Heights of Justice

Heights of Justice

Discourse from

Boston College Law School

Edited by

Lawrence A. CunninghamAssociate Dean for Academic Affairs

Professor of Law and BusinessBoston College Law School

Carolina Academic PressDurham, North Carolina

Copyright © 2006Lawrence A. Cunningham

All Rights Reserved

ISBN 1-59460-233-6LCCN 2006922243

Carolina Academic Press700 Kent Street

Durham, NC 27701Telephone (919)489-7486

Fax (919)493-5668www.cap-press.com

Printed in the United States of America

Dedicated toDarald and Juliet Libby,

with eternal gratitude for your generous support.

Contents

Acknowledgments xiStyle Note xiiiIntroduction xv

Part I Education and Practice

A. Dialogue1. A Culture of Conversation 32. Theory and Practice 153. A Theory-Practice Spiral 274. Comparative Law 41

B. Roles5. Self-Awareness and Critical Reflection 536. Ethics in Externships 637. Analytical Feedback on Student Writing 738. Fundamental Structure in Legal Writing 81

C. Lawyering9. Professionalism 89

10. Civil Disobedience 9711. Rebellious Lawyering 10912. Multicultural Lawyering 123

Part II Institutions and Legitimacy

A. Separation of Powers13. Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion 13514. Judges v. Legislators as Sources of Law 149

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B. Federalism15. Federal Prosecution of State and Local Officials 16316. Corporate Federalism 175

C. Contemporary Lawmaking17. Private Standards in Public Law 18918. Uncertain Risk 20319. Third World Environmental Issues 213

Part III Law and Society

A. Democratic Order20. Democracy, Taxes and Wealth 22721. The Overlooked Middle 23922. Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor Market 25323. The Public’s Right to Know 267

B. Equality and Difference24. Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment 28325. Girls in the Juvenile Justice System 29726. Patients’ Bill of Rights 30727. Transracial Adoption 317

Part IV Convention and Critique

A. Aspirations28. Situated Decisionmaking 33329. Trade and Inequality 34730. The Apogee of the Commodity 359

B. Affiliations31. Fiduciary Relationships 37532. Marriage as Partnership 38933. Consensual Amorous Relationships 399

C. Lawmakers34. The Article 2 Merchant Rules 40735. Lessons from the Article 8 Revision 42136. Copyright Opinions 43137. Copyright and Time 445

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Part V Courts and Beyond

A. Supervision38. Origin of the Appeal 46339. Judicial Integrity 47940. A More Independent Grand Jury 493

B. Examination41. Maximum Sentence Enhancements 50942. Catholic Judges in Capital Cases 52143. Behavioral Science Evidence 533

C. Circumvention44. Doctrine in Dispute Resolution 55145. Advance Pricing Agreements 565

Index of Contributions 577Index 583

CONTENTS ix

xi

Acknowledgments

Thanks to all my co lleagues at Bo s ton Co ll ege Law Sch ool for their over-wh elming su pport of this proj ect . I apprec i a te their tru s ting me to reprodu ce ,s el ectively, porti ons of t h eir con s i dera ble con tri buti ons to legal sch o l a rs h i p.Wh et h er or not I su cceeded in vi n d i c a ting that trust by faithfully ren deri n gt h eir work in my sel ecti on s , I en co u ra ge re aders inspired by the sch o l a rs h i pappearing in this anthology to consult the original contributions.

An asterisk footnote accompanying each selection provides citations to theoriginal printed version and to a subsequent Internet version of each article.Com p l ete vers i ons of m a ny papers by profe s s ors of Bo s ton Co ll ege Law Sch oo la re ava i l a ble from the Bo s ton Co ll ege Legal Re s e a rch Series on the Legal Sch o l-arship Network: http://www.ssrn.com/link/boston-college-public-law.html.

Thanks to Deena Frazier, Bibliographic Access & Resources Librarian, fordevel oping our In tern et - b a s ed sch o l a rly repo s i tory, to wh i ch she has po s tedcom p l ete vers i ons of a ll pieces excerpted in this boo k . In tu rn , thanks to Gloria Tower, Law Library Assistant, and John Gordon, Publication SupportSpecialist. Thanks to my secretary, Jeannie Kelly, for helping to prepare manyof the pieces con t a i n ed in this boo k . For produ cti on assistance at va ri o u sstages, thanks to Meg Daniel, Linda Lacy, Elizabeth Rosselot, Katy Morrisseyand Keith Sipe. Thanks finally to John Garvey, Dean of Boston College LawSchool, for his unwavering financial and intellectual support of this project.

Acknowledgment is also made to those organizations holding copyright tothe works contained in this volume.

L.A.C.

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Style Note

Th ree types of ac ademic con tri buti ons appear in this anthology. Som ep i eces are short essays ad a pted su b s t a n ti a lly as ori gi n a lly publ i s h ed ; o t h ers arelonger papers from which discrete sections were so adapted; and other longerp i eces su gge s ted more of a cascading sel ecti on , i n cluding porti ons fromthroughout the piece.

In all cases, stylistic conformity within this book required applying minortechnical ed i torial conven ti on s . Key examples were occ a s i on a lly adding orm od i f ying secti on head i n gs and in ra rer cases mod i f ying para gra ph length to-ward a uniform standard.

Footnotes are removed; selected references appear in concluding pages toe ach piece , a l ong with su gge s ti ons for furt h er re ading of works by each au-thor. In the references, books appear by author and title (with date) and ar-ticles appear by author, title, journal and date (the journal name preceded byvolume number and succeeded by page number).

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Introduction

Hei ghts of Ju s ti ce ex p l ores po l i ti c a l , s oc i a l , econ omic and procedu ral attri bute sof ju s ti ce , as app l i ed law. Th emes com bine theory and practi ce to arti c u l a te mora land ethical va lues that fac i l i t a te a ra ti onal app l i c a ti on of l aw. This app l i c a ti ons eeks to fo s ter legal arra n gem ents imbu ed by va lues assoc i a ted with the Je suit tra-d i ti on , i n cluding the dign i ty of pers on s , advancing the com m on good and com-p a s s i on for the underprivi l eged . Acti ons in the name of ju s ti ce ex h i bit com m i t-m ent to serving others ; l egal sch o l a rship in this vein is ded i c a ted to provi d i n gi n tell ectual and profe s s i onal su s ten a n ce nece s s a ry to ach i eve these obj ective s .

For lawyers, pursuit of these objectives begins in law school. Legal educa-ti on ide a lly entails dialogue and intell ectual discovery. Di a l ogue inclu des mak-ing con n ecti ons bet ween seem i n gly different cl a s s i fic a ti on s , su ch as theory andpracti ce , or clinical training and feminist ju ri s pru den ce . Su ch itera ti on , a l on gwith para ll el exch a n ges using interd i s c i p l i n a ry and com p a ra tive inqu i ry, of tenprodu ces su rpri s i n gly powerful insigh t s . One example is how seeming di-chotomies sometimes turn out not only to be false, but to reflect a mutually-complementing spiral. Engaging discussion of this kind among teachers ands tu dents broadens ped a gogical ra n ge , ren dering law not merely a sys tem ofrules but a pathway to justice. When such conversations continue into reflec-tive legal practi ce , i nven tive con cepti ons of ju s ti ce em er ge that deepen themeaning and value of lawyering.

In ju s ti ce’s po l i tical dimen s i on , i n s ti tuti onal legi ti m acy is a corn ers ton e . Anexample is the rel a ti onship bet ween govern m ental bra n ch e s , e s pec i a lly be-t ween the ju d i c i a ry and legi s l a tu re s . Finding harm ony in this rel a ti on s h i p,wh et h er thro u gh inqu i ry into the natu re of equ i ty or wh en ad d ressing su chcharged topics as bioethics, lends a sense of justice to these institutional dy-n a m i c s . Similar inqu i ries illu m i n a te the rel a ti onship bet ween cen tral and loc a la ut h ori ties in a federal rep u bl i c . One vi rtue of federalism is that it en a bles cen-tral aut h ori ty to prom o te dem oc ra tic legi ti m acy by policing or pre s su ring loc a la ut h ori ti e s . Con tem pora ry lawmaking is com p l ex , i n corpora ting exec utivebranch agencies (such as the Food and Drug Administration and the Securi-ties and Exchange Commission), private actors (such as the American Dental

xvi INTRODUCTION

As s oc i a ti on and the Financial Acco u n ting Standards Boa rd) and intern a ti on a lorganizations (such as the World Bank). Suitable institutional arrangementsto ensure political justice are essential to incorporate such participants.

In s ti tuti onal legi ti m acy depen d s , f u rt h er sti ll , on the con tent of re su l ti n gs ocial and econ omic po l i c i e s . This need cre a tes an inters ecti on of l aw and so-c i ety requ i ring atten ti on to principles of both dem oc ra tic order and equ a l i ty.At the cen ter of this inters ecti on are matters of wealth distri buti on , i n flu en cedby tax po l i c y, and soc i o - po l i tical factors su ch as family stru ctu res and tradeu n i on s . In an inform a ti on age , h ow inform a ti on is shared is cen tral to or ga n i-z a ti onal legi ti m ac y, of both govern m ent and large en terprises su ch as publ i ccom p a n i e s . Equ a l i ty plays a com p l ex role in this dem oc ra tic proce s s , i n f lu-encing su ch important issues as immigra ti on and deport a ti on policy and healthc a re del ivery. Q u e s ti ons of equ a l i ty must deal with the role of d i f feren ce , a p-p a rent in su ch set ti n gs as tre a tm ent of gi rls versus boys in juvenile ju s ti ce sys-tems and in tra n s racial adopti ons (wh i te parents adopting bl ack babi e s ) .

Conven ti on helps to prom o te insti tuti onal legi ti m acy and the va lues ofdem oc racy and equ a l i ty. Conven ti on’s vi rtu e , h owever, depends upon its en d-less cri ti qu e . For ex a m p l e , accepted models of dec i s i on-making or intern a-ti onal trade law must be te s ted , s om etimes ref a s h i on ed , and on ly then do theyremain legitimate. Slavery, a convention, withered only under critique. Asso-ciated methods of discourse promote justice. This occurs independent of theintellectual tradition used for study, such as pragmatism, liberalism, utilitar-ianism, or Aristotelean virtue ethics, to name a few major approaches. Whenapplied to lawmakers, discourse pitting convention against critique advancesjustice too, whether assessing the drafting of commercial codes or writing ju-dicial opinions resolving copyright disputes.

In ad ju d i c a ti on , ju s ti ce entails su pervi s i on , s t a rting with the appeal and in-volving judicial review of official conduct, such as prosecutors in grand juryproceed i n gs . Ju d ges also must po l i ce them s elves and their co u rtroom s ; t h eyf requ en t ly must reconcile legal mandates with moral va lues wh en these co l-l i de , or overs ee ex pert wi tnesses wh en assessing probi ty of prof fered evi den ce .Courts’ infirmities in adjudication invite pursuing alternative paths to justice,su ch as med i a ti on . Blazing su ch passages may requ i re doctrinal ad ju s tm en t ,the pursuit of wh i ch prom o tes ju s ti ce . Bo l der paths to ju s ti ce inclu de pre - d i s-pute contracting, a recent innovation in international tax law. This shows ca-pacity of contemporary institutions to respond justly to needs of an endlesslychanging world.

While justice may be a vague concept, it is powerful and pervasive. Its in-fin i te com p l ex i ty inclines sch o l a rs to recogn i zed categories of ju s ti ce . Ro u gh ly,l e ading examples are po l i tical ju s ti ce , d i s tri butive ju s ti ce , corrective ju s ti ce ,

INTRODUCTION xvii

and procedu ral ju s ti ce (fairness in ad m i n i s tra ti on ) . These ro u gh categories arecon te s ted , overl a pp i n g, and of ten essen ti a lly tools of conven i en ce . While theseconceptions have some utility, practical justice would suffer from attemptingto classify its manife s t a ti ons into su ch pigeon holes. In s te ad , Hei ghts of Ju s ti ceis organized to reflect the preceding illustrations.

This arrangement generates considerable coherence in the topics featured.This collection of scholarship is unusual because it is all generated by mem-bers of a single law fac u l ty, Bo s ton Co ll ege Law Sch oo l . E ach con tri butor pur-sues an indivi dual sch o l a rly arc . E ach devel ops an indivi du a l i zed body ofk n owl ed ge that gel s , wh en vi ewed in to t a l . This vo lume captu res a differen tco h eren ce , one ac ross co lleagues of a sch oo l . This unu sual fe a tu re means bo t h(1) the co ll ecti on pre s ents an or ganic wh o l e , re ad a ble in the sequ en ce pre-s en ted and (2) it wi ll en ri ch re aders who prefer to skip aro u n d , and these re ad-ers likely will wish to study further works of particular scholars. In preparingthis introdu cti on and in sel ecting excerpts for inclu s i on , I serve as a re ader,i n terpreter and narra tor of the work s . Com m en t a ry and con tent thus filterthrough a different lens than the original materials, making me, not each au-thor, responsible for any omissions of nuance or subtlety.

I. Legal Education and PracticeCon tri buti ons co ll ected in the boo k’s opening secti on ref l ect upon the

meaning of l egal edu c a ti on , te ach i n g, wri ting and thinking abo ut ju s ti ce . Th efirst series of works ad d resses dialogue in legal edu c a ti on , the second bu i l d son these foundations to explore roles in the legal academy, and the third ex-tends these insights into the practice of law.

A . Di a l o g u e. Conven ti onal wi s dom den om i n a tes law sch oo l ’s principal taskas te aching stu dents to “think like law yers .” Gregory Ka l s ch eur dem on s tra te sh ow re s tri cting su ch a con cepti on is and pushes, i n s te ad , for law sch ools to cel-ebra te the fundamental human drive to ask qu e s ti ons and to fo ll ow our cu-ri o s i ty wh erever it takes us. Profe s s or Ka l s ch eur elu c i d a tes the thought ofBern a rd Lon er gan and James Boyd Wh i te to en h a n ce understanding of m e a n-ing and va lue in con ceiving law as a social and cultu ral activi ty. E nvi s i on i n gl aw sch ool as a process call ed “re - h ori zon i n g,” he em ph a s i zes how trad i ti ons ofthe Soc i ety of Je sus en a ble law sch ools within a Je suit univers i ty, su ch as Bo s tonCo ll ege , to provi de unique ways to establish cultu res of a ut h en tic convers a ti on .

In a classic work that Professor Kalscheur draws upon, Mark Spiegel firstprovi des working defin i ti ons of t h eory and practi ce and then explains how di-vi s i on into these categories does not reflect a natu ral order but a ch oi ce . By

xviii INTRODUCTION

discussing development of the case method and the legal realist challenge toit, he shows how traditional approaches to legal education can be seen eitheras theoretical or as practi c a l . Profe s s or Spiegel explains that these labels arethus contingent products of our age, explores why we persist in this labelingand what differen ce this makes for legal edu c a ti on and its capac i ty for en-richment.

Provi s i on a lly adopting Profe s s or Spiegel ’s working defin i ti ons of t h eory andpracti ce so dissected , P hyllis Goldfarb deepens the theme using two movem en t sin law ’s ac ademy: clinical edu c a ti on (seen as practical) and feminist ju ri s pru-den ce (seen as theoreti c a l ) . She iden ti fies underlying met h odo l ogical kinshipto illu s tra te how probl em a tic the theory - practi ce label rem a i n s . By stu dyi n gthe ethical impulse that sparks both clinical edu c a ti on and fem i n i s m , Profe s-s or Goldfarb discerns a theory - practi ce spira l , growing thro u gh mutual affin i-ti e s . This discovery opens a new ethical vi s i on to rei nvent the natu re of m ora lt h eory as anch ored in the con c rete re a l i ty of s pec i fic people in our live s , n o tone orbi ting around the abstract “gen era l i zed others” of trad i ti onal ph i l o s ophy.

Dialogue in legal education is the animating theme of Hugh Ault’s ensuinge s s ay, wh i ch ex p l ores com p a ra tive law as a directive force in reshaping lega ledu c a ti on . A worl d - ren own ed com p a ra tive tax sch o l a r, Profe s s or Ault re-counts his pion eering devel opm ent of a com p a ra tive law co u rse at Bo s ton Co l-lege Law School decades ago. The essay is contextualized in the broad frame-work of ch a n ge in legal edu c a ti on du ring the last dec ades of the twen ti et hcen tu ry. That is wh en law profe s s ors became incre a s i n gly inven tive , l aw be-came incre a s i n gly interd i s c i p l i n a ry, and cri tical theory from legal history, ph i-l o s ophy, econ omics and other fields en ri ch ed the tape s try of l egal rules andtheir operation to generate deeper insights into legal systems.

B. Rol e s. The second series of p i eces in this secti on builds upon these tra n s-formative enterprises to explore varying conceptions of roles in legal educa-tion. Noting the sociological foundations of the concept of role, Filippa An-z a l one ref l ects on learning theory, s h owing how te ach ers are more ef fectivewh en sel f - aw a re . The piece is a ph en om en o l ogy of d i s covery abo ut learn i n gtheory, a report of applied knowledge aimed at excellence in pedagogy and as tu dy of h ow con tem pora ry reflective practi ce and cri ticism con ti nue to tra n s-form legal education and the professor’s role in it.

The con tri buti on fe a tu ring Al exis An ders on ex p l ores ch a ll en ges facing va r-ious participants in law school externship programs, centering on ethical is-sues of confidentiality. The piece uses cases to illuminate the roles of studentsand supervisors in the field and on the faculty. It provides protocols to teachstudents skills and professional habits necessary to provide competent clientrepresentation.

INTRODUCTION xix

Jane Kent Gion f ri d do, a form er Pre s i dent of the Legal Wri ting In s ti tute ,pre s ents a theory of wri t ten analytical feed b ack on stu dent wri ting for lawpractice. She envisions legal writing teachers playing the dual role of legal ed-u c a tor plus re ader in law practi ce . Profe s s or Gion f ri d do illu s tra tes how hert h eory work s , using a spec i fic legal probl em showing stu dent com mu n i c a ti onand teacher feedback, along with commentary on why the feedback succeedspedagogically.

Judith Tracy ex tends Profe s s or Gion f ri d do’s fra m ework to dem on s tra te howusing samples in the cl a s s room en h a n ces analytical devel opm en t . Ba l a n c i n gthe roles of legal educators engaging students to pursue justice while trainingt h em as profe s s i on a l s , she ex p l ores te aching met h ods producing imminent en-ga gem en t . These em ph a s i ze the specific roles of a u d i en ce and wri ter, n o tmonolithic off-the-rack exercises.

C . Law yeri n g. Legal edu c a ti on does not stop at law sch oo l , but dem a n d scontinued nurturing. In the practice of law, a theme of roles continues. Butas Daniel Coquillette explains, it is impossible for lawyers in practice to sep-a ra te profe s s i onal ethics from pers onal mora l i ty. Yet these som etimes con fli ct .Emphasizing how professional identity as lawyers is the center of the lawyer’spers onal mora l i ty, Dean Coqu i ll et te’s med i t a ti on focuses on our ulti m a te mo-tivation for obeying rules in all roles. He critically examines three theories ofprofessional behavior—goal-based, rights-based, and duty-based —to guidelawyers into justice’s humanistic roots, away from instrumentalism.

Recognizing the impo s s i bi l i ty of d rawing sharp lines bet ween the law yerand one’s self, Judith McMorrow considers latitude lawyers have in commit-ting acts of c ivil disobed i en ce . Su ch con du ct may be proper under certain cir-c u m s t a n ces for non - l aw yers , yet remain improper for law yers . Profe s s or Mc Morrow devel ops a theory and pre s c ri bes a norm of s pecial cauti on forl aw yers . Its premise is the correl a ti on bet ween the rule of l aw and po s i tive law,meaning that lawyers bear special obligations to act in accordance with law toprom o te dem oc ra tic legi ti m ac y. This limits law yerly civil disobed i en ce , g u i dedby the standard of special caution.

The question of roles likewise contributes to defining the nature of lawyer-ing. Paul Tremblay works through competing conceptions of poverty lawyer-ing, dubbed “rebellious” lawyering and “regnant” lawyering. Regnant lawyer-ing is the conven ti onal approach , em phasizing cl i ent auton omy and call i n gfor the law yer to adva n ce the cl i en t’s interests here and now. Rebellious law yer-ing takes a broader and longer view, conceiving of the lawyer’s role as drivinga “ ju s ti ce - b a s ed all oc a ti on of re s o u rces aw ay from cl i en t s’ s h ort - term needs infavor of a community’s long-term needs.” Professor Tremblay develops a the-ory of justice aimed at refashioning legal ethics into this model of lawyering.

xx INTRODUCTION

Building on themes of c ri tical sel f - ref l ecti on , Ca rwina Weng ex a m i n e sscholarship on multicultural lawyering to discover a focus on learning aboutc u l tu ra lly - d i f ferent cl i en t s . The litera tu re wron gly overl ooks the human incl i-n a ti on tow a rds unconscious cultu ral blindness and discri m i n a ti on aga i n s tthose who are different. To address this oversight, she calls for a new concep-tion of multicultural lawyering, one demanding self-analysis of one’s cultureand its influences. Professor Weng contributes a framework for learning cul-tural self-awareness, using cognitive and social psychology to lend complete-ness to cross-cultural lawyering.

II. Institutions and LegitimacyThe delivery and administration of justice depends upon existence of legal

institutions. In a democracy, these require components that provide balanceand fairness to systemic efficacy and legitimacy. Traditional notions of sepa-ration of powers and federalism support these structures in the United States.In c re a s i n gly ad m i n i s tra tive agencies and priva te actors , both within the Un i tedS t a tes and gl ob a lly, p l ay cri tical though inch oa te ro l e s . S ch o l a rs ex p l ore ad-vanced attributes of these legal power structures in this section.

A. Separation of Powers. The relationship between the judicial and legisla-tive branches of government in generating law and justice is a central themeof United States jurisprudence. The first pair of contributions in this sectionconsiders aspects of this relationship. Both reflect how it is the role of legisla-tures to express political will and of courts to mediate it.

Zygmunt Plater examines the role of equ i t a ble discreti on in the moderns t a tutory con tex t . He starts with an unsettling propo s i ti on : co u rt s , even co u rt sin equity, lack discretion to permit violations of statutes to continue despitebroad mandates to “balance the equities.” Resolving this separation of powerspuzzle involves dissecting equitable powers into three distinct balancing exer-cises: a threshold balance, a balance on the question of contending conducts,and a balance in tailoring equ i t a ble rem ed i e s . Equ i ty defers to legi s l a ti on inthe second but retains discreti on as to the first and third . So the thri ce - b a l-anced method facilitates equity in the age of statutes, mediating the roles ofcourts and legislatures.

Ch a rles Ba ron ex p l ore s , m ore direct ly, the rel a tive de s i ra bi l i ty of l aw bei n gmade by courts or legislatures, using the law regarding the “right to die” to il-lustrate. Common law responded, in the absence of legislation, to technolog-ical adva n ces in pro l on ging human life . Legi s l a tors side s tepped difficult qu e s-ti ons while case law increm en t a lly evo lved re s pon s ive legal pri n c i p l e s . Th e

INTRODUCTION xxi

i n teracti on ex h i bits law ’s magi s terial dialectic proce s s . Nei t h er bra n ch is in-s ti tuti on a lly su b s ervi ent to the other. The interacti on bet ween them prom o te spublic confidence that results yield more just law.

B. Federalism. Public confidence is a component of democratic legitimacy;it is a cri tical functi on of federa l i s m . L i kewise a cen tral theme of Un i ted State sju ri s pru den ce , the second pair of con tri buti ons in this secti on con s i ders as-pects of the federal-state relationship. Both reflect federalism’s flexibility en-abling it to promote public confidence and democratic legitimacy.

George Brown explores federal prosecutions of state and local officials forpolitical corruption. These actions pose difficult issues of how federalism re-l a tes to state auton omy and local soverei gn ty. He examines S a b ri v. Un i tedStates, which endorses such actions without appreciating the significant con-stitutional issues they pose, and links it to the widely-publicized campaign fi-nance reform case (McConnell). Questioning conventional rationales such asjustifiable protection of federal funds, Professor Brown explains that endors-ing these federal acti ons prom o tes anti - corru pti on impera tives gro u n ded inprinciples making Congress “the guardian of the democratic process.”

Reneé Jones explains federalism on similar grounds of p u blic con fiden ce inl awm a k i n g. She focuses on federalism in corpora te law, i m p l i c a ted by the Sa r-banes-Oxley Act of 2002 that suggests a “creeping federalization of corporatelaw.” She explains that a realistic federal threat to state jurisdiction is criticalto devel opm ent of l egi ti m a te corpora te law among state s . Profe s s or Jones usesSa rb a n e s - Ox l ey to ground one prong of h er theory of dynamic federa l i s m .This is a rel a ti onship bet ween state and federal reg u l a ti on that en a bles each toreinforce the other’s efficacy. In this context, enabled by the federal preemp-tive thre a t , federal legi s l a ti on indu ces state co u rts to ju ri s pru den tial shifts con-gruent with democratic principles garnering popular support.

C . Co n tem po ra ry Lawm a k i n g. The federal preem ptive threat inherent infedera l i s m , and the sep a ra ti on of powers con cept , p l ay defining roles in thebroader stage of law production found in the administrative state. Each piecein this part grapples with this complex, radial, production of law in contem-porary society, including the role of private actors.

Ma ry Ann Ch i rb a - Ma rtin examines public safety wh en priva te assoc i a ti on se s t a blish standard s —en dors ed by federal agen c i e s— that may not be in thep u blic intere s t . The illu s tra ti on is dental amalgam fill i n gs , wh i ch the Am eri-can Dental As s oc i a ti on (ADA) ch a m p i ons as safe while the Food and Drug Ad-m i n i s tra ti on (FDA) essen ti a lly defers . Judicial capac i ty to provi de a forum tore s o lve con tending interests is limited . So on ly state legi s l a tu res can produ cel aw nece s s a ry to assu re appropri a te safety and dissem i n a ti on of i n form a ti on—and they are con s tra i n ed by the threat of federal preem pti on in doing so.

xxii INTRODUCTION

Federal ad m i n i s tra tive agencies incre a s i n gly levera ge their reg u l a tory func-tion by adopting private standards as public law. This phenomenon, well il-lustrated by how the Securities and Exchange Commission adopts private ac-co u n ting standards for public com p a n i e s , poses issues of both public acce s sto materials and legi ti m acy of the proce s s . In my con tri buti on to this vo lu m e ,I offer an analytical framework to promote the legitimacy of this process and,for the federal government, nominate the Director of the Federal Register toimplement its objectives.

In emerging areas of international practice in which law as yet plays littleformal ro l e , i n n ova tive and cre a tive approaches are essen tial to establish le-gitimacy and promote justice. David Wirth explores the example of how pri-va te or ga n i z a ti ons from the Un i ted States and abroad , toget h er with don orco u n try govern m en t s , h ave reori en ted both the procedu res for devel oping andthe content of third world development agendas financed by the World Bank.He fashions a partnership advocacy model to guide those efforts, with partic-ular atten ti on to assu ring dem oc ra tic acco u n t a bi l i ty to the poor in devel op-ing co u n tries who are the osten s i bl e , but ra rely the actu a l , ben ef i c i a ries ofdonor lending operations. Professor Wirth then defines a principled role forAmerican lawyers in such partnerships.

III. Law and SocietyL aw must re s pond to the needs of s oc i eties it governs to ach i eve ju s ti ce .

Two series of p a pers in this secti on illu s tra te how. The firs t , pre s en ted asdemocracy, seeks systemic solutions in contexts of taxation, mediating insti-tuti on s , the work force and public access to govern m ental inform a ti on . Th es econd seri e s , den om i n a ted as equ a l i ty, ad d resses spec i fic instances that foc u son immigrants, girls, patients and infants.

A. Democracy. Democracy and wealth are inextricably bound, each facili-tating and simultaneously threatening the other. James Repetti demonstrateshow wealth concentration impairs economic growth, due to reduced oppor-tu n i ti e s , and fru s tra tes dem oc ra tic proce s s e s . Pa rti c u l a rly wh en wealth con-cen tra ti on arises from inheri t a n ce , tax policy should be used to of fs et theseadverse ef fect s , with proceeds from su ch tra n s fers all oc a ted to fund edu c a ti onthat nurtures human capital.

A sub-theme of tax policy aimed at nurturing human capital is the idea ofthe middle cl a s s , a cl a s s i fic a ti on em bracing a more gen eral middl e . Th om a sKohler laments a systemic tendency to overlook this vast “middle,” comprisedof f a m i l i e s , rel i gious con grega ti on s , s ervi ce and fra ternal gro u p s , gra s s roo t s

INTRODUCTION xxiii

political clubs, and unions—all of which mediate relations between individ-uals and insti tuti on s . Med i a ting bod i e s — “little platoon s” of s oc i ety as Ed-mund Bu rke call ed them—i n c u l c a te habits cen tral to sel f - rule at indivi du a land social level s . This is why Tocqu evi lle stre s s ed assoc i a ti ons as med i a ti n ggroups with potential to act as “schools for democracy.”

Ex tending this con cern abo ut the overl oo ked middl e , Kent Green field con-siders federal law concerning candor. It protects against fraud in capital mar-kets by theorizing that accurate information facilitates optimal capital alloca-ti on . A similar ra ti on a l e , perhaps even stron ger, ju s ti fies equ iva l ent pro tecti ona gainst fraud in labor market s , but nei t h er federal nor state law provi des it.Professor Greenfield explains why common law and state regulation are inad-equate, requiring a federal statutory approach.

Information is central to capital and labor markets and increasingly to allc i ti zens in a dem oc rac y. The ven era ble doctrine call ed the publ i c’s ri ght tok n ow unders cores this theme wh en ad d ressing inform a ti on held by govern-m en t . Ma ry - Rose Pa p a n d rea dem on s tra tes judicial relu ct a n ce to prom o te thisright when the executive branch asserts secrecy on grounds of national secu-ri ty. Yet the publ i c’s ri ght to know, gro u n ded both in the First Am en d m en tand the Freedom of Information Act, is essential to political justice, particu-larly amid national crisis when government activities are directed at non-cit-izens.

B. Eq u a l i ty. Non - c i ti zens are part of nu m erous groups of ten put in law ’ss h adows , den i ed access to ju s ti ce even though equ a l i ty demands it. In the caseof n on - c i ti zen s , a cri tical mom ent of ju s ti ce arises in deport a ti on proceed i n gs .D a n i el Ka n s troom explains how deport a ti on is of ten an autom a tic con s e-qu en ce of c riminal convi cti on , yet con s ti tuti onal pro tecti ons provi ded inc riminal proceed i n gs do not app ly in deport a ti on proceed i n gs . To maintainconstitutional legitimacy, Professor Kanstroom says, the Constitution’s crim-inal law pro tecti ons should be incorpora ted into the deport a ti on sys tem . O n emodel for doing so appears in the juvenile justice system.

The juvenile ju s ti ce sys tem’s goal is indivi du a l i zed reh a bi l i t a tive ju s ti ce , yetjuveniles sometimes likewise are denied justice through blindness to notionsof equ a l i ty of tre a tm en t . E f fects can be parti c u l a rly pernicious for gi rl s .Francine Sherman documents the disparities girls face in the juvenile justices ys tem and explains legal rem edies to provi de red re s s . While differen ces be-tween male and female offenders have undermined equal rights challenges inthe adult aren a , d i f feren ces among indivi duals are ack n owl ed ged in juven i l ecourts, and dispositions can be driven by those individual needs.

If equ a l i ty means ad d ressing gen der- s pec i fic needs of gi rls in the juven i l eju s ti ce sys tem , broader con cepti ons of equ a l i ty play an overl oo ked role in po-

xxiv INTRODUCTION

l i ti c a lly - d riven proposals for a “p a ti en t s’ bi ll of ri gh t s .” While assigning du eprocess rights to patients of privately-funded health plans, Dean Hashimotoexplains that the proposals never apprec i a ted how Med i c a i d - m a n a ged care sys-tems often do not provide equal treatment for the poor or other minorities.Any patients’ bill of rights should safeguard such patients by extending pro-tecti ons to su ch managed care programs based on a principle of equ a l i ty, Pro-fessor Hashimoto says.

Principles of equality are complex. From whose viewpoint should equalitybe assessed? Ruth-Arlene Howe confronts such questions in one of her classica rti cles on the tra n s - racial adopti on deb a te— ch i efly the adopti on by wh i tecouples of black children. Her thesis is that the increase in such adoptions re-flects less an interest in the equality of all persons participating in the processthan it does an el eva ti on of the interests of wh i te adults above the needs ofbl ack ch i l d ren . Profe s s or Howe urges a shift from sedu cti on by the rh etori cabout trans-racial adoption to crystallizing culturally-sensitive approaches tomeeting needs of black children in foster care.

IV. Convention and CritiqueConven ti onal wi s dom is of ten long on conven ti on and short on wi s dom .

Papers in this section critique and expose such limitations. In legal discourse,this fac i l i t a tes evo lving legal conven ti ons tow a rds more just formu l a ti on s ,wh et h er the topic is dec i s i on - m a k i n g, i n tern a ti onal trade , s l avery, rel a ti on-ships or lawmaking.

A . As p i ra ti o n s. Pra gm a ti s m , a hearty ph i l o s ophy for cen tu ri e s , occ a s i on-a lly comes under rebu ke for lacking ra ti onal principles to re s o lve difficultquestions. Catharine Wells defends pragmatic analysis of legal decision-mak-ing. She presents two models of normative decision-making that purport todistinguish between types of decision-making but shows how these describei n terdepen dent parts of a ny dec i s i on-making proce s s . Profe s s or Wells con-clu des that pra gm a tic dec i s i on-making should be apprec i a ted as elu c i d a ti n gcon tex tual el em ents of a ll forms of del i bera ti on , not as rej ecting ra ti on a llystructured decision-making procedures.

Confronting the concept and meaning of justice head-on is an ambitiousproject. Taking the leap, Frank Garcia explores various theories of justice inthe trad i ti on of l i bera l i s m , i n cluding com mu n i t a ri a n , l i bert a ri a n , and fair-ness-based accounts. From this analysis, Professor Garcia articulates a Rawl-sian framework of justice that he expands to evaluate contemporary interna-ti onal trade law. His com pelling con clu s i on , con tra ry to conven ti on , is that

INTRODUCTION xxv

trad i ti onal liberal ju s ti fic a ti ons of the intern a ti onal order ju s tify asking we a l t h-ier states to adopt redistributive policies in international trade law.

E f fects of i n ju s ti ce persist long after correcti ons are made . This is amon gthe major lessons in our legacy of s l avery. Deep wounds heal slowly, a n dwounds of the soul may never heal. Anthony Farley critically reviews the re-alities of slavery to conclude that “the black is the apogee of the commodity,”a trait sustaining inheri ted inju s ti ces marked by the trauma of “ wh i te - over-bl ack .” De s p i te en er getic search for em powerm ent and rep a ra ti ons by com-mu n i ty leaders , su ch as the Bl ack Pa n t h ers , this mora lly bankru pt legac ym a kes a mockery of accepted aspira ti onal noti on s , su ch as the rule of l aw, de-signed to win struggles against injustice. Achieving justice is even more per-plexing than many conventional theorists may think.

B. Affiliations. Legal classifications are often pivotal in conceptions of jus-tice and applications of law. How should relationships be treated, accordingto arms’-length norms of the market place or the relational strictures of fidu-ciary obligation? A trio of pieces provides perspective on the law and natureof affiliations.

S cott FitzGibbon con s c i o u s ly sets out to devel op a theory of a f f i l i a ti on s ,s pec i f ying its arch i tectu re and arti c u l a ting assoc i a ted ethical obl i ga ti on s . Th i sexercise entails engaging with the distinction between contract and fiduciarylaw. Applying virtue ethics, this account refutes utilitarian theories that denya ny differen ce bet ween con tract and fidu c i a ry duty. Acco u n ting for the et h i c s ,psychology and anthropology of affiliations, Professor FitzGibbon provides abasis for sustaining attri butes that distinguish the worlds of con tract and tru s t .

L aw has stru ggl ed for cen tu ries to classify the natu re of m a rri a ge , as roo tedin status or in con tract . By revi ewing evo lving legal doctrines and social di-m en s i ons of t h ree fe a tu res of m odern matri m onial arra n gem en t s—a n te - nu p-tials, cohabitations, and property settlements— Sanford Katz concludes thatmarriage is a special model of contract, partaking of components of consen-sual free exchange along with social constraints directed through state agents.The result is a law of marriage in flux, blending private and public law, indi-vidual and communal values, local and national concerns.

The complexion of marriage as straddling the zones of private individualautonomy and public policy becomes more acute in amorous consensual re-l a ti onships bet ween te ach ers and stu den t s . E l i s a beth Kell er ex p l ores the ju-ri s pru den tial terrain anch ored in freedoms of a s s oc i a ti on and privacy but con-strained by societal norms.

C . Lawm a kers. Ju s ti ce is a perform a n ce as well as a stru ctu ral proce s s ,meaning lawm a kers are cen tral figure s . Th ey wri te laws , both in legi s l a ti onand judicial op i n i on s . S tu dying these actors in acti on are two pairs of p i ece s ,

xxvi INTRODUCTION

one on statutory com m ercial law and the other on ju d ge - m ade copyri gh tl aw. Bi s m a rk reportedly qu i pped that those who like laws (or sausage s )should not wi tness how they are made ; those who like ju s ti ce insist upons eei n g.

The Un i form Com m ercial Code is among the most ambi tious and su c-cessful modern legi s l a tive initi a tive s , covering a broad ra n ge of com m erc i a ltransactions in its dozen different articles. Among the most famous of theses t a tutes is Arti cle 2, on sales, bra i n child of Ka rl Llewelly n , a prolific andprovocative law professor in his day. A peculiar feature of Llewellyn’s work inArti cle 2 is a disti n cti on bet ween merchants and non - m erch a n t s . In gri dHillinger demonstrates, contrary to common belief, that the merchant rulesdid not codify trade customs but codified Llewellyn’s conceptions of rationalcommercial rules. Reconceived as statements of policy not reality, they inviteasking how law shapes practice and why the merchant rules should not applyto non-merchants.

O n to l ogical issues appear in legi s l a tive dra f ting exercises of a ll kinds, i n-cluding statutory updates of the UCC in light of technological change. JamesRogers cites changes in securities trading during the latter twentieth century,when electronic means of recording proliferated. Commercial law reformersrewrote the law in putatively media-neutral terms, updating the law suitablefor paper tra n s acti ons to ex pre s s ly cover paperless tra n s acti on s . Profe s s orRogers ex p l ores the limits of this stra tegy, s pec u l a ting that ch a n ges in themedium ineluctably change the content, meaning a shift from print to digitsbears ontological effects obscured by such legislative updating.

Two copyri ght law sch o l a rs examine judicial approaches to the su bj ect . Th ejudge’s job is to assess and, despite objective principles, this is an art. The re-a l i ty of the judicial art is most pron o u n ced wh en most reliant upon ju d gm en t ,wh i ch is the field of copyri ght law that entails making ae s t h etic ju d gm en t s .Al f red Yen devel ops this exqu i s i te insight by ex p l oring major movem ents fromae s t h etic theory and showing how they corre s pond to the analytic premises ofjudicial op i n i ons in copyri ght dispute s . Accord i n gly, the ae s t h etic natu re oflegal reasoning requires explicit consciousness of aesthetics in judging.

Ju d ges in copyri ght disputes of ten face arguments that the ven era ble fairuse doctrine permits a copycat to use a work without payment or constraint.The mu l ti - f actor judicial inqu i ry leaves out , su rpri s i n gly, the length of ti m esince a work’s first publication. Joseph Liu examines this omission, showingh ow time is as important a factor in fair use analysis as trad i ti onal factors . In-corpora ting time fac i l i t a tes dynamic judicial acco u n ting for policy stake s , su chas aut h orial incen tives and public acce s s , while also injecting publ i c - rega rd-ing values into copyright jurisprudence.

INTRODUCTION xxvii

V. Courts and BeyondAd ju d i c a ti on is the high - w a ter mark of ju s ti ce . As su ring its integri ty is cen-

tra l . Mechanisms inclu de the appeal and other stru ctu ral arra n gem ents de-s i gn ed to prom o te integri ty; judicial inspecti on rei n forces these stru ctu re s .Enduring limitations of adjudication yield to searches for superior pathwaysto justice.

A. Supervision. Inherent in the American system of justice is the possibil-i ty of a ppe a l , a qu i n te s s en ti a lly su pervi s ory con cepti on en a bling su peri orcourts to review lower court judgments. Mary Sarah Bilder uses cultural his-tory to explain that appeals are a foundational feature of American jurispru-dence. They are not merely legal procedures, rooted in common law, as con-ven ti on has it, but a tra n s a t l a n tic ch a racteri s tic of We s tern Eu ropean lega lculture. Professor Bilder defines an American “culture of appeal” as a centralattribute of justice rooted in legal, religious, political, and literary ideas dat-ing to the 1630s.

If the appeal is an em bl em of equ i t a ble ju s ti ce , t h en appell a te revi ew of of-ficial actors is cri tical to ju s ti ce . As Robert Bl oom ex p l a i n s , the con cept of ju-dicial integri ty is a hall m a rk of our Con s ti tuti onal order, and sancti ons ju d i c i a lexercise of su pervi s ory powers that, in tu rn , prom o te the integri ty of pers on sacting under of ficial licen s e . He lamen t s , h owever, that a series of Su prem eCo u rt pron o u n cem ents mistaken ly retreats from the doctrine of judicial in-tegri ty, d i m i n i s h ed in part by redu ced exercise of su ch su pervi s ory powers .

S pec i fic judicial su pervi s i on is essen tial to po l i ce practi ces of pro s ec utors ex-ercising exec utive bra n ch powers . A com m on example occ u rs wh en pro s ec u-tors seeking a grand ju ry indictm ent possess but do not disclose exc u l p a toryevi den ce du ring the proceed i n g. Mi ch ael Ca s s i dy dem on s tra tes how histori c a la pprec i a ti on of the grand ju ry ’s ro l e , com bi n ed with the su pervi s ory powersof federal co u rt s , m a n d a tes judicial revi ew. S h ort of t h i s , s t a te legi s l a tive andjudicial acti on can su pervise pro s ec utorial discreti on in grand ju ry proceed i n gsby mandating discl o su re of exc u l p a tory evi den ce in spec i fied cases.

B. Examination. Structures contribute partial promotion of justice in ad-judication; courts also must exercise examination, of legislators, themselves,and participants in litigation.

Courts exercise considerable discretion when imposing sentences on crim-inal defen d a n t s , a l t h o u gh va rious legi s l a tive sch emes of ten exert limitati on son this discretion. Difficult issues arise as to what due process safeguards arerel evant to sen ten c i n g, as disti n g u i s h ed from su b s t a n tive el em ents of a cri m e .Frank Herrmann ex p l ores the landscape , en co u ra ging app lying full du eprocess safeg u a rds to all types of s en tencing sch em e s . Cri tical in su ch exer-

xxviii INTRODUCTION

cises is how judicial su pervi s i on of s en tencing laws can be ach i eved wi t h o utprovoking legi s l a tive ef forts to nega te this power thro u gh artful dra f ting ofcriminal statutes.

A slight but lethal swing in the penal pendulum occurring towards the endof the twen ti eth cen tu ry bro u ght death as a pen a l ty back to the foref ront ofsocial thought. This penalty poses profound moral issues for Catholic judgess i t ting in capital cases. John Garvey provi des a fra m ework to reconcile lega lrequirements with religious conviction by inquiring into theories of cooper-ation in morally impermissible behavior. His model establishes that Catholicjudges cannot enforce the death penalty, either by sentence or upon jury rec-ommendation, but face more difficult balancing when reviewing lower courtorders or petitions for habeas corpus.

Ad ju d i c a ti on requ i res establishing evi den ti a ry grounds for con clu s i on s ,whether by judges or juries. Among difficult contexts is evidence provided byexpert witnesses, designed to educate fact finders in arcane areas. Social sci-entific evidence poses greatest complexities. Mark Brodin measures this formof proof a gainst spec i fic rel i a bi l i ty standards and gen eral requ i rem ents for ad-mitting expert testimony. He finds that much of this testimony should be ex-clu ded . It does not assist ju ri e s , can distort the acc u racy of the fact - fin d i n gprocess and imperil a proceeding’s fairness.

C . Ci rc u mven ti o n. Judicial dispute re s o luti on may be recogn i z a ble as a com-m on means of ad ju d i c a ti on , but altern a tives pro l i fera te . Ob s tru cting thesepathways are doctrinal entanglements or administrative obstacles, which twoscholars in concluding pieces show can be removed.

Ray Madoff reflects upon mediation’s appeal, observing its varying successin fields ra n ging from divorce (wh ere it has worked well) to wi lls (wh ere it hasn o t ) . She theori zes med i a ti on’s rel a tive su ccess in divorce law is due to doc-trinal revolutions such as the no-fault principle and its relative failure in willssettings as owing to the unseen hand of doctrine, a wills law that encouragesopting for judicial disputation. To increase successful mediation for wills dis-pute resolution, doctrinal changes are necessary.

In n ova ti ons for dispute re s o luti on incre a s i n gly take one step back in theprocess to prevent disputes from arising. This occurs in international tax lawwh en parties agree with govern m ents in adva n ce on the tax tre a tm ent of com-p l ex cro s s - border tra n s acti on s . Diane Ring puts this fascinating “adva n ce pri c-ing agreement” procedure under the lens of administrative theory, to test thetheory, including examining its lessons for academic accounts of the admin-istrative state. She finds in this inquiry a certain justice in this innovation en-a bl ed by the ad m i n i s tra tive state , an exercise in coopera ti on that ep i tom i ze semerging models of collaborative governance.

INTRODUCTION xxix

CodaJu s ti ce is law ’s deep bed , wh et h er the topogra phy is call ed distri butive , cor-

rective , po l i tical or procedu ral ju s ti ce , or loc a ted on the more tex tu red terra i nof s oc i a l , econ om i c , or racial ju s ti ce . Norm a tive moral theories and beh av-i oral practi ces interact with law in com p l ex ways . Ethical law yers gra pple wi t hva lue and meaning in all aspects of t h eir spiri tu a l , i n tell ectu a l , m ora l , a n dprofessional lives, whether in formal legal education or practicing law. Con-tributions to this anthology animate how these theories and practices ascendto the heights of justice.

Lawrence A. CunninghamAssociate Dean for Academic AffairsBoston College Law SchoolMarch 15, 2006