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How successful have EU crisis management missions been? Discuss in relation to two CSDP

operations.

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Europe was able to begin

the healing process caused by decades of division between East and West. NATO’s role had

fundamentally changed from being a defensive alliance, focused on the threat from the USSR,

to become a more humanitarian motivated security actor, and in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo

(1999), the European Union (EU) began to realise that they relied too heavily on NATO power

to provide European security. The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 had already established the

European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but towards the end of the 20th

Century, a feeling had grown within the EU that more needed to be done by European states to

promote their own security, absent of United States involvement. Concurrently, the nature of

warfare had changed from the Cold War era interstate wars, to a newer style characterised by

intrastate conflict, with brought with it the emergence of humanitarian intervention operations.

The Rwandan genocide in 1994 horrified the European Union, and debates began to emerge

about how to prevent similar situations occurring again (Olsen, 2009). At a summit in St. Malo

in 1998, the United Kingdom led by the Prime Minister Tony Blair, and France led by President

Jacques Chirac, pushed for the notion of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

motivated by a desire for the EU to become an effective security actor and to respond to the

challenges of effective crisis management (Giegrich and Wallace, 2004). The resultant

declaration states that the two parties ought to “propose to our (European) partners that the EU

should examine how it can contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa,

including through autonomous operations, in close co-operation with the United Nations”

(Anglo-French Summit, 2003). In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty sought to upgrade the ESDP, and

consequently established the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), this time adding

a provision for post-conflict stabilisation (Menon, 2011). In conjunction with the 2003

European Security Strategy, the EU sought to define the tools available to the EU in pursuit of

its CSDP security objectives, a core component being security through development in places

like Africa, achieved through crisis management missions involving both a military and/or a

civilian component.

In order to judge whether these crisis management missions have been successful or not, we

must first consider what constitutes ‘success’. Within this there are two strands, success for the

targets of the crisis management missions, and success for the EU. According to the ESDP

objectives, the EU’s wider external policies are designed to promote “democracy, human

rights, good governance, and reform” in crisis hit countries, with the belief that addressing

these problems will increase their stability, and as a result, the security of Europe (Anglo-

French Summit, 2003). Additionally, the European Africa Strategy adopted in 2005 highlights

that “it is now universally recognised that there can be no sustainable development without

peace and security (European Communities, 2005). What these two statements show is that the

EU aims to promote long-lasting development, with a particular focus on political development

to stabilise ‘crisis countries’ – and in doing so, improve the security for Europe. Therefore, in

one sense, success should be measured in terms of the long-term impacts of crisis management

missions, and their ability to promote stability, development, and security in crisis hit countries.

However, it is important to remember that the ESDP and the subsequent CSDP were designed

to promote the EU as an effective security actor, which is often measured in terms of how

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successfully an operation fulfils its mandate. These mandates are often very limited, and are

worded is such ways that success is almost inevitable. Yet the EU is essentially a coalition of

member states, each with their own interests and thus their own individual objectives against

which success can be measured, meaning that success can also be the promotion of a particular

member states’ goals or norms. In the light of this consideration, it is therefore important to

also consider who the crisis management missions are really designed to be successful for.

This essay will argue that EU crisis management missions are, on the whole, successful in

terms of achieving their pre-determined mandates, but not successful when it comes to

implementing lasting development and stability. Furthermore, this essay will develop this

argument by explaining how the crisis management missions are often designed to be

successful for the EU and its member states, rather than ‘crisis areas’, as is often publically

stated. In order to make this argument, this essay is divided into three sections. Firstly, it shall

outline the structures and processes by which crisis management missions are decided upon

and implemented, focusing on the ability of member states to influence the decision making

process and attach their own interests to EU branded crisis management missions, and for the

EU to portray itself as an effective security actor; meaning that EU crisis management mission

are not successful in terms of implementing lasting development and security. Secondly, this

essay will analyse Operation Artemis with regards to its success, and highlight how the real

effect of this operation was the implementation of France’s interests under an EU banner, and

that its primary motivation was not for the security or development of the Congolese people.

Finally, this essay will look at EUFOR RD Congo, and demonstrate how this operation was

also motivated more by member states’ interests rather than concerns for the people living in

the crisis hit area, thereby limiting its success in terms of long-term stability and development

for the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Structures and processes

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) is the EU’s most recent strategy document and, in

theory, outlines the fundamental strategic objectives of the EU, the instruments available to

pursue these objectives, and the locations that are of greatest strategic importance to the EU, in

order to become an effective security actor (Biscop & Coelmont, 2012a). In relation to this

essay, the ESS defines where EU crisis management missions can be launched, and the tools

best suited for a successful operation. It can be summarised into three core principles:

prevention, a holistic approach, and multilateralism (Biscop & Coelmont, 2012a). The

principle of prevention directly relates to crisis management operations because, as the

document states: “we (the EU) should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention

and threat prevention cannot start too early” (European Security Strategy, 2003). Conflict

prevention is designed to promote stability through addressing the root causes of conflict,

which means greater access for countries to security, prosperity, freedom, and social well-being

(Biscop & Coelmont, 2012a). The document then links the prevention strategy to foreign

operations by saying “the first line of defence will often be abroad” (European Security

Strategy, 2003). This core principle underlines the EU’s need for crisis management missions,

and crucially states that in order for Europe to be secure, stability must be achieved abroad –

thereby linking crisis management with European security directly. It also implies that the

fundamental goal of crisis management operations is to promote the security of Europe, with

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the development of crisis areas relegated to a secondary objective. The second principle

outlines that the EU should take a holistic approach to achieving its security objectives; “none

of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each

requires a mixture of instruments” (European Security Strategy, 2003). This is significant

because it outlines that crisis management mission are not to be purely military, but must

involve civilian components where necessary. The document then continues to explain that

good governance, social and political reform, reduced corruption and the promotion of the rule

of law and human rights are the targets of this holistic approach – thus outlining the scope, and

to some extent the objectives, of crisis management missions (European Security Strategy,

2003). The third and final core principle is multilateralism: “we need to pursue our objectives

both through multilateral co-operation in international organizations and through partnerships

with key actors” (European Security Strategy, 2003). The relevance of this principle to crisis

management missions is that the EU believes operations are most effective when pursued in

conjunction with other actors, such as the United Nations. The ESS demonstrates that the

operations launched on the back of this document are motivated primarily by desire to portray

the EU as an independent and capable international actor, and secondly for the benefit of the

suffering (Gegout, 2009). However, the ESS is only a partial grand strategy, merely detailing

how to do things, and not what to do (Biscop & Coelmont, 2012a). As a result, it is very difficult

to translate the grand strategy objectives into goals for the CFSP, and subsequently the CSDP

(Biscop & Coelmont, 2012b). In practise, this means that the strategic rationale behind the

crisis management operations is not clear, and so it is hard to judge long-term success (Biscop

& Coelmont, 2012b). Moreover, without an effective strategic framework, ad-hoc decision

making is perpetuated, resulting in the historical interests of former colonial member states

playing an enlarged role in choosing which missions are undertaken (Biscop & Coelmont,

2012b). As mentioned previously, a strategic goal of the EU’s crisis management operations is

to focus on conflict prevention, however, there is no general agreement on how to define this

concept. Karin Aggestam (2003) argues that there are two types of conflict prevention:

structural prevention, which aims to address the underlying causes of conflict, and direct

prevention, which refers to short-term strategies but lack any comprehensive formula. The

confusion over how to properly define conflict prevention means that an effective strategy is

yet to be constructed, which naturally impacts upon the ability of a crisis management operation

to be successful (Smith, 2003). Nevertheless, it appears that the EU prefers to use peacekeeping

operations, sanctions, diplomacy, and humanitarian aid to realise success, in keeping with the

EU principle of holistic solutions (Lund & Mehler, 1999).

In addition to the ESS, the decision making process within the EU must be considered. After

the Lisbon Treaty, decisions on whether to launch crisis management operations require

unanimous agreement at the ministerial level within the General Affairs and External Relations

Council, and it falls to member states to propose and implement operations, thereby allowing

them to dominate the decision making process (Olsen, 2009; Gourlay, 2004; Menon, 2011).

This process is known as liberal intergovernmentalism, and it involves the member states

‘uploading’ their preferences and interests to the relevant EU institution, at which point the

states’ EU partners are able to debate the proposed operation (Olsen, 2009; Olsen, 1998). The

implications of this are far reaching because it means that it is member states that exercise the

most influence over where and how a crisis management mission occurs. Yet not all member

states enjoy similar levels of influence; with regards to Africa, the former colonial powers,

most notably Britain and France, exercise the greatest influence (Olsen, 2009). By using the

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EU to action a member states’ interests, they are able to dodge the charge of neo-colonialism

under the guise of multilateralism, and promote crisis management missions designed to be

successful in retaining a states’ influence in a country, rather promoting development and

stability in crisis areas as often publically stated by the EU (Chafer, 2002). This demonstrates

that crisis management missions are designed to be primarily successful for the interests of

member states, with the concerns of ‘the people’ relegated to second place. Liberal

intergovernmentalism means that the EU becomes a repository for colonial concerns that

require the ethical identity of the EU to be successful (Olsen, 2009). Furthermore, only 10% of

mission costs are funded by the contributions to the EU from individual member states (which

are based on their respective GDPs), leaving the rest to be funded by the participating states.

This means that countries with higher GDPs, like Germany, are reluctant to sanction missions

that do not suit their interests – further reinforcing the idea that crisis management missions

are designed to be successful for member states.

The structures and processes that influence where crisis management missions are undertaken

highlight two important issues. Firstly, as defined by the ESS, they are designed to be

successful for the image of the EU as an effective security actor, and secondly, as a result of

liberal intergovernmentalism, they are often simultaneously successful for member states.

However, the EU states that its own security rests on the levels of development and security in

strategically important countries. The decision making process underpinning crisis

management missions is not conducive to the success of this goal, therefore these crisis

management operations are not successful in terms of promoting development and stability for

crisis hit areas.

Operation Artemis

On June 12th 2003, the European Union launched its first military operation under the ESDP

without support from NATO (Gegout, 2005; Ulriksen et al., 2004). The objective of this

operation was to stabilise the Ituri province, in the North Eastern corner of the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC), and to improve the humanitarian situation around the province’s

capital - Bunia (Faria, 2004; Ulriksen et al., 2004). Conflict involving clashes between local

and national actors over issues of land ownership had been almost constant in this region since

1999 (Duke, 2008). The issue of land ownership was particularly divisive, because much of

the DRC’s wealth derives from the riches of minerals in the Ituri province such as cobalt,

copper and uranium, but most notably from diamonds which account for over half of the

country’s exports, and the ownership of land containing these minerals could bring great

personal wealth (Duke, 2008). And to further exacerbate the problem, the DRC became an oil

producing country in the 1970s (Duke, 2008). In August 1999, the United Nations sent 90

peacekeepers (MONUC) into the region in order to implement the Lusaka Ceasefire signed by

the DRC, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Angola, which was designed to end the Second

Congo War (Duke, 2008). Unfortunately, this agreement rapidly fell apart, and the UN was

forced to increase the number of troops to almost 2,000 in February 2000, and eventually to

8,700 in 2003 – just prior to Operation Artemis (Duke, 2008). By 2003, 500,000 people had

been displaced and 60,000 people had been killed in the Ituri province alone (Duke, 2008).

International observers were worried that the new outbreak in violence, caused by the

withdrawal of Ugandan troops, would threaten the chances of a negotiated settlement (Ulriksen

5

et al., 2004; Council of the European Union, 2003). As a result, the then UN Secretary-General,

Kofi Annan, called for the establishment of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to end the atrocities in

Ituri, and to implement a temporary solution until the UN was able to deploy a more effective

force in the region (Olsen, 2009). In response, around 2,000 soldiers were deployed from EU

member states, future members, and non-EU countries acting under a French-led framework

to support the UN MONUC mission (Ulriksen et al., 2004; Faria, 2004). As the framework

nation, France supplied the bulk of the EU force (Council of the European Union, 2003). Their

mandate was specifically limited to the area around Bunia, detailing that the EU should stabilise

this zone, protect the airport, protect the internally displaced people camps, and protect

civilians (Council of the European Union, 2003). It was made clear by the UN that the operation

would only last a few months (Annan, 2003). Operation Artemis officially ended on the 1st

September 2003, after just three months (European External Action Service, 2015).

Operation Artemis can be considered a success because it managed to achieve its limited and

poorly defined mandate (Olsen, 2009). However, as highlighted earlier, success can also be

measured in terms of the benefit to the EU, to member states, and to the lasting development

and security of the DRC. In the spring of 2003, a deep rift opened between the EU member

states over the Iraq War, most significantly between Britain and France, with some member

states choosing to support the war, whilst others chose not to. At the time, the UK published

its ‘Food for Thought’ paper, which stated that the effectiveness of the ESDP could be

undermined if its two main underwriters failed to see eye to eye (Duke, 2008). In the wake of

this, the EU sought to use Operation Artemis as a means to demonstrate that the EU remained

an effective power and to reinforce the ESDP, with the Greek Defence Minister stating that

Artemis is “very important for the Union” (Salmon, 2005; Menon, 2005; Papantoniou, 2003).

This suggests that the operation was designed to be successful in terms of promoting the image

of unity within the EU, rather than the development of the DRC. Furthermore, France (a major

force behind the inception of the ESDP) wanted to show to the world that the EU was capable

of undertaking security actions independent from NATO, in the face of scepticism from

Washington regarding the ESDP (Duke, 2008; Gegout, 2009). This further supports the

argument that this crisis management mission was designed to be successful for the European

Union, rather than for the DRC. In terms of promoting the image of a united EU and the notion

that it is an independent security actor, Operation Artemis was naturally successful because the

simple act of deploying troops from a number of member states without US support indicates

that the EU was indeed united, committed to the ESDP, and able to act independently. Yet

France had its own interests in supporting Operation Artemis. The DRC was a French colony

until 1960, and the completion of Artemis allowed an African audience to witness a successful

French led operation into a former colony following its failures in Rwanda, thereby allowing

France to increase its reputation, prestige, and influence in Africa all while being ‘far removed’

from a charge of neo-colonialism by acting under an EU banner (Gegout, 2009; Chaffer, 2002;

Chivvis, 2007; Bourmaud, 2000). The clear French interest in the DRC, and the benefits it

stood to gain from a successful operation, indicate that Operation Artemis was also instigated

in order to be successful for France. Nevertheless, Operation Artemis merely put a “plaster on

an on-going crisis situation”, and did little to ensure that long-term stability and development

was provided to the DRC, as evidenced by the second case study of this essay, and the fact that

four more missions were launched in the DRC (Gegout, 2009). Therefore, in summary,

Operation Artemis was successful in that it achieved its mandate, improved the image of the

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EU, and gifted France greater influence in Africa, but it failed to be successful when measured

against the long-term benefits for the DRC.

EUFOR RD Congo

In June 2006, the EU launched another crisis management mission in the DRC, but this time

to ensure the smooth running of the country’s first presidential, parliamentary, and provincial

elections since 1965 in the capital Kinshasa (Gegout, 2007). Alongside this operation, the EU

also had EUSEC DRCongo (a security Sector reform mission), and EUPOL Kinshasa (a police

mission) active in the DRC (Gegout, 2007). On the 27th December 2005, the UN asked the EU

to support its long running MONUC mission, but it wasn’t until the 23rd March that EUFOR

RD Congo was decided upon (Gegout, 2007). It was estimated that 1,200 people died each day

in the DRC as a result of the ongoing conflict, and 400,000 refugees had fled to neighbouring

states (UNICEF, 2006). The transitional government, established after the signing of the

‘Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ in 2002, was charged with

organising elections to provide a legitimate government for the DRC; these elections started in

July and finished in December 2006, with a turnout of 75% (Gegout, 2007). EUFOR was

mandated to take all necessary measures to support the 17,000 MONUC troops, contribute to

the protection of civilians under threat of violence, help protect the airport in Kinshasa; ensure

the security and free movement of EUFOR personnel and installations, and execute limited

operations to extract endangered individuals (Gegout, 2007). Germany accepted control of the

mission, but it was France that was responsible for organising the deployment of some 800

military personnel in Kinshasa (Gegout, 2007). In total, almost 2,000 troops were deployed,

1,100 of which were stationed on call nearby in Gabon, with 22 states contributing – Germany

and France were the largest contributors with 780 and 500 troops respectively (Gegout, 2007;

Le Nouvel Observateur, 2006; Howorth, 2007).

The mission proved to be a success in that met its mandate: it was on time, it reinforced military

capacity when needed, supported MONUC, and used its technology to enforce the weapons

ban in Kinshasa, but it was never properly tested (Gegout, 2007; Olsen, 2009). EUFOR RD

Congo was also successful for the EU in that it facilitated French-German cohesion,

strengthened the credibility of the ESDP (which was much needed after the rejection of the

European constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands), demonstrated that the EU was a

credible security actor, and acted as a testing ground for the EU to design forms of intervention

(Olsen, 2009; Security and Defence Agenda, 2007; Gegout, 2007). The mission was also

successful for member states. France was able to address their ‘neo-colonial’ concerns under

the guise of the EU, incorporate Germany into European Security (in the hope this would

provide underpinnings for an EU army), and managed to shift Africa from being a mainly

French responsibility (Gegout, 2007; Olsen, 2009; Die Welt, 2006). Germany was able to ease

the pressure on migration to Europe, and at the time, Germany wanted a permanent seat on the

UN Security Council, and was therefore able to demonstrate its security credentials, and

support the UN (Gegout, 2007). However, this crisis management mission had no long-term

impact on stability or development in the DRC, and tensions in Kinshasa were still high when

the EU left, suggesting that it failed to address the root causes of conflict and that this mission

was not successful for the Congolese people (Gegout, 2007). If the EU had been serious about

improving the situation in the DRC, EUFOR RD Congo’s mandate could easily have been

7

extended into 2007 (Gegout, 2007). This operation is yet another example where a crisis

management mission was successful for the EU and its member states, but not for the suffering

people.

Conclusion

The EU crisis management missions have been successful in terms of achieving their mandates

and promoting the interests of the EU as a whole and its individual member states, but so far,

they have not been successful at improving the development and stability of the Third World

countries in which they have operated. This is a problem for the EU because it publically states

that the security of Europe is tied to levels of development in key regions such as Africa.

Furthermore, the decision making process behind crisis management missions is designed to

promote operations that are successful for the EU and for member states, rather than missions

that are successful for ‘the people’. Individual member states play a determinate role in this

process, which allows them to pursue their own interests whilst masking them under the ethical

identity of the EU. Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo exemplify this. Artemis allowed

France to exercise ‘neo-colonial’ ambitions, and promote the reputation of the ESDP, with little

regard to its long-term implications for the Congolese People. This was replicated in the 2006

EUFOR RD Congo mission, although on this occasion, Germany was able to pursue its lofty

UN ambitions. However, the pursuit of EU and member states interests does not necessarily

mean that operations launched on these motives are illegitimate and without meaningful

purpose. If the real goal of the CSDP is to promote the EU’s foreign policy interests then these

operations have certainly been successful, albeit at the expense of people caught in crisis areas.

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