Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience Ewald Nowotny

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Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience Ewald Nowotny Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank Athens, May 27, 2009

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Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience Ewald Nowotny Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank Athens, May 27, 2009 www.oenb.at. Outline. The crisis in a nutshell The reaction of Austrian economic policy - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience Ewald Nowotny

Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience

Ewald Nowotny

Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank

Athens, May 27, 2009

www.oenb.at

Page 2: Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience Ewald Nowotny

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Outline

• The crisis in a nutshell

• The reaction of Austrian economic policy

• The crisis in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE)

• The crisis in CESEE from the perspective of Austrian banks

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The crisis in a nutshell

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Initial conditions and trigger of the crisis

Initial conditions

• High saving levels and low interest rates “search for yield”• Securitization of assets + underregulation of financial markets

complex, hard-to-value assets and increasing interconnection of financial institutions around the globe

• Leveraging increases vulnerability of MFIs

Trigger

• Problems on U.S. subprime market caused initial losses

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Amplification and contagion

• Financing problems of MFIs in short-term money markets “Fire sales” of assets Decrease of asset prices (esp. of complex, hard-to-value

papers) Decline of equity

• Need to improve capital ratio deleveraging by selling assets and/or reducing lending

• Feedback loop between financial and real sectors of the economy

• Global deleveraging large-scale capital outflows from emerging economies

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Needs for policy action

Financial institutions• Decline of equity Need to recapitalize financial institutions

• Decline in confidence Deposit insurance to prevent bank runs

• Collapse of interbank market Measures to restore liquidity

• Toxic assets Framework for valuing and disposing of toxic assets

Nonfinancial sector• Contagion of real economy Fiscal and monetary policy measures to

dampen economic downturn

Emerging economies• Capital outflows,

capital account pressures Financial support

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The reaction of Austrian economic policy

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The Austrian banking support package

Capital measures: EUR 15 billion to strengthen capital base of Austrian banks

Liquidity measures: EUR 65 billion for clearing bank and bond guarantees

Agreed capital measures amount to EUR 6.9 billion (paid out: EUR 4.7 billion): HGAA: EUR 900 million participation capital Erste Group: EUR 2.7 billion participation capital (+ hybrid capital) RZB: EUR 1.75 billion participation capital VBAG: EUR 1 billion participation capital BAWAG: EUR 0.55 billion participation capital (+ EUR 0.4 billion asset guarantees)

Bank bonds issued under state guarantee amount to EUR 15.65 billion Austrian clearing bank allotted a total amount of about EUR 6 billion

Deposit insurance: deposit guarantee raised by EUR 10 billion

Guarantees for nonfinancial corporations: EUR 10 billion

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The Austrian bank stabilization package – international comparison

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

Greec

e

Spain

Portu

gal

Franc

e

Germ

any

UK

Finlan

d

Austri

a

Sloven

ia

Nethe

rland

s

Sweden

Bank stabilization packages in Europein % of GDP

Source: OeNB.

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The role of fiscal policy in times of crisis

• Scope of crisis requires discretionary fiscal policy measures– Traditional monetary policy hits the zero lower bound

– Automatic stabilizers help, but are not large enough

– Output gap expected to remain negative for a longer period Implementation lag of discretionary fiscal policy less problematic

– Threat of hysteresis effects (increase in NAIRU) via reduction in human capital

• Potential for larger multipliers– Low capacity utilization

– High number of liquidity-constrained households/firms

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The Austrian fiscal stimulus package

Estimated Growth and Employment Effects of Economic Stimulus and Tax Reform Measures

Measures

2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010

Consumption-stimulating measures 4.360 4.310 9.312 17.840 0,57 0,89of which: tax reform 2.910 3.060 5.508 11.718 0,33 0,60

Investment incentives and export facilitation 1.395 1.385 590 1.079 0,05 0,07

Investment in infrastructure 580 745 2.698 6.299 0,16 0,33

Job support measures1 275 275 - - 0,04 0,06

Total 6.610 6.715 12.600 25.218 0,82 1,36

of which: relevant for deficit 4.095 4.758

Source: Austrian Finance Ministry, OeNB.1 The job support effects of short-term working rules and of the job support initiatives cannot be quantified at present.Note: Simulation with the OeNB's macro model (AQM). Volumes are annual totals (reflecting increases over the 2007 budget), effects on

in EUR millionEmployment1

in personsGDP

in % of baseline solutionVolume

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The crisis in Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE)

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CESEE output expected to shrink in 2009

1.8

0.8

6.4

3.2

4.8

0.5

6.0

7.1

2.4 2.1

5.6

-4.0 -4.0

-2.6 -2.7

-1.4

-6.3

-1.6

-4.0

-3.0

-8.0

-3.8

-0.1 -0.1

0.70.3

0.8

-0.3 -0.1

0.0

1.51.0

1.5

-9

-7

-5

-3

-1

1

3

5

7

9

11

2008 2009f 2010f

GDP forecastat constant prices, year-on-year percentage change

Source: European Commission (Spring Forecast), May 2009. For Ukraine: IMF (World Economic Outlook), April 2009.

Czech Rep.Euro area Poland Hungary Bulgaria Romania UkraineSlovakia Croatia RussiaAustria

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High share of foreign currency credit in some CESEE and CIS countries constitutes a major risk …

1 3 1 0

27

39

5

67

9

29 29

59

81

67

53

72

18

12

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008 2003 2008

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Domestic LC credit to households Domestic FC credit to households Share of FC credit in total credit to households (rhs)

Outstanding total credit to householdsend-of-period stock as percentage of GDP; points: share of foreign currency (FC) credit in total credit to households

Source: ECB, Eurostat, National central banks, National statistical offices, OeNB. Note: Foreign currency credit includes both foreign currency-denominated and foreign currency-linked credit.

PolandSlovakia Czech Rep Hungary Bulgaria Romania Croatia Ukraine Russia

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... in case of sudden exchange rate depreciations

6.18.4

-0.1 0.0

25.7

1.6

6.73.8

17.5

11.9

2.70.0

-13.1

2.70.1

-3.6

-31.0

-22.0

0.0

-16.2

-4.9

-34.6

-21.1

10.5 10.5

6.2

0.02.8

0.7

-3.5

4.2

-17.1

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

31 Dec 2004 to 29 June 2007 29 June 2007 to 12 Sept 2008 12 Sept 2008 to 17 Feb 2009 17 Feb 2009 to 29 April 2009

National currencies and the euroEuro per national currency unit, change in percent

Source: Thomson Financial, OeNB.

Czech Rep Poland Hungary Bulgaria Romania Croatia Ukraine Russia

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Huge current account deficits in some CESEE and CIS countries

-2.3

-7.4

-24.5

-11.9-9.3

-7.0

6.0

-5.4 -4.4

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

Q4/08 Q4/08 Q4/08 Q4/08 Q4/08 Q4/08 Q4/08 Q4/08 Q4/08

Trade balance Services balance Income balance

Transfer balance Capital account balance Current & capital acc. balance

Current and capital account balance and its componentsfour quarter rolling sum in % of 4q rolling sum of GDP; points for total current and capital account balance (i.e. sum of sub-balances)

Source: Eurostat, National central banks, OeNB.

PolandSlovakia Czech Rep Hungary Bulgaria Romania Croatia Ukraine Russia

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Crisis leads to high write-downs in emerging markets

IMF estimates for Eastern Europe Include local banks Include foreign owned subsidiaries Direct cross border credits are not

considered!

Write downs for banks in emerging markets 796 billion USD

Eastern Europe: 185 billion USD

Asia, 270

Eastern Europe, 185

Latin America, 181

Middle East/Africa,

160

Estimated write-downs for banks in emerging markets

(by country of origin, in billion USD)

Source: IMF.

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Oct 08 Nov 08 Dec 08 Jan 09

Feb 09 Mar 09 Apr 09

21 Feb 09:IMF provides EUR 7.5 bn funding to Latvia.

23 Feb 09:World Bank president demands support for CESEE.

End of Oct 08EU and IMF agree on USD 25 bn support package for Hungary.

Beginning of Nov 08:IMF provides loan of USD 16.5 bn to Ukraine.

Dec 08:IMF agrees on USD 2.5 bn funding for Belarus.Dec 09:The European Commission raises its current account support to EUR 25 bn

Mar 09:World Bank, EBRD and EIB plan to lend EUR 24.5 bn to CEE1 Mar 09:EU rejects Hungarian proposal for a EUR 180 bn CEE package,25 Mar 09:IMF SBA disbursement of USD 2.35 bn for Hungary,IMF approves USD 17.5 bn loan to Romania.26 Mar 09:Serbia signs an SBA over USD 3 bn with the IMF.

2 Apr 09:IMF funds increased to USD 500 bn and additional Special Drawing Rights of USD 250 bn as a consequence of the G20 meeting. 14 Apr 09:Poland seeks USD 20.5 bn and flexible credit line from the IMF.17 Apr 09:IMF credit to Ukraine could be resumed with a new instalment of USD 2.8 bn.

International response to the crisis – timeline of events with a focus on CESEE

Jan 09:Banks from Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and Greece call for an action plan for CESEE. 16 Jan 09IMF approves EUR 402.5 mnStand-by-Arrangement for Serbia.26 Jan 09IMF starts talks about a new Stand-by-Arrangement for Turkey.

May 09

5 May 09:European Council increases current account support to EUR 50 bn

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The crisis in CESEE from the perspective of Austrian banks

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Austrian banks’ exposure to CESEE and CIS markets is high…

•Austrian banks dominate lending to new Member States, but not to SEE and CIS

•EU banks’ lending to CESEE decreased by 4.4% in the fourth quarter of 2008

•The decline in Western banks’ exposure to CESEE corresponds to developments in other emerging markets

Austria € 199; 20%

Germany 16%

Italy 15%

France 11%

Belgium 10%

Netherlands8%

Sweden 8%

Other 13%

Source: BIS, 2008Q04 (provisional data); in bn EUR resp. in %.

CESEE-Exposure of EU-15 banksEUR 988 bn

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… but exposure is broadly diversified across countries …

• CESEE is a heterogeneous region and the exposure of Austrian banks is broadly diversified

• Total exposure of Austrian banks to CESEE: EUR 199 billion [incl. UnicreditBA and HGAA: ~ EUR 293 billion]

• Austrian banks’ exposure is broadly diversified but focused on new EU Member States (¾ of exposure)

• About 20% of EU-15 banks’ total exposure to CESEE

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

CZ RO SK HU HR RU PL UA SI RS BG BA AL TR BY Rest

EA EU SEE CIS Not allocated

Exponierung von AT Banken in CESEE

in bn EUR

Quelle: BIZ, 2008Q04.

Exposure of Austrian banks to CESEE

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… and subsidiaries in CESEE have a solid local funding basis

Loan-to-deposit ratio of nonbanks in %

< 100, < 150, 150 =<

Source: OeNB, unconsolidated figures, Q4 2008.

NMS-20046%

NMS-200724%

SEE14%

CIS56%

Deposit Gap in 2008Q4

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

NMS-2004 NMS-2007 SEE CIS

Deposits of nonbanks Deposits of banksEquity Liabilities evidenced by paperSubordinated debt Other liabilitiesClaims on nonbanks

Refinancing of CESEE subsidiaries

SEE: 114% LDR

NMS-07: 130% LDR

NMS-04: 102% LDR

CIS: 172% LDR

Average CESEE subsidiary: 117% LDR

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Austrian banks continue to support subsidiaries in CESEE

• Questionnaire sent to five major banks shows that net position increased further in 2008

• Austrian banks intend to keep their net position in most CESEE markets stable/increasing

• Efforts aiming at macroeconomic stabilization have to complement bank liquidity provision

3.0

10.3

7.8 7.7

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4

Quarterly Growth Rates of Net Exposure to CESEE Subsidiaries

in pp

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Summary

• Crisis called for fast and coordinated policy reaction

• Austrian bank stabilization package guarantees functioning of the Austrian banking sector

• Fiscal package in Austria helps dampen adverse impact on real economy

• Impact of crisis on CESEE region is heterogeneous

• Financial support to CESEE provided by international institutions helps stabilize the region

• Exposure is high, but diversified; local funding base of Austrian banks in CESEE is solid

• In line with their strategic objectives, Austrian banks continue to support subsidiaries in CESEE

Page 25: Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience Ewald Nowotny

Crisis Management – General Reflections and the Austrian Experience

Ewald Nowotny

Governor of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank

Athens, May 27, 2009

www.oenb.at