatit couldbe entirelyskirtedby skilfulpoliticalmoves;if not,what waslack-ingin plainmilitarypotentialandcapabilitywould haveto bemadeup with dash,daring,andinspired eadership n the field.Two finalpointsshould be mentioned.Not onlywasthe moraleof the Czechforceshigh,butthe Germanswerealmost hroughoutconvinced that the Czechs would put up heavy resistance.Notuntil 21 September, .e. uponthe acceptanceof the Anglo-Frenchproposals,did the Germanassessmentchange.However, wo dayslaterthey had changedtheir mindsonce againandhad noted 'theincreaseof the Czechwill to fight'.23Second,thereappeared o be the possibility hata risingamongthe Sudeten Germans could be instigatedupon the outbreakofhostilities,or even before. A Freikorpswas organizedand armedNazi formationswere includedin the Germanorderof battle.Arising of sorts did take place on 12 September,but it was veryfirmlyput downby the Czechs,thus showingwhatthey could dowhen they had the will to do it.It can thusbe seenthat it wasthe view of both heCzechand theGermanmilitarycommandershat the CzechoslovakArmy, un-aided,couldput up stiffresistanceandkeepthe Germansat bay,probablyfor severalmonths, conceivably or manymore.24Boththe evidenceavailableat the timeandwhat hascome to light sincesupports his view.The defectionof Francedidnotmaterially lterthis stateof affairs.It was the politicaland psychologicalclimatethat changed.

21 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London, I948), p. 39-40.Also, Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 328-9; and Taylor, op. cit., p. 200-I.22 Jodl's diary,entry for o0 August I938, in IMT Documents, no. I780-PS.23 Jodl's diaryfor 22 and 23 September.See also E.M. Robertson,Hitler'sPre-War Policy (London, I963), p. 142-3.24 There wasa planto retreatgradually o a redoubt n the easternhalfof thecountry,and to that end armsfactorieshad been established here. The Frenchhad encouraged he Czechsto do so.51



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYIt follows that had the Czechs determined to resist Anglo-Frenchpressureand face the Germansalone t is - atthe veryleast

- unlikelythat the Germanswould have succeeded n destroyingthe Czechoslovak tate,while it is verymuch more thanlikelythatthe 'Europeancrisis' that Hitler feared would have occurred.On the other hand, the final outcome of such resistancecouldnot be certain.If certaintywas soughtit could be found only insurrender.Preciselywhat occurredduringthe 48 hours or so of what musthavebeenthe heart-rending ndhumiliatingdebateduringwhichthe Czech authoritiesdiscussedthe Anglo-Frenchproposalshasnever been made public. AuthoritativeCzech spokesmen25 avealmostuniversallypreferredo shiftattention othe debatebetweenthe Czechauthoritiesand the Western Powers. This reticenceisperfectlycomprehensible,but it meansthatanyattempt o under-standwhattranspiredhasto be highlyconjectural.It must be rememberedhatthe Anglo-Frenchproposals, evereandunpalatablehough theywere,did not specifya time-table orthe transferof territories o the Germansnor did they go into themodalitiesof such a transfer.It meant a great loss of wealth,military nstallationsand skilledcitizens.It meanttoo that therewould be a loss of strategicallyadvantageousborders.A weakerCzechoslovakiawas implicit in the cession, but though it wasoffensiveto nationalpride and extremelydisturbing o those re-sponsiblefor the defenceof the country,it was nevertheless ustconceivable hat the re-fashionedstate might be viable. GeneralSyrovywasto sayin his broadcastof 30 September:OurStatewill notbeoneofthesmallestn theworld.Thereareotherswhicharemuchsmaller, ndyettheyaresoundandresistant.Weshallhaveenough erritoryeft to giveus thepossibility f further ulturalandeconomicprogress. t is truethat we shalllive withinnarrowerboundaries,utwe shallbeentirely mong urselves.Manyhindrancesto thegoodandpeaceful dministrationf ourStatewill be removed.Agreement ithourneighbours,oo,willbe easier.OurArmywillcon-

25 Such as Hubert Ripka. Left-wing accounts (e.g. 'Pierre Buk', La Tragedietchicoslovaque (Paris, 1939), and more recent accounts published in Prague afterthe war) tend to lay great stress on Agrarian Party machinations. In view ofBenes' immense authority it would seem that the net effect of such pressurecould not have been great, still less decisive.52



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERStinue to have its taskand will protectthe nationand the Stateand willcontinueto be on guardas formerly.26If this was true after Munich, it was true afortiori nine days before.So far as national security was concerned, the loss of strategicfrontiers could perhaps be offset by the fact that Britain would nowformally join France in guaranteeing Czech independence. Asagainst the implied cancellation of the Franco-Czech alliance therewas an international, Anglo-French guarantee: it was a new re-lationship with the West, suited to the new times, deriving much ofits force from the fact that it was to be proclaimed at this difficultmoment. It was madness to go to war over the differences betweenwhat had already been conceded and what was now demanded andlose the life-line to the West in the bargain.A keen mind could haveperceived how things would go even before the formal Note waspresented. All this could be argued. And, as we have seen, theminds of those in authority were already made up on the morningof I9 September.Benes, and presumably his close associates, believed this to bethe wisest course. The soldiers had a much less certain and seem-ingly more cruel alternative to offer; in any case they 'wouldobey'. There does not seem to have been a real debate between thecivilians and the military at this stage. But it was expected thatmany of the political leaders would oppose it and that the popula-tion at large would hate it.There was another problem. It was clear to the President and tomost of those who had actual dealings with the western statesmenand diplomats that the Western Powers would not hesitate to useany available weapon in the political armoury. They were intenton a Czechoslovak surrender; for them it was a matter of life ordeath and argument could not possibly sway them. But, at the sametime, Czechoslovakia had not merely a moral, but a formal andlegal right to insist on western support against Germany. It wastherefore not enough that the Governmentshould sense or evenknow of the impending renunciation of their obligations by theWest. The renunciation had to be clear and unmistakable and

public. If the Western Powers - France in particular- baulked atthis and fought shy of actually certifying their refusal to honourtheir obligations, so much the better. A considerable diplomatic26 RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, 1938, vol. ii, p. 328.53



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYbattle would have been won. Either way, the Government couldnot be charged with failing to explore all available avenues ofescape.Thus on September 20, approximately 24 hours after his inter-view with Benes, Newton was telegraphing that he had had it froma very good source (Hodza ?) that the official reply just handed tohim that evening 'should not be regarded as final'.A solution must however be imposedupon the Governmentas withoutsuch pressure many of its members are too committedto be able toacceptwhat they realiseto be necessary.If I can delivera kind of ulti-matum to President Benes, Wednesday,he and his Governmentwillfeel able to bow to force majeure. t might be to the effect that in theview of His Majesty'sGovernment he CzechoslovakGovernmentmustaccept the proposalswithout reserveand without furtherdelay,failingwhich His Majesty'sGovernmentwill takeno further interest in thefate of the country.I understand hatmy Frenchcolleague s telegraph-ing to Parisin a similarsense.27Lacroix, the French Minister, did indeed send a telegram, onewhich was later the subject of much dispute since part of it wasexploited by the French Foreign Minister in the public debate thatfollowed Munich.28 After the war, Lacroix told the FrenchParliamentaryCommission of Inquiry what had occurred:M. Hodza, Presidentdu Conseil, me convoquapar telephone.J'inter-rompisaussit6tmon travailpourme rendreAson invitation.M. Hodzame demandasi j'etais certain que la France se deroberaiten cas deconflit. Je lui repondis que je n'en savais rien et je lui proposai detelegraphier mmediatementA Paris pour avoir une reponse ferme. IIm'objectaque cette demarcheseraittrop longue et ajouta:'J'admetsapriorique la France ne marcherapas et si vous pouvezcette nuit memeobtenirde votre gouvernementun telegramme e confirmant, e Presi-dent de la Republique s'inclinera. C'est le seul moyen de sauver lapaix.29

27 DBFP, vol. ii, p. 425.28 See H. Beuve-Mery, 'La verite sur la pression franco-britannique',nL'Europe nouvelle, 29 October 1939; and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich(London, I948), p. I22. Georges Bonnet, Hubert Beuve-Mery, and Lacroixhimselfwere all closely questionedon the subject when they testified beforethe Commission.Lacroix'sevidence s convincing.29 Les evenements survenus en France, Rapport, vol. ii, p. 268. The questionhas been raised whether Hodza had Benes' authorityfor his request or not.Lacroix, at any rate, did not doubt it at the time, althoughhe told the Com-mission that Benes' capitulationsurprisedhim. Even in retrospecthe could

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSLacroixreceived his telegramcertifyingthe French decision todissociatethemselvesfrom Czechoslovakia'sate and Newton gothisultimatum.The celebrated udiencewithBenesatjustpasttwoo'clock in the morningof 2I Septemberensued.It was a long and painfulinterview.Benes pointed out his de-tailedobjections o the planandasked or clarification f a numberof points, including the precise nature of the guaranteeoffered.Then he justifiedhis country'sforeignpolicy and statedthat inpursuingit 'he had not been driven by the Soviet Governmentwhichhe hadkeptto one side'.He expected nternal roublesanddid not know whether the Government could control them.Finally,towardsthe end,M. Benes aid hathetookourdemarcheo be a kindof ultimatumndindeedonlysuchan ultimatumould ustifyhimandhisGovernmentnaccepting he Anglo-French roposalswithoutobtainingbeforehandthesanction f Parliaments wasconstitutionallyequired.Wethereforetold himthat our demarchead the character f an ultimatumn thesense that it representedhe finaladviceof our Governmentsnd intheirview he lastpossiblemoment oracceptancef theiradvice,f thiscountrywas to be saved.30But of course it was not an ultimatum n any acceptedsense. Itwas a threat o cut the Czechs ooseonverystormyseas,wipingtheslate clean of all that had been written on it since the French,twenty years before, had first recognized the CzechoslovakNational Council 'as the first basis' of the future CzechoslovakGovernment.As has been noted, Benes was careful to point out that he hadnot been guidedby the Russians,andlater it wasoften arguedonhis behalfthat one of the mainconsiderations nderlyinghispolicywas the fear that his countrywould find itself fightingwith theRussiansagainstthe Germans,with the West on the sidelines orworse,participatingn a generalcrusadeagainstcommunism. t isnot clearhow realthis fear was. The Czechswerecareful o main-tainfriendlycontactwith the Russiansandexplore he possibilitiesnot quiteunderstand t andthoughtthat internaldifficulties, .e. AgrarianPartypressure,might have been a cause. For, said Lacroix, 'a premierevue ... lePresidentBenes n'avaitaucuneraison de capitulerpuisquel'armeeetaitprete aentrer en guerre et que le Parlement etait en vacance. Je me suis toujoursdemande si le couragene lui a pas manqueau derniermoment'.30 DBFP, vol. ii, p. 450.

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CONTEMPORARYHISTORYof assistance,shouldit be decided to call for their aid. When thecrisis came the Russians were duly informed.On 19 SeptemberBenes summonedthe Soviet Minister, Alexandrovsky,and in-formedhim of the Anglo-Frenchproposalsandwhatthey implied.He also told the Minister that the Governmenthad rejectedtheproposals.Benes put two questionsto the Russians:Would theSoviets fulfil their undertakingsf Francedid? And, as Czecho-slovakiawould appeal to the League in the event of an attack,would the Soviet Union render assistanceas a member of theLeagueunder ArticlesI6 and 17? A tougherBenes,morecriticalof the West, emergesfromthe Soviet diplomat'sdespatch hanissuggested by the reports of the western envoys. The SovietMinister also reportedthat Clement Gottwald, the communistleader, had seen Benes on 19 September,but had not receiveda clearreplyto his questionwhetherthe Governmenthaddecidedto acceptthe proposals.In any event, the Sovietslost no time ingiving Benes an affirmative ndunequivocalanswer o both ques-tions.31They also informedthe French of the answerthey weretransmitting o the Czechs.This wason 20 September,beforethefinal confrontationwith the westernrepresentatives.On 21 Sep-tember Litvinovtoldthe Assemblyof the Leagueof Nationsbothof the Czechqueryandof the Sovietanswer,andof aFrenchqueryin the same vein that had precededit. Having backedtheir pri-vately transmittedreplies with a public statement, the Sovietpositionwas rendered ormally mpeccable.They appear o havewonderedwhythe Czechsdidnot askthemoutrightwhethertheywould offer unconditionalid if so requested,but did not insist.A requestfor, or an offerof, unilateralmilitaryaid, i.e. one whichhadneither he coverof a Leagueof Nationsresolutionnor the co-operationof the WesternPowers,would have implied a Russianinvasionof Rumaniaor Polandunderthe worstpossiblecircum-stances.They were clearlyreluctantto enter into a conflictwithGermanywith the strongpossibilitythat much of Europewouldbe arrayedagainst hem.32But to be set against he Sovietreluct-anceto enterinto such a conflictwasthe Czechoslovak eluctanceto invite them.

31 New Documents on the History of Munich (Prague, I958) (henceforth, NewDocuments), pp. 89, 90.32 Cf. Fierlinger'sdispatchof I7 Septemberquoted in WilliamV. Wallace,'New Documents on the History of Munich', InternationalAffairs, OctoberI959, P. 453.56



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSAll this was, however,subsidiary o the main business of therelations with the Western Powers. Foreign Minister Krofta's

circular elegramof 2I Septemberto Czech Missions abroadre-viewing developmentsdid not mention it and concluded,simply,with the followingparagraph:In view of this [Anglo-French]ultimatum,and being completelyiso-lated, the Czechoslovak Governmentwill evidently have to yield toirresistiblepressure.An answerwill be handedto the BritishandFrenchMinisters in the course of to-day.33On the day after the Czech surrender o Anglo-Frenchpressurethe Sudeten German Freikorpsentered Czech territory andoccupiedthe bordertowns of Asch and Eger. 'Reichgerman'SAand SS units joinedthem. Meanwhilethe GermanArmypropercontinued to move towards the frontierin accordancewith theOperationGreentimetable,and a fully orchestrated ndtypicallyvicious propaganda ampaignwas loosed againstCzechoslovakia.When, on the same day, Chamberlainmet Hitler at Godesbergwiththe Czechcapitulationn his pocket- he wasconfrontedwithnew demands.Brieflyput, thesewere thatthe 'German' erritoriesof Czechoslovakia to be delineatedby the Germans hemselveswere to be transferred o Germanauthoritywithin eight days.After the occupationby German roopsa plebiscitecouldbe heldin thoseareas;a plebiscitewouldin anycase be heldin otherareasnot immediatelyoccupied.This meant,in plainterms,thata panicflight of Czechs, Jews, German Social-Democratsand otherpotential victims of the Germanswould ensue, that the Czechforces would not have time to remove their stores, destroytheirinstallations,or organize new defences before evacuation, andthat,to crown t all,the entireprocedurewould be deliberately ndunmistakablyhumiliating.As the Czechsrightlypointedout, theGodesbergMemorandumwas 'a defacto ultimatum of the sortusuallypresented o avanquishednationandnot aproposition o asovereignstate'.Chamberlainwasappalledandangeredand,afterconcludingthat Hitler could not be shaken,returned o London.Butbefore eavingGermanyhe hadreluctantly greedwithHalifaxthat in view of the Germantroop movements 'the French andBritish Governmentscannot continue to take responsibilityof

33 New Documents, p. IOo.57



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYadvising them not to mobilize'.34 The Czechs, who until then hadobeyed the injunction not to mobilize, promptly and joyfully didso. The mobilization was an immense organizational success. Itwas more than a demonstration of the efficiency of the arrange-ments and the loyalty of the reservists. It was convincing proof ofthe high state of national morale and of the popular feeling againstcapitulation. 'No one who was there to see', reported the SpecialCorrespondent of The Times (26 September I938), 'could everforget the quietness and dignity with which the Czechoslovaknation took up their arms on Friday night.'35Thus by the time the Czech Government met to consider theGodesberg terms on 25 September the situation seemed to havechanged profoundly. At home, reconstituted under General Syrovy,they were riding on a new crest of popularity. Abroad, they couldwell believe that the Germans had finally and irrevocably revealedhow brutal, unscrupulous, and insatiably ambitous they were, andthat it was in the light of this recognition of the true state of affairsthat the French and British Ministers were meeting in London.The Czechs themselves had very properly been asked to send adelegation and make plain their views. The nightmare of isolationwas surely over and the policy of acceding to western wishes inorder to retain western friendship appeared to have justified itself.War was probably inevitable but no blame could be attached toCzechoslovakia which had done all in its power to save the peace.It was urgently necessary to secure Polish neutrality in the event ofwar, but for the rest Prague could await developments. Thusfortified, the Czechs felt they could reject the German terms andface the prospect of war with all the necessary courage and with adetermination eloquently expressed in Jan Masaryk's formal Noteto Halifax:My Governmentwish me to declare n all solemnitythat Herr Hitler'sdemandsin their present form are absolutelyand unconditionallyun-acceptable o my Government.Againstthesenew andcruel demandsmyGovernment eel boundto maketheir utmost resistanceand we shalldoso, God helping. The nation of St. Wenceslas,JohnHus andThomasMasarykwill not be a nationof slaves.34 DBFP, vol. ii, pp. 519, 46I.35 Cf. Colonel Stronge's indignant comment on doubts cast by his colleague inBerlin on the morale of the Czech Armed Forces, DBFP, vol. ii, p. 58 -2. Thereis abundant evidence to support his views in all the sources, Czech, French,British, and German.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSWe rely upon the two greatWesterndemocracies,whose wishes wehave followed much againstour own judgment,to stand by us in our

hour of trial.36The illusion,if illusiontherewas,that the WesternPowerswouldnow support them was of brief duration. The intense fear anddetestationof waramongthe dominantmembersof the BritishandFrench Governmentswas not diminishedby the feeling that warmightreallybe imminent.Aftera littlewhile,when the immediateshock of Godesberghad worn off, the Britishpulled themselvestogether and despatched Sir Horace Wilson to Hitler: '... so longas there remained even a slender chance of peace, we must notneglectanyopportunityof securing t'.37It is characteristic f theproceedings hatthiswas donebeforetheAnglo-Frenchministerialconferencehad ended or even arrivedatanyconsidered udgmenton the policy to proceedwith. Their purposewas clear and theywere correspondingly wift and uncompromising n its pursuit.WhatPrague houghtnow mattered ess andless, andthey ceasedto addressthemselvesseriouslyto the Czech Government.Fromthispointon, Newton'sinstructions, n essence,were to calmtheirgrowingfears:Youshould xplaino theCzechoslovakovernmenthat hecommuni-cationwhich is beingmadeto the GermanChancellorhroughSirHoraceWilson n no way prejudiceshe positionof the CzechoslovakGovernment.This profound ear of warwas onesourceof Czechweaknessvis-a-vis the WesternPowers. There was a second, less fundamental:the concessionsthey had alreadymade continued to dog them.Looked at in cold blood, the differencebetween what they hadalreadyagreedto (i.e. the Anglo-Frenchproposals),and did noteven now denounce, and what the Germansrequired,could bemade to appear procedural.It concerned not the principle ofcession,but 'the way in which the territory s to be handedover'.And this, in Chamberlain's iew, could be settled by agreement.No doubt, as he knew and stated in his letter to Hitler (quotingMasaryk),the Germanswere demandinga procedurethat washarsh in the extreme, and probablyendangeredCzech nationalsecurity. But it was nevertheless an incrementaldifference, a

36 DBFP, vol. ii, p. 5I9.37 Chamberlain to the assembled Ministers, 26 September, in DBFP, vol. ii,P. 537.59



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYmarginal addition to the great concession that had already beenmade. Thus in the battle for the minds of the Western leaders theCzechs were bound to lose and the Germans to win. The Czechscould only point to the injustice and the cruelty that would be donethem. The Germans could (and did) argue that the Czechs wereintent on precipitating a general war to avoid fulfilling their under-taking to hand over the Sudeten territories. All the Germans hadto do was to stand firm. And this, despite their nervousness, themutterings of the generals, and - in many cases - their own un-willingness to go to war at this time, they did. No doubt Hitler'siron nerve held them together. At any rate the debate was now con-ducted on this basis and it is hard to see how it could have had anyother issue but a demand that the Czechs make one last, marginalconcession.At the Four Power Conference at Munich that followed on 29September, the question of Czech acceptance of the emergingdiktat hardly arose in a serious manner. When it did it was dis-missed by Hitler on the grounds that if they rejected it it provedthey only respected force. Towards the end the conferees did askthemselves, What was to be done about the Czechs ? But this wasonly a procedural question, namely how the terms of the Agree-ment were to be transmitted to Prague. The demand to acceptthem, when it came, was peremptory. 'You will appreciate thatthere is no time for argument,' Chamberlain telegraphed Newtonfrom Munich; 'it must be plain acceptance'. 38The differences between the Munich terms and those of theGodesberg Memorandum - which the Czechs had firmly rejected -were extremely small, hardly amounting to technical or even cos-metic improvements. To Chamberlain they mattered because theyimplied the continued reign of international order, not anarchy.To the Czechs, the only significant comparison could be with theAnglo-French proposals. Ten days before it could at least beargued that while the issue before them was one of a very severeloss of territory and wealth and defensive capacity, it was possiblethat the operation might be followed by renewed health. Now

thiscould simply not be believed. At the very best, it could be hopedthat somehow, some day, the nation would outlive its enemies.The text of the Agreement was received at a quarter past six in38 DBFP, vol. ii, pp. 630-5.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSthe morning.The Germansdidnot requireananswer,butnotifiedthe Czechs that their representativeson the InternationalCom-missionwereexpectedat 5 p.m. the samedayat the BerlinForeignMinistry.The party eadersbegana meetingwithPresidentBenesat9.30a.m.andtheCabinetmet elsewhereatthesame ime.Shortlyafterwards othgroups,joined by the membersof Dr Hodza's ateGovernmentand two generals representingthe Army, met to-getherunderthe President's eadership.But if they believedtheyhad until the afternoon o decidetheywere soondisillusioned.TheBritish,Frenchand Italianenvoyscalledanddemandeda reply bynoon that day. And in fact at noon, barelytwo-and-a-halfhoursafterthe conveningof themeeting,the decisionto acceptthe termswas taken.

Justbefore this meetingBenestelephonedthe SovietMinister,Alexandrovsky.He informedhimof theAgreement nddefined heCzech dilemmaas between'beginningwarwith Germany,havingagainsther Britainand France,at anyratein the senseof the atti-tude of their governmentswhich are also workingon the publicmind, getting it to believe that Czechoslovakias the cause of thewar,orcapitulatingo the aggressor'.Leavingopenthe questionofthe decisionCzechoslovakiawould take, the Presidentwantedtoknow the attitudeof the Soviet Union to these two possibilities:further struggle or capitulation.39An answerwas requestedby6-7 p.m. However,at noon the Sovietenvoywasinformed hat noanswerwas now required.Reporting his, in turn,Alexandrovskyadded:From he wordsandbehaviour f Smutny ndGeneralHusarek,whomI alsomet at theCastle, havenodoubt hatBenesmadenoreferenceto the fact thathe hadreceivedno answer romthe USSR. Justthecontrary.He andthe LeftgroupoftheGovernmentvidently ctedonthe assumptionhat the USSR wouldcometo theirassistance t thefirstopportunity.his sborneoutby yesterday'sroadcastyMinisterVavrecka and the former Minister ... Derer who for the first timepubliclyannouncedhat the USSR wasthe onlyone whoremainedloyalallyofCzechoslovakiao theend.Asimilartatement,utnotovertheradio,wasmadebyBeran,he leader ftheAgrarians. llthree ookpart n the saidmeetingof Ministers.4039 New Documents, pp. I26-7.40 Telegram dated I October. New Documents, pp. I30-I. Neither telegramreached Moscow until the late afternoon. However, the Czechs never deniedtheir knowledge or belief that the Soviets were prepared to assist them. Thus,

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYClearly, he questionof invokingSovietaid was neverseriouslydis-cussed and the doctrine ayingdown thatthe Sovietalliancemustbe contingentuponaneffectivealliancewiththe West cannothavebeen seriously challenged.Nor was the military situation dis-cussed, except insofar as the generalswere asked questions,theanswers o which couldbe used to supportargumentsadvancedonothergrounds.The decisiveconfrontationbetween those who supportedcapi-tulation and those who opposed it took place after the officialdecisionto capitulatehad been made.A deputationof six seniorgenerals called on President Benes (who was also SupremeCommander). t was composedof the Chief of the GeneralStaff,General Krejci, three provincial commanders,the Inspector-Generalof the Forces,andthe PrimeMinister,GeneralSyrovy.The generalsargued hat the troopswerealreadymobilizedanddeployedin the fortifiedareasand that, in consequence, his wasthe timeto resist, f ever.They were convinced hat thepopulationwouldresist,evenif the Governmentdid not. 'Wemustgo to war,'they said, 'regardlessof consequences.The WesternPowerswillbe forcedto followus. The populationof the Republic s united,the Army is resolute,anxiousto fight. And even if we were leftalone we must not yield; the army has the duty to defend thenational erritory,wantsto go andwill go to war.'41'They begged, entreated,threatened. Some of them wept.'42PresidentBenes admiredthem and sympathized,but refusedtoreconsider.He gavethreereasons.The first relatedto the centralfactof the Frenchdefactodenunciation f theirTreatyof Alliance.The secondto the Polishthreatto occupyTeschen,with the mili-taryandpolitical mplicationsof fightingtwo enemies.The third,quite simply, to the foreseeableslaughter.Warwill come quickly(the Presidenttold them). GreatBritain,Franceandthe othernationswill not help us fightnow, but they will certainlyDr Hubert Ripka in 'The Repudiation of Munich', Czechoslovak Documents andSources, no. 6, I943: 'Soviet policy was prepared to implement its formal treatypledges to us.' At the time of writing, Ripka was Minister of State in theCzechoslovak Government in Exile.41 Edvard Benes, Mnichovske dny (London, I955), pp. II5-I7, quoted inOtakar Odlozik, 'Edvard Benes on Munich Days'. Journal of Central EuropeanAffairs, January I957.42 Speech by President Benes at Chicago, 27 May I943, quoted in B. Bilek,Fifth Columnat Work (London, I945), p. 75.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERShave to fight later- perhapsunder worse conditions.We would not beunderstoodby Europeandthe world if we provokedthe warnow. Thenation must endure. Do not give way, whateverhappens,and wait forthe right moment. Then we shall enterthe struggle again,as we did inI9I4. And we shall win again.Finally,The generals eft dissatisfied,embittered,and in a desperatemood. Andas for me, I ponderedseriouslyonce more the question: Have I madethe right decision in this terrible crisis?43There could have been no greater demonstration of the President'svast authority. At five o'clock that afternoon General Syrovy him-self broadcast the news of the capitulation to the Czechoslovakpeople.As the President in his farewell broadcast on 5 October expresslyabstained from explaining what had occurred ('I will neither analysethese events in detail nor criticise them today'), General Syrovy'sbroadcast remains the authoritative public statement. The threekey points were as follows:We had the choice between a desperateand hopeless defence ... andthe acceptanceof conditions ... unparalleled n history for ruthless-ness.... we were deserted,and we stood alone.All the States of Europe, including our neighboursto the North andSouth, are under arms. We are in a certainsense a fortressbeleagueredby forces which are more powerfulthan ours.Therefore the Government... cameto the conclusionthatif we had to choosebetween a reductionof our territoryand the death of the nation, it was our sacredduty topreservethe life of our people, so that we might emergefromthis timeof terrorunweakened.44Thus it may be seen that the decision to accept the Munich termswas taken quickly and under the heaviest kind of pressure. Therewas none of the careful, if anguished, deliberation which character-ized the lengthy discussions that preceded the full acceptance ofthe Anglo-French proposals. The only hint of a discussion of

43 Mnichovske ny.What wassaid in detail,undertheseheadings, s unknown.Fifth Column at Work.44 RIIA, Documents on International Affairs, I938, vol. ii, p. 327.63



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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYalternative olicies s to be found in the confrontation etweenthePresidentand the generalsand it is characteristichatit tookplaceon the generals' nitiative,not the Government's.With one exception, the argumentsthat appearto have beenadvancedby Benes andthose hinted at by Syrovywere based- atbest - on half truths. The defence of Czechoslovakiawas farfrombeing a desperateundertaking. t was certainlynot hopeless.Andto say categorically, s GeneralSyrovydid, thatresistance wouldhave meant the sacrificenot only of an entiregenerationof ouradultmen, but also of women and children',was simplymislead-ing. So far as the Poleswereconcerned,by30 Septemberheques-tion had been settled in principle and the Poles informedthatTeschen wouldbe ceded. This had beendone with the deliberatepurposeof obtainingPolishneutrality.45 he case of Teschenwasneitherso vitalto the Statenor so sound(fromthe formalpointofview) that it could not be sacrificed n the interestsof avoidingagreater acrifice.Finally, he Czechshadnotbeenentirelydeserted.They had no strongreasonto believe that the Sovietswould notcontinue to supportthem. It was by their own decisionthat theydeniedthemselves he opportunity o invoke Sovietaid.In the faceof this, discussionas to whetherthe Rumanianswould or wouldnot haveallowed Soviet forcesthroughtheirterritoryor airspace,or whether n facttransportacilitieswere or werenotadequate,arerenderedmeaningless.There remains the one - unanswerable - argument that resist-anceimpliedslaughter.No doubtthe Czech eaderscouldnot haveforeseenwhat the Germanoccupationof Bohemiaand Moraviawould be like. Perhapsthey envisageda new version,admittedlysomewhatmorebrutal,of Habsburgrule. Even such a regimeisreallynot comparablen terms of the physicalpainit inflictson thepopulationwith what is sufferedin war. The dread of a greatdisaster and a national blood-letting was understandablyverystrong n Prague.Yet there canbe no doubtthatthey wouldhavegoneto warwithoutanyreservationhadthe WesternPowersbeenwith them, even thoughfor manymonthsit would havebeen thesamefightingagainstverynearly he sameodds.'Nous n'attendonspas un nouvel Austerlitz,une armeefrangaiseen Moravie.Noustiendrons e coupnous-memes, e tempsqu'ilfaudra,dessemaines,

45 The notes exchanged between the Czechs and the Poles, as well as an im-portant letter from Benes to Namier, are in L. B. Namier, Europein Decay.64



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSdes mois, quatre, six peut-etre', Benes had told Henri Hauser onlya few months before.46

Like all civilized men of his generation, Benes hated and fearedwar. But war in good company, in an honourable cause, was onething. War conducted alone, with uncertain prospects, or war inthe company of one barbarian state against another - that wasdifferent. For the Czechs, with their historic defeat in the seven-teenth century in mind and their newly re-won and still fragilesovereign status, such a prospect was particularly terrible. Theonly way they themselves could act to preserve their nationalsovereignty - to be lost, in any case, at Munich - was by endanger-ing it in a harsh and bloody departure from their political andmoral norms.The case of Czechoslovakia in 1938 is paradoxical. In certainrespects it was an easily demonstrable model of what a small,enlightened nation could do to maximize its resources. Economic-ally, the country was strong. Politically, it had been for many yearsthe centre of a system of alliances which was anchored to theFrench, to be sure, but which owed much of its strength andinspiration to the Czechs themselves. Militarily, it was capable ofproducing a machine that in the moment of crisis was the match ofthe adversary's.That Czechoslovakia'sstrength availed it nothing inthe crisis is only natural: economic potential can be significant onlyas the basis of extended build-up of forces or as support in alengthyconflict. But the Czech alliances melted the moment they weretested or were left uninvoked; and the military machine played norole in the defence of the state and only barely in the calculations ofthe political leaders.How this situation arose and what alternatives faced the Czechleaders even as late as September I938, has been described. Hadthey been less fixed in their minds as to the policy they shouldpursue and more unwilling from the start to pay the price andmake the concessions demanded of them, it is possible that thesituation facing them on 30 September would never have arisen. Itwould certainly have been different in its essentials. Had theydecided on war when all other possibilities were exhausted there isno reason to believe that defeat was certain; on the contrary, theyhad every prospect of maintaining an effective and extended46 Henri Hauser, op. cit.

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CONTEMPORARYHISTORYresistanceand the Europeansituationwould most probablyhavebeen alteredthereby,as Hitler understood rom the first. Withinthe logic of whatthe Czechoslovakeadershad been tryingto dofortwentyyears, he most thatcanbe said s thathavingrecognizedthe failureof theirpolicy,theyaccepteddefeatandresolved o pre-serve their nation physically, until, 'as in I914 ... we shall winagain'.In termsof humanityandprivatemorality his argumentsclearlyunanswerable. n termsof the managementof a sovereignstateit borderson the absurd.Forwinning as in 1914' meanttotaldependenceon forces beyond their controland only marginallysusceptibleto their influence,if at all. It was the abnegationofstatehoodand the abdicationof sovereignty.It is difficult o escapethe impression hat these considerationswere discussed andunderstoodwithin an extremelyrigid frame-workof ideas. Czechoslovakiamust belinked o theWest;mustnotfight alone;must not enterinto an effectiverelationshipwith theSovietUnionunaccompanied y France;mustpreserve tsreputa-tion, even when the behaviourof otherpowersbeliestheirs; andso on. All theseprincipleshadstrongrootsin historyandin goodsense.Employed ogetheras a systemof rulesforpoliticalconductit is not surprising hat they led to disaster.But anotherquestionarises.WasPresidentBenesrightafterallin seeingor sensingthat Czechoslovakovereigntyhadtoo smallabaseto be more thanintermittentlyeffective,that in the long runit depended on the backingand approvalof much larger,trulypowerfuland sovereignstates?How else canhis ownfinal,publicjudgmenton his stewardshipbe understood?I onlywish to make t clear hatin the years1936-38Czechoslovakpolicyrightlydiagnosed hatwas he matterwithEurope. t didevery-thing, reallyeverything,o retrievehe situation f Czechoslovakia,fits friendsandofallEuropen the faceof Fascistgangsterismndpan-GermanNazismandof war tself.Inthatperiodwhen heEuropeanndworldcrisiswasapproaching,therewas no State n Europewhichcouldhaveacleareronsciencefdoing ts duty owardstsNationand ts friendshan heCzechoslovakRepublicunder hepresidencyf Masarykndmyself.47One answerwould appear o be that effectivesovereigntys less adirect functionof size thanof a complexrelationshipbetweenthe

47 Memoirs, op. cit., p. 33.66



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE POWERSstate, its purposes,and the externaloppositionto them. Grantedunquestionedauthorityin the domestic sphere, full exercise ofsovereigntywould seem to depend principallyon two factors:thewill of its statesmento exercise that independenceand the abilityof opposingstates (if any) to impede them. The outcome of anyconflictobviouslydepends, in the first instance,on the objectiveattributesof the opponents.But equally,where the will to employthose attributes s lacking,or whereit is paralysedby an apparentdisproportionn relativestrengthor for any otherreason,such asthe privatequalitiesandviews of the leaders,physicalstrengthandotherobjectiveattributesavailnothing. They are,in anycase,onlya potential.The management f a stateseemsto requirea special irmnessofpurpose and a blindness to all considerationsextraneousto theoverridingconsideration f politicalsurvival.The leadersof 'newnations' - as the Czechoslovaks were at the time - because theywill havespentmanyyearsarguing heircase in normative erms nother nations' chancelleries,are not always fully aware of this.Whentheyare,their initial nstinct s often to denyit. Theyremainin awe of the GreatPowers even to the extent of privatelydis-paraging heirownformalequalitywiththem. Giventhis frameofmind,the full rangeof possibilitiesavailable o the state is unlikelyto be surveyed,still less exploited.

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Czechoslovakia and the Powers, September 1938 Author(s): David Vital

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Transcript of Czechoslovakia and the Powers, September 1938 Author(s): David Vital