Cultural Difference in Negotiations

8/2/2019 Cultural Difference in Negotiations

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Culturaltendencies innegotiation:AcomparisonofFinland,India,Mexico,Turkey,andtheUnitedStates

LynnE.Metcalfa AllanBirdb MaheshShankarmaheshb ZeynepAycanc JormaLarimod DdimoDewarValdelamare

aCaliforniaPolytechnicStateUniversity,SanLuisObispo,CA93407,UnitedStates

bUniversityofMissouri,1UniversityBlvd.,SaintLouis,MO63121-4499,UnitedStates

cDepartmentofPsychology,RumelifeneriYolu,KocUniversity,34450SariyerIstanbul,Turkey

dFacultyofBusinessStudies,UniversityofVaasa,P.O.Box700/Wolffintie34,65101Vaasa/65200Vaasa,FinlandeSchoolofBusinessandSocialSciences,TecnologicodeMonterrey,CampusCuernavaca,AvenidaPaseodelaReforma182-A,

Col.LomasdeCuernavaca,C.P.62589,Temixco,Morelos,Mexico

AbstractIn this era of increased global cooperation, a growing number of negotiators conduct business in multiple countries and,

therefore, needaccess toa systematiccomparisonof negotiating tendencies acrossawide range ofcountries.Empiricalworksystematicallycomparingvariationsacrossarangeofculturesisscarce.Acomparativeanalysisofnegotiatingtendenciesinfivecountriesispresented.Thisstudyestablishestheutilityofthe[Salacuse,J.(1998)Tenwaysthatcultureaffectsnegotiatingstyle:Somesurveyresults.NegotiationJournal,14(3):221235]framework in identifying countrydifferencesacross fivecountries,representing five cultural clusters. Significant differences in negotiation orientations both between and within cultures wererevealedatalevelofcomplexitynotfoundinpreviousempiricalstudies.

Inaneracharacterizedbyenormousproliferationoftrade and professional ties across borders (cf. Berton,Kimura,&Zartman,1999;Brett,2001;Cellich&Jain,2004; Cohen, 1997; Foster, 1992), internationalnegotiation has received increasing attention. While

tional(1997)prolong,

internationalnegotiationsusedtobelimitedtoaskilledcorps of diplomats, the ease of international travel,communication and transportation has widened thecircleofinternationalactorstoincludeindividualsfromallwalksoflifebusinesspeople,engineers,scientists,and people engaged in humanitarian aid. This unprecedentedlevelofcooperationacrossbordersincreasespossibilitiesformisunderstandingcausedbyvariationsin negotiating behaviors that are grounded in culturaldifferences(Cohen,1997;Faure,1999).

Theeffectsofcross-culturaldifferencesoninternanegotiation are widely acknowledged. Cohen

notes that cultural factors can complicate,and frustrate negotiations. While there is

substantialempiricalevidencethatnegotiatingtendencies differ by culture (cf. Adair, Okumura, & Brett,


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2001;Graham,Mintu,&Rodgers,1994),muchoftheinformation that isavailable toanexpandingcorpsofinternationalnegotiatorsaboutnegotiatingbehaviorsincountriesaround theworld isdescriptive(Elashmawi,2001;Foster,1992;Gesteland,1999;Moran&Stripp,1991;Morrison,Conaway,&Borden,1994;Salacuse,2003).Negotiatorsmayfindthemselvesrelyingonverybasiclistsofdosanddonts(cf.CultureGrams,2005;Morrisonetal.,1994),whichmayormaynotcontaintips relevant to negotiating. Moreover, the itemsincluded in the lists are generally not comparableacross countries. Empirical work that systematicallycomparesvariationsacrossarangeofculturesisscarce(Metcalf & Bird, 2004). An example of what isavailableforthefivecountriesthatarethesubjectofthisstudyispresentedinTable1.Whatthedatainthistablemakesclearisthelackofinformationoncountries,theTable1Conventionalwisdomaboutnegotiationinfivecountriesa

stereotypical nature of what is available, and thecontradictions that exist without explanation between widely available sources. In this era ofincreased global cooperation, it is imperative thatnegotiatorsbeequippedwithabetterunderstandingofthebehaviorstheymightexpectatthenegotiationtable.Negotiators need information about the negotiatingbehaviorstheyarelikelytoencounterinagivencountryand, because a growing cadre of negotiators conductsbusiness in several,orevenmany,different countries,there is also a need for access to a systematiccomparison of negotiating tendencies across a widerangeofcountries.

A number of models that capture the myriadinfluences on international negotiating behavior andthat would permit comparisons between countrieshavebeenproposed(cf.Bertonetal.,1999;Cellich&

Dimension Finland India Mexico Turkey UnitedStatesGoal:contractor BusinessinIndiais Mexicansseek Establishrelationships Establishrapport

relationship personal,establish long-term beforenegotiating quickly;thenmoverelationships relationships tonegotiating

Attitude:win/lose Mexicanshavea Lookformutualorwin/win winwinattitude gains,whenever

possiblePersonalstyle: Negotiationsfollow Establishedetiquette Americansdonot

informalor

formal

procedures,

must

be

followed

like

formality

or

formal buttheatmosphere ritualsinbusiness

isfriendlyand interactionrelaxed

Communication: Finnsaredirect Noisharsh. Mexicannegotiators Politenessis important Bedirectandtodirectorindirect Evasiverefusals mayseemindirect thepoint

arecommon andavoidsayingnoandmorepolite

Timesensitivity: Finnsbegin Indiansconduct Thebusinessatmosphere Donotexpectto USnegotiatorshighorlow businessright businessata iseasygoing getrightdownto expectquick

away,without leisurelypace. business.Thepace decisionsandsmalltalk.Itis Time-is-money ofmeetingsand solutionsnotappropriate isanalienconcept negotiationsisslowtobelate

Emotionalism: Useobjective Factsareless Truthisbasedonfeelings. Turksshowemotion. Subjectivefeelingshighorlow facts,rather persuasive Emotionalargumentsare Feelingscarrymore arenotconsidered

thansubjective thanfeelings moreeffective thanlogic weightthan facts.Pointsfeelings.Serious objectivefacts aremadebyandreserved accumulatingfacts

Teamorganization: Individualsare Decisionswillbe Authorityisvestedin Individualswithoneleader responsiblefor madeatthetop afewatthetop. relevantknowledgeorconsensus decisions Mexicanspreferconsensus andskillsmake

decisionsRisktaking: Indianstakerisks Mexicansavoidrisk Turkstakerisks

highorlowa

TheserecommendationsaredrawnfromavarietyofsourcesincludingBusinessMexico,2002;CultureGrams;Elashmawi(2001),FisherandUry(1991),HallandHall(1990),Hampden-TurnerandTrompenaars(2000),InvestorsBusinessDaily(2004),Kras(1989),Lewis(2004),MoranandStripp(1991).


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Jain, 2004; Cohen, 1997; Salacuse, 1991; Weiss &Stripp, 1985). These models can be classifiedaccording to the comparative, micro-behavioral(cross-cultural) paradigm identified by Weiss (2004)inhisreviewoftheinternationalnegotiationliterature.This micro-behavioral paradigm directs attention totheface-to-faceinteractionbetweennegotiators,withparticularinterestintheorientationsandbehaviorsofnegotiators,aswellastheeffectofcontextualfactors.Streamsofresearchonthisparadigmincludetheworkof Graham and his associates on intraculturalnegotiation and Brett and her associates on intercultural negotiation. These bodies of work, whileshedding light on cultural differences in negotiatingbehaviors, limited their focus to notmore than threenegotiating tendencies. The only framework that hasbeen empirically investigated in full is the Salacuse(1991) framework (see Fig. 1). It includes tennegotiating tendencies and allows for a range ofpossibleresponsesalongeachbi-polarcontinuum.

The research reported in this article involves acomparativeanalysis ofnegotiating tendencies in fivecountries,basedonthetendimensionsintheSalacuseframework.Ourobjectivesaretwofold.First,wetesttheutility of the ten dimensions in identifying countrydifferences,employingsamplesizessufficienttoallowformultivariatestatisticalanalysis.Second,weidentifythe specific dimensions on which country differencesare

likely

to

be

found.

1. Method1.1. Countryselection

With the intent of establishing variation betweencultures,thefivecountriesselectedforconsiderationinthis study are drawn from different cultural clusters.Ronen and Shenkar (1985) originally proposed the

Fig.1. Dimensionsofculturalvariationinnegotiation.

notion of cultural clusters and, more recently, theGLOBE research project (House, Hanges, Javidan,Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004) adopted a similar clusterapproach. The premise underlying cultural clusters isthat due toreasons ofgeographicproximity, commonlanguage and historical relatedness, similarities invalues and beliefs, there may be found similaritiesamong national cultures. Five cultural clusters arerepresented in this study: Finland is classified in theNordic/Scandinaviancluster,TurkeyintheNearEastern/Middle Eastern cluster; Mexico in the LatinAmerican cluster; the USA in the Anglo cluster; andIndiaintheSouthernAsiacluster(Houseetal.,2004;Ronen&Shenkar,1985).1.2. Surveyinstrument

To measure negotiating tendencies, Salacuseemployed a survey instrument that included ten bipolar dimensions measured on five-point scales.5Respondents were instructed to indicate where theirown negotiating style and approach to businessnegotiations fell along each of the ten continua. Inhis1998study,Salacusereportedresultsfromasurveyof191respondentsfrom12countries.LimitationstothestudynotedbySalacuseincludethesizeofthesample(191/12 yields an average of 16 respondents percountry) and the fact that respondents completed thesurvey

in

English.

To

overcome

these

limitations,

we

sought significantly larger samples and translated theEnglish-languagesurveyintoMexicanSpanish,FinnishandTurkishusingtranslatorsineachcountry.Toensurethat items were accurately translated, bi-lingualscholars familiar with concepts of cross-culturalnegotiation compared each translation to the Englishoriginal.

The survey method has been widely used in thenegotiation literature (cf. Ganesan, 1993; Perdue &Summers, 1991) and in large-scale research projectscomprisingmultiplecountries(cf.Houseetal.,2004).While negotiation experiments conducted in a labsetting may yield focused insight into severalvariables, surveys enable researchers to collect dataoverabroaderrangeofvariables.Moreover,surveysare less cumbersome to conduct across multiplecountries and multiple investigators. The surveymethod does assume that respondents are truthfulregarding their preferences.

5For instance, on the goal dimension, contract=1 and relation

ship=5.


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1.3. SubjectsAsampleofbusinesspeopleanduniversitystudents

with business experience was drawn from Finland,India, Mexico, Turkey, and the USA. The resultspresentedbelowarebasedonresponsesfrom147menand women from Finland, 196 from India, 327 fromTurkey,192fromMexico,and327fromtheUSA.

Chi-square test results show demographic differences between the samples. Finnish and Indianrespondents were predominantly male, whereas thegendersof respondents from the other three countriesweremoreevenlydivided.USandIndianrespondentswere younger than Mexican and Turkish respondents.Indian respondents were better educated than therespondents from the other four countries. Finally,45%oftheIndiansamplereportedhavingeithermiddlemanagement or top-level executive experience, with39%forMexico,28%forTurkey,14%fortheUS,and12%forFinland.Differingdemographicprofilesacrosscountriesisnotuncommoninmulti-countrystudies(cf.theGLOBEproject).Thisissuehasbeenacknowledgedin prior research involving multiple countries andmultiple investigators. In our analyses, nationaldifferences in negotiation orientations remained aftercontrolling for demographic differences. Recognizingthe variance in demographic characteristics acrosscountry samples, the data still provide useful insightsinto

intra- and

intercultural

variation

in

negotiating

tendencies.1.4. Dataanalysis

To test whether respondents country of originaccounted for differences in the ten negotiatingorientations,weconductedaMANOVAanalysis. Theresultsweresignificant, indicating thatcountrydifferences innegotiatingtendenciesexist.Meanscoresforeachcountryoneachofthe10negotiatingtendenciesarereportedinTable2.Totestforcountrydifferencesindividually across each of the ten negotiatingtendencies, we used Tukeys Honestly SignificantDifference Test. This is a more powerful post hocmultiplecomparisontestfortestingalargenumberofpairs of means (Winer, Michels, & Brown, 1991).TukeysHSDresultsarealsopresented inTable2.

Before meaningful cross-cultural comparisons canbe made, response bias a systematic tendency todistort responses to rating scales either by selectingextremeormodestanswersmustbeaddressed(VandeVijver&Leung,1997).Recently,researchershavebeenurgedtoseektheoreticalexplanationsfordifferencesin Ta

ble2

N

egotiatingtendencymeans,standarddeviationsandTukeysHSDforFinland,India,Mexico,Turkey,andtheUSA

N

egotiating

Meansandstandard

deviations

TukeysHSD

tendencies

Fin

India

Mex

Turkey

USA

Fin

Fin

Fin

Fin

India

India

India

Mex

Mex

Turk

India

Mex

Turk

USA

Mex

Turk

USA

Turk

USA

USA

G

oal

3.57(1.239)

2.76(1.782)

2.61(1.390)

1.98(1.211)

2.90(1.085)

+a

+

+

+

NS

+

NS

+

NS

+

A

ttitudes

4.20(1.083)

3.66(1.762)

4.26(1.203)

2.93(1.477)

4.02(0.976)

+

NS

+

NS

+

+

+

+

NS

+

P

ersonalstyles

2.54(1.002)

3.30(1.7

53)

3.58(1.211)

3.33(1.408)

2.90(1.001)

+

+

+

+

NS

NS

+

NS

+

+

C

ommunications

1.8

5(0.645)

1.62(1.203)

1.70(0.973)

1.63(0.976)

1.87(0.714)

+

NS

+

NS

NS

NS

+

NS

NS

+

T

imesensitivity

2.63(0.960)

2.02(1.486)

2.22(1.126)

1.81(1.032)

2.5

5(0.962)

+

+

+

NS

NS

NS

+

+

+

+

E

motionalism

3.03(1.079)

3.31(1.644)

2.87(1.279)

3.53(1.344)

3.1

5(0.987)

NS

NS

+

NS

+

NS

NS

+

NS

+

A

greementform

2.36(1.060)

2.29(1.695)

2.16(1.247)

2.17(1.260)

2.10(0.845)

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

A

greementbuild

4.14(0.991)

2.65(1.713)

3.10(1.494)

3.27(1.577)

2.84(1.076)

+

+

+

+

+

+

NS

NS

NS

+

T

eam

organization

2.63(1.166)

2.93(1.844)

3.01(1.371)

3.86(1.396)

3.62(1.082)

NS

NS

+

+

NS

+

+

+

+

NS

R

isk

3.36(1.437)

2.28(1.566)

2.66(1.049)

2.51(1.274)

2.63(0.874)

+

NS

+

NS

+

NS

+

NS

NS

NS

aSignificantdifference.


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patternsofresponseratherthanimmediatelyconcludethat such differences are a result of response bias(Fischer,2004;Smith,2004).IntheresultsreportedinTable 3 and our ensuing discussion, reasonableresearch-based explanations are provided for thedifferent patterns of response found among the fivecountriesstudied.

In addition to reporting mean scores, Au (1999)urgedinternationalbusinessresearcherstotakeacloserlook at the dispersion of responses within a givenculture.Intra-culturalvariation(ICV),measuredbythestandard deviation, can help capture critical cross-cultural differences. Results show that ICV for Indiawas consistently larger than the other four countriesacross all tennegotiating tendencies.Incontrast,ICVfortheUSwasthesmallestamongthefivecountriesforsevenofthetennegotiatingtendencies.Wewillreturnto a consideration of ICV in our discussion of theresults.2. Results

Itiscommon,whenreportingtheresultsofstatisticalanalysesemployingtwoormoretechniques,todiscussthefindingsderivedfromeachtechnique.Thenatureofourinvestigationandourinterestinwithin- andwellasbetween-culture variation led to us to examine theintersectionof two setsof results: (1) comparisons ofmeans

and

standard

deviations

between

pairs

of

countries and (2) comparisons of within-countryresponse distributions. We focus first on results foreach negotiation dimension, and then move on to aconsiderationofthebroaderfindings.2.1. Goal:contractorrelationship?

This dimension refers to the primary goal of abusinessnegotiation:toarriveatasignedcontractortobuildarelationshipbetweenthetwoparties(Salacuse,2003). Chi-square test results show a significantdifferenceamongthedistributionofresponsesforeachcountry on this behavior (see Table 3). Turkishrespondentsshowedthestrongestpreferenceforleavingthe negotiating table with a contract, while Finnsshowed a stronger orientation toward building arelationship. These two countries occupied opposingpositionsonthedistribution,withtheotherthreefallingsomewhereinthemiddle.ResultsforIndiaweremixed,with39%ofrespondentspreferringtoarriveatasignedcontract and 34% preferring to build a relationship.Mexicanrespondentsshowedastrongerpreferenceforarriving at a signed contract, and US respondents

centered their responses between the two poles.Sizeable percentages of US respondents were alsofound in the neither and slight preference for arelationshipresponsecategories.2.2. Attitude:winloseorwinwin?

Businessnegotiatorstendtoapproachanegotiationwith one of two basic attitudes: it is either a processwherebothpartiescangainorastruggleinwhichthereis awinner and a loser(Salacuse,2003). Turkish andIndianrespondentsshowedthestrongestpreferenceforwinloseoutcomes.Withthatsaid,Turkishrespondentswere fairly evenly divided, and somewhat evenlydistributed across the winlose/winwin continuum,whereasIndianrespondentsdemonstratedeitheraclearpreference for a winwin or a winlose outcome.Respondents from Finland, Mexico, and the USdemonstratedagreaterpreferenceforwinwinresults,withMexicansleast likely topreferawinloseresult.Of ten paired comparisons, seven were statisticallysignificantindifferenceonthisdimension(seeTable2).2.3. Personalstyle: informalorformal?

Thisdimensionreferstothewayinwhichbusinessnegotiators talk to and interact with others, use titles,and dress (Salacuse, 2003). Respondents from Indiawere

clear

in

their

preference

for

a

more

formal

personal style, with respondents from Mexico andTurkey following suit, although not as strongly. Bycontrast,overhalfoftheFinnishrespondentspreferredan informalpersonalstyle.Preferences ofUSrespondents were less strong, with the tendency towardformality nearly as strong as the tendency towardinformality. Results reported in Table 2 show statisticallysignificantdifferencesonsevenof the10pairedcomparisons.2.4. Communication:directorindirect?

Negotiators from some countries prefer direct andsimple communication, while others employ anindirect, more complex style of communication(Salacuse, 2003). Chi-square tests between pairs ofcountriesshowthatthepatternsofresponseforFinlandand theUSA,aswellasforMexicoandTurkeyweresimilar (see Table 3). While respondents from allcountries largely prefer a direct communication style,thereareinterestingandunexpecteddifferencesintheresponsepatterns.Indianrespondentsdemonstratedthestrongest preference (71%) for a direct style of


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Table3Percentagedistributionsfortendimensions

(*)Allx2 scoresarewith20degreesoffreedom,significantatp=.000.(y)Cellswithresultsof33percentorhigherareshadedforemphasis.


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communication, followed by Turkey and Mexico.Surprisingly, although US respondents clearly favordirect communication, their orientation was the leastpronouncedofthefivecountries.2.5. Timesensitivity:highor low?

Salacuse(2003)referstowhethernegotiatorsfromagiven country are punctual or late and whethernegotiatorsfromaparticularcountrynegotiateslowlyorarequicktomakeadeal.TheChi-squaretestresultsshowasignificantdifferenceamongcountriesontimesensitivity(seeTable3)andpairedcomparisonsshowsignificantdifferencesonsevenofthetencombinations.At least half of the respondents from all countriesdemonstrate sensitivity toward time. Perhaps mostnoteworthy isthattheIndianrespondents(59%)showthestrongestsensitivity,followedbyTurkishandthenMexicanrespondents.Alsoofinterestisthefindingthat15% of Indian respondents the largest percentagereportedinthiscategoryforanycountryalsoreportedlowsensitivity towardtime.2.6. Emotionalism:highorlow?

The tendency to act emotionally and/or to displayemotions while negotiating is captured in Salacuses(2003) sixth dimension. Though Indian respondentsreport

the

strongest

tendency

not

to

display

emotions,

as

wellasthestrongesttendencytodisplayemotions,thedistributionofIndianresponsesisessentiallytri-modal,withanothersizeablegroup(19%)occupyingthecenterof the distribution. Turkish respondents also tendedtowardlowemotionalism.Incontrast,FinlandandtheUShaddistributionsthatwereclearlyanchored inthemiddle, and Mexicos distribution was skewed somewhat towardemotionalism.2.7. Agreementform:specificorgeneral?

Thisdimensionreferstothedegreetowhichthefinalagreementbetweenthepartiesincludesdetailedclausesthatattempttoprovidespecificallyforasmanyfutureeventsandrisksaspossible(Salacuse,2003).Whileatleast two-thirdsof the respondents from each countrypreferred a specific agreement, the strength of thepreferencevariedacrosscountries(seeTable3).Indianrespondents demonstrated the strongest preference(55%) for a specific agreement, followed by MexicoandTurkish respondents. FinnishandUS respondentsdemonstrated a weaker preference for specific agreements but were also least likely to prefer a general

agreement.WeagainfoundabimodalresponsepatternforIndian,with25%preferringageneralagreement.Itshouldalsobepointedout,asreflectedinTable2,thatthere were no statistically significant differences inmeanscoresbetweenpairsofcountries.2.8. Agreementbuilding:bottomupor topdown?

This dimension captures whether negotiators buildagreement by negotiating specifics, such as productcharacteristics,price,andtermsofdelivery,orwhethertheystartfromgeneralprinciplesand thenproceed tospecific items (Salacuse, 2003). Finnish respondentsstrongly preferred a top down approach, with 85%positionedonthatendofthecontinuum(seeTable3).Indianresponsesstoodinsharpcontrastwithmorethan50% preferring a bottom-up approach, although onceagainasizeableportion(27%)locatedatthetop-downend.TheTurkishresponsepatternleanedtowardatop-down approach, while Mexican and US patternsreflected no strong preference. Paired comparisonsreported in Table 2 show statistically significantdifferencesonsevenof the tencombinations.2.9. Teamorganization:oneleaderorconsensus?

Some negotiating teams are led by one individualpossessingcompleteauthoritytodecidematters,whileothers

stress

team

consensus

in

decision-making

(Salacuse, 2003). Turkish respondents reported thestrongest tendency to stress team negotiation andconsensus decision-making, with more than 70% ofrespondents leaning in that direction (see Table 3). Asizeable percentage of US respondents also reportedpreference for consensus decision-making. Indianrespondents were split almost evenly between consensus and one leader. Finnish and Mexican respondents do not indicate a strong preference in eitherdirection, butappear to lean toward the one-leaderendof thescale.2.10. Risk-taking:highor low?

Salacuse (2003) notes that negotiators from somecountries are more risk averse than others. With theexceptionofFinland,alargepercentageofrespondentsfrom each country favor a risk-taking approach (seeTable 3). Indian respondents are the most likely tostrongly favor a risk taking approach, followed byTurkishrespondents.USandMexicanrespondentswereleastlikelytohaveastrongpreferenceforarisk-takingapproach,thoughtheyclearlyleanedinthatdirection.


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In contrast, Finnish respondents anchored themselvesclearlyinabalancedpositionbetweenrisk-takingandrisk-averse,with46%at themidpoint.3. Discussionand implications

Ourobjectivesforthisstudyweretwofold.First,wesoughttoestablishtheutilityoftheSalacuseframeworkin identifyingcountrynegotiatingdifferences.Second,wesoughttoidentifythespecificdimensionsonwhichcountries differ. We did, indeed, find significantdifferences between Finland, India, Mexico, Turkey,and the USA. Additionally, the pattern of responsesacrossthetendimensionswasuniqueforeachcountry.Specificcountrydifferenceswereidentifiedusingpair-wisetests.ForfiveofthedimensionsGoal,Attitude,Personal Styles, Time Sensitivity, and AgreementBuilding we found significant differences on sevenof the 10 paired comparisons. In only one case AgreementFormdidwefindnosignificantdifferencesbetweenthefivecountries.

Examiningthepatternofresponsesforeachcountry,we identified several interesting findings. The mostsignificantfindingisthenatureandextentofICVacrossthetendimensions.IndiademonstratedthelargestICVacrossalltendimensions.Au(1999)positedthatlargeICVcanbeexplainedbyfactorssuchasdemographics,alowuncertaintyavoidancescore(Hofstede,1981),aloose

culture

where

there

are

multiple

and

sometimes

conflicting norms governing specific behaviors, and apervasivedemocraticideology,whichexposespeopletoawiderrangeofviewpointsandwaysofdoingthings.India is a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic country, has thelowest uncertainty avoidance score among the fivecountries,isalooseculture,andhasbeenademocracyfor six decades. In contrast, ICV for the US was thesmallestamong thefivecountriesforsevenof the tennegotiatingtendencies.SmallerICViscontrarytowhatone might expect, given that the US has the secondlowest uncertainty avoidance score among the fivecountries, is a loose culture, and has the oldestdemocracy. Yang (1988) argued that industrializationhomogenizesthevaluesystemsofindividuals.AsmallICVfortheUSmaybeattributed to thehigh levelofindustrializationintheUnitedStates.ThetendencyofUS respondents to avoid extremes may also be amanifestation of this countrys homogenized valuesystem.

Althougheachcountrypresentedauniquepatternofnegotiationorientations,notsurprisinglycountrieswerefoundtobesimilaronsomedimensions.Forexample,nosignificantdifferenceswerefoundbetweenpairsof

countriesonagreementform,despitethefactthatICVthat varied widely. The similarities between countriesandthedifferenceswithincountriesandvice-versapresent the opportunity to explore further interestingfindingsforseveraldimensions.3.1. Goal:contractorrelationship?

Because it is rare for US parties to enter intoagreements without the benefit of a contract (Kurz,2000),onewouldexpectthemajorityofUSrespondentstonotonlydemonstrateapreferenceforcontractsbutalsoholdastrongerpreferenceforacontractthanwouldrespondentsfromtheothercountries.Thiswasnotthecase.OurfindingsmayreflectagrowingemphasisintheUSondevelopingandmaintaininglong-termrelationshipswithsuppliersandcustomers.Althoughcontractsare important, close relationships facilitate businessprocesses, such as supply chain management and JITmanufacturing,thatarethehallmarkoftodaysindustryleaders.Ontheotherhand,conventionalwisdomholdsthat Indian businesspersons generally demonstrate abasic reliance on the underlying relationship (Shroff,2000).YetourIndianrespondentsdidnotindicatethis.Infact,amajorityofthempreferredacontract.Indiasrapid ascent as a global player and the increasingwesternizationofitsbusinesspracticesmayaccountforourresults.

Aclear

implication

of

this

finding

is

that

negotiators

shouldrealizethatthegoalsofasignedcontractandofbuilding a relationship are not necessarily mutuallyexclusiveand that theachievementofonecan lead totheother.Asbusinesspracticeschangeovertimeduetoglobal diffusion, negotiators should be wary of theconventionalthinkingthatnegotiatorsfromtheUSarecontract-oriented and those from India, Mexico, andTurkeyarerelationship-oriented.

Thepreceding implication,as well as thosefor theother nine dimensions, is presented in Table 4. Our findingssuggest thatnegotiatorsshouldpreparedifferentlythanconventionalwisdomregardingnegotiationorientationsinthesefivecountriesmightsuggest(referagaintoTable1).Table4presentsanumberofpracticaldosanddontsthatnegotiatorscantakeawayfromourempiricalfindings.3.2. Attitude:win/loseorwin/win?

Negotiatorsshouldnotviewthenegotiationprocessasadversarial,norshouldtheylookatitasaforumformaking unilateral concessions. With the exception ofTurkey,theorientationofrespondentsonthisdimension


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Table4Culturaltendenciesinnegotiation:ImplicationsforpreparationandbehaviorDimension Do DonotGoal:contractorrelationship

Attitudes:win/loseorwin/win

Personalstyle:informalorformal

Communication:directorindirect

Timesensitivity:highorlow

EstablishrelationshipswithFinnishnegotiators

Acquireknowledgeaboutgeneralattitudesofindividualnegotiators.Turksareaslikelytobewinloseaswinwin.IndianattitudesareextremeRecognizethatIndians,Mexicans,andTurksaremorelikelytoadheretorulesthatgovernprofessionalconduct,negotiatingprocedures,andhospitalityDiscussdirectlyunderlyingissueswithFinnish,Indian,Mexican,Turkish,andUSnegotiatorsAddressnegotiationissueswithIndian,Mexican,andTurkishnegotiatorsinatime-boundmanner

AssumethatIndian,Mexican,andTurkishnegotiatorsarenotfocusedonconcludingacontractAssumethatawin/winapproachwillbeappealing.WhenIndiansorTurksadoptawinloseattitude,emphasizeyourconcessionsandtheirgainsIgnoreprotocolincountrieswhereitisimportant

ExpectAmericannegotiatorstouseamoredirectstylethanIndian,Mexican,orTurkishnegotiatorsThinkofIndian,Mexican,orTurkishnegotiatorsaslesssensitivetotimethanAmericansorFinns

Emotionalism:highorlowAgreementform:specificorgeneral

Agreementbuilding:bottomuportopdown

Teamorganization:oneleaderorconsensus

SupportargumentswithfactswhennegotiatingwithIndiansorTurksNegotiatespecificcontracttermsinIndia,Mexico,andTurkey.BeawarethatsomenegotiatorsinIndiawillviewdefinitivecontracttermsastoorigidBuildmomentumwithIndiansbynegotiatingagreementonsmallerissues.BuildrapportwithFinnsandlayoutthegeneralthemesandprinciplesbehindthenegotiationsIdentifyandbuildastrongrapportwiththeleaderofthenegotiatingteaminFinlandandIndia

ExpectIndianorTurkishnegotiatorstouseemotionalargumentsExpectthatbroadorvaguecontractlanguagewillbeacceptableinFinland,India,Mexico,Turkey,andtheUSBeginnegotiationswithFinnsandTurksbydiscussingdetailsoftheproject

Ignoremid-levelnegotiatorsinIndiaandMexico.Theymayhavethecapacity

Risktaking:highor low Offerspecificbottom-lineguaranteestotoformaconsensusand/orinfluencedecisionsmadeatthetopAssumethatMexicannegotiatorsavoidrisk

allaythefearsofrisk-aversenegotiatorsfromIndiaandTurkey

was strongly tilted toward finding mutual rewards innegotiations. The sizeable percentage of Turkishrespondents in each of the five response categoriesonthisdimensionsuggeststhatwhennegotiatingwithTurks,negotiatorsfromothercountriesneedtoexploretheattitudesofthespecificpartieswithwhomtheyarenegotiating. This, of course, is prudent advice in allnegotiationsettings.3.3. Personalstyle: informalorformal?

WhileitiscommonlybelievedthatAmericanstendtobehighly informal,ourfindingsindicate thatFinnsareevenmoreso.Thissuggests thatnegotiatorsfromthe other four countries particularly Americans shouldbesensitivetothelevelofformalitytheyexhibitwhenworkingwithFinns.Whethertheyareformalorinformal, negotiators from all countries generally

engage in informal social interactions before and/orduringtheformalnegotiationprocess.Itisworthwhilefor negotiators to learn the boundaries between suchinformal social activities and formal task-specificnegotiations. Friendliness exhibited during socialinteractions may not necessarily translate intofriendly concession-making behavior during actualnegotiations.Ourfindingssuggestthatthismaybethecase with Indian, Mexican and Turkish negotiators.Negotiatorsare advised toviewwhatoccurs in socialinteractionsonlyasaguidetounderstandingthelargersocialcontext.3.4. Communication:directorindirect?

Given the relatively unambiguous findings on thisdimension, negotiators are encouraged to engage indirectdiscussionofboththemajorandminorissuesin


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theunderlyingnegotiations.Givenglobaldiffusionofbusiness practices, it is not a good idea to go byconventional thinking that US negotiators use a moredirect style of communication than negotiators fromothercountriessuchasTurkeyorIndia.3.5. Timesensitivity:highor low?

The results on this dimension were surprising andcontradict what is commonly known and understoodaboutnegotiatorsfromeachofthefivecountries.MostsourcesindicatethatMexicanandIndiannegotiatorsdonotexpectpunctualityandtendtofollowaslowerpace;Turkish negotiators are punctual, yet also follow aslowerpace;andtime ismoneyforUSnegotiators(Foster, 1992; Kras, 1989; Morrison et al., 1994;Salacuse,2003;Victor,1992).YetgreaterpercentagesofrespondentsfromFinland,India,Mexico,andTurkeyreported a higher sensitivity toward time than USrespondents.Whileonthesurfaceitmaybesurprisingthat US respondents were not as sensitive to time asconventionalwisdommightindicate,ourfindingsmayreflect a shift in US orientation brought about bycontinuous and specific criticisms of US negotiatorsduringthe1980sand1990sthattheyweretoofocusedon time to the detriment of social relationships (cf.Lewinetal.,1995;LincolnandKalleberg,1985).

Researchers have called for businesspeople to becross

pollinators

and

fertilizers

that

span

different

culturalenvironments(Bartlett&Ghoshal,1992).Theexplosion inglobal tradeover thepastdecadeand thediffusionofbestbusinesspracticesacrosstheglobemayhavesimultaneouslydecreasedthetimesensitivitiesofUS negotiators and increased time sensitivities ofnegotiators in countries, such as India and Mexico,which have traditionally held more relaxed attitudestowardtime.Consequently,negotiatorsareadvisednottothinkof theirIndian and Mexicancounterpartsas lesssensitivetotimethannegotiatorsfromtheUSorFinland.In the struggle to maintain competitiveness, businesspeopledealingwithpartnersaroundtheworldcanhardly

justify tardiness as a cultural characteristic. While notbeingpunctualmaystillbeacceptableincertainculturesfor personal transactions, global business culture isincreasingly time dominated. Accordingly, negotiatorsareadvisedtoaddressbothmajorandminornegotiationissuesinatime-boundmanner.3.6. Emotionalism:highorlow?

ItisinterestingtonotethataratherlargepercentageofUSandFinnishrespondentspreferredneithertoact

emotionallynortokeeptheiremotionsunderwraps.ForUS negotiators, this may reflect the tendency of USbusinesspeople to communicate objections and dissatisfaction openly and directly, with the expectationthat the other party will engage in problem-solvingbehavior. It is important for negotiators to recognizethat it maybe impossible for counterparts from somecountriestoseparatetheemotionalcomponentfromthetask-based component on certain issues. Wherepossible, negotiators might be well advised to divideissuesintotwocategories:onethatcontainsissueswithahighemotionalcomponentandanotherthatcomprisesissueswithoutahighemotionalcomponent.Forissueswithalargeemotionalcomponent,strategiestoresolvethem should include informal social interactions incombination with conventional problem-solving techniques.Ontheotherhand,issueswithalowemotionalcomponent can be effectively addressed using traditionalproblem-solvingapproachesalone.3.7. Agreementform:specificorgeneral?

Giventhegeneralpreferenceacrossallrespondentsforaspecificagreement,negotiatorsmaybewellservedtospecifyclearlythenatureofagreementonbothmajorandminornegotiationissueswhennegotiatinginanyofthese five countries. Additionally, when negotiatingwithIndians and, to a lesser extent Finns, negotiatorsmay

also

find

it

useful

to

incorporate

a

more

general

foundationasabasisforthespecificsoftheagreement.Moreover,insertingtoomanyspecificclausestoprotectagainstpotentialliabilitiesintheeventofafailureintherelationship can sow the seeds of suspicion and spoilopportunities tofoster trust intherelationship.3.8. Agreementbuilding:bottomupor topdown?

In Finland and Mexico, which favor a top-downapproachtoagreement-building,thegeneralthemesandprinciples behind negotiations can be laid out duringsocial interactions preceding the formal negotiationprocess.Ontheotherhand,inIndiasocialinteractionscanbeusedtobroachspecifictask-relatedissuesinsteadofoverarching themesandprinciples.3.9. Teamorganization:one leaderorconsensus?

Results for India and Mexico are consistent withconventional wisdom, with respondents from bothcountries reporting a greater preference for decisionsmadebyasingleleader.InIndiadecisionsaremadeatthetop,butmid-levelnegotiatorshaveinput(Morrison


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etal.,1994).OurresultsshowTurksasbeingthemostconsensus-oriented, a finding consistent with theGLOBEsstudy(Houseetal.,2004).GLOBEfindingsshowthatTurksplacealowervalueonpowerdistance,while maintaining a high value for collectivismaprofilethatfitswellwiththeideaofconsensusbuildingin the negotiation context. Data from the most recentworld values survey (Inglehart, Basanez, Dez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004) offer additionalinsight. Turkey scores very low on trust towardsleadersinsociety;therefore,relyingonasingleleaderinnegotiationsmaybeperceivedasrisky.ThoughUSnegotiatorsarenotconsensus-orientedintheJapanesesense of conformity, decision-makers rely on andconsidertheadviceofexpertsonthenegotiatingteam.By contrast, in countries such as India, wherenegotiators tend to prefer a single-leader approach, itisimportanttoidentifyandtobuildstrongrapportwithsuch leaders. Negotiators must also make full use ofsocial interactions to build a platform for stronginterpersonal relationships with key decision makers.In countries that prefer a consensual approach,negotiators must not ignore the roles of the otherpartysmid-levelnegotiatorsand technicaladvisors ininfluencingorganizationaldecisions.3.10. Risk taking:highor low?

While

risk

aversion

and

uncertainty

avoidance

are

not equivalent concepts they are related (Hofstede,2001). Negotiators from cultures with tendenciestoward lower Uncertainty Avoidance accept not onlyfamiliarbutalsounfamiliarrisks,whereasnegotiatorsfromcultureswithhighUncertaintyAvoidance(UAI)scorestendtolimittheriskstheytaketothosethatareknown.TurkeyrankshighestonHofstedesUAIindex(85),withMexiconotfarbehind(82),followedbytheUS (46) and India (40). Results on Salacuses risk-takingdimensionshowUSandMexicanrespondentsasthe least likely to favor a high-risk approach tonegotiating. These results are consistent with whatonewouldexpectforMexico,givenitshighUAIindex;however, the results for the US are not. A largepercentage of US respondents fell in the neithercategory.Theseresultsmaybeconsistentwithwhatisgenerally known about US negotiatorsthat they arerisktolerant,showinganinterestinreducingriskratherthantryingtoavoiditaltogether.Forhighlyrisk-aversenegotiators from another country, negotiators shouldfocusonthebottom-lineaspectsofthecontractandhowtheagreementcanbebeneficialeveninworst-casescenarios.Evenrealisticscenarioscanbeperceived

differentlybyrisk-aversepartners,whomaybesatisfiedbynothinglessthanspecificbottom-lineguarantees.Onthe other hand, for risk-taking negotiators, one canhighlightthepotentialupsidesorbest-casescenariosoftheagreement.

The findings suggest several directions for futureresearch. Some of the dimensions in the Salacuseframeworkarenotclearlydefined.Forexample,inhisdiscussionoftimesensitivity,Salacuse(2003)referstotwo different concepts: whether negotiators from agiven country are punctual or late and whether negotiatorsarequicktomakeadealorproceedslowly.Tothe extent that these are conceptually separable, theyshould be treated as such. This calls for furthertheoreticaldevelopment.

The dimensions identified are consistent withprevious conceptualizations (Weiss & Stripp, 1985;Metcalf&Bird,2004).Thereare,however,importantdifferences. Extending the work of Weiss and Stripp(1985), Metcalf and Bird (2004) identify twelvenegotiation dimensions, which are grouped into sixcategories: general model, team dynamics, communication, protocol, risk-taking, and outcomes. Five ofthesixcategoriesincludetwoormoredimensions,theloneexceptionbeingtheoutcomescategory.Still,thereis substantial overlap between the two approaches,whichfutureresearchshouldseek tosynthesize.

Beforeconcluding,wenoteseverallimitationstothisstudy.

First,

the

five

countries

included

neither

represent

all of the cultural clusters identified by Ronen andShenkar (1985) or the GLOBE study (House et al.,2004) nor do they represent the full range of scoresreportedbyHofstede(2001)onhiswork-relatedvaluesdimensions.Theinclusionofcountrysamplesfromtheother cultural clusters holds the prospect for addingbreadthandwouldhelpstrengthenthefindingsreportedinthisstudy.Second,includingmorethanonecountryfrom a given cultural cluster may yield insight intocultural variation within clusters. To that end, we aregathering data from Spain, Portugal, Germany, andAustralia; and have plans for China, Japan, SouthKorea,andThailand.

A second limitation of the study relates to thecomparability of the samples for each country.Although it would be ideal to have samples withmatched demographicprofiles, it must be pointed outthat obtaining such samples in international businessresearch is difficult. This can be attributed to thechallenges associated with multiple investigatorscollecting data in countries representing five culturalclusters.Acquiringdatafromadditionalrespondentsineachcountry,somethingcurrentlyunderway,willallow


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ustoinvestigatetheimpactofdemographiccharacteristicsonnegotiating tendencies.4. Conclusions

Ourfindingsconfirmthatcross-nationalvariationinnegotiation tendencies can be identified. Frameworkshelp facilitate adjustments in negotiator expectationsand increase the likelihood ofpositiveoutcomes.Theuse of a dimensional framework also allows formeaningful cross-national comparison. Negotiatorscan use the ten dimensions to systematically identifypossibleareasoftension,therebymakingitpossibletoappropriatelyadjusttheirexpectationsandnegotiationpractices accordingly. Although the findings of thisstudy are limited to five countries, because thesecountriesaredrawnfromfivedifferentculturalclusters,they point to the likelihood of wider generalizability.Second,negotiatorscanusetheframeworktodevelopinsightintotheirownorientations.Usingrisk-takingasan example, a negotiator whose response falls in theneither category, between risk avoidance and highrisk taking,developsamorefine-grainedappreciationof himself as someone who is risk tolerant, yetinterestedinreducingrisk.

Ultimately, however, the most significant contributionsofthisstudyaretheinsightsthataregeneratedbythe framework, not the framework itself. The frameworkwaseffectiveinrevealingthevariedandcomplexnature of negotiation tendencies within and betweencultures.Culturesaresimilaronsomedimensions(e.g.,communication, agreement form) and different onothers(e.g.,agreementbuilding).Equallyimportant,ifnot more so, the findings reveal that individuals andgroups within cultures may be united on somedimensions(Indiansondirectcommunication),deeplydivided or split on others (Indians on attitudes), anduncommittedonothers(Finnsonrisk-taking).It isnolongeracceptablenorisitaccurateorusefulifiteverwas

for,

say,

an

American

negotiator

to

expect

a

Mexican counterpart to be relationship-oriented or anAmerican compatriot to be contract-oriented.6 OurfindingspointtotheinherentinaccuracyofwhatOslandand Bird (2000) have referred to as sophisticatedstereotyping. If it is trite to note that internationalnegotiationsarehighlycomplexaffairs,thenitshouldnot come as a surprise to find that the negotiatorsthemselvesaresimilarlycomplex.

6Theauthorsthankananonymousreviewerforcontributingthese

ideas.

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