Culture and Negotiations between Rival States...international negotiation. There are two prominent...

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Culture and Negotiations between Rival States

Patrick M. ReganBinghamton University

and

Russell J. LengMiddlebury College

April, 2008

Prepared for Presentation at a workshop on Culture and Conflict, Binghamton University,April 11 & 12, 2008

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Culture and Negotiation between Rival States

This paper examines the use of culture as an analytic tool for the study of

diplomatic relations between rival states, specifically their readiness to use negotiation,

including mediation, to resolve their disputes, and their success in doing so. It tests the

general proposition that cultural similarities and differences affect how state governments

interact with each other, including their management of disputes.

We begin with a discussion of conceptual problems related to the meaning of the

term culture generally, as well as a level of analysis issue particular to the use of culture

as an analytic tool in the study of interstate relations. We suggest an approach that

focuses on those cultural characteristics that citizens of a particular state share in

common. Then we turn to the question of whether local cultural similarities and

differences between rival states are likely to prevail over a global diplomatic culture of

political realism. We hypothesize that, even in negotiations where vital interests are at

stake, local cultural attributes exert influence in two ways. First, cultural similarities or

differences can affect the attitudes of the parties toward each other. Second, cultural

similarities or differences can affect their ability to communicate effectively with each

other. We would expect states that are culturally similar to be more inclined to attempt to

settle their disputes peacefully through negotiation, and to be more successful in doing

so. We then describe a simple research design to test these hypotheses, and present the

results of some initial findings.

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Culture as an Analytic Concept

During the 19th century, and in certain circles today, the term culture has had

evolutionary implications, as something that is acquired as one becomes more civilized.

Some people are considered, or consider themselves, more “cultured” than others.

Needless to say, such a view can have, and has had political implications. The global

evolutionary perspective was rejected by a number of 20th century anthropologists, such

as Benedict and Mead, in favor of a focus on the plurality of cultures across societies,

without moral distinctions. This too, has political implications, as evidenced by

contemporary debates over “moral relativism.”

Anthropologists traditionally have viewed culture as something that is a function

of society, that is, that the cultural traits of an individual are acquired from an integrated

society of which he or she is a part. Individuals acquire cultural attributes from their

social environment, and those attributes provide a guide for interactions with others.

Societal culture encourages common patterns of interacting and reacting to the actions of

others by creating a set of shared values and beliefs to guide behavior, including

interactions with others.

Kevin Avruch (1998), who has written insightfully about culture and conflict

resolution, argues that culture is most properly analyzed at the individual level, as “the

derivative of individual experience, something learned or created by individuals

themselves1 or passed on to them socially by contemporaries or ancestors” (1998,:50).

For Avruch, “local cultures are those complex systems of meanings created, shared, and

transmitted (socially inherited) by individuals in particular groups” (1998:10), but an

1 We do not discuss the added complication of cultural attributes that may be self-generated. See Avruch(1998:16-17).

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individual’s culture may be an amalgam of influences from several groups, including

one’s nation, region, family, social class, ethnicity, religion, language, and occupation.

This begs the question of the efficacy of examining culture at the state level. If

each individual is an amalgam of multiple cultural influences, and the potency of those

influences varies across individuals within the same society, how can one make valid

cultural distinctions between governmental representatives based on their nationality?

Cultural generalizations about individuals based on state citizenship become

especially problematic today, with the increasingly heterogeneous demographic

composition of so many states. Thus any discussion of national cultural attributes must

distinguish between those attributes that are common to all members of the state, as

opposed to stereotypical images of certain nationalities. With that caveat in mind, we

propose that there are certain state-level cultural attributes, shared by virtually all

members of a state, which affect the meanings attached to their relationships with other

states and their interactions with those states, regardless of the individuals’ other cultural

attributes. We recognize that the relative potency of cultural attributes observed at the

state level will vary from individual to individual, but we hypothesize that these effects

will be potent enough to affect how state leaders manage their disputes with rival states.

In effect we assume that national leaders, at least when addressing questions of security

over interstate conflict, act as if they represent an amalgamation of national cultural

attributes.

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How Culture May Affect Interstate Negotiation

Cultural attributes observed at the national level influence interstate negotiations

in two ways. First, cultural similarities or differences affect the attitudes of the parties

toward each other along two related dimensions: affinity/antipathy and trust/distrust. It is

reasonable to assume that states that enjoy more friendly relations with each other are

more likely to attempt to resolve their differences peacefully through negotiation, and to

be more successful at doing so. By the same token, trust is cited by many students of

negotiation as a key variable in the readiness of states to negotiate and to do so

successfully (Zartman and Berman, 1982; Pruitt, 2000; Kelman, 1997).

Second, cultural similarities or differences can affect the ability of the parties to

communicate effectively with each other. Effective communication is dependent on clear

transmission and shared understandings of the signals that one party sends to the other

during the course of a dispute. These signals are encoded in verbal or written

communications, or conveyed through actions whose meaning must be interpreted by the

recipient. Recipient expectations based on culturally derived rules regarding interaction,

including negotiation, affect how signals are decoded or interpreted. Studies of

intercultural communication have demonstrated that how signals are decoded across

cultures can result in misinterpretation of the message and misperceptions of the sender’s

intentions (Cohen, 1997; Hofstede, 1991; Triandis, 1995; Hall, 1977, Ross, 1993).

Cultural differences can cause parties to screen out information inconsistent with

culturally grounded assumptions, to project meanings onto the other party’s words and

actions, and to misinterpret the other party’s intentions (Fisher, 1980). Moreover, what

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Cohen (1997) has termed “intercultural dissonance,” may be exacerbated by distrust and

antipathy between cultures.

An earlier empirical study by the authors demonstrated that cultural differences

do matter, even when the stakes are high (Regan and Leng, 2003). We generated data on

negotiations in a sample of 294 militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) occurring between

1945 and 1992.2 We found that when the participant states were culturally similar along

four dimensions – region, social system, democratic political culture, and religion – they

were more inclined to seek negotiated settlements to their disputes and to be successful in

doing so. We found less consistent results in a comparable study of the relationship

between cultural similarities and differences and outcomes of mediation in MIDs,

although we did find a strong positive correlation between shared democratic cultures and

the success of mediation. (Leng and Regan, 2003).

What those studies did not test, however, was the effect of culture on lower level

disputes, that is, those disputes that did not become militarized. Presumably, the effects

of cultural similarities and differences on the willingness of the disputants to seek

negotiated settlements, and their success in doing so, would be greater in those cases. By

including negotiations between rival states in lower level disputes, that is, those non-

militarized disputes occurring within the intervals between MIDs, along with negotiations

in MIDs, we can examine the validity of the hypothesis that the effects of cultural

differences dissipate when the stakes are high enough for the threat of war to be present.

2 Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) are disputes between states in which at least one side threatens,displays, or uses military force (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996).

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Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that cultural similarities or differences

influence the readiness of rival states to seek negotiated solutions to their disputes, and to

do so successfully. We elaborate on this more fully below.

Counter Arguments

These arguments are by no means universally accepted by students of

international negotiation. There are two prominent counter arguments, both of which are

based on the notion of a global culture that overrides local national cultural similarities or

differences. The first counter argument is related to our earlier point about the different

sources of cultural influences on individuals, including one’s occupation. Some scholars

and practitioners argue that there is a global culture of diplomacy, which is universally

understood by the elites who carryout interstate negotiations (Zartman, 1993; Nicolson,

1963 ). This is an argument that carried greater weight in the 19th and early 20th

centuries, when most interstate diplomacy was conducted by trained diplomatists in

Western states, many of whom had attended the same European universities. It is more

problematic today, with the greater heterogeneity of the membership of the interstate

system, as well as among those carrying out diplomacy, including individuals with far

less, if any, experience in diplomatic practice. Anyone reading personal memoirs of

American negotiations with representatives of Asian cultures, for example, would be hard

pressed to argue that cultural differences played no significant role in negotiations.

(Kissinger, 1979, 1982; Talbot, 2006).

The second counter-argument is also based on the notion of a global diplomatic

culture, but from a different perspective, that of political realism, particularly in the

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classical tradition of “practical realism,” espoused by authors like Morgenthau (1978) and

Kissinger (1994). It is not the niceties of diplomatic discourse that are the fruit of the

global culture, but a shared understanding of the realities of power and the role that it

plays in interstate relations, particularly when security interests are at stake. Viewed

from a realist perspective, Henry Kissinger and North Vietnam’s Le Duc Tho may have

come from very different local cultures, but they spoke the same global political

language, the language of Realpolitik, during their negotiations over the war in Vietnam

(see Kissinger, 1979). Local cultural differences are trumped by the influence of a

global political system’s shared culture of Realpolitik.

It is, of course, possible for interstate relations to be affected by both local cultural

differences and a global culture of Realpolitik.. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho could be

viewed as skilled diplomats, and practitioners of Realpolitik, whose relationship and

ability to communicate could be also be affected by local cultural differences. The issue

then becomes that of the relative potency of these variables. One plausible possibility is

that, while local cultural differences might have an effect on negotiations where vital

security interests are not at stake, they are trumped by Realpolitik when they are (Cohen,

1990). Specifically, the effects of cultural differences that one might observe in

negotiations in disputes between rival states may become muted when disputes become

militarized. Conversely, it can be argued that cultural differences can exacerbate the

difficulties in resolving security issues. Henderson (1998) argues that strategic issues,

such as territory, may become more difficult to settle because of the added effects of

cultural antipathies and distrust related to cultural differences (Henderson, 1998).

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Cultural Variables

To investigate the question of the relative impact of Realpolitik pressures along

with the broader question of the influence of cultural similarities and differences on

negotiations between states engaged in enduring rivalries, it is necessary to specify which

cultural variables are likely to exert the most potent effects. In the interest of parsimony,

we have limited the putatively most significant cultural influences shared in common

among citizens of a state to four variables. Two of these variables, religion and political

culture influence the readiness of the parties to negotiate, as well as outcomes when they

do negotiate. The other two, language and social culture, affect the quality of

communication between the disputants when negotiations take place. We are interested

in the relationship between the cultural attributes of those pairs. For example, in our

examination of the effects of language, we are interested in whether the parties share the

same language, as opposed to what particular languages they speak.

We now turn to a brief description of each of the four culture variables, along

with an explanation of its hypothesized effect on interstate negotiation. We borrow from

Pruitt’s (2005) “readiness theory” to identify two influences on the willingness of each

party to negotiate with the other: motivation and optimism.3 Pruitt’s conceptualization of

each party’s motivation combines a realist conceptualization of a calculation of the

likelihood of prevailing in the dispute and the costs and risks of continuing the conflict,

with the degree of optimism regarding the likelihood of reaching an acceptable settlement

with the other party.

3 We say “borrow” because we depart from Pruitt’s (2005) approach in several respects, most notably, inour focus on the dyad, as opposed to the separate readiness of the two participants. Pruitt also includesanother influences on optimism: the status of the negotiators that is, their capacity to reach an agreementthat will be accepted by their governments.

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Optimism is dependent on the tractability of the issues at stake, but also the

party’s perception of the other disputant, specifically its trust in the other as a negotiating

partner (Pruitt, 2005; Zartman and Berman, 1982). States that distrust the other party are

more likely to attempt coercive means of pursuing their interests and, if they do negotiate,

are more likely to do so only after demonstrating their resolve through a show of strength

(Leng, 2000). Conversely, those states that are optimistic regarding their ability to

achieve a peaceful settlement with the other party are more likely to negotiate, and to do

so earlier in the dispute.

Confidence is likely to be affected by the party’s degree of affinitiy/enmity, as

well as trust/distrust of the other. As K. J. Holsti (1996:146) argues, realist assertions to

the contrary, how states interact with each other is affected significantly by affinities or

enmities based on moral judgments. We argue that optimism and confidence are

influenced by similarities or differences in religion and/or the role of religion in politics,

and political culture.

Religion. Given the conflicts raging today, there is little doubt that religion plays

a significant role in the relationships between states, as well as between sub-national and

transnational groups. The most prominent exposition of this thesis is Huntington’s Clash

of Civilizatons? (1996). Huntington views a “civilization” as the largest possible cultural

unit, and his primary cultural marker is religion. Aggregate data empirical studies,

however, have failed to support Huntington’s thesis, either as a predictor of interstate war

(Henderson and Tucker, 2000) or civil wars (Gurr, 1994).4 Part of the explanation for

the failure to find empirical support for Huntington’s hypothesis may lie in his attempt to

4 In an earlier study , Henderson did find a positive association between religious differences and war,although not according to Huntington’s categorization.

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map the globe according to competing civilizations based primarily on religion. Many

countries are home to a variety of religious and non-religious groups, and many countries

in which one can identify a majority religion are not in conflict with others over religious

differences.

We posit that if this cultural variable adversely affects relations between states, it

does so in more limited circumstances, that is, between theocratic and secular states, and

between theocratic states with competing religions or religious sects.5 We make the

theocratic-secular distinction on two grounds. First, theocratic states, unlike secular

states, include their religion as an essential part of their identity. Identity issues, as

Huntington points out, are not open to compromise or change. They are indivisible.

Second, within theocratic states, there is no separation between religion and politics.

Religious doctrine and practice are embedded in the fabric of the state’s political culture.

Thus, for the leaders of theocratic states, religious similarities or differences will affect

not only their degree or affinity or antipathy toward other states, but also their approach

to the management of interstate disputes. We articulate these arguments as a series of

hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a. Disputants are more likely to use negotiation if they are both

secular states;

Hypothesis 1b: Disputants are more likely to use negotiation if they are theocratic

states that share the same religion and religious sect;

5 Huntington’s (1996) thesis, in fact, focuses on a subset of civilizational clashes in which religion plays amajor role, including clashes between fundamentalist religious cultures, most notably Islam, and the secularWest, although he extends the thesis to other potential civilizational clashes as well.

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Hypothesis 2a: Disputants are more likely to resort to early negotiations if they

are both secular states;

Hypothesis 2b: Disputants are more likely to resort to early negotiations if they

are theocratic states that share the same religion and religious sect;

Hypothesis 3a. When disputants use negotiation, they are more likely to succeed

in moderating or settling the dispute if they are both secular states or if they are

theocratic states that share the same religion and religious sect.

Hypothesis 3b. When disputants use negotiation, they are more likely to succeed

in moderating or settling the dispute if they are both theocratic states that share

the same religion and religious sect.

Political Culture. Different political systems create different political cultures,

including different ways of responding to and attempting to resolve disputes. The most

frequently cited statistical finding regarding the relationship between political systems

and interstate conflict has been the “democratic peace,” that is, the virtual absence of war

between democracies during the modern interstate system (Small and Singer, 1976;

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1990; Russett, 1993; Maoz and , 1993; Russett, Oneal

and Cox, 2000).

It is possible to make a broad cultural argument for the democratic peace based on

political identity, specifically a shared self-image among democratic or liberal states

(Brewin, 1991). The leaders of democratic states, it is argued, share an affinity for other

members of the democratic “family,” which encourages them to settle their differences

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through peaceful means. Moreover, they recognize that they share cultural norms of non-

violent behavior. Specifically, the normative/cultural argument for the democratic peace

hypothesizes that disputes between democracies are more amenable to peaceful

settlement because each government trusts the other’s inclination to follow peaceful

norms of dispute management through negotiation and compromise (Maoz and Russett,

1993; Dixon, 1994). That expectation, it is argued, does not obtain in disputes between

authoritarian states, which have a political culture in which force plays a prominent role,

or in disputes between democracies and authoritarian states because democracies,

recognizing the difference in political cultures, do not trust authoritarian states to follow

democratic norms of dispute settlement.

A second explanatory processes of the democratic peace focuses on the structural

impediments that derive from institutional constraints on the executive. The structural

hypothesis is that shared decision-making powers, including institutional checks and

balances, an active opposition party, and a free press constrain the government from

capricious, sudden, and/or surprise attacks on its neighbors (Buena de Mesquita and

Lalman, 1992; Morgan and Campbell, 1991). Presumably, leaders of disputing

democratic states know that, in bargaining with each other, they enjoy the security of

being able to seek a peaceful settlement through negotiation without the risk of a sudden,

unexpected attack from the other party.

However, the most extensive comparative test (Maoz and Russett, 1993) provides

evidence that the democratic cultural norm of non-violent dispute resolution is a more

robust predictor of the avoidance of dispute escalation than structural constraints. We

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assume that cultural affinities among democracies is at least as important as their

structural cousins, and as such focus our attention on these cultural attributes.

Hypotheisis 4a: When the disputants use negotiation, they are more likely to succeed in

moderating or settling the dispute if they are both democracies;

Hypothesis 4b. When the disputants use negotiation, they are more likely to succeed in

moderating or settling the dispute if their political systems share non-violent norms of

dispute settlement.

Language. Language is cited frequently as one of the primary attributes of

cultural identity. Sharing, or not sharing, a common language can affect the attitudes of

state representatives toward each other. During the Second World War, Winston

Churchill, in his efforts to ingratiate himself with Franklin Roosevelt, continually stressed

the natural affinity between the two great Anglophone nations (Kennedy, 1999:465).

During the Cold War era, France’s President Charles De Gaulle traveled to Quebec and

fanned the flames of separatism by emphasizing the special relationship between France

and the francophone majority in Quebec. The other side of close affinity that may grow

out of a shared language, is the separation of self and other that is generated by language

differences.

Language differences can affect the quality of communication between state

representatives, not only because of linguistic differences per se, but because of

language’s role as an expression of the cultural attributes of the negotiating parties.

Cohen (1997) argues that language is the medium through which shared meanings are

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transmitted throughout society, and, unlike most symbolic representations of culture, it is

a dynamic medium that reflects social change, as well as retaining a country’s historical

identity. Language is “a repository of [a] shared common sense directing a country’s

conduct of negotiation. It is the link between culturally embedded meaning and practice”

(Cohen, 1997:13). When disputants do not share a common first language, problems in

understanding can occur even if the parties are communicating in a common second

language, such as English.

Hypothesis 6. When the disputants use negotiation, they are more likely to

succeed in moderating or settling the dispute, if they share the same first

language.

Individualistic versus Collectivist Societies. Our second communication variable, a

distinction between individualistic and collectivist societies, is drawn from research on

intercultural communication (Triandis, 1995; Hofstede, 1991). The

individualist/collectivist distinction represents the extent to which a culture emphasizes

individual or group identity. A paralinguistic distinction is drawn between individualists

and collectivists. Individualists are outcome-oriented negotiators who direct their

attention to tangible outcomes or goals. Collectivists are process-oriented negotiators

who emphasize the management of relationship-related and reputational interests, such as

pride, dignity, trust, and respect (Ting-Toomey, 1999).

Individualism/collectivism has been show to covary significantly with another

prominent paralinguistic distinction in intercultural communication research: Hall’s

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(1977, 1959) high-context/low-context categorization. Individuals from low-context

societies presume that the information of interest lies in the encoded message itself; high-

context negotiators are more attuned to contextual cues, such as the interpersonal

relationship between negotiators and their nonverbal expressions (Cohen, 1997).

Because it has a stronger empirical foundation, we have chosen

individualism/collectivism as our indicator of cultural paralinguistic similarities and

differences, but its covariation with the high-context/low-context distinction should tap

the effects of both cultural indicators. We hypothesize that differences between state

representatives on these dimensions will impair the quality of communication in

interstate negotiations.

Hypothesis 7: When the disputants use negotiation, they are more likely to

succeed in moderating or settling the dispute, if they are both from either

individualistic or collectivist societies.

In sum, we propose, that all other things being equal, the first two cultural

predictors, religion and political culture, will affect the readiness of the parties to use

negotiation in attempt to settle their disputes, but that all four predictors: religion,

political culture, language, and societal culture, will affect the outcome of any

negotiations that do take place.

Realist Variables. We noted above that the most compelling counter-argument to

our general proposition comes from political realism, which suggests that a global

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political culture, based on Realpolitik, will trump local cultural effects, particularly when

vital security interests are at stake. Working from a classical realist perspective, the key

variables of interest are (1) the gravity of the issues at stake, and (2) the comparative

military capabilities of the rival states. These are the two most prominent variables in

realist discussions of interstate interactions (Morgenthau, 1978), and dispute bargaining

(Snyder and Diesing, 1977). Moreover, in a study of 40 militarized crises, Leng (1993)

found that the combined effects of tangible interests at stake and optimism, on the part of

both parties regarding the costs and risks of war, was positively associated with more

coercive bargaining strategies.

When issues are of vital importance to both sides, disputants are less likely to be

optimistic with regard to the probability of finding common ground for a peaceful

settlement (Pruitt, 2005), and hence less ready to pursue negotiations. Also, from a realist

perspective, they are more likely to accept the costs and risks of the use of force to defend

or pursue their interests. Thus, when vital interests, such as territory, are at stake, we

would expect the disputants to be less willing to negotiate, and less successful in

achieving a settlement when they do negotiate.

The relationship between comparative capabilities and the willingness of the

parties to seek a negotiated settlement is more complex. From a realist perspective, states

should be more willing to use force in an attempt to achieve their objectives unilaterally

when they are optimistic about their chances, that is, when they view the costs and risks

as relatively low (Blainey, 1988). But, for both sides to be optimistic about their chances

in a military conflict, at least one party has to misperceive the comparative military

capabilities of the two sides, either through bounded rationality, or the withholding of

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private information by one at least one side.6 As Fearon (1995) has demonstrated, with

complete information, there is no rational reason for the parties to choose war over

negotiation. If they are evenly matched, the costs and risks of a military conflict should

be too high for both states; if they are unevenly matched, the weaker should yield rather

than accept the additional costs of a lost war. Thus, without a detailed historical analysis

of the perceptions of the leaders in each of the disputes, we cannot predict readiness to

negotiate on the basis of observable comparative military capabilities. But, when the

parties do negotiate, classical realism would predict that, if negotiations did not fail, they

would lead to a compromise settlement, or end in a stalemate when the parties are evenly

matched in military capabilities, and that the weaker party would yield when there is an

uneven balance in military capabilities.

Hypothesis 8a. Disputants will be less likely to negotiate their disputes when they

are geographically continguous;

Hypothesis 8b. Negotiations are more likely to fail, or end in a stalemate, when

they are geographically continguous;

Research Design and Procedures

Cases and Sources. To test these hypotheses, we have chosen a sample of 16 pairs

of states engaged in enduring rivalries in the period between 1946 and 2000. Within each

rivalry, we make a distinction between negotiations that occur within the context of

6 Leng’s (1993) study estimated the optimism of state leaders through a close historical analysis of each ofthe cases in the study.

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ongoing militarized disputes and those negotiations that occur during the more peaceful

intervals occurring between disputes. This distinction allows for a more direct test of

whether Realpolitik trumps cultural differences when the stakes are greater. The sample

of rivalries appears in Table 1.

TABLE 1: SAMPLE OF RIVALRIES

Rivalry DatesRussia-Norway 1956-2001Afghanistan – Pakistan 1949-1992China – India 1950-1992India – Pakistan 1947-1992Ethiopia – Somalia 1960-1985Greece-Turkey 197?-2000Iraq -Israel 1967-1992Syria -Israel 1948-2001Lebanon - Israel 1948-1993Jordan - Israel 1948-1998Saudi Arabia - Israel 1957-1981North Korea - South Korea 1949-2001Cuba - United States 1959-1996Ecuador – United States 1952-1981Iran-Iraq 1953-2000Egypt-Israel 1948-1989

The 16 rivalries include 430 negotiations, and 229 MIDs. These negotiations take

place both within the MIDs and during the intervals between subsequent MIDs and

provide the cases to test our hypotheses regarding the role played by culture in

negotiations between rival states. Although our sample is overly populated with rivalries

involving Israel and its neighboring state, we also include rivals involving four of the

major powers, India and Pakistan as regional powers, and two Latin American rivalries

involving the United States. We focus specifically on bilateral disputes.

Enduring rivalries are defined operationally as bilateral relationships between

states in which there are at least six militarized disputes occurring within 20 years

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(Bennett, 1998). Militarized disputes are disputes in which at least one of the parties

threatens, displays, or uses military force (Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996). These cases

allow for a stringent test of the validity of the proposition that culture matters, even in

disputes where vital interests are at stake.

To obtain information on negotiations with our sample of enduring rivalries, we

identified all bilateral disputes, which occurred between 1945 and 2000 involving these

pair of rivals. From this list we generated data on negotiations occurring within them.

Over the past four years we coded data on negotiations within these rivalries that

incorporate security issues. Within the temporal confines of a MID we record

information on negotiations pertaining to the issues related to the MID. During inter-

MID intervals we record information on negotiations pertaining to national security

issues. For each negotiation, we record the beginning and ending dates of negotiation,

days on which the parties are actively engaged in negotiation, the affiliation and ranks of

negotiators and any third party mediators, changes in negotiators or mediators, the issues

under negotiation, and negotiation outcomes, as well as the cultural variables described

above. The data are drawn from accounts in the international press, diplomatic histories,

and memoirs of participants. These data on negotiations within inter-MID intervals are

interleaved with data describing militarized disputes and any negotiations to allow for a

temporal tracing of conflict and attempts to manage that conflict through negotiation.

Data on the militarized disputes are taken from the Correlates of War project. Dispute

attributes identified include: the beginning and ending dates of each dispute, the

participants, magnitude of militarized behavior.

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Out unit of observation in the data is the event-period. Our events are temporally

bracketed, with each period stopping and starting based on the character of the event. For

example, all rivalries begin with a militarized dispute that records the first event in the

series. The end date of the MID provides the starting date for the inter-MID interval

period, which ends with the onset of the next MID. If there are negotiations either within

a MID or during the intervals, the temporal duration of each negotiation is recorded as a

separate event-period. In effect we have a temporally defined event-based unit of

observation that records negotiations within and between militarized disputes. The total

number of inter-MID interval or MID event-periods in our data is 743, including 430

periods involving negotiations and 313 periods without negotiations.

Outcome Variables. We are interested in whether cultural similarities or

differences affect: (1) the willingness of the parties to seek negotiated solutions to their

disputes, and (2) the success of negotiations that do take place. Initially we

operationalize willingness to negotiate in terms of whether or not negotiations occur in

the period and the time from the end of the MID to the start of negotiations. Negotiation

outcomes are categorized according to an ascending order of success as: (1) full

settlement of the dispute, (2) partial settlement of some issues, (3) no agreement on

political issues, but moderation of the severity of the dispute (e.g., cease-fire), and (4)

failed negotiations.

Culture Variables. We record cultural attributes in terms of religion, political

orientation, language, and social orientation. The first two culture variables, religion and

political culture, may vary over the course of the rivalry. Afghanistan, or example,

changes from a communist, secular state to a state under religious law under the Taliban;

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Pakistan’s political regime shifts from democratic to authoritarian on a number of

occasions.

For the religion variable, we distinguish between those pairs in which (a) the

states are both secular, or are theocratic but share the same religion and religious sect,

and (b) those pairs in which one state is classified as secular and the other theocratic, or

both states are theocratic, but with different dominant religions or religious sects. We

classify a state as theocratic when religious doctrine or practices are included in the

state’s legal system. The religion categorization is obtained by consulting documentary

sources, as well as country experts.

We employ two political culture indicators. The first indicator is a commonly

used distinction between pairs of states that share democratic political systems, and pairs

in which one state is democratic and the other is authoritarian, or both states are

authoritarian. The democratic-authoritarian distinction is drawn from the Hewitt,

Wilkenfield, and Gurr (2008) POLITY IV data on state attributes

(www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity).. The POLITY IV data scores range from -10 (most

autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). For each pair of rival states, we use the lowest of

the two scores, the "weak link" specification, to determine the democracy score for the

dyad. If the lowest democracy score is +6 or above, we code the dyad as sharing a

democratic political culture.

We make simple dichotomous distinctions based whether the rival states would be

classified as sharing the same, or a different: language or social culture. We code the

parties as the same on the language variable when the elites share fluency in a language,

and also use that language in common discourse. For example, we code India and

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Pakistan are sharing a common language, English, even though the traditional languages

of the two states are Hindi and Urdu, because English is commonly spoken by elites in

those countries. On the other hand, if the United States and Cuba were negotiating with

each other, and the Cuban negotiator was fluent in English, we would code the languages

as of the states as different.

The distinction between individualistic and collectivist cultures is drawn largely

from a comparative survey of 61 states by Hofstede (1991), who classified states

according to one or the other of these two attributes. Hofstede did not include the then

communist states in his study; consequently, we have made our own judgments in those

few cases not fitting into his survey.

Realist Variables. The two realist variables are continguity and comparative

military capabilities. As a proxy for relative capabilities we record whether one of the

participants to the rivalry was a major power, as defined by the Correlates of War project.

There is some consensus that territorial disputes represent the most serious issues in

interstate disputes, with the extant empirical research indicating a positive correlation

between territorial issues and more contentious behavior (Vasquez, 1993). To tap this

effect, we distinguish between those disputes involving contiguous actors and those that

do not.

Analysis and Findings

Our results are necessarily preliminary. We begin by examining the distribution

of our data with regard to our specific outcome variables. We recognize that the world is

more complex than bivariate results betray – particularly when culture is the focus – but

bivariate distributions can permit broad stroked inferences. Tables 1-8 present the

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distribution of negotiation attempts by various cultural attributes. We hypothesized that

negotiation patterns would differ across sects within rivalries between theocratic states,

and our initial results lend tentative support to this inference. In table 1 we see that if a

pair of countries in a rivalry are theocracies of they same sect they are equally like to

negotiate or not. However this general pattern masks evidence that within the context of

a militarized dispute theocratic states are less likely to engage in negotiations. Since the

data are broken into periods involving militarized disputes and other less conflictual

periods, one inference is that theocratic states actively involved in militarized hostilities

with another theocratic state are not likely to enter negotiations, but during less

conflictual times these same two states are more likely to find a way to use diplomacy to

address their security concerns (Tables 1 & 2)

Table 1Joint Theocracy & Sect and Negotiations, complete sample

| theocratic, same sect negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 288 35 | 323 | 89.16 10.84 | 100.00 | 43.37 44.30 | 43.47-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 376 44 | 420 | 89.52 10.48 | 100.00 | 56.63 55.70 | 56.53-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 664 79 | 743 | 89.37 10.63 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

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Table 2Joint Theocracy & Sect and Negotiations, MIDs Only

| theocratic, same sect negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 162 22 | 184 | 88.04 11.96 | 100.00 | 52.77 95.65 | 55.76-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 145 1 | 146 | 99.32 0.68 | 100.00 | 47.23 4.35 | 44.24-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 307 23 | 330 | 93.03 6.97 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

Common languages between rivals point to a considerably greater propensity to

adopt negotiations as a form of conflict management than other pair of rivals, and this

result appears to hold – albeit less robustly – within the context of a militarized dispute.

Table 3Common Language and Negotiations, complete sample | common language negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 268 55 | 323 | 82.97 17.03 | 100.00 | 48.38 29.10 | 43.47-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 286 134 | 420 | 68.10 31.90 | 100.00 | 51.62 70.90 | 56.53-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 554 189 | 743 | 74.56 25.44 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

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Table 4Common Language and Negotiations, MIDs Only

| common language negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 152 32 | 184 | 82.61 17.39 | 100.00 | 62.04 37.65 | 55.76-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 93 53 | 146 | 63.70 36.30 | 100.00 | 37.96 62.35 | 44.24-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 245 85 | 330 | 74.24 25.76 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

If pairs of rivals are of a similar social culture they are in general more likely to

enter negotiations over security issues, but as with other cultural traits, within the context

of a militarized disputes the tendency to negotiate goes away. Interestingly, when both

parties to a rivalry have democratic political cultures they are more likely to engage in

negotiations over security issues, except during periods of active military hostilities. In

many ways this runs counter to the general notion that democracies are more attuned to

and more likely to adopt negotiations as a way to avoid war.

Table 5Same Social Culture and Negotiations, complete sample

| same social negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 181 142 | 323 | 56.04 43.96 | 100.00 | 50.84 36.69 | 43.47-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 175 245 | 420 | 41.67 58.33 | 100.00 | 49.16 63.31 | 56.53-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 356 387 | 743 | 47.91 52.09 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

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Table 6Same Social Culture and Negotiations, MIDs Only

| same social negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 100 84 | 184 | 54.35 45.65 | 100.00 | 62.50 49.41 | 55.76-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 60 86 | 146 | 41.10 58.90 | 100.00 | 37.50 50.59 | 44.24-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 160 170 | 330 | 48.48 51.52 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

Table 7Joint Democratic Culture and Negotiations, complete sample

| both democratic negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 289 34 | 323 | 89.47 10.53 | 100.00 | 44.19 38.20 | 43.47-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 365 55 | 420 | 86.90 13.10 | 100.00 | 55.81 61.80 | 56.53-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 654 89 | 743 | 88.02 11.98 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

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Table 8Joint Democratic Culture and Negotiations, MIDs Only

| both democratic negotiate | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 0 | 160 24 | 184 | 86.96 13.04 | 100.00 | 57.14 48.00 | 55.76-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 120 26 | 146 | 82.19 17.81 | 100.00 | 42.86 52.00 | 44.24-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 280 50 | 330 | 84.85 15.15 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

Table 9 presents a multivariate logistic regression of cultural variables on the

existence of negotiations within and between MIDs. The basic question being asked is

whether political and social cultural variables predict the use of negotiations when

controlling for their simultaneous impact of other variables. Our results suggest that

cultural variables influence considerably the willingness of the rivals to engage in

negotiations, but only during the periods between militarized disputes (Model 1).

However, only the level of hostilities is a significant predictor of negotiation within a

MID, and in this case the more violent the dispute the less likely it is that we will observe

negotiations. Cultural variables just don’t seem to matter within the context of violent

military hostilities.

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Table 9Logit Regression on Use of Negotiations*

----------------------------------------------------------------------

| Model 1 Model 2 negotiate | Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| | Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|-------------+---------------------------------------------------------contiguous | .38 .33 0.26 -.47 .60 0.43both democratic| -.42 .65 0.51 .09 .45 0.83one democratic | 1.33 .42 0.002 .63 .64 0.33same social | 1.77 .56 0.002 .10 .77 0.89common language| .19 .33 0.56 .62 .67 0.35both theocratic| 1.69 .48 0.00 .81 .97 0.40both secular | .48 .29 0.096 -.39 .50 0.43highest host | -.02 .01 0.02constant | -1.85 .61 0.002 -.52 .82 0.52

*Model 1 is during Intervals Only; Model 2 is during MIDs OnlyBold font p<.05; Italic font p<.10Numb Obs 413 330Wald Chi Sq 62.58 51.05Prob > Chi Sq .000 0.000Log Likelihood -232.9 -210.77

During the intervals between MIDs, however, similar social culture leads to a

greater propensity to use negotiations as does a dyad comprised of joint theocratic states.

Jointly autocratic dyads involved in a rivalry are considerably less likely to engage in

negotiations relative to mixed dyads, and jointly democratic rivals show no consistent

pattern of negotiating during the inter-MID periods. Somewhat surprisingly neither

common languages are not associated with an increased use of negotiations during the

intervals between MIDs, and two secular states are more likely to use negotiation in the

inter-MID period, but our level of confidence in this statistical result is weak (.10 level).

Our results of bivariate distributions of the data suggest that the outcome of

negotiations is not related to religious or social culture in any remarkable way.

Moreover, political culture – at least from the perspective of jointly democratic dyads – is

associated with outcomes short of success. For example, in the full population of cases

jointly democratic rivals are much less likely to achieve a full settlement than other

rivals. Of the 16 full settlements only one (6%) is a result of negotiations between jointly

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democratic rivals, while 25% of the full settlements occur between jointly autocratic

rivals.

Table 10Joint Democratic Culture and Negotiation Outcomes, complete sample

| both democratic outcome | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 15 1 | 16 | 93.75 6.25 | 100.00 | 4.04 1.79 | 3.75-----------+----------------------+---------- 2 | 67 8 | 75 | 89.33 10.67 | 100.00 | 18.06 14.29 | 17.56-----------+----------------------+---------- 3 | 195 35 | 230 | 84.78 15.22 | 100.00 | 52.56 62.50 | 53.86-----------+----------------------+---------- 4 | 94 12 | 106 | 88.68 11.32 | 100.00 | 25.34 21.43 | 24.82-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 371 56 | 427 | 86.89 13.11 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

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Table 11Joint Democratic Culture and Negotiation Outcomes, MIDs Only

| both democratic outcome | 0 1 | Total-----------+----------------------+---------- 1 | 4 1 | 5 | 80.00 20.00 | 100.00 | 3.31 3.85 | 3.40-----------+----------------------+---------- 2 | 29 6 | 35 | 82.86 17.14 | 100.00 | 23.97 23.08 | 23.81-----------+----------------------+---------- 3 | 52 14 | 66 | 78.79 21.21 | 100.00 | 42.98 53.85 | 44.90-----------+----------------------+---------- 4 | 36 5 | 41 | 87.80 12.20 | 100.00 | 29.75 19.23 | 27.89-----------+----------------------+---------- Total | 121 26 | 147 | 82.31 17.69 | 100.00 | 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

We examine the role of political, social, and religious culture in predicting the

outcome of negotiations by using a multinomial logit estimator with a multivariate

model. Our outcome variable has four categories reflecting the degree of settlement that

results from negotiations. While the results are not immediately striking, there are some

interesting relationships that generally confirm our hypotheses. Of the four categories,

the moderation of the dispute, often conceived of as a ceasefire, is the baseline outcome

and the affect of our predictor variables on the other outcomes are judged relative to this

baseline.

For example, within the context of a militarized dispute, jointly theocratic rivals

are more likely to have failed negotiations and jointly democratic rivals are considerably

less likely to have failed negotiations than either would be to have negotiations reach a

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Table 13Multinomial Logit On Outcome of Negotiations, Intervals Only

Number of obs = 280Log pseudolikelihood = -279.07486Pseudo R2 = 0.0575

(Std. Err. adjusted for 15 clusters in dyadcode)------------------------------------------------------ outcome | Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|-------------+-----------------------------------------1 | contiguous | 1.37 .99 0.16bothdemocr~c | -30.83 1.75 0.00bothautocr~c | .29 .97 0.76 samesocial | -.45 .80 0.57commonlang~e | -1.06 .96 0.26boththeocr~c | -.52 .95 0.57 bothsecular | -.91 1.02 0.37 _cons | -2.71 .95 0.00-------------+------------------------2 | contiguous | .22 .45 0.61bothdemocr~c | -.57 .95 0.54bothautocr~c | -.13 .54 0.80 samesocial | .08 .47 0.85commonlang~e | -.07 .49 0.88boththeocr~c | -.49 .50 0.35 bothsecular | -.97 .49 0.05 _cons | -1.08 .38 0.00-------------+------------------------4 | contiguous | .60 .43 0.16bothdemocr~c | .95 .73 0.19bothautocr~c | .05 .32 0.86 samesocial | -.80 .42 0.05commonlang~e | -.46 .25 0.06boththeocr~c | -.21 .45 0.63 bothsecular | -.80 .39 0.04 _cons | -.51 .34 0.14--------------------------------------------------------------

For clarity in interpretation we translated the estimated outcome into predicted

probabilities, given a fixed set of conditions on our explanatory variables (Table 14 and

15). While we could provide predicted outcomes for each explanatory variable we use

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two variables to demonstrate the impact of culture on negotiation outcomes. In Table 14

we use common language to gauge the impact on negotiations and our estimated results

suggest that there is an increased probability of failed negotiations when the rivals share a

formal negotiating language (53% versus 39%). The estimated probability of a full or

partial settlement is reasonably similar across language divisions, when holding

everything else in the model constant. On the other hand, theocratic rivals are

considerable less likely to fail to achieve any moderating outcome than rivals with other

religious combinations (53% versus 8%), and are much more likely to achieve at least a

partial settlement (43% versus 15%).

Table 14Predicted Outcomes Across Common Languages

___________________________________________________

Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev.-------------+----------------------------------------------- Same language settle | 743 .062 .042 Same Language partial| 743 .24 .19 Same Language Fail | 743 .53 .22------------------------------------------------------------- Different Lang Settle| 743 .02 .01 Different Lang Partial| 743 .18 .18 Different Lang Fail | 743 .39 .24

Table 15Predicted Negotiation Outcomes, Theocratic States

Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev.-------------+--------------------------------------------------Both Theocratic Settle | 743 2.08e-17 1.64e-17Both Theocratic Partial| 743 .43 .24Both Theocratic Fail | 743 .08 .05----------------------------------------------------------------Non-Theocratic Settle | 743 .03 .02Non-Theocratic Partial | 743 .15 .10Non-Theocratic Fail | 743 .53 .17

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Much of the scholarship in International Relations focuses on the

relationship among critical security issues as a predictor of military conflict. In

our models we use geographic contiguity to capture this realist notion of security.

Although contiguity is not a direct measure of security or issues at stake,

considerable research has demonstrated that contiguity is highly correlated with

conflictual behavior (eg. Bremer, 1992), and that the ability to project power is

degraded as a function of distance (Boulding, 1963). Predictions from our model

suggest that when holding all else constant, contiguous states in a rivalry are 40%

more likely to fail to achieve any sort of productive outcome to negotiations than

are non-contiguous states.

Table 16Predict Negotiation Outcome, Contiguity

Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev.-------------+--------------------------------------------Contiguous Settle | 743 .04 .02Contiguous Partial | 743 .13 .08Contiguous Fail| 743 .71 .10----------------------------------------------------------Non-Contiguous Settle | 743 .03 .02Non-Contiguous Parial | 743 .15 .13Non-Contiguous Fail | 743 .31 .16

Discussion

To be continued…..

36

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