Cultural Planning as a Solution at Displacement and Recovery

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Journal of US-China Public Administration, ISSN 1548-6591

Nov ember 201 1, Vo l. 8, No. 1 1, 1 22 7-12 41

Cultural Planning as a Solution at Displacement and Recovery

Problem in the Porong Mud Volcano Disaster

Achmad Room Fitrianto

The State Institute for Islamic Studies o f Sunan Ampel, Surabaya, Indo nesia

The Porong Mud Volcano in Sido arjo represents a major environmental and so cial disaster in Indo nesia. In order to

mitigate the negative impact of the Mud eruption gov ernment set up some policies. However those policies that are

set up still cannot fulfill community satisfaction especially for the victims. Policies that cannot achieve community

expectation are a sign th at there are missing link s in the mitigation and redevelopment p lan mechanism. There are

four gaps that are observed between the mitigation program and the community n eeds: firstly, there was no

adequate supp ort given to the affected small and medium businesses which could have been empowered throu gh

assistance programs; second ly, th ere was insu fficient retraining for those who lost their job s; thirdly, there were

inadequate educational incentives and v ery little supp ort was given to the victims; and lastly, there were no cu ltural

settlement assistance programs for those moving to new settlement areas. Ramesh and Howlett stated that every

po licy was alway s related to po litics. Po licy th at has a lon g term dimensio n co uld create more favorab le ou tcomes

for landowners, and create greater oppo rtunities for investment. As a po ssible solution , it is b elieved th at the

implementation of cultural plann ing, in combination with th e principles of the sus tainable livelihood framework,

would be an effort to increase the attractiveness of the region . In the lo ng term, it could in crease the potential

opportunity that could be gained by the societies by increasing income, reducing vulnerability, developing

networking, building national identity and providing the sustainable use of natural resources.

Keyword s: Indon esia Sidoarjo mudflows, environmental disasters, community need, gov ernment po licy, cultural

plan nin g

The Porong mudflow disaster occurred on May 29, 2006 (see Figure 1). Five thousand cubic meters of

mud a day spurted up in the beginning. This has now increased to around 130,000 cubic meters a day and

remains constant (Williamson, 2006). There is now a lake of mud, which has buried approximately 600 ha of

land and villages. Therefore a major environmental and social disaster has been the consequence of the Porong

mudflow disaster. Considera tion of this case provides strong insight into the Indonesian governm ents recent

environmental management of the disaster, which demonstrates weaknesses, particularly in terms of

enforcem ent and accountability.

The government policies to mitigate the impact of the mudflow showed as political image building just to

keep the ruling party popular. As a result, the mitigation body that had task and duty to solve the nega tive

impac ts of this disaster seem ed to have no holistic planning. They had see n just as technical body whose only

Corresponding author: Achmad Room Fitrianto, lecturer and researcher, Department of Islamic Economic, Syariah Faculty,The State Institute for Islamic Studies of Sunan Ampel; research fields: government reform, community development. E-mail:

[email protected].


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A SOLUTION AT DISPLACEMENT AND RECOVERY PROBLEM1228

effort was to dam the mud without considering other aspects. The use of appropriate approaches based on the

best knowledge and available technology that would reduce the negative eff ects of the disaster wa s ignored.

The policy initiatives that were set up to cope with the disaster demonstrated the willingness of the government

to mitigate the effects of the disaster.

Figur e 1. The map location of the mudflow. So urces: Centre for Remote Imaging , Sensing and Processing (CRISP)

(2008); Sidoarjo Tourism (2008);

This paper is aimed at evaluation for the government in tackling social and economy problems that are

occurred. As solution, cultural planning approaches are introduced. Some advantages and handicap of using

this approach ar e elaborated.

This paper c onsists of five sections. The first sec tion discusses the positions of the governm ent and the

corporate body in solving the problems. The second section describes the community needs. The third section

discusses the gaps between the com munity nee ds in the disaster a rea and centra l government policies. The

fourth section descr ibes cultural planning as a way out. The last section discusses the lessons that could be

learned from the mitigation policy toward Porong mudflow disaster.

Government and Corporate Body Positions

The Porong mudflow volcano located near the Banjarpanji-1 (BJp-1) well exploration site, produced not

only hot toxic mud but also caused a significant amount of damage to infrastructure, the environment, and to

society. More over, the exploration perm its in Block Brantas that was gra nted to PT. Lapindo Brantas by the

central government was not compatible with the Sidoarjo site plan (BPK report, 2007). According to the

Indonesian Supreme Audit Board, the drilling location of BJp-1 well is located just five metres from residential

areas, 37 me tres from P orong freeway and less than 100 metres from the gas pipe. Based on the decree of

Badan Standar Nasional Indonesia No. 13-6910-20021

and Presidential Decree (Inpres) No. 1/19762

, PT

Lapindo should not have been allowed to conduct its mining activities near residential areas and near public

1This decree regulates the off-shore and in-shore drill procedures.

2

This decree expels the sy nchronisation of the agrarian sector to th e forestry, mining, transmigration and g eneral work that is

stated in the law No. 11/1967.


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A SOLUTION AT DISPLACEMENT AND RECOVERY PROBLEM 1229

infrastructure facilities. However, even though their drilling activities were not compatible with the Sidoarjo

site plan, the government still approved the exploration.

These facts wer e parallel to Epsteins (1990) opinion that questioned the honesty of the company that

conducted the feasibility study in preparing its business activities. The regulatory system, the laws, and the

bureauc ratic process involved in the feasibility study imply that before a ny e xploration goes ahea d, an

appropriate f easibility study that calculates and e stimates the potentialities and the danger involved in

exploration should be conducted beforehand. If the dangers outweigh the potencies, the exploration permit

should not be issued. Therefore, in order to obtain a business permit, it is possible that a company could

manipulate the feasibility study to guarantee approval. Moreover, Epstein (1990) also underlined that the

ineffectiveness of the regulatory sy stem is exace rbated by the fact that private citizens and public intere st

groups have no right to bring a legal action to enforce the statute, which means that public involvement and

participation could support and control the implem entation of the regulatory system . Moreover, the bottom-up

planning mechanism such asMusrenbang3

, could function not only as community participation in development

but also as comm unity watch tools.

In addition, the governm ent could do two things in order to re duce the abuse c omm itted by businesses.

Firstly, it should not give special pr ivileges to business without acknowledging the c omm unity needs. For

example, it is clearly stated in the Sidoarjo site plan that the BJp-1 well location is categorised as an area for

residence s, household industries, and industrial storage, not for mining. Never theless, in order to fulfill

Indonesias oil shortages, BP Migas granted approval to PT Lapindo to explore in that location.

Secondly, the government should reform its position to that of a facilitator and regulator. The government

should minimise the miscommunication between itself and its agencies. For example, Kontrak karya (working

contracts) or Kuasa pertambangan (mining authorities) for gas and oil exploration in Porong should be

considered on the basis of the implementation of an environmental impact assessment or AMDAL (Analisis

Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan, Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA]). The process in gaining an AMDAL

should consider the laws and regulations that guarantee the safety of the communities and the environment

surrounding the exploration area s. But facts showed that the process for obtaining a Kontrak kary a (working

contract) or a Kuasa pertambangan (mining authority) for gas and oil exploration in Porong contradicted the

decree of Badan Standar Nasional Indonesia No. 13-6910-2002, Presidential Decree No. 1/1976 and the

Sidoarj o District Regulation No. 16/2003. Yet, the explora tion permit was issued. This also showed that there

was a lack of coordination between government agencies in processing the exploration permit for Porong.

Interf erence by private parties and businesses crea tes miscomm unication or a lack of coordination am ong

government agencies. It can be assumed that the bureaucrats attitude or the politicians behaviour reflects the

pressure of organised groups outside the governm ent and determ ines every single policy that the governm ent

adopts (Kingdon, 1995; Cobb & Ross, 1997; Tay lor et al., 1997). The businesses in particular are an organised

group outside the government that tries to persuade the policy maker to formulate policy that supports business

activities. The aims of businesses are to maximise production in order to maximise profits (Hirschey & Pappas

1996). However, besides maximising profit, the corporation should develop a philanthropy program in

anticipation of the negative externa lities. Such programs c ould build good public images for businesses.

3Musrenbang is a mechanism that guid es local governments in Indo nesia in formulating d evelopment plans. It involves a p rocess

of socialisation and participation in planning at government level. Moreover, it also is a guide used in the planning and the

evaluation of regional development.


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Corporate social responsibly (CSR concept) is aimed at giving more attention to social and moral aspects

(Kemp, 2001), which demonstrate the companys social responsibility to society (UNISA, 2009). For example,

the com pany should not use child workers in orde r to push down labor costs and should give priority to the

locals when recruiting workers. Recent facts show that in Indonesia, the CSR concept is seen mostly as a

community deve lopment program that supports and provides public facilities for society (Koestoer, 2007).

Somehow, if this interpretation is not well defined and if a ll companies support and provide public facilities,

such as public toilets and/or maintain drainage systems, the governments function as a public server would be

taken over (Koestoer, 2007).

As there was no legal obligation for companies to pay compensation, PT Lapindo maintained that the

compensation they paid out was a part of PT Lapindo Brantas CSR program (Kompas, November 3, 2008). PT

Lapindo Brantas was blam ed by som e for causing the mudf low disaster even though according to some others,

it was triggered by the Yogjakarta ea rthquake. Despite of the possible causes, corporate social re sponsibility is

needed in the mining sector. According to Warhursts notes in Jenkin and Yokovelva (2006), over the last 40

years of mining and petroleum exploration, industries have contributed significantly to environmental disasters

and huma n rights abuses. There fore, it is logical that corporations should be involved in land rehabilitation and

in minimising the environmental impact of natural resource exploitation. Moreover, community development

and social-cultural disruption must become subjects of routine dialogue between mining companies and the

government as the administrative authority. For the m ining industry, CSR is about balancing the diverse

demands of communities and the imperative to protect the environment, with the ever present need to make a

profit (Jenkin & Yokovelva, 2000).

Newm an mining company in Peru has set a good exam ple: Newm an adds to the social embeddedness

construct in the extent multinational enterprises are re aching out to gain legitima cy in the local com munities in

which they are working (Gilford & Kestler, 2008). Meanwhile, the community and NGOs forced Newman to

consider c ommunity welfar e a nd to provide benefits by compensating for the environmental dam age a nd social

externalities that they might cause. These programs, by creating a network of trusted partnerships with diverse

organisations and institutions, promoted the m ultinational enterprises products in the eme rging economy

(Gilford & Kestler, 2008). Moreover , Newma n invited academ ics from the University of Colorado to

investigate what it could do to improve the welfare of communities that surrounded the exploration site. What

Newm an did was rather different compared to other m ining companies worldwide. Mining companies mostly

spent their social program funding on health services, for example Angio Gold in South Africa funded and

provided anti-retroviral thera py f or their workers with HIV, and Freeport-Mcmora n launched com munity wide

treatment for lymphatic filariasis to decrease the impact of the debilitating disease on its workforce (Gilford &

Kestler, 2008). Indeed, the business of the contribution in development planning through the empowerment of

societies not only is a philanthropic m ission but also brings significant advantages to business.

Community Needs

Porong and its surroundings have faced the effects of the mudflow disaster for almost more than three

years since it first spewed on May 29, 2006. According to Moral and Walker (2007), humans have always

been a t the mercy of large natural disturbances, which m eant that human life a lway s depended on nature.

However, in recent times, besides the natural hazards, human civilisation has also been threatened by massive

population growth. Therefor e, in order to fulfill human nee ds and its dem and for goods and service s, humans


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have actively modified the earth so much as to trigger further disturbances and other hazards. The increase in

human population contributes significantly in crea ting a fragile environment and intensifying the impacts of

natural hazards (Walker & Moral, 2007). These threats provided challenges to humans when having to mitigate

the negative eff ects of natural turbulences or human made disasters. The use of appropriate approaches based

on the best knowledge and available technology would reduce the negative ef fec ts of the disaster.

The Porong mudflow disaster buried around 600 ha of land and caused 15,000 fac tory workers to lose

their jobs. Moreover, this disaster also forced 2,299 small and medium enterprises to collapse and become

bankrupt (Ham zirwan, 2007; Tem po Interac tive, January 22, 2007; Williamson, 2006). It caused not only

environmental destruction but also social tension and dislocation. There are at least four programs that the

community needs in order to reduce the social tension that has occur red:

Firstly , the community needs capac ity-building program s such as a job-seeking assistance program f or the

workers who lost their j obs. Another program could provide skills training for the victims who can no longer

work in their previous jobs and therefore must retrain to earn an income;

Secondly, a psy chosocial assessment of the victims was neede d, especially for those who experience d the

direct impact of the disaster and who were left mentally shocked as a result of having to leave their heritage

land and culture and adapt to a new environment;

Thirdly, the community needs adequate education support for its children. Providing mobile libraries for

students who live in the vicinity of the disaster a rea to support their study is a good exam ple. Besides that,

providing alternative educa tion for schools that were badly a ffe cted by the disaster would also help to minimise

the disruption of the education process in this area . In addition, scholarships and fre e tuition could be granted to

students who were direc tly affected, especially to those who have previously achieved high grades. In this way,

students would not miss out of a n educa tion due to the disaster;

Lastly, the government could assist in developing comm unity networks aime d at, in the short term , the

distribution of charity by philanthropy organisations to the victims. For example, the government could support

the Indonesian Red Cross in distributing assistance to the victims. In the medium term, the networking could

support private schools, whose land and buildings were buried by helping them obtain compensation. In the

long term, the networking could become a program that could connect the small and medium businesses to

banks in order to provide adequate capital to start their business.

The Gaps Between Government Policy and Community Needs

The policy initiatives that have been set up to cope with the disaster dem onstrate the willingness of

the government to mitigate the effects of the disaster (Ife & Tesoriero, 2006). The governments

willingness is the result of a political process that reflects the impact of government on society (Heywood,

2004). In more detail, Hey wood (2004) described the policy a s a linkage among intentions, actions and

results. By intention, Heywood (2004) was referring to whether the government was for the people or for

the intere sted groups. On the other hand, policy implementation reflects governm ent action, whether the

government really means to solve the problem or is just paying lip service. The level of community

satisfaction demonstrates the result of the policy . If the com munity is satisfied with the governme nt policy,

it will support the governm ent.

The governments response to the disaster was demonstrated in the two presidential decrees: Presidential

Decree 13/2006 (Keputusan Presiden 13/2006) and 14/2007 (Peraturan Presiden 14/2007). Both decrees clearly


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stated that the tasks and duties of the m itigation authority were to formulate methods to stop the mudflow, and

manage the surface problems caused by it, including its social and economic impacts4

. However, the

government effort to mitigate the impact of the mudflow showed lack of political willingness. The mitigation

authority was j ust a technical body whose only eff ort was to dam the mud without considering other a spects.

As Ife and Tesoriero (2006) explained, the c ommunity based services are seen as structures and processes

for meeting human need, drawing on the resourc es, expertise and wisdom of the community itself. Structurally,

the presidential decrees are on track for providing the expertise to stop the mudflow and to provide adequate

compensation to the victims. However, the social construction programs that have been set up are not

sufficient5

. The government simply a ssumed that giving society m ore money would solve the problems.

Community m em bers need further a ssistance to norma lise their lives after being disturbed by the disaster.

There are four aspects that seem to have been neglected by the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency

(Badan Penanggulangan Lumpur Sidoarjo):

The first was that there was no adequate support for empowering and providing assistance programs for

sma ll and medium sized enterprises that were af fec ted by the mud. It was reported that around 2,299 small

businesses and medium sized enterpr ises collapsed and becam e bankrupt. There fore , it is important to

regenerate the local business activities;

Secondly, there was no adequate training for the victims who lost their jobs. Chapter 10 of the Presidential

Decree 14/2007, stated the duties of the social deputy6

of the Sidoarj o Mudflow Mitigation Agency w ho was to

develop strategies to solve the social problem that resulted. Moreover , the Pr esidents direct instruction given

on December 28, 2006 stated that the government agencies responsible for the disaster had to explore new

em ployment opportunities for the victims who lost their jobs as a re sult of the disaster. However, the facts were

that insufficient assistance was given to workers who lost their jobs. For example, there were around 1,022

farm workers registered in Renokenongo, Jatirejo, Siring Ketapang, and Kedungbendo villages (The Sidoarjo

Statistics Board, 2006). When the m ud buried the fa rm lands in those villages, these workers wer e not skilled to

obtain employment in other sectors. Therefore, government involvement in providing special training to

provide new working skills was important (Ka rpagam , 1999);

Thirdly, there w ere no sufficient educational incentives for the victims. Logically, if 15,000 factory

workers lost their jobs, none of those could replace the 1,022 farmers in order to undertake farm work without

adequate re-training. As 2,299 small and medium sized enterprises collapsed and became bankrupt, many

parents could not continue to pay tuition fees for their children. There fore , these children would have found it

difficult to enroll in a school or university. Moreover, based on the Indonesian Supreme Audit Board (BPK

report, 2007), up to December 13, 2006, 18 schools were buried and about 5,397 students were affected.

Therefore, special treatment for these affec ted students was essential;

Finally, it is general knowledge in Indonesia that every village has its own customs; therefore, the

government or the agencies must consider this when formulating resettlement programs. Providing social

assistance in order to prevent social clash is essential as social clash could occur as a result of the difference in

4Presidential decree 14/2 007 , article 1, su b-article two, mentions the social and phy sical reconstruction.

5The Surabaya post of May 27 , 20 09 reported that in 2 008 the Indon esian footwear centre and BPLS trained 4 40 disaster victims

in a new life skill such as food processing, han dicraft produ ction, and automotive mechanic training. It planned to train anoth er

420 v ictims in 12 round s in 2009.6

The Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency is comprised o f the head o f agencies, vice head of agencies, secretary and three

deputies that are responsible for the agencys operational activities with regards to infrastructure and so cial matters.


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customs in new settlement areas. For example, in Indonesia there are two big Islamic movements: Nahdatul

Ulama (NU) andMuhammadiyah. Both groups practise different customs and rituals as a part of their daily

activities. If there was no social assistance from the government, this would create new tension between both

Islamic moveme nts.

In short, the government should be aware of its policy gaps. A more proactive approach toward the

formulation of cr eative programs to reduce the negative effec ts of the disaster is necessary.

As discussed previously, the central government policies with regards to the Porong mudflow disaster are

represented in the Presidential Degree 14/2007a decree that obligates PT Lapindo to be responsible for all the

losses incurred from the disaster. Article 1, sub-article two of the decree , states that the social and physical

reconstruction of affected areas should be conducted in order to minimise the negative effects of the disaster.

Figur e 2. Gaps between g overnment policy and the community needs. Sou rce: Fitrianto (200 9).

However , the Sidoarj o Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS), manda ted to mitigate the effects of the

disaster, but concentrated only on the conducting of physical mitigation programs such as the damming of the

mud and rebuilding of the freewa ys. In addition, the paym ent of compe nsation, also the responsibility of P T

Lapindo7

, was implemented only by buy ing the land and the properties that were buried. This study found four

7As it is stated in article 15 of the Presidential Degree 14/2 007 .

1. Government through mitigation

bo dies in Poron g ten d to concen trate

on physical programs such as

damming the mud or rebuilding the

freeways

2. Lapindo assumes that buying all the

bu ried land will solv e the p roblems

Community needs

1. Capacity building

assessments

2. Psych osocial assessment

3. Education support

4. Networking development

GAPS

Analysis of the regulation and

government policy regarding the

disaster

Community n eeds assessment

analysis

1. Inadequate support in

empowering and providing

assistance programs for small and

medium enterprises affected by the

mud

2. Inadequ ate retraining for the

victims who lo st their jobs in o rder

to obtain other jobs

3. Insu fficient educational

incentives for the victims

4. No cultural settlement assistance

1. Two presidential decrees

2. Two ministerial decrees

3. Cash and resettlements p olicy

4. Cash and carry policy

Analysis of the existing bodies

responsible for mitigating

damages

1. BPLS

2. Minarak Lapindo Jaya

3. Local gov ernment

Analysis of the impacts of the

disaster

1. Victims characteristics

2. Co mmunity perspective

3. Community hopes and wishes

Analysis of the go vernment and

corporate capacities in go verning th e

mitigation program


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gaps in the implem entation of the Presidential Decree 14/2007 and the comm unity needs: firstly, there was no

adequate support given to the affected small and medium businesses which could have been empowered

through assistance program s; secondly, there was insufficient retra ining for those who lost their j obs; thirdly,

there we re inadequate educa tional incentives and very little support was given to the victims; and lastly , there

were no cultural settlement assistance programs for those moving to new settlement areas. The complete

description of the gaps between policy aims and community needs is outlined in Figure 2.

Government has only conducted a part of the policy aims with regards to the Porong mudflow disaster.

This was assumed as there was no legal decision ma de by the cour t as to who should be made responsible for

the disaster in Porong. Two opinions existed regarding the causes of the disaster: the first was that the

underground blowout that caused the mud volcano was triggere d by PT La pindos drilling activities at BJp-1

well; the second opinion was that the underground blowout was ca used by the Yogjakarta ear thquake. Despite

of these opinions, an investigation should be conducted to dem onstrate the cor relation between dr illing

activities at BJp-1 well and the m ud volcano. Based on this investigation, the court could then m ake a dec ision

about the responsibilities of the par ties involved.

However , even though the court decision has not y et been made, re development programs should be

carried out immediately and integrated, and sustainable programs should be developed. It is believed that a

three-prong involvement between the government, communities and businesses could solve the problems in

Porong. As previously mentioned, Indonesia practises a participatory m echanism in development known as

Musrenbanga bottom-up planning mechanism involving all the stakeholders in the society a t every social

level. Therefore, it is suggested that local wisdom can be used through cultural and cluster development

planning. This planning involves the existing social capital, joint coopera tion am ong comm unities, governm ent

and private companies. Such planning can narr ow the gaps between governm ent policy and the community

needs.

Cultural Planning Through Community InvolvementA Way Out

Cultural planning could be defined as a tool that accommodates all elements of a community that involves

and relates to development programs. As Krempl (2006) stated, cultural planning was a development tool that

involved art and culture as central development processes that could create a sustainable framework and

strategic planning best practices. Culture becomes a central theme of development as it represents dreams,

values, beliefs and communication techniques within society (Krempl, 2008). Moreover, culture also portrays

the human behaviour interaction in a modified nature and environment for supporting human needs. In more

specific terms, cultural planning looks at the community as co-dwellers in one house (Krempl, 2008). In a

house, there are many private spaces and comm on areas such as the dining room, kitchen, and garden. In

cultural planning, the comm on area c annot be shaped, designed, or determined by a single interest. The

comm on area should be seen as shared spaces, media to interact am ong society, and an ar ea to develop

togetherness. In order to keep the comm on area functional, collaboration from e ach society m em ber is essential.

Therefore, developing understanding am ong society mem bers respects the roles of the player s that are par ts of

the social contract, and developing trust among society members becomes a key instrument.

However, developing common sense in a public space cannot be separated from the seven cultural factors.

According to Krempl (2005), the seven cultural factors were artistic, commercial, educational, environmental,

political, social and spiritual. Krempl (2005) de scribed the factors that determ ine culture as a c ultural wheel. A


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complete description of the cultural wheel is outlined in Figure 3.

Figur e 3. Cultural wheel. Source: Krempl (2005 ).

Because each culture is determined by the seven factors, development cannot be conducted using the same

methods and approaches. Such approaches could be conducted using the sustainable livelihoods framework

(SLF). The SLF provides a holistic approach in addressing the most pressing constraints faced by the

community (Ludi & Slater , 2008). It focuses on understanding how individuals and households obtain and use

particular social and economic a ssets to seek further opportunities, reduce risk, minimise vulnerability and

ma intain or improve their livelihoods (DFID, 1997; Ludi & Slater, 2008). In a ddition, this fra mework assists

other agencies to develop flexible and locally appropriate responses in reducing exposure to vulnerability and

setting priorities for development programs (Ludi & Slater, 2008). This means that the SLF places humans at

the centre of planning that is influenced by the social condition, the political environment, existing huma n

problems, the f inancial situation and natural resourc es. Figure 4 outlines the complexity of the sustainable

livelihoods framework.

It could be observed from Figure 4 that there are multiple actors and pressures that come into operation in

the mitigation program. This figure portrays the sustainable livelihood framework. The figure shows that the

policy m akers can use m ultiple strategies in limiting the dangers and risks. In addition, this fram ework also

provides flexibility to the agencies in reducing the risk of vulnerability. The SLF also provides evidence of

development problems that can be prioritized for tackling by the agencies (Ludi & Slater, 2008). In this study,

there were four community needs that succeeded to be identified: capacity-building, psychosocial assessment,

educational support, and networking programs. Community needs should be central to the analysis of the social

condition, the political environment, existing human problems, the financial situation and natural resourc es. As

shown in Figure 4, one of the final outcomes of this framework is to reduce social vulnerability and to provide

more sustainable methods of exploring natural resources. Therefore, the use of the SLF makes the community

the centre of attention. The government, as a public services provider, should mitigate the problems that

occurred as a result of the disaster.


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Figur e 4. The sustainable livelihood s framework. S = so cial; P = p olitical; H = human; N = natural; F = financial.

Source: DFID (1997).

As stated previously, the comm unity in eac h region has its own characteristics and customs. Therefor e, a

cultural planning approach should go hand in hand with the use of the sustainable livelihood framework. In

addition, clustering methods should also be considered. One of the advantages of the clustering development

plan is that it could support the growth of industries, and its possible ef fec ts on the developme nt process. In

other words, clustering could inject economic dynamism into the region (OECD, 1999, p. 182). Moreover,

Potter (1998) emphasized that the clustering method could create commonalities, complementarities and

linkages among companies and interrelated institutions. With regards to the mudflow disaster case in Porong,

the Sidoarjo government uses theMusrenbangmechanism. Moreover, Sidoarjo also has a site plan that could

be used as a guidance in revitalising Porong and its surrounding areas. The Sidoarj o governme nt divided its

territories based on their geographical positions and potencies. In terms of geographical position, regions were

divided into five groups of sub-districts known as SSWP-subsatuan wilayah pengembangan (development

cluster areas) (Bappeda Kabupaten Sidoarjo, 2003). In terms of its potencies, the area was divided into

conservation and production zones (Bappeda Kabupaten Sidoarjo, 2003). The production zone was further

divided into five centres of development: the first are agropolitan or agricultural development areas, the second

are Gemapolis or industrial areas, the third is a coastal development area and the fourth are areas allocated for

residential development. The last area is to be developed into water-front cities in the east of Sidoarjo (Bappeda

Kabupaten Sidoarjo, 2003). Based on this brief descr iption, the Sidoarj o site plan has employ ed the cluster

approach. The use of this approach is the right choice to promote rapid development across the sub-districts.

Participatory planning also supports this approach. In addition, in order to gain optimal results in sustainable

development, it is suggested that the sustainable livelihood fram ework and cultural plan should adopt a

bottom- up approach. W ith regards to the Porong mudflow case, the gover nment should classify the problems

that occur and place them in the centre of an analysis in considering the social condition, the political

environment, existing human problems, the financial situation and natural resources. This analysis would

acc omm odate the existing customs and help to ma ximise the input of volunteer experts that would like to

participate in solving the problems in Porong. It is believed that the participatory, disaster mitigation method is

more sustainable and relatively more accommodating of all local interests.

Cultural Planning as a Solution at Displacement and Recovery

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Transcript of Cultural Planning as a Solution at Displacement and Recovery