Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. Nos. L-25204 and L-25219 January 23, 1970QUETOaliasTAN QUETO, (PERSHING TAN QUETO), ET AL.,petitioners,vs.HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, respondent. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,intervenor.Valeriano S. Kaamio for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for intervenor.Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico in his own.SYLLABUS1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; JURISDICTION TO INQUIRE INTO INFIRMITIES OF NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS; OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon infirmities connected with the original proceedings must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. The procedure is by cancellation of the naturalization certificate (Sec. 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63), in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.

2. COURTS; NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; JUDGE AS INQUISITOR, DANGERS. As a general rule, a court proceeding in our judicial set-up is accusatorial or adversarial and not inquisitorial in nature. It contemplates two contending parties before the court, which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial. This basic philosophy would be violated if a judge were permitted to act as inquisitor, pursue his own independent investigation, arrive at a conclusion ex-parte, and then summon the party affected so as to enable him, if that were still possible, to show that the conclusion thus arrived at is without justification. The danger in all this is most forcefully demonstrated in the present case, where respondent Judge took "judicial notice," to use his own words, of "news" derogatory to one of the petitioners, thereby elevating rumors and gossips to the level of incontrovertible proof; and worse, where judgment, not to say prejudice, on the part of said respondent was so blatantly shown by the abusive epithets he used in referring to the same petitioner before he had any chance to be heard.

3. COURTS; JUDGES; DUTIES AND LIMITATIONS OF AUTHORITY. Judges, in their zeal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure. If they arrogate unto themselves the authority allocated to other officials, there can be no consequence but confusion in the administration of justice and, in many instances, oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.

D E C I S I O N

MAKALINTAL,J.:In the annals of Philippine Jurisprudence there has been no case quite like the one now before us, where over fifty naturalized citizens were haled into court by officiousness on the part of a Judge, and one of them, as if by way of example, was unnecessarily subjected to overbearing and abusive verbal treatment from the bench. The time wasted in the proceedings below, and here as a result of the petition for prohibition which had to be filed in order to correct them, could have been employed more profitably in meritorious cases instead of aggravating the already dogged court dockets.The instant petition for prohibition1was filed on October 26, 1965 in behalf of thirty-seven of those naturalized citizens, in whose favor the corresponding certificates of naturalization had been issued on different dates, the earliest of which was August 27, 1961, and the latest, June 6, 1964.The proceedings complained of began when, under date of October 5, 1965, each one of those affected was served with a uniformly worded mimeographed notice from the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by herein respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico, as follows:Acting in accordance with the instructions received from the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of this district, and in accordance further with the records of the naturalization cases in this Court, you are hereby notified that you are one among those who have taken oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines where the proceedings in connection therewith were null and void,ab initio, in the light of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court on naturalization.By authority granted me by the Executive Judge, you are hereby ordered to appear before him on October 15, 1965, at 9:00 in the morning, at the Session Hall, Branch I, at Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, with your counsel, for the purpose of discussing the ways and means of how to avoid further ill use of your pretended Philippine Citizenship either by acquiring real properties which is prohibited by the Constitution to aliens like you, or exercising the right of suffrage.On October 15, 1965 respondent Judge called the cases for hearing, "to thresh out," in the language of the order he issued on the same date, "the best procedure to follow tending to stave off the imminent declaration of nullity of the oath taking and consequent issuance of the certificate of naturalization to the applicants in the above-named cases as a natural consequence of the nullity of the proceedings had in connection with the aforecited legally defective oath taking for lack of notification to the Solicitor General who is the only counsel of record of the State."As thus spelled out, the Judge took it upon himself to summon herein petitioners, among many others, for a discussion of what to do in connection with the nullity of their naturalization a matter he had evidently already pre-judged, on the ground, according to him, that said petitioners were allowed to take their respective oaths of allegiance without previous notices of the Solicitor General, the notices to the provincial and/or city fiscals who actually appeared in the naturalization proceedings being ineffective.At the hearing on October 15, 1965 the Judge reveal that the action he took was the result of a letter of Chua Tuan, alias Lim Tian Yu, through his counsel, asking the Clerk of Court to furnish him with copies of his certificate of naturalization and oath of allegiance, which were needed in connection with certain requirements of the Bureau of Lands. The Judge remarked that he did not know Chua Tuan at all but "could not ignore his activities." He then proceeded to deliver in open court a lengthy dissertation reflecting on the honesty and integrity of provincial and city fiscals appearing in naturalization cases, and venting his spleen particularly on Chua Tuan, referred to him as a Chinese who had become a multi-millionaire by making overshipments of copra, who was "untouchable because he could buy his way out in Malacaang, in the Army, in the Foreign Affairs, in the Immigration, in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in the Courts of Justice." Of all these things, the Judge said, he would take judicial notice. Other epithets were used by him to castigate the object of his tirade "balasubas;" ingrate; "humbug;" animalistic; a danger and a disgrace to the community; a dishonor to the Filipino people.The letter-request of Chua Tuan elicited the following written reply from the Court:In view of the inherent nullity of the proceedings above pointed out leading to your acquisition of Philippine citizenship, you did not acquire a valid Filipino citizenship; and therefore you, for all legal purposes, are still an alien prohibited by the Constitution to acquire lands in the Philippines.Thus, at one stroke, without any petition from the Solicitor General and without hearing, respondent Judge in effect nullified all the previous proceedings petition, publication, trial judgment, oath taking and issuance of the certificate of naturalization. And following the example of Chua Tuan the other petitioners herein were called to hear the same fate, although with respect to them the Judge, after saying that he was going to declare all of them aliens, expressed his readiness to hear their arguments.To the credit of the lawyers who appeared before him, the manner in which they argued their cases was a lesson in humility, decorum and forbearance. In respectful language they pointed out, among other things, that the proper procedure that should have been pursued against each of their clients was through cancellation of the naturalization certificate by the court "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal ... (a) if it is shown that sand naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently orillegally," as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 473, Section 18; that respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to actmotu propioand declare that herein petitioners had not acquired Filipino citizenship by virtue of their naturalization; and that such declaration was arbitrary and void.Respondent Judge, however, made short shrift of the arguments by saying that since the petitioners had not become Filipino citizens because their oath taking was void for lack of notice to the Solicitor General, there were no naturalization certificates to be cancelled pursuant to the legal provision aforementioned. Nevertheless, acting on counsel's motion for continuance in order to await the advice already requested by them from the Solicitor General, respondent Judge granted the same and set the hearing anew for November 12, 1965. However, they filed the instant petition on October 26, 1965, to stop said respondent from taking further action in the proceedings initiated by him. As prayed for by the petitioners this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on November 3, 1965.Since then thirty-five of the thirty-seven petitioners have withdrawn as such, alleging that they would file the proper petitions in the Court below to remove whatever cloud there might be in their status as naturalized Filipino citizens; and the corresponding motions for withdrawal have been granted by this Court. Only two petitioners still remain, namely, Chua Tuan @ Lim Tian Su (CFI No. 75, G.R. No. L-25204); and Pepito Go (CFI No. 33, G.R. No. L- 25219).On December 8, 1965 the Solicitor General filed a motion to intervene in this proceeding, which motion was duly granted by resolution of this Court dated December 15, 1965. The case was set for hearing on April 18, 1966, on which date counsel for the remaining petitioners and a representative of the Solicitor General appeared and moved that they be allowed to file memoranda in lieu of oral argument. The memorandum for the petitioners was filed in due time, but none was submitted by the Solicitor General.The issue is whether or not respondent Judge,motu proprio,had jurisdiction to reopen and review, or putting it more accurately in this case, to declare null and void the grant of citizenship to the petitioners pursuant to final judgments of competent courts and after the oaths of allegiance had been taken and the corresponding certificates of naturalization issued. It may be true, as alleged by said respondent, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is by cancellation of the naturalization certificate [Sec. 1 (5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.As a general rule a court proceeding in our judicial set-up is accusatorial or adversary and not inquisitorial in nature. It contemplates two contending parties before the court, which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial. This basic philosophy would be violated if a judge were permitted to act as inquisitor pursue his own independent investigation, arrive at a conclusionex-parte, and then summon the party affected so as to enable him, if that were still possible, to show that the conclusion thus arrived at is without justification. The danger in all this is most forcefully demonstrated in the present case, where respondent Judge took "judicial notice," to use his own words, of "news" derogatory to one of the petitioners, thereby elevating rumors and gossip to the level of incontrovertible proof ; and worse, where prejudgment, not to say prejudice, on the part of said respondent was so blatantly shown by the abusive epithets he used in referring to the same petitioner before he had any chance to be heard.Judges, in their zeal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure. If they arrogate unto themselves the authority allocated to other officials, there can be no consequence but confusion in the administration of justice and, in many instances, oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the injunction heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. The Solicitor General is, of course, not precluded from taking such steps as may be warranted in connection with the naturalization cases of the petitioners.Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Honorable the Secretary of Justice.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J., and Barredo, J., took no part.Footnotes1 Although only one petition was filed, it was given thirty-seven docket numbers, from L-25183 to L-25219, inclusive, each number corresponding to one petitioner.============================================================================================================================================================================================

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 143618-41.July 30, 2002]

BENJAMIN Kokoy ROMUALDEZ,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER II EVELYN TAGOBA LUCERO,respondents.

D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Previous to this case, petitioner instituted a petition docketed as G.R. No. 105248, entitled,Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, Petitioner, versus Sandiganbayan (First Division) and Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Respondents.[1]He assailed therein, among others, the validity of twenty-four informations which the PCGG filed against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, more specifically for failure to file his statements of assets and liabilities covering the years 1962 to 1985 when he was in the government service.The cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan as Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429.He argued that PCGG Commissioner Augusto E. Villarin, who conducted the preliminary investigation, had no authority to do so.On May 16, 1995, a Decision was rendered in said case declaring the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG invalid, based on the following findings:Now, the crimes ascribed to Romualdez (failure to file his annual statements of assets and liabilities) do not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by him.No such relation may be perceived in the indictments themselves, which in fact merely state that there wasno justifiable causefor Romualdezs refusal or failure to file his annual statements.Moreover, the Sandiganbayan itself made the finding that the cases against Romualdez did not refer to acquisition of wealth under a crony status, but solely ** (to) his bare physical non-compliance with his mechanical duty to file his statement of assets and liabilities over a period of twenty-four (24) years **; and that the omissions have no bearing on Civil Case No. 0035 against Romualdez involving transactions in which he allegedly took advantage of his relationship with the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos.These considerations also call for rejection of the Solicitor Generals theory that Romualdezs non-filing of statements of assets and liabilities ** (was) a means ofconcealing** (his) assets and frustrating the efforts of the Government to determine the actual value or extent of ** (his) wealth.The Court therefore declares invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGGover the 24 offenses ascribed to Romualdez (of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.[2]While the preliminary investigation was invalid, we ruled that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the informations much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.Hence, we held that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the warrants of arrest against petitioner.However, the Sandiganbayan was directed to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429, and to require the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct a proper preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner.In compliance with the said decision, the Sandiganbayan, on November 13, 1995, issued a resolution giving petitioner fifteen days from receipt thereof within which to submit his counter-affidavit and controverting evidence, furnishing copies thereof to the PCGG.The Sandiganbayan also gave the PCGG the same period to file a reply affidavit or pleading if it so desired.Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor was directed to conduct the reinvestigation.[3]At that time, however, petitioner was still in exile abroad.Naturally, he failed to submit the required counter-affidavits.He returned to the Philippines only on April 27, 2000, after which he voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and posted the required bail bond.On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan gave Special Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero ten days within which to submit the result of any reinvestigation she may have undertaken.[4]Prosecutor Lucero informed the Sandiganbayan that she has set a clarificatory hearing on June 2, 2000, and moved for a thirty-day extension to submit the results of the reinvestigation.[5]Prosecutor Lucero sent notice of the clarificatory hearing to Atty. Jesus Borromeo, on behalf of petitioner.The latter immediately went to Prosecutor Luceros office to inform her that he was not the counsel for petitioner in these particular cases, although he represented petitioner in other cases pending before different divisions of the Sandiganbayan.The scheduled hearing on June 2, 2000 was cancelled for non-appearance of petitioner and counsel.In the meantime, petitioner, through Atty. Otilia Dimayuga-Molo, filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 2, 2000 a Motion to Quash the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429.[6]He argued therein that the PCGG Commissioner who filed the informations had no authority to do so.On June 6, 2000, petitioner received at his address in Tacloban City a notice from Prosecutor Taguba of the clarificatory hearing scheduled on June 9, 2000.[7]The Motion to Quash was heard by the Sandiganbayan on June 8, 2000, one day before the clarificatory hearing.Without granting the prosecution time to oppose the motion, the Presiding Justice, in open court, denied the Motion to Quash and terminated the preliminary investigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero.Furthermore, the Presiding Justice set the arraignment of petitioner on June 26, 2000.On June 23, 2000, petitioner was able to obtain a written copy of the order dated June 8, 2000 denying his Motion to Quash and setting his arraignment on June 26, 2000.[8]Petitioner likewise received another order dated June 8, 2000, denying his oral motion for reconsideration.[9]The arraignment scheduled on June 26, 2000 was reset to July 28, 2000.[10]On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed the instant petition, seeking to annul the assailed orders dated June 8, 2000 and to prohibit the Sandiganbayan from implementing the same.Petitioner further prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, enjoining his arraignment on July 28, 2000.In a resolution dated July 17, 2000, respondents were required to comment and the parties were directed to maintain thestatus quo anteprevailing at the time of filing of the petition.[11]The petition is anchored on the following grounds:I.RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FILED IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 13406-13429 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE PCGG COMMISSIONER WHO FILED SAID INFORMATIONS HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO;II.THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT COMPLYING WITH THE DIRECTIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE ROMUALDEZ CASE THAT IT SHOULD ORDER THE OMBUDSMAN TO CONDUCT A PROPER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;III.THE PETITION WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS THAT SHOULD COME FROM AN IMPARTIAL AND COLDLY NEUTRAL JUDGE.RESPONDENT PREJUDGED THE ISSUES WHEN IT DICTATED IN OPEN COURT THE LENGTHY ORDER OF JUNE 8, 2000, DENYING OUTRIGHT THE MOTION TO QUASH AND ISSUING ANOTHER ORDER ON THE SAME DATE DENYING AN ALLEGED ORAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[12]Respondents counter that the first issue raised by petitioner has already been resolved in G.R. No. 105248, thus:The invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation does not however affect the jurisdiction of the Trial Court which may have taken cognizance of the information.The controlling principles are set out by a well known authority now sitting in the Court, in his work entitledRemedial Law Compendium,as follows:**.Any objection to lack of preliminary investigation must be made before entry of the plea(People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 60962, July 11, 1986)and the court, instead of dismissing the information, must remand the case for preliminary investigation(People vs. Casiano, L-15309, Feb. 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1960; Zacarias vs. Cruz, L-25899, Nov. 29, 1969; People vs. Abejuela, L-29715, Mar. 31, 1971; Sanciangco, et al. vs. People, G.R. No. 12830, Mar. 24, 1987).The refusal of the court to remand the case for preliminary investigation can be controlled by certiorari and prohibition to prevent trial(Bandiala vs. CFI, L-24652, Sept. 30, 1970).**.As regards proceedings in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, another author observes that:Sinceabsence of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information(Sec. 3, Rule 117, Rules of Court), proceedings upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the case remanded to the Ombudsman, for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation (Luciano vs. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187, 201; Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People, 149 SCRA 1, 3-4).The principle was applied despite the fact that trial on the merits had begun and the prosecution had already presented four witnesses. The trial was ordered suspended pending the preliminary investigation (Go vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992).Considering that the invalidity of the preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the informations or otherwise render it defective, ** (m)uch less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court **," the only effect, to repeat, being the imposition on the latter of the obligation to suspend the proceedings and require the holding of a proper preliminary investigation, it follows that all acts done by the Court prior thereto must be accorded validity and effect, subject to the outcome of the preliminary investigation yet to be conducted.The dispositions thus made by respondent Sandiganbayan, i.e., its refusal to recall and quash the warrants of arrest or to modify the conditions laid down by it for petitioner's cash bond; and its confiscation of the cash deposit of petitioner for violation by the latter of the conditions thereof, cannot be regarded as having been made without or in excess of jurisdiction, or so whimsical, capricious or oppressive or so utterly without foundation as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.[13]The above-quoted ruling is based on our earlier decisions in the cited cases ofLuciano v. Mariano,[14]Ilagan v. Enrile,[15]Sanciangco, Jr. v. People[16]andGo v. Court of Appeals.[17]In these cases, what was assailed was the lack of proper preliminary investigation before the filing of the informations.The informations therein were filed by the proper officer albeit without conducting the requisite preliminary investigation.The case at bar, on the other hand, differs in that the officer who filed the informations against petitioner, PCGG Commissioner Villarin, was not authorized to do so.This defect invoked by petitioner is one of the grounds for filing a motion to quash, to wit:Grounds.--- The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:xxxxxxxxx.(d)That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;xxxxxxxxx.[18]What was assailed in G.R. No. 105248 was the Sandiganbayans refusal to quash the warrants and modify the conditions of the bail bond, as well as its confiscation of the cash deposit.While we ruled therein that the PCGG Commissioner had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, we did not squarely rule on his lack of authority to file the informations.The issue before the Court was the invalidity of the preliminary investigation and its consequences.The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Sandiganbayan, argues that a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy against the denial of a motion to quash.He cites the cases ofQuion v. Sandiganbayan[19]andRaro v. Sandiganbayan.[20]That, however, is the general rule, from which there are known exceptions.In both cases, we qualified the rule by stating that [i]t is only where there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal that the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition may exceptionally be allowed.[21]There are such special circumstances in the case at bar.Indeed, it would be a gross infringement of petitioners right to due process, not to mention an utter waste of time and judicial resources, if trial is allowed to proceed only to be nullified by the higher courts later on upon the ground that the charges were filed by a person who had no authority to file the same.An information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,subscribed by the prosecutorand filed with the court.[22]As can be clearly gleaned, it is the prosecutor, not the PCGG, who subscribes and files the information.In cases before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor is the Ombudsman.As we have held, the crimes charged against petitioner do not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth, over which the PCGG had no jurisdiction.All trial courts, the Sandiganbayan included, are reminded that they should take all the necessary measures guaranteeing procedural due process from the inception of custodial investigation up to rendition of judgment.[23]They are not to turn a blind eye to procedural irregularities which transpired before the criminal case reached the court.The validity and sufficiency of the information are important.[24]In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as inPecho v. Sandiganbayan[25]where the wording of the certification in the information was found inadequate, or inPeople v. Marquez,[26]where the required certification was absent.Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party.The defect cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation.An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.In fact, where an information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, it is subject to quashal.More particularly, the information may be quashed where the officer who filed it had no authority to do so.[27]At all stages of the proceedings leading to his trial and conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure prescribed by law and marked by observance of the rights given to him by the Constitution.In the same way that the reading of the information to the accused during arraignment is not a useless formality,[28]so is the validity of the information being read not an idle ceremony.Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly processes of law.[29]In all criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step procedure required by the Rules.The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking the life or liberty except that of the guilty.[30]The case ofCruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[31]is directly in point:Consequently, the amended information that was filed against petitioner did not fall under the category of criminal actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth filed against a member of the family of President Marcos, relatives, subordinates or close associates who took advantage of their office or authority as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.What the petitioner is actually charged with is for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019.Public respondent PCGG does not pretend that the President assigned to it this particular case against the petitioner for investigation and prosecution in accordance with Section 2(b) of Executive Order No. 1.Moreover, an examination of the complaint filed with respondent PCGG, as well as the affidavits, counter-affidavits and exhibits submitted at the preliminary investigation show thatthere is no evidence at all that this alleged violation is crony-related, committed by petitioner by taking advantage of his public office, and was committed in relation with the ill-gotten wealth being sought to be recovered as aforestated.There is, therefore, no evidence in the hands of the respondent PCGG to justify the amendment of the information.Indeed, the said amendment appears to be an afterthought to make it fall under the type of offenses respondent PCGG may investigate and prosecute under the law.It is a fundamental principle that when on its face the information is null and void for lack of authority to file the same, it cannot be cured nor resurrected by an amendment.Another preliminary investigation must be undertaken and thereafter, based on evidence adduced, a new information should be filed.Consequentlyall the actions respondent PCGG had taken in this case including the filing of the information and amended information with the respondent court should be struck down.[32]Recently, we ruled that the infirmity in the information caused by lack of authority of the officer signing it cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence or even by express consent.A new information must be filed by the proper officer.Thus:xxxxxxxxx.It is a valid information signed by a competent officer, among other requisites, which confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation.In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former prosecution.If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded.As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in petitioners subsequent prosecution.Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.[33]The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero.It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right.Petitioners right was violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases.It bears stressing that our directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to due process.The Sandiganbayan contends that petitioner waived his right to a proper preliminary investigation.This is untenable.The records show that petitioner was unable to attend the clarificatory hearings on June 2 and 5, 2000 simply due to lack of notice.Prosecutor Lucero herself admits that Atty. Borromeo, to whom she initially served notice of the hearing, did not represent petitioner in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429.Effectively, petitioner was only notified of the clarificatory hearing scheduled on June 9, 2000.That setting, however, no longer materialized because the day before, the Sandiganbayan prematurely terminated the reinvestigation.Finally, petitioner charges the Sandiganbayan with having prejudged the cases and deprived him of his right to due process.Considering the defective nature of the informations in the criminal cases below, there is no more need to pass upon this last assignment of error.The Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the informations against petitioner.In the exercise of their discretion, all courts are admonished to uphold the law and procedure and to do what is fair and just.[34]The Sandiganbayan failed in this regard.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.The assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan dated June 8, 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan,andAustria-Martinez, JJ.,concur.

[1]244 SCRA 152 [1995].[2]Ibid.,at 162-163; emphasis provided.[3]Rollo, p. 103.[4]Ibid.,p. 107.[5]Ibid.,pp. 108-109.[6]Ibid.,pp. 110-114.[7]Ibid.,p. 115.[8]Ibid.,pp. 45-50.[9]Ibid.,pp. 51-52.[10]Ibid.,p. 53.[11]Ibid.,pp. 132-134.[12]Ibid.,p. 14.[13]Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,supra,at 164-165; emphasis provided.[14]40 SCRA 187 [1971].[15]139 SCRA 349 [1985].[16]149 SCRA 1 [1987].[17]206 SCRA 138 [1992].[18]Rules of Court, Rule 117, Sec. 3.[19]271 SCRA 575 [1997].[20]335 SCRA 581 [2000].[21]Quion v. Sandiganbayan,supra,at 592; Raro v. Sandiganbayan,supra,at 600.[22]Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 4.[23]Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 12 (1); Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]; People v. Lino, 196 SCRA 809 [1991].[24]People v. Mencias, 46 SCRA 88 [1972].[25]238 SCRA 116 [1994].[26]27 SCRA 808 [1969].[27]Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Section 3 (d).[28]Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 [1977]; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 [1908]; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425 [1905].[29]Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457 [1988].[30]Tabao v. Espina, 257 SCRA 298 [1996] andAlonte v. Sabellano, 287 SCRA 245 [1998].[31]194 SCRA 474, 484-485 [1991].[32]Ibid.,at 484-485; emphasis supplied.[33]Cudia v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 173, 182 [1998].[34]Tabao v. Espina, 257 SCRA 298 (1996).===========================================================================================================================================================================================================================================Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988RODOLFO DELA CRUZ,petitioner,vs.Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Rolando C. Rama for petitioner.The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF A VALID COURT PROCEEDING. For a court proceeding to be valid, it is essential that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, otherwise the entire proceedings are null and void.

2. ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER, DETERMINED BY STATUTE IN FORCE AT COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.

3. ID.; JURISDICTION; RETAINED UP TO TERMINATION OF LITIGATION. Once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation.

4. ID.; GENERAL ORDER NO. 59; VESTED IN MILITARY TRIBUNALS JURISDICTION OVER ALL OFFENSES COMMITTED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL. General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages 6373-1 to 6378-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over" (a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President . . ." (Section 1.)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY EITHER CIVIL COURT OR MILITARY TRIBUNALS. The proviso in General Order No. 59 merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense is conclusive for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The CFI has no jurisdiction over the case where evidence of the prosecution presented in court likewise shows that the victim was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order.

D E C I S I O NCORTES,J.:Involving as it does a purely legal question, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus was certified to this Court by the then Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30, 1983.On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other PC men, received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. In compliance with said mission order, Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted arrest. The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime, such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao, in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40080.While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties.Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The motion was denied. Hence, the present petition.At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 40080.One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire proceedings are null and void.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. [Silvestre v. Military Commission, L-48366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10; People v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799 (1967), 21 SCRA 717.] And once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. [Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, (1929); Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. CIR, 93 Phil. 747 (1953); Tuvera v. De Guzman, 121 Phil. 706 (1965),13 SCRA 729; Rilloraza v. Arciaga,supra: Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 123 Phil. 766 (1966),16 SCRA908).In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, published in 73Official Gazette(Supplement) #28, pages 6373-1 to 6373-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President. . . " (Section 1.) As no amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette between the time G.R. No. 59 was published until the information in Criminal Case No. 40080 was filed on August 2,1979, then said General Order No. 59 remained in force on said date.In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, petitioner Dela Cruz was a member of the Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of the deceased Cabilto was committed while petitioner was executing the Mission Order.But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate to be issued by the Secretary of National Defense?The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense isconclusivefor the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is duty-connected. Nor does it make the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP.In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was presented in court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta, directing Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao to verify and apprehend persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. These undisputed facts compel this Court to declare that respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner Dela Cruz.The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822 and 1822-A which vest in the courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the AFP in the performance of their duties were not yet in effect, the same having been promulgated only in 1981.Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar. However, General Order No. 59 cited above applies.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The in Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for appropriate action.Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.===========================================================================================================================================================================================Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO,respondents.

SYLLABUS1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. Public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder. At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which pertinently provides for its exclusive original jurisdiction and exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

2. ID.; JURISDICTION; SANDIGANBAYAN; FELONIES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS; REQUISITE. We held in Aguinaldo v. Domagas (G.R. No. 98452, En Banc Resolution, 26 September 1991) that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2), of PD No. 1606, as amended by PD 1861, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office. We reiterated this pronouncement in Sanchez v. Demetriou, (G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993, 227 SCRA 627) Natividad v. Felix, (G.R. No. 111616, 4 February 1994, 229 SCRA 680) and Republic v. Asuncion. (G.R. No. 108208, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 211). In Sanchez, we restated the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario (90 Phil. 49 [1951]) that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. We also reiterated the principle in People v. Montejo (108 Phil, 613 [1960]) that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and we further intimated that the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information.

3. ID.; ID.; DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS IN INFORMATION. It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the result of evidence after trial. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

4. ID.; ID.; TAKING ADVANTAGE OF POSITION DOES NOT MEAN OFFENSES COMMITTED IN RELATION TO PUBLIC OFFICE. The allegation of taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to public office." In Montilla v. Hilario, such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance, and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. It says: But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime. Also, in Bartolome v. People of the Philippines, (142 SCRA 459 [1986]) despite the allegation that the accused public officers committed the crime of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because" [t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense. Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.

5. ID.; ID.; SANDIGANBAYAN; JURISDICTION MODIFIED UNDER RA 7975. In view of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, introduced by R.A. No. 7975, approved on 30 March 1995, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; R.A. No. 1379; and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 of RA 7975 and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (RA. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in said subsection a, Section 4. However, it retains its exclusive original over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said cases allege that the crimes charged were committed by the PNP officers in relation to their office, it would appear indubitable that the cases would fall within the jurisdiction of the court a quo. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129." However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Under the above assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed, the governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by R.A. No. 7975? Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally tertninated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation. In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That Section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan. It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof.

7. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; MOTION REJECTED FOR FAILURE TO QUESTION WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME DENIAL OF APPLICATION IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. As regards the motion for bail of accused-respondents, the same must fail. The motions for bail filed by the accused-respondents with the Regional Trial Court where the cases against them are pending were denied sometime in February, 1994. In Enrile v. Salazar, (186 SCRA 217 [1990]) as reiterated in Galvez v. Court of Appeals, (237 SCRA 685 [1994]) this Court said: "Only after that remedy [petition to be admitted to bail] was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court [be] invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there." There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have questioned the denial of their applications for bail in a petition forcertiorarieither before the Court of Appeals or this Court. It was only on 26 December 1994, when they filed their respective comments on the instant petition, that they challenged the denial premised on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was not strong. Even if their respective Comment and Reiteration of Motion for Bail and respondent Dumancas Motion for Bail filed on 22 March 1995, were treated as petitions forcertiorari, still the same would not prosper for not having been seasonably filed. While the Rules of Court does not fix a time-frame for the filing of a special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, existing jurisprudence requires that the same be filed within a reasonable period of time from receipt of the questioned judgment or order. And, in Philec Workers Union v. Hon Romeo A. Young (GR. No. 101734 22 January 1992) it was held that a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed within a reasonable period of three months from notice of the decision or order. Here, about nine to ten months had already elapsed before the respondents assailed the denial of their motions for bail. In any event the private respondents who were denied bail are not precluded from reiterating before the trial court their plea for admission to bail.

PADILLA,J., concurring and dissenting opinion:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; PD 1606; SANDIGANBAYAN; OFFENSES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS IN RELATION TO THEIR OFFICE AS ALLEGED IN INFORMATION The accused PNP personnel committed the crime alleged in the two (2) informations in relation to their office. The wording of the informations clearly shows that P/Col. Torres used his authority over his subordinate officers when he ordered them to arrest the two (2) swindling suspects/victims in connection with the complaint of the Dumancas spouses. This act of Torres is "intimately connected" with his position as Station Commander of the PNP, Bacolod Station. In turn, the other accused PNP personnel who detained the two (2) victims were performing their functions as law enforcers under orders from their direct superior. Under such circumstances, the two (2) informations would have been properly filed with the Sandiganbayan since the law in force at the time was P.D. No. 1606 which gave the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correctional or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00.

2. ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT 7975; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AS PROPER TRIBUNAL. Rep. Act No. 7975 has revised the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under said revised jurisdiction, the Regional Trial Courts now have jurisdiction over offenses committed by PNP officers with ranks below that of superintendent or its equivalent, whether or not the offenses are committed in relation to their office. In the present case, none of the accused PNP officers has the rank of superintendent or higher. Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 7975 also provides that upon effectivity of said Act, all criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606 where trial has not begun in said court, shall be referred to the proper courts. In the present case, even if the criminal cases were then within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the offenses having been committed in relation to the accuseds office, as earlier discussed, yet, the cases were not filed in said court. Since the cases now fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the express provisions of Rep. Act. No. 7975, they can remain in said regional trial court.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. Whether accused Jeanette Ya.nson-Dumancas should be granted bail, I agree with Mr. Justice Kapunan that the Court should exercise its discretion, disregard technicalities and rule on the motion for bail filed with this Court. Accused Jeanette should, in my view, be released on bail for the following reasons: 1, The spouses Dumancas were included in the informations as accused merely because they were the ones who complained to the police that the two (2) victims had swindled them. There is no showing that the spouses knew, much less instigated, the kidnapping and murder of the victims. 2. The situation of Jeanette is no different from that of her husband who was granted bail by the trial court. 3. Jeanette came back from abroad even after the charges against her had been filed. Certainly, this is not indicative of a probability of her later jumping bail should she be released on bail. 4. To deny bail to a mother of two (2) minor children in the absence of direct evidence that she was indeed a principal by inducement as alleged in the two (2) informations, is antagonistic not only to her constitutional right to bail but also to the ideals and demands of ajust and humane society.

KAPUNAN,J., concurring and dissenting opinion:*

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; PETITION PROPER FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS. At least with respect to petitioner Jeanette Dumancas, this Court, mainly for humanitarian reasons, should exercise its discretion to grant said petitioner her constitutional right to bail, pending the determination of her guilt or innocence in the trial court. The facts so far established in the case at bench with respect to the spouses Dumancas as narrated in the courts opinion clearly casts enough doubt regarding the strength of the evidence of guilt against Mrs. Dumancas, which ought to be sufficient for us to exercise our discretion to grant bail in her case. The trial court has already refused to grant her petition for bail, which under the facts and circumstances so far available to the lower court, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, subject to this courts action. While normally, a motion for reconsideration should be addressed to the trial court or to the Court of Appeals (if the said motion were denied by the lower court), I see no reason why we should not exercise our discretion to grant Mrs. Dumancas her right to bail.

D E C I S I O NDAVIDE, JR., J.:At issue in this special civil action forcertiorariis whether it is the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the Philippine National Police (PNP).On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the PNP, namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, P/Insp. Adonis C. Abeto, Police Officers Mario Lamis, Jose Pahayupan, and Vicente Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations, later docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the said court, are similarly worded, except as to the names of the victims, who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first case and Danilo Lumangyao in the second, thus:The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR PECHA AND EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:That during the period beginning in the late afternoon of August 6, 1992 and ending the late evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent and execution thereof with one another, save for the accessories for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353, 000.00, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously to wit:Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police, Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian (police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. (Criminal Case No. 94-15562 and DANILO LUMANGYAO (Criminal Case No. 94-15563), shortly thereafter at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of August 7, 1992, failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victims, while being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado, with knowledge that the said Gargar [and Lumangyao, in Crim. Case No. 94-15563 were victims] of violence, did then and there secretly bury the corpses in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime of murder in order to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and prejudice to the heirs of said victims, to wit:P 50,000.00as indemnity for death;

50,000.00actual damages;

300,000.00compensatory damages

(Lost income);

100,000.00moral damages;

50,000.00exemplary damages.

CONTRARY TO LAW (Articles 268 and 248 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code).1These cases were consolidated.Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later, they filed their respective motions for bail. At the hearings thereof, the prosecution presented state witness Moises Grandeza, the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the commission of the complex crimes. After the completion of his testimony, the trial court, per Judge Edgar G. Garvilles, granted bail in favor of only six of the accused, namely, P/Insp. Adonis Abeto, Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., Charles Dumancas, Edgar Hilado, and Cesar Pecha. The other eight accused who were denied bail are now detained at the City Jail of Bacolod City.2Through the testimony of Grandeza, the prosecution established that in response to the complaint of spouses Charles and Jeanette Dumancas, P/Col. Nicolas Torres instructed his men to look for Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao who were allegedly members of the group that had swindled the Dumancas spouses. On 6 August 1992, Police Officer Mario Lamis, together with civilian agents, namely, Teody Delgado, Edwin Divinagracia, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando Fernandez, and Moises Grandeza, arrested and abducted the two swindling suspects. Conformably with Torres's order, the two suspects were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel. There, they were investigated by Police Inspector Adonis Abeto and Police Officers Jose Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr.. They were then taken to the Ceres Compound, where Jeanette Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a member of the group that had swindled her. She then asked about the money that the group had received from her. Upon being told by Lumangyao that the money had already been divided among his partners long time ago, she said to the accused, specifically to Dominador Geroche: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or police and I will call Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them." Thereafter, the two suspects were transferred to D' Hacienda Motel, then to Moonlit Inn, then to Casa Mel Lodge, and back to D' Hacienda Motel, where the two were shot and killed. The team forthwith went to the office of P/Col. Torres and reported that the killing had been done. The latter told them: "You who are here inside, nobody knows what you have done, but you have to hide because the NBI's are after you."3Thereafter, the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused. Accused Torres and Abeto presented their respective evidence. Presentation of evidence by the other accused was, however, suspended because of the motions of several accused for the inhibition of Judge Garvilles. Despite opposition by the prosecution, Judge Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing both cases, which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by herein public respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes.On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 inRepublic of the Philippines vs. Asuncion,4the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. In his Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records, the State Prosecutor adopted the motion of the private prosecutors.5In its order of 15 August 1994,6the trial court, thru respondent Judge, ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.Citing People vs. Montilla,7it held that the allegation in the informations that the accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the commission of the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense intimately connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case should continue.Relying onPeople vs. Montejo,8the prosecution moved to reconsider the said order.9On 7 September 1994,10the trial court issued an order denying the motion becausePeople vs. Montejois not applicable, since in that case there was (a) an intimate connection between the offense charged and the public position of the accused and (b) a total absence of personal motive; whereas, in these cases, no such intimate connection exists and the informations emphasize that the accused were moved by selfish motives of ransom and extortion.The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for the other accused. Accused Gargallano, Fernandez, Lamis, Delgado, and Geroche, as well as his three witnesses, had already completed their respective testimonies when, upon motion of the prosecution, the respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with us a petition forcertiorari, prohibition, andmandamuswith a prayer for a temporary restraining order challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan.On 12 December 1994, we required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondent or his successor to desist from proceeding with the trial of the subject cases.11On 27 February 1995, after considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition as well as in the comments of the private respondents, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Most of them submitted their memoranda, while the petitioner and some of the private respondents adopted their initiatory pleadings as their memoranda.On 22 March 1995, private respondent Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas filed an urgent motion for the grant of bail,12which we noted on 15 May 1995.13Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, we are convinced that public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder.At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which pertinently provides as follows:Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by Law is higher thanprision correccionalor imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of 16,000.00:PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceedprision correccionalor imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, in their respective jurisdiction.xxx xxx xxxIn case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees.Applying this section, we held inAguinaldo vs. Domagas14that for the Sandiganbayan to haveexclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2) above, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher thanprision correccionalor imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their office. We reiterated this pronouncement inSanchez vs. Demetriou,15Natividad vs. Felix,16andRepublic vs. Asuncion,17In Sanchez, we restated the principle laid down inMontilla vs. Hilario18that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. We also reiterated the principle inPeople vs. Montejo19that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and we further intimated that the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the information.20There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 before the court below are higher thanprision correcionalor imprisonment for more than six years. The only question that remains to be resolved then is whether the said offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.Relying on its evidence and on the Montejo case, the petitioner submits that the crimes charged in the subject cases were connected with public office because the accused PNP officers, together with the civilian agents, arrested the two swindling suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not out of personal motive, and if they demanded from the two suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas spouses and later killed the two; they did so in the course of the investigation conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner further asserts that the allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the Philippine National Police" and "taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the functions attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are sufficient to show that the offenses charged were committed in relation to their office. The petitioner then concludes that the cases below fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information,21and not by the result of evidence after trial.22In Montejo23where the amended information alleged:Leroy S. Brown, City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and . . . special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo, which is under his command . . . supervision and control, where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions and would not have peen committed had they not held their office; besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime; thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.Unlike in Montejo, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to public office." InMontilla vs. Hilario,24such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance,25and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office, It says:But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.Also, inBartolome vs. People of the Philippines,26despite the allegation that the accused public officers committed the crime of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this Court held that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense."Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court27and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.In Dumancas's and Torres's motions for the early resolution of this case and in Abeto's Supplement to Comment with Motion to Dismiss all filed in July 1995, it is contended that even assuming that the informations do charge the accused PNP officers with crimes committed in relation to their office, still the Regional Trial Court would have jurisdiction over the subject cases in view of the amendments to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, introduced by R.A. No. 7975, which was approved on 30 March 1995, whose Section 2 provides:Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sanggunian panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;(a) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758,or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.xxx xxx xxxIn case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them. (emphasis supplied).As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost itsexclusive original jurisdictionin cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019,28as amended; R.A. No. 1379;29and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;30it retains only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsectiona, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty,viz., that which is higher thanprision correccionalor imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsectiona, Section 4 above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1,312,3214,33and 14-A.34The respondents maintain that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 because none of the five PNP officers involved therein occupy the rank of chief superintendent or higher, or are classified as Grade "27" or higher under R.A. No. 6758 and of the five, P/Col. Nicolas Torres has the highest rank,viz., Senior Superintendent whose salary grade under the said Act is Grade "18."Assuming then for the sake of argument that the informations in the said cases allege that the crimes charged were committed by the five PNP officers in relation to their office, it would appear indubitable that the cases would fall within the jurisdiction of the courta quo. Under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 7975:In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent35or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.However, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.36Under the above assumption then, the cases should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan since at the time the informations were filed, the governing law was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861. But, would that jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan be affected by R.A. No. 7975?Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated.37Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan