Criminal Law Case Compilation

8/10/2019 Criminal Law Case Compilation

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1ST EXAM COVERAGE CASES and SPECIAL LAWS

MUTILATION OF COINS

PD 247

MALACAANG M a n i l a

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 247 July 18, 1973

PROHIBITING AND PENALIZING DEFACEMENT,MUTILATION, TEARING, BURNING OR DESTRUCTION OFCENTRAL BANK NOTES AND COINS.

WHEREAS, the Central Bank has the sole right and authorityto issue currency within the territory of the Philippines under itsissue power, and pursuant to Section 54 of Republic Act No.265, otherwise known as the "Central Bank Act," as amended,by Presidential Decree No. 72 dated November 29, 1972, the

notes and coins issued by the Central Bank shall be fullyguaranteed by the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines and shall be legal tender in the Philippines for alldebts, both public and private;

WHEREAS, Central Bank notes and coins are issued forcirculation as medium of exchange and to utilize them for otherpurposes does not speak well of the due respect and dignitybefitting our currency; and

WHEREAS, defacing, mutilating, tearing, or partially burning ordestroying our currency by any means renders it unfit forcirculation, thereby unduly shortening its lifetime, and suchacts unfavorably reflect on the discipline of our people andcreate a bad image for our country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Presidentof the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by theConstitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 datedSeptember 21, 1972, Proclamation No. 1104 dated January17, 1973, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972,and in order to effect the desired changes and reforms in thesocial, economic and political structure of our society, dohereby order and decree:

1. That it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully deface,mutilate, tear, burn or destroy, in any manner whatsoever,currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank of thePhilippines; and

2. That any person who shall violate this Decree shall, uponconviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twentythousand pesos and/or by imprisonment of not more than fiveyears.

All laws, orders and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistentherewith are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.

This Decree is hereby made part of the law of the land andshall take effect immediately after the publication thereof in anewspaper of general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July, in the year ofOur Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.

FORGERY

DEL ROSARIO v. PEOPLE

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961

SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

P. N. Stuart del Rosario for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

CONCEPCION,J .:

Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio delRosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar wereconvicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegalpossession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to anindeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10years and 1 day of prision mayor , and pay a fine of P5,000,without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as wellas a proportionate part of the costs. On appeal, the judgmentwas affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as themaximum of said indeterminate penalty which was increasedto 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor . The case is

before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.

It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario delRosario the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G andthe Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him tobelieve that the same were counterfeit paper moneymanufactured by them, although in fact they were genuinetreasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits ofeach of which had been altered and changed, theaforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtainingP1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, onJune 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the


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manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of thePhilippines. The only question raised in this appeal is whetherthe possession of said Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes aviolation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellantmaintains that, being genuine treasury notes of ourgovernment, the possession thereof cannot be illegal. We find

no merit in this pretense. lawphil.net

It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as toread 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been madein the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E,in the last digit in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in thelast digit 9 of Serial No.D-716329 of Exhibit H.

Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or banknotes and other instruments of credit . Unless the act be oneof those coming under the provisions of any of the precedingarticles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in hispossession, with intent to use any of the false or falsifiedinstruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penaltynext lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

ART. 169. How forgery is committed . The forgery referred toin this section may be committed by any of the followingmeans;

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrumentpayable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, theappearance of a true and genuine document.

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by anymeans the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.

It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuinetreasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters,words or signs contained" in which had been erased and oraltered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used bypetitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner advertedto above, is punishable under said Article 168, in relation to

Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S.vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).

Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decisionappealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs againstpetitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is so ordered.

FALSIFICATION

SIQUIAN v. PEOPLE


Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989

MANUEL L. SIQUIANpetitioner,vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OFAPPEALS, respondents.

Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J .:

The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the thenmunicipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime offalsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of theRevised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant ProvincialFiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court ofCauayan, Isabela reads as follows:

That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L.Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan,Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such MunicipalMayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniouslyprepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, towit. An official communication to the Civil ServiceCommissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law inorder to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B.Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the MunicipalSecretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating andmaking it appear in said document that there was such aposition existing and that funds therefore were available. Whenin truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there wasno such position or item and no funds were available for said


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position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, norwas there any special ordinance creating said position andappropriating the necessary funds therefor.

x x x

[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offensecharged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found bythe Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975,Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan,Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of theMunicipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply foremployment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and herfriends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask

information if there was any vacancy. When she was informedthat there was, she went to see the accused in his house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her because heaccompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary,Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Evenso, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work thefollowing day and that she should be included in the budget.The accused then accompanied her to the Office of theMunicipal Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed thatshe could report for work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of theMunicipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to theaccused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary towork for her appointment papers.

She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in theOffice of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by theaccused.

x x x

Accompanying her appointment is the certification, amongothers, of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July

1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant tothe requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila(Exh. "C").

x x x

Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1,1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Hermonthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for themonths of July, August, September, October, November andDecember 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was not,

however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to theMunicipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told thatthere was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to seethe accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. Shewent to the treasurer who told her that there was no money.because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at

the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) informationregarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty.Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio askedher if she had complete appointment papers. hereafter, shefiled her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against theaccused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N.Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for themunicipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l",and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, theannual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, wasdeemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantillaof Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as thePlantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. Nosupplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of

Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemedre-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no newitem or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of theMunicipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new positionof clerk in the office of the Municipal Council appearing in theMunicipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975,

was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accusedwhen he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits"J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to theoffice of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, itwas already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A.Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held byMiss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused,but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l").

x x x

[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]

After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of publicdocument as charged in the information, the Court herebysentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty offrom FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAYof prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARSof prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREETHOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.


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SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordancewith law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed.Costs against the accused- appellant.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]

Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CAdecision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian.Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided aquestion of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudencewhen it affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting him ofthe crime of falsification despite the following

A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of

the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence ofcriminal intent on the part of the accused.

B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of hisposition as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedlyfalsified certification.

C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" isnot a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.

D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process oflaw when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence

despite a pending petition for change of venue with theSupreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]

Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public officer,employee or notary who, taking advantage of his officialposition, shall falsify a document by committing any of thefollowing acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in anarration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind offalsification, the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthfulstatements in a narration of facts;

(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of thefacts narrated by him; and

(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutelyfalse Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152SCRA 18.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar.Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of themunicipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthfulstatement in the narration of facts contained in the certificationwhich he issued in connection with the appointment ofcomplainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been

issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of hisoffice is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765(1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil ServiceCommissioner to whom the certification was addressedreceived the document issued by petitioner. Since thecertification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with thestandard forms prescribed by the government (specifically theCivil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certificationwas invested with the character of a public document [Peoplev. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)]falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of theRevised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document wascommitted when the petitioner stated that funds were availablefor the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed whenhe knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist andno funds had been appropriated therefor.

Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issuedcontained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law isnot meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the SolicitorGeneral's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:

Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at byany process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination offacts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to

the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161;Black's Law Dict., p. 362].

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that thecertification by the appellant that 'funds for the position areavailable' does not require the application of the artificial rulesof law. To certify that funds are available for the position whatone should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of

personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if suchitem exists and funds are allocated therefor.

In the present case, despite the presence of the records whichshows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to inthe certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data providedby the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position areavailable" [Rollo, p. 41).

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failedto enact the annual budget of the municipality for the FiscalYear 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the lastfiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D.No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2")accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of

Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is nosuch position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office


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of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which JesusaCarreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriationmade in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 forsuch position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in hiscertification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of thestatement made in the document is met when there exists not

even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in thenarration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in thiscase. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and thirdrequirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fullysatisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Underthe civil service rules and regulations, specificallythe Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original

Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of theavailability of funds for the position to be filled up is required tobe signed by the head of office or any officer who has beendelegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by lawto issue this certification which is designated as Civil ServiceForm No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligationto disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in saidcertification which includes information as to the availability ofthe funds for the position being filled up.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intentto injure a third person is not necessary when the falsifieddocument is a public document. This has already beenauthoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po GiokTo [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the aforementioned caseexplicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused

to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crimeof falsification of public document. The rationale for thisprincipal distinction between falsification of public and privatedocuments has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In thefalsification of public or official documents, whether by publicofficials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there bepresent the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person,for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed"[People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana,47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documentstherefore, the controlling consideration is the public character

of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused tothird persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damagebecomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra ].

Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidencefor the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on hispart must be denied. While this Court has declared good faithas a valid defense to falsification of public documents bymaking untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v.San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve toexonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has notclearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipalmayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of themunicipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised AdministrativeCode] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by themunicipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised AdministrativeCode]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget

for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of theMunicipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was theMunicipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for FiscalYear 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under theMunicipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there wereno funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipalsecretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the factthat he even affixed his signature in attestation to thecorrectness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V andMunicipal Plantilla of Personnel. [ See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2",Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith inissuing a certification of the availability of funds for thequestioned position since at the time he issued suchcertification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 hadalready commenced and no new ordinance creating the newposition to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had beenenacted by the municipal council.

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be heldcriminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely falsecertification as to the availability of funds for the subjectposition. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts toan untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a publicdocument [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminalintent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist onthe part of the person who executes an act which the lawpunishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v.

Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption thatpetitioner committed the act with criminal intention, whicharose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, standsunrebutted.

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he tookadvantage of his official position in falsifying the documentshould likewise be rejected. This essential element offalsification of a public document by public officer requires thatthe offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige orascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the

crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of publicoffice is considered present when the offender falsifies adocument in connection with the duties of his office whichconsist of either making or preparing or otherwise interveningin the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376(1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in thecase of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing thecertification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed bythe trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in theabsence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change


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of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. Acareful and thorough review of the record reveals thatpetitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court,in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances toenable the defense to present its evidence although theprosecution had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978.

[See Original Records, p. 253, et seq. ]

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to dueprocess is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack ofopportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence,this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether anaccused in a criminal case has been properly accorded dueprocess of law:

. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processesof law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, uponnotice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgmentawarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then hehas had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v.Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused isafforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but dueto his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings,the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted uponthe evidence presented by the prosecution. For under suchcircumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to

be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of theRevised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence onhis behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with theSupreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of thepetitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in thetrial court due to the pendency of the petition for change ofvenue, he also failed to appear [ See Order dated January 18,1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto,one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trialcourt that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for thereason that he has lost contact with the latter who already wentabroad [ See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial courtcannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solelyof the evidence presented by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity withlaw and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and theinstant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. VILLALON

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]

192 SCRA 521

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Pet i t ioner, vs. HON.FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO D

GUZMAN, Respond ents .

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO,J .:

Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order

rendered by Judge Manuel Castaeda on January 28, 1976dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court ofFirst Instance of Pangasinan, and the order rendered in thesame case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the hereinpublic respondent, denying petitioner's motion forreconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal.

Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant MarianoCarrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of aparcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley,Pangasinan, registered in their names under TransferCertificate of Title No. 47682.

On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a specialpower of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr.,naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawfulattorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondentmortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and TrustCompany in Dagupan City using the said special power ofattorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as aloan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power ofattorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in theRegistry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.:- nad

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and themortgage account not having been paid, the mortgagee bankforeclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon

Serafica and Vileta Quinto who were issued TransferCertificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January,1972, complainant allegedly discovered that their property wasalready registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica whenthe latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of theformer from the premises.

On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thrufalsification of a public document was filed against privaterespondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,the information reading as follows:


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"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City ofDagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, beingthen a private individual, after having in his possessionTransfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then and there,wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the signature

of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney,causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F.CARRERA, signed and affixed his signature in the said Powerof Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter offact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not inanyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave hispermission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification,with intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits, thesaid accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsifiedpublic document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securingthe loan from the People's Bank and Trust Company in theamount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS(P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the knowledge andconsent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage andprejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and otherconsequential damages." 2

After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty,the case proceeded to trial and the prosecution presentedcomplainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig fromthe Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province ofPangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, ahandwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the samewas not continued as counsel for private respondent moved forand was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.

On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed,wherein it was alleged that the crime charged would not lie dueto the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the effectthat he authorized private respondent to mortgage the saidone-half portion of the land owned by him and his brother. Saidpartial testimony of complainant was quoted, with theemphasized portions, as follows:

"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of yourproperty at present?

A Yes, sir, I know.

Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?

A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.

Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do youknow the reason why it was foreclosed by the Bank?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed bythe Bank?

A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrerawent to Manila and he asked me to sign a document as awitness and I asked him he interpreted that this is anauthorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the

Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, mybrother said.

Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrerawent to you in Manila and asked you to sign a power ofattorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-halfportion of that land owned by you and your brother. Do youhave any document to show that?

x x x

ATTY. DIAZ:

Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964if shown to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document whichis, your Honor, for the purpose of identification, and may werequest that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. Thisdocument consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the firstpage be marked as Exhibit B and the second page be markedas Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Courtwhat is this?

A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for meto sign, sir.

x x x

(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4

Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondentcontends that there is no sufficient basis for the charge andthis fact warrants the dismissal of the case.

Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribedsince more than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time thecrime was committed. Since the information charges thecomplex crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document,then the penalty shall be that for the more serious crime whichshall be applied in its maximum period, as provided for by

Article 48 of the Penal Code. The more serious crime in thepresent case is the falsification of the public document which ispunishable with prision correccional in its medium andmaximum period and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. Prisioncorreccional being a correctional penalty, the same prescribesin ten (10) years.

It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filedin the case merely alleged the date of the commission of thecrime which was February 5, 1964 and the information wasfiled only on March 29, 1974. This being the case, privaterespondent claims that more than ten (10) years has passedfrom the commission of the crime to the filing of theinformation. No other allegation having been made as to thediscovery of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed thatthe period of prescription commenced on the day on which thecrime was committed. He asserts that, from the date appearingin the transfer certificate of title covering the land mortgagedwith the bank, the mortgage documents were duly registeredwith the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13,


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1984, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge onthe same date. To support his theory, private respondent madethe following citation:

"The period of prescription commences to run from the date ofthe commission of the crime if it is known at the time of itscommission.:-cralaw

"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to bediscovered, because the entire series of transactions was bypublic instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafacommitted in connection with said transaction was known tothe offended party when it was committed and the period ofprescription commenced to run from the date of itscommission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50(The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, RevisedEdition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5

The prosecution countered that the testimony of MarianoCarrera shows that what was intended was an authority to

mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother andhe was only quoting what his brother told him when he saidthat ". . . this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get aloan from the bank on the half portion of the land whichbelongs to me, my brother said." 6

It further submitted that the information was not filed out of timesince the date to be considered should not be the date ofregistration of the alleged power of attorney on February 13,1964. It argued that the crime was actually discovered only inJanuary, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed an action to ejectcomplainant from the premises, which fact was not alleged inthe information because it was considered by the prosecutionas a mere evidentiary matter which would not be in accord withthe legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimatefacts and not evidentiary matters." 7

With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by privaterespondent, petitioner submits that "(t)he same has only apersuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretationof Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as the same is the soleprerogative of the Supreme Court." 8

As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castaeda ofthe Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III,dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that thecrime had prescribed. The People's motion for reconsiderationwas denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge FelicidadCarandang Villalon.

On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appealfrom both orders of the trial court. In a resolution dated May 13,1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a petition forreview on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440.9 Thereafter, said petition for review and the correspondingcomment and reply of the parties having been filed, onFebruary 21, 1977 the Court resolved to treat said petition as aspecial civil action and required petitioner and privaterespondent to submit their respective memoranda. 10

From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with theresolution of the following issues:

1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissalbecause the private respondent would thereby be placed indouble jeopardy;

2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a publicdocument filed against the private respondent has sufficientground to exist in law and in fact; and,

3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminalcase is already extinguished by prescription. 11

The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the presentrecourse. As enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila,etc., et al.:

"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the caseafter arraignment and plea of the defendant to a validinformation shall be a bar to another prosecution for the

offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same orfrustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarilyincludes or is necessarily included in the complaint orinformation (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by theprosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case)by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) thedismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, ofthe defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal orbased upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits ofthe case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by theappellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal befound incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to thecourt of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or

innocence of the defendant." 12On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsificationof a public document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and inlaw, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a publicdocument may be a means of committing estafa becausebefore the falsified document is actually utilized to defraudanother, the crime of falsification has already beenconsummated, damage or intent to cause damage not beingan element of the crime of falsification of public, official orcommercial documents. The damage to another is caused bythe commission of estafa, not by the falsification of thedocument, hence, the falsification of the public, official orcommercial document is only a necessary means to committhe estafa. 13

Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by thefact that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-halfportion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertainingto complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quotedhis brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the findings ofpublic respondent are substantially the same. We agree thatthe offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explainedin the findings of the court below:

"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partialtestimony of complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record,


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as regards the first ground, the court finds that the contentionof the defense that the authorization given to him to mortgagethe whole property is not sustained by the evidence because acursory study of the answer made by the witness complainantclearly shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was theone-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera,

excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N..pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other words, thealleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get aloan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred tothe share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on thefollowing quoted answer:

'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is anauthorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from thebank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, mybrother said.'

Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quotedtestimony. He merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera towhom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, asquoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `whichbelongs to you.'" 14

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency ofthe charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document, theresolution of the issue on prescription is, however,determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of publicrespondent.: nad

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penaltyfor a complex crime is that for the most serious componentoffense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In thecrime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the moreserious crime is the falsification which carries with it thecorrectional penalty of prision correccional in its medium andmaximum periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposedby Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable by correctionalpenalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 ofthe Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptiveperiod commences to run "from the day on which the crime isdiscovered by the offended party, the authorities, or theiragents . . ."

The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarizedspecial power of attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds ofDagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private

respondent to mortgage a parcel of land covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loan ofP8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company. Theinformation for estafa thru falsification of a public documentwas filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claimthat the ten-year period commenced when complainantsupposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972 by reasonof the ejectment suit against him.

People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well establishedrule that registration in a public registry is a notice to the wholeworld. The record is constructive notice of its contents as wellas all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All

persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. Onthese considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs.Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that in the crime offalsification of a public document the prescriptive periodcommences from the time the offended party had constructivenotice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered

with the Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.

It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 ininterpreting the phrase "from the discovery" found in Article1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case ofmistake or fraud, within four years from the time of thediscovery of the same, the Court also held that the discoverymust be reckoned to have taken place from the time thedocument was registered in the Register of Deeds, for thefamiliar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole worldand this should apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad

We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that theapplication of said rule on constructive notice in theinterpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code wouldmost certainly be favorable to private respondent herein, sincethe prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckonedwith earlier, that is, from the time the questioned documentswere recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved wasregistered on February 13, 1964. The criminal informationagainst private respondent having been filed only on March 29,1974, or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime withwhich private respondent was charged has indubitablyprescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack ofmerit and the challenged orders of public respondent are

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


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US v. CAPULE


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7447 January 2, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.NICASIO CAPULE, defendant-appellant.

Luciano de la Rosa, for appellant. Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

TORRES, J . :

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of convictionrendered in this case by the Honorable Vicente Jocson, judge.

On September 2, 1903, Nicasio Capule, for the purpose ofappropriating to himself a tract of coconut land, situated in thetown of San Pablo, Laguna, without the knowledge or consentof the owners thereof, the married couple Aniceto Maghirangand Isabel Pili, by agreement and cooperation with the notarypublic, Inocente Martinez, who later died, prepared and drewup a document setting forth the sale in his favor of the saidland, pretending that it was made and executed by the said

owners of the tract, stating in the document that they had madethe declaration that they had sold said land for the sum of 550pesos paid at the time of the sale to the vendors, and JacintoPeaflor and Jorge Tolentino appear in said document aswitnesses of the execution thereof; and Eulogio Ortega andDoroteo Guia as the signers of the deed of sale, because thealleged vendors did not know how to do so. Recorded at thebottom of the document was their ratification of its contents inthe presence of said notary, before whom the said marriedcouple appeared. The defendant Capule exhibited saiddocument later, although he had been assured that it wasfalse, in a trial before the justice of the peace of that town inthe attempt to sustain his alleged right to the said piece of land.

For this reason a complaint was filed on February 3, 1910, bythe provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Laguna,charging Nicasio Capule with the crimes of falsification of apublic document and estafa . After due trial the judge rendered

judgment therein on March 21, 1911, sentencing NicasioCapule to the penalty of eight years of presidio mayor , topayment of a fine of 2,000 pesetas , the accessories, and thecosts; from which judgment the defendant appealed.

The document whose falsification is here in question, Exhibit A,the original whereof appears at pages 17 and 148 of the file

exhibits and has been attached to the complaint, seems tohave been executed on September 2, 1903, by AnicetoMaghirang y Espiritu and Isabel Pili y Emnaceno, of legal age,residents of San Pablo, who declare therein that they haveagreed with the accused Capule on the real and absolute saleof a piece of land planted with 42 fruit-bearing coconut trees

and approximately 300 not bearing fruit, for the sum of P550,which the purchaser has paid them to their entire satisfaction,which land is located in the place called Quinayoan, barrio ofDolores of the said town, with its boundaries and situationstated; and further setting forth that the land is the property ofIsabel Pili, who acquired it by inheritance from her deceasedniece, Claudia Reyes, according to a certified copy of someaffidavit proceedings; that the land described had not beensold, ceded or encumbered in favor of any person other thanNicasio Capule, to whom then and thenceforth they deliveredthe possession and usufruct of said land as its legitimateowner, with right to alienate it, they being responsible toCapule, his heirs and successors in interest for the ownership,and agreeing to defend him against any just claims that mightbe presented; and Nicasio Capule y Capitulo, informed of thecontents of the document by the vendor married couple,accepted it on his part; and as the vendors do not know how tosign Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia do so at their request,as does also the purchaser, who signs the document induplicate and to the same effect in the town hall of San Pablo,and there furthermore appear therein the signatures of JacintoPeaflor and Jorge Tolentino as witnesses. On the same dateappears the certificate of the notary public, whose commissionextended to January 1, 1905, wherein it is recorded thatpersonally appeared before him the married couple Maghirangand Pili, whom he knew as the executors of the foregoingdocument and they ratified it as executed of their own free will,the husband, as well as the purchaser, exhibiting his cedula,but not the woman because she was exempt from paymentthereof.

It likewise appears from the evidence adduced in this case thatsaid married couple Maghirang and Pili were the owners ofsaid land, which they possessed and had the usufruct of andfor which they paid to the Government the corresponding landtax; that on January 31, 1904, said married couple sold aportion of said land with 150 coconut trees to Esteban Reyesand his wife Elisea Maghirang for 250 pesos, according to

Exhibit B, and since then Reyes has possessed and had theusufruct of the portion of land he had bought, and madedeclaration before the land-tax board in May, 1906, as of landbelonging to him, according to Exhibit E, which sale wasratified by the vendors in favor of Reyes before the notarySegundo Abrera on May 2, 1908, Exhibit C.

On May 2, 1908, the married couple Aniceto Maghirang andIsabel Pili likewise sold the remaining portion of the said landwith its coconut trees to Melecio Brias for the sum of 650pesos, before the notary public Segundo Abrera, according toExhibit J, and since then Brias has possessed and had the


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usufruct of the land purchased, although in the tax list the tractcontinues in the name of the vendor, who had madedeclaration in May, 1906, Exhibit K, and had been paying thetax from 1903, Exhibit P, although Reyes, the owner of onepart which he had bought in 1904, appears to have paid the taxup to 1910, Exhibit F.

Although Esteban Reyes was in lawful possession of a portionof the land he had purchased, on February 2, 1909, NicasioCapule filed a complaint before the justice of the peace of SanPablo accusing him of the theft of coconuts from the land hepossessed and of which Reyes was the owner; but the courtdismissed the case for lack of evidence of the right alleged bythe plaintiff, with the costs against him, Exhibit D, page 17 ofthe record.

On April 16, 1909, Nicasio Capule, claiming to be the owner ofthe coconut land situated in Dolores, the subject matter of analleged sale, accused the married couple Maghirang and Piliand Eusebio Soriano of theft, and in spite of the fact that heexhibited the document marked "Exhibit A", setting forth thesaid sale made in his favor by that married couple, the justiceof the peace acquitted the accused of the crime of theft, Exhibit1, page 67; and on June 4, 1909, according to Exhibit I, page107 of said record, Aniceto Maghirang and Guadalupe Javierwere also acquitted of the crime of coercion with which theywere accused.

On October 21, 1909, Nicasio Capule and his wife wereaccused by Nemesio Brias of the crime of theft in the justiceof the peace court of San Pablo and upon trial were sentenced

to two months of arresto mayor and payment of P14.25 withthe costs, from which judgment they appealed to the Court ofFirst Instance, page 54 of the record, although at the request ofthe fiscal the case was dismissed, because the actionexercised by the complainant had to be settled in a civil suit.

Although Capule presented, in some of the said hearingsbefore the justice of the peace court of San Pablo, the deed ofsale, Exhibit A, for the purpose of proving that he was theowner of the land in question, yet in the judgments renderedtherein said instrument was held to be false and no probativevalue whatever was attached to it.

Aniceto Maghirang denies that he sold the said land to NicasioCapule or that he executed in his favor any document of sale,stating that he had conferred a power of attorney upon him sothat he might represent himself and his wife, who later died, ina suit they had with Maximino Reyes, because of the absoluteconfidence they had in the defendant, just as it was the latterhimself who drew up the document that was later signed in hisstead by Eulogio Ortega, because he could not read or write;but he denied that he or his wife had ever been in the house ofthe notary Inocente Martinez to execute or ratify any documentor that he and his wife Isabel Pili, when she was alive, had told

the defendant Capule that they wished to sell the said land andthat he had offered to buy it.

Nicasio Capule avers that the said document, Exhibit A, wasdrawn up in his own house in the presence of the marriedcouple, Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili, for whom he had totranslate the contents of the document into Tagalog, and theythen signified their agreement; and as they could not sign,Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia did so in their stead, and atthat time Jacinto Peaflor and Jorge Tolentino, also signed itas witnesses; and that on the afternoon of that day the marriedcouple Maghirang and Pili appeared in the house of the notaryMartinez and ratified before him the said document in thepresence of the witness testifying; all of which AnicetoMaghirang denies, asserting that he did not execute saiddocument, or ratify it before the notary Martinez, for he hadnever been in the latter's house nor had he ever seen thedocument, Exhibit `A. His wife, Isabel Pili, did not testify, forshe had died in the meantime.

Let us examine the statements of the persons who appear tohave signed the document, impugned as false, in place of themarried couple executing it, and one of the witnesses to theexecution of the said document, for it does not appear that theother, Jorge Tolentino, testified.

Upon making his statement and after having been informed ofthe contents of the document, Exhibit A, Doroteo Guia deniedthat he had been present in the drawing up and executionthereof, or that he had ever known that the married couple

Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili had sold any land to the

defendant, Nicasio Capule, although he remembered that on acertain occasion said married couple had asked him to sign forthem in the defendant Capules's house a document of powerof attorney made out in Capule's favor, so that the latter mightrepresent them in a suit they were prosecuting againstMaximino Reyes, and believing that it was in fact a question ofa power of attorney, as they had assured him, went to thedefendant's house and without informing himself of thecontents of the document that Capule spread out on a table,signed it, but he denies that Eulogio Ortega, Jacinto Peaflor,and Jorge Tolentino with whom he was acquainted, werepresent in that house.

Eulogio Ortega likewise denied that he signed any document ofsale of land or that he had ever been informed that the marriedcouple Maghirang and Pili had sold any land to the defendantNicasio Capule, although he remembers that one day aboutseven years ago Nicasio Capule and Isabel Pili came to hishouse and the latter told him that as she did not know how towrite she begged him to do the favor of signing in her stead apower of attorney, whereupon the defendant told him that ashe did not know Spanish the contents of said document wouldbe translated to him so that he might understand them, statingat the same time that a power of attorney was conferred uponhim, Capule, by Aniceto Maghirang and Isabel Pili in the suit


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against Maximino Reyes, the attorney thus authorizedresponding for its result, without the necessity for theintervention of the married couple granting the power; and thatafter being informed of the of the contents of the documentpresented to him he signed it, and he asserts that saiddocument is Exhibit A; that on that occasion Doroteo Guia,

Jacinto Peaflor, and Jorge Tolentino were not present; andthat one Sunday, when he was passing a tienda with JorgeTolentino and Domingo Capuno, the defendant Capule, whowas there, called to him and after offering them wine told himthat they should understand each other for that documentwhich he, Capule, had said was a power of attorney was reallya deed of sale executed in his favor by Aniceto Maghirang andin case of winning the suit Capule would give him P200.

Jacinto Peaflor, who figures in said document as a witness,having the same before him, stated that the signature whichappears therein with his name and surname looks like his, buthe could not assert definitely whether such signature was hisor not, for he does not remember having signed such adocument in the presence of the married couple Maghirangand Pili and the individuals Eulogio Ortega, Doroteo Guia, andJorge Tolentino, setting forth the sale of a tract of lands toNicasio Capule, and that he did not recognize the signatures ofDoroteo Guia and Eulogio Ortega.

From the result of taking these statements and the conduct ofthe accused together, it is logically inferred that after preparingthe document, Exhibit A, he tried by all the means he thoughtexpedient to assert his ownership of the land which, under analleged title of acquisition, had come to be his property and to

that end he tried to dispose of the products of the young treesthat there were on the tract, even daring to trample upon thelegitimate rights of its original owners and of the new ones whohad later acquired it, up to the point of accusing them asperpetrators of crimes directed against his pretended and falseright of ownership, which he claimed to have acquired throughthe said false instrument.

Believing that with the document, Exhibit A, he could get thecourts to override the true owners of the land, which hepretended its original owners had sold, in the variouscomplaints he presented before the justice of the peace of SanPablo against the offended alleged owners and one of the new

owners who acquired part of the land in question, as well aswhen he was accused of theft by the owner of the remainingpart of the tract, the defendant dared to assert that he was theowner thereof and of the coconut trees growing thereon, evento the point of exhibiting said false instrument, but in spite ofhis allegations and his documentary evidence the personsaccused by him were acquitted, while Capule himself wasconvicted of theft of coconuts on a complaint of one of theowners of said land. The notary, Inocente Martinez, was notexamined, for he had died in the meantime.

It therefore appears to be plainly proven that the crime offalsification of a document has been committed, and while itmay not be public still it is of an official or notarial character,provided for and penalized in articles 300 and 301, becausethe defendant executed upon said notarial document of anofficial character acts constituting falsification, by counterfeiting

therein the intervention of the married couple AnicetoMaghirang and Isabel Pili, to whom he ascribed statementsdifferent from what they had made to him and by perverting thetruth in the narration of facts, getting two persons to sign in thename of said married couple through deceit, after giving themto understand that the document contained a commission orpower of attorney, when in fact it was a deed of sale of a pieceof land, the legitimate owners whereof had never intended orconsented to its alienation.

None of the persons who appear to have signed saiddocument and seem to have been present at its executionwere informed of its true contents, because they all confidedwith the greatest good faith in the false and deceitfulstatements of the defendant, believing what he said to theeffect that said instrument was a commission voluntarilyconferred upon him by the couple executing it, who neverintended to execute any document of sale of their property tothe defendant, who went to the extreme of getting a notary tocertify to its ratification before him, made apparently by thealleged vendors in the contents of the said false document.

The fact that the married couple Maghirang and Pili did notknow how to read and write certainly reveals great ignoranceand lack of culture in them, but when they got to be

landowners and acquired property of some value, they cannotbe absolutely denied the ability to distinguish a deed of salefrom a power of attorney, because they have demonstratedwell enough that they understood their purpose to be that thedefendant should represent them in a suit pending in a courtand that they had never intended or executed any fact for thealienation of a tract of land belonging to them in favor of thedefendant, and it is therefore unquestionable that he tookadvantage of the opportunity when he was to have executed adocument or instrument of power of attorney, which themarried couple desired, to draw up maliciously and deceitfullya deed of sale in his favor, deceiving the alleged vendors andthe two persons who signed for them and making them believe

that the document executed was a power of attorney orcommission, when it fact it was a deed of sale and is theExhibit A, wherein, if he did not forge the signatures of the twowitnesses Peaflor and Tolentino, he must have obtained themin an equally deceitful way.

If it were true that the vendors had really alienated theircoconut land to the defendant, their continuing to pay the landtax is unexplained. In January, 1904, a part of said land with itscoconut trees was sold to Esteban Reyes and in May, 1908,the rest of the tract was sold to Melecio Brias. Persons sosimple, even ignorant and of little culture, as the offended


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parties, would not have dared to sell successively to two oftheir neighbors in two portions the said land, if it had been infact already sold to the defendant Capule; while the latter, byprofession a clerk and acting as such for the notary Martinez,who made sworn statements before the assessment board andpaid the land tax for the year 1906, never complied with these

obligations of landowner in connection with the land which,according to Exhibit A, he had acquired on September 2, 1903,yet on the other hand it does not appear why he did not enterin possession of the tract if he had really bought it inSeptember of that year, which indicates that although he daredto draw up a false document with the connivance of the notary,his boldness did not prevail to the extent of depriving in a frankand open manner its legitimate owners of the possession ofthe land by appealing to the courts to assert his right, providedhe was sure that it was legitimate.

Although under article 535 of the Penal Code those whocommit fraud by causing another to subscribe a document bythe use of deceit, as the defendant has done, incur, accordingto paragraph 7 thereof, the penalties set forth in the precedingarticle; still when as in the present case the crime offalsification was committed for the purpose of getting a piece ofreal property, which is the profit its perpetrator sought toobtain, he is regarded as duly punished as guilty of falsificationof a notarial document, in which crime fraud or estafa is held tobe included, with the penalties indicated in said article 301 ofthe Code.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that the marriedcouple Maghirang and Pili had positively sold him the land to

which Exhibit A refers for the sum of P500 which he forthwithdelivered to them, Eulogio Ortega and Doroteo Guia and twoother eyewitnesses to the execution of the document havingsigned the instrument which he drew up in his house in thepresence of all of them, and that it was he who drew up thecertificate of ratification authorized by the notary andinterpreted the contents of the document with its ratificationbefore the notary to the vendors, who really did not know orunderstand Spanish, on the afternoon of the same date onwhich said instrument was drawn up; further stating thatimmediately afterwards he took possession, in the same monthof September, 1903, of the land he had bought and from thattime on picked the fruit the coconut trees produced, although

he was disturbed in his possession by the vendors themselvesand the neighbors Esteban Reyes and Melecio Brias; that itwas true that he had not in 1906 made any declaration ofownership of said land, as is ordered for the purposes ofassessment, but he paid the land tax for that time by deliveringthe money to Isabel Pili, although he did not know whether thereceipts had been made out in her name. The defendant, whois a person of more education and knowledge than theoffended parties, even alleged other defenses which were inlike manner as those stated completely unsupported.

He tried to prove that in January, 1906, he sold said landunder pacto de retro for two years to Andres Borja, whopossessed it during those two years, although the allegedpurchaser Borja said that only a private document was madeout for the sale nor did he require of the defendant anyprevious document of ownership to evidence the defendant's

right to the land sold, which private document was notexhibited in the case and no proof was adduced to showBorja's possession of the land sold to him; and what is strangerstill is that in the declaration of ownership of the land, Exhibit K,page 116, presented by the offended party Aniceto Maghirangin May of the same year, 1906, the alleged Andres Borjaappears to have signed as a witness, attesting that the landwas Aniceto Maghirang's and thus Andres Borja signs at page87 of his statement, in spite of the alleged previous purchase,nor does it appear that the defendant redeemed the tract.

An attempt was also made to prove that in November, 1908,the defendant Capule sold the same land absolutely toMarcelino Capiria with another tract, which is set forth in thedocument, Exhibit B, ratified before a notary, for the sum ofP2,500, and the purchaser forthwith took possession of thelands sold. If this absolute sale is true it is incomprehensiblewhy the purchaser Capiria did not ever attempt to enter intopossession of the land in question sold to him in November,1908, on which date the original owners, Maghirang and Pili,had already got rid of said land, having sold a part thereof toEsteban Reyes on January 31, 1904, and the remainder onMay 2, 1908, to Melecio Brias. These new owners tookpossession from that time on of the respective portions of theland they had acquired, nor does it all appear in the case thatthe purchaser Capiria asked the alleged vendor to makedelivery of the land sold to him, or that he ever appealed in anyway to the courts. Moreover, in presenting his complaints yearslater against the married couple Maghirang and Pili and others,the defendant Capule did so in the capacity of owner of thatvery land, so it is not true that he had previously sold it to thesaid Capiria.

These two alleged sales to Borja and Capiria were ways andmeans chosen by the defendant to see if he could effectuallydeprive the married couple Maghirang and Pili of their right tothe land in question, since at that time he did not yet dare toexhibit the false instrument he had maliciously and fraudulently

drawn up and he did not secure from said document the resultshe expected and intended to become the owner of the land bymeans of a false instrument.

Likewise the alleged transaction that he says Eulogio Ortegaproposed to him to allow rescission of the alleged sale in thedocument, Exhibit A, through return of the price by thevendors, a transaction proposed, according to the accused andhis witness Silvestre Capiria, one day in the month of July,1909, is in every way unlikely to have been made in the nameof Aniceto Maghirang, because the land had already been soldsome years before to Esteban Reyes and Melecio Brias, and


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therefore the offended party could not get Ortega to talk withthe defendant to propose said transaction for the return of apiece of land that had never been sold to him but to the saidReyes and Brias in 1904 and 1908, and in 1909 he no longerhad any interest or right in the land in question, aside from thefact that he has not proved that the offended party Maghirang

ever intrusted such a commission to Eulogio Ortega orauthorized him to make the proposition. Eulogio Ortega deniedhaving interviewed the defendant Capule on behalf of AnicetoMaghirang. Such allegations are nothing more than ingeniousquibbles and tricks invented by the defendant's counsel to savehim from the punishment he deserves as the provenperpetrator of the crime of falsification.

Starting from the hypothesis that the defendant really obtainedin a fraudulent and deceitful manner the consent of the marriedcouple Maghirang and Pili to the execution of said falseinstrument, his counsel argues that still he was not guilty of thecrime of falsification of a public document, in accordance withthe finding of this court in the decision of the case againstGeronimo Milla (4 Phil. Rep., 391), wherein the followingprinciple was laid down:

The fact that one's consent to a contract may be obtained bymistake, violence, intimidation, or fraud does not make thecontract a false contract, and therefore a person who hasobtained such contract by those means, whatever be the crimehe may be guilty of, is not guilty of the crime of falsificationeither of a public or of a private document.

This was the question of a contract wherein the offended

parties gave their consent to the execution of the documentthat was later impugned as false, although this consent wasobtained through intimidation which the defendants in thatcase, Juan Cardona and Geronimo Milla, had used upon them,and for this reason the court, in view of the fact that thecontracting parties consented to the terms of the instrument,could not find that there was falsification in the statement of thefacts, according to article 300 of the Penal Code, merelybecause the consent had been secured through intimidation.

As has been seen, there was no contract in the present case,nor any consent to the contract pretended to have beenstipulated in the instrument, Exhibit A, wherein the defendantentered statements ascribed to the alleged vendors, whoproposed and intended to execute an instrument ofcommission or power of attorney in favor of the defendant, butnot a deed of sale, as in bad faith and with evidentperverseness the defendant did, perverting the truth in thestatement of facts and ascribing to the offended partiesstatements different from those they made to him in thecounterfeited document, since the statements set forth thereinwere not characteristic and constitutive of an instrument ofpower of attorney in his favor in order that he might representthem in a suit against Maximino Reyes.

Finally, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United Statesin the case of Weems vs. U.S. (217 U.S., 349) is vainlyinvoked, for Nicasio Capule is not a public officer and,moreover, as he is accused of the crime of falsification of anotarial document of official character equivalent to a publicdocument the principle laid down in said decision is totally

inapplicable in his favor. The defendant Capule does not comewithin the purview of article 300 of the Penal Code, but of 301,which fixes the penalty, not of cadena temporal but of presidiomayor ; further keeping in mind that the act of falsification of apublic document in itself constitutes a crime, morally andlegally punishable, even though to date the penal law withrespect to falsification of a public document committed bypublic officers, in lieu of said article 300 of the code, has notyet been promulgated; but article 301, applicable to the presentcase, has not been repealed and subsists in all its force.

The concurrence of neither extenuating nor aggravatingcircumstances can be found in the commission of the crime,and therefore the penalty fixed in said article 301 of the codemust be imposed in its medium degree.

For these reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from are found to be refuted, we hold that itshould be affirmed; provided, however, that Nicasio Capule besentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day of presidiomayor , to the accessories fixed in article 57 of the code, to thepayment of a fine of 5,000 pesetas , without subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency, according to article 51;and to the costs in the case. So ordered.


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PEOPLE v. MANANSALA


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38948 November 18, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.TOMAS MANANSALA, ET AL., defendants.GALICANO ALON and RICARDO CABRALES, appellants.

Roman Gesmundo for appellants.Office of the Solicitor-General for appellee.

VICKERS,J .:

The appellants Galicano Alon ( alias Grego), and RicardoCabrales ( alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala,Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza, were prosecuted in theCourt of First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa ,committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of February, 1932, in themunicipalities of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal, withintwo and a half miles from the city limits and within the

jurisdiction of this court, and in the City of Manila proper,Philippine Islands, the said accused conspiring andconfederating together and helping one another, did then andthere wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud one Perfecto

Abordo in the following manner, to wit: the said accused bymeans of false and fraudulent representations which maymade to the said Perfecto Abordo to the effect that they had forsale six hundred (600) tins of opium, a prohibited drug, andthat they would deliver the same to him upon paying themP600 in advance and by means of other similar deceit, inducedthe said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to them, as in facthe gave and delivered to them, the said sum of P600, inconsideration of which the accused gave him a gasoline canwhich they represented to contain the 600 tins of opium, whenin truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, the said cancontained only six small tin cans containing a black substancewhich was not opium, the accused thereby wilfully, unlawfully,and feloniously defrauding the said Perfecto Abordo in the sumof P600 to his damage and prejudice in said amount.

That the accused Tomas Manansala y Velasco and Galicano Alon y Ponce ( alias Grego) have each once been convicted ofthe crime of estafa ; and the accused Ricardo Cabrales y

Pelorina ( alias Maning) and Isidro Mendoza y Santos Sollo arehabitual delinquents, the first having been convicted once forrobbery, once for theft and three times for estafa , havingserved his last sentence on February 4, 1927, and the secondhaving been convicted one of estafa and once of robbery,having served his last sentenced on October 30, 1922, all of

said convictions having been rendered by virtue of final judgments of competent courts.

After the prosecution had rested, the information wasdismissed as to the defendants Tomas Manansala, GenerosoJacinto, and Isidro Mendoza for lack of evidence to show thatthey had taken part in the commission of the crime. Upon thetermination of the trial, Judge Pedro Concepcion found thedefendants Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales guiltyof estafa , in accordance with the provisions of article 354, No.2, of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3244, andsentenced each of them to suffer four months and one dayof arresto mayor , with the accessory penalties prescribed bylaw, to indemnify the offended party, Perfecto Abordo, in thesum of P600, with subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency, and to pay the proportionate part of the costs.

The trial judge's findings as to the facts as follows:

With respect to the other accused, Galicano Alon and RicardoCabrales, the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently showsthat about a week prior to February 19, 1932, the former whogave his name as "Grego" and the latter known by the name of"Maning" in company with another person whom they called"Pepe" offered to sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of

opium at P1.50 each telling him that he could sell them for P10a tin. Tempted with the prospect of an enormous profit, Mr.Perfecto Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and theaccused agreed to sell it to him in lots of 1,000 tins at P600 lot.It was agreed that the delivery of P1,000 tins would take placeat P5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and VitoCruz within the jurisdiction of this city. Attorney Perfecto

Abordo accordingly went to the place indicated with the money,and there waited for them. The accused Galicano Alon arrivedalone in an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to theplace where the 1,00 tins of opium were kept. trustingGallicano Alon, who always called Abordo "brother" becausehe claimed to be a Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter went with

him in his automobile to the rotunda of Rizal AvenueExtension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel. It wasalready twilight when they arrived at the rotunda, and therethey met Maning, or the accused Ricardo Cabrales, who, incompany with others, was waiting for Abordo in anotherautomobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortlythereafter appeared Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to getthe tins of opium. Pepe got from a lot nearby the can Exhibit A,the top of which was ordered by Cabrales in order to show

Abordo the six tins of opium contained in a wooden box,Exhibit B, which Abordo saw when the top of said Exhibit Awas opened. Finding that said tins really contained opium,


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Abordo believed that the rest of the contents of the can alsoconsisted of tins of opium. He handed the six hundred pesos toManing, who, after receiving the money, immediately went tothe automobile where his companions were waiting. At thesame time Abordo returned to his car with the accusedGalicano Alon and the person named Pepe, carrying the can.

While proceeding towards Taft Avenue Extension Abordonoticed that the accused Cabrales was following in hisautomobile, and that when they were nearing the corner of Taft

Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which Cabrales wasriding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Galicano Alontold Attorney Abordo that those in the other automobile wereconstabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the canExhibit A. The accused Cabrales, whom Attorney Abordo wasable to recognize very well, and the companions of the formerwhom Abordo was not able to identify because it was alreadydark, approached his car saying that they were constabularyagents and told Abordo that he was under arrest. Knowing thatthey were not constabulary agents and that their purpose wasto get possession of the can Exhibit A, Abordo drew hisrevolver and ordered his chauffeur to proceed. Cabrales andhis companions again followed him in their car and for thesecond time tried to head off Abordo somewhere before theintersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but Abordoproceeded until he arrived at his house. There he opened thecan Exhibit A and inside he found the wooden box Exhibit B,but the rest of the contents of the can was sand. He bore ahole in one of the tins and found that it only containedmolasses.

The accused tried to give, by their testimony and that of MiguelRosales, who had been convicted twelve times of estafa , along story to the effect that Abordo engaged the accusedCabrales, through the intervention of Miguel Rosales, toprepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling tins of opium, thaton the afternoon agreed upon for the payment of the value ofsaid tins, Abordo refused to deliver the money on the pretextthat the purchaser of said tins had not arrived, and invited theaccused to his house in Pasay in order to make the paymentinasmuch as they insisted upon collecting from him; but beforearriving in Pasay Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile andrequired the latter to hand over the money, at the same timeplacing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which hesaid contained the 1,000 tins of molasses asked for by Abordo.

It is hardly necessary to state that this story is a sheerfabrication.

The attorney for the appellants makes the followingassignments of error:

I. El Juzgado incurrio en error al declarar que las pruebasdemuestran que Ricardo Cabrales y Galicano Alon, encompaia de otro individuo llamado "Pepe", vendieron alabogado Perfecto Abordo mil latas de opio falsificado por elprecio de P600.

II. El Juzgado incurrio en eror al no declarar que el supuestoofendido, Perfecto Abordo, por medio de Miguel Rosales,encomendo a Ricardo Cabrales la confeccion de mil latas deopio al precio de P0.60 cada lata poniendo como contenidomelaza, para venderlas como opio legitimo.

III. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no declarar que aun en elsupuesto de que realidad Ricardo Cabrales vendio a Perfecto

Abordo dichas mil latas de opio por el precio de P600, elacusado Galicano Alon nada tiene que ver con dicha venta.

IV. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no absolver a los acusadosapelantes, apreciando cuando menos en favor de los mismosy sobre todo en favor del apelante Galicano Alon, el beneficiode la duda racional.

The assignments of error raise only questions of fact,depending on the credibility of the witnesses. No reason has

been adduced that would justify us in disturbing the findings ofthe trial judge. As to the contention of the appellants, the trial judge found it to be a mere fabrication and worthy of no credit.The witnesses for the defense were Miguel Rosales and theappellants themselves. The evidence shows that MiguelRosales had been convicted of the falsification of commercialdocuments in twelve cases. The appellant Galicano Alon hadbeen convicted of estafa , and the other appellant, RicardoCabrales, had been convicted once of robbery, once of theft,and three times of estafa . The trial judge was fully justified indisbelieving the improbable story of said witnesses.

The crime committed by the appellants is that of estafa as

defined in article 315, paragraph 1 ( a ) of the Revised PenalCode, which provides that any person who shall defraudanother through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence byaltering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of valuewhich the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to doso, even though such obligation be based on an immoral orillegal consideration. The amount of the fraud being P600, thepenalty applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period toprison correccional in its minimum period, and it appearing thatthe appellant Galicano Alon has already been convictedof estafa , he is therefore a recidivist, and the penalty applicableto him should be imposed in the maximum degree.

It was alleged in the information that Ricardo Cabrales was ahabitual delinquent because he had been convicted once ofrobbery, once of theft, and three times of estafa , and that thelast penalty for estafa was extinguished by him on February 4,1927. These prior convictions were admitted by him in opencourt. He is therefore a habitual delinquent, but his priorconvictions can not be taken into consideration also as anaggravating circumstance for the purpose of increasing theprincipal penalty, which should therefore be imposed in themedium degree.


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As the additional penalty, the Solicitor-General recommendsthe medium degree of prision mayor in its minimum andmedium periods, or from six years and one day to seven yearsand four months. This is erroneous. It is apparently basedupon the mistaken idea that only the prior convictions of thisappellant for estafa are to be taken into account. The correct

interpretation of the law is that all prior convictions of any of thecrimes of theft, robbery, estafa , or falsification should be takeninto account when a person is convicted of any one of thesecrimes and of being habitual delinquent. To hold otherwise, aperson might be twice convicted of each of these four crimes,and still not be a habitual delinquent.

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant Galicano Alon issentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and one dayof prision correccional , and the appellant Ricardo Cabrales issentenced to suffer one year and one day of prisioncorreccional , and said defendants are jointly and severallysentenced to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P600,with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency. The appellant Ricardo Cabrales having beenpreviously convicted five times of theft, robbery, or estafa , he issentenced as a habitual delinquent to suffer an additionalpenalty of eleven years, six months, and twenty-one daysof prision mayor .

As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, withthe costs against the appellants.

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT

US v. CASTILLO


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 2829 September 19, 1906

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

PIO CASTILLO, defendant-appellant.

T.L. Hartigan, for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General, Araneta, for appellee.

CARSON, J .:

It was proven at the trial of the case on the morning of

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