Cyber security public_health_threats_barnett_june 2014

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Cyber Security Threats to Public Health Daniel J. Barnett, MD, MPH Associate Professor Department of Environmental Health Sciences Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health

Transcript of Cyber security public_health_threats_barnett_june 2014

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Cyber Security Threats to Public Health

Daniel J. Barnett, MD, MPHAssociate Professor

Department of Environmental Health SciencesJohns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health

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The Problem

• “Everything gets hacked” – Bruce Schneier

• HITECH Rollout

– Increased electronic healthcare infrastructure

– Minimal coincident healthcare security

• Healthcare as a “tantalizing opportunity” for cyberterrorism (Harries & Yellowlees 2013)

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Blackouts…

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…Chemical Spills…

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…and Targeted Attacks?

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Attack Scenarios

• EMR Data -> Targeted blackmail/broad-scale mistrust in healthcare

• Public Infrastructure -> Large-scale crisis

• Medical Devices and Hospital Infrastructure -> Direct attacks on patients and providers

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Healthcare seems to “[lag] behind the other critical industries, mostly because of its diverse,

fragmented nature and a relative lack of regulation when compared with, say, the

energy industry.” (Colias, 2004)

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What can we leverage?

Barnett, Kirk, Lord, et al., 2013

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Health Care Delivery System

• Vulnerabilities

– Power/public utilities dependency (GAO, 2012b)

– Direct attacks/hacking (Kramer et al., 2012)

– Theft/loss of data

• Strengths

– Specialized skill sets

– Tested in stressful situations

– Used to coordinating complex workflows

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Homeland Security and Public Safety

• Vulnerabilities

– Communication disruption in EMS (Kun, 2002)

– Overload of a physical attack + cyber attack (Gellman, 2002)

– Coordination is a challenge (Lord & Sharp, 2011)

• Strengths

– Scale

– Training

– Unique portfolio of force use

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Employers and Businesses

• Vulnerabilities

– Ill-prepared for physical attacks

– Minimally-prepared for cyber attacks

– Part of medical supply chains (De Olivera et al., 2011)

• Strengths

– Diversity of industry

– Nexus for both production and centralizing citizenry

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The Media

• Vulnerabilities

– Communications/utilities dependent

• Strengths

– Scope of reach and role as “legitimator” of information (Wray et al., 2004)

– Social media coordination capcity (DHS, 2012)

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Communities

• Vulnerabilities

– Highly vulnerable to public health effects

– Lack backups and redundancies of other groups ( Clem et al., 2003)

– Social unrest possible (Choo, 2011)

• Strengths

– They’re our friends, neighbors and strongest allies when properly mobilized and informed

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Academia

• Vulnerabilities

– Limited capacity to respond during an attack (Wray et al., 2004)

• Strength

– Tremendous capacity to prepare for an attack (IOM, 2002)

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Governmental PH Infrastructure

• Vulnerabilities

– Subject to the same physical and cyber threats as other actors

• Strengths

– Can serve as a centralized actor and facilitator in public health emergencies

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How do we convene these disparate groups to proactively and creatively mitigate our respective vulnerabilities, and develop resilient systems that utilize our unique strengths?

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Our 2013 publication discusses a list of 10 recommendations for utilizing these resources...

…but we need more than publications on this topic…

…we need real, actionable solutions, and the means to implement them

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Next Step

• Creation of a Common Resource Core

– A Public Health Cybersecurity Partnership

• A method for convening the public sector, the private sector and academia

• A nexus for understanding the threat landscape and implementing solutions

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4 C’s

We need a resource that can:

- Convene all necessary parties

- Comprehend the threat

- Create the tools we need

- Collaborate on an ongoing basis

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What Comprises the PHCP?

• Risk Analysis Resources Core

• New Tool R&D Group

• Evidence-Informed Training

• Inter-Institutional Exchanges

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Step One – Haddon Matrix

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The Haddon Matrix

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Reference & Special Acknowledgements

• Barnett DJ, Sell TK, Lord RK, Jenkins CJ, Terbush JW, Burke TA. Cyber security threats to public health. World Medical & Health Policy 2013; 5(1): 37-46.

• Robert K. Lord, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine

• Capt James Terbush, MD, MPH, USN (Ret.), Martin, Blanck & Associates

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Thank You

• Questions?

[email protected]

• (410) 502-0591