Critique on Kantian Account on Passion

8/11/2019 Critique on Kantian Account on Passion

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2011-17384

Alexis Dela Cruz

Philosophic Problems

Prof. Samuel Vera Cruz

The Significance of Passions on our Moral Judgments

Kants ethics undermines and gives little or no moral worth at all to our actions,

which are non-intellectually motivated. An action with moral worth, for Kant, is not of

those, which are motivated by passions, even if it is a positive one. Motivations must come

from the reverence to the law of our moral principles and the action must be done in

accordance to our duty. The action with moral worth is that of someone who, despite the

fact that he does not feel any sympathy for others still helps them because it is his duty to

help others. In this paper, I would discuss Kants account on passion and how some

philosophers reacted against it, specifically David Hume and part of the ethics of Adam

Smith, as well as my own arguments against Kants undervaluing of human passions.

I.

Kants account on passion and our Duty of Apathy

Kant argues that we have a duty of apathy, meaning we have a duty to act without

affect and passions. Kant defined affect in his work The Metaphysics of Morals, as a strong

and powerful burst of feelings, which is often short lived. Passion on the other hand lingers

longer. Kant argues that we have a duty to remain indifferent to these feelings because it


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inhibits us from reflection. (Formosa, 2011) In his ethics, moral judgment must be done out

of the operations of reason not out passion. That is why; we must develop a character,

which could withstand the dictates of affect and passions. This he calls the proper self.

(Kant, 1785)

Why must our moral judgments not come out of passions and affect? Affect,

according to Kant, is a sudden burst of emotion, which restricts us from making a rational

judgment and could lead us to wrong choice of action. Kant made a distinction between

affect and passion in the context of the duration that it stays; but for the sake of this

discussion both along with emotions would be used interchangeably. Every affect, he says,

is blind. He argues that, it makes a man beside his own self, in such a way that he has no

control over himself. Imagine a woman who caught her husband cheating on her in

flagrante delicto. Emotions such as hatred, disgust, hurt could be evoked. If she had acted

out of the dictates of her passions she could have hurt the other woman, or even kill her out

of extreme hatred. We are all aware that killing is not a right action but because of passion

there is a possibility for us to act in such a way that is not in accordance to our knowledge

of the right action. That is why our judgment must come out of the operations of reason,

because passion has the tendency to make us do the wrong action despite our knowledge of

which is appropriate. Kant also argues that judgment and emotions does not necessarily

coincide with each other because what we feel good or bad is not necessarily what we

rationally approve and disapprove. Lets go back to the wife who caught her husband

cheating, she may feel better if she hurt his husband and his mistress than not doing

anything at all. Then again, her rational mind tells her that inflicting pain on other people is

not a good thing to do. Her feeling of hurt and hatred may subside by hurting the other


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party but then again it doesnt necessarily coincide with what her knowledge of right and

wrong tells her hence, she do otherwise. Her decision therefore, at the end lies on her

reasoning and is more appropriate to do so.

To what extent are we blamed for our passions? Since passions and affect are

faculties that we have no control over, meaning we cannot choose what kind of emotions

we would have and when we are to have it, hence, we cannot be blamed by having them.

What we are responsible of is how we manage our emotions and act rightly. It is absurd to

even think that we have a duty to have feelings, meaning to feel this and that at a particular

kind of situation, because we have no control over what feelings to invoke. In other words,

you do not blame the wife from feeling hatred and having the desire to hurt her husband

and his mistress because those are things the she cannot control. Nonetheless, we could

control our actions and restrain ourselves from blindly acting upon our emotions.

Even if we cannot choose what emotions to invoke we could, according to Kant,

learn what to feel in a certain kind of situation. For example, we can learn how to

sympathize or empathize with people and that is praiseworthy. This is done through

reinforcement and habituation, which could develop into virtuous. Kant defined virtue as

an aptitude of a persons will to determine ones self to act through the thought of the law.

(Kant, 1788)In other words that is the capacity to withstand, that which opposes our moral

dispositions. Being virtuous means being able to control our passion when it opposes our

moral dispositions. Hence, even if we cannot control what emotions we evoke, we have the

responsibility not to act on it irrationally and that is a kind of virtue. We do not blame the

wife for her passions but she could be blamed for not acting rationally in her situation. If

she had developed a good state of character however, for example, the character of being


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kind hearted at all times even to those who had done her wrong, which is praiseworthy.

However, do not mistake being praiseworthy of having moral worth. For Kant, if the wife

did not hurt her husband and his mistress because of her aversion to violence or feeling of

pity to those who are hurt then that action has no moral worth. Although positive passions

are good as well, the moral worthiness of an action is if it is done out of duty. In other

words, if the wife has not attempted to hurt the two, not because she pity the hurt but

because it is her duty to not hurt anyone then that is the time when her action has moral

worth.

II. Humes argument against reason

A lot of philosophers had reacted against Kants moral theory of having to disregard

passions in coming up with a moral judgment. One of them is Kants predecessor, David

Hume. Unlike Kant who grounded his moral theory to a prioriprinciples, Hume was an

empiricist. He is famous for his words that reason is and ought only to be the slaves of

passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them (Treatise of

Human Nature: Book II. 1739), which is contrary to Kants philosophy of putting aside our

passions, and leave our judgments to the operation of reason. Hume discussed the role of

passions in our moral judgments in his work, The Treaties of Human Nature, specifically

book II and book III.

The reason why Hume thought that reason is slaves to our passion is because reason

alone cannot cause actions. (Zimmerman, 2007) We are able to restrain from our bodily

pleasure not just because of an understanding alone. It is always aided with other


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passions which value overrides the other. For example, the wife who was cheated by her

husband, she would have restrain from killing the mistress not just because of some

rational process that happened in her but it was aided by passions such as fear of the

consequences in the future, which Hume calls prudence, or even feeling of humanity. Even

if she had knowledge of the right thing to do, if it is not at some point affect her then it is

not enough for her to restrain herself from doing the action. It is very hard to imagine a

person who is detached or does not feel any sentiments towards the consequences. Hume

thinks that reason alone cannot motivate actions. He thinks that a person, to be able to have

genuine moral considerations, that person at some point must have sympathy with the

others. He also thinks that a person naturally have aversion to any form of sufferings both

in the present and the future. It is therefore unavoidable that we think of the future

consequences of an action and this what motivates us from refraining from the action; and

this cannot be derived from the work of reason alone.

It does not however follow that Hume believes that reason does not have a role in

making judgments. Nonetheless, its job does not include making actions, that is the job of

our passions, nor can it control or overcome passion. (Zimmerman, 2007) The role of

reasons is to generate data. Humes first argument aboutthe role of reason is that its job is

to demonstrate the relations of ideas with each other and to draw out causal inference from

the information. (Hume, 1739) For example, when the wife sees her husband acting with

unnecessary intimacy with another woman in a restaurant, the job of reason is to gather

the facts and infer from it. Such as, her husband is in a restaurant alone with an unknown

woman, he is treating her intimately, the wife knows that the woman is not a relative;

therefore the husband must have been cheating. Humes second argument about the role of


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reason is that it is a discovery of truth and falsehood.(Hume, 1739) One of its jobs is to

accumulate true beliefs. For example, the wifes belief that the woman is not a relative of

her husband and hence must have been a mistress. Passions however, cannot be true or

false for it is a faculty innate in an individual.

Hume emphasizes the role of prudence in our decision-making. By prudence I mean,

caring for the consequences of the future. Hume argues that we have an aversion to pain

and sufferings and so to those that will happen in the future. Going back to the wife,

presuming that she has the urge to kill the woman at that moment, then again she fears of

her sufferings in the future, such as loosing the love thats left for her from her husband,

going to jail, and be tormented by the guilt of killing someone. If fear of these future pains

overrides her urge of killing the mistress, then she will restrain from doing the act but if the

urge overwhelms her fears then she is bound to do otherwise.

This is where the state of character plays its role. To Hume, for us to make ourselves

predispose in being prudent and not be overwhelmed by negative passions there is a need

for the strength of character, which is achieved through habituation. The strength of

character as Hume defined is the prevalence of the calm passion over the violent. (Treatise of

Human Nature: Book II. 1739)In other words, training and habituation would help us to

predispose ourselves in evoking prudence over blind aggression. If the wife is a person

who has the virtue of prudence, meaning she is predispose to care for the future

consequences, her immediate actions to situations would be that of which is derived from

the evaluation of the future benefits and sufferings. Hence, at that moment the wife will be

more likely to refrain from acting out of blind aggressiveness because she had developed a

character not to act upon it. Another factor of moral judgment that Hume discusses is


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sympathy. By sympathy I am referring to the feeling of sorrow or pity for the other. It is

part of our human nature to feel a certain degree of sympathy; thinking of the pain that

could inflict on the other would make us feel bad. It is natural for the wife to resent her the

woman and would therefore have the urge to kill her. Then again it is possible for her to

feel sympathy for the possible pain that the woman would experience or if not the

sufferings of the family of the woman. This will make her feel bad and would have the

tendency to be repulsed by the action. Humes moral theory therefore, in contrast to Kant,

argues that our passion, which makes us repulsive or approve of a certain action,

determines our moral judgment.

III.

Smiths account on sympathy and approbation

Another philosopher, who argued against Kant, was Adam Smith. Adam Smith in his

book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, argues that our moral judgments start with our

evaluations of people. (Sayre McCord) We tend to disapprove on the action of a person base

on our judgment of that person. When we judge that person we think of what they do and

why they do it on the basis of sentiments or affection which the action precedes. He said

that we base our judgment with two considerations, that of which what motivates the

action and the consequences that may possibly follow. The first one he regard as the

Judgment of Propriety. When we judge an action to be right or wrong we consider the

appropriateness of the action. This is where passion plays its role through sympathy. By

sympathy, what I mean is the ability to understand and share the feelings of another. When

we judge if the action is proper in that situation we try to imagine ourselves in that


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situation and if we would have done what the person did that is when we would have

approved that action. For example, when the wife restrains herself and does not kill the

mistress, we would have approved her action because if we imagine ourselves in that

situation we would have done the same. If the one judging, however, was more inclined to

hatred, then when the wife kills the woman the judge would have understand why the wife

did the action and possibly would not have deemed her wrong.

The other consideration Smith discusses is theJudgment of Merit. In here we judge

the rightness or wrongness of an action through the consequences if it breeds resentment

or gratitude from the people affected. If what follows brings misfortune to the other person

then our sympathy towards the person doing the act, even if it was appropriate, would be

gone. Going back to the wife, if the action the she chose to do was to kill the mistress at that

moment we would have thought that the wife has appropriate motivation in her action.

Then again, her action would have caused sufferings to the other woman and possibly the

family and the people who care for that woman. Hence, we would have disapproved with

that action. Now there are two underlying elements in accounting for our judgments, first is

our capacity for sympathy and second our capacity for approbation. Our sympathy,

towards the person doing the act and towards the person the act is done upon, is what

gives rise to our approval and disapproval. Moral judgments for Smith, therefore, are

derived from our sentiment of sympathy towards the agents that are involved in the action.

IV.

The role of sympathy and human relations on moral judgments


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I myself simply cannot agree with Kant when he argues that passions are unreliable

source of moral judgment. I am more inclined in choosing passion as a source of moral

judgment and I think as a human being, we cannot have a moral judgment free from

passion. I am basing this belief from two premises. First, I agree with Smith when he say

that it is part of human nature to have some degree of sympathy; and that is where I believe

that moral judgment commences. Second, Kant does not give any account on our personal

relations with other people. I simply cannot think of any human affairs, which personal

relations do not count. I would first discuss my idea of sympathy. When I feel that I have

done something that is not right, there is a feeling of something bad that is happening

inside. For example, if I had cheated on an exam, there is something within me that is

repulsed with my action and that is when I know that what I did was wrong. If I do a good

action on the other hand there is a good feeling that is happening within me. For example,

if I helped an old lady from crossing the street I would feel good about what I did. These

feelings that are invoked in my actions are what motivates me to do or not to do an action. I

believe that the passions, which motivate the action, are what make it morally worthy. Kant

argues that the moral worthiness of an action is derived from our sense of duty. This

statement I cannot agree. If we are doing an action out of duty, this means that we are

compelled to do so. It is in nature of a morally worthy action to be praise worthy as well.

For example, it is the duty of a policeman to protect the people from criminals and it is

expected of him to do so. If he is protecting the people because it is his job to do so, he is

acting in accordance to the nature of his job. What he is doing is good but he is doing it

because that is what we expect him to do and I do not see anything praise worthy with that

because it is just natural for him to so. We do not praise something that is what is expected


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for us to do. I mean, we do not praise a teacher for teaching. However, if there are positive

passions that follow then the action is worthy of praise. For example, if the policeman was

doing his job because of his love for peace and repulsion of evil then we praise that man for

his kindness. If the teacher was teaching because he wants to impart his knowledge to the

children to improve the state the we praise the teacher for having those sentiments. For

me, therefore, a morally worthy action is that of which there is a passion and volition to

arrive at something better through that action. When I help the people who were

devastated because of a hurricane and I do it because I want to relieve them from their pain

then that is when my action becomes morally worthy. If I helped the people because I just

believe that I have the duty to help other people but I do not necessarily feel sympathy or

care towards them then the action is just a sense of compulsion. The action is good but it is

not morally worthy. Only an action with the hope of something better would come out of it

is a morally worthy action. It does not follow however that I believe that the worth of an

action is based on the consequences. I am a consequentialist at some degree but I believe

that there are morally worthy actions which does not necessarily produced a good

consequences for consequences cannot be calculated, there is a need for an element of luck

and chances for the calculations to be correct.

My second argument against Kants account on passions is that of the role of our

personal relations to our moral judgments. As I was saying a while ago, I cannot think of

any human affair, which does not account for personal relations. How I treat a friend maybe

different from how I treat a stranger. For example, if I were a surgeon how I feel about

operating on a stranger would be different from how I would feel about operating on my

own mother and therefore would have acted differently. I could have refused to operate on


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my mother because of some sentiments in me that is repulsed with the idea of operating on

my mother. It is like having to punch someone who you love and punching someone you

bare extreme hated for, if you are compelled to do it the degree of force that you would

invoke would vary because of the difference in sentiments that you hold for the two. What I

am trying to say here is that, how we personally relate with other people may affect how

we arrive at a moral judgment, which Kant did not account for. Imagine a mans son who is

need of a blood transplant, the man and his son are both Muslims hence, donating blood is

forbidden in their religion. If that man was asked to donate his blood to a total stranger

there is a high possibility that the man would refuse because it is immoral to do so, as what

was said in their religion. If the person who is in need however was his son and if he does

not do the transfusion his son would die, at this situation unlike that with the stranger,

there is a much higher possibility that the man would donate his blood to his son.

V.

Conclusion

I disagree to the account of Kant regarding passion but I do not entirely disagree

with his ethical theory. I would not go as far as Hume to say that reasons is a slave to our

passion. I also believe that our passions sometimes blind us from coming up with the better

option that is I believe in the significance of reflection. However, as what I was arguing a

while ago the beginning of moral judgment is still our passions, such as compassion and

sympathy, but reason also have its role, which is to traffic our emotions. Our passion gives

us the capacity for moral consideration while reason puts our passions in the right place.

Both therefore, are equally necessary in coming up with the right moral decisions. I would


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end my discussion with a quote from the Confucian idea ofxin, which perfectly

encapsulates my idea of the relation of reason to passions Reason is what regulates

behavior but it nonetheless originates from the emotions of human heart.


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Bibliography:

Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. Sentiments and Spectators: Adam Smiths Theory of Moral

Judgment.University of North Carolina. Article. Print.

Aaron Zimmerman. Humes Reason.University of California, Sta. Barbara. Article. Print.

Paul Formosa.A Life without Affect and Passions: Kant on the Duty of Apathy.

Parrhesia. 2011. Article. Print.

David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature book II: the Passions.Translated by, Jonathan

Bennett. 2010. Print.

Kung Fu Tzu. The Analects. Translated by R. Eno. 2012. Print.

Immanuel Kant. Ground Work for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Allen Wood.

Yale University Press. 2002. Print.

Critique on Kantian Account on Passion

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