Curs 10 Mental Causation

8/12/2019 Curs 10 Mental Causation

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Mental causation

Being strongly related to emergence, mental causation involves the relationship

between mental and physical. One of the well-known philosophers who has worked

on the problem of mental causation problem is Jaegwon Kim. Kims approach

belongs to nonreductive physicalism that in his view involves three doctrines:

mind-body supervenience, physical irreducibility in that mental properties are not

reducible to physical properties and the causal efficaciousness of the mental:

Mental properties have causal efficacy-that is, their instantiations can, and do, cause

other properties, both mental and physical, to be instantiated. (Kim 2005, pp. 34-5)

Kim depicts the main problem of mental causation as follows. There is one

mental property M that causes the appearance of another mental property M*. Within

the supervenience framework, M and M* supervene on P and P*, respectively. Then

overdetermination appears: M* is caused by P* and M. According to the exclusion

principle, M* must have only one cause. For reconciling the contradiction, Kim

introduces another principle: In order to cause a supervenient property to be

instantiated, you must cause one of its base properties to be instantiated. (Kim 2005,

p. 20) He argues that it is quite normal to accept the idea that if a mental event occurs

then at the same time something happens in your brain. This means that mental states

supervene on neural states.

Kims general view is this: we cannot admit mental causation and at the same

time accept all the following claims: (1) physical causal closure (2) causal exclusion

(3) mind-body supervenience (4) mental/physical property dualism (mental properties

are irreducible to physical properties). Kim analyzes in detail the alternatives for

avoiding this contradiction. The main idea is that it is not possible to accept

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overdetermination, because of the exclusion principle. Therefore, Kim believes that

the only solution is to give up on claim (4), property dualism.

Kim tries to find the place for mind in a physical world. (Kim 1998) Within

the physical-world in this case in accord to the physical exclusion principle, it must be

only one cause. For reconciling this contradiction, Kim introduces another principle:

In order to cause a supervenient property to be instantiated, you must cause one of its

base properties to be instantiated. (Kim 2005, p. 20; Kim 2006, 1998) He argues that

we can accept the idea that if a subject has a mental state in her mind at the same time

something it happens in her brain. This means that mental states supervene on neural

states.

After many years of hard working, Kim is aware that he cannot find a

definitive answer to the problem of mental causation. Consequently, in the book from

2005, he introduces one idea in his argument with which I do not agree. His idea is a

premise without any support. Almost bafflingly, Kim borrows one idea from the

great (his expression!) eighteenth century American theologian-philosopher Jonathan

Edwards. The notions for this dictum are vertical determination and horizontal

causation. Vertical determination means that macroscopic properties are vertically

determined at the same time by their microstructure. (Kim 2005, p. 36) This vertical

determination grasps the relationship between micro and macro levels. For Edwards,

however, vertical determination assumes Gods intervention. Horizontal causation is a

normal causal relationship between two objects/events in successive times. Kim calls

the following assertion Edwards dictum: There is tension between vertical

determination and horizontal causation. In fact, vertical determination excludes

horizontal causation. (Kim, p. 36)

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He realizes that it is necessary to preserve of horizontal causation, i.e. ordinary

physical causation, and at the same time to preserve vertical determination, i.e.,

supervenience, but to reject mental causation. However, even in this situation, he

knows that in general this argument does not work. Indeed, Kim writes that the

tension between vertical determination and horizontal causation has been at the heart

of the worries about mental causation. (Kim 2005, p. 38) He is aware that it is a

necessary refinement and clarification of this argument. (p. 39) If we accept

supervenience, irreducibility, closure and the exclusion principle (that eliminate

overdetermination), then we have to accept only the closure of physical causation and

to eliminate mental causation. Nevertheless, this downward causation can take place

from the mental level not to the neural level but to the fundamental physical level, if

this level exists.

According to Block (in Do causal powers drain away?) The exclusion

Principle leads to problems about causal powers draining away. (Block 1998 in

Kim p. 52-3) This is the generalization of supervenience: Supervenience is applicable

at any level. There are three alternatives: (1) we have causation only at the

fundamental physical level; (2) this level does not exist and so there is no causation at

all; (3) we accept the layered model, meaning that the objects and properties of the

world are arrayed in a hierarchy of levels because each level supervenes on the next

level down. Evidently, neither physicists know what the fundamental physical means

exactly level nor do philosophers know what precisely the layered model of reality

represents. In fact, the distinction between the fundamental level and the layered

model reflects the realism-antirealism debate under the unicorn-world umbrella.

Different special sciences (see Fodor) compel us to accept the existence of

objects, properties and laws at each level. But how then do we conciliate the existence

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of mind and the corresponding brain or the existence of a table and the corresponding

sum of micro-particles?

What does Kim reply to the idea of supervenience? He reminds us that the

supervenience is supported by the idea of the irreducibility of the mental. (p. 54) He

avoids two things: (1) the reductionist thesis which requires that the causal relation

M-to-M* is identical with causal relation P-to-P* and (2) causal impotence (i.e.,

epiphenomenalism). Kim considers that a micro-based property of an object reflects

its micro-structure, i.e., the micro-constituents and their relationships. (Kim 2005, pp.

57-69) At the same time, the micro-based properties of an object are its macro-

properties and there is no supervenience of macro- to micro-properties. Moreover,

certain chemical and biological properties can be explained in micro-based properties.

In this way, Kim avoids a positive answer to Blocks question Do causal powers

drain away? Against this idea, Block introduces the idea of multiple composition.

It means that the micro-based properties, by analogy with multiple realization, can be

realized in alternative ways . (Block 2003, pp. 145) However, Kim shows that this

idea is defeated either by disjunctive property/kind identities or instance (token)

identities. (Kim 2005, p. 59) Block replies with an endless subvenience. If each

level supervenes on some lower level, it appears to be a problem for causation: it

supervenes ad infinitum and this is not possible. But for Kim the solution that reflects

Edwards viewpoint can be that mental causation supervenes upon or depends on (or

derives from) physical causation. If Block writes that of course, the non-reductive

materialist who accepts causation at many levels should not recognize any tension

(Block p. 149), Kim believes that the nonreductive physicalist who accepts

supervenience ought to recognize the tension and to explain it. (Kim, pp. 63-4) Block

introduces his drainage idea to defeat the notion of supervenience but his position is a

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form of reduction. Kim stresses that we need a clear and forceful explanation of

mental causation in the context offered by the physical causal closure principle. But

this principle is available only for the fundamental physical level. In this sense, Kim

rejects dualism. He argues that the causation between two objects depends on a

shared space-like coordinate system in which these objects are located, a scheme that

individuates objects by their locations in the scheme. (Kim 2005, p. 91) If we reject

the existence of a bottom level, we have endless subvenience (a causally efficacious

property is supervenient on a lower level property) and accepting the causal exclusion

argument then there is no causation. (Block 2003, p. 138)

I want to point out a few things regarding the dispute mentioned above

between Kim and Block. To understand the reason why I examine this dispute in such

detail, the reader has to imagine it as a ping-pong game in (de)constructing arguments

that requires consistency and, because of the unicorn-world framework, a powerful

imagination. Within the unicorn-world, nobody can win such games even if Kim and

Block are both very good at the game of (de)constructing such arguments.

In the last chapter Kim draws his conclusion. The title of his chapter is the

same as the title of his book. He returns again to the idea that Causality requires a

domain with a space-like structure-that is, a space within which objects and events

can be identified by their 'locations and only the domain of physical objects has

such a structure. Therefore, we have to accept a monistic physicalist ontology. (Kim

2005, p. 151) Another reason for this position is that nonreductive materialism cannot

explain better than Descartes dualism the mental causation that is fundamental to

our conception of mentality. (Kim, p.153) Therefore he considers that nonreductive

materialism (like Davidsons anomalous monism or Putnam and Fodors

functionalism) is not a viable alternative for mental causation. The only realistic

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alternative is a version of physicalism (but not type physicalism) that permits the

reduction of certain, but not all, mental states to physical states.

Mental states that are functional can be reduced to physical states. Qualia are

not functional and hence cannot be reduced to the physical. This means that the

qualitative states of consciousness are not functional and cannot be reduced to

physical states. In Kims words, this is the residue that we have to live with. (Kim, p.

170) This is the reason that we cannot accept the physicalism of the type identity

thesis: for every type of sensation state, S, there is a type of physical state, P, such that

S=P (Kim, p. 127).

Monismul anomalist (Anomalous monism)

In 1970, Donald Davidson- Mental events. Monism = toate evenimentele

mentale care exista- sunt evenimente fizice. Anomalist = evenimentele

descries de termeni psihologici nu asculta de legi stricte.

3 Principii:

(1) Interactiunii causale: Evenimentele mentale interactioneaza causal cu cele

fizice.

(2) Caracterul nomologic al cauzalitatii: existenta cauzalitatii implica existenta

unei legi.

(3) Anomalismul mental: evenimentele mentale nu pot fi explicate si descries de

legi deterministice stricte.

Kant: idea de libertate implica anomalia.

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Davidson nu da o definitie clara la starile mentale sau fizice. (Davidson 1970,

p. 211)

MA= materialist- un fel de token identity dar diferenta constitutiva intre

mental si fizic - data de vocabulary. (Kant vs. Carnap si Ryle)

Pentru Davidson: problema ontologica Cartesiana a uniunii minte-corp este

transformata in una lingvistica.

Un eveniment mental descries prin propozitie mentala deschisa care contine

verbe psihologice cand creaza contexte non-extensionale. Ceva descries de

propozitii cu vocabular fizic intr-un sistem inchis. (Davidson 1970, pp. 210-

11) Dar in accord cu Yalowitz, Inchiderea cauzala a fizicului (Causal

Closure of the Physical) = fiecare eveniment fizic are o explicatie fizica.

(Yalowitz 2005) Intr-un sistem inchis, legile fizice sunt posibile. Dar

Davidson evenimentele descris de vocabular al gandirii si actiunii nu pot fi

integrate intr-un system deterministic inchis. (Davidson, Psychology as

Philosophy , p. 230)

Anomalous monism denies the existence of psychophysical laws (or it rejects the idea that mental

phenomena can be translated in physical terms) even if it agrees with the dependence (or

supervenience) of mental states on physical states. This supervenience means that two events that are

alike in physical cannot be different in mental; or a states cannot be modified at mental level without

being modified at physical level. (Davidson 1970, p. 214)

Reconcilierea celor 3 principii: Mentalul este nomologic ireductibil. Si chiar

daca legam fizic de mental asemenea relatii nu sunt supuse legilor.

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Curs 10 Mental Causation

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