CVE Supplementary Module for Moro

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    I. Muslims in the Philippines and the Creation of theARMM

    CITIZEN-VOTER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENTARY MODULE FOR MORO 1

    Muslims in thePhilippines andthe Creation of theARMM

    This module is prepared by the

    Institute for Political and Electoral Reform

    With Support from the

    United Nations Development Programme

    Commission on Human Right, and

    National Economic Development Authority

    3rd printing

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    Muslims in the Philippines and the Creation of theRMM

    CITIZEN-VOTER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENTARY MODULE FOR MORO 3

    However, talks regarding the details of autonomy entered a deadlockwhen then Pres. Marcos insisted and implemented his version of auton-omy, resulting in 10 out of 13 provinces voting for autonomy. It resultedin the breakdown of negotiations between the Philippine governmentand the MNLF.

    The events of the mid-1980 at the national level overtook the regionalevents, and on 1986 when the EDSA revolution deposed the Marcos re-gime and installed the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino.During Pres. Aquinos term, talks continued when emissaries were sentto MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). MILF wasbreakaway organization established by former MNLF Vice-ChairpersonUstadz Hashim Salamat. The talks resulted to the Jeddah Accord.

    Aquinos appointed commission to draft the new constitution also in-cluded a provision on autonomy for Mindanao and the cordillera regions.Furthermore, Aquino also organized the Mindanao Regional Consulta-tive Commission to draft the necessary autonomy bill, which was sub-mitted to Congress. She emphasized that this is the new constitutionalprocess that will further implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agree-ment. In 1989, Congress passed RA 6743, or the Organic Act of the Au-tonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. With both the MNLF callingfor a boycott of the plebiscite, only 4 provinces Sulu, Maguindanao,Lanao del Sur, and Tawi-tawi opt for autonomy.

    The 20th ICFM in Istanbul called for the resumption of talks betweenthe MNLF and the Philippines government, and talks resumed in Jakar-ta, October 1993. Over and above the different amnesty programs andthe thematic concerns discussed, the Final Peace Agreement was signedSeptember 2, 1996.

    As part of the peace agreement, Congress started drafting amendmentsfor the Organic Act. On February 2001, RA 9054, or The Expanded Or-ganic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was signedinto law. Adding the province of Basilan and the Islamic City of Marawi,but excluding the city of Isabela. RA 9054 remains the basic law thatdenes the structure and functions of ARMM.

    However, even after the peace agreement and the expanded organic act,

    Historically, Muslims in the Philippines play a great role in national de-velopment. Mindanao has become the homeland of Filipino Muslimseven before the country has been occupied by the Spaniards. The regionis often dubbed as the land of the plenty for being rich in agricultural,mineral, and marine resources. Filipino Muslims are recognized for its

    resistance to foreign colonialism and such strong resistance contributedin shaping their culture and way of life. Oppressed, disadvantaged, andmarginalized in what has become a predominantly Christian country,the Moros history has become a continuing struggle of self- determina-tion and self-rule. Moro was coined from the Spanish word Moors dur-ing the colonial period by the Spaniards to refer to the native Musliminhabitants.

    The turn of the 20th century has become an unstable period for the re-gion. For instance, settlers from Luzon and the Vizayas transformedMindanao into an arena for cultural, religious, and economic hostilities.Lands for example, were titled in favor of northern settlers, against theinterest of the organic communities. Government also provided supportfor the paramilitary groups such as the Ilaga, who regularly launched of-fensives on Moro civilians. Moro politicians were also disenfranchised

    and replaced by government-supported settlers. Consolidating and rep-resenting the Moro struggle against these and representing the Morostruggle against these oppressive initiatives, the Moro National Libera-tion Front (MNLF) was set up in the late 1960s. Though engaged in mul-tiple forms of struggle, the MNLF, with the support of the Islamic Con-ference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), began talks with the Philippinegovernment in 1974 to nd a peaceful and political solution to the crisis.These talks of course led to the Tripoli Agreement, which was signedby MNLF Chairperson Nur Misuari and Defense Secretary Carmelo Bar-bero on December 23, 1976. The Tripoli Agreement provided autonomyfor 13 provinces and 9 cities in the southern Philippines.

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    CITIZEN-VOTER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENTARY MODULE FOR MORO 5

    the region remains to be one among the poorest and least developed re-gions in the country. President Aquino in his talks about the situation inARMM cited that the reason for poverty is not because of lack of funds,he cited a recent Commission on Audit ndings that point to unaccount-ed funds (eg. None of the allocated budget for infrastructure was com-pleted). It is seen that there needs to be change in framework to addressissues of poverty, corruption, and impunity.

    Until recently, the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Framework of Agreementon the Bangsamoro that will pave the way for the establishment of the

    new autonomous political entity. It was signed in October 15, 2012 inMalacaang Palace, witnessed by Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III, MalaysianPrime Minister Dato Najib Tun Razak, and other dignitaries.

    The framework agreement will replace the current ARMM to a newBangsamoro Autonomous Political Entity, it is envisioned to be moreempowered and to have a more equitable system. However, the detailswould require a democratic mandate. It shall include the formation of aTransition Committee to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law and it shall beapproved by Congress.

    After the approval of the Organic Law, a plebiscite shall be conducted toapprove the geographical scope of the Bangsamoro. The people should beinvolved and participate in the decision making process.

    Meanwhile, a Bangsamoro Transition Authority shall provide for a tran-sitory phase to bridge the period between the plebiscite and the 2016elections. The Bangsamoro will have a ministerial form of governmentto allow MILF and other political groups to democratically participatein the elections. Political Parties will have a big role as citizen-voterswill be voting for political parties. The elections for the new Bangsamorogovernment will be held in 2016.

    Muslims in the Philippines and the Creation of theRMM

    Current Electoraland GovernanceIssues in ARMM

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    CITIZEN-VOTER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENTARY MODULE FOR MORO 7

    dents of election-related violent incidents happen, particularly in placeswhere warlordismwith its private armed groupsexists. The mostnotorious areas considered as political and electoral hotspots coincidewith the presence of a large number of private armed groups.

    This is especially true for ARMM where the bulk of private armed groupsabound. Electoral contests in the region normally coincide with the riseof incidents of election-related violence, exemplied by the infamous2009 Maguindanao massacre. ARMM election violence, along with vio-lence arising out of the Moro conict, forms part of the over-all politicalviolence in the area.

    There is an urgent need to address and solve the problems of warlord-

    ism, political and electoral violence, and political dynasties, particularlyin the areas where they are prevalent and threatening to the growth andstrengthening of Philippine democracy.

    Other governance problems branch out from these roots. It impedes eco-nomic development in both the region and in a national level because ofpervasive corruption. Absence of peace and stability discourage poten-tial investors from capitalizing in the development of the region. This isunfortunate given the available resources in the region. Poverty for thepeople becomes a major problem with lack of jobs available and inacces-sible basic government services.

    The people of ARMM should be vigilant in ensuring that the regionaland its component LGUs are open to the input of traditional and indig-enous leaders, the people are consulted regarding policies and programs,transparent in the processes of governance.

    Citizen-voters then must continually engage the Regional Governmentand its component LGUs to further mainstream their agenda and solidifytheir place as stakeholders in all political and developmental processes.

    The regional government of the autonomous region was instituted to ad-dress the cultural and religious distinctiveness of the region. Its relevanceis measured by how it addresses the basic needs of its constituents andthrough the religious and cultural sensitivity of its responses.

    However, the region continues to confront several governance and elec-toral issues that disregard the basic objectives of its creation. For so manydecades now, election violence had been one of the major problems thathinder from achieving peaceful and honest elections.

    Most election violence-related incidents are associated with anotherphenomenon--warlordism. Both feed on each other to create situations

    of electoral fraud and white terror that undermine the right of suffrageamong citizen-voters during the electoral exercise and eventually threat-ens democracy itself.

    Election violence and warlordism are often the offshoot of dynastic poli-tics and situations of close contests between or among political clans andcandidates, particularly in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao(ARMM). They are part of the triad we often referred to as the tradi-tional guns, goons, and gold politics in the country.

    In almost every election (and in between elections), hundreds of inci-

    Current Electoral and Governance Issues inRMM

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    CITIZEN-VOTER EDUCATION SUPPLEMENTARY MODULE FOR MORO 9

    The structure of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao reectsthe structure of the national government. It has a legislative body that en-acts policies to address the needs of its constituents in the region. Thesepolicies are implemented by the executive branch. Equally important, theregional government has the responsibility of managing the special courts that havebeen created to address judicial needs.

    Scope of Powers of the Regional Government

    - Administrative organization

    - Creation of sources and revenues

    - Ancestral domain and natural resources

    - Personal, family, and property relations

    - Regional urban and rural planning development

    - Economic, social, and tourism development

    - Educational policies

    - Preservation and development of cultural heritage

    (see diagram on the next page)

    The elective posts in ARMM have a three-year term, with a maximumof three consecutive terms. ARMM also has an Executive Council thatadvises the Governor on matters of governance in the region. It is com-posed of the Regional Governor, Vice-Governor, and Three Deputy Re-gional Governors representing the Muslims, Christians, and IndigenousCultural Communities.

    . Structure of Government

    Structure ofGovernment

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    . Structure of Government

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    REGIONAL GOVERNORChief Executive of the Regional Government

    REGIONAL AGENCIESREGIONAL VICE-GOVERNOR

    Management of Special

    Courts

    LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVES

    Provincial Governor

    Municipal Mayors

    Barangay Chairpersons

    Local Executive Agencies

    THE REGIONAL LEGISLATIVE

    ASSEMBLY

    - Speaker of the assembly

    - Basilan (3 seats)

    - Sulu (6 seats)

    - Tawi-tawi (3 seats)

    - Lanao del Sur (6 seats)

    - Maguindanao (6 seats)

    - 3 seats per legislative

    district

    LOCAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES

    - Provincial Vice-Governor

    - Provincial Board

    - Municipal Vice-Mayor

    - Municipal Councils

    - Barangay Councils

    Mechanisms forPeoplesParticipation in theAutonomous Region

    in Muslim Mindanao

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    (Book I, Title One, chap. 4, sec. 28-30) the Regional governmentshould promote the establishment and operation of NGOs and POs.LGUs may enter into joint ventures and other cooperative engagementswith NGOs and POs, and even provide nancial assistance.

    (Book II, Title Two, Chap. 5, sec. 64-71) the right of the people toinitiate the process of recall

    (Book III, Title One, Chap. 6, sec. 392-393) the Barangay must con -duct a Barangay Assembly at least twice a year. All Barangay residentsthat are residents of the area for at least six months, duly registered andat least 15 years of age can participate.

    (Book I, Title Nine, Chap. 2, Sec. 123-130) the people have the rightto initiative and referendum

    (Book I, Title Two, Chap. 1, Sec. 35(d), Book III, Title Two, Chap. 3,Art. 3, Sec. 441(b) for Municipalities, Book III, Title Three, Chap. 3, Art.3, Sec. 452(b) for Cities, Book IV, Title Four, Chap. 3, Art. 3, Sec. 461(b)for Provinces) Local Sanggunians must have sectoral representativesfrom women, workers and and a third sector, to be determined by theSanggunian concerned

    The people through their organizations can participate in Local Spe -cial Bodies (LSBs)

    o Local Health Board (Book I, Title Five, Sec. 98-101)

    o Local School Board (Book I, Title Four, Sec. 94-97)

    o Regional Planning and Development Board and Local Development

    Councils (Book I, Title Six, Sec. 102-106)

    o Regional Reconciliation and Unication Commission and the Lo-cal Peace and Order Council (Book I, Title Seven, Sec. 117-119)

    Aside from voting, the expanded organic act (RA 9054) and the LocalGovernment Code of ARMM (MMAA No. 25) provides for other mecha-nisms to advance democratization, peoples participation, and citizensstake in governance in both the regional and local level. These specicmechanisms are provided in the following statutes:

    RA 9054

    (Art.III, Sec. 14) The right of the people to legislative initiative andreferendum

    (Art.IV, Sec. 3) There should be sectoral representatives for agricul-ture, labor, urban poor, indigenous peoples, youth and women

    (Art. VII, sec. 6) The Appointment of 3 deputies (1 Christian, 1 Muslim,1 form the indigenous peoples) by the Regional Government

    (Art. VII, sec. 13) The RLA should provide for a system of recall

    (Art. XII, sec. 4(e)) Right of communities to consultations on issues ofpermits, licenses, franchises, and concessions over natural resources inancestral domains

    (Art. XII, sec. 12) The RLA should provide for the process of electing5 representatives from the private sector for the Regional Economic andDevelopment Planning Board

    (Art. XV, sec. 8) The Regional Government should promote the rightsof peoples organizations

    MMAA No. 25

    (Book I, Title One, chap. 1, sec. 3) LGUs should encourage the par-ticipation of the private sector, particularly in the area of delivering basicservices

    (Book I, Title One, chap. 3, art. I, sec. 23-24) NGOs and other sectorsmust be consulted for projects that may cause pollution, climate change,depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland or for-est cover, and the extinction of animal or plant species.

    V. Mechanisms for Peoples Participation in theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

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